RIS 2007-14, Fingerprinting Requirements for Licensees Implementing the Increased Control Order

Fingerprinting Requirements for Licensees Implementing the Increased Control Order

ML071500056
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/05/2007
From:	Schlueter J R NRC/FSME/DMSSA
To:
References
SRM-SECY-07-0011 RIS-07-014
Download: ML071500056 (10)

UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF FEDERAL AND STATE MATERIALS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PROGRAMSWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555June 5, 2007NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2007-14FINGERPRINTING REQUIREMENTS FOR LICENSEES

IMPLEMENTING THE INCREASED CONTROL ORDER

ADDRESSEES

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensees that have received the IncreasedControls (IC) requirements. All Agreement State Radiation Control Program Directors and StateLiaison Officers.

INTENT

The NRC is issuing this regulatory issue summary (RIS) to inform addressees that in Fall 2007,the NRC will issue additional Orders to licensees that have received the IC requirements. The Orders will require fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records check for individuals that have or will have unescorted access toradioactive material in quantities of concern. No specific action or written response is requiredat this time.Agreement States will be taking similar actions through the issuance of Orders or other legallybinding requirements to their IC licensees.

BACKGROUND

Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), several national andinternational efforts were underway to address the potentially significant health and safety hazards posed by uncontrolled sources. Following 9/11, it was recognized that these efforts should focus on efforts to deter unauthorized access to radioactive material for the purpose of malicious acts.In 2005, NRC and the Agreement States issued IC Orders or other legally binding requirementsto licensees [70 Federal Register 72128, December 1, 2005]. The purpose of the ICs for radioactive sources is to enhance control of certain radioactive material in quantities of concern to reduce the risk of unauthorized use, in order to prevent unintended radiation exposure and to prevent malicious acts that would be detrimental to public health and safety. Enclosure 1 identifies these radionuclides and their quantities of concern.On March 12, 2007, the Commission directed staff to develop a plan to require fingerprinting forIC licensees under the NRC's authority to protect the public health and safety. Enclosure 2 contains Staff Requirements Memorandum SECY-07-0011, directing the development of fingerprinting requirements. IC 1 of the IC Orders requires each licensee ensure the safe handling, use, and control ofmaterial by controlling access at all times to radioactive material quantities of concern and by limiting access to such materials to only approved individuals who require access to perform their duties. Under the IC's, licensees approved individuals for unescorted access to radioactive material quantities of concern using a trustworthiness and reliability review process.

As part of this process, licensees were required to document the basis for approving individuals who required unescorted access to materials. For individuals employed by the licensee for three years or less, IC 1.b. requires trustworthinessand reliability to be determined, at a minimum, by verifying employment history, education, and personal references. For individuals employed by the licensee for longer than three years,trustworthiness and reliability is determined, at a minimum, by a review of the employees'

employment history with the licensee. On August 8, 2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) was enacted. Section 652 of theEPAct amended Section 149 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) to require fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records check of any person who is permitted unescorted access to radioactive materials subject to regulation by the Commission, and which the Commission determines to be significant to the public health and safety as to warrant fingerprinting and background checks.

SUMMARY OF ISSUE

In accordance with Section 149 of the AEA, as amended by the EPAct, the NRC andAgreement States will impose additional requirements for unescorted access to material in quantities of concern, so that affected licensees can obtain and grant unescorted access to radioactive materials. Orders or other legally binding requirements will be issued in the nearfuture requiring that the results of an FBI criminal history records check, based on fingerprints,are used in conjunction with IC trustworthy and reliability criteria to make determinations forindividuals granted unescorted access to radioactive materials in quantities of concern. All NRCand Agreement State licensees that are required to implement the IC requirements will berequired to fingerprint and make a trustworthiness and reliability determination for individuals granted unescorted access to radioactive material in quantities of concern. A joint NRC and Agreement State working group has been formed to address issues associatedwith the implementation of the fingerprinting requirements of the EPAct for IC licensees. The working group will be responsible for the development of a plan and implementing guidance for the fingerprinting of IC licensees. It is anticipated that fingerprinting Orders or other legally binding requirements will be issued in Fall 2007.NRC and the Agreement States have recently issued a RIS to non-manufacturer and distributor(non-M&D) service providers. NRC and the Agreement States will offer the opportunity for non- M&D service providers to receive an Order or other legally binding requirements imposingtrustworthy and reliability and fingerprinting requirements that manufacturer and distributor (M&D) service provider licensees must currently meet for unescorted access to radioactivematerial quantities of concern. IC 1.c. requires that all service providers be escorted unless determined to be trustworthy and reliable by an NRC required background investigation as an employee of a M&D licensee. Once a non-M&D service provider has received and implemented all the trustworthy andreliability and fingerprint requirements, they may provide service without an escort at a IC

licensee's facility, if the IC licensee chooses to allow them to have unescorted access.

