PNP 2013-013, Response to Clarification Request - License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
{{#Wiki_filter:Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043 Tel 269 764 2000 Anthony J Vitale Site Vice President PNP 2013-013 February 21, 2013 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043 Tel 269 764 2000 Anthony J Vitale Site Vice President PNP 2013-013 February 21, 2013 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001  


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
Response to Clarification Request - License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20
Response to Clarification Request - License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20  


==References:==
==References:==
: 1. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. letter, PNP 2012-106, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors, dated December 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12348A455)
: 1. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. letter, PNP 2012-106, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors, dated December 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12348A455)  


==Dear Sir or Madam:==
==Dear Sir or Madam:==
In Reference 1, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO) submitted a license amendment request to adopt the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 performanced-based standard for fire protection for light water reactors.
In Reference 1, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO) submitted a license amendment request to adopt the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 performanced-based standard for fire protection for light water reactors.
On February 5, 2013, a conference call was held with the NRC to discuss clarification questions which were sent via electronic mail on February 4, 2013. A follow-up call was conducted with the NRC on February 6, 2013, to confirm the clarification questions and required response timeframe.
On February 5, 2013, a conference call was held with the NRC to discuss clarification questions which were sent via electronic mail on February 4, 2013. A follow-up call was conducted with the NRC on February 6, 2013, to confirm the clarification questions and required response timeframe.
Attachment 1 provides the ENO responses to the clarification questions.
provides the ENO responses to the clarification questions.
A copy of this response has been provided to the designated representative of the State of Michigan.
A copy of this response has been provided to the designated representative of the State of Michigan.
This letter contains no new or revised commitments.
This letter contains no new or revised commitments.  


PNP 201 3-013 Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 21, 2013.
PNP 201 3-013 Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 21, 2013.
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==Attachment:==
==Attachment:==
: 1. Response to Clarification Requests License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors cc:   Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC State of Michigan
1.
Response to Clarification Requests License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors cc:
Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC State of Michigan


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors A request for clarification was received from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), by electronic mail on February 4, 2013. Subsequent conference calls with the NRC on February 5, 2013 and February 6, 2013 were conducted to confirm the clarification questions and required response timeframe.
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 1 of 79 A request for clarification was received from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), by electronic mail on February 4, 2013. Subsequent conference calls with the NRC on February 5, 2013 and February 6, 2013 were conducted to confirm the clarification questions and required response timeframe.
The Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO) response is provided below.
The Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO) response is provided below.
NRC Request
NRC Request
Line 49: Line 50:
The Palisades Fire PRA Peer Review was evaluated in three phases against the requirements of ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Part 4 [15] by essentially the same personnel.
The Palisades Fire PRA Peer Review was evaluated in three phases against the requirements of ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Part 4 [15] by essentially the same personnel.
: 1. The first in-process Peer review (Phase 1) was conducted during the week of January 18th, 2010.
: 1. The first in-process Peer review (Phase 1) was conducted during the week of January 18th, 2010.
: 2. The second in-process Peer review (Phase 2) which included two NRC observers was conducted during the week of August 27, 2010.
: 2. The second in-process Peer review (Phase 2) which included two NRC observers was conducted during the week of August 27, 2010.  
Page 1 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 2 of 79
: 3. The final phase (Final) was conducted during the week of March 21, 2011.
: 3. The final phase (Final) was conducted during the week of March 21, 2011.
The final report as described in paragraph two in Attachment V of the LAR, SCIENTECH document 17825-1, was released in July 2011.
The final report as described in paragraph two in Attachment V of the LAR, SCIENTECH document 17825-1, was released in July 2011.
Line 60: Line 60:
A Final Peer review, of selected technical elements, was deemed necessary to meet the intent of the standard. The final report [16] provides the results of the Final Peer review and the in-process Peer reviews for those technical elements sufficiently reviewed during the in process reviews. Findings and observations from in-process Peer reviews were revisited by the Peer review team, but the finding descriptions were not eliminated or revised due to time constraints. For example, a number of supporting requirements with associated findings in the final report were categorized as meeting CC II (capability category) or greater. In other cases, every element as required by the standard is met, however, a singular refinement or enhancement is found to be needed and hence a finding would result.
A Final Peer review, of selected technical elements, was deemed necessary to meet the intent of the standard. The final report [16] provides the results of the Final Peer review and the in-process Peer reviews for those technical elements sufficiently reviewed during the in process reviews. Findings and observations from in-process Peer reviews were revisited by the Peer review team, but the finding descriptions were not eliminated or revised due to time constraints. For example, a number of supporting requirements with associated findings in the final report were categorized as meeting CC II (capability category) or greater. In other cases, every element as required by the standard is met, however, a singular refinement or enhancement is found to be needed and hence a finding would result.
There were no changes in applied methodology from the conduct of the Final Peer review on March 21, 2011 to the formal LAR submittal release on December 12, 2012.
There were no changes in applied methodology from the conduct of the Final Peer review on March 21, 2011 to the formal LAR submittal release on December 12, 2012.
Table 1, below illustrates the overall results presented in the summary table from the final report [16]. These results show that 94 supporting requirements meet the ASME standard CC II or greater, 58 supporting requirements (SRs) were not met, 3 met category I, and 14 were classified as not applicable. Four SRs had a final status of not reviewed after the Final peer review; these are presented in Table 3.
Table 1, below illustrates the overall results presented in the summary table from the final report [16]. These results show that 94 supporting requirements meet the ASME standard CC II or greater, 58 supporting requirements (SRs) were not met, 3 met category I, and 14 were classified as not applicable. Four SRs had a final status of not reviewed after the Final peer review; these are presented in Table 3.  
Page 2 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Additional information is provided in Table 2, below to illustrate during which Peer review phase F&Os were identified and reviewed, as well as summary information from the final report to clarify the teams conclusions for each ASME standard element in which a finding was noted. This table re-presents the information provided in LAR Attachment V, Table V-1, with the addition of three new columns, annotated in bold and italics, as shown below. The SR, Topic, Status, and Finding or Suggestion columns were not changed from Attachment V, Table V-1. The disposition description for several SRs was revised to clarify the basis for status of these requirements.
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 3 of 79 Additional information is provided in Table 2, below to illustrate during which Peer review phase F&Os were identified and reviewed, as well as summary information from the final report to clarify the teams conclusions for each ASME standard element in which a finding was noted. This table re-presents the information provided in LAR Attachment V, Table V-1, with the addition of three new columns, annotated in bold and italics, as shown below. The SR, Topic, Status, and Finding or Suggestion columns were not changed from Attachment V, Table V-1. The disposition description for several SRs was revised to clarify the basis for status of these requirements.
SR           SR         Disposition    Supplemental Initial  Subsequent                     Information Peer    Peer Review Review        Status Status In the SR Initial Peer Review Status column, the status from when the supporting requirement (SR) was initially reviewed is provided.
SR Initial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition Supplemental Information In the SR Initial Peer Review Status column, the status from when the supporting requirement (SR) was initially reviewed is provided.
In the SR Subsequent Peer Review Status column, the status from the Final Peer review for the SR is provided.
In the SR Subsequent Peer Review Status column, the status from the Final Peer review for the SR is provided.
When a supporting requirement was categorized as not met this was the status at completion of the Final Peer review conducted during the week of March 21, 2011. If the supporting requirement was subsequently addressed prior to the LAR submittal in December 2012, it was categorized as closed in the status column (per the disposition discussion). In these cases the SR finding or suggestion has been fully addressed and the intent of Capability Category II has been met to properly support the LAR submittal.
When a supporting requirement was categorized as not met this was the status at completion of the Final Peer review conducted during the week of March 21, 2011. If the supporting requirement was subsequently addressed prior to the LAR submittal in December 2012, it was categorized as closed in the status column (per the disposition discussion). In these cases the SR finding or suggestion has been fully addressed and the intent of Capability Category II has been met to properly support the LAR submittal.
In the Supplemental Information column, additional information is provided that supports the review for this supporting element was complete; especially if the F&O implies the work was not in a state that could be reviewed. This information was primarily obtained from the Summary of Review Results (Section 4) of the Final Peer review report [16].
In the Supplemental Information column, additional information is provided that supports the review for this supporting element was complete; especially if the F&O implies the work was not in a state that could be reviewed. This information was primarily obtained from the Summary of Review Results (Section 4) of the Final Peer review report [16].  
Page 3 of 79
 
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 4 of 79  
 
Table1:SummaryofOverallResultsofthePalisadesFirePRAPeerReview NumberofSupportingRequirementsMeetingEachCapabilityCategory FirePRA Element NotMet Met CCI CCI/II CCII CCII/III CCIII Not Applicable (NA)
Not Reviewed (NR)
Total PP 1
8
 
3
 
12 ES 9
2
 
1
 
1 1
 
14 CS 4
9
 
1
 
1 1
 
16 QLS
 
6
 
1
 
7 PRM 10 5
 
1 4
20 IGN 2
9
 
1 1
2
 
15 QNS*
 
6
 
6 CF 1
1
 
1
 
3 HRA 6
1 3
 
1
 
1
 
12 SF 6
 
6 FQ 4
5
 
1
 
10 FSS 13 16
 
3 9
6 2
1


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 1: Summary of Overall Results of the Palisades Fire PRA Peer Review Number of Supporting Requirements Meeting Each Capability Category Not      Not Fire PRA Not Met          Met            CCI        CCI/II      CCII        CCII/III    CCIII  Applicable Reviewed Total Element (NA)      (NR)
50 UNC 2
PP            1              8                                                          3                                      12 ES            9              2                                          1                          1          1                14 CS            4              9                                          1                          1          1                16 QLS                            6                                                                                1                7 PRM              10              5                                                                                1          4    20 IGN            2              9                                                          1          1          2                15 QNS*                                                                                                              6                6 CF            1              1                                                          1                                        3 HRA            6              1              3                          1                          1                          12 SF            6                                                                                                                  6 FQ            4              5                                                                                1                10 FSS            13            16                            3            9              6          2          1                50 UNC             2                                                                                                                  2 Total            58            62              3            3            12              11          6        14          4    173
  % of Total        34%            36%            2%            2%            7%              6%          3%        8%        2%
% excluding 37%            40%            2%            2%            8%              7%          4%        9%        3%
NA or NR
*Palisades did not perform quantitative screening so the requirements of QNS are not applicable Page 4 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
2 Total 58 62 3
SR      Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                          Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status CSA401    If additional cables are selected  Closed    The Fire PRA cable data is      Phase 1    Phase 2/ Suggestion closed by                During the Phase 1 and Phase 2 reviews, (Suggestion) based on SR CSA3, VERIFY that              maintained in the SAFE        (reviewed      Final  documentation update. No            this SR was classified as Not Met the adverse effects due to failure          software and an adjunct        not met)      (met)  impact to NFPA805 analysis.        During the Final Peer review in March of the selected cables are                  Excel spreadsheet. The data                          Cable data from the adjunct Excel  2011, additional reviews of the cable included the Fire PRA plant                  should be integrated into a                          spreadsheet has been integrated    selection element were conducted to response model.                              single data set within the                            into the SAFE database to ensure    assess resolution of F&Os identified during SAFE software to ensure                              longterm maintenance of the        the inprocess reviews. The findings from proper longterm                                      analysis.                          Phase 1 and Phase 2 for this SR were maintenance of the analysis.                                                              resolved and this suggestion was identified during that review.
3 12 11 6
Per the final Scientech report 178251, The cable selection and location task is essentially complete. Future work will typically involve iterations to refine the Fire PRA.
14 4
Specifically, the Phase 1 review identified 7 findings and 5 suggestions. The Phase 2 Peer review modified 8 F&Os and added 2 additional suggestions. The Final Peer review resulted in 4 findings, 2 suggestions, and 1 best practice; supporting the fact the work had transitioned satisfactorily from the first inprocess Peer review.
173
CSA901    INCLUDE consideration of proper    Open      PLP has conducted updates        Phase 1    Phase 2/ Finding open. Although the data    A finding in this SR was identified during (Finding)    polarity hot shorts on                      to the original cable          (reviewed      Final  gathering is complete, it was not  the Phase 1 Peer review. Cable Selection ungrounded DC circuits; requiring            selection to ensure multiple    not met)    (not met) fully implemented into the model    elements were subsequently reviewed in up to and including two                      hot short failures are                                used for the LAR.                  the Phase 2 and Final Peer reviews. The independent faults could result in          identified. It is not evident                        Cable data for the PLP FPRA was    finding in this area was revised as part of adverse consequences.                        that the supplemental                                obtained from two separate          the Final Peer review, but remains open as analysis work specifically                            sources: the SAFE database and      some minor numerical changes are looked for proper polarity                            NEXUS spreadsheets. The SAFE        anticipated once the Fire PRA model is hot shorts on ungrounded                              database was populated with the    updated to utilize the full set of cable data DC circuits.                                          original Palisades Appendix R cable maintained in just one location (SAFE).
%ofTotal 34%
Page 5 of 79
36%
2%
2%
7%
6%
3%
8%
2%


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
%excluding NAorNR 37%
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                    Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                              Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status data, the cable data collected for offsite power components, and the initial set of components selected for cable analysis for the fire PRA.
40%
Subsequent efforts were performed to analyze additional components, refine previously collected cable data and to revisit vintage data using modern criteria including proper polarity dc hot shorts.
2%
CSB101  ANALYZE all electrical distribution Closed    The analysis and review of        Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    This Finding was noted during the initial 1
2%
(Finding) buses credited in the Fire PRA                electrical overcurrent          (reviewed    (not met)  update. No impact to NFPA805        Phase 1 Peer review. Cable selection plant response model for proper              coordination and protection      not met)              analysis.                            elements were again reviewed by the Peer overcurrent coordination and                  has been initiated but is not                          Palisades has documented a            review as part of the Phase 2 and Final protection and IDENTIFY any                  yet complete. The final                                complete breaker coordination        Peer reviews, but this finding had not been additional circuits and cables                analysis should address                                study for all buses considered in    resolved. The breaker coordination study whose failure could challenge                coordination for all Fire PRA                          the fire PRA as described in EA      was subsequently completed and power supply availability due to              electrical distribution buses.                          APR95004, Ref (9).                  modifications identified to resolve the inadequate electrical overcurrent            Refer to F&O CSC401 for a                                                                  finding.
8%
protective device coordination                related discussion on                                  The following modifications will be performed to resolve the identified  The finding was not fully resolved for the documentation of the                                                                          Final Peer review, but was subsequently coordination and protection                            Electrical Coordination Challenges:
7%
closed prior to the LAR submittal.
4%
analysis.                                                      The circuit breakers in MCC 3 buckets (Breakers 52345 and 52325) will be replaced.
9%
Replacement of, or supplement the overcurrent protection in DC distribution panels, 111, 112, 11A, 21 1, 212, and 21A utilizing fuses to assure coordination at higher fault currents.
3%
Replacement of the fuses Page 6 of 79
* Palisades did not perform quantitative screening so the requirements of QNS are not applicable


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 5 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status currently installed in panels served by the Y01.
Status 2
Adjustment of the breaker/relay settings in breakers 152201, 152115, 152108.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation CSA401 (Suggestion)
Plant modifications will address all buses where electrical coordination could not be demonstrated. No impact to NFPA 805 analysis.
Ifadditionalcablesareselected basedonSRCSA3,VERIFYthat theadverseeffectsduetofailure oftheselectedcablesare includedtheFirePRAplant responsemodel.
CSC101  DOCUMENT the cable selection      Open      The cable selection and          Phase 1    Phase 2/ Finding is open because although    This finding was identified during the Phase (Finding) and location methodology                    location methodology is        (reviewed      Final the data verification is complete,  1Peer review. The CSC1 supporting applied in the Fire PRA in a                documented in Section 4        not met)    (not met) the results have not been fully      requirement was subsequently reviewed manner that facilitates Fire PRA            the Model Development                                implemented into the model used      during both the Phase 2 and Final Peer applications, upgrades, and Peer            Report (0247070005.03)                              for the LAR.                         review. This finding remains open as some review.                                     and associated appendices.                           Section 4 of the Model              minor numerical changes are anticipated The methodology for                                  Development Report, Ref (3), has    once the Fire PRA model is updated to completed work is                                    been updated in a manner that        utilize the full set of cable data maintained documented in a manner                                ensures consistent interpretation    in just one location (SAFE).
Closed TheFirePRAcabledatais maintainedintheSAFE softwareandanadjunct Excelspreadsheet.Thedata shouldbeintegratedintoa singledatasetwithinthe SAFEsoftwaretoensure properlongterm maintenanceoftheanalysis.
consistent with this                                  of Fire PRA applications.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
supporting requirement; however, the methodology                              Additionally, the verification of for the supplemental cable                            Appendix R NonSafe Shutdown selection review                                      Cable Routing to Support the Fire (Attachment 1) is not                                PRA has been separately formally documented in a                              documented in PLPRPT1200134, manner that ensures                                  Ref (10).
Phase2/
consistent interpretation for Fire PRA applications and upgrades. Additionally, the sample cable routing verification check is not formally documented in the Page 7 of 79
Final (met)
Suggestionclosedby documentationupdate.No impacttoNFPA805analysis.
CabledatafromtheadjunctExcel spreadsheethasbeenintegrated intotheSAFEdatabasetoensure longtermmaintenanceofthe analysis.
DuringthePhase1andPhase2reviews, thisSRwasclassifiedasNotMet DuringtheFinalPeerreviewinMarch 2011,additionalreviewsofthecable selectionelementwereconductedto assessresolutionofF&Osidentifiedduring theinprocessreviews.Thefindingsfrom Phase1andPhase2forthisSRwere resolvedandthissuggestionwasidentified duringthatreview.
PerthefinalScientechreport178251, Thecableselectionandlocationtaskis essentiallycomplete.Futureworkwill typicallyinvolveiterationstorefinethe FirePRA.
Specifically,thePhase1reviewidentified7 findingsand5suggestions.ThePhase2 Peerreviewmodified8F&Osandadded2 additionalsuggestions.TheFinalPeer reviewresultedin4findings,2suggestions, and1bestpractice;supportingthefactthe workhadtransitionedsatisfactorilyfrom thefirstinprocessPeerreview.
CSA901 (Finding)
INCLUDEconsiderationofproper polarityhotshortson ungroundedDCcircuits;requiring uptoandincludingtwo independentfaultscouldresultin adverseconsequences.
Open PLPhasconductedupdates totheoriginalcable selectiontoensuremultiple hotshortfailuresare identified.Itisnotevident thatthesupplemental analysisworkspecifically lookedforproperpolarity hotshortsonungrounded DCcircuits.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Phase2/
Final (notmet)
Findingopen.Althoughthedata gatheringiscomplete,itwasnot fullyimplementedintothemodel usedfortheLAR.
CabledataforthePLPFPRAwas obtainedfromtwoseparate sources:theSAFEdatabaseand NEXUSspreadsheets.TheSAFE databasewaspopulatedwiththe originalPalisadesAppendixRcable AfindinginthisSRwasidentifiedduring thePhase1Peerreview.CableSelection elementsweresubsequentlyreviewedin thePhase2andFinalPeerreviews.The findinginthisareawasrevisedaspartof theFinalPeerreview,butremainsopenas someminornumericalchangesare anticipatedoncetheFirePRAmodelis updatedtoutilizethefullsetofcabledata maintainedinjustonelocation(SAFE).


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 6 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                  Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status Fire PRA Report or any other plant document, and thus does not lend itself to consistent treatment for future Fire PRA applications and upgrades.
Status 2
CSC201    DOCUMENT cable selection and      Closed    Appendix F of the Model          Phase 1    Phase 2/  Suggestion resolved by            This SR was categorized as Not Met by the (Suggestion) location results such that those            Development Report (0247      (reviewed      Final    documentation update. No impact  Phase 1 Peer review. The finding was results are traceable to plant              070005.03) documents the        not met)      (met)    to NFPA805 analysis.            revised to a Suggestion in the Final Peer source documents in a manner                process by which the cable                              The sources of the cable data are review and subsequently resolved by that facilitates Fire PRA                  data was compiled and                                    documented in the Fire PRA Model  documentation provided in the Model applications, upgrades, and Peer            organized for the PLP FPRA.                              Development Report, 024707      Development Report.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation data,thecabledatacollectedfor offsitepowercomponents,andthe initialsetofcomponentsselected forcableanalysisforthefirePRA.
review.                                    However, to facilitate FPRA                              0005.03, Ref (03).
Subsequenteffortswere performedtoanalyzeadditional components,refinepreviously collectedcabledataandtorevisit vintagedatausingmoderncriteria includingproperpolaritydchot shorts.
applications, upgrades, and Peer review, the consolidated cable dataset (combining the Nexus and SAFE databases) should be documented in such a format (including such information as cable ID, corresponding equipment ID, cable function, and cable fault consequences, etc.)
that provides endtoend data traceability.
CSC401    DOCUMENT the review of the        Closed    Unlike other elements of          Phase 1    Phase 2/  Finding resolved by documentation A finding in this SR was identified during (Finding)    electrical distribution system              this Technical Element, the    (reviewed      Final    update. No impact to NFPA805    the Phase 1Peer review. The CSC1 1
overcurrent coordination and                Fire PRA Report does not        not met)    (not met)  analysis.                        supporting requirement was subsequently protection analysis in a manner            address the methodology,                                Palisades has documented a        reviewed during both the Phase 2 and Final that facilitates Fire PRA                  process, or criteria for the                            complete breaker coordination    Peer review.
applications, upgrades, and Peer            electrical coordination and                              study for all buses considered in The finding was revised during the Phase 2 Page 8 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
CSB101 (Finding)
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status review.                                     protection analysis. This                                  the fire PRA as described in EA    Peer review, but remained open following information will need to be                                APR95004, Ref (9).                the Final Peer reviews as the breaker co included in final documents                                                                    ordination study was incomplete.
ANALYZEallelectricaldistribution busescreditedintheFirePRA plantresponsemodelforproper overcurrentcoordinationand protectionandIDENTIFYany additionalcircuitsandcables whosefailurecouldchallenge powersupplyavailabilitydueto inadequateelectricalovercurrent protectivedevicecoordination Closed Theanalysisandreviewof electricalovercurrent coordinationandprotection hasbeeninitiatedbutisnot yetcomplete.Thefinal analysisshouldaddress coordinationforallFirePRA electricaldistributionbuses.
to satisfy this supporting                                                                    Subsequently this study was completed requirement.                                                                                  and the finding resolved prior to the LAR submittal.
RefertoF&OCSC401fora relateddiscussionon documentationofthe coordinationandprotection analysis.
ESA201  REVIEW power supply, interlock    Closed    It is unclear at this point if      Phase 1    Phase 2/  Finding resolved by documentation  This SR was designated as not met in the (Finding) circuits, instrumentation, and              all interlock / permissive        (reviewed      Final    and model update. No impact to      Phase 1 Peer review. The equipment 1
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
support system dependencies                circuits which may lead to        not met)    (not met)   NFPA805 analysis.                 selection (ES) element was fully reviewed and IDENTIFY additional                    specific consequential IEs                                A complete review of Safety        during the Phase 2 Peer review and a equipment whose fireinduced                have been properly                                        Injection Signal (SIS), Containment limited scope review was performed during failure, including spurious                captured for the functions                                High Pressure (CHP), Containment    the Final Peer review.
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
actuation, could adversely affect          being credited in the PRA.                                High Radiation (CHR), Containment  The final report summary for the ES any of the equipment identified            This may be particularly                                  Isolation Signal (CIS) and          element states:
Palisadeshasdocumenteda completebreakercoordination studyforallbusesconsideredin thefirePRAasdescribedinEA APR95004,Ref(9).
per SR ESA1.                              important where the                                        Recirculation Actuation Signal function credited in the                                                                      Extensive modeling changes have been (RAS) logic was performed to        made to explicitly represent both random Appendix R analysis is                                    identify potential adverse different from the Fire PRA,                                                                   and fire induced failures of interlock component actuations that could    circuits, instrumentation and associated or auto actuation of the                                  occur due to a spurious signal from component is required in                                                                      power supplies. When this effort is any of these sources.              complete the modeling of this aspect the PRA but not in Appendix R.                                                        Logic was added for 45 PRA          should be among one of the most components to consider spurious    comprehensive in the industry.
Thefollowingmodificationswillbe performedtoresolvetheidentified ElectricalCoordinationChallenges:
Need to document process                                  operation from any of the          The finding was not fully resolved for the by which all supporting                                    automatic actuation circuits.      Final Peer review, but was subsequently equipment and interlocks                                  Report 0247070005.04, Ref (4),   closed prior to the LAR submittal.
ThecircuitbreakersinMCC 3buckets(Breakers52345 and52325)willbereplaced.
have been addressed. The                                  was updated to reflect these PRA team appears to                                        changes.
Replacementof,or supplementtheovercurrent protectioninDCdistribution panels,111,112,11A,21 1,212,and21Autilizing fusestoassurecoordination athigherfaultcurrents.
recognize this deficiency                                  These logic changes were exists at present and have                                addressed prior to the conduct of plans in places to rectify                                Phase 2.
Replacementofthefuses ThisFindingwasnotedduringtheinitial Phase1Peerreview.Cableselection elementswereagainreviewedbythePeer reviewaspartofthePhase2andFinal Peerreviews,butthisfindinghadnotbeen resolved.Thebreakercoordinationstudy wassubsequentlycompletedand modificationsidentifiedtoresolvethe finding.
once all auto actuation modeling issues are resolved.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
Page 9 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 7 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                    Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status ESA301  INCLUDE equipment whose fire      Closed    The review of initiating        Phase 1    Phase 2/   Finding resolved by documentation    This SR was designated as not met in the (Finding) induced failure, not including              events considered in the      (reviewed      Final    and model update. No impact to      Phase 1 Peer review. The equipment 1
Status 2
spurious operation, contributes              internal events analysis is    not met)    (not met)  NFPA805 analysis.                  selection (ES) element was fully reviewed to or causes                                described in Report 0247                              Appendix B of Ref (3) was updated    during the Phase 2 Peer review and a (a) fireinduced initiating events          070005. 03 Appendix B. A                              to provide additional detail as to  limited scope review was performed during treated in the Fire Safe                    rationale for reexamining                              how initiating events were          the Final Peer review.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation currentlyinstalledinpanels servedbytheY01.
Shutdown/Appendix R analysis                the screening process to                                screened as to their applicability  The finding was not fully resolved for the (b) Internal Events PRA initiators          identify new IEs which may                              for fire scenarios.                 Final Peer review, but was subsequently as identified using the IE                  have been screened or                                                                        closed by fully documenting consequential requirements in Part 2 (including            subsumed in that analysis is                            The success criteria for consequential LOCA events and        LOCA event development in the event tree any gradations across capability            discussed. No new initiating                                                                and success criteria notebook prior to the categories in that standard) as              events or additional                                    their associated pathways and sizes were updated in Section 5.0    LAR submittal.
Adjustmentofthe breaker/relaysettingsin breakers152201,152115, 152108.
modified per 42.5, or                      equipment were identified.
Plantmodificationswilladdressall buseswhereelectrical coordinationcouldnotbe demonstrated.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysis.
(c) unique fireinduced initiating          However, the review                                    of notebook NBPSAETSC, Ref events not addressed or                      process undertaken is not                              (11). The updated notebook otherwise screened from the                  well documented. It is                                  details consequential LOCA events above two analyses if SR IEC4 in            unclear, e.g., if multiple                              that may result from fire including:
CSC101 (Finding)
Part 2 cannot be met                        coincident pathways were                                multiple primary coolant pump addressed when identifying                              (PCP) seal failures, demands on the the size of LOCA that may                              pressurizer safety valves, and be induced by fire and any                              spurious operation of the reactor potential success criteria                              head vent and letdown isolation conflicts which may arise in                            valves. Additional detail was also the mapping of the fire                                added to report 0247070005.04, induced IE to the internal                              Ref (4), for the PCP seal failures events IE. (e.g. very small                            and chemical and volume control LOCA, Small LOCA vs.                                    system (CVCS) pathways.
DOCUMENTthecableselection andlocationmethodology appliedintheFirePRAina mannerthatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer review.
medium LOCA). (Note the                                The modeling approach for same concerns arise when                                containment isolation pathways addressing the screening                                was updated as described in process for Containment                                Attachment D of EAPSAFPIEFIRE isolation pathways where                                1204, Ref (12). Consequential such pathways were                                      ISLOCA events, potentially caused screened on the size of a                              by fire, are specifically addressed single pathway.)                                        in the XFRISLOCA event tree described in Section 5.6 of NBPSA Page 10 of 79
Open Thecableselectionand locationmethodologyis documentedinSection4 theModelDevelopment Report(0247070005.03) andassociatedappendices.
Themethodologyfor completedworkis documentedinamanner consistentwiththis supportingrequirement; however,themethodology forthesupplementalcable selectionreview (Attachment1)isnot formallydocumentedina mannerthatensures consistentinterpretationfor FirePRAapplicationsand upgrades.Additionally,the samplecablerouting verificationcheckisnot formallydocumentedinthe Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Phase2/
Final (notmet)
Findingisopenbecausealthough thedataverificationiscomplete, theresultshavenotbeenfully implementedintothemodelused fortheLAR.
Section4oftheModel DevelopmentReport,Ref(3),has beenupdatedinamannerthat ensuresconsistentinterpretation ofFirePRAapplications.
Additionally,theverificationof AppendixRNonSafeShutdown CableRoutingtoSupporttheFire PRAhasbeenseparately documentedinPLPRPT1200134, Ref(10).


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringthePhase 1Peerreview.TheCSC1supporting requirementwassubsequentlyreviewed duringboththePhase2andFinalPeer review.Thisfindingremainsopenassome minornumericalchangesareanticipated oncetheFirePRAmodelisupdatedto utilizethefullsetofcabledatamaintained injustonelocation(SAFE).
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                            Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status ETSC, Ref (11).
ESA501  CONSIDER up to and including        Closed    A review of the MSO report        Phase 1    Phase 2/  Finding resolved by documentation    This SR was designated as not met in the (Finding) two spurious actuations of                    024707000504 Appendix        (reviewed      Final    and model update. No impact to      Phase 1 Peer review. The equipment 1
equipment alone or in                          A found several deficiencies. not met)    (not met)  NFPA805 analysis.                   selection (ES) element was fully reviewed combination with other fire                  These are indicated below.                              The MSO expert panel was            during the Phase 2 Peer review and a induced loss of function failures              General: The MSO panel                                  reconvened on 03/15/2011 at the      limited scope review was performed during for the special case where fire              was convened in 2008.                                   Palisades site to address all        the Final Peer review.
induced failures could contribute              Westinghouse published the                              additions, deletions and/or          The finding was not fully resolved for the not only to an initiating event but            latest MSO report in April                              changes to the MSO assessment        Final Peer review, but was subsequently also simultaneously either                    2009 [WCAPNP16933].                                    that have occurred due to post      closed by incorporating modeling logic and (a) affect the                                The current MSO reference                                expert panel reviews and in          updating the MSO report prior to the LAR operability/functionality of that              numbers and description in                              consideration of the most current    submittal.
portion of the plant design to be              Appendix A do not match                                  information available from the credited in response to the                    the list in WCAPNP16933.                              PWROG Owners Group. The initiating event in the Fire PRA              There are some new issues                                results of this expert panel review (b) result in an initiating event              which are not covered by                                are documented in 024707 where the mitigating function is              the current MSO panel                                    0005.04, Multiple Spurious not addressed in the Fire Safe                report.                                                  Operations, Ref (4).
Shutdown/Appendix R Analysis or                Suggest a final reconciliation (c) result in a loss of reactor                of the MSO panel results                                PLP1, PLP2, and PLP3 were coolant system integrity                      [either with a new panel                                updated in report 024707 meeting or a rewrite of the                            0005.04. Palisades PCP seal LOCA report] with WCAPNP                                    model has been updated to be 16933.                                                  consistent with the latest industry PLP1, PLP2,PLP3: The                                  guidance (WCAP15749P, Revision MSO descriptions in these                                1, Guidance for the WCAP issues are intended                                Implementation of the CEOG for Westinghouse plants                                  Model for Failure of RCP Seals which have 2 diverse                                    Given Loss of Seal Cooling (Task methods of seal cooling. The                            2083), Combustion Engineering MSO report states the issue                              Owners Group (CEOG), December is notapplicable to PLP.                                2008). Further detail is provided in However, it is necessary to                              Appendix B of 0247070005.04.
ensure that all failure                                  PLP10 was finalized as combinations of loss of CCW                              documented in 0247070005.04 Page 11 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 8 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR Topic (ASME Standard Category II Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial    SR                  Disposition          Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer     Subsequent Review      Peer Status      Review Status seal cooling are included for                        Section 5.10. The PRA model was PLP.                                                  updated to include spurious valve PLP10: Resolution not                                failures to address this MSO.
Status 2
final.;                                              PLP11 is correctly evaluated in PLP11: WCAP issue                                    report 0247070005.04 Section misunderstood by MSO                                  5.11. The MSO panel correctly panel. Issue is for closure of                        understood the scenario.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation FirePRAReportoranyother plantdocument,andthus doesnotlenditselfto consistenttreatmentfor futureFirePRAapplications andupgrades.
both RWST suction valves                              Simultaneous spurious closure of and is applicable to PLP.                            CV3031 and CV3057 does not Simultaneous spurious                                isolate charging suction from the closure of CV3031 and                                SIRWT as the charging suction is CV3057 is this issue. ;                              from a separate nozzle. Closure of PLP12: Resolution not final                          these valves is addressed in MSO
                                              ;                                                    scenarios which impact the engineered safeguards pumps.
PLP14: In WCAPNP16933,                            MSO scenario PLP10 considers issue 14 is applicable to                            spurious isolation of charging Palisades. Issue 14 is CHP                            pump suction valves, including runout when RCS is                                    those which would isolate charging depressurized. Palisades                              from the SIRWT.
needs to look at pump runout possibility for all                            The resolution of MSO scenario ECCS, CCW, AFW, and SWS                              PLP12 was completed in Section pumps. ;                                              5.12 of 0247070005.04. Spurious closure of MO2087 due to fire was PLP18: Resolution for PLP                          added to the PRA model.
18 states RWST may drain, which is not considered in                            Evaluation of PLP14 was updated PRA. If RAS occurs and CV                            in Section 5.14 of 024707 3029 or CV03030 opens,                                0005.04. The evaluation now RWST will not drain,                                  describes how this scenario is because of check valve in                            addressed in the model.
sump line. Other                                      MSO scenario PLP18 was updated.
possibilities involving                              The evaluation describes model deadhead / NPSH of ECCS                              changes incorporated to explicitly pumps are not explored. If                            address early drain down of the 3029/3030 open on a                                  SIRWT in the PRA model and dead Page 12 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
CSC201 (Suggestion)
SR Topic (ASME Standard Category II Status        Finding or Suggestion       SR Initial    SR                  Disposition            Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer    Subsequent Review      Peer Status      Review Status spurious signal,                                     heading of the ECCS pumps.
DOCUMENTcableselectionand locationresultssuchthatthose resultsaretraceabletoplant sourcedocumentsinamanner thatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer review.
CV3031/CV3057 and                                    PLP19 was finalized per Section CV3027/3056 will receive a                            5.19 of 0247070005.04. This signal to close. Power is                            scenario involves early drain down disabled to 3027/3056.                                of the SIRWT via containment Scenarios for insufficient                            spray and is addressed in the NPSH include a) spurious SI;                          resolution to scenario PLP18.
Closed AppendixFoftheModel DevelopmentReport(0247 070005.03)documentsthe processbywhichthecable datawascompiledand organizedforthePLPFPRA.
b) opening of 3029/3030; c) closure of 3031/3057.                                 Scenarios PLP27, PLP34, PLP35 Possibilities for ECCS                                were revised address affects other deadhead include: a)                                  than cooldown due to a stuck open spurious SI; b) opening of                            atmospheric dump valve (ADV).
However,tofacilitateFPRA applications,upgrades,and Peerreview,the consolidatedcabledataset (combiningtheNexusand SAFEdatabases)shouldbe documentedinsucha format(includingsuch informationascableID, correspondingequipment ID,cablefunction,andcable faultconsequences,etc.)
3029/3030; c) operator                                The direct effects of a blowdown mistakenly restores power                            of a steam generator are modeled to 3027/3056 [based on                                explicitly in the PRA in terms of the false instruments] resulting                          impact on steam supply to the in deadhead of ECCS pumps.                           turbine driven AFW pump. The resulting SI signal also has PLP19: Needs final                                  potentially negative effects such as resolution;                                          load shed of bus 1E and isolation of PLP27, PLP34,PLP35: MSO                            the noncritical service water states SGADV does not                                header (CV1359) and on the need to be included because                          shrink and swell of the PCS which overcooling is not an issue                          could result in a potential demand at Palisades. However, need                          on a pressurizer safety valve (ad to consider other affects of                          described in scenario PLP42).
thatprovidesendtoend datatraceability.
SO ADV, which are: a) AFW                            Appendix F was added to 024707 pump runout; b) Faulted SG                            0005.04 to evaluate the potential may be unsuitable for decay                          for AFW pump runout on spurious heat removal in the long                              full opening of the AFW flow term [i.e.., not able to raise                        control valves to a depressurized steam].; c) Heat removal is                          steam generator.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
less than effective and                              Additional evaluation was condensate inventory                                  performed to address MSO makeup is required.                                  scenario PLP39 and added as PLP39: Need better reason                            Appendix G to 0247070005.04.
Phase2/
Page 13 of 79
Final (met)
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
Thesourcesofthecabledataare documentedintheFirePRAModel DevelopmentReport,024707 0005.03,Ref(03).
ThisSRwascategorizedasNotMetbythe Phase1Peerreview.Thefindingwas revisedtoaSuggestionintheFinalPeer reviewandsubsequentlyresolvedby documentationprovidedintheModel DevelopmentReport.
CSC401 (Finding)
DOCUMENTthereviewofthe electricaldistributionsystem overcurrentcoordinationand protectionanalysisinamanner thatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer Closed Unlikeotherelementsof thisTechnicalElement,the FirePRAReportdoesnot addressthemethodology, process,orcriteriaforthe electricalcoordinationand Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Phase2/
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Palisadeshasdocumenteda completebreakercoordination studyforallbusesconsideredin AfindinginthisSRwasidentifiedduring thePhase1Peerreview.TheCSC1 supportingrequirementwassubsequently reviewedduringboththePhase2andFinal Peerreview.
ThefindingwasrevisedduringthePhase2


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 9 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR Topic (ASME Standard Category II Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial    SR                  Disposition            Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer     Subsequent Review      Peer Status      Review Status to exclude blowdown valves                            This evaluation provides the basis as potential flow diversion                          for excluding the blowdown valves rates appear to be                                    as a potential flow diversion path.
Status 2
significant. ;                                        Additional evaluation was PLP43: Resolution for                                performed to address MSO pressurizer spray valves                              scenario PLP43 and added as states that SO spray valve                            Appendix I to 0247070005.04.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation review.
would lead to loss of                                This evaluation provides the basis subcooling. Loss of                                  for excluding spurious opening of subcooling will lead to SI                            the pressurizer spray valves from signal. Spurious spray valve                          the PRA model.
protectionanalysis.This informationwillneedtobe includedinfinaldocuments tosatisfythissupporting requirement.
opening will lead to SI in [on                        It was validated that the fault tree the order of] 5 minutes.                              referred to in PLP45 is correctly Spray valve spurious should                          identified in the CAFTA model.
thefirePRAasdescribedinEA APR95004,Ref(9).
be included in Fire PRA as leading to SI signal.                                The resolution of PLP47 was PLP45: Basic events for                              finalized with the addition of pressurizer heaters could                            evaluations in Appendices N and O not be found in CAFTA as                              of 0247070005.04 to describe the indicated in the resolution;                          treatment of boron dilution events PLP47: Resolution not final.                        in the PRA.
Peerreview,butremainedopenfollowing theFinalPeerreviewsasthebreakerco ordinationstudywasincomplete.
PLP57 PLP58: Effect of                              MSO scenarios PLP57 and PLP58 spurious operation of load                            have been finalized and sequencers not evaluated.                            incorporated into the PRA model Possible scenarios include 1)                         as described in Sections 5.57 and failure of cable causes                              5.58 of 0247070005.04.
Subsequentlythisstudywascompleted andthefindingresolvedpriortotheLAR submittal.
spurious load shed on                                The evaluations for MSO scenarios operating bus, 2) failure of                          PLP60, PLP80, and PLP84 have cable causes load of DG on                            been finalized.
ESA201 (Finding)
operating bus.                                       The modeling approach for PLP60,PLP80,PLP84: Need                            containment isolation pathways final resolution.                                    was updated as described in General: No indication of                            Attachment D of EAPSAFPIEFIRE search for containment                                1204, Ref (12). Consequential isolation failure pathways                            ISLOCA and containment bypass Page 14 of 79
REVIEWpowersupply,interlock circuits,instrumentation,and supportsystemdependencies andIDENTIFYadditional equipmentwhosefireinduced failure,includingspurious actuation,couldadverselyaffect anyoftheequipmentidentified perSRESA1.
Closed Itisunclearatthispointif allinterlock/permissive circuitswhichmayleadto specificconsequentialIEs havebeenproperly capturedforthefunctions beingcreditedinthePRA.
Thismaybeparticularly importantwherethe functioncreditedinthe AppendixRanalysisis differentfromtheFirePRA, orautoactuationofthe componentisrequiredin thePRAbutnotinAppendix R.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
Needtodocumentprocess bywhichallsupporting equipmentandinterlocks havebeenaddressed.The PRAteamappearsto recognizethisdeficiency existsatpresentandhave plansinplacestorectify onceallautoactuation modelingissuesare resolved.
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                          Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status which can contribute to                                events, potentially caused by fire, LERF.                                                 are specifically addressed in the XFRISLOCA event tree described in Section 5.6 of NBPSAETSC, Ref (11)
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
ESC101  IDENTIFY instrumentation that is  Closed    Since the full complement of    Phase 1    Phase 2/   Finding resolved by documentation    This SR was designated as not met in the (Finding) relevant to the operator actions            OMAs to be included in the    (reviewed      Final    and model update. No impact to      Phase 1 Peer review. The equipment 1
Phase2/
for which HFEs are defined or                fire PRA has yet to be        not met)   (not met)   NFPA805 analysis.                  selection (ES) element was fully reviewed modified to account for the                  identified instrument set is                          Instrumentation relevant to          during the Phase 2 Peer review and a context of fire scenarios in the            incomplete.                                            operator actions in fire scenarios  limited scope review was performed during Fire PRA, per SRs HRAB1 and                                                                       were identified and validated by    the Final Peer review.
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
HRAB2.                                                                                             completion of PostInitiator        With respect to this SR the Final Peer Operator Action Questionnaires (P  review report states:
AcompletereviewofSafety InjectionSignal(SIS),Containment HighPressure(CHP),Containment HighRadiation(CHR),Containment IsolationSignal(CIS)and RecirculationActuationSignal (RAS)logicwasperformedto identifypotentialadverse componentactuationsthatcould occurduetoaspurioussignalfrom anyofthesesources.
IOAQ).                               The identification of instrumentation to A copy of the Human Failure Event    support operator actions of omission, (HFE) PostInitiator Calculation (P carried over from the internal events PRA IC) and PIOAQ were provided to      model, is complete and comprehensive.
Logicwasaddedfor45PRA componentstoconsiderspurious operationfromanyofthe automaticactuationcircuits.
current SRO licensed onshift        While additional post fire recovery actions Operations Department personnel      may be identified during the refinement of and Training Department              the fire PRA model, it appears unlikely that personnel for use in validating HFE  significant additional instrumentation will information accuracy.               be needed to support these actions.
Report0247070005.04,Ref(4),
HFEs were assigned to Operations    The finding was not fully resolved for the Department Operating Crews and      Final Peer review, but was subsequently
wasupdatedtoreflectthese changes.
                                                                                                              /or Operations training personnel    closed prior to the LAR submittal.
Theselogicchangeswere addressedpriortotheconductof Phase2.
for review. Their reviews included ensuring indications, procedure selection and use, and activity performance manpower and timing is correct. Training personnel reviews included ensuring procedure selection and use were consistent with current training expectations, and the Page 15 of 79
ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.
ThefinalreportsummaryfortheES elementstates:
Extensivemodelingchangeshavebeen madetoexplicitlyrepresentbothrandom andfireinducedfailuresofinterlock circuits,instrumentationandassociated powersupplies.Whenthiseffortis completethemodelingofthisaspect shouldbeamongoneofthemost comprehensiveintheindustry.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 10 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status training type and frequency are accurate.
Status 2
The final set of operator manual actions (OMA), records of the current operating crews, and training personnel are provided in notebook NBPSAHR, Ref (13).
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ESA301 (Finding)
ESC201    IDENTIFY instrumentation            Closed    Instruments which provide        Phase 1    Phase 2/   Finding resolved by documentation  This SR was designated as not met in the (Finding)   associated with each operator                supporting cues for            (reviewed      Final    and model update. No impact to      Phase 1 Peer review. The equipment 1
INCLUDEequipmentwhosefire inducedfailure,notincluding spuriousoperation,contributes toorcauses (a)fireinducedinitiatingevents treatedintheFireSafe Shutdown/AppendixRanalysis (b)InternalEventsPRAinitiators asidentifiedusingtheIE requirementsinPart2(including anygradationsacrosscapability categoriesinthatstandard)as modifiedper42.5,or (c)uniquefireinducedinitiating eventsnotaddressedor otherwisescreenedfromthe abovetwoanalysesifSRIEC4in Part2cannotbemet Closed Thereviewofinitiating eventsconsideredinthe internaleventsanalysisis describedinReport0247 070005.03AppendixB.A rationaleforreexamining thescreeningprocessto identifynewIEswhichmay havebeenscreenedor subsumedinthatanalysisis discussed.Nonewinitiating eventsoradditional equipmentwereidentified.
action to be addressed, based on              operator actions have been      not met)    (not met)   NFPA805 analysis.                 selection (ES) element was fully reviewed the following: fireinduced failure          identified and are being                                A simulator exercise was            during the Phase 2 Peer review and a of any single instrument whereby              explicitly modeled in the fire                          performed with current Palisades  limited scope review was performed during one of the modes of failure to be            PRA together with their                                  license holders in which several    the Final Peer review.
However,thereview processundertakenisnot welldocumented.Itis unclear,e.g.,ifmultiple coincidentpathwayswere addressedwhenidentifying thesizeofLOCAthatmay beinducedbyfireandany potentialsuccesscriteria conflictswhichmayarisein themappingofthefire inducedIEtotheinternal eventsIE.(e.g.verysmall LOCA,SmallLOCAvs.
considered is spurious operation              associated power supplies                                scenarios were evaluated to        With respect to this SR the Final Peer of the instrument. and fire                                                                          determine how Operators would      review report states:
mediumLOCA).(Notethe sameconcernsarisewhen addressingthescreening processforContainment isolationpathwayswhere suchpathwayswere screenedonthesizeofa singlepathway.)
induced failure, including                    Undesired operator actions                              respond given spurious or false spurious indication, even if they            potentially occurring as a                                                                  Phase 2: The identification of operator instrument indications. The results actions of commission arising due to fire are not relevant to the HFEs for              result of spurious plant                                of these exercises were considered which instrumentation is                      monitoring and alarm                                                                        induced spurious alarms has not been in the HFE development process. completed as yet. While this is can be a identified within the scope                  instruments do not appear                                The process and evaluation results defined by ESC1, if the failure              to have been addressed at                                                                    fairly extensive effort very few alarms are documented in NBPSAHR, Ref    typically remain unscreened and require could cause an undesired                      the present time. Neither                                (13).
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
operator action related to that              has a process for identifying,                                                              explicit modeling.
portion of the plant design                  screening and modeling                                                                      Final: Extensive effort has been conducted.
credited in the analysis.                    such occurrences been                                                                        Documentation is progressing.
discussed. This should be                                                                    The finding was not fully resolved for the addressed.                                                                                   Final Peer review, but was subsequently closed prior to the LAR submittal.
ESD101    DOCUMENT the identified            Closed    Plant specific validation of      Phase 1    Phase 2/  Suggestion resolved by              This SR was designated as not met in the (Suggestion) equipment in a manner that                    the rationale for excluding    (reviewed      Final    documentation and model update. Phase 1 Peer review. The equipment 1
facilitates Fire PRA applications,            fire induced failure of trip    not met)    (not met)  No impact to NFPA805 analysis. selection (ES) element was fully reviewed upgrades, and Peer review and is              should be provided under                                MSO Scenario PLP38 was revised    during the Phase 2 Peer review and a sufficient to support the other                                                                                                            limited scope review was performed during Page 16 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
Phase2/
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status Fire PRA tasks so that                        MSO PLP38.                                              as documented in Section 5.38 of    the Final Peer review.
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
(a) it is clear which equipment                                                                        0247070005.04, Ref (4). The PRA  The suggestion was not fully resolved for will be associated with                                                                                model was updated to include        the Final Peer review, but was determining initiating events in                                                                      spurious operation of the AFW      subsequently closed prior to the LAR the Fire PRA plant response                                                                            pump low suction pressure trips. submittal.
AppendixBofRef(3)wasupdated toprovideadditionaldetailasto howinitiatingeventswere screenedastotheirapplicability forfirescenarios.
model for the postulated fires (b) the equipment and its failures including spurious operation or indication can be modeled appropriately (c) cables associated with the equipment can be identified (d) failure modes of interest for the equipment are clear so as to support circuit analyses if required Justifications are provided with regard to equipment considered but screened out of the Fire PRA including when meeting SR ESA3 relevant to meeting SR IEC4 in Part 2 for initiating events, meeting SR ESB6 for the mitigating equipment to be credited in the Fire PRA, and using the "exception" under SR ESC2 for instrumentation considerations.
Thesuccesscriteriafor consequentialLOCAeventsand theirassociatedpathwaysand sizeswereupdatedinSection5.0 ofnotebookNBPSAETSC,Ref (11).Theupdatednotebook detailsconsequentialLOCAevents thatmayresultfromfireincluding:
FQA401  QUANTIFY the fireinduced CDF        Closed    Many of the accident              Phase 2      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  The fire risk quantification (FQ) element 1
multipleprimarycoolantpump (PCP)sealfailures,demandsonthe pressurizersafetyvalves,and spuriousoperationofthereactor headventandletdownisolation valves.Additionaldetailwasalso addedtoreport0247070005.04, Ref(4),forthePCPsealfailures andchemicalandvolumecontrol system(CVCS)pathways.
(Finding) in accordance with HLRQUA and                sequences involve a Fire        (reviewed    (not met) and model update. No impact to      was reviewed in detail in both the Phase 2 its SRs in Part 2 with the                    initiator which goes straight    not met)              NFPA805 analysis.                 and Final Peer reviews.
Themodelingapproachfor containmentisolationpathways wasupdatedasdescribedin AttachmentDofEAPSAFPIEFIRE 1204,Ref(12).Consequential ISLOCAevents,potentiallycaused byfire,arespecificallyaddressed intheXFRISLOCAeventtree describedinSection5.6ofNBPSA ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.
following clarification:                      to core damage [i.e.., there                            Recovery actions and proposed      The finding in this SR was provided during (a) quantification is to include the          is no success path]. This                              modifications have been            the Final Peer review.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedbyfullydocumentingconsequential LOCAeventdevelopmentintheeventtree andsuccesscriterianotebookpriortothe LARsubmittal.
fire ignition frequency (per the              implies a single fire event                            incorporated into the final version IGN requirements) and fire                    can fail both trains of safe                                                                With respect to the FQ element the Final Page 17 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 11 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status specific conditional damage                shutdown capability. The                            of the fire PRA model. The final    report states:
Status 2
probability factors (per the FSS            CDF is too high to accept so                        model has no sequences with a       Overall process is consistent with prevailing requirements)                               many individual sequences                            conditional core damage            good practices. Results are not final and (b) QUA4 in Part 2 is to be met            with no success path. There                          probability of 1. Results are      thus certain SRs cannot be demonstrated based on meeting HLRHRAD in              has not been sufficient                              described in Appendix B of 0247    to have been met. Continuing the 42.10                                      investigation done to                                070005.01, Fire Risk              refinement in process and planned provides and                                        indicate whether recovery                            Quantification and Summary, Ref    confidence this technical element will meet DEVELOP a defined basis to                  actions are truly not                                (1).                               the Standard.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ETSC,Ref(11).
support the claim of                        possible, or simply not nonapplicability of any of the              modeled yet.                                                                             The finding was not fully resolved for the requirements under HLRQUA in                                                                                                      Final Peer review, but was subsequently Part 2.                                                                                                                              closed prior to the LAR submittal.
ESA501 (Finding)
FQB101  PERFORM the quantification in    Closed    QUB3 requires                  Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  The fire risk quantification (FQ) element (Finding) accordance with HLRQUB and                demonstration of                (met)        (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805      was reviewed in detail in both the Phase 2 its SRs in Part 2                          acceptable truncation value                          analysis.                          and Final Peer reviews.
CONSIDERuptoandincluding twospuriousactuationsof equipmentaloneorin combinationwithotherfire inducedlossoffunctionfailures forthespecialcasewherefire inducedfailurescouldcontribute notonlytoaninitiatingeventbut alsosimultaneouslyeither (a)affectthe operability/functionalityofthat portionoftheplantdesigntobe creditedinresponsetothe initiatingeventintheFirePRA (b)resultinaninitiatingevent wherethemitigatingfunctionis notaddressedintheFireSafe Shutdown/AppendixRAnalysisor (c)resultinalossofreactor coolantsystemintegrity Closed AreviewoftheMSOreport 024707000504Appendix Afoundseveraldeficiencies.
and                                        by an iterative convergence                          The convergence process to          The finding in this SR was initially noted DEVELOP a defined basis to                  process. The PLP fire PRA                            determine acceptable truncation    during Final Peer review and subsequently support the claim of                        does not have this process.                         limits for the final fire PRA model resolved by documenting the convergence nonapplicability of any of the              Although there is no                                were documented in Section 6 of    process to determine acceptable requirements under HLRQUB in              indication the current                              0247070005.01, Ref (1). The      truncation limits.
Theseareindicatedbelow.
Part 2.                                    truncation value is not                              truncation levels are based on acceptable, the convergence                          convergence calculations per the process exercise was not                            ASME PRA standard, which states done.                                               that convergence can be considered sufficient when successive reductions in truncation value of one decade result in decreasing changes in CDF or LERF, and the final change is less than 5%.
General:TheMSOpanel wasconvenedin2008.
FQC101  ADDRESS dependencies during      Open      PRA document NBPSAHR        Phase 1       Final  This finding is considered open    The fire risk quantification (FQ) element (Finding) the Fire PRA plant response                1, Rev 3 provides an HEP          (not    (reviewed given that the procedure            was reviewed in detail in both the Phase 2 model quantification in                    dependency analysis and      reviewed)     not met) development, modification          and Final Peer reviews.
Westinghousepublishedthe latestMSOreportinApril 2009[WCAPNP16933].
Page 18 of 79
ThecurrentMSOreference numbersanddescriptionin AppendixAdonotmatch thelistinWCAPNP16933.
Therearesomenewissues whicharenotcoveredby thecurrentMSOpanel report.
Suggestafinalreconciliation oftheMSOpanelresults
[eitherwithanewpanel meetingorarewriteofthe report]withWCAPNP 16933.
PLP1,PLP2,PLP3:The MSOdescriptionsinthese WCAPissuesareintended forWestinghouseplants whichhave2diverse methodsofsealcooling.The MSOreportstatestheissue isnotapplicabletoPLP.
However,itisnecessaryto ensurethatallfailure combinationsoflossofCCW Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Phase2/
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
TheMSOexpertpanelwas reconvenedon03/15/2011atthe Palisadessitetoaddressall additions,deletionsand/or changestotheMSOassessment thathaveoccurredduetopost expertpanelreviewsandin considerationofthemostcurrent informationavailablefromthe PWROGOwnersGroup.The resultsofthisexpertpanelreview aredocumentedin024707 0005.04,MultipleSpurious Operations,Ref(4).
PLP1,PLP2,andPLP3were updatedinreport024707 0005.04.PalisadesPCPsealLOCA modelhasbeenupdatedtobe consistentwiththelatestindustry guidance(WCAP15749P,Revision 1,Guidanceforthe ImplementationoftheCEOG ModelforFailureofRCPSeals GivenLossofSealCooling(Task 2083),CombustionEngineering OwnersGroup(CEOG),December 2008).Furtherdetailisprovidedin AppendixBof0247070005.04.
PLP10wasfinalizedas documentedin0247070005.04 ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedbyincorporatingmodelinglogicand updatingtheMSOreportpriortotheLAR submittal.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 12 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion    SR Initial    SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                       Peer     Subsequent Review      Peer Status      Review Status accordance with HLRQUC and                develops adjustment factors                        detailed development, and              This finding remains open as detailed HEPs its SRs in Part 2                          to apply to the cutsets.                           operations reviews are ongoing.        cannot be developed until updated and                                        Multiple HFE's are evaluated                        A dependency analysis was              procedures and modification details are DEVELOP a defined basis to                  for dependencies using the                          completed to identify                  complete.
Status 2
support the claim of                        EPRI HRA calculator.                               combinations of human failure nonapplicability of any of the              Dependency adjustment                              events (HFEs) in which requirements under HLRQUC in              factors are developed and                          dependencies between actions Part 2.                                     applied in the cutsets.                             may contribute to an increase in However, the "Q" model                              core damage frequency (CDF)
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation sealcoolingareincludedfor PLP.
[which was reviewed] does                          when compared to the CDF not incorporate this work.                         calculated when screening values Therefore the F&O and the                          for human error probabilities not met assessment.                                 (HEPs) are used.
PLP10:Resolutionnot final.;
Dependencies between actions were assigned based on sequence specific evaluations of cues, timing, location, and available resources, and the HEPs adjusted if necessary to represent the level of dependence; the CDF was then recalculated using the modified HEPs. HFEs not explicitly evaluated for dependence were assigned HEPs of 1 (i.e., the represented operator actions are assumed to fail with a probability of unity), and thus the resulting CDF represents an upper bound for the potential impact of dependencies upon the results. Shared cues conservatively assumed 100% dependence. This approach has identified important HFEs for which the completion of detailed human reliability analyses may be beneficial.
PLP11:WCAPissue misunderstoodbyMSO panel.Issueisforclosureof bothRWSTsuctionvalves andisapplicabletoPLP.
Page 19 of 79
Simultaneousspurious closureofCV3031and CV3057isthisissue.;
PLP12:Resolutionnotfinal PLP14:InWCAPNP16933, issue14isapplicableto Palisades.Issue14isCHP runoutwhenRCSis depressurized.Palisades needstolookatpump runoutpossibilityforall ECCS,CCW,AFW,andSWS pumps.;
PLP18:ResolutionforPLP 18statesRWSTmaydrain, whichisnotconsideredin PRA.IfRASoccursandCV 3029orCV03030opens, RWSTwillnotdrain, becauseofcheckvalvein sumpline.Other possibilitiesinvolving deadhead/NPSHofECCS pumpsarenotexplored.If 3029/3030openona Section5.10.ThePRAmodelwas updatedtoincludespuriousvalve failurestoaddressthisMSO.
PLP11iscorrectlyevaluatedin report0247070005.04Section 5.11.TheMSOpanelcorrectly understoodthescenario.
Simultaneousspuriousclosureof CV3031andCV3057doesnot isolatechargingsuctionfromthe SIRWTasthechargingsuctionis fromaseparatenozzle.Closureof thesevalvesisaddressedinMSO scenarioswhichimpactthe engineeredsafeguardspumps.
MSOscenarioPLP10considers spuriousisolationofcharging pumpsuctionvalves,including thosewhichwouldisolatecharging fromtheSIRWT.
TheresolutionofMSOscenario PLP12wascompletedinSection 5.12of0247070005.04.Spurious closureofMO2087duetofirewas addedtothePRAmodel.
EvaluationofPLP14wasupdated inSection5.14of024707 0005.04.Theevaluationnow describeshowthisscenariois addressedinthemodel.
MSOscenarioPLP18wasupdated.
Theevaluationdescribesmodel changesincorporatedtoexplicitly addressearlydraindownofthe SIRWTinthePRAmodelanddead


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 13 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status The fire PRA HRA dependency analysis is documented in NBPSA HR, Ref (13).
Status 2
Screening values are still applied for fire HEPs pending development of final procedures, modifications, and operations reviews.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation spurioussignal, CV3031/CV3057and CV3027/3056willreceivea signaltoclose.Poweris disabledto3027/3056.
FQE101  IDENTIFY significant contributors    Closed    The discussion of dominant      Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  The fire risk quantification (FQ) element (Finding) in accordance with HLRQUD                    results is not presented in        (not    (reviewed  update. No impact to NFPA805      was reviewed in detail in both the Phase 2 1
Scenariosforinsufficient NPSHincludea)spuriousSI; b)openingof3029/3030;c) closureof3031/3057.
and HLRLEF and their SRs in Part            the 0247070005.01. The      reviewed)   not met)   analysis.                          and Final Peer reviews.
PossibilitiesforECCS deadheadinclude:a) spuriousSI;b)openingof 3029/3030;c)operator mistakenlyrestorespower to3027/3056[basedon falseinstruments]resulting indeadheadofECCSpumps.
2 with the following clarifications:           results are categorized and                            Section 6.0 of 0247070005.01,     The finding was not fully resolved for the (a) SR QUD5a and QUD5b of                    sorted in terms of the                                Fire Risk Quantification and      Final Peer review, but was subsequently Part 2 are to be met including                dominant contributors [as                              Summary, Ref (1), was revised to  closed prior to the LAR submittal.
PLP19:Needsfinal resolution; PLP27,PLP34,PLP35:MSO statesSGADVdoesnot needtobeincludedbecause overcoolingisnotanissue atPalisades.However,need toconsiderotheraffectsof SOADV,whichare:a)AFW pumprunout;b)FaultedSG maybeunsuitablefordecay heatremovalinthelong term[i.e..,notabletoraise steam].;c)Heatremovalis lessthaneffectiveand condensateinventory makeupisrequired.
identification of which fire                  per FQE1], but there is no                            include a discussion of the scenarios and which physical                  discussion as required by                              dominant results.
PLP39:Needbetterreason headingoftheECCSpumps.
analysis units (consistent with the            this SR.
PLP19wasfinalizedperSection 5.19of0247070005.04.This scenarioinvolvesearlydraindown oftheSIRWTviacontainment sprayandisaddressedinthe resolutiontoscenarioPLP18.
level of resolution of the Fire PRA such as fire area or fire compartment) are significant contributors (b) SR QUD5b of Part 2 is to be met recognizing that "component" in Part 2 is generally equivalent to "equipment" in this Standard (c) SR QUD3 for comparison to similar plants is not applicable (d) SR LEF3 including the "Note" for that SR of Part 2 is to be met (1) following HLRQUD of Part 2 with the clarifications above concerning SRs QUD5a and QU D5b.
ScenariosPLP27,PLP34,PLP35 wererevisedaddressaffectsother thancooldownduetoastuckopen atmosphericdumpvalve(ADV).
(2) but the uncertainty Page 20 of 79
Thedirecteffectsofablowdown ofasteamgeneratoraremodeled explicitlyinthePRAintermsofthe impactonsteamsupplytothe turbinedrivenAFWpump.The resultingSIsignalalsohas potentiallynegativeeffectssuchas loadshedofbus1Eandisolationof thenoncriticalservicewater header(CV1359)andonthe shrinkandswellofthePCSwhich couldresultinapotentialdemand onapressurizersafetyvalve(ad describedinscenarioPLP42).
AppendixFwasaddedto024707 0005.04toevaluatethepotential forAFWpumprunoutonspurious fullopeningoftheAFWflow controlvalvestoadepressurized steamgenerator.
Additionalevaluationwas performedtoaddressMSO scenarioPLP39andaddedas AppendixGto0247070005.04.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 14 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status requirement and reference to Table 22.76(e) in Part 2 does not apply here. See 42.13.
Status 2
and DEVELOP a defined basis to support the claim of nonapplicability of any of the requirements under these sections in Part 2.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation toexcludeblowdownvalves aspotentialflowdiversion ratesappeartobe significant.;
FSSA101 IDENTIFY all riskrelevant ignition Closed    The treatment of MCC's is      Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) sources, both fixed and transient,           not properly justified. FSS      (met)      (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS) in each unscreened physical                  document 0247070005.06                            analysis.                           element was in progress. A detailed analysis unit within the global              includes the statement "All                          Section 6.1 of 0247070005.06,      assessment of the FSS supporting analysis boundary                            Motor Control Centers                                Ref (6), has been revised to include requirements was performed during the (MCC) have been treated as                          a reference to the walkdown          Final Peer review.
PLP43:Resolutionfor pressurizersprayvalves statesthatSOsprayvalve wouldleadtolossof subcooling.Lossof subcoolingwillleadtoSI signal.Spurioussprayvalve openingwillleadtoSIin[on theorderof]5minutes.
closed, sealed and robust in                        information and photographs          This finding was identified during the Final which damage beyond the                              which provide a basis for this      Peer review and resolved by subsequent ignition source will not be                          statement.                           documentation update.
Sprayvalvespuriousshould beincludedinFirePRAas leadingtoSIsignal.
postulated." No documentation of                                                                          From the Final Peer review summary:
PLP45:Basiceventsfor pressurizerheaterscould notbefoundinCAFTAas indicatedintheresolution; PLP47:Resolutionnotfinal.
inspections of the MCC's,                                                                 Significant progress has been made in including the top of the                                                                  support of the FSS technical elements cabinets have been                                                                        (Mathcad, detailed analysis on areas such provided to justify not                                                                  as PAU 4 (1C); documentation is in propagating fires outside                                                                progress). This progress allowed the peer the MCC.                                                                                  review team to conduct a review of the fire scenario selection analysis.
PLP57PLP58:Effectof spuriousoperationofload sequencersnotevaluated.
* All supporting requirements in FSS have been reviewed, which is evidence of all the work conducted over the last period.
Possiblescenariosinclude1) failureofcablecauses spuriousloadshedon operatingbus,2)failureof cablecausesloadofDGon operatingbus.
* The inconsistencies identified in earlier reviews have been generally addressed.
PLP60,PLP80,PLP84:Need finalresolution.
* The comments generated from this Page 21 of 79
General:Noindicationof searchforcontainment isolationfailurepathways Thisevaluationprovidesthebasis forexcludingtheblowdownvalves asapotentialflowdiversionpath.
Additionalevaluationwas performedtoaddressMSO scenarioPLP43andaddedas AppendixIto0247070005.04.
Thisevaluationprovidesthebasis forexcludingspuriousopeningof thepressurizersprayvalvesfrom thePRAmodel.
Itwasvalidatedthatthefaulttree referredtoinPLP45iscorrectly identifiedintheCAFTAmodel.
TheresolutionofPLP47was finalizedwiththeadditionof evaluationsinAppendicesNandO of0247070005.04todescribethe treatmentofborondilutionevents inthePRA.
MSOscenariosPLP57andPLP58 havebeenfinalizedand incorporatedintothePRAmodel asdescribedinSections5.57and 5.58of0247070005.04.
TheevaluationsforMSOscenarios PLP60,PLP80,andPLP84have beenfinalized.
Themodelingapproachfor containmentisolationpathways wasupdatedasdescribedin AttachmentDofEAPSAFPIEFIRE 1204,Ref(12).Consequential ISLOCAandcontainmentbypass


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 15 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status review are for the most part directed to individual SRs and should not impact the overall technical strategy currently in placed to meet the FSS requirements.
Status 2
FSSA301 If the exact routing of a cable (or Closed    The process of mapping and      Phase 1        Final  Finding resolved by documentation  During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire 1
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation whichcancontributeto LERF.
(Finding) group of cables) has not been                accounting for targets in the  (reviewed   (not met)   update. No impact to NFPA805      scenario selection and analysis (FSS) established (see SRs CSA10 and              Fire PRA is not documented. not met)               analysis.                          element was in progress. A detailed CSA11), ASSUME that those                    Technical discussion during                              In the event that a cables plant  assessment of the FSS supporting cables fail for any fire scenario            the review period indicates                            location cannot be established, the requirements was performed during the that has a damaging effect on                that targets with unknown                              process of crediting by assumed    Final Peer review.
events,potentiallycausedbyfire, arespecificallyaddressedinthe XFRISLOCAeventtreedescribedin Section5.6ofNBPSAETSC,Ref (11)
any raceway or conduit where                  routing are mapped to all                              routing was performed. The          The finding was not fully resolved for the the subject cable might                      the scenarios within a PAU                              process involved determining, with  Final Peer review, but was subsequently reasonably exist.                             unless it has been verified                            a high degree of confidence,       closed prior to the LAR submittal.
ESC101 (Finding)
that the target is not in a                            locations in the plant that do not specific scenario. However,                             contain the cable in question. This this process was not clearly                            is accomplished by considering the demonstrated during the                                likely routing of a cable and was review and is not                                      performed by experienced plant documented in report 0247                              personnel. In many cases, this 070005.06.                                            assessment was made by grouping components into an appropriate surrogate category (as described in section 5.3 of the Model Development Report # 024707 0005.03, Ref (3)). The results of this detailed assessment are provided in Appendix I of the Model Development Report 0247 070005.03.
IDENTIFYinstrumentationthatis relevanttotheoperatoractions forwhichHFEsaredefinedor modifiedtoaccountforthe contextoffirescenariosinthe FirePRA,perSRsHRAB1and HRAB2.
FSSB101 DEFINE and JUSTIFY the              Open      The current Fire PRA does        Phase 1        Final  Finding open. Control room          During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) conditions that are assumed to                not consider abandonment          (met)      (not met)  abandonment scenarios with          scenario selection and analysis (FSS) cause MCR abandonment and/or                  of the main control room                                respect to environmental effects    element was in progress. A detailed reliance on excontrol room                  due to lack of                                          have been addressed. However,      assessment of the FSS supporting Page 22 of 79
Closed Sincethefullcomplementof OMAstobeincludedinthe firePRAhasyettobe identifiedinstrumentsetis incomplete.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Phase2/
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
Instrumentationrelevantto operatoractionsinfirescenarios wereidentifiedandvalidatedby completionofPostInitiator OperatorActionQuestionnaires(P IOAQ).
AcopyoftheHumanFailureEvent (HFE)PostInitiatorCalculation(P IC)andPIOAQwereprovidedto currentSROlicensedonshift OperationsDepartmentpersonnel andTrainingDepartment personnelforuseinvalidatingHFE informationaccuracy.
HFEswereassignedtoOperations DepartmentOperatingCrewsand
/orOperationstrainingpersonnel forreview.Theirreviewsincluded ensuringindications,procedure selectionanduse,andactivity performancemanpowerand timingiscorrect.Training personnelreviewsincluded ensuringprocedureselectionand usewereconsistentwithcurrent trainingexpectations,andthe ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.
WithrespecttothisSRtheFinalPeer reviewreportstates:
Theidentificationofinstrumentationto supportoperatoractionsofomission, carriedoverfromtheinternaleventsPRA model,iscompleteandcomprehensive.
Whileadditionalpostfirerecoveryactions maybeidentifiedduringtherefinementof thefirePRAmodel,itappearsunlikelythat significantadditionalinstrumentationwill beneededtosupporttheseactions.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 16 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion    SR Initial      SR                    Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status operator actions including                  equipment/control due to                            the current model does not          requirements was performed during the remote and/or alternate                    fire damage.                                        specifically identify scenarios that Final Peer review.
Status 2
shutdown actions.                                                                                result in abandonment due to        Equipment damage leading to control equipment damage.                    room abandonment is addressed in the Fire PRA model; however, this finding remains open pending formal development of the list of equipment whose fire induced damage could cause control room abandonment. The model includes logic at the component level for operation of key equipment outside of the control room as prescribed for control room abandonment such as local operation of equipment at EC 150, and for other local actions such as local control of P8B. These sequences are evaluated for all scenarios, not only scenarios where the control room abandonment event tree is employed (control room evacuation due to smoke or high temperature).
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation trainingtypeandfrequencyare accurate.
FSSB201 SELECT one or more fire          Closed    The CCDP quantification        Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    A finding was identified during the initial 1
Thefinalsetofoperatormanual actions(OMA),recordsofthe currentoperatingcrews,and trainingpersonnelareprovidedin notebookNBPSAHR,Ref(13).
(Finding) scenarios, either in the MCR or            does not reflect the human  (reviewed    (not met)  and model update. No impact to      Peer review and modified as part of the elsewhere, leading to MCR                  error probabilities              met)                NFPA805 analysis.                  Final Peer review. As indicated the abandonment and/or a reliance              associated with control                              Main Control room abandonment        identified issue was corrected. This is on excontrol room operator                room abandonment and the                            scenarios have been postulated      consistent with the Peer review team final actions including remote and/or            fire impacted cables may                            based on damage to equipment        assessment for FSS which indicated:
ESC201 (Finding)
alternate shutdown actions,                 not reflect the                                      and controls. Postulated fires in    The comments generated from this review consisting of a combination of an          equipment/control that may                          the Control Room (CR) have the      are for the most part directed toward ignition source (or group of                or may not be available                              potential to challenge habitability  individual SRs and should not impact the ignition sources), such that the            after abandonment.                                  or visibility due to smoke          overall technical strategy currently in place selected scenarios provide                                                                      generation or excessive heat. An    to meet the FSS requirements.
IDENTIFYinstrumentation associatedwitheachoperator actiontobeaddressed,basedon thefollowing:fireinducedfailure ofanysingleinstrumentwhereby oneofthemodesoffailuretobe consideredisspuriousoperation oftheinstrument.andfire inducedfailure,including spuriousindication,evenifthey arenotrelevanttotheHFEsfor whichinstrumentationis identifiedwithinthescope definedbyESC1,ifthefailure couldcauseanundesired operatoractionrelatedtothat portionoftheplantdesign creditedintheanalysis.
reasonable assurance that the                                                                    abandonment analysis MCR abandonment fire risk                                                                                                              The specific concern cited by the peer (Attachment 1 of 0247070005.06, Page 23 of 79
Closed Instrumentswhichprovide supportingcuesfor operatoractionshavebeen identifiedandarebeing explicitlymodeledinthefire PRAtogetherwiththeir associatedpowersupplies


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
Undesiredoperatoractions potentiallyoccurringasa resultofspuriousplant monitoringandalarm instrumentsdonotappear tohavebeenaddressedat thepresenttime.Neither hasaprocessforidentifying, screeningandmodeling suchoccurrencesbeen discussed.Thisshouldbe addressed.
SR      Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                          Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status contribution can be realistically                                                                  Ref (6)) was performed to          review team during the review was that characterized.                                                                                     determine the response of the CR    only individual cabinet failures were envelope given a range of possible  considered for control room abandonment fire events. The analysis          scenarios. The revised treatment considered three different          considers three multiple cabinet failure operating states of the CR          groups which when combined encompass mechanical ventilation system and  all the cabinets in the control room.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
three different configurations of  The quantification for these three the CR Door. Based on this          scenarios reflect the human error assessment, three scenarios, each  probabilities associated with control room involving multiple cabinets, were  abandonment and the fire impacted cables implemented into the model.        that are not available after abandonment.
Phase2/
Human actions that could not be performed prior to the time control room abandonment was necessary were considered failed.
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
FSSC301    JUSTIFY the heat release rate      Closed    The supporting requirement      Phase 1      Final   Suggestion resolved by              During Phase 1 fire burnout times appear (Suggestion) profile stages included in the                states that the growth        (reviewed      (met)  documentation update. No impact    not to be a factor affecting the analysis analysis (i.e., fire growth, steady          stages included in the            as not              to NFPA805 analysis                results.
Asimulatorexercisewas performedwithcurrentPalisades licenseholdersinwhichseveral scenarioswereevaluatedto determinehowOperatorswould respondgivenspuriousorfalse instrumentindications.Theresults oftheseexerciseswereconsidered intheHFEdevelopmentprocess.
burning, or decay stages).                   analysis should be justified. applicable)            The Model Development Report,      Subsequent to the Phase 1 review, the fire The justification is not                              Ref (3), was revised to include a  growth stages were applied in the analysis.
Theprocessandevaluationresults aredocumentedinNBPSAHR,Ref (13).
included in the                                      discussion of the treatment for the documentation.                                                                           Hence, the Phase 1 not applicable growth stages of a fires heat      determination changed to a met, release rate.                       satisfying capability category II/III.
ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.
This suggestion was closed prior to the LAR submittal.
WithrespecttothisSRtheFinalPeer reviewreportstates:
FSSC401    If a severity factor is credited in Closed    The severity factor for          Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding)   the analysis, ENSURE that                    hotwork fires of 0.01 is not  (reviewed     (met)  and model update. No impact to      scenario selection and analysis (FSS)
Phase2:Theidentificationofoperator actionsofcommissionarisingduetofire inducedspuriousalarmshasnotbeen completedasyet.Whilethisiscanbea fairlyextensiveeffortveryfewalarms typicallyremainunscreenedandrequire explicitmodeling.
(a) the severity factor remains              properly justified. The        not met)              NFPA805 analysis.                 element was in progress. A detailed independent of other                          documentation does not                                The 0.01 severity factor for        assessment of the FSS supporting quantification factors                        provide a description how                            hotwork is no longer applied in    requirements was performed during the Page 24 of 79
Final:Extensiveefforthasbeenconducted.
Documentationisprogressing.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
ESD101 (Suggestion)
DOCUMENTtheidentified equipmentinamannerthat facilitatesFirePRAapplications, upgrades,andPeerreviewandis sufficienttosupporttheother Closed Plantspecificvalidationof therationaleforexcluding fireinducedfailureoftrip shouldbeprovidedunder Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Phase2/
Final (notmet) 1 Suggestionresolvedby documentationandmodelupdate.
NoimpacttoNFPA805analysis.
MSOScenarioPLP38wasrevised ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 17 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status (b) the severity factor reflects the          the value was calculated                              final fire PRA model. Severity      Final Peer review.
Status 2
fire event set used to estimate                and an explanation of why                            factors are now based on            This finding was identified during the Final fire frequency                                the value remains                                    NUREG/CR6850. Section 8.3 of        Peer review and resolved by subsequent (c) the severity factor reflects the          independent of the generic                            0247070005.06, Ref (6), was        documentation and model update.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation FirePRAtaskssothat (a)itisclearwhichequipment willbeassociatedwith determininginitiatingeventsin theFirePRAplantresponse modelforthepostulatedfires (b)theequipmentanditsfailures includingspuriousoperationor indicationcanbemodeled appropriately (c)cablesassociatedwiththe equipmentcanbeidentified (d)failuremodesofinterestfor theequipmentareclearsoasto supportcircuitanalysesif requiredJustificationsare providedwithregardto equipmentconsideredbut screenedoutoftheFirePRA includingwhenmeetingSRESA3 relevanttomeetingSRIEC4in Part2forinitiatingevents, meetingSRESB6forthe mitigatingequipmenttobe creditedintheFirePRA,and usingthe"exception"underSR ESC2forinstrumentation considerations.
conditions and assumptions of                  ignition frequency.                                  updated to reflect this change.
MSOPLP38.
the specific fire scenarios under analysis, and (d) a technical basis supporting the severity factors determination is provided FSSC501 JUSTIFY that the damage criteria    Closed    No scenario is evaluated for    Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    This finding was identified during the Final (Finding) used in the Fire PRA are                      conditions where the target  (reviewed      (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805        Peer review. As indicated the identified representative of the damage                  damage criteria is that of        met)                analysis.                            issue was corrected. This is consistent targets associated with each fire              sensitive electronics.                                Section 5.2 of 0247070005.06,     with the Peer review team final Ref (6), was revised to provide      assessment for FSS which indicated:
asdocumentedinSection5.38of 0247070005.04,Ref(4).ThePRA modelwasupdatedtoinclude spuriousoperationoftheAFW pumplowsuctionpressuretrips.
further basis for excluding          The comments generated from this review scenarios with the sensitive        are for the most part directed toward electronics criteria. The exclusion  individual SRs and should not impact the is based primarily on physical      overall technical strategy currently in place cabinet distances from fire ignition to meet the FSS requirements.
theFinalPeerreview.
sources and that these targets are generally within an enclosure that provides some protection from the heat source.
Thesuggestionwasnotfullyresolvedfor theFinalPeerreview,butwas subsequentlyclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.
FSSC701 If multiple suppression paths are    Closed    No evaluation of                Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    Suppression capabilities were initially not 1
FQA401 (Finding)
(Finding) credited, EVALUATE and                        independence of              (reviewed    (not met) update. No impact to NFPA805        credited.
QUANTIFYthefireinducedCDF inaccordancewithHLRQUAand itsSRsinPart2withthe followingclarification:
PROPERLY MODEL dependencies                    suppression paths has been      as not              analysis.                           Subsequent analysis identified the among the credited paths                      included in the analysis. applicable)             Section 10.1 of 0247070005.06,    treatment of dependence between including dependencies                                                                              Fire Scenario Development, Ref    suppression paths in the scenario associated with recovery of a                                                                        (6), was revised to describe the    suppression event tree as described in the failed fire suppression system, if                                                                  treatment of dependence between      disposition column.
(a)quantificationistoincludethe fireignitionfrequency(perthe IGNrequirements)andfire Closed Manyoftheaccident sequencesinvolveaFire initiatorwhichgoesstraight tocoredamage[i.e..,there isnosuccesspath].This impliesasinglefireevent canfailbothtrainsofsafe Phase2 (reviewed notmet)
such recovery is credited.                                                                           suppression paths in the scenario    The finding was not fully resolved for the Page 25 of 79
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
Recoveryactionsandproposed modificationshavebeen incorporatedintothefinalversion Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.
ThefindinginthisSRwasprovidedduring theFinalPeerreview.
WithrespecttotheFQelementtheFinal


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 18 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status suppression event tree.              Final Peer review, but was subsequently closed prior to the LAR submittal.
Status 2
FSSC801 If raceway fire wraps are          Closed    The report does not discuss      Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire 1
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation specificconditionaldamage probabilityfactors(pertheFSS requirements)
(Finding) credited,                                    the treatment of fire          (reviewed    (not met) update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS)
(b)QUA4inPart2istobemet basedonmeetingHLRHRADin 42.10 and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRQUAin Part2.
(a) ESTABLISH a technical basis              barriers credited in the          as not              analysis.                             element was in progress. A detailed for their fireresistance rating,             analysis.                       applicable)              Documentation was added to          assessment of the FSS supporting and                                                                                                  Section 2.2 of report 024707        requirements was performed during the (b) CONFIRM that the fire wrap                                                                        0005.02, Ref (2), which discusses    Final Peer review.
shutdowncapability.The CDFistoohightoacceptso manyindividualsequences withnosuccesspath.There hasnotbeensufficient investigationdoneto indicatewhetherrecovery actionsaretrulynot possible,orsimplynot modeledyet.
will not be subject to either                                                                        the treatment of fire barriers        The finding was not fully resolved for the mechanical damage or direct                                                                          credited in the analysis. Credit for  Final Peer review, but was subsequently flame impingement from a high                                                                        raceway fire barriers, thermal        closed prior to the LAR submittal.
ofthefirePRAmodel.Thefinal modelhasnosequenceswitha conditionalcoredamage probabilityof1.Resultsare describedinAppendixBof0247 070005.01,FireRisk QuantificationandSummary,Ref (1).
hazard ignition source unless the                                                                    wraps or other localized protection wrap has been subject to                                                                              features have not been credited in qualification or other proof of                                                                      identifying a physical analysis unit.
reportstates:
performance testing under these conditions.                                                                                          Additionally, as can be noted in the Fire Scenario Development Report (0247070005.06, Ref (6)), no credit is taken for the presence of raceway fire wraps.
Overallprocessisconsistentwithprevailing goodpractices.Resultsarenotfinaland thuscertainSRscannotbedemonstrated tohavebeenmet.Continuingthe refinementinprocessandplannedprovides confidencethistechnicalelementwillmeet theStandard.
FSSD101 SELECT appropriate fire modeling    Closed   Although in general              Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire 1
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
(Finding) tools for estimating fire growth              appropriate fire models        (reviewed    (not met) update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS) and damage behavior considering              have been selected, the            met)                analysis.                             element was in progress. A detailed the physical behaviors relevant to            justification for the use of                            Appendix E of 0247070005.06,        assessment of the FSS supporting the selected fire scenarios.                  the selected tools needs to                            Fire Scenario Development, Ref     requirements was performed during the be improved. This finding is                            (6), was updated to include further  Final Peer review.
FQB101 (Finding)
specifically applicable to the                          discussion on the applicability of    The finding was not fully resolved for the use of the time to damage                              the MathCAD tool for calculation      Final Peer review, but was subsequently models programmed in                                    of the nonsuppression probability. closed prior to the LAR submittal.
PERFORMthequantificationin accordancewithHLRQUBand itsSRsinPart2 and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRQUBin Part2.
MathCAD, which are calculations that have not been documented and Page 26 of 79
Closed QUB3requires demonstrationof acceptabletruncationvalue byaniterativeconvergence process.ThePLPfirePRA doesnothavethisprocess.
Althoughthereisno indicationthecurrent truncationvalueisnot acceptable,theconvergence processexercisewasnot done.
Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Theconvergenceprocessto determineacceptabletruncation limitsforthefinalfirePRAmodel weredocumentedinSection6of 0247070005.01,Ref(1).The truncationlevelsarebasedon convergencecalculationsperthe ASMEPRAstandard,whichstates thatconvergencecanbe consideredsufficientwhen successivereductionsintruncation valueofonedecaderesultin decreasingchangesinCDForLERF, andthefinalchangeislessthan 5%.
Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.
ThefindinginthisSRwasinitiallynoted duringFinalPeerreviewandsubsequently resolvedbydocumentingtheconvergence processtodetermineacceptable truncationlimits.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
FQC101 (Finding)
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status reviewed by the industry.
ADDRESSdependenciesduring theFirePRAplantresponse modelquantificationin Open PRAdocumentNBPSAHR 1,Rev3providesanHEP dependencyanalysisand Phase1 (not reviewed)
FSSD201 USE fire models that have          Closed    No fire detection analysis        Phase 1       Final  Finding resolved by documentation  During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire 1
Final (reviewed notmet)
(Finding) sufficient capability to model the          has been conducted in            (reviewed   (not met)  update. No impact to NFPA805      scenario selection and analysis (FSS) conditions of interest and only              support of the activation of        met)                analysis.                          element was in progress. A detailed within known limits of                      fixed suppression systems or                            Section 10.1 of 0247070005.06,    assessment of the FSS supporting applicability                                the time to smoke                                        Fire Scenario Development, Ref    requirements was performed during the detection.                                              (6), was revised to describe the    Final Peer review.
Thisfindingisconsideredopen giventhattheprocedure development,modification Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.
treatment of automatic              The finding was not fully resolved for the suppression system activation      Final Peer review, but was subsequently times on the suppression            closed prior to the LAR submittal.
probability.
FSSD401 ESTABLISH a technical basis for    Closed    This finding is associated        Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  This finding was identified during the Final (Finding) fire modeling tool input values              with treatment of transient      (reviewed       (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805      Peer review. As indicated the identified used in the analysis given the              fires. 1) Fire elevation for        met)               analysis.                          issue was corrected. This is consistent context of the fire scenarios                transient fires has been                                Section 7.0 of 0247070005.06,    with the Peer review team final being analyzed.                              assumed to be on the floor.                              Fire Scenario Development, Ref    assessment for FSS which indicated:
: 2) the heat release rate for                            (6), was revised to describe the    The comments generated from this review transient fires have been                                treatment of fire elevation and    are for the most part directed toward assumed to be characterized                              heat release rate for transient    individual SRs and should not impact the by electric motor fires.                                fires. The transient heat release  overall technical strategy currently in place These are important input                                rate was increased to 317 kW; 98th  to meet the FSS requirements.
values for determining zone                              percentile heat release rate for of influence.                                            transient combustibles, in lieu of the value for electric motor fires.
FSSD701 In crediting fire detection and    Closed    Items a, b, and c in the Cat II    Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) suppression systems, USE generic            requirement are not              (reviewed      (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805      scenario selection and analysis (FSS) estimates of total system                    explicitly address in the        met CC I)              analysis.                          element was in progress. A detailed unavailability provided that                analysis.                                                Section 10.1 of 0247070005.06,    assessment of the FSS supporting (a) the credited system is                                                                            Fire Scenario Development, Ref    requirements was performed during the installed and maintained in                                                                          (6), was revised to describe the    Final Peer review.
accordance with applicable codes                                                                      basis for availability of automatic This finding was identified during the Final Page 27 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 19 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status and standards                                                                                        suppression systems and the        Peer review and resolved by subsequent (b) the credited system is in a                                                                      impact on suppression probability, documentation update.
Status 2
fully operable state during                                                                          including a discussion of outlier plant operation, and                                                                                  behavior.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation accordancewithHLRQUCand itsSRsinPart2 and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRQUCin Part2.
(c) the system has not experienced outlier behavior relative to system unavailability FSSD801 INCLUDE an assessment of fire      Closed    The Fire PRA currently does       Phase        Final  Finding resolved by documentation  During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire 1
developsadjustmentfactors toapplytothecutsets.
(Finding) detection and suppression                    not include an assessment      1(reviewed    (not met)   update. No impact to NFPA805      scenario selection and analysis (FSS) systems effectiveness in the                of the effectiveness of the        not                  analysis.                         element was in progress. A detailed context of each fire scenario                fire suppression and          applicable)              Section 10.1 of 0247070005.06,   assessment of the FSS supporting analyzed.                                    detection systems credited                              Fire Scenario Development, Ref  requirements was performed during the in the analysis.                                         (6), was revised to provide an    Final Peer review.
MultipleHFE'sareevaluated fordependenciesusingthe EPRIHRAcalculator.
assessment of the effectiveness of The finding was not fully resolved for the automatic suppression systems      Final Peer review, but was subsequently and the impact on suppression      closed prior to the LAR submittal.
Dependencyadjustment factorsaredevelopedand appliedinthecutsets.
probability.
However,the"Q"model
FSSE301 PROVIDE a mean value of, and      Open      A qualitative                    Phase 1        Final  Finding open as the                During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) statistical representation of, the          characterization of the        (reviewed    (not met)  characterization has not been      scenario selection and analysis (FSS) uncertainty intervals for the                parameters used in the fire      met CC I)              completed. No impact to NFPA      element was in progress. A detailed parameters used for modeling                modeling in significant fire                            805 analysis as the results are    assessment of the FSS supporting the significant fire scenarios.              scenarios have not been                                  based on the point estimate values requirements was performed during the completed as the Fire PRA                                which approximate the mean        Final Peer review.
[whichwasreviewed]does notincorporatethiswork.
still needs detailed analysis                            values.                           This finding was identified during the Final to reduce the plant CDF.                                A characterization of the          Peer review and remains open, but as The qualitative discussion                              parameters used in the fire        indicated this finding does not impact the required to meet category 1                              modeling in significant fire      point estimate values used in the NFPA 805 should be completed once                                scenarios has not been completed. analysis.
ThereforetheF&Oandthe notmetassessment.
key scenarios are identified.                            However, it is not expected that refinement of the parameter uncertainty intervals will impact the fire PRA conclusions.
detaileddevelopment,and operationsreviewsareongoing.
Page 28 of 79
Adependencyanalysiswas completedtoidentify combinationsofhumanfailure events(HFEs)inwhich dependenciesbetweenactions maycontributetoanincreasein coredamagefrequency(CDF) whencomparedtotheCDF calculatedwhenscreeningvalues forhumanerrorprobabilities (HEPs)areused.
Dependenciesbetweenactions wereassignedbasedonsequence specificevaluationsofcues,timing, location,andavailableresources, andtheHEPsadjustedifnecessary torepresentthelevelof dependence;theCDFwasthen recalculatedusingthemodified HEPs.HFEsnotexplicitlyevaluated fordependencewereassigned HEPsof1(i.e.,therepresented operatoractionsareassumedto failwithaprobabilityofunity),and thustheresultingCDFrepresents anupperboundforthepotential impactofdependenciesuponthe results.Sharedcuesconservatively assumed100%dependence.This approachhasidentifiedimportant HFEsforwhichthecompletionof detailedhumanreliabilityanalyses maybebeneficial.
ThisfindingremainsopenasdetailedHEPs cannotbedevelopeduntilupdated proceduresandmodificationdetailsare complete.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 20 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status FSSF101 DETERMINE if any locations          Closed    The report 024707                Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) within the Fire PRA global                    0005.08, which documents        (reviewed      (met)   update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS) analysis boundary meet both of                structural steel analysis,        not met)             analysis.                            element was in progress. A detailed the following two conditions: (a)             does not describe what is a                            The definition of a significant fire  assessment of the FSS supporting exposed structural steel is                  "high hazard fire".                                    hazard was added to Section 2.0 of    requirements was performed during the present (b) a highhazard fire                Consequently, it is not clear                          the Exposed Structural Steel        Final Peer review.
Status 2
source is present in that location            what specific fires where                              Analysis Report, 0247070005.08,    The finding was not fully resolved for the and If such locations are                    considered as high hazard                              Ref (8): The following details have  Final Peer review, but was subsequently identified, SELECT one or more                during the walkdowns and                                been added to the to the report,      closed prior to the LAR submittal.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ThefirePRAHRAdependency analysisisdocumentedinNBPSA HR,Ref(13).
fire scenario(s) that could                  analysis to conclude that a                            For the purposes of this analysis, damage, including collapse, the              scenario should be                                      a significant fire hazard was exposed structural steel for each            quantified in the analysis.                             defined as having at least the same identified location.                                                                                 or greater combustible loading equivalent to 50 gallons of fuel oil, which is in excess of a heat value of 7E+6 BTU [5].
Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.
FSSF201 If, per SR FSSF1, one or more      Closed    The criteria for identifying      Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) scenarios are selected,                      and analyzing fire scenarios    (reviewed     (met)   update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS)
FQE101 (Finding)
ESTABLISH and JUSTIFY criteria                associated with damage to        met CC I)            analysis.                            element was in progress. A detailed for structural collapse due to fire          structural steel is not clearly                        The appropriate criteria for fire    assessment of the FSS supporting exposure.                                    documented. The criteria                                damage to structural steel were      requirements was performed during the utilized has been inferred                              added to Section 3.0 of the,          Final Peer review.
IDENTIFYsignificantcontributors inaccordancewithHLRQUD andHLRLEFandtheirSRsinPart 2withthefollowingclarifications:
from the analysis and is                                Exposed Structural Steel Analysis    The finding was not fully resolved for the considered appropriate.                                 Report, 0247070005.08, Ref (8). Final Peer review, but was subsequently The criteria includes 1)                                The following criteria guidelines    closed prior to the LAR submittal.
(a)SRQUD5aandQUD5bof Part2aretobemetincluding identificationofwhichfire scenariosandwhichphysical analysisunits(consistentwiththe levelofresolutionoftheFirePRA suchasfireareaorfire compartment)aresignificant contributors (b)SRQUD5bofPart2istobe metrecognizingthat "component"inPart2is generallyequivalentto "equipment"inthisStandard (c)SRQUD3forcomparisonto similarplantsisnotapplicable (d)SRLEF3includingthe"Note" forthatSRofPart2istobemet (1)followingHLRQUDofPart2 withtheclarificationsabove concerningSRsQUD5aandQU D5b.
possibility of a high hazard                            have been added to 1) Presence fire, 2) exposed structural                            of significant fire hazard (Section steel, and 3) a steel                                  2.0), 2) Presence of exposed temperature of 1000 F.                                 structural steel, 3) Steel Surface temperature in excess of 1000°F for fire configuration to clearly document the criteria used for Page 29 of 79
(2)buttheuncertainty Closed Thediscussionofdominant resultsisnotpresentedin the0247070005.01.The resultsarecategorizedand sortedintermsofthe dominantcontributors[as perFQE1],butthereisno discussionasrequiredby thisSR.
Phase1 (not reviewed)
Final (reviewed notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section6.0of0247070005.01, FireRiskQuantificationand Summary,Ref(1),wasrevisedto includeadiscussionofthe dominantresults.
Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 21 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status identifying and analyzing fire scenarios associated with structural steel damage. The one thousand degree criteria is consistent with the statement provided in Reference 2 of the Structural Steel Analysis from NIST, Fire Protection of Structural Steel in High - Rise Buildings..
Status 2
FSSF301 If, per SR FSSF1, one or more    Closed    The four scenarios selected    Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) scenarios are selected,                    for evaluation have been      (reviewed      (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS)
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation requirementandreferenceto Table22.76(e)inPart2does notapplyhere.See42.13.
COMPLETE a quantitative                    screened and therefore not    not met)             analysis.                            element was in progress. A detailed assessment of the risk of the              included in the CDF                                  Section 3.2.2 of the Structural Steel assessment of the FSS supporting selected fire scenarios in a                calculation for the plant.                          Analysis Report, Ref (8), was        requirements was performed during the manner consistent with the FQ              The screening process for                            revised using the frequencies        Final Peer review.
and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderthese sectionsinPart2.
requirements, including collapse            one of the scenarios is                              found in NUREG/CR6850 (Vol. 2)      The finding was not fully resolved for the of the exposed structural steel.            based on the frequency of                            and EPRI TR 1016735 to calculate a    Final Peer review, but was subsequently such an event (PAU23,                              new turbinegenerator                closed prior to the LAR submittal.
turbine generator fire). The                        catastrophic fire frequency of calculated frequency is not                          3.13E6 /yr and 1.59E6 /yr, based on fire ignition                              respectively. Site Specific frequencies documented in                            frequencies documents in the FIF current Fire PRA EPRI                                and Plant Partitioning Report 0247 guidance.                                            070005.02, Ref (2), were implemented in the quantitative assessment of the FPRA.
Quantitative calculations and factors applied are also documented in section 3.2.2 of the Structural Steel Report.
FSSG201 DEFINE screening criteria for    Closed    Elements of the qualitative    Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) multicompartment fire scenarios            criteria require further          (not      (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS) that provide reasonable                    evaluation. Specifically,    reviewed)              analysis.                            element was in progress. A detailed Page 30 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
FSSA101 (Finding)
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II      Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status assurance that the contribution                "exposing PAU is outdoors;                              The screening criteria in Table 31  assessment of the FSS supporting of the screened physical analysis              no HGL postulated" and                                  of 0247070005.07, Multi          requirements was performed during the unit combinations are of low risk              "exposed PAU has a                                      Compartment Analysis, Ref (7),     Final Peer review.
IDENTIFYallriskrelevantignition sources,bothfixedandtransient, ineachunscreenedphysical analysisunitwithintheglobal analysisboundary Closed ThetreatmentofMCC'sis notproperlyjustified.FSS document0247070005.06 includesthestatement"All MotorControlCenters (MCC)havebeentreatedas closed,sealedandrobustin whichdamagebeyondthe ignitionsourcewillnotbe postulated."No documentationof inspectionsoftheMCC's, includingthetopofthe cabinetshavebeen providedtojustifynot propagatingfiresoutside theMCC.
significance.                                  sufficient volume that any                              were revised to add discussion of    The finding was not fully resolved for the hot gases that may enter                                outdoor transformers near turbine    Final Peer review, but was subsequently PAU                                                    building walls and hot gas layer. A  closed prior to the LAR submittal.
Phase1 (met)
would dissipate before                                  quantitative definition for significant damage would                                sufficient volume was also occur." In the former, the                              provided. This latter criterion is qualitative assessment                                  only applied in two areas where it should include a discussion                            was subsequently verified that a of yard transformer fires                              hot gas layer could not form in less near turbine building walls.                            than 60 minutes.
Final (met)
In the later, assessment of hot gas layer conditions should be quantitatively addressed.
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
FSSG202 DEFINE screening criteria for        Closed    The quantitative screening        Phase 1      Final   Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) multicompartment fire scenarios                criteria do not include            (not        (met)   update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS) that provide reasonable                        consideration for the          reviewed)              analysis.                           element was in progress. A detailed assurance that the contribution                cumulative risk screened                                Revised Section 3.5 of 024707      assessment of the FSS supporting of the screened physical analysis              out due to multi                                        0005.07, MultiCompartment          requirements was performed during the unit combinations are of low risk              compartment combinations.                               Analysis, Ref (7), to describe the  Final Peer review.
Section6.1of0247070005.06, Ref(6),hasbeenrevisedtoinclude areferencetothewalkdown informationandphotographs whichprovideabasisforthis statement.
significance.                                  Currently, multi                                        cumulative impact of CDF            The finding was not fully resolved for the compartments are screened                              screening at 1E7. The total CDF    Final Peer review, but was subsequently at a threshold of 1E7, but                            impact from the screened areas is    closed prior to the LAR submittal.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
there is no verification of                            also less than 1E7/yr.
ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewandresolvedbysubsequent documentationupdate.
the cumulative risk screened.
FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:
FSSG401 If passive fire barriers with a fire Closed    The SR requires                  Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire 1
Significantprogresshasbeenmadein supportoftheFSStechnicalelements (Mathcad,detailedanalysisonareassuch asPAU4(1C);documentationisin progress).Thisprogressallowedthepeer reviewteamtoconductareviewofthefire scenarioselectionanalysis.
(Finding) resistance rating are credited in              confirmation of allowed            (not    (not met) update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS) the Fire PRA                                    credit, assessment of          reviewed)              analysis.                           element was in progress. A detailed (a) CONFIRM that the allowed                    effectiveness and reliability,                          Revised Appendix A of 024707      assessment of the FSS supporting Page 31 of 79
*AllsupportingrequirementsinFSShave beenreviewed,whichisevidenceofallthe workconductedoverthelastperiod.
*Theinconsistenciesidentifiedinearlier reviewshavebeengenerallyaddressed.
*Thecommentsgeneratedfromthis