BACKFIT DISCUSSION

This RIS requires no action or written response. Any action on the part of addressees inaccordance with the guidance contained in this RIS is strictly voluntary and, therefore, is not a backfit under any regulatory requirement in 10 CFR. Consequently, the staff did not perform a backfit analysis.

FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION

A notice of opportunity for public comment on this RIS was not published in the Federal Registerbecause this RIS is informational, and does not represent a departure from current regulatory requirements.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This RIS contains information collection requirements that are subject to the PaperworkReduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval numbers 3150-0001;3150-0007; 3150-0009; 3150-0010; 3150-0015; 3150-0016; 3150-0020; 3150-0029;

3150-0130; and 3150-0158.

PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request forinformation or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT

This RIS is not a rule as designated by the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. et seq.) and,therefore, is not subject to the Act.

RELATED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS

RIS 2007-15, "Unescorted Access to Materials for Non-Manufacturer and Distributor ServiceProviders."RIS 2007-07, "Clarification of Increased Controls for Licensees That Possess CollocatedRadioactive Material During Transportation Activities."

CONTACT

This RIS requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions, pleasecontact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate regional office./RA/Janet R. Schlueter, DirectorDivision of Materials Safety and State Agreements Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs

Technical Contact:

Nima Ashkeboussi, FSME (301) 415-7637 Email: naa@nrc.govEnclosures:1. Radionuclides of Concern2. SRM-SECY-07-0011 3. List of Recently Issued Generic Communications

RELATED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS

RIS 2007-15, "Unescorted Access to Materials for Non-Manufacturer and Distributor ServiceProviders."RIS 2007-07, "Clarification of Increased Controls for Licensees That Possess CollocatedRadioactive Material During Transportation Activities."

CONTACT

This RIS requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions, pleasecontact the technical contact listed below or the appropriate regional office. /RA/Janet R. Schlueter, DirectorDivision of Materials Safety and State Agreements Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs

Technical Contact:

Nima Ashkeboussi, FSME (301) 415-7637 Email: naa@nrc.govEnclosures:1. Radionuclides of Concern2. SRM-SECY-07-0011 3. List of Recently Issued Generic CommunicationsOFCFSME:SSSBFSME:SSSBFSME:MSEA FSME:MSSANAMENAshkeboussiTHarrisAMcIntoshSMooreDATE 5 / 14 /07 5 / 15 /07 5 /15 /07 5/ 16 /07OFCOGC-CRAOGC - NLOOISNSIR:DSPNAMEDReddickTcampbell forJGoldbergMJanneyMShafferDATE 05 / 25 /07 05 / 17 /07 05 / 23 /07 05 / 23 /07OFCFSME:MSSANAMEJSchlueterDATE 06 / 05 /07OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Enclosure 1 RADIONUCLIDES OF CONCERNRadionuclide Quantity ofConcern1 (TBq) Quantity ofConcern2 (Ci ) Am-241 0.6 16 Am-241/Be 0.6 16 Cf-252 0.2 5.4 Cm-244 0.5 14 Co-60 0.3 8.1 Cs-137 1 27 Gd-153 10 270 Ir-192 0.8 22 Pm-147 400 11,000 Pu-238 0.6 16 Pu-239/Be 0.6 16 Se-75 2 54 Sr-90 (Y-90) 10 270 Tm-170 200 5,400 Yb-169 3 81 Combinations of radioactivematerials listed above3 See FootnoteBelow4 1 The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of the same radionuclide should be included whenthe total activity equals or exceeds the quantity of concern. 2 The primary values used for compliance with this Order are TBq. The curie (Ci) values are rounded totwo significant figures for informational purposes only. 3 Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated if breaching a common physicalsecurity barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to theradioactive material or devices containing the radioactive material. 4 If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of the activity of each source, i ofradionuclide, n, A(i,n), to the quantity of concern for radionuclide n, Q(n), listed for thatradionuclide equals or exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide A) ÷ (quantity of concern for radionuclide A)] + [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) ÷ (quantity of concern for radionuclide B)] + etc........ >1 Enclosure 2 March 12, 2007MEMORANDUM TO:Luis A. Reyes Executive Director for Operations FROM:Annette L. Vietti-Cook, Secretary/RA/SUBJECT:STAFF REQUIREMENTS - SECY-07-0011 - INTERIMIMPLEMENTATION OF FINGERPRINTING REQUIREMENTS IN