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 22 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                               Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status credit is consistent with the fire            and evaluation of random                                0005.07, Ref (7), to describe the    requirements was performed during the resistance rating as                          failures of passive barriers.                            applicability and basis for the      Final Peer review.
Status 2
demonstrated by conformance to                No analysis has been                                    random failure probability of        The finding was not fully resolved for the applicable test standards                      presented or documented                                  passive fire barriers from          Final Peer review, but was subsequently (b) ASSESS the effectiveness                  addressing these                                        NUREG/CR6850 used in the multi    closed prior to the LAR submittal.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation reviewareforthemostpartdirectedto individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyin placedtomeettheFSSrequirements.
reliability, and availability of any          requirements.                                           compartment analysis.
FSSA301 (Finding)
passive fire barrier feature credited, and (c) EVALUATE the potential for fireinduced or random failure of credited passive fire barrier features FSSG501    For any scenario selected per        Closed    The SR requires                    Phase 1      Final   Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire 1
Iftheexactroutingofacable(or groupofcables)hasnotbeen established(seeSRsCSA10and CSA11),ASSUMEthatthose cablesfailforanyfirescenario thathasadamagingeffecton anyracewayorconduitwhere thesubjectcablemight reasonablyexist.
(Finding)    FSSG3, if the adjoining physical              quantification of                    (not    (not met)  update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS) analysis units are separated by                effectiveness, reliability and  reviewed)              analysis.                           element was in progress. A detailed active fire barrier elements,                 availability of the active fire                          Revised Appendix A of 024707       assessment of the FSS supporting QUANTIFY the effectiveness,                    barriers. No analysis has                                0005.07, Ref (7), to describe the    requirements was performed during the reliability, and availability of the          been presented or                                        applicability and basis for the      Final Peer review.
Closed Theprocessofmappingand accountingfortargetsinthe FirePRAisnotdocumented.
active fire barrier element.                   documented addressing                                    random failure probability of active The finding was not fully resolved for the these requirements in                                    fire barriers from NUREG/CR6850    Final Peer review, but was subsequently addition of using the generic                            used in the multicompartment        closed prior to the LAR submittal.
Technicaldiscussionduring thereviewperiodindicates thattargetswithunknown routingaremappedtoall thescenarioswithinaPAU unlessithasbeenverified thatthetargetisnotina specificscenario.However, thisprocesswasnotclearly demonstratedduringthe reviewandisnot documentedinreport0247 070005.06.
values in NUREG/CR6850.                                analysis (MCA). Table 34 of this document reflects the quantification of MCA interaction failures.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
FSSG601    QUANTIFY the risk contribution      Closed    LERF results are not              Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Suggestion) of any selected                                reported in the multi                (not        (met)   update. No impact to NFPA805        scenario selection and analysis (FSS) multicompartment fire scenarios                compartment analysis            reviewed)              analysis.                           element was in progress. A detailed in a manner consistent with the                report, but they have been                              Updated report 0247070005.07,     assessment of the FSS supporting FQ requirements.                              calculated.                                              Ref (7), to report the LERF results  requirements was performed during the from the final fire PRA model in    Final Peer review.
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section 4.0 of the multi            The suggestion was not fully resolved for the Final Peer review, but was Page 32 of 79
Intheeventthatacablesplant locationcannotbeestablished,the processofcreditingbyassumed routingwasperformed.The processinvolveddetermining,with ahighdegreeofconfidence, locationsintheplantthatdonot containthecableinquestion.This isaccomplishedbyconsideringthe likelyroutingofacableandwas performedbyexperiencedplant personnel.Inmanycases,this assessmentwasmadebygrouping componentsintoanappropriate surrogatecategory(asdescribedin section5.3oftheModel DevelopmentReport#024707 0005.03,Ref(3)).Theresultsof thisdetailedassessmentare providedinAppendixIofthe ModelDevelopmentReport0247 070005.03.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
FSSB101 (Finding)
DEFINEandJUSTIFYthe conditionsthatareassumedto causeMCRabandonmentand/or relianceonexcontrolroom Open ThecurrentFirePRAdoes notconsiderabandonment ofthemaincontrolroom duetolackof Phase1 (met)
Final (notmet)
Findingopen.Controlroom abandonmentscenarioswith respecttoenvironmentaleffects havebeenaddressed.However, DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 23 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status compartment analysis.              subsequently closed prior to the LAR submittal.
Status 2
FSSH201 DOCUMENT a basis for target        Closed    The treatment of hydrogen        Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  During the Phase 2 review, work on the fire (Finding) damage mechanisms and                        fires is incorrectly          (met CC I)      (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805      scenario selection and analysis (FSS) thresholds used in the analysis,            documented in report 0247                            analysis.                          element was in progress. A detailed including references for any                070005.06.                                            The documentation for treatment    assessment of the FSS supporting plantspecific or targetspecific                                                                  of hydrogen fires in report 0247  requirements was performed during the performance criteria applied in                                                                    070005.06, Ref (6), was updated    Final Peer review.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation operatoractionsincluding remoteand/oralternate shutdownactions.
the analysis.                                                                                      to be consistent with approach      The finding was closed to meet CC II prior applied in the fire model which    to the LAR submittal.
equipment/controldueto firedamage.
complies with Appendix N of NUREG/CR6850.
thecurrentmodeldoesnot specificallyidentifyscenariosthat resultinabandonmentdueto equipmentdamage.
FSSH501 DOCUMENT fire modeling output      Closed    The Fire PRA is in process.      Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  This finding was identified during the Final (Finding) results for each analyzed fire              Fire modeling results are not    (met)        (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805      Peer review because additional scenario, including the results of          complete. Documentation                                analysis.                          refinements were still anticipated following parameter uncertainty                        of output results should be                            The final fire modeling output      the Final Peer review. As indicated by the evaluations (as performed) in a              consistent with current                                results for each analyzed fire      met status, however, the format of the manner that facilitates Fire PRA            approach for scenarios                                scenario were documented in        existing results discussion was acceptable.
applications, upgrades, and Peer            analyzed while the fire PRA                            Section 6.0 of report 024707 review.                                      is completed.                                          0005.01, Ref (1). Additionally, Section 7.1 of Ref (1) was revised to include a statistical representation of the uncertainty intervals used for modeling the significant fire scenarios from the final fire PRA model.
FSSH901 DOCUMENT key sources of            Closed    Sources of uncertainty in        Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  This supporting requirement was not 1
(Finding) uncertainty for the FSS technical            the fire modeling analysis        (not    (not met)  update. No impact to NFPA805      reviewed during the Phase 1 Peer review element.                                     are not documented in          reviewed)              analysis.                          as the model progress was not sufficiently 0247070005.06.                                      Sources of uncertainty in the fire  complete. This finding was identified scenario selection process were    during the Final Peer review, but was Page 33 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                  Supplemental Information Text)                                                            Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status documented in report 024707      subsequently addressed prior to the LAR 0005.01, Fire Risk Quantification submittal.
Equipmentdamageleadingtocontrol roomabandonmentisaddressedinthe FirePRAmodel;however,thisfinding remainsopenpendingformaldevelopment ofthelistofequipmentwhosefireinduced damagecouldcausecontrolroom abandonment.Themodelincludeslogicat thecomponentlevelforoperationofkey equipmentoutsideofthecontrolroomas prescribedforcontrolroomabandonment suchaslocaloperationofequipmentatEC 150,andforotherlocalactionssuchas localcontrolofP8B.Thesesequencesare evaluatedforallscenarios,notonly scenarioswherethecontrolroom abandonmenteventtreeisemployed (controlroomevacuationduetosmokeor hightemperature).
and Summary, Ref (1).
HRAA201 For each fire scenario, IDENTIFY    Closed    The identification of fire        Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  During the Phase 2 review, work on the (Finding) any new firespecific safe                    response actions is not yet    (reviewed      (met)  and model update. No impact to    human reliability analysis (HRA) element shutdown actions called out in                complete. Additional fire        not met)              NFPA805 analysis.                was in progress. A detailed assessment of the plant fire response                        safe shutdown actions are                              The final identification of fire  the HRA supporting requirements was procedures (e.g., deenergizing                still being identified as the                          response actions was completed    performed during the Final Peer review.
equipment per a fire procedure                Fire PRA analysis continues                            and documented in notebook NB    The Final Peer review summary report for a specific fire location) in a            to be refined.                                        PSAHR1, Ref (13). These actions  noted:
manner consistent with the                                                                            were incorporated into the final scope of selected equipment                                                                                                              The review did not identify issues with the fire PRA model where appropriate. fundamental approaches being used [for]
from the ES and PRM elements of this Standard,                                                                                                          the completed portion of the HRA and in accordance with HLRHRE                                                                                                          assessment.
and its SRs in Part 2 with the following clarifications:
(a) where SR HRE1 discusses procedures, this is to be extended to procedures for responding to fires (b) where SR HRE1 mentions "in the context of the accident scenarios," specific attention is to be given to the fact that these are fire scenarios (c) another source for SR HRE1 is likely to be the current Fire Safe Shutdown/Appendix R analysis and DEVELOP a defined basis to support the claim of nonapplicability of any of the requirements under HLRHRE in Page 34 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
FSSB201 (Finding)
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion        SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status Part 2.
SELECToneormorefire scenarios,eitherintheMCRor elsewhere,leadingtoMCR abandonmentand/orareliance onexcontrolroomoperator actionsincludingremoteand/or alternateshutdownactions, consistingofacombinationofan ignitionsource(orgroupof ignitionsources),suchthatthe selectedscenariosprovide reasonableassurancethatthe MCRabandonmentfirerisk Closed TheCCDPquantification doesnotreflectthehuman errorprobabilities associatedwithcontrol roomabandonmentandthe fireimpactedcablesmay notreflectthe equipment/controlthatmay ormaynotbeavailable afterabandonment.
HRAA301 For each fire scenario, IDENTIFY  Closed    Section 6.3 of the HRA            Phase 1        Final    Finding resolved by documentation    During the Phase 2 review, work on the 1
Phase1 (reviewed met)
(Finding) any new, undesired operator                Notebook discusses the          (met CC I)  (met CC I)  and model update. No impact to      human reliability analysis (HRA) element action that could result from              review that was performed                                NFPA805 analysis.                  was in progress. A detailed assessment of spurious indications resulting              with the licensed operators                              A simulator exercise was            the HRA supporting requirements was from failure of a single                    for the identification of the                            performed with current Palisades    performed during the Final Peer review.
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
instrument, per SR ESC2 (e.g.,            new, undesired operator                                  license holders in which several    The Final Peer review summary report due to verbatim compliance with            actions in response to                                    scenarios were evaluated to          noted:
MainControlroomabandonment scenarioshavebeenpostulated basedondamagetoequipment andcontrols.Postulatedfiresin theControlRoom(CR)havethe potentialtochallengehabitability orvisibilityduetosmoke generationorexcessiveheat.An abandonmentanalysis (Attachment1of0247070005.06, Afindingwasidentifiedduringtheinitial Peerreviewandmodifiedaspartofthe FinalPeerreview.Asindicatedthe identifiedissuewascorrected.Thisis consistentwiththePeerreviewteamfinal assessmentforFSSwhichindicated:
the instruction in an alarm                spurious indications.                                    determine how Operators would response procedure, when                    However, the detailed                                                                          The review did not identify issues with the respond given spurious or false      fundamental approaches being used [for]
Thecommentsgeneratedfromthisreview areforthemostpartdirectedtoward individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyinplace tomeettheFSSrequirements.
separate confirmation is not                documentation for the                                    instrument indications. The results available or required).                    evaluation process and the                                                                    the completed portion of the HRA of these exercises were considered  assessment.
Thespecificconcerncitedbythepeer
justifications for the                                    in the HFE development process.
conclusion that no                                        The process and evaluation results  The finding was not fully resolved for the undesired operator actions                                are documented in NBPSAHR, Ref    Final Peer review, but was subsequently will be taken in these                                    (13).                               closed prior to the LAR submittal.
instrumentation failure conditions was not yet completed for the reviewers to confirm the conclusion that no undesired operator actions need to be considered.
HRAA401 TALK THROUGH (i.e., review in    Open      As the fire scenario              Phase 1        Final    Finding open, given that the        During the Phase 2 review, work on the (Finding) detail) with plant operations and          refinement continues,          (reviewed    (not met)  procedures, modification detail,    human reliability analysis (HRA) element training personnel the                      additional fire response        not met)                operations review, and detailed      was in progress. A detailed assessment of procedures and sequence of                  actions will be identified and                            HRA model development are not        the HRA supporting requirements was events to confirm that                      evaluated, which will                                    yet complete.                       performed during the Final Peer review.
interpretation of the procedures            require the performance of                                A copy of the Human Failure Event    The Final Peer review summary report relevant to actions identified in          additional operator                                      (HFE) PostInitiator Calculation (P noted:
SRs HRAA1, HRAA2, and HRAA3              interviews. As such, this task                            IC) and associated PostInitiator is consistent with plant                    is not fully completed yet.                                                                    The review did not identify issues with the Operator Action Questionnaire (P    fundamental approaches being used [for]
operational and training                    Also, operator interviews for                            IOAQ) were provided to current      the completed portion of the HRA Page 35 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 24 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR Topic (ASME Standard Category II Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial    SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer     Subsequent Review      Peer Status      Review Status practices.                                those fire response actions                          SRO licensed onshift Operations    assessment.
Status 2
that are still using screening                        Department personnel and            This finding remains open as indicated in values (e.g., ACPDGOTB5B                          Training Department personnel for  the Disposition column.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation contributioncanberealistically characterized.
DG, ACPPMOE38311A,                                use in validating HEP information ACPPMOE38312A, AFW                                accuracy.
Ref(6))wasperformedto determinetheresponseoftheCR envelopegivenarangeofpossible fireevents.Theanalysis consideredthreedifferent operatingstatesoftheCR mechanicalventilationsystemand threedifferentconfigurationsof theCRDoor.Basedonthis assessment,threescenarios,each involvingmultiplecabinets,were implementedintothemodel.
PMOAP8BCRAB, etc.) may                              HFEs were assigned to Operations not have been completed.                             Department Operating Crews and
Humanactionsthatcouldnotbe performedpriortothetime controlroomabandonmentwas necessarywereconsideredfailed.
                                                                                                    /or Operations training personnel (Note: Specific HEP basic                            for review. Their reviews included event identifiers cited by the                        ensuring indications, procedure Peer review team may have                            selection and use, and activity been subsequently renamed                            performance manpower and or removed from the model                            timing is correct. Training as part of the F&O                                    personnel reviews included resolution process.)                                  ensuring procedure selection and use were consistent with current training expectations, and the training type and frequency are accurate.
Operator comments were reviewed and discussed with PRA personnel and proposed resolutions forwarded to the comment initiator for further comment or acceptance. Comment acceptance is documented by their initialing the HFE Validation form.
Significant HFEs were evaluated and developed in further detail.
Screening values are still applied for fire HEPs pending development of final procedures, modifications, and operations reviews.
The records of the current operating crews and training Page 36 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
reviewteamduringthereviewwasthat onlyindividualcabinetfailureswere consideredforcontrolroomabandonment scenarios.Therevisedtreatment considersthreemultiplecabinetfailure groupswhichwhencombinedencompass allthecabinetsinthecontrolroom.
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion       SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status personnel are provided in notebook NBPSAHR, Ref (13).
Thequantificationforthesethree scenariosreflectthehumanerror probabilitiesassociatedwithcontrolroom abandonmentandthefireimpactedcables thatarenotavailableafterabandonment.
HRAB201 INCLUDE new firerelated safe      Closed   Identification of new, fire      Phase 1        Final  Finding resolved by documentation   During the Phase 2 review, work on the 1
FSSC301 (Suggestion)
(Finding) shutdown HFEs corresponding to                response actions and          (reviewed   (not met)   and model update. No impact to      human reliability analysis (HRA) element the actions identified per SR HRA            incorporation of the            not met)               NFPA805 analysis.                  was in progress. A detailed assessment of A2 in the Fire PRA plant response            identified fire response                                The final identification of fire    the HRA supporting requirements was model in a manner consistent                  actions into the Fire PRA                              response actions was completed      performed during the Final Peer review.
JUSTIFYtheheatreleaserate profilestagesincludedinthe analysis(i.e.,firegrowth,steady burning,ordecaystages).
with 42.2 and Section 42 and in            model are not completed.                                and documented in notebook NB      The Final Peer review summary report accordance with HLRHRF and its                                                                      PSAHR1, Ref (13). These actions  noted:
Closed Thesupportingrequirement statesthatthegrowth stagesincludedinthe analysisshouldbejustified.
SRs in Part 2 and                                                                                    were incorporated into the final DEVELOP a defined basis to                                                                                                                The review did not identify issues with the fire PRA model where appropriate. fundamental approaches being used [for]
Thejustificationisnot includedinthe documentation.
support the claim of nonapplicability of any of the                                                                                                            the completed portion of the HRA requirements under HLRHRF in                                                                                                            assessment.
Phase1 (reviewed asnot applicable)
Part 2.                                                                                                                                   The finding was not fully resolved for the Final Peer review, but was subsequently closed prior to the LAR submittal.
Final (met)
HRAB301 COMPLETE the definition of the      Open      The impact of loss of all        Phase 1        Final  Finding open, given that the        During the Phase 2 review, work on the (Finding) HFEs identified in SRs HRAB1                redundant/diverse              (reviewed    (not met)  procedures, modification detail,    human reliability analysis (HRA) element and HRAB2 by specifying the                  instrumentation on HEPs        not met)                operations review, and detailed    was in progress. A detailed assessment of following, taking into account the            has been modeled by ORing                              HRA model development are not      the HRA supporting requirements was context presented by the fire                the instrumentation logic                              yet complete.                      performed during the Final Peer review.
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis TheModelDevelopmentReport, Ref(3),wasrevisedtoincludea discussionofthetreatmentforthe growthstagesofafiresheat releaserate.
scenarios in the Fire PRA:                    with its associated HEP.                               The simulator exercise performed    The Final Peer review summary report (a) accident sequence specific                Thus, in cases where total                              with current Palisades license    noted:
DuringPhase1fireburnouttimesappear nottobeafactoraffectingtheanalysis results.
timing of cues, and time window              instrument failure (by                                  holders evaluated operator for successful completion                    hardware fault or fire)                                                                     The review did not identify issues with the response to several scenarios with  fundamental approaches being used [for]
SubsequenttothePhase1review,thefire growthstageswereappliedintheanalysis.
(b) accident sequence specific                occurs (including the failure                          false, partial or total loss of procedural guidance (e.g., AOPs,              of the only instrument                                                                      the completed portion of the HRA instrument indications. The results assessment.
Hence,thePhase1notapplicable determinationchangedtoamet, satisfyingcapabilitycategoryII/III.
EOPs)                                        available), the HEP is                                  of these exercises were considered (c) the availability of cues or              appropriately failed.                                  in the HFE development process      This finding remains open as indicated in other indications for detection              However, the failure impact                            for purposes of developing timing  the Disposition column.
ThissuggestionwasclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.
and evaluation errors                        of partial instrumentation                              of cues and time windows.
FSSC401 (Finding)
(d) the specific highlevel tasks            on an HEP has not yet been The final developed fire HFEs Page 37 of 79
Ifaseverityfactoriscreditedin theanalysis,ENSUREthat (a)theseverityfactorremains independentofother quantificationfactors Closed Theseverityfactorfor hotworkfiresof0.01isnot properlyjustified.The documentationdoesnot provideadescriptionhow Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
The0.01severityfactorfor hotworkisnolongerappliedin DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 25 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial    SR                  Disposition            Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer     Subsequent Review      Peer Status      Review Status (e.g., trainlevel) required to              implemented. There are                                incorporate task complexity and achieve the goal of the response.           cases in the model where                              procedural guidance as multiple instruments                                  documented in the PostInitiator provide cues to the                                  Operator Action Questionnaire (P operators to perform                                  IOAQ) provided to current SRO actions. Operator actions                            licensed onshift Operations based on false indication                            Department personnel and have not been considered.                             Training Department personnel for In addition, HFEs modeled                            use in validating HFE information using screening values (for                          accuracy.
Status 2
some of the fire response                            Significant HFEs were evaluated actions identified; e.g., ACP                        and developed in further detail.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation (b)theseverityfactorreflectsthe fireeventsetusedtoestimate firefrequency (c)theseverityfactorreflectsthe conditionsandassumptionsof thespecificfirescenariosunder analysis,and (d)atechnicalbasissupporting theseverityfactors determinationisprovided thevaluewascalculated andanexplanationofwhy thevalueremains independentofthegeneric ignitionfrequency.
DGOTB5BDG, FPSPMOE                                Screening values are still applied STARTL, ACPPMOE383                                for fire HEPs pending development 12A, ACPPMOE38311A,                                of final procedures, modifications, etc.) and those fire response                        and operations reviews.
finalfirePRAmodel.Severity factorsarenowbasedon NUREG/CR6850.Section8.3of 0247070005.06,Ref(6),was updatedtoreflectthischange.
actions that will be identified as the fire                                The final list of fire HFEs and their scenario refinement                                  associated documentation are continues have not yet                                provided in NBPSAHR, Ref (13).
FinalPeerreview.
accounted for the scenario context including timing, procedural guidance, instrumentation, task complexity, etc. Also, HRA Calculator evaluation sheets cannot be located for PCP PMOFP50XLOC and EDG PMOEPORTPUMP, and AFWAVOACV2010D, SWSAVOACV082326, and SWSAVOBCV082447M still need to be modified for fire related conditions.
ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewandresolvedbysubsequent documentationandmodelupdate.
Page 38 of 79
FSSC501 (Finding)
JUSTIFYthatthedamagecriteria usedintheFirePRAare representativeofthedamage targetsassociatedwitheachfire Closed Noscenarioisevaluatedfor conditionswherethetarget damagecriteriaisthatof sensitiveelectronics.
Phase1 (reviewed met)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section5.2of0247070005.06, Ref(6),wasrevisedtoprovide furtherbasisforexcluding scenarioswiththesensitive electronicscriteria.Theexclusion isbasedprimarilyonphysical cabinetdistancesfromfireignition sourcesandthatthesetargetsare generallywithinanenclosurethat providessomeprotectionfromthe heatsource.
ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreview.Asindicatedtheidentified issuewascorrected.Thisisconsistent withthePeerreviewteamfinal assessmentforFSSwhichindicated:
Thecommentsgeneratedfromthisreview areforthemostpartdirectedtoward individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyinplace tomeettheFSSrequirements.
FSSC701 (Finding)
Ifmultiplesuppressionpathsare credited,EVALUATEand PROPERLYMODELdependencies amongthecreditedpaths includingdependencies associatedwithrecoveryofa failedfiresuppressionsystem,if suchrecoveryiscredited.
Closed Noevaluationof independenceof suppressionpathshasbeen includedintheanalysis.
Phase1 (reviewed asnot applicable)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe treatmentofdependencebetween suppressionpathsinthescenario Suppressioncapabilitieswereinitiallynot credited.
Subsequentanalysisidentifiedthe treatmentofdependencebetween suppressionpathsinthescenario suppressioneventtreeasdescribedinthe dispositioncolumn.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 26 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status HRAC101 For each selected fire scenario,  Open      Fire response HFEs modeled      Phase 1      Final  Finding open, given that the      During the Phase 2 review, work on the (Finding) QUANTIFY the HEPs for all HFEs              with screening values have    (reviewed    (met CC I) procedures, modification detail,  human reliability analysis (HRA) element and ACCOUNT FOR relevant fire              not yet been evaluated in a    not met)              operations review, and detailed    was in progress. A detailed assessment of related effects using detailed              manner accounting for                                  HRA model development are not      the HRA supporting requirements was analyses for significant HFEs and            relevant PSFs (e.g., ACP                              yet complete.                      performed during the Final Peer review.
Status 2
conservative estimates (e.g.,                DGOTB5BDG, FPSPMOE                                Significant HFEs were evaluated    The Final Peer review summary report screening values) for                        STARTL, ACPPMOE383                                and developed in further detail as noted:
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation suppressioneventtree.
nonsignificant HFEs, in                      11A, ACPPMOE38312A,                                documented in NBPSAHR, Ref accordance with the SRs for HLR            etc.). Also, HRA Calculator                                                              The review did not identify issues with the (13). Screening values are still  fundamental approaches being used [for]
FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
HRG in Part 2 set forth under at            evaluation sheet cannot be                            applied for fire HEPs pending least Capability Category II, with          located for PCPPMOFP                                                                  the completed portion of the HRA development of final procedures,  assessment.
FSSC801 (Finding)
the following clarification:                 50XLOC and EDGPMOE                                  modifications, and operations (a) Attention is to be given to              PORTPUMP, and AFW                                    reviews.                          This finding remains open as indicated in how the fire situation alters any            AVOACV2010D, SWS                                                                      the Disposition column.
Ifracewayfirewrapsare
previous assessments in nonfire              AVOACV082326, and analyses as to the influencing              SWSAVOBCV082447M factors and the timing                      still need to be modified for considerations covered in SRs HR            fire related conditions. This G3, HRG4, and HRG5 in Part 2              task is not completed.
: credited, (a)ESTABLISHatechnicalbasis fortheirfireresistancerating, and (b)CONFIRMthatthefirewrap willnotbesubjecttoeither mechanicaldamageordirect flameimpingementfromahigh hazardignitionsourceunlessthe wraphasbeensubjectto qualificationorotherproofof performancetestingunderthese conditions.
And (b) DEVELOP a defined basis to support the claim of nonapplicability of any of the requirements under HLRHRG in Part 2.
Closed Thereportdoesnotdiscuss thetreatmentoffire barrierscreditedinthe analysis.
HRAD101 INCLUDE operator recovery          Closed   Identification and evaluation    Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  During the Phase 2 review, work on the 1
Phase1 (reviewed asnot applicable)
(Finding) actions that can restore the                of recovery actions for risk  (reviewed    (not met) and model update. No impact to    human reliability analysis (HRA) element functions, systems, or                      significant scenarios are      not met)              NFPA805 analysis.                was in progress. A detailed assessment of components on an asneeded                  expected to continue as the                            The final identification of fire  the HRA supporting requirements was basis to provide a more realistic            refinement of fire scenario                            response actions was completed    performed during the Final Peer review.
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
evaluation of significant accident          analysis continues.                                   and documented in notebook NB    The Final Peer review summary report sequences.                                  Currently, some of the top                            PSAHR1, Ref (13). These actions  noted:
Documentationwasaddedto Section2.2ofreport024707 0005.02,Ref(2),whichdiscusses thetreatmentoffirebarriers creditedintheanalysis.Creditfor racewayfirebarriers,thermal wrapsorotherlocalizedprotection featureshavenotbeencreditedin identifyingaphysicalanalysisunit.
core damage fire scenarios                            were incorporated into the final still do not account for                                                                  The review did not identify issues with the fire PRA model where appropriate. fundamental approaches being used [for]
Additionally,ascanbenotedinthe FireScenarioDevelopmentReport (0247070005.06,Ref(6)),no creditistakenforthepresenceof racewayfirewraps.
Page 39 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status realistic recovery actions.                                                                 the completed portion of the HRA This task is not completed                                                                  assessment.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
yet.                                                                                        The finding was not fully resolved for the Final Peer review, but was subsequently closed prior to the LAR submittal.
FSSD101 (Finding)
HRAD201 INCLUDE operator recovery          Open      Many of the operator              Phase 1      Final  This finding open is treated as      During the Phase 2 review, work on the (Finding) actions that can restore the                 recovery actions associated    (reviewed   (not met) open since screen values were        human reliability analysis (HRA) element functions, systems, or                      with fire response are still    not met)              used as recovery values. This is a    was in progress. A detailed assessment of components on an asneeded                  modeled with screening                                result given that the procedures,    the HRA supporting requirements was basis to provide a more realistic            values; i.e., not accounting                          modification detail, operations      performed during the Final Peer review.
SELECTappropriatefiremodeling toolsforestimatingfiregrowth anddamagebehaviorconsidering thephysicalbehaviorsrelevantto theselectedfirescenarios.
evaluation of significant accident          for all of the relevant PSFs.                          review, and detailed HRA model        The Final Peer review summary report sequences (same as HRAD101).               Dependency analysis has                                development are not yet complete. noted:
Closed Althoughingeneral appropriatefiremodels havebeenselected,the justificationfortheuseof theselectedtoolsneedsto beimproved.Thisfindingis specificallyapplicabletothe useofthetimetodamage modelsprogrammedin MathCAD,whichare calculationsthathavenot beendocumentedand Phase1 (reviewed met)
been performed for the                                Screening values are still applied current set of fire scenarios                                                                The review did not identify issues with the for fire HEPs.                       fundamental approaches being used [for]
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
and operator actions in the "T" model. The results                                A dependency analysis was            the completed portion of the HRA generated from the "Q"                                completed to identify                assessment.
AppendixEof0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasupdatedtoincludefurther discussionontheapplicabilityof theMathCADtoolforcalculation ofthenonsuppressionprobability.
model did not incorporate                              combinations of human failure        This finding remains open as indicated in the dependency analysis.                              events (HFEs) in which                the Disposition column.
The dependency analysis                                dependencies between actions needs to be reanalyzed                                may contribute to an increase in before finalization of the                            core damage frequency (CDF)
Fire PRA model. This task is                          when compared to the CDF not complete yet. Also, HRA                            calculated when nominal screening Calculator evaluation sheets                          values for human error cannot be located for PCP                            probabilities (HEPs) are used.
PMOFP50XLOC and EDG                                Dependencies between actions PMOEPORTPUMP, and                                    were assigned based on sequence AFWAVOACV2010D,                                    specific evaluations of cues, timing, SWSAVOACV082326, and                              location, and available resources, SWSAVOBCV082447M                                    and the HEPs adjusted if necessary still need to be modified for                          to represent the level of fire related conditions                                dependence; the CDF was then recalculated using the modified HEPs. HFEs not explicitly evaluated Page 40 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                            Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status for dependence were assigned HEPs of 1 (i.e., the represented operator actions are assumed to fail with a probability of unity), and thus the resulting CDF represents an upper bound for the potential impact of dependencies upon the results. Shared cues conservatively assumed 100% dependence. This approach has identified important HFEs for which the completion of detailed human reliability analyses may be beneficial; those analyses have not been completed.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
The fire PRA HRA dependency analysis is documented in NBPSA HR, Ref (13).
HRAE101 DOCUMENT the Fire PRA HRA          Open      Documentation for HFEs          Phase 1      Final  Finding open, given that the          During the Phase 2 review, work on the (Finding) including                                    associated with selected fire  (reviewed    (not met) procedures, modification detail,      human reliability analysis (HRA) element (a) those firerelated influences            response HFEs (e.g., FPS      not met)              operations review, and detailed        was in progress. A detailed assessment of that affect the methods,                      PMOESTARTL, ACPPMOE                              HRA model development are not          the HRA supporting requirements was processes, or assumptions used                38311A, ACPPMOE383                                yet complete. Screening values        performed during the Final Peer review.
as well as the identification and            12A, etc.) in the risk                                are still applied for fire HEPs        The Final Peer review summary report quantification of the HFEs/HEPs              significant fire scenarios                            pending development of final          noted:
in accordance with HLRHRI and              need to be provided. Also,                            procedures, modifications, and its SRs in Part 2, and DEVELOP a              HRA Calculator evaluation                            operations reviews.                    The review did not identify issues with the defined basis to support the                  sheets cannot be located for                                                                fundamental approaches being used [for]
claim of nonapplicability of any of          PCPPMOFP50XLOC, EDG                                                                    the completed portion of the HRA the requirements under HLRHRI              PMOEPORTPUMP, and                                                                          assessment.
in Part 2,                                   PULLFUSE; AFWPMOTP                                                                        This finding remains open as indicated in and                                          8BLOC seems to have been                                                                    the Disposition column.
(b) any defined bases to support              changed to AFWPMOTP the claim of nonapplicability of              8BSBO in HRA notebook Page 41 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 27 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                  Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status any of the referenced                        (but not changed in Fire PRA requirements in Part 2 beyond                model); and AFWAVOACV that already covered by the                  2010D, SWSAVOACV clarifications in this Part                  082326, and SWSAVOB CV082447M still need to be modified for fire related conditions. This task is not complete.
Status 2
IGNA1001 PROVIDE a mean value of, and a    Closed   The characterization of          Phase 1       Final  Finding resolved by documentation  Review of the ignition frequency (IGN) 1 (Finding) statistical representation of, the          uncertainties in the fire      (reviewed   (not met) update. No impact to NFPA805      element was completed during the Phase 2 uncertainty intervals for                    ignition frequencies has not    not met)              analysis.                           Peer review. From the final report:
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation reviewedbytheindustry.
significant fire ignition                    been addressed in the                                  The characterization of            Technical work completed and reviewed in frequencies.                                 report qualitatively or                                uncertainties in the fire ignition  August 2010; No additional review in quantitatively.                                        frequencies have been addressed    March 2011.
FSSD201 (Finding)
in Report 0247.07.005.01, Ref (1). The finding was closed prior to the LAR The change in ignition frequency    submittal.
USEfiremodelsthathave sufficientcapabilitytomodelthe conditionsofinterestandonly withinknownlimitsof applicability Closed Nofiredetectionanalysis hasbeenconductedin supportoftheactivationof fixedsuppressionsystemsor thetimetosmoke detection.
has a direct impact on CDF since ignition frequency is included in the calculation of CDF for every scenario. The report describes the sensitivities run by changing the bin ignition frequencies to the 5th and 95th percentile values of the original frequencies for both EPRI and NUREG/CR6850 values.
Phase1 (reviewed met)
Calculating the 5th and 95th percentiles was done so using the GAMMADIST function in Excel for the EPRI frequencies and provided as BART output for the NUREG/CR 6850 frequencies. This sensitivity provides an adequate upper and lower bound of the final CDF which used the mean frequencies.
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Page 42 of 79
Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe treatmentofautomatic suppressionsystemactivation timesonthesuppression probability.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
FSSD401 (Finding)
ESTABLISHatechnicalbasisfor firemodelingtoolinputvalues usedintheanalysisgiventhe contextofthefirescenarios beinganalyzed.
Closed Thisfindingisassociated withtreatmentoftransient fires.1)Fireelevationfor transientfireshasbeen assumedtobeonthefloor.
2)theheatreleaseratefor transientfireshavebeen assumedtobecharacterized byelectricmotorfires.
Theseareimportantinput valuesfordeterminingzone ofinfluence.
Phase1 (reviewed met)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section7.0of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe treatmentoffireelevationand heatreleaseratefortransient fires.Thetransientheatrelease ratewasincreasedto317kW;98th percentileheatreleaseratefor transientcombustibles,inlieuof thevalueforelectricmotorfires.
ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreview.Asindicatedtheidentified issuewascorrected.Thisisconsistent withthePeerreviewteamfinal assessmentforFSSwhichindicated:
Thecommentsgeneratedfromthisreview areforthemostpartdirectedtoward individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyinplace tomeettheFSSrequirements.
FSSD701 (Finding)
Increditingfiredetectionand suppressionsystems,USEgeneric estimatesoftotalsystem unavailabilityprovidedthat (a)thecreditedsystemis installedandmaintainedin accordancewithapplicablecodes Closed Itemsa,b,andcintheCatII requirementarenot explicitlyaddressinthe analysis.
Phase1 (reviewed metCCI)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe basisforavailabilityofautomatic DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 28 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion    SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                  Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status IGNA601    When combining evidence from      Closed    The Bayesian update            Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by              Review of the ignition frequency (IGN)
Status 2
(Suggestion) generic and plantspecific data,           process used to update          (met)       (met)  documentation update. No impact    element was completed during the Phase 2 USE a Bayesian update process or            generic ignition frequencies                        to NFPA805 analysis.               Peer review. From the final report:
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation andstandards (b)thecreditedsystemisina fullyoperablestateduring plantoperation,and (c)thesystemhasnot experiencedoutlierbehavior relativetosystemunavailability suppressionsystemsandthe impactonsuppressionprobability, includingadiscussionofoutlier behavior.
equivalent statistical process.            to plant specific is not                           The Bayesian update process used    Technical work completed and reviewed in JUSTIFY the selection of any                documented. A question                              to update the generic frequencies  August 2010; No additional review in informative prior distribution              was submitted during the                            to plant specific frequencies is    March 2011.
Peerreviewandresolvedbysubsequent documentationupdate.
used on the basis of industry              Peer review activities and                          documented in Section 4.2 of the experience.                                 the response suggests that                          Fire Ignition Frequency and Plant the Bayesian approach is                            Partitioning, report 024707 documented and will be                              0005.02, Ref (2). Section 4.2.1 of added to the report.                               the report identifies the Bayesian statistical update of the EPRI TR 1016735 generic frequencies that was performed using PLP specific fire events data. The revised fire ignition frequencies, including the frequencies calculated in Appendix G of Report 0247070005.02, have gamma uncertainty distributions.
FSSD801 (Finding)
Therefore, the prior data provided included: the mean, alpha, and beta factors. The Bayesian analysis was performed in a manner consistent with the assertion that the bin ignition frequencies were gamma distributions.
INCLUDEanassessmentoffire detectionandsuppression systemseffectivenessinthe contextofeachfirescenario analyzed.
Section 4.2.2 of the report 0247.070005.02 identifies the Bayesian statistical update of the NUREG/CR6850 generic frequencies was performed using PLP specific fire events data.
Closed TheFirePRAcurrentlydoes notincludeanassessment oftheeffectivenessofthe firesuppressionand detectionsystemscredited intheanalysis.
NUREG/CR6850 provides the Page 43 of 79
Phase 1(reviewed not applicable)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtoprovidean assessmentoftheeffectivenessof automaticsuppressionsystems andtheimpactonsuppression probability.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
FSSE301 (Finding)
PROVIDEameanvalueof,and statisticalrepresentationof,the uncertaintyintervalsforthe parametersusedformodeling thesignificantfirescenarios.
Open Aqualitative characterizationofthe parametersusedinthefire modelinginsignificantfire scenarioshavenotbeen completedastheFirePRA stillneedsdetailedanalysis toreducetheplantCDF.
Thequalitativediscussion requiredtomeetcategory1 shouldbecompletedonce keyscenariosareidentified.
Phase1 (reviewed metCCI)
Final (notmet)
Findingopenasthe characterizationhasnotbeen completed.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysisastheresultsare basedonthepointestimatevalues whichapproximatethemean values.
Acharacterizationofthe parametersusedinthefire modelinginsignificantfire scenarioshasnotbeencompleted.
However,itisnotexpectedthat refinementoftheparameter uncertaintyintervalswillimpact thefirePRAconclusions.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewandremainsopen,butas indicatedthisfindingdoesnotimpactthe pointestimatevaluesusedintheNFPA805 analysis.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 29 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status mean, 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles, and standard deviation for each bin ignition frequency.
Status 2
The Bayesian analysis assumes the NUREG/CR6850 bin ignition frequencies are lognormal distributions. Frequencies for Bins 16a, 16b, 16c, and 16d are provided in FAQ 060017 and FAQ 070035. The generic frequency distributions along with the plant evidence discussed in Section 4.2 of Report 0247070005.02 were input into the Bayesian software tool BART, and the new bin frequencies developed. Table 45 of Report 0247070005.02 provides the posterior mean, 5th percentile, 95th percentile, median, and range factor values associated with each bin for use in future update.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation FSSF101 (Finding)
IGNA701 USE a plantwide consistent        Closed    Page 31 of report 024707    Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  Review of the ignition frequency (IGN)
DETERMINEifanylocations withintheFirePRAglobal analysisboundarymeetbothof thefollowingtwoconditions:(a) exposedstructuralsteelis present(b)ahighhazardfire sourceispresentinthatlocation andIfsuchlocationsare identified,SELECToneormore firescenario(s)thatcould damage,includingcollapse,the exposedstructuralsteelforeach identifiedlocation.
(Finding) methodology based on                        0005.02 appears to suggest      (met)       (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805      element was completed during the Phase 2 parameters that are expected to              that no frequency for                                analysis.                           peer review. From the final report:
Closed Thereport024707 0005.08,whichdocuments structuralsteelanalysis, doesnotdescribewhatisa "highhazardfire".
influence the likelihood of                  miscellaneous hydrogen                              Report 0247.07070005.02, Ref     Technical work completed and reviewed in ignition to apportion highlevel            fires has been assigned to                          (2), and Fire Ignition Frequency    August 2010; No additional review in ignition frequencies (e.g., plant          applicable physical analysis                        calculation databases have been    March 2011.
Consequently,itisnotclear whatspecificfireswhere consideredashighhazard duringthewalkdownsand analysistoconcludethata scenarioshouldbe quantifiedintheanalysis.
wide values) to estimate physical            units. This may affect the                          updated to assign miscellaneous analysis unit or ignition source            PAU level quantification by                          hydrogen fires to all applicable level frequencies.                          reducing the fire ignition                          Physical Analysis Units (PAUs). As frequency assigned to the                            noted in Section 4 of report 0247 applicable plant locations.                          070005.02, the frequency associated with Bin 19, Page 44 of 79
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Thedefinitionofasignificantfire hazardwasaddedtoSection2.0of theExposedStructuralSteel AnalysisReport,0247070005.08, Ref(8):Thefollowingdetailshave beenaddedtothetothereport, Forthepurposesofthisanalysis, asignificantfirehazardwas definedashavingatleastthesame orgreatercombustibleloading equivalentto50gallonsoffueloil, whichisinexcessofaheatvalueof 7E+6BTU[5].


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
SR      Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status Miscellaneous Hydrogen Fires, has been allocated based on linear feet, valve location and tank location in PAUs where hydrogen equipment exists. Applying these criteria has apportioned miscellaneous hydrogen frequency to the following PAUs: 04 (1C Switchgear Room), 13 (Reactor Building), and 23 (Turbine Building).
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
IGNA901    POSTULATE the possibility of        Closed    The report 0247070005.02      Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by              Review of the ignition frequency (IGN)
FSSF201 (Finding)
(Suggestion) transient combustible fires for all          does not list the transient or    (met)       (met)  documentation update. No impact      element was completed during the Phase 2 physical analysis units regardless            fixed ignition source                                to NFPA805 analysis.               Peer review. From the final report:
If,perSRFSSF1,oneormore scenariosareselected, ESTABLISHandJUSTIFYcriteria forstructuralcollapseduetofire exposure.
of the administrative restrictions.           frequencies in each fire                              Report 0247.070005.02, Ref (2),    Technical work completed and reviewed in zone. The report appears to                          has been updated to include          August 2010; No additional review in only list the total frequency.                        transient and fixed ignition source  March 2011.
Closed Thecriteriaforidentifying andanalyzingfirescenarios associatedwithdamageto structuralsteelisnotclearly documented.Thecriteria utilizedhasbeeninferred fromtheanalysisandis consideredappropriate.
frequencies for each PAU (fire zone). Appendix E and F of Report 0247070005.02 includes frequencies on a PAU basis broken down into Transient, Fixed and Total for each. Each Appendix provides a detailed Ignition Source Datasheet (ISDS) of frequencies by bin and PAU for the corresponding frequency. The ISDS utilizes data from the counting walkdowns, the transient and cable weighting factors, location weighting factors, and the Bayesian updated fire ignition frequencies to calculate the Fire Frequency for each Physical Analysis Unit.
Thecriteriaincludes1) possibilityofahighhazard fire,2)exposedstructural steel,and3)asteel temperatureof1000F.
Page 45 of 79
Phase1 (reviewed metCCI)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Theappropriatecriteriaforfire damagetostructuralsteelwere addedtoSection3.0ofthe, ExposedStructuralSteelAnalysis Report,0247070005.08,Ref(8).
Thefollowingcriteriaguidelines havebeenaddedto1)Presence ofsignificantfirehazard(Section 2.0),2)Presenceofexposed structuralsteel,3)SteelSurface temperatureinexcessof1000°F forfireconfigurationtoclearly documentthecriteriausedfor DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 30 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status The ISDS provides the Physical Analysis Unit identification and description, the generic location categories (fixed and transient source) weighting factors and count summary necessary to calculate the fire frequency in accordance with the equations provided in the body of this notebook in accordance with the guidelines established in NUREG/CR6850.
Status 2
IGNB201    DOCUMENT references for fire      Closed   The report 0247070005.02      Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by                Review of the ignition frequency (IGN)
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation identifyingandanalyzingfire scenariosassociatedwith structuralsteeldamage.Theone thousanddegreecriteriais consistentwiththestatement providedinReference2ofthe StructuralSteelAnalysisfrom NIST,FireProtectionofStructural SteelinHigh-RiseBuildings..
(Suggestion) events and fire ignition frequency          does not reference plant        (met)       (met)   documentation update. No impact      element was completed during the Phase 2 sources used.                               specific fire events used to                        to NFPA805 analysis.                 Peer review. From the final report:
FSSF301 (Finding)
update fire ignition                                Report 024707005.02, Ref (2),       Technical work completed and reviewed in frequencies.                                         has been updated to document the      August 2010; No additional review in plant specific fire events that were  March 2011.
If,perSRFSSF1,oneormore scenariosareselected, COMPLETEaquantitative assessmentoftheriskofthe selectedfirescenariosina mannerconsistentwiththeFQ requirements,includingcollapse oftheexposedstructuralsteel.
used to update the fire ignition frequencies in Appendix A of the report. The appendix documents the review of all fire events at PLP for the dates of January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2011. This review was performed to determine if any fire events were classified as potentially challenging in accordance with NUREG 6850.
Closed Thefourscenariosselected forevaluationhavebeen screenedandthereforenot includedintheCDF calculationfortheplant.
Fire events that are identified as potentially challenging required the updating of the generic fire frequencies provided in NUREG/CR6850 and EPRI TR 1016735 for use in the plant Page 46 of 79
Thescreeningprocessfor oneofthescenariosis basedonthefrequencyof suchanevent(PAU23, turbinegeneratorfire).The calculatedfrequencyisnot basedonfireignition frequenciesdocumentedin currentFirePRAEPRI guidance.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section3.2.2oftheStructuralSteel AnalysisReport,Ref(8),was revisedusingthefrequencies foundinNUREG/CR6850(Vol.2) andEPRITR1016735tocalculatea newturbinegenerator catastrophicfirefrequencyof 3.13E6/yrand1.59E6/yr, respectively.SiteSpecific frequenciesdocumentsintheFIF andPlantPartitioningReport0247 070005.02,Ref(2),were implementedinthequantitative assessmentoftheFPRA.
Quantitativecalculationsand factorsappliedarealso documentedinsection3.2.2ofthe StructuralSteelReport.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
FSSG201 (Finding)
DEFINEscreeningcriteriafor multicompartmentfirescenarios thatprovidereasonable Closed Elementsofthequalitative criteriarequirefurther evaluation.Specifically, Phase1 (not reviewed)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 31 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status specific fire PRA.
Status 2
IGNB401    DOCUMENT the plantspecific        Closed    The report 0247070005.02      Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by                Review of the ignition frequency (IGN)
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation assurancethatthecontribution ofthescreenedphysicalanalysis unitcombinationsareoflowrisk significance.
(Suggestion) frequency updating process.                   does not clearly describe        (met)       (met)   documentation update. No impact        element was completed during the Phase 2 INCLUDE in the documentation                  the process for classifying                          to NFPA805 analysis.                 Peer review. From the final report:
"exposingPAUisoutdoors; noHGLpostulated"and "exposedPAUhasa sufficientvolumethatany hotgasesthatmayenter PAU woulddissipatebefore significantdamagewould occur."Intheformer,the qualitativeassessment shouldincludeadiscussion ofyardtransformerfires nearturbinebuildingwalls.
fire events as potentially                          The 0247070005.02, Ref (2),         Technical work completed and reviewed in (a) the selected plantspecific              challenging or not                                  report documents the process of        August 2010; No additional review in events                                        challenging. The report                              classifying fire events as potentially March 2011.
Inthelater,assessmentof hotgaslayerconditions shouldbequantitatively addressed.
does provide a table                                challenging or not challenging in (b) the basis for the selection and          indicating which portion of                          Appendix A.
ThescreeningcriteriainTable31 of0247070005.07,Multi CompartmentAnalysis,Ref(7),
or exclusion of events                        the criteria was met.
wererevisedtoadddiscussionof outdoortransformersnearturbine buildingwallsandhotgaslayer.A quantitativedefinitionfor sufficientvolumewasalso provided.Thislattercriterionis onlyappliedintwoareaswhereit wassubsequentlyverifiedthata hotgaslayercouldnotforminless than60minutes.
However, the report should                          Fire event reports were obtained (c) the analysis supporting the              describe how this table was                          from plant personnel for the plantspecific reactoryears, and            populated. It is not evident                        station covering the period of from the table how the                              January 1, 2001 through December (d) the Bayesian process for                  criteria was met/not met                            31, 2011. Plant personnel made an updating generic frequencies                  from the information                                extensive search of their provide in the event                                condition report and Ideas description column.                                  databases for fire incident reports.
assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
The search criteria included dates 1/1/01 through 12/31/11 and key words fire, heat, and smoke.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
This search revealed thousands of hits but a review of each identified only a total of eleven (11) fire incidents within the protected area and in areas included in the global analysis boundary.
FSSG202 (Finding)
Each of these reports was reviewed, summarized, categorized and classified as either potentially challenging or not potentially challenging. The criteria for a fire to be deemed potentially challenging are provided in NUREG 6850.
DEFINEscreeningcriteriafor multicompartmentfirescenarios thatprovidereasonable assurancethatthecontribution ofthescreenedphysicalanalysis unitcombinationsareoflowrisk significance.
Page 47 of 79
Closed Thequantitativescreening criteriadonotinclude considerationforthe cumulativeriskscreened outduetomulti compartmentcombinations.
Currently,multi compartmentsarescreened atathresholdof1E7,but thereisnoverificationof thecumulativerisk screened.
Phase1 (not reviewed)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
RevisedSection3.5of024707 0005.07,MultiCompartment Analysis,Ref(7),todescribethe cumulativeimpactofCDF screeningat1E7.ThetotalCDF impactfromthescreenedareasis alsolessthan1E7/yr.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
FSSG401 (Finding)
Ifpassivefirebarrierswithafire resistanceratingarecreditedin theFirePRA (a)CONFIRMthattheallowed Closed TheSRrequires confirmationofallowed credit,assessmentof effectivenessandreliability, Phase1 (not reviewed)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
RevisedAppendixAof024707 DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 32 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                  Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status Appendix C in 6850, Section C.3.3.1 provides criteria for classifying a fire event as "potentially challenging."
Status 2
MUA101  The PRA configuration control    Closed    The Palisades PRA Model          Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  The finding was resolved prior to the 1
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation creditisconsistentwiththefire resistanceratingas demonstratedbyconformanceto applicableteststandards (b)ASSESStheeffectiveness reliability,andavailabilityofany passivefirebarrierfeature credited,and (c)EVALUATEthepotentialfor fireinducedorrandomfailureof creditedpassivefirebarrier features andevaluationofrandom failuresofpassivebarriers.
(Finding) process shall include monitoring            Update procedure includes      (reviewed    (not met)  update. No impact to NFPA805      conduct of the Final Peer review. This SR of changes in design, operation,           maintenance and upgrades        not met)               analysis.                           was not reexamined during the Final Peer and maintenance that could                  to the PRA to be consistent                            Section 3.3 of the configuration    review. The final report is inconsistent and affect the PRA. Such changes                with the asbuilt, as                                control notebook, NBPSACC, Ref    does not reflect resolution of this finding.
Noanalysishasbeen presentedordocumented addressingthese requirements.
shall include operating                    operated plant. Resolution                            (14), has been revised to include a procedures, design configuration,           of the Full Power Internal                            requirement for a Peer review initiating event frequencies,               Events (FPIE) Peer Review                              against the ASME standard for PSA unavailabilities, and component            F&Os and incorporation of                              model upgrades.
0005.07,Ref(7),todescribethe applicabilityandbasisforthe randomfailureprobabilityof passivefirebarriersfrom NUREG/CR6850usedinthemulti compartmentanalysis.
failure rate data.                         design and operational information relevant to a Fire PRA should result in meeting the Standard.
requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
PPA101  INCLUDE within the global        Closed    Requirement PPA01              Phase 1      Final   Finding resolved by documentation  Review of the plant partitioning (PP)
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
(Finding) analysis boundary all fire areas,          includes Note PPA12            (met)       (met)   update. No impact to NFPA805      element was completed during the Phase 2 fire compartments, or locations            which clarifies that the                              analysis.                           Peer review. From the final report:
FSSG501 (Finding)
within the licenseecontrolled              intent of the requirement is                          At the completion of Task 1 (Plant  Technical work completed and reviewed in area where a fire could adversely          to include plant locations                            Partitioning) a set of PAUs were    August 2010; No additional peer review in affect any equipment or cable              with no credited plant                                established for the fire PRA. These March 2011.
Foranyscenarioselectedper FSSG3,iftheadjoiningphysical analysisunitsareseparatedby activefirebarrierelements, QUANTIFYtheeffectiveness, reliability,andavailabilityofthe activefirebarrierelement.
item to be credited in the Fire            equipment that may affect                              PAUs are evaluated and undergo PRA plant response model                    locations with credited plant                          the screening process outlined in including those locations of a              equipment in multi                                    Section 2.1 of report 024707 sister unit that contain shared            compartment fire scenarios.                            0005.02, Ref (2). The screening equipment credited in the Fire              With respect to the multi                              analysis qualitatively determines PRA.                                        compartment analysis, the                              the fire risk associated with each report 0247070005.02                                PAU. The results of the Task 4 makes no mention on the                                screening are used in Task 6 (Fire treatment of qualitatively                            Ignition Frequency), where fire screened buildings or plant                            frequencies are estimated for each Page 48 of 79
Closed TheSRrequires quantificationof effectiveness,reliabilityand availabilityoftheactivefire barriers.Noanalysishas beenpresentedor documentedaddressing theserequirementsin additionofusingthegeneric valuesinNUREG/CR6850.
Phase1 (not reviewed)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
RevisedAppendixAof024707 0005.07,Ref(7),todescribethe applicabilityandbasisforthe randomfailureprobabilityofactive firebarriersfromNUREG/CR6850 usedinthemulticompartment analysis(MCA).Table34ofthis documentreflectsthe quantificationofMCAinteraction failures.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
FSSG601 (Suggestion)
QUANTIFYtheriskcontribution ofanyselected multicompartmentfirescenarios inamannerconsistentwiththe FQrequirements.
Closed LERFresultsarenot reportedinthemulti compartmentanalysis report,buttheyhavebeen calculated.
Phase1 (not reviewed)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Updatedreport0247070005.07, Ref(7),toreporttheLERFresults fromthefinalfirePRAmodelin Section4.0ofthemulti DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
Thesuggestionwasnotfullyresolvedfor theFinalPeerreview,butwas


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 33 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial    SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review      Peer Status    Review Status locations.                                           of the unscreened fire compartments.
Status 2
Qualitative screening as described in Task 4 (Qualitative Screening) of NUREG/CR6850 is intended to identify those fire compartments where, according to pre determined criteria, the fire risk is expected to be relatively low or nonexistent compared to others.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation compartmentanalysis.
This task assumes that the risk (i.e.
subsequentlyclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.
CDF and/or LERF) associated with the fire scenarios where a controlled manual plant shutdown may be attempted as a precautionary measure and no other fire PRA components are affected is low. If a compartments exclusion from the fire PRA is uncertain (for instance, whether an automatic or manual plant trip will occur may not be known with certainty), that compartment should be retained for quantitative analysis to better determine its contribution, if any, to the overall fire risk.
FSSH201 (Finding)
In the Palisades fire PRA there were two PAUs qualitatively screened. The qualitative screening process and criteria are described in Section 2 of report 0247070005.02.
DOCUMENTabasisfortarget damagemechanismsand thresholdsusedintheanalysis, includingreferencesforany plantspecificortargetspecific performancecriteriaappliedin theanalysis.
PPB101 DEFINE Fire PRA physical analysis Closed    The plant partitioning report  Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by                Review of the plant partitioning (PP)
Closed Thetreatmentofhydrogen firesisincorrectly documentedinreport0247 070005.06.
Page 49 of 79
Phase1 (metCCI)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Thedocumentationfortreatment ofhydrogenfiresinreport0247 070005.06,Ref(6),wasupdated tobeconsistentwithapproach appliedinthefiremodelwhich complieswithAppendixNof NUREG/CR6850.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.
ThefindingwasclosedtomeetCCIIprior totheLARsubmittal.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
FSSH501 (Finding)
SR      Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion    SR Initial      SR                Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status (Suggestion) units based on a combination of              does not describe cable        (met)       (met)   documentation update. No impact    element was completed during the Phase 2 plant fire areas as defined in the          trenches, duct banks,                              to NFPA805 analysis.               Peer review. From the final report:
DOCUMENTfiremodelingoutput resultsforeachanalyzedfire scenario,includingtheresultsof parameteruncertainty evaluations(asperformed)ina mannerthatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer review.
plants fire protection program              manholes, etc. that may be                          Physical analysis units for the    Technical work completed and reviewed in and physical analysis units where            present in the yard. The                            Palisades fire PRA correspond to    August 2010; No additional peer review in each physical analysis unit                  Fire PRA should have a                              Fire Areas defined in the Fire      March 2011.
Closed TheFirePRAisinprocess.
represents a subdivision of a fire          disposition for these areas                        Protection Program. Confirmatory area, and If any fire area is                as to why there may/may                            walkdown notes have been subdivided into two or more                  not be the need for                                documented in Attachment 3 of physical analysis units, ENSURE              postulating fire scenarios                          Report 0247070005.02, Ref (2).
Firemodelingresultsarenot complete.Documentation ofoutputresultsshouldbe consistentwithcurrent approachforscenarios analyzedwhilethefirePRA iscompleted.
that the physical analysis unit              and where in the yard the definitions comply with the                  scenarios may be                                    Six plant locations were identified balance of the PPB SRs (PPB2              postulated.                                        that were not specifically through PPB7).                                                                                 addressed in the FHA and new physical analysis units were created for use in the fire PRA.
Phase1 (met)
These fire locations were the Cooling Tower Pump House, Feedwater Purity Building, Yard Area, Switchyard, Administration Building, and Service Building. The boundary requirements for a fire risk assessment were sufficiently met by the boundaries of the Feedwater Purity Building and Cooling Tower Pump House. The Yard Area and Switchyard were outdoor areas and therefore did not have any fire rated barriers except for the separations from the indoor analysis units. Spatial separation has been inherently credited with the use of current Fire Protection Program fire boundaries. Spatial separation is present between the following PAUs boundaries: Component Cooling Pump Water Rooms and Page 50 of 79
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Thefinalfiremodelingoutput resultsforeachanalyzedfire scenarioweredocumentedin Section6.0ofreport024707 0005.01,Ref(1).Additionally, Section7.1ofRef(1)wasrevised toincludeastatistical representationoftheuncertainty intervalsusedformodelingthe significantfirescenariosfromthe finalfirePRAmodel.
ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewbecauseadditional refinementswerestillanticipatedfollowing theFinalPeerreview.Asindicatedbythe metstatus,however,theformatofthe existingresultsdiscussionwasacceptable.
FSSH901 (Finding)
DOCUMENTkeysourcesof uncertaintyfortheFSStechnical element.
Closed Sourcesofuncertaintyin thefiremodelinganalysis arenotdocumentedin 0247070005.06.
Phase1 (not reviewed)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Sourcesofuncertaintyinthefire scenarioselectionprocesswere Thissupportingrequirementwasnot reviewedduringthePhase1Peerreview asthemodelprogresswasnotsufficiently complete.Thisfindingwasidentified duringtheFinalPeerreview,butwas


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 34 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II      Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building and Radwaste Addition VRS, and lastly East Engineered Safeguards Rooms and Auxiliary Building.
Status 2
These boundaries have been documented and referenced in the current Fire Hazards Analysis to meet the requirements of this fire risk assessment.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation documentedinreport024707 0005.01,FireRiskQuantification andSummary,Ref(1).
The switchyard is located approximately a quarter mile outside of the protected area but within the Owner Controlled Area.
subsequentlyaddressedpriortotheLAR submittal.
The Yard Area is defined as all outside areas within the protected area fencing. The Fire Scenario Development Report, 024707 0005.02 accounts for the presence of cables, bus ducts, etc. in the development of the postulated fire scenarios in the yard area.
HRAA201 (Finding)
PPB201    If partitioning credits wall, ceiling, Closed   Report 0247070005.02          Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by              Review of the plant partitioning (PP)
Foreachfirescenario,IDENTIFY anynewfirespecificsafe shutdownactionscalledoutin theplantfireresponse procedures(e.g.,deenergizing equipmentperafireprocedure foraspecificfirelocation)ina mannerconsistentwiththe scopeofselectedequipment fromtheESand PRMelementsofthisStandard, andinaccordancewithHLRHRE anditsSRsinPart2withthe followingclarifications:
(Suggestion) or floor elements that lack a fire              does not provide adequate        (met)       (met)  documentation update. No impact      element was completed during the Phase 2 resistance rating, JUSTIFY the                  justification for crediting                          to NFPA805 analysis.               peer review. From the final report:
(a)whereSRHRE1discusses procedures,thisistobe extendedtoproceduresfor respondingtofires (b)whereSRHRE1mentions"in thecontextoftheaccident scenarios,"specificattentionisto begiventothefactthatthese arefirescenarios (c)anothersourceforSRHRE1is likelytobethecurrentFireSafe Shutdown/AppendixRanalysis and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRHREin Closed Theidentificationoffire responseactionsisnotyet complete.Additionalfire safeshutdownactionsare stillbeingidentifiedasthe FirePRAanalysiscontinues toberefined.
judgment that the credited                      barriers when outside the                            Physical analysis units for the      Technical work completed and reviewed in element will substantially contain              fire protection program.                             Palisades fire PRA correspond to    August 2010; No additional peer review in the damaging effects of fires                                                                        Fire Areas defined in the Fire      March 2011.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
given the nature of the fire                                                                          Protection Program. Confirmatory sources present in each                                                                              walkdown notes have been compartment separated by the                                                                          documented in Attachment 3 of nonrated partitioning element.                                                                        report 0247070005.02, Ref (2).
Final (met)
Credit for raceway fire barriers, thermal wraps or other localized protection features have not been Page 51 of 79
Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
Thefinalidentificationoffire responseactionswascompleted anddocumentedinnotebookNB PSAHR1,Ref(13).Theseactions wereincorporatedintothefinal firePRAmodelwhereappropriate.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.
TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:
Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]
thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 35 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II    Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                             Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status credited in identifying a physical analysis unit.
Status 2
PPB301    If spatial separation is credited as Closed    Report 0247070005.02          Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by              Review of the plant partitioning (PP)
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation Part2.
(Suggestion) a partitioning feature, JUSTIFY                does not clearly discuss the      (met)       (met)   documentation update. No impact      element was completed during the Phase 2 the judgment that spatial                      credit for spatial separation.                       to NFPA805 analysis.               Peer review. From the final report:
HRAA301 (Finding)
separation is sufficient to                    There are two areas noted                            Report 0247070005.02, Ref (2),     Technical work completed and reviewed in substantially contain the                      that do rely on spatial                              has been updated to discuss the      August 2010; No additional peer review in damaging effects of any fire that              separation: the Switchyard                            credit of spatial separation in      March 2011.
Foreachfirescenario,IDENTIFY anynew,undesiredoperator actionthatcouldresultfrom spuriousindicationsresulting fromfailureofasingle instrument,perSRESC2(e.g.,
might be postulated in each of                and Yard Area which are                              Section 2.2.
duetoverbatimcompliancewith theinstructioninanalarm responseprocedure,when separateconfirmationisnot availableorrequired).
the fire compartments created as              outdoors and thus have no a result of crediting this feature.           rated fire barriers. F/O                              The physical analysis units used for related to the yard has been                          the fire risk assessment correlate documented under a                                    to fire areas used for the Fire different SR and may                                  Protection Program. This approach address the concern of                                allowed the fire risk assessment to spatial separation.                                   rely on the existing programmatic controls and design requirements for maintaining the integrity of the associated physical analysis unit boundaries. Based on the documentation provided in the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), the boundaries for these PAUs had fire withstand ratings consistent with the requirements of the Fire Protection Program. The test and maintenance requirements of the Fire Protection Program were sufficient to satisfy the boundary requirements for the fire risk assessment.
Closed Section6.3oftheHRA Notebookdiscussesthe reviewthatwasperformed withthelicensedoperators fortheidentificationofthe new,undesiredoperator actionsinresponseto spuriousindications.
In addition, utilization of the area boundaries established by the Fire Page 52 of 79
However,thedetailed documentationforthe evaluationprocessandthe justificationsforthe conclusionthatno undesiredoperatoractions willbetakeninthese instrumentationfailure conditionswasnotyet completedforthereviewers toconfirmtheconclusion thatnoundesiredoperator actionsneedtobe considered.
Phase1 (metCCI)
Final (metCCI) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
Asimulatorexercisewas performedwithcurrentPalisades licenseholdersinwhichseveral scenarioswereevaluatedto determinehowOperatorswould respondgivenspuriousorfalse instrumentindications.Theresults oftheseexerciseswereconsidered intheHFEdevelopmentprocess.
Theprocessandevaluationresults aredocumentedinNBPSAHR,Ref (13).
DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.
TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:
Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]
thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
HRAA401 (Finding)
TALKTHROUGH(i.e.,reviewin detail)withplantoperationsand trainingpersonnelthe proceduresandsequenceof eventstoconfirmthat interpretationoftheprocedures relevanttoactionsidentifiedin SRsHRAA1,HRAA2,andHRAA3 isconsistentwithplant operationalandtraining Open Asthefirescenario refinementcontinues, additionalfireresponse actionswillbeidentifiedand evaluated,whichwill requiretheperformanceof additionaloperator interviews.Assuch,thistask isnotfullycompletedyet.
Also,operatorinterviewsfor Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet)
Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.
AcopyoftheHumanFailureEvent (HFE)PostInitiatorCalculation(P IC)andassociatedPostInitiator OperatorActionQuestionnaire(P IOAQ)wereprovidedtocurrent DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.
TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:
Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]
thecompletedportionoftheHRA


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 36 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status      Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status Protection Program allows the use of previously gathered equipment and cable location data and facilitates the verification and control of the boundaries.
Status 2
Walkdowns were conducted to confirm that accessible boundaries of each physical analysis unit were of substantial construction, and that physical openings in the barriers were noted. Physical analysis units for the Palisades fire PRA correspond to Fire Areas defined in the Fire Protection Program. Confirmatory walkdown notes have been documented in Attachment 3 of 0247070005.02.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation practices.
Credit for raceway fire barriers, thermal wraps or other localized protection features have not been credited in identifying a physical analysis unit.
thosefireresponseactions thatarestillusingscreening values(e.g.,ACPDGOTB5B DG,ACPPMOE38311A, ACPPMOE38312A,AFW PMOAP8BCRAB,etc.)may nothavebeencompleted.
The switchyard is located approximately a quarter mile outside of the protected area but within the Owner Controlled Area.
The Yard Area is defined as all outside areas within the protected area fencing.
PPB401    DO NOT CREDIT raceway fire        Closed    Report 0247070005.02          Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by                Review of the plant partitioning (PP)
(Suggestion) barriers, thermal wraps, fire              does not discuss crediting of    (met)      (met)  documentation update. No impact      element was completed during the Phase 2 retardant coatings, radiant                raceway fire barriers.                              to NFPA805 analysis.                Peer review. From the final report:
energy shields, or any other                                                                    Report 0247070005.02, Ref (2),      Technical work completed and reviewed in localized cable or equipment                                                                    has been updated to reflect that      August 2010; No additional peer review in Page 53 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
(Note:SpecificHEPbasic eventidentifierscitedbythe Peerreviewteammayhave beensubsequentlyrenamed orremovedfromthemodel aspartoftheF&O resolutionprocess.)
SR Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status    Finding or Suggestion    SR Initial    SR                  Disposition                  Supplemental Information Text)                                                    Peer    Subsequent Review      Peer Status      Review Status protection feature as partitioning                                                          raceways fire barriers have not      March 2011.
SROlicensedonshiftOperations Departmentpersonneland TrainingDepartmentpersonnelfor useinvalidatingHEPinformation accuracy.
elements in defining physical                                                                been credited in the fire PRA analysis units.                                                                             analysis.
HFEswereassignedtoOperations DepartmentOperatingCrewsand
The physical analysis units used for the fire risk assessment correlate to fire areas used for the Fire Protection Program. This approach allowed the fire risk assessment to rely on the existing programmatic controls and design requirements for maintaining the integrity of the associated physical analysis unit boundaries. Based on the documentation provided in the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), the boundaries for these PAUs had fire withstand ratings consistent with the requirements of the Fire Protection Program. The test and maintenance requirements of the Fire Protection Program were sufficient to satisfy the boundary requirements for the fire risk assessment.
/orOperationstrainingpersonnel forreview.Theirreviewsincluded ensuringindications,procedure selectionanduse,andactivity performancemanpowerand timingiscorrect.Training personnelreviewsincluded ensuringprocedureselectionand usewereconsistentwithcurrent trainingexpectations,andthe trainingtypeandfrequencyare accurate.
In addition, utilization of the area boundaries established by the Fire Protection Program allows the use of previously gathered equipment and cable location data and facilitates the verification and control of the boundaries.
Operatorcommentswere reviewedanddiscussedwithPRA personnelandproposed resolutionsforwardedtothe commentinitiatorforfurther commentoracceptance.Comment acceptanceisdocumentedbytheir initialingtheHFEValidationform.
Walkdowns were conducted to confirm that accessible boundaries of each physical analysis unit were of substantial construction, and Page 54 of 79
SignificantHFEswereevaluated anddevelopedinfurtherdetail.
Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.
Therecordsofthecurrent operatingcrewsandtraining assessment.
Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 37 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status that physical openings in the barriers were noted.
Status 2
PPB501    DEFINE AND JUSTIFY the basis      Closed   Report 0247070005.02          Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by                Review of the plant partitioning (PP)
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation personnelareprovidedin notebookNBPSAHR,Ref(13).
(Suggestion) and criteria applied when active            does not discuss crediting        (met)       (met)   documentation update. No impact      element was completed during the Phase 2 fire barrier elements (such as              active fire barriers.                                 to NFPA805 analysis.                 Peer review. From the final report:
HRAB201 (Finding)
normally open fire doors, water                                                                    Report 0247070005.02, Ref (2),     Technical work completed and reviewed in curtains, and fire dampers) are                                                                    has been updated to discuss the      August 2010; No additional peer review in credited in partitioning.                                                                          credit of active fire barriers.       March 2011.
INCLUDEnewfirerelatedsafe shutdownHFEscorrespondingto theactionsidentifiedperSRHRA A2intheFirePRAplantresponse modelinamannerconsistent with42.2andSection42andin accordancewithHLRHRFandits SRsinPart2and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRHRFin Part2.
The report notes that the Physical analysis units for the Palisades fire PRA correspond to Fire Areas defined in the Fire Protection Program. Additionally, confirmatory walkdown notes have been documented in Attachment 3 of 0247070005.02. Credit for raceway fire barriers, thermal wraps or other localized protection features have not been credited in identifying a physical analysis unit.
Closed Identificationofnew,fire responseactionsand incorporationofthe identifiedfireresponse actionsintotheFirePRA modelarenotcompleted.
PPB701    CONDUCT a confirmatory            Closed    Walkdown forms are              Phase 1      Final  Suggestion resolved by               Review of the plant partitioning (PP) 1 (Suggestion) walkdown of locations within the            referenced in report 0247    (reviewed   (not met) documentation update. No impact      element was completed during the Phase 2 global analysis boundary to                070005.02 but walkdown        not met)              to NFPA805 analysis.                 Peer review. Although listed in Table 416 confirm the conditions and                  results are not attached or                            Walkdowns were conducted to          as not met from the final report:
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
characteristics of credited                available. A question on this                          confirm that accessible boundaries    Technical work completed and reviewed in partitioning elements.                      topic was submitted during                            of each physical analysis unit were  August 2010; No additional peer review in the Peer review and the                                of substantial construction, and      March 2011.
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
response to the question                              that physical openings in the clarified the concern of lack                                                                The finding was verified closed prior to the barriers were noted. These            LAR submittal.
Thefinalidentificationoffire responseactionswascompleted anddocumentedinnotebookNB PSAHR1,Ref(13).Theseactions wereincorporatedintothefinal firePRAmodelwhereappropriate.
of documentation for the                              walkdowns are documented in walkdowns.                                             Attachment 3 of Report 024707 0005.02, Ref (2).
DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.
Page 55 of 79
TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:
Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]
thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
HRAB301 (Finding)
COMPLETEthedefinitionofthe HFEsidentifiedinSRsHRAB1 andHRAB2byspecifyingthe following,takingintoaccountthe contextpresentedbythefire scenariosintheFirePRA:
(a)accidentsequencespecific timingofcues,andtimewindow forsuccessfulcompletion (b)accidentsequencespecific proceduralguidance(e.g.,AOPs, EOPs)
(c)theavailabilityofcuesor otherindicationsfordetection andevaluationerrors (d)thespecifichighleveltasks Open Theimpactoflossofall redundant/diverse instrumentationonHEPs hasbeenmodeledbyORing theinstrumentationlogic withitsassociatedHEP.
Thus,incaseswheretotal instrumentfailure(by hardwarefaultorfire) occurs(includingthefailure oftheonlyinstrument available),theHEPis appropriatelyfailed.
However,thefailureimpact ofpartialinstrumentation onanHEPhasnotyetbeen Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet)
Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.
Thesimulatorexerciseperformed withcurrentPalisadeslicense holdersevaluatedoperator responsetoseveralscenarioswith false,partialortotallossof instrumentindications.Theresults oftheseexerciseswereconsidered intheHFEdevelopmentprocess forpurposesofdevelopingtiming ofcuesandtimewindows.
ThefinaldevelopedfireHFEs DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.
TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:
Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]
thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.
Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 38 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status PPC201  JUSTIFY the exclusion of any      Closed    It is not entirely clear how      Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    Review of the plant partitioning (PP)
Status 2
(Finding)  locations within the licensee              some excluded areas listed        (met)      (met)  update. No impact to NFPA805        element was completed during the Phase 2 controlled area that are not                in Section 2.1.2.2 of Report                          analysis.                           Peer review. From the final report:
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation (e.g.,trainlevel)requiredto achievethegoaloftheresponse.
included in the global analysis            0247070005.02 satisfy the                            Report Section 2.1.2.2 of Report    Technical work completed and reviewed in boundary by demonstrating that              exclusion criteria, namely                            0247070005.02, Ref (2), has been  August 2010; No additional peer review in they do not satisfy the selection          the Service Building and                              updated to satisfy the exclusion    March 2011.
implemented.Thereare casesinthemodelwhere multipleinstruments providecuestothe operatorstoperform actions.Operatoractions basedonfalseindication havenotbeenconsidered.
criteria as defined per PPA1.             Administrative building.                              criteria of the Service Building and These buildings appear to                              Administrative Building. The share a common boundary                                buildings common boundary with with the Auxiliary Building.                          the Auxiliary Building has been For example, would not a                              detailed and the PAUs are retained major fire in the Service                              for MCA analysis.
Inaddition,HFEsmodeled usingscreeningvalues(for someofthefireresponse actionsidentified;e.g.,ACP DGOTB5BDG,FPSPMOE STARTL,ACPPMOE383 12A,ACPPMOE38311A, etc.)andthosefireresponse actionsthatwillbe identifiedasthefire scenariorefinement continueshavenotyet accountedforthescenario contextincludingtiming, proceduralguidance, instrumentation,task complexity,etc.Also,HRA Calculatorevaluationsheets cannotbelocatedforPCP PMOFP50XLOCandEDG PMOEPORTPUMP,and AFWAVOACV2010D, SWSAVOACV082326,and SWSAVOBCV082447M stillneedtobemodifiedfor firerelatedconditions.
building be designated a challenging fire requiring a plant shutdown? The report states that fires within the Administration Building, Service Building, and Service Building Addition were not expected to propagate to the included physical analysis units, cause a plant transient, or require plant shutdown.
incorporatetaskcomplexityand proceduralguidanceas documentedinthePostInitiator OperatorActionQuestionnaire(P IOAQ)providedtocurrentSRO licensedonshiftOperations Departmentpersonneland TrainingDepartmentpersonnelfor useinvalidatingHFEinformation accuracy.
Are excluded buildings permanently excluded, or are they considered during multicompartment evaluations?
SignificantHFEswereevaluated anddevelopedinfurtherdetail.
PRMB1101 MODEL all operator actions and    Open      Complete work                    Phase 1      Final  Finding open, given that the        Review of the fire PRA plant response (Finding)  operator influences in                                                      (reviewed    (not met) procedures, modification detail,     model (PRM) technical element was mostly accordance with the HRA                                                     not met)              operations review, and detailed      complete during the Phase 1 review. A element of this Standard.                                                                         HRA model development are not        limited review was conducted during the yet complete.                       Final.
Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.
Page 56 of 79
ThefinallistoffireHFEsandtheir associateddocumentationare providedinNBPSAHR,Ref(13).