SECTION 652 OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005The Commission has approved the staff's plan to issue orders imposing fingerprintingrequirements for individuals with unescorted access to radioactive material possessed by Security Order Licensees which includes licensees who (1) are licensed for a spent fuel storage facility, fuel cycle facility, or decommissioning reactor; or (2) possess and ship spent nuclear fuel. (Recommendation 1) These orders should serve as an interim step while the rule to require fingerprinting is developed and finalized.The Commission has approved the staff's recommendation to issue a generic communication toNRC and Agreement State Increase Control requirement recipients and known non- manufacturer and distributor service providers. (Recommendation 4) The genericcommunication should be prepared in close coordination with the Agreement States, to ensure there is a full and common understanding of the path forward among the affected programs and that potentially affected licensees in the States promptly receive the generic communication.Subsequently, the staff should issue impose on non-manufacturer and distributor service provider licensees that prefer unescorted access the same trustworthiness and reliability requirements and fingerprinting requirements that manufacturer and distributor service providerlicensees must currently meet for unescorted access. The staff should develop a more formal method to identify non-manufacturer and distributer service providers that have the same intimate knowledge of risk-significant sources as manufacturer and distributer providers. The Commission has disapproved the staff's proposal to not impose fingerprinting requirementsby order on licensees required to implement increased controls while the staff develops the rulemaking. (Recommendation 2) The staff should expeditiously engage the Agreement States to develop a plan to require fingerprinting for this group of licensees under public health and safety, with a goal of issuing the requirements as enhancements to the Increased Controls within six months. The staff should keep the Commission fully informed of the progress and any significant difficulties.The Commission has disapproved the staff's proposal to issue an immediately effective rule toexempt research, and test reactor (RTR) licensees from fingerprinting requirements while thestaff develops a second rulemaking to define "unescorted access" as it would apply to RTR

licensees. (Recommendation 3) Instead, the staff should expeditiously develop a definition of

"unescorted access" that would apply to RTR licensees and issue orders to RTR licensees to require fingerprinting for individuals that fall within this definition. To ensure compliance with Section 104c. of the Atomic Energy Act to impose only the minimum amount of regulation needed for RTR licensees, the orders should require fingerprinting only for individuals with unescorted access to risk-significant areas or materials within the facilities. The staff should then proceed with the rulemaking to determine if additional personnel should be fingerprinted. Enclosure 2 For future Commission papers involving State issues, the staff should address States' views inthe coordination section of the paper either by noting the Organization of Agreement States and/or Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors views or describing the interactions, if any, that have taken place. In a small number of cases information cannot be shared with thestates before it is provided to the Commission for deliberation. In these cases a brief statement as to why it was not coordinated with the states would be appropriate. The Commission has no objection to sharing this SRM with Agreement States and affectedlicensees with appropriate controls.cc:Chairman Klein Commissioner McGaffigan Commissioner Merrifield Commissioner Jaczko Commissioner Lyons OGC

CFO

OCA

Enclosure 3 Recently Issued FSME/NMSS Generic Communications DateGC No.Subject

Addressees

02/02/07IN-07-03Reportable Medical EventsInvolving Patients Receiving Dosages of Sodium Iodide Iodine-131 less than the Prescribed Dosage Because of Capsules Remaining in Vials after AdministrationAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medical use licensees and NRC Master Materials Licensees.

All Agreement State Radiation Control Program Directors and State LiaisonOfficers.02/28/07IN-07-08Potential Vulnerabilities of Time-reliant Computer-based Systems Due to Change in Daylight Saving Time DatesAll U. S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licensees and all Agreement State Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison Officers.03/15/07IN-07-10Yttrium-90 Theraspheres andSirspheres ImpuritiesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission (NRC) Medical Licensees and NRC Master Materials Licensees.

All Agreement State Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison Officers.04/04/07IN-07-13Use of As-Found Conditions toEvaluate Criticality-related Process Upsets at Fuel Cycle FacilitiesAll licensees authorized to possess acritical mass of special nuclear material.03/01/07RIS-07-03Ionizing Radiation WarningSymbolAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licensees and certificate holders. All Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison Officers03/09/07RIS-07-04Personally IdentifiableInformation Submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionAll holders of operating licenses fornuclear power reactors and holders of and applicants for certificates for reactor designs. All licensees, certificate holders, applicants, and other entities subject to regulation by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of the use of source, byproduct, and special nuclear material03/20/07RIS-07-05Status and Plans forImplementation of NRC

Regulatory Authority for Certain Naturally-occurring and Accelerator-produced Radioactive MaterialAll NRC materials licensees, RadiationControl Program Directors, State Liaison Officers, and NRC's Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes Enclosure 3 DateGC No.Subject

Addressees

04/05/07RIS-07-07Clarification of IncreasedControls for Licensees That Possess Collocated Radioactive Material During Transportation Activities All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission (NRC) licensees issuedNRC's Order Imposing Increased Controls and all Radiation Control Program Directors and State Liaison OfficersNote: A full listing of generic communications may be viewed at the NRC public website at the followingaddress: http://www.nrc.gov/Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections/Generic Communications.