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 39 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status Screening values are still applied  From the Final Peer review summary:
Status 2
for fire HEPs pending development  The Fire PRA plant response model was of final procedures, modifications, reviewed with very few findings. There and operations reviews.             were no technical F&Os on the scope or content of the PRM model itself. The F&Os assigned to PRM were either a) cross referenced from other tasks [HRA and ES]
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation HRAC101 (Finding)
or b) were for incomplete documentation.
Foreachselectedfirescenario, QUANTIFYtheHEPsforallHFEs andACCOUNTFORrelevantfire relatedeffectsusingdetailed analysesforsignificantHFEsand conservativeestimates(e.g.,
This HRA related finding remains open.
screeningvalues)for nonsignificantHFEs,in accordancewiththeSRsforHLR HRGinPart2setforthunderat leastCapabilityCategoryII,with thefollowingclarification:
PRMB301 IDENTIFY any new initiating        Closed    The fault tree model            Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  Review of the fire PRA plant response 1
(a)Attentionistobegivento howthefiresituationaltersany previousassessmentsinnonfire analysesastotheinfluencing factorsandthetiming considerationscoveredinSRsHR G3,HRG4,andHRG5inPart2 And (b)DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRHRGin Part2.
(Finding) events arising from the                      development omitted the      (reviewed    (not met) and model update. No impact to      model (PRM) technical element was mostly considerations of the ES and CS              DC power dependency            not met)              NFPA805 analysis.                 complete during the Phase 1 review. A technical elements that might                requirement for the RCP                              The fault tree model applied to the limited review was conducted during the result from a fire event that were          breaker trip function.                               fire PRA was updated to include    Final.
Open FireresponseHFEsmodeled withscreeningvalueshave notyetbeenevaluatedina manneraccountingfor relevantPSFs(e.g.,ACP DGOTB5BDG,FPSPMOE STARTL,ACPPMOE383 11A,ACPPMOE38312A, etc.).Also,HRACalculator evaluationsheetcannotbe locatedforPCPPMOFP 50XLOCandEDGPMOE PORTPUMP,andAFW AVOACV2010D,SWS AVOACV082326,and SWSAVOBCV082447M stillneedtobemodifiedfor firerelatedconditions.This taskisnotcompleted.
not included in the Internal                                                                      the DC power dependency for the    From the Final Peer review summary:
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Events PRA including those                                                                        primary coolant pump breaker trip arising from the consideration of                                                                                                      The Fire PRA plant response model was function. This logic was added at  reviewed with very few findings. There spurious actuation.                                                                                model gates PCPSEALSSW20,       were no technical F&Os on the scope or PCPSEALSSW22, PCPSEALSSW      content of the PRM model itself. The F&Os 21, and PCPSEALSSW23 for each    assigned to PRM were either a) cross of the four primary coolant pumps. referenced from other tasks [HRA and ES]
Final (metCCI)
or b) were for incomplete documentation.
Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.
The finding was not fully resolved for the Final Peer review, but was subsequently closed prior to the LAR submittal.
SignificantHFEswereevaluated anddevelopedinfurtherdetailas documentedinNBPSAHR,Ref (13).Screeningvaluesarestill appliedforfireHEPspending developmentoffinalprocedures, modifications,andoperations reviews.
PRMB302 IDENTIFY any new initiating        Closed    Spurious SI is not included    Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  Review of the fire PRA plant response 1
(Finding) events arising from the                      as a potential initiating    (reviewed   (not met) and model update. No impact to      model (PRM) technical element was mostly considerations of the ES and CS              event                          not met)              NFPA805 analysis.                  complete during the Phase 1 review. A technical elements that might                                                                      A complete review of Safety        limited review was conducted during the result from a fire event that were                                                                Injection Signal (SIS), Containment Final.
not included in the Internal                                                                      High Pressure (CHP), Containment    From the Final Peer review summary:
Events PRA including those Page 57 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion    SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                    Supplemental Information Text)                                                          Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status arising from the consideration of                                                                High Radiation (CHR), Containment  The Fire PRA plant response model was spurious actuation.                                                                              Isolation Signal (CIS) and          reviewed with very few findings. There Recirculation Actuation Signal      were no technical F&Os on the scope or (RAS) logic was performed to        content of the PRM model itself. The F&Os identify potential adverse          assigned to PRM were either a) cross component actuations that could    referenced from other tasks [HRA and ES]
TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:
occur due to a spurious signal from or b) were for incomplete documentation.
Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]
any of these sources.              The finding was not fully resolved for the Logic was added for 45 PRA          Final Peer review, but was subsequently components to consider spurious    closed prior to the LAR submittal.
thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.
operation from any of the automatic actuation circuits.
Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.
Report 0247070005.04, Ref (4),
HRAD101 (Finding)
Section 5.71 was updated to reflect these changes.
INCLUDEoperatorrecovery actionsthatcanrestorethe functions,systems,or componentsonanasneeded basistoprovideamorerealistic evaluationofsignificantaccident sequences.
PRMB501 For those fireinduced initiating  Closed   The MSO expert panel          Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation  Review of the fire PRA plant response 1
Closed Identificationandevaluation ofrecoveryactionsforrisk significantscenariosare expectedtocontinueasthe refinementoffirescenario analysiscontinues.
(Finding) events included in the Internal              issues have not been        (reviewed   (not met) and model update. No impact to      model (PRM) technical element was mostly Events PRA model, REVIEW the                completely resolved and      not met)               NFPA805 analysis.                  complete during the Phase 1 review. A corresponding accident sequence              incorporated into the PRA                            All MSO expert panel issues have    limited review was conducted during the models and                                  model. Thus, all modeling                            been resolved and integrated into  Final.
Currently,someofthetop coredamagefirescenarios stilldonotaccountfor Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
(a) IDENTIFY any existing accident          work associated with MSO                            the final PRA fire model as        From the Final Peer review summary:
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
sequences that will require                  incorporation has not been                          appropriate. All MSO scenario modification based on unique                done at this time.                                                                       The Fire PRA plant response model was dispositions are documented in the  reviewed with very few findings. There aspects of the plant fire response                                                                final MSO report 0247070005.04, procedures in accordance with                                                                                                        were no technical F&Os on the scope or Ref (4).                           content of the PRM model itself. The F&Os HLRASA and HLRASB of Part 2 and their supporting                                                                                                                  assigned to PRM were either a) cross requirements                                                                                                                          referenced from other tasks [HRA and ES]
Thefinalidentificationoffire responseactionswascompleted anddocumentedinnotebookNB PSAHR1,Ref(13).Theseactions wereincorporatedintothefinal firePRAmodelwhereappropriate.
And                                                                                                                                  or b) were for incomplete documentation.
DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.
(b) IDENTIFY any new accident                                                                                                        The finding was not fully resolved for the sequences that might result from                                                                                                      Final Peer review, but was subsequently a fire event that were not                                                                                                            closed prior to the LAR submittal.
TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:
included in the Internal Events PRA in accordance with HLRASA Page 58 of 79
Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 40 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status and HLRASB of Part 2 and their supporting requirements.
Status 2
PRMB901 For any cases where new system    Closed    Failure to trip Pressurizer      Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    Review of the fire PRA plant response 1
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation realisticrecoveryactions.
(Finding) models or split fractions are                heaters is not explicitly      (reviewed    (not met) and model update. No impact to      model (PRM) technical element was mostly needed, or existing models or                addressed                      not met)              NFPA805 analysis.                   complete during the Phase 1 review. A split fractions need to be                                                                          Fault tree PZRSPURHTRFT(45)      limited review was conducted during the modified to include fireinduced                                                                    was added to the fire PRA to        Final.
Thistaskisnotcompleted yet.
equipment failures, firespecific                                                                  model spurious operation of          From the Final Peer review summary:
thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.
operator actions, and/or spurious                                                                  pressurizer heaters and failure of actuations, PERFORM the                                                                                                                  The Fire PRA plant response model was pressurizer spray. Failure of this  reviewed with very few findings. There systems analysis portion of the                                                                    fault tree results in a potential Fire PRA model in accordance                                                                                                            were no technical F&Os on the scope or stuck open pressurizer safety        content of the PRM model itself. The F&Os with HLRSYA and HLRSYB and                                                                      valve, or valves.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
their SRs in Part 2 with the                                                                                                            assigned to PRM were either a) cross following clarifications, and                                                                      Section 5.45 of report 024707      referenced from other tasks [HRA and ES]
HRAD201 (Finding)
DEVELOP a defined basis to                                                                          0005.04, Multiple Spurious          or b) were for incomplete documentation.
INCLUDEoperatorrecovery actionsthatcanrestorethe functions,systems,or componentsonanasneeded basistoprovideamorerealistic evaluationofsignificantaccident sequences(sameasHRAD101).
support the claim of                                                                                Operation Report, Ref (4), was      The finding was not fully resolved for the nonapplicability of any of these                                                                    updated to reflect this change.      Final Peer review, but was subsequently requirements in Part 2:                                                                                                                  closed prior to the LAR submittal.
Open Manyoftheoperator recoveryactionsassociated withfireresponsearestill modeledwithscreening values;i.e.,notaccounting foralloftherelevantPSFs.
All the SRs under HLRSYA and HLRSYB in Part 2 are to be addressed in the context of fire scenarios including effects on system operability/functionality accounting for fire damage to equipment and associated cabling.
Dependencyanalysishas beenperformedforthe currentsetoffirescenarios andoperatoractionsinthe "T"model.Theresults generatedfromthe"Q" modeldidnotincorporate thedependencyanalysis.
QLSB201 DOCUMENT the disposition of        Closed    See PPC201.                    Phase 1      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    Review of the qualitative screening (QLS)
Thedependencyanalysis needstobereanalyzed beforefinalizationofthe FirePRAmodel.Thistaskis notcompleteyet.Also,HRA Calculatorevaluationsheets cannotbelocatedforPCP PMOFP50XLOCandEDG PMOEPORTPUMP,and AFWAVOACV2010D, SWSAVOACV082326,and SWSAVOBCV082447M stillneedtobemodifiedfor firerelatedconditions Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
(Finding) each physical analysis unit                                                (reviewed      (met)   update. No impact to NFPA805        element was completed during the Phase 2 defined by the plant partitioning                                              not                analysis.                           Peer review. From the final report:
Final (notmet)
analysis as either "screened out"                                          applicable)            Section 2.1.2.2 of Report 024707  Technical work was completed and or "retained for quantitative                                                                      0005.02, Ref (2), has been updated  reviewed in August 2010; No additional analysis" and in a manner that                                                                      to satisfy the exclusion criteria of review in March 2011.
Thisfindingopenistreatedas opensincescreenvalueswere usedasrecoveryvalues.Thisisa resultgiventhattheprocedures, modificationdetail,operations review,anddetailedHRAmodel developmentarenotyetcomplete.
Page 59 of 79
Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPs.
Adependencyanalysiswas completedtoidentify combinationsofhumanfailure events(HFEs)inwhich dependenciesbetweenactions maycontributetoanincreasein coredamagefrequency(CDF) whencomparedtotheCDF calculatedwhennominalscreening valuesforhumanerror probabilities(HEPs)areused.
Dependenciesbetweenactions wereassignedbasedonsequence specificevaluationsofcues,timing, location,andavailableresources, andtheHEPsadjustedifnecessary torepresentthelevelof dependence;theCDFwasthen recalculatedusingthemodified HEPs.HFEsnotexplicitlyevaluated DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.
TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:
Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]
thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.
Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 41 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR   Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer   Subsequent Review        Peer Status      Review Status facilitates Fire PRA applications,                                                                  the Service Building and upgrades, and Peer review.                                                                          Administrative Building. The buildings common boundary with the Auxiliary Building has been detailed and the PAUs are retained for MCA analysis.
Status 2
SFA101  For those physical analysis units  Open      The current seismic fire        Phase 1        Final  Finding open. No impact to NFPA      Review of the seismic fire (SF) element was (Finding) within the Fire PRA global                  interactions analysis relies  (reviewed    (not met)  805 quantified results.              completed during the Phase 1 Peer review.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation fordependencewereassigned HEPsof1(i.e.,therepresented operatoractionsareassumedto failwithaprobabilityofunity),and thustheresultingCDFrepresents anupperboundforthepotential impactofdependenciesuponthe results.Sharedcuesconservatively assumed100%dependence.This approachhasidentifiedimportant HFEsforwhichthecompletionof detailedhumanreliabilityanalyses maybebeneficial;thoseanalyses havenotbeencompleted.
analysis boundary,                          on the IPEEE study. The        not met)                Report 0247070005.05, Seismic    From the final report:
ThefirePRAHRAdependency analysisisdocumentedinNBPSA HR,Ref(13).
(a) LOOK for fire ignition source            report needs to                                        Fire Interaction, Ref (5), evaluates Completed in January 2010 and not re scenarios that might arise as the            demonstrate that the scope                              Palisades with respect to            reviewed in August 2010 or March 2011.
result of an earthquake that                of that work meets the                                  NUREG/CR6850 Task 13, Seismic would be unique from those                  objectives of the Standard                                                                    This finding remains open, but this has no Fire Interactions Assessment. .      impact on the quantified results.
postulated during the general                and that plant changes since analysis of each physical analysis          the work was performed do                              The seismic fire interactions unit,                                        not compromise the                                      analysis has not been updated.
and                                          conclusions.                                           However, since the Standard only (b) PROVIDE a qualitative                                                                            requires a qualitative analysis, assessment of the potential risk                                                                    there is no impact on the significance of any unique fire                                                                      quantified results in fire PRA ignition source scenarios                                                                            model.
identified UNCA101 PERFORM the uncertainty            Closed    Only a limited number of        Phase 1 /      Final  Finding resolved by documentation    The uncertainty and sensitivity supporting 1
(Finding) analysis in accordance with HLR            parameter and modeling          Phase 2    (not met)  update. No impact to NFPA805        requirements were not reviewed during QUE and its SRs in Part 2 as well          uncertainties and associated      (not                analysis.                            the Phase 1 and Phase 2 Peer reviews as as SRs LEF2 and LEF3 under                assumptions have been          reviewed)                Section 7.1 of the fire risk          the model progress was not sufficiently HLRLEF in Part 2 and DEVELOP a            identified. The list is                                summary report, 0247070005.01,     complete. This finding was identified defined basis to support the                incomplete and not defined                              Ref (1), was revised to include      during the Final Peer review, but was claim of nonapplicability of any            in sufficient detail to                                additional discussion and            subsequently addressed prior to the LAR of the requirements under these              support a reasonable                                    evaluation of the stateof          submittal.
sections in Part 2.                         characterization or                                    knowledgecorrelation and the evaluation. Uncertainties                              impact of uncertainty associated have been propagated                                    with severity factors and non Page 60 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
HRAE101 (Finding)
SR  Topic (ASME Standard Category II  Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial      SR                Disposition                  Supplemental Information Text)                                                           Peer    Subsequent Review        Peer Status    Review Status through a Monte Carlo                                  suppression probability. The approach. However,                                     discussion indicated that the correlation of state of                                distributions might be more broad knowledge uncertainties has                            if a more detailed parametric not been addressed, i.e. all                          uncertainty assessment were to be initiators have been treated                          performed.
DOCUMENTtheFirePRAHRA including (a)thosefirerelatedinfluences thataffectthemethods, processes,orassumptionsused aswellastheidentificationand quantificationoftheHFEs/HEPs inaccordancewithHLRHRIand itsSRsinPart2,andDEVELOPa definedbasistosupportthe claimofnonapplicabilityofanyof therequirementsunderHLRHRI
as independent variables, Severity Factor (SF) and Non Suppression Probabilities (NSP) and spurious actuation probabilities are not correlated.
: inPart2, and (b)anydefinedbasestosupport theclaimofnonapplicabilityof Open DocumentationforHFEs associatedwithselectedfire responseHFEs(e.g.,FPS PMOESTARTL,ACPPMOE 38311A,ACPPMOE383 12A,etc.)intherisk significantfirescenarios needtobeprovided.Also, HRACalculatorevaluation sheetscannotbelocatedfor PCPPMOFP50XLOC,EDG PMOEPORTPUMP,and PULLFUSE;AFWPMOTP 8BLOCseemstohavebeen changedtoAFWPMOTP 8BSBOinHRAnotebook Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
(Uncertainties carried over from the internal events analysis are correlated). This approach has led to unrealistically narrow predictions of CDF and LERF distributions (error factor of
Final (notmet)
: 2) and the potential underestimation of the mean values for scenarios which are quantified based on the product of like distributions (e.g. multiple spurious actuation probabilities).
Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.Screeningvalues arestillappliedforfireHEPs pendingdevelopmentoffinal procedures,modifications,and operationsreviews.
UNCA201 INCLUDE the treatment of          Open      The uncertainty intervals      Phase 1 /      Final  Finding open as the approach for  The uncertainty and sensitivity supporting (Finding) uncertainties, including their              assigned to Fire IEs, Severity    Phase 2    (not met) performing the parametric          requirements were not reviewed during documentation, as called out in            Factors and Non                    (not              uncertainty evaluation has not yet the Phase 1 and Phase 2 Peer reviews as SRs PRMA4, FQF1, IGNA10,                Suppression Probabilities      reviewed)             been updated.                      the model progress was not sufficiently IGNB5, FSSE3, FSSE4, FSSH5,             are not based on acceptable                            No impact to NFPA805 analysis as  complete. This finding was identified FSSH9, and CFA2 and that                  systematic methods.                                   the results are based on the point during the Final Peer review, but as required by performing Part 2              1) Uncertainty distributions                          estimate values which              indicated this does not impact the point referenced requirements                    for fire IEs have been                                                                    estimate values used in the NFPA805 Page 61 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.
SR Topic (ASME Standard Category II Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial    SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                         Peer    Subsequent Review      Peer Status      Review Status throughout this Standard.                 assigned the same error                              approximate the mean values. The    analysis.
TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:
factor of 10 rather than                              parametric uncertainty analysis is  This finding remains open.
Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]
using posterior distributions                        presented in Section 7.1 of the fire from Bayesian update                                  risk summary report, 024707
thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.
: 2) SF distributions have                              0005.01, Ref (1). The issues been assigned without an                              identified have not been fully underlying basis.                                    addressed, but this primarily
Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.
: 3) NSP uncertainty                                    impacts the potential range of the distribution has been                                uncertainty distribution and does derived on the basis of                              not have a significant impact on NUREG/CR 1278. This                                  the mean value; and has no impact provides guidance on HEP                              on the point estimate mean values uncertainty assessment.                              used in the analysis.
However, NSP terms are an output of a combination of fire growth and suppression modeling and guidance in NUREG/CR 1278 has therefore little relevance. A valid approach would be to address the uncertainties in damage times in combination with uncertainties in suppression probabilities based on specific contributing factors.
: 4) Uncertainties associated with spurious actuation probabilities have been characterized according to a set of rules defined for severity factors. In this case spurious actuation probabilities with a failure probability of > 0.25 are assigned an error factor of Page 62 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 2
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 42 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
SR         Topic (ASME Standard Category II        Status        Finding or Suggestion      SR Initial    SR                  Disposition                      Supplemental Information Text)                                                                 Peer     Subsequent Review      Peer Status      Review Status 1.0. In contrast NUREG/CR 6850 recommend use of a uniform distribution with the following limits Cables with 15 or less conductors: +20%
Status 2
Cables with more than 15 conductors: +50%
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation anyofthereferenced requirementsinPart2beyond thatalreadycoveredbythe clarificationsinthisPart (butnotchangedinFirePRA model);andAFWAVOACV 2010D,SWSAVOACV 082326,andSWSAVOB CV082447Mstillneedtobe modifiedforfirerelated conditions.Thistaskisnot complete.
Alternatively the values included in tables 101 to 105 NUREG/CR 6850 could be used where limits appear to be wider. The Palisades analysis has not accounted for larger uncertainties associated with cables with
IGNA1001 (Finding)
                                                                    > 15 conductors.
PROVIDEameanvalueof,anda statisticalrepresentationof,the uncertaintyintervalsfor significantfireignition frequencies.
: 1) The supporting requirement was categorized as not met at completion of the Final Peer review conducted during the week of March 21, 2011. The supporting requirement was subsequently addressed and categorized as met/closed (per the disposition discussion), prior to the LAR submittal in December 2012.
Closed Thecharacterizationof uncertaintiesinthefire ignitionfrequencieshasnot beenaddressedinthe reportqualitativelyor quantitatively.
: 2) Status Closed implies F&O disposition is sufficient to meet Category II.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Page 63 of 79
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Thecharacterizationof uncertaintiesinthefireignition frequencieshavebeenaddressed inReport0247.07.005.01,Ref(1).
Thechangeinignitionfrequency hasadirectimpactonCDFsince ignitionfrequencyisincludedin thecalculationofCDFforevery scenario.Thereportdescribesthe sensitivitiesrunbychangingthe binignitionfrequenciestothe5th and95thpercentilevaluesofthe originalfrequenciesforbothEPRI andNUREG/CR6850values.
Calculatingthe5thand95th percentileswasdonesousingthe GAMMADISTfunctioninExcelfor theEPRIfrequenciesandprovided asBARToutputfortheNUREG/CR 6850frequencies.Thissensitivity providesanadequateupperand lowerboundofthefinalCDFwhich usedthemeanfrequencies.
Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.
ThefindingwasclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 3: Supporting Requirements with Status of Not Reviewed SR     Topic (ASME Standard Category II Text)               Status   Peer Review Basis for Assessment                  Disposition PRMA3 CONSTRUCT the Fire PRA plant response model so        Not      This SR is not reviewed because the sequence      This supporting requirement is meant to refer to the Fire Risk Quantification that it is capable of determining the significant    Reviewed  infrastructure to provide this capability is not  supporting requirements in Section 42.12 (as there is no Section 42.7.12 in contributors to the fireinduced risk with 42.7.12.            available at this time. The capability to          the PRA standard). Since the Fire Risk Quantification SRs were fully calculate risk importance in a single scenario is  reviewed during the Phase 2 and Final Peer reviews, the PRMA3 supporting available at the present time. The internal        requirement was implicitly reviewed during that process as the model had events PRA provides an acceptable method for      to be constructed to determine the significant contributors to perform the development of risk importance. Palisades uses    FQ review. For the final Peer review, FRANC was used to quantify the SAPHIRE for quantification, which claims to be    Palisades Fire PRA. FRANC provides CCDP and CLERP results on a fire able to integrate all fire scenarios into a global scenario basis and, when combined with the scenario fire frequencies, core damage equation and calculate global          calculates and displays CDF and LERF. These results were presented to the importance using replacement events for basic      fire PRA peer review team in the initial issue of the completed Fire Risk and events that have different probabilities in        Quantification Summary Report, 0247070005.01 (Rev. 0 [17], March 2011).
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 43 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
different rooms. Palisades claims this has been    Additionally, the dispositions for the findings of the FQ element in Table 2 done in internal flooding, which has the same      are applicable to PRMA3.
Status 2
multipleevent quantification challenges. If this method is successful, Palisades would be an        The fire risk quantification (FQ) element was reviewed in detail in both the industry leading plant in the development of      Phase 2 and Final Peer reviews.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation
global importance.                                With respect to the FQ element the Final report states:
Overall process is consistent with prevailing good practices. Results are not final and thus certain SRs cannot be demonstrated to have been met.
Continuing the refinement in process and planned provides confidence this technical element will meet the Standard.
PRMB2 VERIFY the peer review exceptions and deficiencies    Not      Not completed yet because the final Internal      The fire Peer review team did not formally review the resolution of the full for the Internal Events PRA are dispositioned, and    Reviewed  Events PRA Peer Review has not been provided      power internal events findings and observations. The resolutions are the disposition does not adversely affect the                  to Palisades                                      discussed in Attachment U of the LAR and their impacts on the fire PRA are development of the Fire PRA plant response model.                                                                  noted. None of the open items impact the NFPA 805 submittal.
The full power internal events (FPIE) peer review report, dated March 12, 2010 was received between the Phase 1 and Phase 2 fire PRA peer reviews.
Resolution of findings from this report were in progress during the Phase 2 and Final fire peer reviews.
With respect to the internal events model, the Final report states:
The Fire PRA and Internal Events PRA use the same model, thus the fidelity between the two is good. The internal events PRA underwent a RG 1.200 peer review in October 2009. The F&Os have been formally addressed and incorporated into the Fire PRA model.
Page 64 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 3: Supporting Requirements with Status of Not Reviewed SR      Topic (ASME Standard Category II Text)                   Status    Peer Review Basis for Assessment              Disposition PRMB4  MODEL any new initiating events identified per SR        Not      No new initiating events were identified, so  As stated in the peer review assessment, no new initiating events were PRMB2 in accordance with HLRIEA, HLRIEB, and        Reviewed  this SR was not required. However, PRMB3      identified so this SR was not required.
IGNA601 (Suggestion)
HLRIEC and their SRs in Part 2 with the following                indicates spurious SI should be considered, so Two findings were noted in the PRMB3 SR and were closed as described in clarifications:                                                    that the SR must be completed.                 Table 2 above.
Whencombiningevidencefrom genericandplantspecificdata, USEaBayesianupdateprocessor equivalentstatisticalprocess.
(a) All SRs under HLRIEA and HLRIEB, and SRs IE                                                              Review of the fire PRA plant response model (PRM) technical element was C4, IEC6, IEC7, IEC8, IEC9, and IEC12 in Part 2 are                                                          mostly complete during the Phase 1 review. A limited review was to be addressed in the context of a fire inducing the                                                            conducted during the Final.
JUSTIFYtheselectionofany informativepriordistribution usedonthebasisofindustry experience.
initiating events excluding initiating events that cannot be induced by a fire                                                                                      From the Final Peer review summary:
Closed TheBayesianupdate processusedtoupdate genericignitionfrequencies toplantspecificisnot documented.Aquestion wassubmittedduringthe Peerreviewactivitiesand theresponsesuggeststhat theBayesianapproachis documentedandwillbe addedtothereport.
and                                                                                                              The Fire PRA plant response model was reviewed with very few findings.
Phase1 (met)
There were no technical F&Os on the scope or content of the PRM model (b) DEVELOP a defined basis to support the claim of                                                              itself. The F&Os assigned to PRM were either a) crossreferenced from other nonapplicability of any of these requirements in Part                                                            tasks [HRA and ES] or b) were for incomplete documentation.
Final (met)
2.
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
The PRMB3 findings were not fully resolved for the Final Peer review, but were subsequently closed prior to the LAR submittal.
TheBayesianupdateprocessused toupdatethegenericfrequencies toplantspecificfrequenciesis documentedinSection4.2ofthe FireIgnitionFrequencyandPlant Partitioning,report024707 0005.02,Ref(2).Section4.2.1of thereportidentifiestheBayesian statisticalupdateoftheEPRITR 1016735genericfrequenciesthat wasperformedusingPLPspecific fireeventsdata.Therevisedfire ignitionfrequencies,includingthe frequenciescalculatedinAppendix GofReport0247070005.02,have gammauncertaintydistributions.
PRMB14 IDENTIFY any new accident progressions beyond the        Not      LERF analysis did not look for any LERF        There are no open F&Os associated with the LERF element from the internal onset of core damage that would be applicable to        Reviewed  phenomena applicable to the fire PRA which    events PRA. No new LERF phenomena were identified for the Palisades fire the Fire PRA that were not addressed for LERF                      were not included in the internal events PRA. PRA.
Therefore,thepriordataprovided included:themean,alpha,and betafactors.TheBayesiananalysis wasperformedinamanner consistentwiththeassertionthat thebinignitionfrequencieswere gammadistributions.
estimation in the Internal Events PRA.                             F&O was not written. The reviewers are not aware of any Fire PRA which looked for beyond internal events" LERF phenomena.
Section4.2.2ofthereport 0247.070005.02identifiesthe Bayesianstatisticalupdateofthe NUREG/CR6850generic frequencieswasperformedusing PLPspecificfireeventsdata.
Page 65 of 79
NUREG/CR6850providesthe Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors References for Question 1 Response
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 44 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
: 1)   Report 0247-07-0005.01 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Risk Quantification and Summary.
Status 2
: 2)    Report 0247-07-0005.02 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Plant Partitioning and Fire Ignition Frequency Development.
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation mean,5th,50th,and95th percentiles,andstandarddeviation foreachbinignitionfrequency.
: 3)    Report 0247-07-0005.03 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Development Report.
TheBayesiananalysisassumesthe NUREG/CR6850binignition frequenciesarelognormal distributions.FrequenciesforBins 16a,16b,16c,and16dare providedinFAQ060017andFAQ 070035.Thegenericfrequency distributionsalongwiththeplant evidencediscussedinSection4.2 ofReport0247070005.02were inputintotheBayesiansoftware toolBART,andthenewbin frequenciesdeveloped.Table45 ofReport0247070005.02 providestheposteriormean,5th percentile,95thpercentile, median,andrangefactorvalues associatedwitheachbinforusein futureupdate.
: 4)    Report 0247-07-0005.04 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Multiple Spurious Operations Report.
IGNA701 (Finding)
: 5)    Report 0247-07-0005.05 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Seismic/Fire Interaction Report.
USEaplantwideconsistent methodologybasedon parametersthatareexpectedto influencethelikelihoodof ignitiontoapportionhighlevel ignitionfrequencies(e.g.,plant widevalues)toestimatephysical analysisunitorignitionsource levelfrequencies.
: 6)   Report 0247-07-0005.06 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Scenario Development Report.
Closed Page31ofreport024707 0005.02appearstosuggest thatnofrequencyfor miscellaneoushydrogen fireshasbeenassignedto applicablephysicalanalysis units.Thismayaffectthe PAUlevelquantificationby reducingthefireignition frequencyassignedtothe applicableplantlocations.
: 7)    Report 0247-07-0005.07 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Multi-Compartment Analysis.
Phase1 (met)
: 8)   Report 0247-07-0005.08 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Exposed Structural Steel Analysis.
Final (met)
: 9)   EA-APR-95-004 Rev. 5, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Associated Circuits Analysis for Common Power Supply and Common Enclosure.
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
: 10)  PLP-RPT-12-00134 Rev. 0, Validation of Appendix R Non-Safe Shutdown Cable Routing to Support the Fire PRA.
Report0247.07070005.02,Ref (2),andFireIgnitionFrequency calculationdatabaseshavebeen updatedtoassignmiscellaneous hydrogenfirestoallapplicable PhysicalAnalysisUnits(PAUs).As notedinSection4ofreport0247 070005.02,thefrequency associatedwithBin19, Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
: 11)  Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-ETSC Rev. 3, Event Trees and Success Criteria.
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.
: 12)  EA-PSA-FPIE-FIRE-12-04 Rev. 0, Palisades Full Power Internal Events and Fire Model.
: 13)   Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-HR Rev. 4, Human Reliability Analysis Notebook Volume 1 (Post Initiator Operator Actions).
: 14)  Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-CC Rev. 1, PSA Model Configuration Control.
: 15)  ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008 Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, 2009.
: 16)  SCIENTECH report 17825-1, Palisades Fire PRA Peer Review to Requirements in Part 4 of the ASME/ANS Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plant Applications.
Page 66 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 45 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
: 17)   Report 0247-07-0005.01 Rev. 0, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Risk Quantification and Summary.
Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation MiscellaneousHydrogenFires,has beenallocatedbasedonlinear feet,valvelocationandtank locationinPAUswherehydrogen equipmentexists.Applyingthese criteriahasapportioned miscellaneoushydrogenfrequency tothefollowingPAUs:04(1C SwitchgearRoom),13(Reactor Building),and23(Turbine Building).
IGNA901 (Suggestion)
POSTULATEthepossibilityof transientcombustiblefiresforall physicalanalysisunitsregardless oftheadministrativerestrictions.
Closed Thereport0247070005.02 doesnotlistthetransientor fixedignitionsource frequenciesineachfire zone.Thereportappearsto onlylistthetotalfrequency.
Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
Report0247.070005.02,Ref(2),
hasbeenupdatedtoinclude transientandfixedignitionsource frequenciesforeachPAU(fire zone).AppendixEandFofReport 0247070005.02includes frequenciesonaPAUbasisbroken downintoTransient,Fixedand Totalforeach.EachAppendix providesadetailedIgnitionSource Datasheet(ISDS)offrequenciesby binandPAUforthecorresponding frequency.TheISDSutilizesdata fromthecountingwalkdowns,the transientandcableweighting factors,locationweightingfactors, andtheBayesianupdatedfire ignitionfrequenciestocalculate theFireFrequencyforeach PhysicalAnalysisUnit.
Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation TheISDSprovidesthePhysical AnalysisUnitidentificationand description,thegenericlocation categories(fixedandtransient source)weightingfactorsand countsummarynecessaryto calculatethefirefrequencyin accordancewiththeequations providedinthebodyofthis notebookinaccordancewiththe guidelinesestablishedin NUREG/CR6850.
IGNB201 (Suggestion)
DOCUMENTreferencesforfire eventsandfireignitionfrequency sourcesused.
Closed Thereport0247070005.02 doesnotreferenceplant specificfireeventsusedto updatefireignition frequencies.
Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
Report024707005.02,Ref(2),
hasbeenupdatedtodocumentthe plantspecificfireeventsthatwere usedtoupdatethefireignition frequenciesinAppendixAofthe report.Theappendixdocuments thereviewofallfireeventsatPLP forthedatesofJanuary1,2001 throughDecember31,2011.This reviewwasperformedto determineifanyfireeventswere classifiedaspotentiallychallenging inaccordancewithNUREG6850.
Fireeventsthatareidentifiedas potentiallychallengingrequired theupdatingofthegenericfire frequenciesprovidedin NUREG/CR6850andEPRITR 1016735foruseintheplant Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation specificfirePRA.
IGNB401 (Suggestion)
DOCUMENTtheplantspecific frequencyupdatingprocess.
INCLUDEinthedocumentation
 
(a)theselectedplantspecific events
 
(b)thebasisfortheselectionand orexclusionofevents
 
(c)theanalysissupportingthe plantspecificreactoryears,and
 
(d)theBayesianprocessfor updatinggenericfrequencies Closed Thereport0247070005.02 doesnotclearlydescribe theprocessforclassifying fireeventsaspotentially challengingornot challenging.Thereport doesprovideatable indicatingwhichportionof thecriteriawasmet.
However,thereportshould describehowthistablewas populated.Itisnotevident fromthetablehowthe criteriawasmet/notmet fromtheinformation provideintheevent descriptioncolumn.
Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
The0247070005.02,Ref(2),
reportdocumentstheprocessof classifyingfireeventsaspotentially challengingornotchallengingin AppendixA.
Fireeventreportswereobtained fromplantpersonnelforthe stationcoveringtheperiodof January1,2001throughDecember 31,2011.Plantpersonnelmadean extensivesearchoftheir conditionreportandIdeas databasesforfireincidentreports.
Thesearchcriteriaincludeddates 1/1/01through12/31/11andkey wordsfire,heat,andsmoke.
Thissearchrevealedthousandsof hitsbutareviewofeachidentified onlyatotalofeleven(11)fire incidentswithintheprotectedarea andinareasincludedintheglobal analysisboundary.
Eachofthesereportswas reviewed,summarized, categorizedandclassifiedaseither potentiallychallengingornot potentiallychallenging.The criteriaforafiretobedeemed potentiallychallengingare providedinNUREG6850.
Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation AppendixCin6850,SectionC.3.3.1 providescriteriaforclassifyinga fireeventas"potentially challenging."
MUA101 (Finding)
ThePRAconfigurationcontrol processshallincludemonitoring ofchangesindesign,operation, andmaintenancethatcould affectthePRA.Suchchanges shallincludeoperating procedures,designconfiguration, initiatingeventfrequencies, unavailabilities,andcomponent failureratedata.
Closed ThePalisadesPRAModel Updateprocedureincludes maintenanceandupgrades tothePRAtobeconsistent withtheasbuilt,as operatedplant.Resolution oftheFullPowerInternal Events(FPIE)PeerReview F&Osandincorporationof designandoperational informationrelevanttoa FirePRAshouldresultin meetingtheStandard.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section3.3oftheconfiguration controlnotebook,NBPSACC,Ref (14),hasbeenrevisedtoincludea requirementforaPeerreview againsttheASMEstandardforPSA modelupgrades.
Thefindingwasresolvedpriortothe conductoftheFinalPeerreview.ThisSR wasnotreexaminedduringtheFinalPeer review.Thefinalreportisinconsistentand doesnotreflectresolutionofthisfinding.
PPA101 (Finding)
INCLUDEwithintheglobal analysisboundaryallfireareas, firecompartments,orlocations withinthelicenseecontrolled areawhereafirecouldadversely affectanyequipmentorcable itemtobecreditedintheFire PRAplantresponsemodel includingthoselocationsofa sisterunitthatcontainshared equipmentcreditedintheFire PRA.
Closed RequirementPPA01 includesNotePPA12 whichclarifiesthatthe intentoftherequirementis toincludeplantlocations withnocreditedplant equipmentthatmayaffect locationswithcreditedplant equipmentinmulti compartmentfirescenarios.
Withrespecttothemulti compartmentanalysis,the report0247070005.02 makesnomentiononthe treatmentofqualitatively screenedbuildingsorplant Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
AtthecompletionofTask1(Plant Partitioning)asetofPAUswere establishedforthefirePRA.These PAUsareevaluatedandundergo thescreeningprocessoutlinedin Section2.1ofreport024707 0005.02,Ref(2).Thescreening analysisqualitativelydetermines thefireriskassociatedwitheach PAU.TheresultsoftheTask4 screeningareusedinTask6(Fire IgnitionFrequency),wherefire frequenciesareestimatedforeach Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation locations.
oftheunscreenedfire compartments.
Qualitativescreeningasdescribed inTask4(QualitativeScreening)of NUREG/CR6850isintendedto identifythosefirecompartments where,accordingtopre determinedcriteria,thefireriskis expectedtoberelativelylowor nonexistentcomparedtoothers.
Thistaskassumesthattherisk(i.e.
CDFand/orLERF)associatedwith thefirescenarioswherea controlledmanualplantshutdown maybeattemptedasa precautionarymeasureandno otherfirePRAcomponentsare affectedislow.Ifacompartments exclusionfromthefirePRAis uncertain(forinstance,whetheran automaticormanualplanttripwill occurmaynotbeknownwith certainty),thatcompartment shouldberetainedforquantitative analysistobetterdetermineits contribution,ifany,totheoverall firerisk.
InthePalisadesfirePRAthere weretwoPAUsqualitatively screened.Thequalitative screeningprocessandcriteriaare describedinSection2ofreport 0247070005.02.
PPB101 DEFINEFirePRAphysicalanalysis Closed Theplantpartitioningreport Phase1 Final Suggestionresolvedby Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP)
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation (Suggestion) unitsbasedonacombinationof plantfireareasasdefinedinthe plantsfireprotectionprogram andphysicalanalysisunitswhere eachphysicalanalysisunit representsasubdivisionofafire area,andIfanyfireareais subdividedintotwoormore physicalanalysisunits,ENSURE thatthephysicalanalysisunit definitionscomplywiththe balanceofthePPBSRs(PPB2 throughPPB7).
doesnotdescribecable trenches,ductbanks, manholes,etc.thatmaybe presentintheyard.The FirePRAshouldhavea dispositionfortheseareas astowhytheremay/may notbetheneedfor postulatingfirescenarios andwhereintheyardthe scenariosmaybe postulated.
(met)
(met) documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
Physicalanalysisunitsforthe PalisadesfirePRAcorrespondto FireAreasdefinedintheFire ProtectionProgram.Confirmatory walkdownnoteshavebeen documentedinAttachment3of Report0247070005.02,Ref(2).
Sixplantlocationswereidentified thatwerenotspecifically addressedintheFHAandnew physicalanalysisunitswere createdforuseinthefirePRA.
Thesefirelocationswerethe CoolingTowerPumpHouse, FeedwaterPurityBuilding,Yard Area,Switchyard,Administration Building,andServiceBuilding.The boundaryrequirementsforafire riskassessmentweresufficiently metbytheboundariesofthe FeedwaterPurityBuildingand CoolingTowerPumpHouse.The YardAreaandSwitchyardwere outdoorareasandthereforedid nothaveanyfireratedbarriers exceptfortheseparationsfrom theindooranalysisunits.Spatial separationhasbeeninherently creditedwiththeuseofcurrent FireProtectionProgramfire boundaries.Spatialseparationis presentbetweenthefollowing PAUsboundaries:Component CoolingPumpWaterRoomsand elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation TurbineBuilding,AuxiliaryBuilding andRadwasteAdditionVRS,and lastlyEastEngineeredSafeguards RoomsandAuxiliaryBuilding.
Theseboundarieshavebeen documentedandreferencedinthe currentFireHazardsAnalysisto meettherequirementsofthisfire riskassessment.
Theswitchyardislocated approximatelyaquartermile outsideoftheprotectedareabut withintheOwnerControlledArea.
TheYardAreaisdefinedasall outsideareaswithintheprotected areafencing.TheFireScenario DevelopmentReport,024707 0005.02accountsforthepresence ofcables,busducts,etc.inthe developmentofthepostulatedfire scenariosintheyardarea.
PPB201 (Suggestion)
Ifpartitioningcreditswall,ceiling, orfloorelementsthatlackafire resistancerating,JUSTIFYthe judgmentthatthecredited elementwillsubstantiallycontain thedamagingeffectsoffires giventhenatureofthefire sourcespresentineach compartmentseparatedbythe nonratedpartitioningelement.
Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotprovideadequate justificationforcrediting barrierswhenoutsidethe fireprotectionprogram.
Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
Physicalanalysisunitsforthe PalisadesfirePRAcorrespondto FireAreasdefinedintheFire ProtectionProgram.Confirmatory walkdownnoteshavebeen documentedinAttachment3of report0247070005.02,Ref(2).
Creditforracewayfirebarriers, thermalwrapsorotherlocalized protectionfeatureshavenotbeen Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation creditedinidentifyingaphysical analysisunit.
 
PPB301 (Suggestion)
Ifspatialseparationiscreditedas apartitioningfeature,JUSTIFY thejudgmentthatspatial separationissufficientto substantiallycontainthe damagingeffectsofanyfirethat mightbepostulatedineachof thefirecompartmentscreatedas aresultofcreditingthisfeature.
Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotclearlydiscussthe creditforspatialseparation.
Therearetwoareasnoted thatdorelyonspatial separation:theSwitchyard andYardAreawhichare outdoorsandthushaveno ratedfirebarriers.F/O relatedtotheyardhasbeen documentedundera differentSRandmay addresstheconcernof spatialseparation.
Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
Report0247070005.02,Ref(2),
hasbeenupdatedtodiscussthe creditofspatialseparationin Section2.2.
Thephysicalanalysisunitsusedfor thefireriskassessmentcorrelate tofireareasusedfortheFire ProtectionProgram.Thisapproach allowedthefireriskassessmentto relyontheexistingprogrammatic controlsanddesignrequirements formaintainingtheintegrityofthe associatedphysicalanalysisunit boundaries.Basedonthe documentationprovidedinthe FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA),the boundariesforthesePAUshadfire withstandratingsconsistentwith therequirementsoftheFire ProtectionProgram.Thetestand maintenancerequirementsofthe FireProtectionProgramwere sufficienttosatisfytheboundary requirementsforthefirerisk assessment.
Inaddition,utilizationofthearea boundariesestablishedbytheFire Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ProtectionProgramallowstheuse ofpreviouslygatheredequipment andcablelocationdataand facilitatestheverificationand controloftheboundaries.
Walkdownswereconductedto confirmthataccessibleboundaries ofeachphysicalanalysisunitwere ofsubstantialconstruction,and thatphysicalopeningsinthe barrierswerenoted.Physical analysisunitsforthePalisadesfire PRAcorrespondtoFireAreas definedintheFireProtection Program.Confirmatorywalkdown noteshavebeendocumentedin of0247070005.02.
Creditforracewayfirebarriers, thermalwrapsorotherlocalized protectionfeatureshavenotbeen creditedinidentifyingaphysical analysisunit.
Theswitchyardislocated approximatelyaquartermile outsideoftheprotectedareabut withintheOwnerControlledArea.
TheYardAreaisdefinedasall outsideareaswithintheprotected areafencing.
PPB401 (Suggestion)
DONOTCREDITracewayfire barriers,thermalwraps,fire retardantcoatings,radiant energyshields,oranyother localizedcableorequipment Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotdiscusscreditingof racewayfirebarriers.
Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
Report0247070005.02,Ref(2),
hasbeenupdatedtoreflectthat Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation protectionfeatureaspartitioning elementsindefiningphysical analysisunits.
racewaysfirebarriershavenot beencreditedinthefirePRA analysis.
Thephysicalanalysisunitsusedfor thefireriskassessmentcorrelate tofireareasusedfortheFire ProtectionProgram.Thisapproach allowedthefireriskassessmentto relyontheexistingprogrammatic controlsanddesignrequirements formaintainingtheintegrityofthe associatedphysicalanalysisunit boundaries.Basedonthe documentationprovidedinthe FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA),the boundariesforthesePAUshadfire withstandratingsconsistentwith therequirementsoftheFire ProtectionProgram.Thetestand maintenancerequirementsofthe FireProtectionProgramwere sufficienttosatisfytheboundary requirementsforthefirerisk assessment.
Inaddition,utilizationofthearea boundariesestablishedbytheFire ProtectionProgramallowstheuse ofpreviouslygatheredequipment andcablelocationdataand facilitatestheverificationand controloftheboundaries.
Walkdownswereconductedto confirmthataccessibleboundaries ofeachphysicalanalysisunitwere ofsubstantialconstruction,and March2011.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation thatphysicalopeningsinthe barrierswerenoted.
PPB501 (Suggestion)
DEFINEANDJUSTIFYthebasis andcriteriaappliedwhenactive firebarrierelements(suchas normallyopenfiredoors,water curtains,andfiredampers)are creditedinpartitioning.
Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotdiscusscrediting activefirebarriers.
Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
Report0247070005.02,Ref(2),
hasbeenupdatedtodiscussthe creditofactivefirebarriers.
ThereportnotesthatthePhysical analysisunitsforthePalisadesfire PRAcorrespondtoFireAreas definedintheFireProtection Program.Additionally, confirmatorywalkdownnoteshave beendocumentedinAttachment3 of0247070005.02.Creditfor racewayfirebarriers,thermal wrapsorotherlocalizedprotection featureshavenotbeencreditedin identifyingaphysicalanalysisunit.
Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.
 
PPB701 (Suggestion)
CONDUCTaconfirmatory walkdownoflocationswithinthe globalanalysisboundaryto confirmtheconditionsand characteristicsofcredited partitioningelements.
Closed Walkdownformsare referencedinreport0247 070005.02butwalkdown resultsarenotattachedor available.Aquestiononthis topicwassubmittedduring thePeerreviewandthe responsetothequestion clarifiedtheconcernoflack ofdocumentationforthe walkdowns.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet) 1 Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.
Walkdownswereconductedto confirmthataccessibleboundaries ofeachphysicalanalysisunitwere ofsubstantialconstruction,and thatphysicalopeningsinthe barrierswerenoted.These walkdownsaredocumentedin ofReport024707 0005.02,Ref(2).
Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.AlthoughlistedinTable416 asnotmetfromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.
Thefindingwasverifiedclosedpriortothe LARsubmittal.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation PPC201 (Finding)
JUSTIFYtheexclusionofany locationswithinthelicensee controlledareathatarenot includedintheglobalanalysis boundarybydemonstratingthat theydonotsatisfytheselection criteriaasdefinedperPPA1.
Closed Itisnotentirelyclearhow someexcludedareaslisted inSection2.1.2.2ofReport 0247070005.02satisfythe exclusioncriteria,namely theServiceBuildingand Administrativebuilding.
Thesebuildingsappearto shareacommonboundary withtheAuxiliaryBuilding.
Forexample,wouldnota majorfireintheService buildingbedesignateda challengingfirerequiringa plantshutdown?Thereport statesthatfireswithinthe AdministrationBuilding, ServiceBuilding,andService BuildingAdditionwerenot expectedtopropagateto theincludedphysical analysisunits,causeaplant transient,orrequireplant shutdown.
Areexcludedbuildings permanentlyexcluded,or aretheyconsideredduring multicompartment evaluations?
Phase1 (met)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
ReportSection2.1.2.2ofReport 0247070005.02,Ref(2),hasbeen updatedtosatisfytheexclusion criteriaoftheServiceBuildingand AdministrativeBuilding.The buildingscommonboundarywith theAuxiliaryBuildinghasbeen detailedandthePAUsareretained forMCAanalysis.
 
Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.
PRMB1101 (Finding)
MODELalloperatoractionsand operatorinfluencesin accordancewiththeHRA elementofthisStandard.
Open Completework Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet)
Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.
ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.
 
FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:
TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]
orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.
ThisHRArelatedfindingremainsopen.
PRMB301 (Finding)
IDENTIFYanynewinitiating eventsarisingfromthe considerationsoftheESandCS technicalelementsthatmight resultfromafireeventthatwere notincludedintheInternal EventsPRAincludingthose arisingfromtheconsiderationof spuriousactuation.
Closed Thefaulttreemodel developmentomittedthe DCpowerdependency requirementfortheRCP breakertripfunction.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
Thefaulttreemodelappliedtothe firePRAwasupdatedtoinclude theDCpowerdependencyforthe primarycoolantpumpbreakertrip function.Thislogicwasaddedat modelgatesPCPSEALSSW20, PCPSEALSSW22,PCPSEALSSW 21,andPCPSEALSSW23foreach ofthefourprimarycoolantpumps.
ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.
FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:
TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]
orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
PRMB302 (Finding)
IDENTIFYanynewinitiating eventsarisingfromthe considerationsoftheESandCS technicalelementsthatmight resultfromafireeventthatwere notincludedintheInternal EventsPRAincludingthose Closed SpuriousSIisnotincluded asapotentialinitiating event Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
AcompletereviewofSafety InjectionSignal(SIS),Containment HighPressure(CHP),Containment ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.
FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation arisingfromtheconsiderationof spuriousactuation.
HighRadiation(CHR),Containment IsolationSignal(CIS)and RecirculationActuationSignal (RAS)logicwasperformedto identifypotentialadverse componentactuationsthatcould occurduetoaspurioussignalfrom anyofthesesources.
Logicwasaddedfor45PRA componentstoconsiderspurious operationfromanyofthe automaticactuationcircuits.
Report0247070005.04,Ref(4),
Section5.71wasupdatedtoreflect thesechanges.
TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]
orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
PRMB501 (Finding)
Forthosefireinducedinitiating eventsincludedintheInternal EventsPRAmodel,REVIEWthe correspondingaccidentsequence modelsand (a)IDENTIFYanyexistingaccident sequencesthatwillrequire modificationbasedonunique aspectsoftheplantfireresponse proceduresinaccordancewith HLRASAandHLRASBofPart2 andtheirsupporting requirements And (b)IDENTIFYanynewaccident sequencesthatmightresultfrom afireeventthatwerenot includedintheInternalEvents PRAinaccordancewithHLRASA Closed TheMSOexpertpanel issueshavenotbeen completelyresolvedand incorporatedintothePRA model.Thus,allmodeling workassociatedwithMSO incorporationhasnotbeen doneatthistime.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
AllMSOexpertpanelissueshave beenresolvedandintegratedinto thefinalPRAfiremodelas appropriate.AllMSOscenario dispositionsaredocumentedinthe finalMSOreport0247070005.04, Ref(4).
ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.
FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:
TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]
orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation andHLRASBofPart2andtheir supportingrequirements.
PRMB901 (Finding)
Foranycaseswherenewsystem modelsorsplitfractionsare needed,orexistingmodelsor splitfractionsneedtobe modifiedtoincludefireinduced equipmentfailures,firespecific operatoractions,and/orspurious actuations,PERFORMthe systemsanalysisportionofthe FirePRAmodelinaccordance withHLRSYAandHLRSYBand theirSRsinPart2withthe followingclarifications,and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthese requirementsinPart2:
AlltheSRsunderHLRSYAand HLRSYBinPart2aretobe addressedinthecontextoffire scenariosincludingeffectson systemoperability/functionality accountingforfiredamageto equipmentandassociated cabling.
Closed FailuretotripPressurizer heatersisnotexplicitly addressed Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.
FaulttreePZRSPURHTRFT(45) wasaddedtothefirePRAto modelspuriousoperationof pressurizerheatersandfailureof pressurizerspray.Failureofthis faulttreeresultsinapotential stuckopenpressurizersafety valve,orvalves.
Section5.45ofreport024707 0005.04,MultipleSpurious OperationReport,Ref(4),was updatedtoreflectthischange.
 
ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.
FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:
TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]
orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.
Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
QLSB201 (Finding)
DOCUMENTthedispositionof eachphysicalanalysisunit definedbytheplantpartitioning analysisaseither"screenedout" or"retainedforquantitative analysis"andinamannerthat Closed SeePPC201.
Phase1 (reviewed not applicable)
Final (met)
Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section2.1.2.2ofReport024707 0005.02,Ref(2),hasbeenupdated tosatisfytheexclusioncriteriaof Reviewofthequalitativescreening(QLS) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:
Technicalworkwascompletedand reviewedinAugust2010;Noadditional reviewinMarch2011.
 
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Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation facilitatesFirePRAapplications, upgrades,andPeerreview.
theServiceBuildingand AdministrativeBuilding.The buildingscommonboundarywith theAuxiliaryBuildinghasbeen detailedandthePAUsareretained forMCAanalysis.
SFA101 (Finding)
Forthosephysicalanalysisunits withintheFirePRAglobal analysisboundary, (a)LOOKforfireignitionsource scenariosthatmightariseasthe resultofanearthquakethat wouldbeuniquefromthose postulatedduringthegeneral analysisofeachphysicalanalysis
: unit, and (b)PROVIDEaqualitative assessmentofthepotentialrisk significanceofanyuniquefire ignitionsourcescenarios identified Open Thecurrentseismicfire interactionsanalysisrelies ontheIPEEEstudy.The reportneedsto demonstratethatthescope ofthatworkmeetsthe objectivesoftheStandard andthatplantchangessince theworkwasperformeddo notcompromisethe conclusions.
Phase1 (reviewed notmet)
Final (notmet)
Findingopen.NoimpacttoNFPA 805quantifiedresults.
Report0247070005.05,Seismic FireInteraction,Ref(5),evaluates Palisadeswithrespectto NUREG/CR6850Task13,Seismic FireInteractionsAssessment..
Theseismicfireinteractions analysishasnotbeenupdated.
However,sincetheStandardonly requiresaqualitativeanalysis, thereisnoimpactonthe quantifiedresultsinfirePRA model.
Reviewoftheseismicfire(SF)elementwas completedduringthePhase1Peerreview.
Fromthefinalreport:
CompletedinJanuary2010andnotre reviewedinAugust2010orMarch2011.
Thisfindingremainsopen,butthishasno impactonthequantifiedresults.
UNCA101 (Finding)
PERFORMtheuncertainty analysisinaccordancewithHLR QUEanditsSRsinPart2aswell asSRsLEF2andLEF3under HLRLEFinPart2andDEVELOPa definedbasistosupportthe claimofnonapplicabilityofany oftherequirementsunderthese sectionsinPart2.
Closed Onlyalimitednumberof parameterandmodeling uncertaintiesandassociated assumptionshavebeen identified.Thelistis incompleteandnotdefined insufficientdetailto supportareasonable characterizationor evaluation.Uncertainties havebeenpropagated Phase1/
Phase2 (not reviewed)
Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.
Section7.1ofthefirerisk summaryreport,0247070005.01, Ref(1),wasrevisedtoinclude additionaldiscussionand evaluationofthestateof knowledgecorrelationandthe impactofuncertaintyassociated withseverityfactorsandnon Theuncertaintyandsensitivitysupporting requirementswerenotreviewedduring thePhase1andPhase2Peerreviewsas themodelprogresswasnotsufficiently complete.Thisfindingwasidentified duringtheFinalPeerreview,butwas subsequentlyaddressedpriortotheLAR submittal.
 
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 61 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation throughaMonteCarlo approach.However, correlationofstateof knowledgeuncertaintieshas notbeenaddressed,i.e.all initiatorshavebeentreated asindependentvariables, SeverityFactor(SF)andNon SuppressionProbabilities (NSP)andspurious actuationprobabilitiesare notcorrelated.
(Uncertaintiescarriedover fromtheinternalevents analysisarecorrelated).This approachhasledto unrealisticallynarrow predictionsofCDFandLERF distributions(errorfactorof 2)andthepotential underestimationofthe meanvaluesforscenarios whicharequantifiedbased ontheproductoflike distributions(e.g.multiple spuriousactuation probabilities).
suppressionprobability.The discussionindicatedthatthe distributionsmightbemorebroad ifamoredetailedparametric uncertaintyassessmentweretobe performed.
 
UNCA201 (Finding)
INCLUDEthetreatmentof uncertainties,includingtheir documentation,ascalledoutin SRsPRMA4,FQF1,IGNA10, IGNB5,FSSE3,FSSE4,FSSH5, FSSH9,andCFA2andthat requiredbyperformingPart2 referencedrequirements Open Theuncertaintyintervals assignedtoFireIEs,Severity FactorsandNon SuppressionProbabilities arenotbasedonacceptable systematicmethods.
1)Uncertaintydistributions forfireIEshavebeen Phase1/
Phase2 (not reviewed)
Final (notmet)
Findingopenastheapproachfor performingtheparametric uncertaintyevaluationhasnotyet beenupdated.
NoimpacttoNFPA805analysisas theresultsarebasedonthepoint estimatevalueswhich Theuncertaintyandsensitivitysupporting requirementswerenotreviewedduring thePhase1andPhase2Peerreviewsas themodelprogresswasnotsufficiently complete.Thisfindingwasidentified duringtheFinalPeerreview,butas indicatedthisdoesnotimpactthepoint estimatevaluesusedintheNFPA805
 
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 62 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation throughoutthisStandard.
assignedthesameerror factorof10ratherthan usingposteriordistributions fromBayesianupdate 2)SFdistributionshave beenassignedwithoutan underlyingbasis.
3)NSPuncertainty distributionhasbeen derivedonthebasisof NUREG/CR1278.This providesguidanceonHEP uncertaintyassessment.
However,NSPtermsarean outputofacombinationof firegrowthandsuppression modelingandguidancein NUREG/CR1278has thereforelittlerelevance.A validapproachwouldbeto addresstheuncertaintiesin damagetimesin combinationwith uncertaintiesinsuppression probabilitiesbasedon specificcontributingfactors.
4)Uncertaintiesassociated withspuriousactuation probabilitieshavebeen characterizedaccordingtoa setofrulesdefinedfor severityfactors.Inthiscase spuriousactuation probabilitieswithafailure probabilityof>0.25are assignedanerrorfactorof approximatethemeanvalues.The parametricuncertaintyanalysisis presentedinSection7.1ofthefire risksummaryreport,024707 0005.01,Ref(1).Theissues identifiedhavenotbeenfully addressed,butthisprimarily impactsthepotentialrangeofthe uncertaintydistributionanddoes nothaveasignificantimpacton themeanvalue;andhasnoimpact onthepointestimatemeanvalues usedintheanalysis.
analysis.
Thisfindingremainsopen.
 
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 63 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)
Status 2
FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation 1.0.IncontrastNUREG/CR 6850recommenduseofa uniformdistributionwith thefollowinglimits Cableswith15orless conductors:+20%
Cableswithmorethan15 conductors:+50%
Alternativelythevalues includedintables101to 105NUREG/CR6850could beusedwherelimitsappear tobewider.ThePalisades analysishasnotaccounted forlargeruncertainties associatedwithcableswith
>15conductors.
1)ThesupportingrequirementwascategorizedasnotmetatcompletionoftheFinalPeerreviewconductedduringtheweekofMarch21,2011.Thesupportingrequirementwassubsequentlyaddressedand categorizedasmet/closed(perthedispositiondiscussion),priortotheLARsubmittalinDecember2012.
2)StatusClosedimpliesF&OdispositionissufficienttomeetCategoryII.
 
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 3: Supporting Requirements with Status of Not Reviewed Page 64 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryIIText)
Status PeerReviewBasisforAssessment Disposition PRMA3 CONSTRUCTtheFirePRAplantresponsemodelso thatitiscapableofdeterminingthesignificant contributorstothefireinducedriskwith42.7.12.
Not Reviewed ThisSRisnotreviewedbecausethesequence infrastructuretoprovidethiscapabilityisnot availableatthistime.Thecapabilityto calculateriskimportanceinasinglescenariois availableatthepresenttime.Theinternal eventsPRAprovidesanacceptablemethodfor developmentofriskimportance.Palisadesuses SAPHIREforquantification,whichclaimstobe abletointegrateallfirescenariosintoaglobal coredamageequationandcalculateglobal importanceusingreplacementeventsforbasic eventsthathavedifferentprobabilitiesin differentrooms.Palisadesclaimsthishasbeen doneininternalflooding,whichhasthesame multipleeventquantificationchallenges.Ifthis methodissuccessful,Palisadeswouldbean industryleadingplantinthedevelopmentof globalimportance.
ThissupportingrequirementismeanttorefertotheFireRiskQuantification supportingrequirementsinSection42.12(asthereisnoSection42.7.12in thePRAstandard).SincetheFireRiskQuantificationSRswerefully reviewedduringthePhase2andFinalPeerreviews,thePRMA3supporting requirementwasimplicitlyreviewedduringthatprocessasthemodelhad tobeconstructedtodeterminethesignificantcontributorstoperformthe FQreview.ForthefinalPeerreview,FRANCwasusedtoquantifythe PalisadesFirePRA.FRANCprovidesCCDPandCLERPresultsonafire scenariobasisand,whencombinedwiththescenariofirefrequencies, calculatesanddisplaysCDFandLERF.Theseresultswerepresentedtothe firePRApeerreviewteamintheinitialissueofthecompletedFireRiskand QuantificationSummaryReport,0247070005.01(Rev.0[17],March2011).
Additionally,thedispositionsforthefindingsoftheFQelementinTable2 areapplicabletoPRMA3.
Thefireriskquantification(FQ)elementwasreviewedindetailinboththe Phase2andFinalPeerreviews.
WithrespecttotheFQelementtheFinalreportstates:
Overallprocessisconsistentwithprevailinggoodpractices.Resultsarenot finalandthuscertainSRscannotbedemonstratedtohavebeenmet.
Continuingtherefinementinprocessandplannedprovidesconfidencethis technicalelementwillmeettheStandard.
 
PRMB2 VERIFYthepeerreviewexceptionsanddeficiencies fortheInternalEventsPRAaredispositioned,and thedispositiondoesnotadverselyaffectthe developmentoftheFirePRAplantresponsemodel.
Not Reviewed NotcompletedyetbecausethefinalInternal EventsPRAPeerReviewhasnotbeenprovided toPalisades ThefirePeerreviewteamdidnotformallyreviewtheresolutionofthefull powerinternaleventsfindingsandobservations.Theresolutionsare discussedinAttachmentUoftheLARandtheirimpactsonthefirePRAare noted.NoneoftheopenitemsimpacttheNFPA805submittal.
Thefullpowerinternalevents(FPIE)peerreviewreport,datedMarch12, 2010wasreceivedbetweenthePhase1andPhase2firePRApeerreviews.
ResolutionoffindingsfromthisreportwereinprogressduringthePhase2 andFinalfirepeerreviews.
Withrespecttotheinternaleventsmodel,theFinalreportstates:
TheFirePRAandInternalEventsPRAusethesamemodel,thusthefidelity betweenthetwoisgood.TheinternaleventsPRAunderwentaRG1.200 peerreviewinOctober2009.TheF&Oshavebeenformallyaddressedand incorporatedintotheFirePRAmodel.
 
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 3: Supporting Requirements with Status of Not Reviewed Page 65 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryIIText)
Status PeerReviewBasisforAssessment Disposition PRMB4 MODELanynewinitiatingeventsidentifiedperSR PRMB2inaccordancewithHLRIEA,HLRIEB,and HLRIECandtheirSRsinPart2withthefollowing clarifications:
(a)AllSRsunderHLRIEAandHLRIEB,andSRsIE C4,IEC6,IEC7,IEC8,IEC9,andIEC12inPart2are tobeaddressedinthecontextofafireinducingthe initiatingeventsexcludinginitiatingeventsthat cannotbeinducedbyafire and (b)DEVELOPadefinedbasistosupporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyoftheserequirementsinPart 2.
Not Reviewed Nonewinitiatingeventswereidentified,so thisSRwasnotrequired.However,PRMB3 indicatesspuriousSIshouldbeconsidered,so thattheSRmustbecompleted.
Asstatedinthepeerreviewassessment,nonewinitiatingeventswere identifiedsothisSRwasnotrequired.
TwofindingswerenotedinthePRMB3SRandwereclosedasdescribedin Table2above.
ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponsemodel(PRM)technicalelementwas mostlycompleteduringthePhase1review.Alimitedreviewwas conductedduringtheFinal.
FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:
TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwasreviewedwithveryfewfindings.
TherewerenotechnicalF&OsonthescopeorcontentofthePRMmodel itself.TheF&OsassignedtoPRMwereeithera)crossreferencedfromother tasks[HRAandES]orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.
ThePRMB3findingswerenotfullyresolvedfortheFinalPeerreview,but weresubsequentlyclosedpriortotheLARsubmittal.
PRMB14 IDENTIFYanynewaccidentprogressionsbeyondthe onsetofcoredamagethatwouldbeapplicableto theFirePRAthatwerenotaddressedforLERF estimationintheInternalEventsPRA.
Not Reviewed LERFanalysisdidnotlookforanyLERF phenomenaapplicabletothefirePRAwhich werenotincludedintheinternaleventsPRA.
F&Owasnotwritten.Thereviewersarenot awareofanyFirePRAwhichlookedfor beyondinternalevents"LERFphenomena.
TherearenoopenF&OsassociatedwiththeLERFelementfromtheinternal eventsPRA.NonewLERFphenomenawereidentifiedforthePalisadesfire PRA.
 
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 66 of 79 References for Question 1 Response
: 1)
Report 0247-07-0005.01 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Risk Quantification and Summary.
: 2)
Report 0247-07-0005.02 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Plant Partitioning and Fire Ignition Frequency Development.
: 3)
Report 0247-07-0005.03 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Development Report.
: 4)
Report 0247-07-0005.04 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Multiple Spurious Operations Report.
: 5)
Report 0247-07-0005.05 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Seismic/Fire Interaction Report.
: 6)
Report 0247-07-0005.06 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Scenario Development Report.
: 7)
Report 0247-07-0005.07 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Multi-Compartment Analysis.
: 8)
Report 0247-07-0005.08 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Exposed Structural Steel Analysis.
: 9)
EA-APR-95-004 Rev. 5, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Associated Circuits Analysis for Common Power Supply and Common Enclosure.
: 10)
PLP-RPT-12-00134 Rev. 0, Validation of Appendix R Non-Safe Shutdown Cable Routing to Support the Fire PRA.
: 11)
Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-ETSC Rev. 3, Event Trees and Success Criteria.
: 12)
EA-PSA-FPIE-FIRE-12-04 Rev. 0, Palisades Full Power Internal Events and Fire Model.
: 13)
Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-HR Rev. 4, Human Reliability Analysis Notebook Volume 1 (Post Initiator Operator Actions).
: 14)
Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-CC Rev. 1, PSA Model Configuration Control.
: 15)
ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008 Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, 2009.
: 16)
SCIENTECH report 17825-1, Palisades Fire PRA Peer Review to Requirements in Part 4 of the ASME/ANS Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plant Applications.
 
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 67 of 79
: 17)
Report 0247-07-0005.01 Rev. 0, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Risk Quantification and Summary.
NRC Request
NRC Request
: 2. There is no indication which Supporting Requirements were ranked below Capability Category II by the Peer Review Team (i.e., no Table V-2,) provide Table V-2.
: 2. There is no indication which Supporting Requirements were ranked below Capability Category II by the Peer Review Team (i.e., no Table V-2,) provide Table V-2.  
 
ENO Response
ENO Response
: 2. Table V-2 is provided below:
: 2. Table V-2 is provided below:  
Page 67 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table V-2 Fire PRA - Category I Summary 1
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 68 of 79 Table V-2 Fire PRA - Category I Summary SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryIIText)
SR       Topic (ASME Standard Category II Text)                       Status   Finding or Suggestion                          Disposition HRAA3   For each fire scenario, IDENTIFY any new, undesired           Closed    Section 6.3 of the HRA Notebook discusses the  Finding resolved by documentation and model update. No impact to NFPA operator action that could result from spurious                        review that was performed with the licensed    805 analysis.
Status 1
indications resulting from failure of a single instrument,              operators for the identification of the new, per SR ESC2 (e.g., due to verbatim compliance with the                undesired operator actions in response to      A simulator exercise was performed with current Palisades license holders instruction in an alarm response procedure, when                       spurious indications. However, the detailed    in which several scenarios were evaluated to determine how Operators separate confirmation is not available or required).                   documentation for the evaluation process and    would respond given spurious or false instrument indications. The results of the justifications for the conclusion that no  these exercises were considered in the HFE development process. The undesired operator actions will be taken in    process and evaluation results are documented in the Palisades Probabilistic these instrumentation failure conditions was    Safety Assessment Notebook NBPSAHR, Human Reliability Analysis not yet completed for the reviewers to confirm  Notebook Volume 1 (Post Initiator Operator Actions), Rev. 4.
FindingorSuggestion Disposition HRAA3 Foreachfirescenario,IDENTIFYanynew,undesired operatoractionthatcouldresultfromspurious indicationsresultingfromfailureofasingleinstrument, perSRESC2(e.g.,duetoverbatimcompliancewiththe instructioninanalarmresponseprocedure,when separateconfirmationisnotavailableorrequired).
the conclusion that no undesired operator actions need to be considered.
Closed Section6.3oftheHRANotebookdiscussesthe reviewthatwasperformedwiththelicensed operatorsfortheidentificationofthenew, undesiredoperatoractionsinresponseto spuriousindications.However,thedetailed documentationfortheevaluationprocessand thejustificationsfortheconclusionthatno undesiredoperatoractionswillbetakenin theseinstrumentationfailureconditionswas notyetcompletedforthereviewerstoconfirm theconclusionthatnoundesiredoperator actionsneedtobeconsidered.
HRAB4    INCLUDE HFEs for cases where fireinduced                    Closed   Same as HRAA301. This SR was assigned CC I    Finding resolved by documentation and model update. No impact to NFPA instrumentation failure of any single instrument could                  based on the related finding HRAA301.         805 analysis.
Findingresolvedbydocumentationandmodelupdate.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysis.
cause undesired operator action, consistent with HLR                                                                  A simulator exercise was performed with current Palisades license holders ESC of this Part and in accordance with HLRHRF and                                                                  in which several scenarios were evaluated to determine how Operators its SRs in Part 2                                                                                                      would respond given spurious or false instrument indications. The results of and                                                                                                                    these exercises were considered in the HFE development process. The DEVELOP a defined basis to support the claim of                                                                        process and evaluation results are documented in the Palisades Probabilistic nonapplicability of any of the requirements under HLR                                                                  Safety Assessment Notebook NBPSAHR, Human Reliability Analysis HRF                                                                                                                    Notebook Volume 1 (Post Initiator Operator Actions), Rev. 4.
AsimulatorexercisewasperformedwithcurrentPalisadeslicenseholders inwhichseveralscenarioswereevaluatedtodeterminehowOperators wouldrespondgivenspuriousorfalseinstrumentindications.Theresultsof theseexerciseswereconsideredintheHFEdevelopmentprocess.The processandevaluationresultsaredocumentedinthePalisadesProbabilistic SafetyAssessmentNotebookNBPSAHR,HumanReliabilityAnalysis NotebookVolume1(PostInitiatorOperatorActions),Rev.4.
Part 2.
HRAB4 INCLUDEHFEsforcaseswherefireinduced instrumentationfailureofanysingleinstrumentcould causeundesiredoperatoraction,consistentwithHLR ESCofthisPartandinaccordancewithHLRHRFand itsSRsinPart2 and DEVELOPadefinedbasistosupporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyoftherequirementsunderHLR HRF Part2.
HRAC1    For each selected fire scenario, QUANTIFY the HEPs for       Open      Fire response HFEs modeled with screening      Finding open, given that the procedures, modification detail, operations all HFEs and ACCOUNT FOR relevant firerelated effects                  values have not yet been evaluated in a        review, and detailed HRA model development are not yet complete.
Closed SameasHRAA301.ThisSRwasassignedCCI basedontherelatedfindingHRAA301.
using detailed analyses for significant HFEs and                        manner accounting for relevant PSFs (e.g., ACP Significant HFEs were evaluated and developed in further detail as conservative estimates (e.g., screening values) for                    DGOTB5BDG, FPSPMOESTARTL, ACP             documented in the Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB nonsignificant HFEs, in accordance with the SRs for HLR                PMOE38311A, ACPPMOE38312A, etc.).         PSAHR, Human Reliability Analysis Notebook Volume 1 (Post Initiator HRG in Part 2 set forth under at least Capability                      Also, HRA Calculator evaluation sheet cannot    Operator Actions), Rev. 4. Screening values are still applied for fire HEPs Category II, with the following clarification:                          be located for PCPPMOFP50XLOC and EDG      pending development of final procedures, modifications, and operations (a) Attention is to be given to how the fire situation                  PMOEPORTPUMP, and AFWAVOACV2010          reviews.
Findingresolvedbydocumentationandmodelupdate.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysis.
alters any previous assessments in nonfire analyses as                  D, SWSAVOACV082326, and SWSAVOBCV to the influencing factors and the timing considerations                082447M still need to be modified for fire covered in SRs HRG3, HRG4, and HRG5 in Part 2 And                    related conditions. This task is not completed.
AsimulatorexercisewasperformedwithcurrentPalisadeslicenseholders inwhichseveralscenarioswereevaluatedtodeterminehowOperators wouldrespondgivenspuriousorfalseinstrumentindications.Theresultsof theseexerciseswereconsideredintheHFEdevelopmentprocess.The processandevaluationresultsaredocumentedinthePalisadesProbabilistic SafetyAssessmentNotebookNBPSAHR,HumanReliabilityAnalysis NotebookVolume1(PostInitiatorOperatorActions),Rev.4.
(b) DEVELOP a defined basis to support the claim of nonapplicability of any of the requirements under HLR HRG in Part 2.
HRAC1 Foreachselectedfirescenario,QUANTIFYtheHEPsfor allHFEsandACCOUNTFORrelevantfirerelatedeffects usingdetailedanalysesforsignificantHFEsand conservativeestimates(e.g.,screeningvalues)for nonsignificantHFEs,inaccordancewiththeSRsforHLR HRGinPart2setforthunderatleastCapability CategoryII,withthefollowingclarification:
: 1) Status Closed implies F&O disposition is sufficient to meet Category II.
(a)Attentionistobegiventohowthefiresituation altersanypreviousassessmentsinnonfireanalysesas totheinfluencingfactorsandthetimingconsiderations coveredinSRsHRG3,HRG4,andHRG5inPart2And (b)DEVELOPadefinedbasistosupporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyoftherequirementsunderHLR HRGinPart2.
Page 68 of 79
Open FireresponseHFEsmodeledwithscreening valueshavenotyetbeenevaluatedina manneraccountingforrelevantPSFs(e.g.,ACP DGOTB5BDG,FPSPMOESTARTL,ACP PMOE38311A,ACPPMOE38312A,etc.).
Also,HRACalculatorevaluationsheetcannot belocatedforPCPPMOFP50XLOCandEDG PMOEPORTPUMP,andAFWAVOACV2010 D,SWSAVOACV082326,andSWSAVOBCV 082447Mstillneedtobemodifiedforfire relatedconditions.Thistaskisnotcompleted.
Findingopen,giventhattheprocedures,modificationdetail,operations review,anddetailedHRAmodeldevelopmentarenotyetcomplete.
SignificantHFEswereevaluatedanddevelopedinfurtherdetailas documentedinthePalisadesProbabilisticSafetyAssessmentNotebookNB PSAHR,HumanReliabilityAnalysisNotebookVolume1(PostInitiator OperatorActions),Rev.4.ScreeningvaluesarestillappliedforfireHEPs pendingdevelopmentoffinalprocedures,modifications,andoperations reviews.
: 1)
StatusClosedimpliesF&OdispositionissufficienttomeetCategoryII.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors NRC Request
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 69 of 79 NRC Request
: 3. Individual VFDRs and the associated disposition are documented for each fire area in LAR Attachment C. However, the dispositions of the VFDRs in Attachment C state no modifications are required and the fire area Risk Summary in Attachment C contains the following generic statement: There were no additional modifications identified that are specific to a given VFDR resolution in this fire area. However, LAR Attachment S, Table S-2, contains modifications that are described as resolving VFDRs. Clarify the discrepancy in Attachment S wherein certain modifications are identified as resolving VFDRs and Attachment C where no VFDRs are identified as being resolved by modifications.
: 3. Individual VFDRs and the associated disposition are documented for each fire area in LAR Attachment C. However, the dispositions of the VFDRs in Attachment C state no modifications are required and the fire area Risk Summary in Attachment C contains the following generic statement: There were no additional modifications identified that are specific to a given VFDR resolution in this fire area. However, LAR Attachment S, Table S-2, contains modifications that are described as resolving VFDRs. Clarify the discrepancy in Attachment S wherein certain modifications are identified as resolving VFDRs and Attachment C where no VFDRs are identified as being resolved by modifications.
ENO Response
ENO Response
Line 769: Line 1,400:
The tables below provide the correlation of each modification to specific VFDRs resolved, either partially or fully. The first column, Item, contains a modification identifier corresponding to the modification identifier in Attachment S. The second column contains the set of VFDRs by fire area (if any) that are fully or partially resolved by the modification. The third column contains additional clarifying comments.
The tables below provide the correlation of each modification to specific VFDRs resolved, either partially or fully. The first column, Item, contains a modification identifier corresponding to the modification identifier in Attachment S. The second column contains the set of VFDRs by fire area (if any) that are fully or partially resolved by the modification. The third column contains additional clarifying comments.
As discussed above, not all modifications were designed to resolve VFDRs:
As discussed above, not all modifications were designed to resolve VFDRs:
some were designed for overall plant fire risk reduction (and intentionally, risk Page 69 of 79
some were designed for overall plant fire risk reduction (and intentionally, risk  


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors reduction with respect to other hazards), while others were purely code-compliance type modifications. Likewise, not all VFDRs are fully or partially resolved by a modification.
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 70 of 79 reduction with respect to other hazards), while others were purely code-compliance type modifications. Likewise, not all VFDRs are fully or partially resolved by a modification.
The residual risk of all VFDRs not resolved fully by modification has been evaluated as acceptable, either with our without credit for recovery actions, as indicated in the Palisades LAR, Attachments G and W.
The residual risk of all VFDRs not resolved fully by modification has been evaluated as acceptable, either with our without credit for recovery actions, as indicated in the Palisades LAR, Attachments G and W.  
Page 70 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Additional Information for Table S-1: Plant Modifications Completed VFDRs Resolved /
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 71 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-1: Plant Modifications Completed Item VFDRs Resolved /  
Item                                                                                Comments
*Partially Resolved Comments S1-1 None Completed modification resolved an Appendix R non-compliance issue.
                    *Partially Resolved S1-1 None                                                 Completed modification resolved an Appendix R non-compliance issue.
S1-2 None Completed modification resolved an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S1-2 None                                                 Completed modification resolved an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S1-3 FA-01:
S1-3 FA-01:                                               Completed modification resolved an Appendix R non-VFDR-0231/ENP-1270*                                 compliance issue.
VFDR-0231/ENP-1270*
FA-02:
FA-02:
VFDR-0232/ENP-1269*                                 Modification does not eliminate need for ex-primary control FA-04:                                               station actions to align fire protection pumps for long term AFW supply.
VFDR-0232/ENP-1269*
FA-04:
VFDR-0177/ENP-1177*
VFDR-0177/ENP-1177*
FA-09:
FA-09:
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this VFDR-0091/ENP-1348*                                  modification. Modification ensures survivability of fire pump FA-23:                                                such that ex-primary control station action remains VFDR-0218/ENP-1195*                                  feasible.
VFDR-0091/ENP-1348*
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.
FA-23:
Page 71 of 79
VFDR-0218/ENP-1195*
Completed modification resolved an Appendix R non-compliance issue.
Modification does not eliminate need for ex-primary control station actions to align fire protection pumps for long term AFW supply.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification. Modification ensures survivability of fire pump such that ex-primary control station action remains feasible.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.  


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed VFDRs Resolved /
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 72 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /  
Item                                                                                  Comments
*Partially Resolved Comments S2-1 None Modification provides overall plant risk reduction for combinations of failures of recovery actions, fire-induced failures and random failures in secondary side decay heat removal.
                      *Partially Resolved S2-1 None                                                 Modification provides overall plant risk reduction for combinations of failures of recovery actions, fire-induced failures and random failures in secondary side decay heat removal.
S2-2 FA-03:
S2-2 FA-03:                                               Modification addresses some but not all conditions that VFDR-0146/ENP-1092*                                 require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.
VFDR-0146/ENP-1092*
VFDR-0343/ENP-1408*
VFDR-0343/ENP-1408*
FA-04:
FA-04:
VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*                                 Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.
VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*
Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.
S2-3 FA-03:                                               Modification addresses some but not all conditions that VFDR-0146/ENP-1092*                                 require ex-primary control station actions for EDG VFDR-0343/ENP-1408*                                 alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.
S2-3 FA-03:
VFDR-0146/ENP-1092*
VFDR-0343/ENP-1408*
FA-04:
FA-04:
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*
VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*
modification.
Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.
S2-4 FA-01:                                               Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.
S2-4 FA-01:
VFDR-0323/ENP-1387 FA-02:
VFDR-0323/ENP-1387 FA-02:
VFDR-0330/ENP-1394 FA-03:
VFDR-0330/ENP-1394 FA-03:
VFDR-0134/ENP-1078 S2-5 FA-01:                                               Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.
VFDR-0134/ENP-1078 Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.
S2-5 FA-01:
VFDR-0086/ENP-1051 FA-02:
VFDR-0086/ENP-1051 FA-02:
VFDR-0055/ENP-1007 FA-03:
VFDR-0055/ENP-1007 FA-03:
Line 813: Line 1,454:
VFDR-0247/ENP-1210 FA-21:
VFDR-0247/ENP-1210 FA-21:
VFDR-0363/ENP-1468 FA-23:
VFDR-0363/ENP-1468 FA-23:
VFDR-0216/ENP-1193 S2-6 FA-03:                                               Modification addresses some but not all conditions that VFDR-0128/ENP-1071*                                  require ex-primary control station actions for AFW pump operation.
VFDR-0216/ENP-1193 Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.
Page 72 of 79
S2-6 FA-03:
VFDR-0128/ENP-1071*
Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for AFW pump operation.  


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed VFDRs Resolved /
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 73 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /  
Item                                                                                    Comments
*Partially Resolved Comments FA-04:
                        *Partially Resolved FA-04:
VFDR-0166/ENP-1138*
VFDR-0166/ENP-1138*                                   Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this FA-13:                                                 modification.
FA-13:
VFDR-0266/ENP-1256*
VFDR-0266/ENP-1256*
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.
S2-7 FA-13:                                                 Modification addresses some but not all conditions that VFDR-0272/ENP-1262*                                    require ex-primary control station actions to align and support HPSI pump operation for inventory control.
S2-7 FA-13:
VFDR-0272/ENP-1262*
Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to align and support HPSI pump operation for inventory control.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.
S2-8 None                                                   Modification ensures additional time margin is available for ventilation alignment for EDG room cooling.
S2-8 None Modification ensures additional time margin is available for ventilation alignment for EDG room cooling.
S2-9 FA-04:                                                 Modification addresses some but not all conditions that VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*                                  require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.
S2-9 FA-04:
VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*
Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.
S2-10 FA-01:                     FA-22:                      Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.
S2-10 FA-01:
VFDR-0231/ENP-1270         VFDR-0197/ENP-1184 VFDR-0307/ENP-1351       FA-23:
VFDR-0231/ENP-1270 VFDR-0307/ENP-1351 FA-02:
FA-02:                      VFDR-0218/ENP-1195 VFDR-0232/ENP-1269         VFDR-0306/ENP-1350 VFDR-0308/ENP-1352        FA-24:
VFDR-0232/ENP-1269 VFDR-0308/ENP-1352 FA-03:
FA-03:                      VFDR-0202/ENP-1199 VFDR-0151/ENP-1097        FA-25:
VFDR-0151/ENP-1097 FA-04:
FA-04:                     VFDR-0208/ENP-1236 VFDR-0177/ENP-1177        FA-26:
VFDR-0177/ENP-1177 VFDR-0309/ENP-1353 FA-05:
VFDR-0309/ENP-1353        VFDR-0234/ENP-1205 FA-05:                     FA-27:
VFDR-0097/ENP-1107 FA-06:
VFDR-0097/ENP-1107        VFDR-0195/ENP-1203 FA-06:                     FA-28:
VFDR-0108/ENP-1150 FA-07:
VFDR-0108/ENP-1150        VFDR-0235/ENP-1208 FA-07:                     FA-29:
VFDR-0189/ENP-1154 FA-08:
VFDR-0189/ENP-1154        VFDR-0275/ENP-1220 FA-08:                    FA-30:
VFDR-0191/ENP-1156 FA-09:
VFDR-0191/ENP-1156        VFDR-0276/ENP-1221 FA-09:                    FA-31:
VFDR-0091/ENP-1348 FA-10:
VFDR-0091/ENP-1348        VFDR-0278/ENP-1223 FA-10:                    FA-32:
FA-22:
Page 73 of 79
VFDR-0197/ENP-1184 FA-23:
VFDR-0218/ENP-1195 VFDR-0306/ENP-1350 FA-24:
VFDR-0202/ENP-1199 FA-25:
VFDR-0208/ENP-1236 FA-26:
VFDR-0234/ENP-1205 FA-27:
VFDR-0195/ENP-1203 FA-28:
VFDR-0235/ENP-1208 FA-29:
VFDR-0275/ENP-1220 FA-30:
VFDR-0276/ENP-1221 FA-31:
VFDR-0278/ENP-1223 FA-32:
Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed VFDRs Resolved /
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 74 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /  
Item                                                                                    Comments
*Partially Resolved Comments VFDR-0209/ENP-1160 FA-11:
                        *Partially Resolved VFDR-0209/ENP-1160         VFDR-0125/ENP-1266 FA-11:                    FA-33:
VFDR-0290/ENP-1271 FA-12:
VFDR-0290/ENP-1271         VFDR-0200/ENP-1267 FA-12:                    FA-34:
VFDR-0292/ENP-1272 FA-13:
VFDR-0292/ENP-1272         VFDR-0282/ENP-1227 FA-13:                    FA-35:
VFDR-0263/ENP-1253 FA-14:
VFDR-0263/ENP-1253         VFDR-0284/ENP-1229 FA-14:                    FA-36:
VFDR-0243/ENP-1212 FA-15:
VFDR-0243/ENP-1212         VFDR-0285/ENP-1230 FA-15:                     FA-38:
VFDR-0221/ENP-1161 FA-16:
VFDR-0221/ENP-1161        VFDR-0286/ENP-1231 FA-16:                     FA-39:
VFDR-0212/ENP-1171 FA-17:
VFDR-0212/ENP-1171        VFDR-0287/ENP-1232 FA-17:                     FA-40:
VFDR-0112/ENP-1158 FA-18:
VFDR-0112/ENP-1158        VFDR-0288/ENP-1233 FA-18:                     FA-41:
VFDR-0116/ENP-1174 FA-19:
VFDR-0116/ENP-1174        VFDR-0289/ENP-1234 FA-19:                    FA-56:
VFDR-0211/ENP-1175 FA-21:
VFDR-0211/ENP-1175        VFDR-0359/ENP-1469 FA-21:
VFDR-0118/ENP-1178 VFDR-0125/ENP-1266 FA-33:
VFDR-0118/ENP-1178 S2-11 FA-01:                                                 Modification fully resolves the VFDRs that involve charging VFDR-0088/ENP-1054*                                   pump spurious actuation / loss of control only (i.e., those without asterisks).
VFDR-0200/ENP-1267 FA-34:
VFDR-0282/ENP-1227 FA-35:
VFDR-0284/ENP-1229 FA-36:
VFDR-0285/ENP-1230 FA-38:
VFDR-0286/ENP-1231 FA-39:
VFDR-0287/ENP-1232 FA-40:
VFDR-0288/ENP-1233 FA-41:
VFDR-0289/ENP-1234 FA-56:
VFDR-0359/ENP-1469 S2-11 FA-01:
VFDR-0088/ENP-1054*
FA-02:
FA-02:
VFDR-0058/ENP-1010*
VFDR-0058/ENP-1010*
FA-03:                                                 Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to eliminate VFDR-0143/ENP-1089                                   spurious charging pump operation and support inventory VFDR-0144/ENP-1090*                                   control.
FA-03:
VFDR-0143/ENP-1089 VFDR-0144/ENP-1090*
VFDR-0361/ENP-1464*
VFDR-0361/ENP-1464*
FA-04:                                                 Therefore, only some VFDRs (those without asterisk) are VFDR-0180/ENP-1120                                   fully resolved by this modification.
FA-04:
FA-05:
VFDR-0180/ENP-1120 FA-05:
VFDR-0101/ENP-1111                                   Since the modification partially resolves the VFDRs FA-06:                                                 indicated with asterisk and fully resolves VFDRs without asterisks it is considered a modification required for VFDR-0109/ENP-1151*
VFDR-0101/ENP-1111 FA-06:
compliance.
VFDR-0109/ENP-1151*
FA-13:
FA-13:
VFDR-0257/ENP-1247 FA-16:
VFDR-0257/ENP-1247 FA-16:
Line 868: Line 1,536:
FA-21:
FA-21:
VFDR-0193/ENP-1268*
VFDR-0193/ENP-1268*
S2-12 None                                                   Modification provides overall plant risk reduction by supporting steam generator depressurization to provide alternate means of secondary side decay heat removal.
Modification fully resolves the VFDRs that involve charging pump spurious actuation / loss of control only (i.e., those without asterisks).
S2-13 FA-13:                                                 Modification addresses some but not all conditions that VFDR-0272/ENP-1262*                                    require ex-primary control station actions to align and support HPSI pump operation for inventory control.
Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to eliminate spurious charging pump operation and support inventory control.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.
Therefore, only some VFDRs (those without asterisk) are fully resolved by this modification.
Page 74 of 79
Since the modification partially resolves the VFDRs indicated with asterisk and fully resolves VFDRs without asterisks it is considered a modification required for compliance.
S2-12 None Modification provides overall plant risk reduction by supporting steam generator depressurization to provide alternate means of secondary side decay heat removal.
S2-13 FA-13:
VFDR-0272/ENP-1262*
Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to align and support HPSI pump operation for inventory control.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.  


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed VFDRs Resolved /
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 75 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /  
Item                                                                                    Comments
*Partially Resolved Comments However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.
                      *Partially Resolved However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.
S2-14 None Modification provides overall plant risk reduction by preventing spurious isolation of CCW to containment due to fire-induced valve-related cable faults.
S2-14 None                                                 Modification provides overall plant risk reduction by preventing spurious isolation of CCW to containment due to fire-induced valve-related cable faults.
S2-15 FA-01:
S2-15 FA-01:                                               Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.
VFDR-0322/ENP-1386 FA-02:
VFDR-0322/ENP-1386 FA-02:
VFDR-0329/ENP-1393 FA-03:
VFDR-0329/ENP-1393 FA-03:
Line 884: Line 1,556:
VFDR-0248/ENP-1211 FA-26:
VFDR-0248/ENP-1211 FA-26:
VFDR-0241/ENP-1207 FA-34:
VFDR-0241/ENP-1207 FA-34:
VFDR-0280/ENP-1225 S2-16 None                                                 Modification increases availability of a Non-Power Operation credited component under certain conditions.
VFDR-0280/ENP-1225 Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.
S2-17 None                                                 Modification increases availability of a Non-Power Operation credited component under certain conditions.
S2-16 None Modification increases availability of a Non-Power Operation credited component under certain conditions.
S2-18 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-17 None Modification increases availability of a Non-Power Operation credited component under certain conditions.
S2-19 None                                                 Modification extends operation of EC-150 panel under certain conditions.
S2-18 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-20 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-19 None Modification extends operation of EC-150 panel under certain conditions.
S2-21 FA-01:                                               Modification does not eliminate need for ex-primary control VFDR-0077/ENP-1044*                                 station actions to align charging suction from the SIRWT.
S2-20 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-21 FA-01:
VFDR-0077/ENP-1044*
FA-02:
FA-02:
VFDR-0042/ENP-0994*                                 Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification. Modification ensures survivability of valve FA-03:
VFDR-0042/ENP-0994*
such that ex-primary control station action remains VFDR-0140/ENP-1086*                                 feasible.
FA-03:
VFDR-0140/ENP-1086*
FA-04:
FA-04:
VFDR-0165/ENP-1137*                                 However, since modification partially resolves the indicated FA-06:                                               VFDRs it is considered a modification required for VFDR-0104/ENP-1146*                                 compliance.
VFDR-0165/ENP-1137*
FA-06:
VFDR-0104/ENP-1146*
FA-11:
FA-11:
VFDR-0006/ENP-0951*
VFDR-0006/ENP-0951*
Line 901: Line 1,578:
FA-21:
FA-21:
VFDR-0122/ENP-1182*
VFDR-0122/ENP-1182*
Page 75 of 79
Modification does not eliminate need for ex-primary control station actions to align charging suction from the SIRWT.
Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification. Modification ensures survivability of valve such that ex-primary control station action remains feasible.
However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed VFDRs Resolved /
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 76 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /  
Item                                                                                  Comments
*Partially Resolved Comments S2-22 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
                      *Partially Resolved S2-22 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-23 None Modifications prevent overall plant risk increase by ensuring electrical coordination remains consistent with PRA assumptions.
S2-23 None                                                 Modifications prevent overall plant risk increase by ensuring electrical coordination remains consistent with PRA assumptions.
S2-24 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-24 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-25 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-25 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-26 FA-01:
S2-26 FA-01:                                               Modification resolves VFDRs that exist during cross-train VFDR-0070/ENP-1037                                   charger alignment only. Cross-train alignment is not the standard alignment modeled in the PRA.
VFDR-0070/ENP-1037 VFDR-0071/ENP-1038 FA-02:
VFDR-0071/ENP-1038 FA-02:
VFDR-0050/ENP-1002 VFDR-0051/ENP-1003 FA-05:
VFDR-0050/ENP-1002 VFDR-0051/ENP-1003 FA-05:
VFDR-0095/ENP-1105 FA-11:
VFDR-0095/ENP-1105 FA-11:
VFDR-0008/ENP-0954 FA-12:
VFDR-0008/ENP-0954 FA-12:
VFDR-0012/ENP-0962 FA-21:
VFDR-0012/ENP-0962 FA-21:
VFDR-0360/ENP-1463 S2-27 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
VFDR-0360/ENP-1463 Modification resolves VFDRs that exist during cross-train charger alignment only. Cross-train alignment is not the standard alignment modeled in the PRA.
S2-28 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-27 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-29 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-28 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-30 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-29 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-31 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-30 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-32 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-31 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-33 None                                                 Modification eliminates 3-phase proper polarity hot short potential for FOGG valves.
S2-32 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-34 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-33 None Modification eliminates 3-phase proper polarity hot short potential for FOGG valves.
S2-35 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-34 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-36 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-35 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
Page 76 of 79
S2-36 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.  


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed VFDRs Resolved /
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 77 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /  
Item                                                                                  Comments
*Partially Resolved Comments S2-37 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
                      *Partially Resolved S2-37 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-38 FA-32:
S2-38 FA-32:                                               Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance VFDR-0123/ENP-1264                                  issue, and in addition modification fully resolves the VFDR-0124/ENP-1265                                  indicated VFDRs.
VFDR-0123/ENP-1264 VFDR-0124/ENP-1265 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue, and in addition modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.
S2-39 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-39 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-40 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-40 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-41 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-41 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-42 None                                                 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.
S2-42 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.  
Page 77 of 79


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors NRC Request
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 78 of 79 NRC Request
: 4. LAR Attachment F describes the process for evaluating MSOs at Palisades, including use of the expert panel approach per FAQ 07-0038, Revision 3. In the Results of Step 1 section, generic industry sources of information used for both MSO reviews are cited but no plant-specific sources are cited. Describe how plant-specific insights were used to identify and evaluate MSOs at Palisades.
: 4. LAR Attachment F describes the process for evaluating MSOs at Palisades, including use of the expert panel approach per FAQ 07-0038, Revision 3. In the Results of Step 1 section, generic industry sources of information used for both MSO reviews are cited but no plant-specific sources are cited. Describe how plant-specific insights were used to identify and evaluate MSOs at Palisades.
ENO Response
ENO Response
Line 944: Line 1,621:
The expert panel included personnel with extensive Palisades-specific expertise in:
The expert panel included personnel with extensive Palisades-specific expertise in:
Operations, Fire Fighting (Fire Marshall),
Operations, Fire Fighting (Fire Marshall),
Design Engineering, Electrical Engineering, System Engineering, Safe Shutdown Analysis, Circuit Analysis, Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis, Neutronics Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment The expert panel and/or multiple spurious operation (MSO) development teams included many of the same plant individuals that developed detailed logic models, containment analysis, and source term modeling supporting historic licensing basis activities, such as a 1982 SEP issue. The expert panel and/or MSO development teams also included individuals responsible for several areas Page 78 of 79
Design Engineering, Electrical Engineering, System Engineering, Safe Shutdown Analysis, Circuit Analysis, Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis, Neutronics Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment The expert panel and/or multiple spurious operation (MSO) development teams included many of the same plant individuals that developed detailed logic models, containment analysis, and source term modeling supporting historic licensing basis activities, such as a 1982 SEP issue. The expert panel and/or MSO development teams also included individuals responsible for several areas  


ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors of the FSAR Chapter 14 licensing analysis and basis, Appendix R, and Fire Protection safety reviews.
ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 79 of 79 of the FSAR Chapter 14 licensing analysis and basis, Appendix R, and Fire Protection safety reviews.
Plant specific data sources included:
Plant specific data sources included:
piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs),
piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs),
Line 954: Line 1,631:
These information sources provided insights that were used in conjunction with the expertise of the team and generic industry information sources to identify potential MSO scenarios of concern for Palisades. Plant-specific and generic industry information sources are explicitly referenced in Report #: 0247 0005.04, Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) Report, which was authored by plant personnel.
These information sources provided insights that were used in conjunction with the expertise of the team and generic industry information sources to identify potential MSO scenarios of concern for Palisades. Plant-specific and generic industry information sources are explicitly referenced in Report #: 0247 0005.04, Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) Report, which was authored by plant personnel.
The effort to identify and evaluate potential MSOs did not end with the conclusion of the expert panel. NFPA 805 project staff continually evolved and refined the MSO work during NFPA 805 model development and analysis. The expert panel was re-convened at the conclusion of the work to ensure concurrence with any new MSOs, insights and evaluations, as documented in Report #: 0247 0005.04.
The effort to identify and evaluate potential MSOs did not end with the conclusion of the expert panel. NFPA 805 project staff continually evolved and refined the MSO work during NFPA 805 model development and analysis. The expert panel was re-convened at the conclusion of the work to ensure concurrence with any new MSOs, insights and evaluations, as documented in Report #: 0247 0005.04.
This report was then used to identify component MSO failure combinations to be included in the safe shutdown analysis to develop VFDRs and ensure the nuclear safety capability assessment also identified these MSO conditions. The results of this work are outlined in PLP-RPT-12-00110, Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Identification and Evaluation.
This report was then used to identify component MSO failure combinations to be included in the safe shutdown analysis to develop VFDRs and ensure the nuclear safety capability assessment also identified these MSO conditions. The results of this work are outlined in PLP-RPT-12-00110, Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Identification and Evaluation.}}
Page 79 of 79}}

Latest revision as of 10:19, 11 January 2025

Response to Clarification Request - License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors
ML13079A090
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/21/2013
From: Vitale A
Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Document Control Desk
References
PNP 2013-013
Download: ML13079A090 (81)
v • d • e


Text

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043 Tel 269 764 2000 Anthony J Vitale Site Vice President PNP 2013-013 February 21, 2013 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

SUBJECT:

Response to Clarification Request - License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20

References:

1. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. letter, PNP 2012-106, License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors, dated December 12, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12348A455)

Dear Sir or Madam:

In Reference 1, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO) submitted a license amendment request to adopt the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 performanced-based standard for fire protection for light water reactors.

On February 5, 2013, a conference call was held with the NRC to discuss clarification questions which were sent via electronic mail on February 4, 2013. A follow-up call was conducted with the NRC on February 6, 2013, to confirm the clarification questions and required response timeframe.

provides the ENO responses to the clarification questions.

A copy of this response has been provided to the designated representative of the State of Michigan.

This letter contains no new or revised commitments.

PNP 201 3-013 Page 2 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 21, 2013.

Sincerely, ajv471

Attachment:

1.

Response to Clarification Requests License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors cc:

Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNRC State of Michigan

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 1 of 79 A request for clarification was received from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), by electronic mail on February 4, 2013. Subsequent conference calls with the NRC on February 5, 2013 and February 6, 2013 were conducted to confirm the clarification questions and required response timeframe.

The Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO) response is provided below.

NRC Request

1. Several critical review elements from the last full-scope fire PRA peer review were either incomplete or received a significant number of findings, indicating the fire PRA was not able to be fully reviewed by the peer review team. As such, a focused-scope peer review is needed for the following elements to support the close out of the licensee proposed dispositions/resolutions: FSS (Fire Scenario Selection), FQ (Fire Quantification), HRA (Human Reliability Analysis) and UNC (Uncertainty Analysis). A list of the findings includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the following: FQ-C1-01, HRA-A2-01, HRA-A3-01, HRA-A4-01, HRA-B3-01, HRA-C1-01, HRA-D2-01, HRA-E1-01, PRM-B11-01, CS-A9-01, CS-C1-01, FSS-B1-01, FSS-E3-01, FSS-H5-01, CS-B1-01, PRM-B3-02, PRM-B9-01, PRM-B5-01, FQ-A4-01, ES-A3-01 and UNC-A2-01.

ENO Response

1. Attachment V of the Palisades license amendment request (LAR), presents the cumulative results of three independent Peer reviews of the Palisades fire probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) model and supporting documentation; two in-process Peer reviews and one Final Peer review. The resulting findings and observations (F&Os), as written by the Peer review team, were presented verbatim in Attachment V. The Staff was concerned that the F&O descriptions imply several PRA elements were incomplete or received a number of findings indicating that they could not be reviewed. This document provides supplemental information to demonstrate that all applicable PRA high level requirements (HLR) were reviewed in detail by the Peer review team.

The Palisades Fire PRA Peer Review was evaluated in three phases against the requirements of ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Part 4 [15] by essentially the same personnel.

1. The first in-process Peer review (Phase 1) was conducted during the week of January 18th, 2010.
2. The second in-process Peer review (Phase 2) which included two NRC observers was conducted during the week of August 27, 2010.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 2 of 79

3. The final phase (Final) was conducted during the week of March 21, 2011.

The final report as described in paragraph two in Attachment V of the LAR, SCIENTECH document 17825-1, was released in July 2011.

The Peer review team consisted of subject matter experts from SCIENTECH, Edan Engineering, SAIC, and ABS Consulting; two of the team members were authors of NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities. The final report as described in paragraph two in Attachment V of the LAR, SCIENTECH document 17825-1 [16], describes the Phase 1, Phase 2 and Phase 3 (Final) findings.

The two in-process reviews were provided to assist Palisades in assessing the technical adequacy and to refine plans, if necessary, to ensure the technical requirements of the final fire PRA would meet the ASME/ANS PRA standard.

Although the in process reviews were not conducted on a completed fire PRA, the reviews were conducted in strict accordance with the standard. Not Met or Not Reviewed was assigned if tasks needed to meet the standard requirements were not complete, depending on the degree of completion. In addition, the in process reviews identified actions necessary to achieve as a minimum Category II, where deemed appropriate.

A Final Peer review, of selected technical elements, was deemed necessary to meet the intent of the standard. The final report [16] provides the results of the Final Peer review and the in-process Peer reviews for those technical elements sufficiently reviewed during the in process reviews. Findings and observations from in-process Peer reviews were revisited by the Peer review team, but the finding descriptions were not eliminated or revised due to time constraints. For example, a number of supporting requirements with associated findings in the final report were categorized as meeting CC II (capability category) or greater. In other cases, every element as required by the standard is met, however, a singular refinement or enhancement is found to be needed and hence a finding would result.

There were no changes in applied methodology from the conduct of the Final Peer review on March 21, 2011 to the formal LAR submittal release on December 12, 2012.

Table 1, below illustrates the overall results presented in the summary table from the final report [16]. These results show that 94 supporting requirements meet the ASME standard CC II or greater, 58 supporting requirements (SRs) were not met, 3 met category I, and 14 were classified as not applicable. Four SRs had a final status of not reviewed after the Final peer review; these are presented in Table 3.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 3 of 79 Additional information is provided in Table 2, below to illustrate during which Peer review phase F&Os were identified and reviewed, as well as summary information from the final report to clarify the teams conclusions for each ASME standard element in which a finding was noted. This table re-presents the information provided in LAR Attachment V, Table V-1, with the addition of three new columns, annotated in bold and italics, as shown below. The SR, Topic, Status, and Finding or Suggestion columns were not changed from Attachment V, Table V-1. The disposition description for several SRs was revised to clarify the basis for status of these requirements.

SR Initial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition Supplemental Information In the SR Initial Peer Review Status column, the status from when the supporting requirement (SR) was initially reviewed is provided.

In the SR Subsequent Peer Review Status column, the status from the Final Peer review for the SR is provided.

When a supporting requirement was categorized as not met this was the status at completion of the Final Peer review conducted during the week of March 21, 2011. If the supporting requirement was subsequently addressed prior to the LAR submittal in December 2012, it was categorized as closed in the status column (per the disposition discussion). In these cases the SR finding or suggestion has been fully addressed and the intent of Capability Category II has been met to properly support the LAR submittal.

In the Supplemental Information column, additional information is provided that supports the review for this supporting element was complete; especially if the F&O implies the work was not in a state that could be reviewed. This information was primarily obtained from the Summary of Review Results (Section 4) of the Final Peer review report [16].

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 4 of 79

Table1:SummaryofOverallResultsofthePalisadesFirePRAPeerReview NumberofSupportingRequirementsMeetingEachCapabilityCategory FirePRA Element NotMet Met CCI CCI/II CCII CCII/III CCIII Not Applicable (NA)

Not Reviewed (NR)

Total PP 1

8

3

12 ES 9

2

1

1 1

14 CS 4

9

1

1 1

16 QLS

6

1

7 PRM 10 5

1 4

20 IGN 2

9

1 1

2

15 QNS*

6

6 CF 1

1

1

3 HRA 6

1 3

1

1

12 SF 6

6 FQ 4

5

1

10 FSS 13 16

3 9

6 2

1

50 UNC 2

2 Total 58 62 3

3 12 11 6

14 4

173

%ofTotal 34%

36%

2%

2%

7%

6%

3%

8%

2%

%excluding NAorNR 37%

40%

2%

2%

8%

7%

4%

9%

3%

  • Palisades did not perform quantitative screening so the requirements of QNS are not applicable

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 5 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation CSA401 (Suggestion)

Ifadditionalcablesareselected basedonSRCSA3,VERIFYthat theadverseeffectsduetofailure oftheselectedcablesare includedtheFirePRAplant responsemodel.

Closed TheFirePRAcabledatais maintainedintheSAFE softwareandanadjunct Excelspreadsheet.Thedata shouldbeintegratedintoa singledatasetwithinthe SAFEsoftwaretoensure properlongterm maintenanceoftheanalysis.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (met)

Suggestionclosedby documentationupdate.No impacttoNFPA805analysis.

CabledatafromtheadjunctExcel spreadsheethasbeenintegrated intotheSAFEdatabasetoensure longtermmaintenanceofthe analysis.

DuringthePhase1andPhase2reviews, thisSRwasclassifiedasNotMet DuringtheFinalPeerreviewinMarch 2011,additionalreviewsofthecable selectionelementwereconductedto assessresolutionofF&Osidentifiedduring theinprocessreviews.Thefindingsfrom Phase1andPhase2forthisSRwere resolvedandthissuggestionwasidentified duringthatreview.

PerthefinalScientechreport178251, Thecableselectionandlocationtaskis essentiallycomplete.Futureworkwill typicallyinvolveiterationstorefinethe FirePRA.

Specifically,thePhase1reviewidentified7 findingsand5suggestions.ThePhase2 Peerreviewmodified8F&Osandadded2 additionalsuggestions.TheFinalPeer reviewresultedin4findings,2suggestions, and1bestpractice;supportingthefactthe workhadtransitionedsatisfactorilyfrom thefirstinprocessPeerreview.

CSA901 (Finding)

INCLUDEconsiderationofproper polarityhotshortson ungroundedDCcircuits;requiring uptoandincludingtwo independentfaultscouldresultin adverseconsequences.

Open PLPhasconductedupdates totheoriginalcable selectiontoensuremultiple hotshortfailuresare identified.Itisnotevident thatthesupplemental analysisworkspecifically lookedforproperpolarity hotshortsonungrounded DCcircuits.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet)

Findingopen.Althoughthedata gatheringiscomplete,itwasnot fullyimplementedintothemodel usedfortheLAR.

CabledataforthePLPFPRAwas obtainedfromtwoseparate sources:theSAFEdatabaseand NEXUSspreadsheets.TheSAFE databasewaspopulatedwiththe originalPalisadesAppendixRcable AfindinginthisSRwasidentifiedduring thePhase1Peerreview.CableSelection elementsweresubsequentlyreviewedin thePhase2andFinalPeerreviews.The findinginthisareawasrevisedaspartof theFinalPeerreview,butremainsopenas someminornumericalchangesare anticipatedoncetheFirePRAmodelis updatedtoutilizethefullsetofcabledata maintainedinjustonelocation(SAFE).

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 6 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation data,thecabledatacollectedfor offsitepowercomponents,andthe initialsetofcomponentsselected forcableanalysisforthefirePRA.

Subsequenteffortswere performedtoanalyzeadditional components,refinepreviously collectedcabledataandtorevisit vintagedatausingmoderncriteria includingproperpolaritydchot shorts.

CSB101 (Finding)

ANALYZEallelectricaldistribution busescreditedintheFirePRA plantresponsemodelforproper overcurrentcoordinationand protectionandIDENTIFYany additionalcircuitsandcables whosefailurecouldchallenge powersupplyavailabilitydueto inadequateelectricalovercurrent protectivedevicecoordination Closed Theanalysisandreviewof electricalovercurrent coordinationandprotection hasbeeninitiatedbutisnot yetcomplete.Thefinal analysisshouldaddress coordinationforallFirePRA electricaldistributionbuses.

RefertoF&OCSC401fora relateddiscussionon documentationofthe coordinationandprotection analysis.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Palisadeshasdocumenteda completebreakercoordination studyforallbusesconsideredin thefirePRAasdescribedinEA APR95004,Ref(9).

Thefollowingmodificationswillbe performedtoresolvetheidentified ElectricalCoordinationChallenges:

ThecircuitbreakersinMCC 3buckets(Breakers52345 and52325)willbereplaced.

Replacementof,or supplementtheovercurrent protectioninDCdistribution panels,111,112,11A,21 1,212,and21Autilizing fusestoassurecoordination athigherfaultcurrents.

Replacementofthefuses ThisFindingwasnotedduringtheinitial Phase1Peerreview.Cableselection elementswereagainreviewedbythePeer reviewaspartofthePhase2andFinal Peerreviews,butthisfindinghadnotbeen resolved.Thebreakercoordinationstudy wassubsequentlycompletedand modificationsidentifiedtoresolvethe finding.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 7 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation currentlyinstalledinpanels servedbytheY01.

Adjustmentofthe breaker/relaysettingsin breakers152201,152115, 152108.

Plantmodificationswilladdressall buseswhereelectrical coordinationcouldnotbe demonstrated.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysis.

CSC101 (Finding)

DOCUMENTthecableselection andlocationmethodology appliedintheFirePRAina mannerthatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer review.

Open Thecableselectionand locationmethodologyis documentedinSection4 theModelDevelopment Report(0247070005.03) andassociatedappendices.

Themethodologyfor completedworkis documentedinamanner consistentwiththis supportingrequirement; however,themethodology forthesupplementalcable selectionreview (Attachment1)isnot formallydocumentedina mannerthatensures consistentinterpretationfor FirePRAapplicationsand upgrades.Additionally,the samplecablerouting verificationcheckisnot formallydocumentedinthe Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet)

Findingisopenbecausealthough thedataverificationiscomplete, theresultshavenotbeenfully implementedintothemodelused fortheLAR.

Section4oftheModel DevelopmentReport,Ref(3),has beenupdatedinamannerthat ensuresconsistentinterpretation ofFirePRAapplications.

Additionally,theverificationof AppendixRNonSafeShutdown CableRoutingtoSupporttheFire PRAhasbeenseparately documentedinPLPRPT1200134, Ref(10).

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringthePhase 1Peerreview.TheCSC1supporting requirementwassubsequentlyreviewed duringboththePhase2andFinalPeer review.Thisfindingremainsopenassome minornumericalchangesareanticipated oncetheFirePRAmodelisupdatedto utilizethefullsetofcabledatamaintained injustonelocation(SAFE).

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 8 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation FirePRAReportoranyother plantdocument,andthus doesnotlenditselfto consistenttreatmentfor futureFirePRAapplications andupgrades.

CSC201 (Suggestion)

DOCUMENTcableselectionand locationresultssuchthatthose resultsaretraceabletoplant sourcedocumentsinamanner thatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer review.

Closed AppendixFoftheModel DevelopmentReport(0247 070005.03)documentsthe processbywhichthecable datawascompiledand organizedforthePLPFPRA.

However,tofacilitateFPRA applications,upgrades,and Peerreview,the consolidatedcabledataset (combiningtheNexusand SAFEdatabases)shouldbe documentedinsucha format(includingsuch informationascableID, correspondingequipment ID,cablefunction,andcable faultconsequences,etc.)

thatprovidesendtoend datatraceability.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Thesourcesofthecabledataare documentedintheFirePRAModel DevelopmentReport,024707 0005.03,Ref(03).

ThisSRwascategorizedasNotMetbythe Phase1Peerreview.Thefindingwas revisedtoaSuggestionintheFinalPeer reviewandsubsequentlyresolvedby documentationprovidedintheModel DevelopmentReport.

CSC401 (Finding)

DOCUMENTthereviewofthe electricaldistributionsystem overcurrentcoordinationand protectionanalysisinamanner thatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer Closed Unlikeotherelementsof thisTechnicalElement,the FirePRAReportdoesnot addressthemethodology, process,orcriteriaforthe electricalcoordinationand Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Palisadeshasdocumenteda completebreakercoordination studyforallbusesconsideredin AfindinginthisSRwasidentifiedduring thePhase1Peerreview.TheCSC1 supportingrequirementwassubsequently reviewedduringboththePhase2andFinal Peerreview.

ThefindingwasrevisedduringthePhase2

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 9 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation review.

protectionanalysis.This informationwillneedtobe includedinfinaldocuments tosatisfythissupporting requirement.

thefirePRAasdescribedinEA APR95004,Ref(9).

Peerreview,butremainedopenfollowing theFinalPeerreviewsasthebreakerco ordinationstudywasincomplete.

Subsequentlythisstudywascompleted andthefindingresolvedpriortotheLAR submittal.

ESA201 (Finding)

REVIEWpowersupply,interlock circuits,instrumentation,and supportsystemdependencies andIDENTIFYadditional equipmentwhosefireinduced failure,includingspurious actuation,couldadverselyaffect anyoftheequipmentidentified perSRESA1.

Closed Itisunclearatthispointif allinterlock/permissive circuitswhichmayleadto specificconsequentialIEs havebeenproperly capturedforthefunctions beingcreditedinthePRA.

Thismaybeparticularly importantwherethe functioncreditedinthe AppendixRanalysisis differentfromtheFirePRA, orautoactuationofthe componentisrequiredin thePRAbutnotinAppendix R.

Needtodocumentprocess bywhichallsupporting equipmentandinterlocks havebeenaddressed.The PRAteamappearsto recognizethisdeficiency existsatpresentandhave plansinplacestorectify onceallautoactuation modelingissuesare resolved.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

AcompletereviewofSafety InjectionSignal(SIS),Containment HighPressure(CHP),Containment HighRadiation(CHR),Containment IsolationSignal(CIS)and RecirculationActuationSignal (RAS)logicwasperformedto identifypotentialadverse componentactuationsthatcould occurduetoaspurioussignalfrom anyofthesesources.

Logicwasaddedfor45PRA componentstoconsiderspurious operationfromanyofthe automaticactuationcircuits.

Report0247070005.04,Ref(4),

wasupdatedtoreflectthese changes.

Theselogicchangeswere addressedpriortotheconductof Phase2.

ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

ThefinalreportsummaryfortheES elementstates:

Extensivemodelingchangeshavebeen madetoexplicitlyrepresentbothrandom andfireinducedfailuresofinterlock circuits,instrumentationandassociated powersupplies.Whenthiseffortis completethemodelingofthisaspect shouldbeamongoneofthemost comprehensiveintheindustry.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ESA301 (Finding)

INCLUDEequipmentwhosefire inducedfailure,notincluding spuriousoperation,contributes toorcauses (a)fireinducedinitiatingevents treatedintheFireSafe Shutdown/AppendixRanalysis (b)InternalEventsPRAinitiators asidentifiedusingtheIE requirementsinPart2(including anygradationsacrosscapability categoriesinthatstandard)as modifiedper42.5,or (c)uniquefireinducedinitiating eventsnotaddressedor otherwisescreenedfromthe abovetwoanalysesifSRIEC4in Part2cannotbemet Closed Thereviewofinitiating eventsconsideredinthe internaleventsanalysisis describedinReport0247 070005.03AppendixB.A rationaleforreexamining thescreeningprocessto identifynewIEswhichmay havebeenscreenedor subsumedinthatanalysisis discussed.Nonewinitiating eventsoradditional equipmentwereidentified.

However,thereview processundertakenisnot welldocumented.Itis unclear,e.g.,ifmultiple coincidentpathwayswere addressedwhenidentifying thesizeofLOCAthatmay beinducedbyfireandany potentialsuccesscriteria conflictswhichmayarisein themappingofthefire inducedIEtotheinternal eventsIE.(e.g.verysmall LOCA,SmallLOCAvs.

mediumLOCA).(Notethe sameconcernsarisewhen addressingthescreening processforContainment isolationpathwayswhere suchpathwayswere screenedonthesizeofa singlepathway.)

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

AppendixBofRef(3)wasupdated toprovideadditionaldetailasto howinitiatingeventswere screenedastotheirapplicability forfirescenarios.

Thesuccesscriteriafor consequentialLOCAeventsand theirassociatedpathwaysand sizeswereupdatedinSection5.0 ofnotebookNBPSAETSC,Ref (11).Theupdatednotebook detailsconsequentialLOCAevents thatmayresultfromfireincluding:

multipleprimarycoolantpump (PCP)sealfailures,demandsonthe pressurizersafetyvalves,and spuriousoperationofthereactor headventandletdownisolation valves.Additionaldetailwasalso addedtoreport0247070005.04, Ref(4),forthePCPsealfailures andchemicalandvolumecontrol system(CVCS)pathways.

Themodelingapproachfor containmentisolationpathways wasupdatedasdescribedin AttachmentDofEAPSAFPIEFIRE 1204,Ref(12).Consequential ISLOCAevents,potentiallycaused byfire,arespecificallyaddressed intheXFRISLOCAeventtree describedinSection5.6ofNBPSA ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedbyfullydocumentingconsequential LOCAeventdevelopmentintheeventtree andsuccesscriterianotebookpriortothe LARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ETSC,Ref(11).

ESA501 (Finding)

CONSIDERuptoandincluding twospuriousactuationsof equipmentaloneorin combinationwithotherfire inducedlossoffunctionfailures forthespecialcasewherefire inducedfailurescouldcontribute notonlytoaninitiatingeventbut alsosimultaneouslyeither (a)affectthe operability/functionalityofthat portionoftheplantdesigntobe creditedinresponsetothe initiatingeventintheFirePRA (b)resultinaninitiatingevent wherethemitigatingfunctionis notaddressedintheFireSafe Shutdown/AppendixRAnalysisor (c)resultinalossofreactor coolantsystemintegrity Closed AreviewoftheMSOreport 024707000504Appendix Afoundseveraldeficiencies.

Theseareindicatedbelow.

General:TheMSOpanel wasconvenedin2008.

Westinghousepublishedthe latestMSOreportinApril 2009[WCAPNP16933].

ThecurrentMSOreference numbersanddescriptionin AppendixAdonotmatch thelistinWCAPNP16933.

Therearesomenewissues whicharenotcoveredby thecurrentMSOpanel report.

Suggestafinalreconciliation oftheMSOpanelresults

[eitherwithanewpanel meetingorarewriteofthe report]withWCAPNP 16933.

PLP1,PLP2,PLP3:The MSOdescriptionsinthese WCAPissuesareintended forWestinghouseplants whichhave2diverse methodsofsealcooling.The MSOreportstatestheissue isnotapplicabletoPLP.

However,itisnecessaryto ensurethatallfailure combinationsoflossofCCW Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

TheMSOexpertpanelwas reconvenedon03/15/2011atthe Palisadessitetoaddressall additions,deletionsand/or changestotheMSOassessment thathaveoccurredduetopost expertpanelreviewsandin considerationofthemostcurrent informationavailablefromthe PWROGOwnersGroup.The resultsofthisexpertpanelreview aredocumentedin024707 0005.04,MultipleSpurious Operations,Ref(4).

PLP1,PLP2,andPLP3were updatedinreport024707 0005.04.PalisadesPCPsealLOCA modelhasbeenupdatedtobe consistentwiththelatestindustry guidance(WCAP15749P,Revision 1,Guidanceforthe ImplementationoftheCEOG ModelforFailureofRCPSeals GivenLossofSealCooling(Task 2083),CombustionEngineering OwnersGroup(CEOG),December 2008).Furtherdetailisprovidedin AppendixBof0247070005.04.

PLP10wasfinalizedas documentedin0247070005.04 ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedbyincorporatingmodelinglogicand updatingtheMSOreportpriortotheLAR submittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation sealcoolingareincludedfor PLP.

PLP10:Resolutionnot final.;

PLP11:WCAPissue misunderstoodbyMSO panel.Issueisforclosureof bothRWSTsuctionvalves andisapplicabletoPLP.

Simultaneousspurious closureofCV3031and CV3057isthisissue.;

PLP12:Resolutionnotfinal PLP14:InWCAPNP16933, issue14isapplicableto Palisades.Issue14isCHP runoutwhenRCSis depressurized.Palisades needstolookatpump runoutpossibilityforall ECCS,CCW,AFW,andSWS pumps.;

PLP18:ResolutionforPLP 18statesRWSTmaydrain, whichisnotconsideredin PRA.IfRASoccursandCV 3029orCV03030opens, RWSTwillnotdrain, becauseofcheckvalvein sumpline.Other possibilitiesinvolving deadhead/NPSHofECCS pumpsarenotexplored.If 3029/3030openona Section5.10.ThePRAmodelwas updatedtoincludespuriousvalve failurestoaddressthisMSO.

PLP11iscorrectlyevaluatedin report0247070005.04Section 5.11.TheMSOpanelcorrectly understoodthescenario.

Simultaneousspuriousclosureof CV3031andCV3057doesnot isolatechargingsuctionfromthe SIRWTasthechargingsuctionis fromaseparatenozzle.Closureof thesevalvesisaddressedinMSO scenarioswhichimpactthe engineeredsafeguardspumps.

MSOscenarioPLP10considers spuriousisolationofcharging pumpsuctionvalves,including thosewhichwouldisolatecharging fromtheSIRWT.

TheresolutionofMSOscenario PLP12wascompletedinSection 5.12of0247070005.04.Spurious closureofMO2087duetofirewas addedtothePRAmodel.

EvaluationofPLP14wasupdated inSection5.14of024707 0005.04.Theevaluationnow describeshowthisscenariois addressedinthemodel.

MSOscenarioPLP18wasupdated.

Theevaluationdescribesmodel changesincorporatedtoexplicitly addressearlydraindownofthe SIRWTinthePRAmodelanddead

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation spurioussignal, CV3031/CV3057and CV3027/3056willreceivea signaltoclose.Poweris disabledto3027/3056.

Scenariosforinsufficient NPSHincludea)spuriousSI; b)openingof3029/3030;c) closureof3031/3057.

PossibilitiesforECCS deadheadinclude:a) spuriousSI;b)openingof 3029/3030;c)operator mistakenlyrestorespower to3027/3056[basedon falseinstruments]resulting indeadheadofECCSpumps.

PLP19:Needsfinal resolution; PLP27,PLP34,PLP35:MSO statesSGADVdoesnot needtobeincludedbecause overcoolingisnotanissue atPalisades.However,need toconsiderotheraffectsof SOADV,whichare:a)AFW pumprunout;b)FaultedSG maybeunsuitablefordecay heatremovalinthelong term[i.e..,notabletoraise steam].;c)Heatremovalis lessthaneffectiveand condensateinventory makeupisrequired.

PLP39:Needbetterreason headingoftheECCSpumps.

PLP19wasfinalizedperSection 5.19of0247070005.04.This scenarioinvolvesearlydraindown oftheSIRWTviacontainment sprayandisaddressedinthe resolutiontoscenarioPLP18.

ScenariosPLP27,PLP34,PLP35 wererevisedaddressaffectsother thancooldownduetoastuckopen atmosphericdumpvalve(ADV).

Thedirecteffectsofablowdown ofasteamgeneratoraremodeled explicitlyinthePRAintermsofthe impactonsteamsupplytothe turbinedrivenAFWpump.The resultingSIsignalalsohas potentiallynegativeeffectssuchas loadshedofbus1Eandisolationof thenoncriticalservicewater header(CV1359)andonthe shrinkandswellofthePCSwhich couldresultinapotentialdemand onapressurizersafetyvalve(ad describedinscenarioPLP42).

AppendixFwasaddedto024707 0005.04toevaluatethepotential forAFWpumprunoutonspurious fullopeningoftheAFWflow controlvalvestoadepressurized steamgenerator.

Additionalevaluationwas performedtoaddressMSO scenarioPLP39andaddedas AppendixGto0247070005.04.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation toexcludeblowdownvalves aspotentialflowdiversion ratesappeartobe significant.;

PLP43:Resolutionfor pressurizersprayvalves statesthatSOsprayvalve wouldleadtolossof subcooling.Lossof subcoolingwillleadtoSI signal.Spurioussprayvalve openingwillleadtoSIin[on theorderof]5minutes.

Sprayvalvespuriousshould beincludedinFirePRAas leadingtoSIsignal.

PLP45:Basiceventsfor pressurizerheaterscould notbefoundinCAFTAas indicatedintheresolution; PLP47:Resolutionnotfinal.

PLP57PLP58:Effectof spuriousoperationofload sequencersnotevaluated.

Possiblescenariosinclude1) failureofcablecauses spuriousloadshedon operatingbus,2)failureof cablecausesloadofDGon operatingbus.

PLP60,PLP80,PLP84:Need finalresolution.

General:Noindicationof searchforcontainment isolationfailurepathways Thisevaluationprovidesthebasis forexcludingtheblowdownvalves asapotentialflowdiversionpath.

Additionalevaluationwas performedtoaddressMSO scenarioPLP43andaddedas AppendixIto0247070005.04.

Thisevaluationprovidesthebasis forexcludingspuriousopeningof thepressurizersprayvalvesfrom thePRAmodel.

Itwasvalidatedthatthefaulttree referredtoinPLP45iscorrectly identifiedintheCAFTAmodel.

TheresolutionofPLP47was finalizedwiththeadditionof evaluationsinAppendicesNandO of0247070005.04todescribethe treatmentofborondilutionevents inthePRA.

MSOscenariosPLP57andPLP58 havebeenfinalizedand incorporatedintothePRAmodel asdescribedinSections5.57and 5.58of0247070005.04.

TheevaluationsforMSOscenarios PLP60,PLP80,andPLP84have beenfinalized.

Themodelingapproachfor containmentisolationpathways wasupdatedasdescribedin AttachmentDofEAPSAFPIEFIRE 1204,Ref(12).Consequential ISLOCAandcontainmentbypass

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation whichcancontributeto LERF.

events,potentiallycausedbyfire, arespecificallyaddressedinthe XFRISLOCAeventtreedescribedin Section5.6ofNBPSAETSC,Ref (11)

ESC101 (Finding)

IDENTIFYinstrumentationthatis relevanttotheoperatoractions forwhichHFEsaredefinedor modifiedtoaccountforthe contextoffirescenariosinthe FirePRA,perSRsHRAB1and HRAB2.

Closed Sincethefullcomplementof OMAstobeincludedinthe firePRAhasyettobe identifiedinstrumentsetis incomplete.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Instrumentationrelevantto operatoractionsinfirescenarios wereidentifiedandvalidatedby completionofPostInitiator OperatorActionQuestionnaires(P IOAQ).

AcopyoftheHumanFailureEvent (HFE)PostInitiatorCalculation(P IC)andPIOAQwereprovidedto currentSROlicensedonshift OperationsDepartmentpersonnel andTrainingDepartment personnelforuseinvalidatingHFE informationaccuracy.

HFEswereassignedtoOperations DepartmentOperatingCrewsand

/orOperationstrainingpersonnel forreview.Theirreviewsincluded ensuringindications,procedure selectionanduse,andactivity performancemanpowerand timingiscorrect.Training personnelreviewsincluded ensuringprocedureselectionand usewereconsistentwithcurrent trainingexpectations,andthe ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

WithrespecttothisSRtheFinalPeer reviewreportstates:

Theidentificationofinstrumentationto supportoperatoractionsofomission, carriedoverfromtheinternaleventsPRA model,iscompleteandcomprehensive.

Whileadditionalpostfirerecoveryactions maybeidentifiedduringtherefinementof thefirePRAmodel,itappearsunlikelythat significantadditionalinstrumentationwill beneededtosupporttheseactions.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation trainingtypeandfrequencyare accurate.

Thefinalsetofoperatormanual actions(OMA),recordsofthe currentoperatingcrews,and trainingpersonnelareprovidedin notebookNBPSAHR,Ref(13).

ESC201 (Finding)

IDENTIFYinstrumentation associatedwitheachoperator actiontobeaddressed,basedon thefollowing:fireinducedfailure ofanysingleinstrumentwhereby oneofthemodesoffailuretobe consideredisspuriousoperation oftheinstrument.andfire inducedfailure,including spuriousindication,evenifthey arenotrelevanttotheHFEsfor whichinstrumentationis identifiedwithinthescope definedbyESC1,ifthefailure couldcauseanundesired operatoractionrelatedtothat portionoftheplantdesign creditedintheanalysis.

Closed Instrumentswhichprovide supportingcuesfor operatoractionshavebeen identifiedandarebeing explicitlymodeledinthefire PRAtogetherwiththeir associatedpowersupplies

Undesiredoperatoractions potentiallyoccurringasa resultofspuriousplant monitoringandalarm instrumentsdonotappear tohavebeenaddressedat thepresenttime.Neither hasaprocessforidentifying, screeningandmodeling suchoccurrencesbeen discussed.Thisshouldbe addressed.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Asimulatorexercisewas performedwithcurrentPalisades licenseholdersinwhichseveral scenarioswereevaluatedto determinehowOperatorswould respondgivenspuriousorfalse instrumentindications.Theresults oftheseexerciseswereconsidered intheHFEdevelopmentprocess.

Theprocessandevaluationresults aredocumentedinNBPSAHR,Ref (13).

ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring theFinalPeerreview.

WithrespecttothisSRtheFinalPeer reviewreportstates:

Phase2:Theidentificationofoperator actionsofcommissionarisingduetofire inducedspuriousalarmshasnotbeen completedasyet.Whilethisiscanbea fairlyextensiveeffortveryfewalarms typicallyremainunscreenedandrequire explicitmodeling.

Final:Extensiveefforthasbeenconducted.

Documentationisprogressing.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

ESD101 (Suggestion)

DOCUMENTtheidentified equipmentinamannerthat facilitatesFirePRAapplications, upgrades,andPeerreviewandis sufficienttosupporttheother Closed Plantspecificvalidationof therationaleforexcluding fireinducedfailureoftrip shouldbeprovidedunder Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Phase2/

Final (notmet) 1 Suggestionresolvedby documentationandmodelupdate.

NoimpacttoNFPA805analysis.

MSOScenarioPLP38wasrevised ThisSRwasdesignatedasnotmetinthe Phase1Peerreview.Theequipment selection(ES)elementwasfullyreviewed duringthePhase2Peerreviewanda limitedscopereviewwasperformedduring

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation FirePRAtaskssothat (a)itisclearwhichequipment willbeassociatedwith determininginitiatingeventsin theFirePRAplantresponse modelforthepostulatedfires (b)theequipmentanditsfailures includingspuriousoperationor indicationcanbemodeled appropriately (c)cablesassociatedwiththe equipmentcanbeidentified (d)failuremodesofinterestfor theequipmentareclearsoasto supportcircuitanalysesif requiredJustificationsare providedwithregardto equipmentconsideredbut screenedoutoftheFirePRA includingwhenmeetingSRESA3 relevanttomeetingSRIEC4in Part2forinitiatingevents, meetingSRESB6forthe mitigatingequipmenttobe creditedintheFirePRA,and usingthe"exception"underSR ESC2forinstrumentation considerations.

MSOPLP38.

asdocumentedinSection5.38of 0247070005.04,Ref(4).ThePRA modelwasupdatedtoinclude spuriousoperationoftheAFW pumplowsuctionpressuretrips.

theFinalPeerreview.

Thesuggestionwasnotfullyresolvedfor theFinalPeerreview,butwas subsequentlyclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.

FQA401 (Finding)

QUANTIFYthefireinducedCDF inaccordancewithHLRQUAand itsSRsinPart2withthe followingclarification:

(a)quantificationistoincludethe fireignitionfrequency(perthe IGNrequirements)andfire Closed Manyoftheaccident sequencesinvolveaFire initiatorwhichgoesstraight tocoredamage[i.e..,there isnosuccesspath].This impliesasinglefireevent canfailbothtrainsofsafe Phase2 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Recoveryactionsandproposed modificationshavebeen incorporatedintothefinalversion Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.

ThefindinginthisSRwasprovidedduring theFinalPeerreview.

WithrespecttotheFQelementtheFinal

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation specificconditionaldamage probabilityfactors(pertheFSS requirements)

(b)QUA4inPart2istobemet basedonmeetingHLRHRADin 42.10 and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRQUAin Part2.

shutdowncapability.The CDFistoohightoacceptso manyindividualsequences withnosuccesspath.There hasnotbeensufficient investigationdoneto indicatewhetherrecovery actionsaretrulynot possible,orsimplynot modeledyet.

ofthefirePRAmodel.Thefinal modelhasnosequenceswitha conditionalcoredamage probabilityof1.Resultsare describedinAppendixBof0247 070005.01,FireRisk QuantificationandSummary,Ref (1).

reportstates:

Overallprocessisconsistentwithprevailing goodpractices.Resultsarenotfinaland thuscertainSRscannotbedemonstrated tohavebeenmet.Continuingthe refinementinprocessandplannedprovides confidencethistechnicalelementwillmeet theStandard.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FQB101 (Finding)

PERFORMthequantificationin accordancewithHLRQUBand itsSRsinPart2 and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRQUBin Part2.

Closed QUB3requires demonstrationof acceptabletruncationvalue byaniterativeconvergence process.ThePLPfirePRA doesnothavethisprocess.

Althoughthereisno indicationthecurrent truncationvalueisnot acceptable,theconvergence processexercisewasnot done.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Theconvergenceprocessto determineacceptabletruncation limitsforthefinalfirePRAmodel weredocumentedinSection6of 0247070005.01,Ref(1).The truncationlevelsarebasedon convergencecalculationsperthe ASMEPRAstandard,whichstates thatconvergencecanbe consideredsufficientwhen successivereductionsintruncation valueofonedecaderesultin decreasingchangesinCDForLERF, andthefinalchangeislessthan 5%.

Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.

ThefindinginthisSRwasinitiallynoted duringFinalPeerreviewandsubsequently resolvedbydocumentingtheconvergence processtodetermineacceptable truncationlimits.

FQC101 (Finding)

ADDRESSdependenciesduring theFirePRAplantresponse modelquantificationin Open PRAdocumentNBPSAHR 1,Rev3providesanHEP dependencyanalysisand Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (reviewed notmet)

Thisfindingisconsideredopen giventhattheprocedure development,modification Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation accordancewithHLRQUCand itsSRsinPart2 and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRQUCin Part2.

developsadjustmentfactors toapplytothecutsets.

MultipleHFE'sareevaluated fordependenciesusingthe EPRIHRAcalculator.

Dependencyadjustment factorsaredevelopedand appliedinthecutsets.

However,the"Q"model

[whichwasreviewed]does notincorporatethiswork.

ThereforetheF&Oandthe notmetassessment.

detaileddevelopment,and operationsreviewsareongoing.

Adependencyanalysiswas completedtoidentify combinationsofhumanfailure events(HFEs)inwhich dependenciesbetweenactions maycontributetoanincreasein coredamagefrequency(CDF) whencomparedtotheCDF calculatedwhenscreeningvalues forhumanerrorprobabilities (HEPs)areused.

Dependenciesbetweenactions wereassignedbasedonsequence specificevaluationsofcues,timing, location,andavailableresources, andtheHEPsadjustedifnecessary torepresentthelevelof dependence;theCDFwasthen recalculatedusingthemodified HEPs.HFEsnotexplicitlyevaluated fordependencewereassigned HEPsof1(i.e.,therepresented operatoractionsareassumedto failwithaprobabilityofunity),and thustheresultingCDFrepresents anupperboundforthepotential impactofdependenciesuponthe results.Sharedcuesconservatively assumed100%dependence.This approachhasidentifiedimportant HFEsforwhichthecompletionof detailedhumanreliabilityanalyses maybebeneficial.

ThisfindingremainsopenasdetailedHEPs cannotbedevelopeduntilupdated proceduresandmodificationdetailsare complete.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ThefirePRAHRAdependency analysisisdocumentedinNBPSA HR,Ref(13).

Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.

FQE101 (Finding)

IDENTIFYsignificantcontributors inaccordancewithHLRQUD andHLRLEFandtheirSRsinPart 2withthefollowingclarifications:

(a)SRQUD5aandQUD5bof Part2aretobemetincluding identificationofwhichfire scenariosandwhichphysical analysisunits(consistentwiththe levelofresolutionoftheFirePRA suchasfireareaorfire compartment)aresignificant contributors (b)SRQUD5bofPart2istobe metrecognizingthat "component"inPart2is generallyequivalentto "equipment"inthisStandard (c)SRQUD3forcomparisonto similarplantsisnotapplicable (d)SRLEF3includingthe"Note" forthatSRofPart2istobemet (1)followingHLRQUDofPart2 withtheclarificationsabove concerningSRsQUD5aandQU D5b.

(2)buttheuncertainty Closed Thediscussionofdominant resultsisnotpresentedin the0247070005.01.The resultsarecategorizedand sortedintermsofthe dominantcontributors[as perFQE1],butthereisno discussionasrequiredby thisSR.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (reviewed notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section6.0of0247070005.01, FireRiskQuantificationand Summary,Ref(1),wasrevisedto includeadiscussionofthe dominantresults.

Thefireriskquantification(FQ)element wasreviewedindetailinboththePhase2 andFinalPeerreviews.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation requirementandreferenceto Table22.76(e)inPart2does notapplyhere.See42.13.

and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderthese sectionsinPart2.

FSSA101 (Finding)

IDENTIFYallriskrelevantignition sources,bothfixedandtransient, ineachunscreenedphysical analysisunitwithintheglobal analysisboundary Closed ThetreatmentofMCC'sis notproperlyjustified.FSS document0247070005.06 includesthestatement"All MotorControlCenters (MCC)havebeentreatedas closed,sealedandrobustin whichdamagebeyondthe ignitionsourcewillnotbe postulated."No documentationof inspectionsoftheMCC's, includingthetopofthe cabinetshavebeen providedtojustifynot propagatingfiresoutside theMCC.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section6.1of0247070005.06, Ref(6),hasbeenrevisedtoinclude areferencetothewalkdown informationandphotographs whichprovideabasisforthis statement.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewandresolvedbysubsequent documentationupdate.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

Significantprogresshasbeenmadein supportoftheFSStechnicalelements (Mathcad,detailedanalysisonareassuch asPAU4(1C);documentationisin progress).Thisprogressallowedthepeer reviewteamtoconductareviewofthefire scenarioselectionanalysis.

  • AllsupportingrequirementsinFSShave beenreviewed,whichisevidenceofallthe workconductedoverthelastperiod.
  • Theinconsistenciesidentifiedinearlier reviewshavebeengenerallyaddressed.
  • Thecommentsgeneratedfromthis

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation reviewareforthemostpartdirectedto individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyin placedtomeettheFSSrequirements.

FSSA301 (Finding)

Iftheexactroutingofacable(or groupofcables)hasnotbeen established(seeSRsCSA10and CSA11),ASSUMEthatthose cablesfailforanyfirescenario thathasadamagingeffecton anyracewayorconduitwhere thesubjectcablemight reasonablyexist.

Closed Theprocessofmappingand accountingfortargetsinthe FirePRAisnotdocumented.

Technicaldiscussionduring thereviewperiodindicates thattargetswithunknown routingaremappedtoall thescenarioswithinaPAU unlessithasbeenverified thatthetargetisnotina specificscenario.However, thisprocesswasnotclearly demonstratedduringthe reviewandisnot documentedinreport0247 070005.06.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Intheeventthatacablesplant locationcannotbeestablished,the processofcreditingbyassumed routingwasperformed.The processinvolveddetermining,with ahighdegreeofconfidence, locationsintheplantthatdonot containthecableinquestion.This isaccomplishedbyconsideringthe likelyroutingofacableandwas performedbyexperiencedplant personnel.Inmanycases,this assessmentwasmadebygrouping componentsintoanappropriate surrogatecategory(asdescribedin section5.3oftheModel DevelopmentReport#024707 0005.03,Ref(3)).Theresultsof thisdetailedassessmentare providedinAppendixIofthe ModelDevelopmentReport0247 070005.03.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSB101 (Finding)

DEFINEandJUSTIFYthe conditionsthatareassumedto causeMCRabandonmentand/or relianceonexcontrolroom Open ThecurrentFirePRAdoes notconsiderabandonment ofthemaincontrolroom duetolackof Phase1 (met)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen.Controlroom abandonmentscenarioswith respecttoenvironmentaleffects havebeenaddressed.However, DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation operatoractionsincluding remoteand/oralternate shutdownactions.

equipment/controldueto firedamage.

thecurrentmodeldoesnot specificallyidentifyscenariosthat resultinabandonmentdueto equipmentdamage.

requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Equipmentdamageleadingtocontrol roomabandonmentisaddressedinthe FirePRAmodel;however,thisfinding remainsopenpendingformaldevelopment ofthelistofequipmentwhosefireinduced damagecouldcausecontrolroom abandonment.Themodelincludeslogicat thecomponentlevelforoperationofkey equipmentoutsideofthecontrolroomas prescribedforcontrolroomabandonment suchaslocaloperationofequipmentatEC 150,andforotherlocalactionssuchas localcontrolofP8B.Thesesequencesare evaluatedforallscenarios,notonly scenarioswherethecontrolroom abandonmenteventtreeisemployed (controlroomevacuationduetosmokeor hightemperature).

FSSB201 (Finding)

SELECToneormorefire scenarios,eitherintheMCRor elsewhere,leadingtoMCR abandonmentand/orareliance onexcontrolroomoperator actionsincludingremoteand/or alternateshutdownactions, consistingofacombinationofan ignitionsource(orgroupof ignitionsources),suchthatthe selectedscenariosprovide reasonableassurancethatthe MCRabandonmentfirerisk Closed TheCCDPquantification doesnotreflectthehuman errorprobabilities associatedwithcontrol roomabandonmentandthe fireimpactedcablesmay notreflectthe equipment/controlthatmay ormaynotbeavailable afterabandonment.

Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

MainControlroomabandonment scenarioshavebeenpostulated basedondamagetoequipment andcontrols.Postulatedfiresin theControlRoom(CR)havethe potentialtochallengehabitability orvisibilityduetosmoke generationorexcessiveheat.An abandonmentanalysis (Attachment1of0247070005.06, Afindingwasidentifiedduringtheinitial Peerreviewandmodifiedaspartofthe FinalPeerreview.Asindicatedthe identifiedissuewascorrected.Thisis consistentwiththePeerreviewteamfinal assessmentforFSSwhichindicated:

Thecommentsgeneratedfromthisreview areforthemostpartdirectedtoward individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyinplace tomeettheFSSrequirements.

Thespecificconcerncitedbythepeer

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation contributioncanberealistically characterized.

Ref(6))wasperformedto determinetheresponseoftheCR envelopegivenarangeofpossible fireevents.Theanalysis consideredthreedifferent operatingstatesoftheCR mechanicalventilationsystemand threedifferentconfigurationsof theCRDoor.Basedonthis assessment,threescenarios,each involvingmultiplecabinets,were implementedintothemodel.

Humanactionsthatcouldnotbe performedpriortothetime controlroomabandonmentwas necessarywereconsideredfailed.

reviewteamduringthereviewwasthat onlyindividualcabinetfailureswere consideredforcontrolroomabandonment scenarios.Therevisedtreatment considersthreemultiplecabinetfailure groupswhichwhencombinedencompass allthecabinetsinthecontrolroom.

Thequantificationforthesethree scenariosreflectthehumanerror probabilitiesassociatedwithcontrolroom abandonmentandthefireimpactedcables thatarenotavailableafterabandonment.

FSSC301 (Suggestion)

JUSTIFYtheheatreleaserate profilestagesincludedinthe analysis(i.e.,firegrowth,steady burning,ordecaystages).

Closed Thesupportingrequirement statesthatthegrowth stagesincludedinthe analysisshouldbejustified.

Thejustificationisnot includedinthe documentation.

Phase1 (reviewed asnot applicable)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis TheModelDevelopmentReport, Ref(3),wasrevisedtoincludea discussionofthetreatmentforthe growthstagesofafiresheat releaserate.

DuringPhase1fireburnouttimesappear nottobeafactoraffectingtheanalysis results.

SubsequenttothePhase1review,thefire growthstageswereappliedintheanalysis.

Hence,thePhase1notapplicable determinationchangedtoamet, satisfyingcapabilitycategoryII/III.

ThissuggestionwasclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.

FSSC401 (Finding)

Ifaseverityfactoriscreditedin theanalysis,ENSUREthat (a)theseverityfactorremains independentofother quantificationfactors Closed Theseverityfactorfor hotworkfiresof0.01isnot properlyjustified.The documentationdoesnot provideadescriptionhow Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

The0.01severityfactorfor hotworkisnolongerappliedin DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation (b)theseverityfactorreflectsthe fireeventsetusedtoestimate firefrequency (c)theseverityfactorreflectsthe conditionsandassumptionsof thespecificfirescenariosunder analysis,and (d)atechnicalbasissupporting theseverityfactors determinationisprovided thevaluewascalculated andanexplanationofwhy thevalueremains independentofthegeneric ignitionfrequency.

finalfirePRAmodel.Severity factorsarenowbasedon NUREG/CR6850.Section8.3of 0247070005.06,Ref(6),was updatedtoreflectthischange.

FinalPeerreview.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewandresolvedbysubsequent documentationandmodelupdate.

FSSC501 (Finding)

JUSTIFYthatthedamagecriteria usedintheFirePRAare representativeofthedamage targetsassociatedwitheachfire Closed Noscenarioisevaluatedfor conditionswherethetarget damagecriteriaisthatof sensitiveelectronics.

Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section5.2of0247070005.06, Ref(6),wasrevisedtoprovide furtherbasisforexcluding scenarioswiththesensitive electronicscriteria.Theexclusion isbasedprimarilyonphysical cabinetdistancesfromfireignition sourcesandthatthesetargetsare generallywithinanenclosurethat providessomeprotectionfromthe heatsource.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreview.Asindicatedtheidentified issuewascorrected.Thisisconsistent withthePeerreviewteamfinal assessmentforFSSwhichindicated:

Thecommentsgeneratedfromthisreview areforthemostpartdirectedtoward individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyinplace tomeettheFSSrequirements.

FSSC701 (Finding)

Ifmultiplesuppressionpathsare credited,EVALUATEand PROPERLYMODELdependencies amongthecreditedpaths includingdependencies associatedwithrecoveryofa failedfiresuppressionsystem,if suchrecoveryiscredited.

Closed Noevaluationof independenceof suppressionpathshasbeen includedintheanalysis.

Phase1 (reviewed asnot applicable)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe treatmentofdependencebetween suppressionpathsinthescenario Suppressioncapabilitieswereinitiallynot credited.

Subsequentanalysisidentifiedthe treatmentofdependencebetween suppressionpathsinthescenario suppressioneventtreeasdescribedinthe dispositioncolumn.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation suppressioneventtree.

FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSC801 (Finding)

Ifracewayfirewrapsare

credited, (a)ESTABLISHatechnicalbasis fortheirfireresistancerating, and (b)CONFIRMthatthefirewrap willnotbesubjecttoeither mechanicaldamageordirect flameimpingementfromahigh hazardignitionsourceunlessthe wraphasbeensubjectto qualificationorotherproofof performancetestingunderthese conditions.

Closed Thereportdoesnotdiscuss thetreatmentoffire barrierscreditedinthe analysis.

Phase1 (reviewed asnot applicable)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Documentationwasaddedto Section2.2ofreport024707 0005.02,Ref(2),whichdiscusses thetreatmentoffirebarriers creditedintheanalysis.Creditfor racewayfirebarriers,thermal wrapsorotherlocalizedprotection featureshavenotbeencreditedin identifyingaphysicalanalysisunit.

Additionally,ascanbenotedinthe FireScenarioDevelopmentReport (0247070005.06,Ref(6)),no creditistakenforthepresenceof racewayfirewraps.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSD101 (Finding)

SELECTappropriatefiremodeling toolsforestimatingfiregrowth anddamagebehaviorconsidering thephysicalbehaviorsrelevantto theselectedfirescenarios.

Closed Althoughingeneral appropriatefiremodels havebeenselected,the justificationfortheuseof theselectedtoolsneedsto beimproved.Thisfindingis specificallyapplicabletothe useofthetimetodamage modelsprogrammedin MathCAD,whichare calculationsthathavenot beendocumentedand Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

AppendixEof0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasupdatedtoincludefurther discussionontheapplicabilityof theMathCADtoolforcalculation ofthenonsuppressionprobability.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation reviewedbytheindustry.

FSSD201 (Finding)

USEfiremodelsthathave sufficientcapabilitytomodelthe conditionsofinterestandonly withinknownlimitsof applicability Closed Nofiredetectionanalysis hasbeenconductedin supportoftheactivationof fixedsuppressionsystemsor thetimetosmoke detection.

Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe treatmentofautomatic suppressionsystemactivation timesonthesuppression probability.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSD401 (Finding)

ESTABLISHatechnicalbasisfor firemodelingtoolinputvalues usedintheanalysisgiventhe contextofthefirescenarios beinganalyzed.

Closed Thisfindingisassociated withtreatmentoftransient fires.1)Fireelevationfor transientfireshasbeen assumedtobeonthefloor.

2)theheatreleaseratefor transientfireshavebeen assumedtobecharacterized byelectricmotorfires.

Theseareimportantinput valuesfordeterminingzone ofinfluence.

Phase1 (reviewed met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section7.0of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe treatmentoffireelevationand heatreleaseratefortransient fires.Thetransientheatrelease ratewasincreasedto317kW;98th percentileheatreleaseratefor transientcombustibles,inlieuof thevalueforelectricmotorfires.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreview.Asindicatedtheidentified issuewascorrected.Thisisconsistent withthePeerreviewteamfinal assessmentforFSSwhichindicated:

Thecommentsgeneratedfromthisreview areforthemostpartdirectedtoward individualSRsandshouldnotimpactthe overalltechnicalstrategycurrentlyinplace tomeettheFSSrequirements.

FSSD701 (Finding)

Increditingfiredetectionand suppressionsystems,USEgeneric estimatesoftotalsystem unavailabilityprovidedthat (a)thecreditedsystemis installedandmaintainedin accordancewithapplicablecodes Closed Itemsa,b,andcintheCatII requirementarenot explicitlyaddressinthe analysis.

Phase1 (reviewed metCCI)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtodescribethe basisforavailabilityofautomatic DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation andstandards (b)thecreditedsystemisina fullyoperablestateduring plantoperation,and (c)thesystemhasnot experiencedoutlierbehavior relativetosystemunavailability suppressionsystemsandthe impactonsuppressionprobability, includingadiscussionofoutlier behavior.

Peerreviewandresolvedbysubsequent documentationupdate.

FSSD801 (Finding)

INCLUDEanassessmentoffire detectionandsuppression systemseffectivenessinthe contextofeachfirescenario analyzed.

Closed TheFirePRAcurrentlydoes notincludeanassessment oftheeffectivenessofthe firesuppressionand detectionsystemscredited intheanalysis.

Phase 1(reviewed not applicable)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section10.1of0247070005.06, FireScenarioDevelopment,Ref (6),wasrevisedtoprovidean assessmentoftheeffectivenessof automaticsuppressionsystems andtheimpactonsuppression probability.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSE301 (Finding)

PROVIDEameanvalueof,and statisticalrepresentationof,the uncertaintyintervalsforthe parametersusedformodeling thesignificantfirescenarios.

Open Aqualitative characterizationofthe parametersusedinthefire modelinginsignificantfire scenarioshavenotbeen completedastheFirePRA stillneedsdetailedanalysis toreducetheplantCDF.

Thequalitativediscussion requiredtomeetcategory1 shouldbecompletedonce keyscenariosareidentified.

Phase1 (reviewed metCCI)

Final (notmet)

Findingopenasthe characterizationhasnotbeen completed.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysisastheresultsare basedonthepointestimatevalues whichapproximatethemean values.

Acharacterizationofthe parametersusedinthefire modelinginsignificantfire scenarioshasnotbeencompleted.

However,itisnotexpectedthat refinementoftheparameter uncertaintyintervalswillimpact thefirePRAconclusions.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewandremainsopen,butas indicatedthisfindingdoesnotimpactthe pointestimatevaluesusedintheNFPA805 analysis.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation FSSF101 (Finding)

DETERMINEifanylocations withintheFirePRAglobal analysisboundarymeetbothof thefollowingtwoconditions:(a) exposedstructuralsteelis present(b)ahighhazardfire sourceispresentinthatlocation andIfsuchlocationsare identified,SELECToneormore firescenario(s)thatcould damage,includingcollapse,the exposedstructuralsteelforeach identifiedlocation.

Closed Thereport024707 0005.08,whichdocuments structuralsteelanalysis, doesnotdescribewhatisa "highhazardfire".

Consequently,itisnotclear whatspecificfireswhere consideredashighhazard duringthewalkdownsand analysistoconcludethata scenarioshouldbe quantifiedintheanalysis.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Thedefinitionofasignificantfire hazardwasaddedtoSection2.0of theExposedStructuralSteel AnalysisReport,0247070005.08, Ref(8):Thefollowingdetailshave beenaddedtothetothereport, Forthepurposesofthisanalysis, asignificantfirehazardwas definedashavingatleastthesame orgreatercombustibleloading equivalentto50gallonsoffueloil, whichisinexcessofaheatvalueof 7E+6BTU[5].

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSF201 (Finding)

If,perSRFSSF1,oneormore scenariosareselected, ESTABLISHandJUSTIFYcriteria forstructuralcollapseduetofire exposure.

Closed Thecriteriaforidentifying andanalyzingfirescenarios associatedwithdamageto structuralsteelisnotclearly documented.Thecriteria utilizedhasbeeninferred fromtheanalysisandis consideredappropriate.

Thecriteriaincludes1) possibilityofahighhazard fire,2)exposedstructural steel,and3)asteel temperatureof1000F.

Phase1 (reviewed metCCI)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Theappropriatecriteriaforfire damagetostructuralsteelwere addedtoSection3.0ofthe, ExposedStructuralSteelAnalysis Report,0247070005.08,Ref(8).

Thefollowingcriteriaguidelines havebeenaddedto1)Presence ofsignificantfirehazard(Section 2.0),2)Presenceofexposed structuralsteel,3)SteelSurface temperatureinexcessof1000°F forfireconfigurationtoclearly documentthecriteriausedfor DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation identifyingandanalyzingfire scenariosassociatedwith structuralsteeldamage.Theone thousanddegreecriteriais consistentwiththestatement providedinReference2ofthe StructuralSteelAnalysisfrom NIST,FireProtectionofStructural SteelinHigh-RiseBuildings..

FSSF301 (Finding)

If,perSRFSSF1,oneormore scenariosareselected, COMPLETEaquantitative assessmentoftheriskofthe selectedfirescenariosina mannerconsistentwiththeFQ requirements,includingcollapse oftheexposedstructuralsteel.

Closed Thefourscenariosselected forevaluationhavebeen screenedandthereforenot includedintheCDF calculationfortheplant.

Thescreeningprocessfor oneofthescenariosis basedonthefrequencyof suchanevent(PAU23, turbinegeneratorfire).The calculatedfrequencyisnot basedonfireignition frequenciesdocumentedin currentFirePRAEPRI guidance.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section3.2.2oftheStructuralSteel AnalysisReport,Ref(8),was revisedusingthefrequencies foundinNUREG/CR6850(Vol.2) andEPRITR1016735tocalculatea newturbinegenerator catastrophicfirefrequencyof 3.13E6/yrand1.59E6/yr, respectively.SiteSpecific frequenciesdocumentsintheFIF andPlantPartitioningReport0247 070005.02,Ref(2),were implementedinthequantitative assessmentoftheFPRA.

Quantitativecalculationsand factorsappliedarealso documentedinsection3.2.2ofthe StructuralSteelReport.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG201 (Finding)

DEFINEscreeningcriteriafor multicompartmentfirescenarios thatprovidereasonable Closed Elementsofthequalitative criteriarequirefurther evaluation.Specifically, Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation assurancethatthecontribution ofthescreenedphysicalanalysis unitcombinationsareoflowrisk significance.

"exposingPAUisoutdoors; noHGLpostulated"and "exposedPAUhasa sufficientvolumethatany hotgasesthatmayenter PAU woulddissipatebefore significantdamagewould occur."Intheformer,the qualitativeassessment shouldincludeadiscussion ofyardtransformerfires nearturbinebuildingwalls.

Inthelater,assessmentof hotgaslayerconditions shouldbequantitatively addressed.

ThescreeningcriteriainTable31 of0247070005.07,Multi CompartmentAnalysis,Ref(7),

wererevisedtoadddiscussionof outdoortransformersnearturbine buildingwallsandhotgaslayer.A quantitativedefinitionfor sufficientvolumewasalso provided.Thislattercriterionis onlyappliedintwoareaswhereit wassubsequentlyverifiedthata hotgaslayercouldnotforminless than60minutes.

assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG202 (Finding)

DEFINEscreeningcriteriafor multicompartmentfirescenarios thatprovidereasonable assurancethatthecontribution ofthescreenedphysicalanalysis unitcombinationsareoflowrisk significance.

Closed Thequantitativescreening criteriadonotinclude considerationforthe cumulativeriskscreened outduetomulti compartmentcombinations.

Currently,multi compartmentsarescreened atathresholdof1E7,but thereisnoverificationof thecumulativerisk screened.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

RevisedSection3.5of024707 0005.07,MultiCompartment Analysis,Ref(7),todescribethe cumulativeimpactofCDF screeningat1E7.ThetotalCDF impactfromthescreenedareasis alsolessthan1E7/yr.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG401 (Finding)

Ifpassivefirebarrierswithafire resistanceratingarecreditedin theFirePRA (a)CONFIRMthattheallowed Closed TheSRrequires confirmationofallowed credit,assessmentof effectivenessandreliability, Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

RevisedAppendixAof024707 DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation creditisconsistentwiththefire resistanceratingas demonstratedbyconformanceto applicableteststandards (b)ASSESStheeffectiveness reliability,andavailabilityofany passivefirebarrierfeature credited,and (c)EVALUATEthepotentialfor fireinducedorrandomfailureof creditedpassivefirebarrier features andevaluationofrandom failuresofpassivebarriers.

Noanalysishasbeen presentedordocumented addressingthese requirements.

0005.07,Ref(7),todescribethe applicabilityandbasisforthe randomfailureprobabilityof passivefirebarriersfrom NUREG/CR6850usedinthemulti compartmentanalysis.

requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG501 (Finding)

Foranyscenarioselectedper FSSG3,iftheadjoiningphysical analysisunitsareseparatedby activefirebarrierelements, QUANTIFYtheeffectiveness, reliability,andavailabilityofthe activefirebarrierelement.

Closed TheSRrequires quantificationof effectiveness,reliabilityand availabilityoftheactivefire barriers.Noanalysishas beenpresentedor documentedaddressing theserequirementsin additionofusingthegeneric valuesinNUREG/CR6850.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

RevisedAppendixAof024707 0005.07,Ref(7),todescribethe applicabilityandbasisforthe randomfailureprobabilityofactive firebarriersfromNUREG/CR6850 usedinthemulticompartment analysis(MCA).Table34ofthis documentreflectsthe quantificationofMCAinteraction failures.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

FSSG601 (Suggestion)

QUANTIFYtheriskcontribution ofanyselected multicompartmentfirescenarios inamannerconsistentwiththe FQrequirements.

Closed LERFresultsarenot reportedinthemulti compartmentanalysis report,buttheyhavebeen calculated.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Updatedreport0247070005.07, Ref(7),toreporttheLERFresults fromthefinalfirePRAmodelin Section4.0ofthemulti DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

Thesuggestionwasnotfullyresolvedfor theFinalPeerreview,butwas

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation compartmentanalysis.

subsequentlyclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.

FSSH201 (Finding)

DOCUMENTabasisfortarget damagemechanismsand thresholdsusedintheanalysis, includingreferencesforany plantspecificortargetspecific performancecriteriaappliedin theanalysis.

Closed Thetreatmentofhydrogen firesisincorrectly documentedinreport0247 070005.06.

Phase1 (metCCI)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Thedocumentationfortreatment ofhydrogenfiresinreport0247 070005.06,Ref(6),wasupdated tobeconsistentwithapproach appliedinthefiremodelwhich complieswithAppendixNof NUREG/CR6850.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthefire scenarioselectionandanalysis(FSS) elementwasinprogress.Adetailed assessmentoftheFSSsupporting requirementswasperformedduringthe FinalPeerreview.

ThefindingwasclosedtomeetCCIIprior totheLARsubmittal.

FSSH501 (Finding)

DOCUMENTfiremodelingoutput resultsforeachanalyzedfire scenario,includingtheresultsof parameteruncertainty evaluations(asperformed)ina mannerthatfacilitatesFirePRA applications,upgrades,andPeer review.

Closed TheFirePRAisinprocess.

Firemodelingresultsarenot complete.Documentation ofoutputresultsshouldbe consistentwithcurrent approachforscenarios analyzedwhilethefirePRA iscompleted.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Thefinalfiremodelingoutput resultsforeachanalyzedfire scenarioweredocumentedin Section6.0ofreport024707 0005.01,Ref(1).Additionally, Section7.1ofRef(1)wasrevised toincludeastatistical representationoftheuncertainty intervalsusedformodelingthe significantfirescenariosfromthe finalfirePRAmodel.

ThisfindingwasidentifiedduringtheFinal Peerreviewbecauseadditional refinementswerestillanticipatedfollowing theFinalPeerreview.Asindicatedbythe metstatus,however,theformatofthe existingresultsdiscussionwasacceptable.

FSSH901 (Finding)

DOCUMENTkeysourcesof uncertaintyfortheFSStechnical element.

Closed Sourcesofuncertaintyin thefiremodelinganalysis arenotdocumentedin 0247070005.06.

Phase1 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Sourcesofuncertaintyinthefire scenarioselectionprocesswere Thissupportingrequirementwasnot reviewedduringthePhase1Peerreview asthemodelprogresswasnotsufficiently complete.Thisfindingwasidentified duringtheFinalPeerreview,butwas

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation documentedinreport024707 0005.01,FireRiskQuantification andSummary,Ref(1).

subsequentlyaddressedpriortotheLAR submittal.

HRAA201 (Finding)

Foreachfirescenario,IDENTIFY anynewfirespecificsafe shutdownactionscalledoutin theplantfireresponse procedures(e.g.,deenergizing equipmentperafireprocedure foraspecificfirelocation)ina mannerconsistentwiththe scopeofselectedequipment fromtheESand PRMelementsofthisStandard, andinaccordancewithHLRHRE anditsSRsinPart2withthe followingclarifications:

(a)whereSRHRE1discusses procedures,thisistobe extendedtoproceduresfor respondingtofires (b)whereSRHRE1mentions"in thecontextoftheaccident scenarios,"specificattentionisto begiventothefactthatthese arefirescenarios (c)anothersourceforSRHRE1is likelytobethecurrentFireSafe Shutdown/AppendixRanalysis and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRHREin Closed Theidentificationoffire responseactionsisnotyet complete.Additionalfire safeshutdownactionsare stillbeingidentifiedasthe FirePRAanalysiscontinues toberefined.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Thefinalidentificationoffire responseactionswascompleted anddocumentedinnotebookNB PSAHR1,Ref(13).Theseactions wereincorporatedintothefinal firePRAmodelwhereappropriate.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation Part2.

HRAA301 (Finding)

Foreachfirescenario,IDENTIFY anynew,undesiredoperator actionthatcouldresultfrom spuriousindicationsresulting fromfailureofasingle instrument,perSRESC2(e.g.,

duetoverbatimcompliancewith theinstructioninanalarm responseprocedure,when separateconfirmationisnot availableorrequired).

Closed Section6.3oftheHRA Notebookdiscussesthe reviewthatwasperformed withthelicensedoperators fortheidentificationofthe new,undesiredoperator actionsinresponseto spuriousindications.

However,thedetailed documentationforthe evaluationprocessandthe justificationsforthe conclusionthatno undesiredoperatoractions willbetakeninthese instrumentationfailure conditionswasnotyet completedforthereviewers toconfirmtheconclusion thatnoundesiredoperator actionsneedtobe considered.

Phase1 (metCCI)

Final (metCCI) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Asimulatorexercisewas performedwithcurrentPalisades licenseholdersinwhichseveral scenarioswereevaluatedto determinehowOperatorswould respondgivenspuriousorfalse instrumentindications.Theresults oftheseexerciseswereconsidered intheHFEdevelopmentprocess.

Theprocessandevaluationresults aredocumentedinNBPSAHR,Ref (13).

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

HRAA401 (Finding)

TALKTHROUGH(i.e.,reviewin detail)withplantoperationsand trainingpersonnelthe proceduresandsequenceof eventstoconfirmthat interpretationoftheprocedures relevanttoactionsidentifiedin SRsHRAA1,HRAA2,andHRAA3 isconsistentwithplant operationalandtraining Open Asthefirescenario refinementcontinues, additionalfireresponse actionswillbeidentifiedand evaluated,whichwill requiretheperformanceof additionaloperator interviews.Assuch,thistask isnotfullycompletedyet.

Also,operatorinterviewsfor Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.

AcopyoftheHumanFailureEvent (HFE)PostInitiatorCalculation(P IC)andassociatedPostInitiator OperatorActionQuestionnaire(P IOAQ)wereprovidedtocurrent DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation practices.

thosefireresponseactions thatarestillusingscreening values(e.g.,ACPDGOTB5B DG,ACPPMOE38311A, ACPPMOE38312A,AFW PMOAP8BCRAB,etc.)may nothavebeencompleted.

(Note:SpecificHEPbasic eventidentifierscitedbythe Peerreviewteammayhave beensubsequentlyrenamed orremovedfromthemodel aspartoftheF&O resolutionprocess.)

SROlicensedonshiftOperations Departmentpersonneland TrainingDepartmentpersonnelfor useinvalidatingHEPinformation accuracy.

HFEswereassignedtoOperations DepartmentOperatingCrewsand

/orOperationstrainingpersonnel forreview.Theirreviewsincluded ensuringindications,procedure selectionanduse,andactivity performancemanpowerand timingiscorrect.Training personnelreviewsincluded ensuringprocedureselectionand usewereconsistentwithcurrent trainingexpectations,andthe trainingtypeandfrequencyare accurate.

Operatorcommentswere reviewedanddiscussedwithPRA personnelandproposed resolutionsforwardedtothe commentinitiatorforfurther commentoracceptance.Comment acceptanceisdocumentedbytheir initialingtheHFEValidationform.

SignificantHFEswereevaluated anddevelopedinfurtherdetail.

Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.

Therecordsofthecurrent operatingcrewsandtraining assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation personnelareprovidedin notebookNBPSAHR,Ref(13).

HRAB201 (Finding)

INCLUDEnewfirerelatedsafe shutdownHFEscorrespondingto theactionsidentifiedperSRHRA A2intheFirePRAplantresponse modelinamannerconsistent with42.2andSection42andin accordancewithHLRHRFandits SRsinPart2and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRHRFin Part2.

Closed Identificationofnew,fire responseactionsand incorporationofthe identifiedfireresponse actionsintotheFirePRA modelarenotcompleted.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Thefinalidentificationoffire responseactionswascompleted anddocumentedinnotebookNB PSAHR1,Ref(13).Theseactions wereincorporatedintothefinal firePRAmodelwhereappropriate.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

HRAB301 (Finding)

COMPLETEthedefinitionofthe HFEsidentifiedinSRsHRAB1 andHRAB2byspecifyingthe following,takingintoaccountthe contextpresentedbythefire scenariosintheFirePRA:

(a)accidentsequencespecific timingofcues,andtimewindow forsuccessfulcompletion (b)accidentsequencespecific proceduralguidance(e.g.,AOPs, EOPs)

(c)theavailabilityofcuesor otherindicationsfordetection andevaluationerrors (d)thespecifichighleveltasks Open Theimpactoflossofall redundant/diverse instrumentationonHEPs hasbeenmodeledbyORing theinstrumentationlogic withitsassociatedHEP.

Thus,incaseswheretotal instrumentfailure(by hardwarefaultorfire) occurs(includingthefailure oftheonlyinstrument available),theHEPis appropriatelyfailed.

However,thefailureimpact ofpartialinstrumentation onanHEPhasnotyetbeen Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.

Thesimulatorexerciseperformed withcurrentPalisadeslicense holdersevaluatedoperator responsetoseveralscenarioswith false,partialortotallossof instrumentindications.Theresults oftheseexerciseswereconsidered intheHFEdevelopmentprocess forpurposesofdevelopingtiming ofcuesandtimewindows.

ThefinaldevelopedfireHFEs DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation (e.g.,trainlevel)requiredto achievethegoaloftheresponse.

implemented.Thereare casesinthemodelwhere multipleinstruments providecuestothe operatorstoperform actions.Operatoractions basedonfalseindication havenotbeenconsidered.

Inaddition,HFEsmodeled usingscreeningvalues(for someofthefireresponse actionsidentified;e.g.,ACP DGOTB5BDG,FPSPMOE STARTL,ACPPMOE383 12A,ACPPMOE38311A, etc.)andthosefireresponse actionsthatwillbe identifiedasthefire scenariorefinement continueshavenotyet accountedforthescenario contextincludingtiming, proceduralguidance, instrumentation,task complexity,etc.Also,HRA Calculatorevaluationsheets cannotbelocatedforPCP PMOFP50XLOCandEDG PMOEPORTPUMP,and AFWAVOACV2010D, SWSAVOACV082326,and SWSAVOBCV082447M stillneedtobemodifiedfor firerelatedconditions.

incorporatetaskcomplexityand proceduralguidanceas documentedinthePostInitiator OperatorActionQuestionnaire(P IOAQ)providedtocurrentSRO licensedonshiftOperations Departmentpersonneland TrainingDepartmentpersonnelfor useinvalidatingHFEinformation accuracy.

SignificantHFEswereevaluated anddevelopedinfurtherdetail.

Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.

ThefinallistoffireHFEsandtheir associateddocumentationare providedinNBPSAHR,Ref(13).

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation HRAC101 (Finding)

Foreachselectedfirescenario, QUANTIFYtheHEPsforallHFEs andACCOUNTFORrelevantfire relatedeffectsusingdetailed analysesforsignificantHFEsand conservativeestimates(e.g.,

screeningvalues)for nonsignificantHFEs,in accordancewiththeSRsforHLR HRGinPart2setforthunderat leastCapabilityCategoryII,with thefollowingclarification:

(a)Attentionistobegivento howthefiresituationaltersany previousassessmentsinnonfire analysesastotheinfluencing factorsandthetiming considerationscoveredinSRsHR G3,HRG4,andHRG5inPart2 And (b)DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthe requirementsunderHLRHRGin Part2.

Open FireresponseHFEsmodeled withscreeningvalueshave notyetbeenevaluatedina manneraccountingfor relevantPSFs(e.g.,ACP DGOTB5BDG,FPSPMOE STARTL,ACPPMOE383 11A,ACPPMOE38312A, etc.).Also,HRACalculator evaluationsheetcannotbe locatedforPCPPMOFP 50XLOCandEDGPMOE PORTPUMP,andAFW AVOACV2010D,SWS AVOACV082326,and SWSAVOBCV082447M stillneedtobemodifiedfor firerelatedconditions.This taskisnotcompleted.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (metCCI)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.

SignificantHFEswereevaluated anddevelopedinfurtherdetailas documentedinNBPSAHR,Ref (13).Screeningvaluesarestill appliedforfireHEPspending developmentoffinalprocedures, modifications,andoperations reviews.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

HRAD101 (Finding)

INCLUDEoperatorrecovery actionsthatcanrestorethe functions,systems,or componentsonanasneeded basistoprovideamorerealistic evaluationofsignificantaccident sequences.

Closed Identificationandevaluation ofrecoveryactionsforrisk significantscenariosare expectedtocontinueasthe refinementoffirescenario analysiscontinues.

Currently,someofthetop coredamagefirescenarios stilldonotaccountfor Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Thefinalidentificationoffire responseactionswascompleted anddocumentedinnotebookNB PSAHR1,Ref(13).Theseactions wereincorporatedintothefinal firePRAmodelwhereappropriate.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation realisticrecoveryactions.

Thistaskisnotcompleted yet.

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

HRAD201 (Finding)

INCLUDEoperatorrecovery actionsthatcanrestorethe functions,systems,or componentsonanasneeded basistoprovideamorerealistic evaluationofsignificantaccident sequences(sameasHRAD101).

Open Manyoftheoperator recoveryactionsassociated withfireresponsearestill modeledwithscreening values;i.e.,notaccounting foralloftherelevantPSFs.

Dependencyanalysishas beenperformedforthe currentsetoffirescenarios andoperatoractionsinthe "T"model.Theresults generatedfromthe"Q" modeldidnotincorporate thedependencyanalysis.

Thedependencyanalysis needstobereanalyzed beforefinalizationofthe FirePRAmodel.Thistaskis notcompleteyet.Also,HRA Calculatorevaluationsheets cannotbelocatedforPCP PMOFP50XLOCandEDG PMOEPORTPUMP,and AFWAVOACV2010D, SWSAVOACV082326,and SWSAVOBCV082447M stillneedtobemodifiedfor firerelatedconditions Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Thisfindingopenistreatedas opensincescreenvalueswere usedasrecoveryvalues.Thisisa resultgiventhattheprocedures, modificationdetail,operations review,anddetailedHRAmodel developmentarenotyetcomplete.

Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPs.

Adependencyanalysiswas completedtoidentify combinationsofhumanfailure events(HFEs)inwhich dependenciesbetweenactions maycontributetoanincreasein coredamagefrequency(CDF) whencomparedtotheCDF calculatedwhennominalscreening valuesforhumanerror probabilities(HEPs)areused.

Dependenciesbetweenactions wereassignedbasedonsequence specificevaluationsofcues,timing, location,andavailableresources, andtheHEPsadjustedifnecessary torepresentthelevelof dependence;theCDFwasthen recalculatedusingthemodified HEPs.HFEsnotexplicitlyevaluated DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation fordependencewereassigned HEPsof1(i.e.,therepresented operatoractionsareassumedto failwithaprobabilityofunity),and thustheresultingCDFrepresents anupperboundforthepotential impactofdependenciesuponthe results.Sharedcuesconservatively assumed100%dependence.This approachhasidentifiedimportant HFEsforwhichthecompletionof detailedhumanreliabilityanalyses maybebeneficial;thoseanalyses havenotbeencompleted.

ThefirePRAHRAdependency analysisisdocumentedinNBPSA HR,Ref(13).

HRAE101 (Finding)

DOCUMENTtheFirePRAHRA including (a)thosefirerelatedinfluences thataffectthemethods, processes,orassumptionsused aswellastheidentificationand quantificationoftheHFEs/HEPs inaccordancewithHLRHRIand itsSRsinPart2,andDEVELOPa definedbasistosupportthe claimofnonapplicabilityofanyof therequirementsunderHLRHRI

inPart2, and (b)anydefinedbasestosupport theclaimofnonapplicabilityof Open DocumentationforHFEs associatedwithselectedfire responseHFEs(e.g.,FPS PMOESTARTL,ACPPMOE 38311A,ACPPMOE383 12A,etc.)intherisk significantfirescenarios needtobeprovided.Also, HRACalculatorevaluation sheetscannotbelocatedfor PCPPMOFP50XLOC,EDG PMOEPORTPUMP,and PULLFUSE;AFWPMOTP 8BLOCseemstohavebeen changedtoAFWPMOTP 8BSBOinHRAnotebook Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.Screeningvalues arestillappliedforfireHEPs pendingdevelopmentoffinal procedures,modifications,and operationsreviews.

DuringthePhase2review,workonthe humanreliabilityanalysis(HRA)element wasinprogress.Adetailedassessmentof theHRAsupportingrequirementswas performedduringtheFinalPeerreview.

TheFinalPeerreviewsummaryreport noted:

Thereviewdidnotidentifyissueswiththe fundamentalapproachesbeingused[for]

thecompletedportionoftheHRA assessment.

Thisfindingremainsopenasindicatedin theDispositioncolumn.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation anyofthereferenced requirementsinPart2beyond thatalreadycoveredbythe clarificationsinthisPart (butnotchangedinFirePRA model);andAFWAVOACV 2010D,SWSAVOACV 082326,andSWSAVOB CV082447Mstillneedtobe modifiedforfirerelated conditions.Thistaskisnot complete.

IGNA1001 (Finding)

PROVIDEameanvalueof,anda statisticalrepresentationof,the uncertaintyintervalsfor significantfireignition frequencies.

Closed Thecharacterizationof uncertaintiesinthefire ignitionfrequencieshasnot beenaddressedinthe reportqualitativelyor quantitatively.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Thecharacterizationof uncertaintiesinthefireignition frequencieshavebeenaddressed inReport0247.07.005.01,Ref(1).

Thechangeinignitionfrequency hasadirectimpactonCDFsince ignitionfrequencyisincludedin thecalculationofCDFforevery scenario.Thereportdescribesthe sensitivitiesrunbychangingthe binignitionfrequenciestothe5th and95thpercentilevaluesofthe originalfrequenciesforbothEPRI andNUREG/CR6850values.

Calculatingthe5thand95th percentileswasdonesousingthe GAMMADISTfunctioninExcelfor theEPRIfrequenciesandprovided asBARToutputfortheNUREG/CR 6850frequencies.Thissensitivity providesanadequateupperand lowerboundofthefinalCDFwhich usedthemeanfrequencies.

Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

ThefindingwasclosedpriortotheLAR submittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation

IGNA601 (Suggestion)

Whencombiningevidencefrom genericandplantspecificdata, USEaBayesianupdateprocessor equivalentstatisticalprocess.

JUSTIFYtheselectionofany informativepriordistribution usedonthebasisofindustry experience.

Closed TheBayesianupdate processusedtoupdate genericignitionfrequencies toplantspecificisnot documented.Aquestion wassubmittedduringthe Peerreviewactivitiesand theresponsesuggeststhat theBayesianapproachis documentedandwillbe addedtothereport.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

TheBayesianupdateprocessused toupdatethegenericfrequencies toplantspecificfrequenciesis documentedinSection4.2ofthe FireIgnitionFrequencyandPlant Partitioning,report024707 0005.02,Ref(2).Section4.2.1of thereportidentifiestheBayesian statisticalupdateoftheEPRITR 1016735genericfrequenciesthat wasperformedusingPLPspecific fireeventsdata.Therevisedfire ignitionfrequencies,includingthe frequenciescalculatedinAppendix GofReport0247070005.02,have gammauncertaintydistributions.

Therefore,thepriordataprovided included:themean,alpha,and betafactors.TheBayesiananalysis wasperformedinamanner consistentwiththeassertionthat thebinignitionfrequencieswere gammadistributions.

Section4.2.2ofthereport 0247.070005.02identifiesthe Bayesianstatisticalupdateofthe NUREG/CR6850generic frequencieswasperformedusing PLPspecificfireeventsdata.

NUREG/CR6850providesthe Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation mean,5th,50th,and95th percentiles,andstandarddeviation foreachbinignitionfrequency.

TheBayesiananalysisassumesthe NUREG/CR6850binignition frequenciesarelognormal distributions.FrequenciesforBins 16a,16b,16c,and16dare providedinFAQ060017andFAQ 070035.Thegenericfrequency distributionsalongwiththeplant evidencediscussedinSection4.2 ofReport0247070005.02were inputintotheBayesiansoftware toolBART,andthenewbin frequenciesdeveloped.Table45 ofReport0247070005.02 providestheposteriormean,5th percentile,95thpercentile, median,andrangefactorvalues associatedwitheachbinforusein futureupdate.

IGNA701 (Finding)

USEaplantwideconsistent methodologybasedon parametersthatareexpectedto influencethelikelihoodof ignitiontoapportionhighlevel ignitionfrequencies(e.g.,plant widevalues)toestimatephysical analysisunitorignitionsource levelfrequencies.

Closed Page31ofreport024707 0005.02appearstosuggest thatnofrequencyfor miscellaneoushydrogen fireshasbeenassignedto applicablephysicalanalysis units.Thismayaffectthe PAUlevelquantificationby reducingthefireignition frequencyassignedtothe applicableplantlocations.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Report0247.07070005.02,Ref (2),andFireIgnitionFrequency calculationdatabaseshavebeen updatedtoassignmiscellaneous hydrogenfirestoallapplicable PhysicalAnalysisUnits(PAUs).As notedinSection4ofreport0247 070005.02,thefrequency associatedwithBin19, Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation MiscellaneousHydrogenFires,has beenallocatedbasedonlinear feet,valvelocationandtank locationinPAUswherehydrogen equipmentexists.Applyingthese criteriahasapportioned miscellaneoushydrogenfrequency tothefollowingPAUs:04(1C SwitchgearRoom),13(Reactor Building),and23(Turbine Building).

IGNA901 (Suggestion)

POSTULATEthepossibilityof transientcombustiblefiresforall physicalanalysisunitsregardless oftheadministrativerestrictions.

Closed Thereport0247070005.02 doesnotlistthetransientor fixedignitionsource frequenciesineachfire zone.Thereportappearsto onlylistthetotalfrequency.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report0247.070005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtoinclude transientandfixedignitionsource frequenciesforeachPAU(fire zone).AppendixEandFofReport 0247070005.02includes frequenciesonaPAUbasisbroken downintoTransient,Fixedand Totalforeach.EachAppendix providesadetailedIgnitionSource Datasheet(ISDS)offrequenciesby binandPAUforthecorresponding frequency.TheISDSutilizesdata fromthecountingwalkdowns,the transientandcableweighting factors,locationweightingfactors, andtheBayesianupdatedfire ignitionfrequenciestocalculate theFireFrequencyforeach PhysicalAnalysisUnit.

Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation TheISDSprovidesthePhysical AnalysisUnitidentificationand description,thegenericlocation categories(fixedandtransient source)weightingfactorsand countsummarynecessaryto calculatethefirefrequencyin accordancewiththeequations providedinthebodyofthis notebookinaccordancewiththe guidelinesestablishedin NUREG/CR6850.

IGNB201 (Suggestion)

DOCUMENTreferencesforfire eventsandfireignitionfrequency sourcesused.

Closed Thereport0247070005.02 doesnotreferenceplant specificfireeventsusedto updatefireignition frequencies.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report024707005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtodocumentthe plantspecificfireeventsthatwere usedtoupdatethefireignition frequenciesinAppendixAofthe report.Theappendixdocuments thereviewofallfireeventsatPLP forthedatesofJanuary1,2001 throughDecember31,2011.This reviewwasperformedto determineifanyfireeventswere classifiedaspotentiallychallenging inaccordancewithNUREG6850.

Fireeventsthatareidentifiedas potentiallychallengingrequired theupdatingofthegenericfire frequenciesprovidedin NUREG/CR6850andEPRITR 1016735foruseintheplant Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation specificfirePRA.

IGNB401 (Suggestion)

DOCUMENTtheplantspecific frequencyupdatingprocess.

INCLUDEinthedocumentation

(a)theselectedplantspecific events

(b)thebasisfortheselectionand orexclusionofevents

(c)theanalysissupportingthe plantspecificreactoryears,and

(d)theBayesianprocessfor updatinggenericfrequencies Closed Thereport0247070005.02 doesnotclearlydescribe theprocessforclassifying fireeventsaspotentially challengingornot challenging.Thereport doesprovideatable indicatingwhichportionof thecriteriawasmet.

However,thereportshould describehowthistablewas populated.Itisnotevident fromthetablehowthe criteriawasmet/notmet fromtheinformation provideintheevent descriptioncolumn.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

The0247070005.02,Ref(2),

reportdocumentstheprocessof classifyingfireeventsaspotentially challengingornotchallengingin AppendixA.

Fireeventreportswereobtained fromplantpersonnelforthe stationcoveringtheperiodof January1,2001throughDecember 31,2011.Plantpersonnelmadean extensivesearchoftheir conditionreportandIdeas databasesforfireincidentreports.

Thesearchcriteriaincludeddates 1/1/01through12/31/11andkey wordsfire,heat,andsmoke.

Thissearchrevealedthousandsof hitsbutareviewofeachidentified onlyatotalofeleven(11)fire incidentswithintheprotectedarea andinareasincludedintheglobal analysisboundary.

Eachofthesereportswas reviewed,summarized, categorizedandclassifiedaseither potentiallychallengingornot potentiallychallenging.The criteriaforafiretobedeemed potentiallychallengingare providedinNUREG6850.

Reviewoftheignitionfrequency(IGN) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation AppendixCin6850,SectionC.3.3.1 providescriteriaforclassifyinga fireeventas"potentially challenging."

MUA101 (Finding)

ThePRAconfigurationcontrol processshallincludemonitoring ofchangesindesign,operation, andmaintenancethatcould affectthePRA.Suchchanges shallincludeoperating procedures,designconfiguration, initiatingeventfrequencies, unavailabilities,andcomponent failureratedata.

Closed ThePalisadesPRAModel Updateprocedureincludes maintenanceandupgrades tothePRAtobeconsistent withtheasbuilt,as operatedplant.Resolution oftheFullPowerInternal Events(FPIE)PeerReview F&Osandincorporationof designandoperational informationrelevanttoa FirePRAshouldresultin meetingtheStandard.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section3.3oftheconfiguration controlnotebook,NBPSACC,Ref (14),hasbeenrevisedtoincludea requirementforaPeerreview againsttheASMEstandardforPSA modelupgrades.

Thefindingwasresolvedpriortothe conductoftheFinalPeerreview.ThisSR wasnotreexaminedduringtheFinalPeer review.Thefinalreportisinconsistentand doesnotreflectresolutionofthisfinding.

PPA101 (Finding)

INCLUDEwithintheglobal analysisboundaryallfireareas, firecompartments,orlocations withinthelicenseecontrolled areawhereafirecouldadversely affectanyequipmentorcable itemtobecreditedintheFire PRAplantresponsemodel includingthoselocationsofa sisterunitthatcontainshared equipmentcreditedintheFire PRA.

Closed RequirementPPA01 includesNotePPA12 whichclarifiesthatthe intentoftherequirementis toincludeplantlocations withnocreditedplant equipmentthatmayaffect locationswithcreditedplant equipmentinmulti compartmentfirescenarios.

Withrespecttothemulti compartmentanalysis,the report0247070005.02 makesnomentiononthe treatmentofqualitatively screenedbuildingsorplant Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

AtthecompletionofTask1(Plant Partitioning)asetofPAUswere establishedforthefirePRA.These PAUsareevaluatedandundergo thescreeningprocessoutlinedin Section2.1ofreport024707 0005.02,Ref(2).Thescreening analysisqualitativelydetermines thefireriskassociatedwitheach PAU.TheresultsoftheTask4 screeningareusedinTask6(Fire IgnitionFrequency),wherefire frequenciesareestimatedforeach Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation locations.

oftheunscreenedfire compartments.

Qualitativescreeningasdescribed inTask4(QualitativeScreening)of NUREG/CR6850isintendedto identifythosefirecompartments where,accordingtopre determinedcriteria,thefireriskis expectedtoberelativelylowor nonexistentcomparedtoothers.

Thistaskassumesthattherisk(i.e.

CDFand/orLERF)associatedwith thefirescenarioswherea controlledmanualplantshutdown maybeattemptedasa precautionarymeasureandno otherfirePRAcomponentsare affectedislow.Ifacompartments exclusionfromthefirePRAis uncertain(forinstance,whetheran automaticormanualplanttripwill occurmaynotbeknownwith certainty),thatcompartment shouldberetainedforquantitative analysistobetterdetermineits contribution,ifany,totheoverall firerisk.

InthePalisadesfirePRAthere weretwoPAUsqualitatively screened.Thequalitative screeningprocessandcriteriaare describedinSection2ofreport 0247070005.02.

PPB101 DEFINEFirePRAphysicalanalysis Closed Theplantpartitioningreport Phase1 Final Suggestionresolvedby Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP)

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation (Suggestion) unitsbasedonacombinationof plantfireareasasdefinedinthe plantsfireprotectionprogram andphysicalanalysisunitswhere eachphysicalanalysisunit representsasubdivisionofafire area,andIfanyfireareais subdividedintotwoormore physicalanalysisunits,ENSURE thatthephysicalanalysisunit definitionscomplywiththe balanceofthePPBSRs(PPB2 throughPPB7).

doesnotdescribecable trenches,ductbanks, manholes,etc.thatmaybe presentintheyard.The FirePRAshouldhavea dispositionfortheseareas astowhytheremay/may notbetheneedfor postulatingfirescenarios andwhereintheyardthe scenariosmaybe postulated.

(met)

(met) documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Physicalanalysisunitsforthe PalisadesfirePRAcorrespondto FireAreasdefinedintheFire ProtectionProgram.Confirmatory walkdownnoteshavebeen documentedinAttachment3of Report0247070005.02,Ref(2).

Sixplantlocationswereidentified thatwerenotspecifically addressedintheFHAandnew physicalanalysisunitswere createdforuseinthefirePRA.

Thesefirelocationswerethe CoolingTowerPumpHouse, FeedwaterPurityBuilding,Yard Area,Switchyard,Administration Building,andServiceBuilding.The boundaryrequirementsforafire riskassessmentweresufficiently metbytheboundariesofthe FeedwaterPurityBuildingand CoolingTowerPumpHouse.The YardAreaandSwitchyardwere outdoorareasandthereforedid nothaveanyfireratedbarriers exceptfortheseparationsfrom theindooranalysisunits.Spatial separationhasbeeninherently creditedwiththeuseofcurrent FireProtectionProgramfire boundaries.Spatialseparationis presentbetweenthefollowing PAUsboundaries:Component CoolingPumpWaterRoomsand elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation TurbineBuilding,AuxiliaryBuilding andRadwasteAdditionVRS,and lastlyEastEngineeredSafeguards RoomsandAuxiliaryBuilding.

Theseboundarieshavebeen documentedandreferencedinthe currentFireHazardsAnalysisto meettherequirementsofthisfire riskassessment.

Theswitchyardislocated approximatelyaquartermile outsideoftheprotectedareabut withintheOwnerControlledArea.

TheYardAreaisdefinedasall outsideareaswithintheprotected areafencing.TheFireScenario DevelopmentReport,024707 0005.02accountsforthepresence ofcables,busducts,etc.inthe developmentofthepostulatedfire scenariosintheyardarea.

PPB201 (Suggestion)

Ifpartitioningcreditswall,ceiling, orfloorelementsthatlackafire resistancerating,JUSTIFYthe judgmentthatthecredited elementwillsubstantiallycontain thedamagingeffectsoffires giventhenatureofthefire sourcespresentineach compartmentseparatedbythe nonratedpartitioningelement.

Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotprovideadequate justificationforcrediting barrierswhenoutsidethe fireprotectionprogram.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Physicalanalysisunitsforthe PalisadesfirePRAcorrespondto FireAreasdefinedintheFire ProtectionProgram.Confirmatory walkdownnoteshavebeen documentedinAttachment3of report0247070005.02,Ref(2).

Creditforracewayfirebarriers, thermalwrapsorotherlocalized protectionfeatureshavenotbeen Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation creditedinidentifyingaphysical analysisunit.

PPB301 (Suggestion)

Ifspatialseparationiscreditedas apartitioningfeature,JUSTIFY thejudgmentthatspatial separationissufficientto substantiallycontainthe damagingeffectsofanyfirethat mightbepostulatedineachof thefirecompartmentscreatedas aresultofcreditingthisfeature.

Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotclearlydiscussthe creditforspatialseparation.

Therearetwoareasnoted thatdorelyonspatial separation:theSwitchyard andYardAreawhichare outdoorsandthushaveno ratedfirebarriers.F/O relatedtotheyardhasbeen documentedundera differentSRandmay addresstheconcernof spatialseparation.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report0247070005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtodiscussthe creditofspatialseparationin Section2.2.

Thephysicalanalysisunitsusedfor thefireriskassessmentcorrelate tofireareasusedfortheFire ProtectionProgram.Thisapproach allowedthefireriskassessmentto relyontheexistingprogrammatic controlsanddesignrequirements formaintainingtheintegrityofthe associatedphysicalanalysisunit boundaries.Basedonthe documentationprovidedinthe FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA),the boundariesforthesePAUshadfire withstandratingsconsistentwith therequirementsoftheFire ProtectionProgram.Thetestand maintenancerequirementsofthe FireProtectionProgramwere sufficienttosatisfytheboundary requirementsforthefirerisk assessment.

Inaddition,utilizationofthearea boundariesestablishedbytheFire Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation ProtectionProgramallowstheuse ofpreviouslygatheredequipment andcablelocationdataand facilitatestheverificationand controloftheboundaries.

Walkdownswereconductedto confirmthataccessibleboundaries ofeachphysicalanalysisunitwere ofsubstantialconstruction,and thatphysicalopeningsinthe barrierswerenoted.Physical analysisunitsforthePalisadesfire PRAcorrespondtoFireAreas definedintheFireProtection Program.Confirmatorywalkdown noteshavebeendocumentedin of0247070005.02.

Creditforracewayfirebarriers, thermalwrapsorotherlocalized protectionfeatureshavenotbeen creditedinidentifyingaphysical analysisunit.

Theswitchyardislocated approximatelyaquartermile outsideoftheprotectedareabut withintheOwnerControlledArea.

TheYardAreaisdefinedasall outsideareaswithintheprotected areafencing.

PPB401 (Suggestion)

DONOTCREDITracewayfire barriers,thermalwraps,fire retardantcoatings,radiant energyshields,oranyother localizedcableorequipment Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotdiscusscreditingof racewayfirebarriers.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report0247070005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtoreflectthat Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation protectionfeatureaspartitioning elementsindefiningphysical analysisunits.

racewaysfirebarriershavenot beencreditedinthefirePRA analysis.

Thephysicalanalysisunitsusedfor thefireriskassessmentcorrelate tofireareasusedfortheFire ProtectionProgram.Thisapproach allowedthefireriskassessmentto relyontheexistingprogrammatic controlsanddesignrequirements formaintainingtheintegrityofthe associatedphysicalanalysisunit boundaries.Basedonthe documentationprovidedinthe FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA),the boundariesforthesePAUshadfire withstandratingsconsistentwith therequirementsoftheFire ProtectionProgram.Thetestand maintenancerequirementsofthe FireProtectionProgramwere sufficienttosatisfytheboundary requirementsforthefirerisk assessment.

Inaddition,utilizationofthearea boundariesestablishedbytheFire ProtectionProgramallowstheuse ofpreviouslygatheredequipment andcablelocationdataand facilitatestheverificationand controloftheboundaries.

Walkdownswereconductedto confirmthataccessibleboundaries ofeachphysicalanalysisunitwere ofsubstantialconstruction,and March2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation thatphysicalopeningsinthe barrierswerenoted.

PPB501 (Suggestion)

DEFINEANDJUSTIFYthebasis andcriteriaappliedwhenactive firebarrierelements(suchas normallyopenfiredoors,water curtains,andfiredampers)are creditedinpartitioning.

Closed Report0247070005.02 doesnotdiscusscrediting activefirebarriers.

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Report0247070005.02,Ref(2),

hasbeenupdatedtodiscussthe creditofactivefirebarriers.

ThereportnotesthatthePhysical analysisunitsforthePalisadesfire PRAcorrespondtoFireAreas definedintheFireProtection Program.Additionally, confirmatorywalkdownnoteshave beendocumentedinAttachment3 of0247070005.02.Creditfor racewayfirebarriers,thermal wrapsorotherlocalizedprotection featureshavenotbeencreditedin identifyingaphysicalanalysisunit.

Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

PPB701 (Suggestion)

CONDUCTaconfirmatory walkdownoflocationswithinthe globalanalysisboundaryto confirmtheconditionsand characteristicsofcredited partitioningelements.

Closed Walkdownformsare referencedinreport0247 070005.02butwalkdown resultsarenotattachedor available.Aquestiononthis topicwassubmittedduring thePeerreviewandthe responsetothequestion clarifiedtheconcernoflack ofdocumentationforthe walkdowns.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Suggestionresolvedby documentationupdate.Noimpact toNFPA805analysis.

Walkdownswereconductedto confirmthataccessibleboundaries ofeachphysicalanalysisunitwere ofsubstantialconstruction,and thatphysicalopeningsinthe barrierswerenoted.These walkdownsaredocumentedin ofReport024707 0005.02,Ref(2).

Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.AlthoughlistedinTable416 asnotmetfromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

Thefindingwasverifiedclosedpriortothe LARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation PPC201 (Finding)

JUSTIFYtheexclusionofany locationswithinthelicensee controlledareathatarenot includedintheglobalanalysis boundarybydemonstratingthat theydonotsatisfytheselection criteriaasdefinedperPPA1.

Closed Itisnotentirelyclearhow someexcludedareaslisted inSection2.1.2.2ofReport 0247070005.02satisfythe exclusioncriteria,namely theServiceBuildingand Administrativebuilding.

Thesebuildingsappearto shareacommonboundary withtheAuxiliaryBuilding.

Forexample,wouldnota majorfireintheService buildingbedesignateda challengingfirerequiringa plantshutdown?Thereport statesthatfireswithinthe AdministrationBuilding, ServiceBuilding,andService BuildingAdditionwerenot expectedtopropagateto theincludedphysical analysisunits,causeaplant transient,orrequireplant shutdown.

Areexcludedbuildings permanentlyexcluded,or aretheyconsideredduring multicompartment evaluations?

Phase1 (met)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

ReportSection2.1.2.2ofReport 0247070005.02,Ref(2),hasbeen updatedtosatisfytheexclusion criteriaoftheServiceBuildingand AdministrativeBuilding.The buildingscommonboundarywith theAuxiliaryBuildinghasbeen detailedandthePAUsareretained forMCAanalysis.

Reviewoftheplantpartitioning(PP) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkcompletedandreviewedin August2010;Noadditionalpeerreviewin March2011.

PRMB1101 (Finding)

MODELalloperatoractionsand operatorinfluencesin accordancewiththeHRA elementofthisStandard.

Open Completework Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen,giventhatthe procedures,modificationdetail, operationsreview,anddetailed HRAmodeldevelopmentarenot yetcomplete.

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation Screeningvaluesarestillapplied forfireHEPspendingdevelopment offinalprocedures,modifications, andoperationsreviews.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

ThisHRArelatedfindingremainsopen.

PRMB301 (Finding)

IDENTIFYanynewinitiating eventsarisingfromthe considerationsoftheESandCS technicalelementsthatmight resultfromafireeventthatwere notincludedintheInternal EventsPRAincludingthose arisingfromtheconsiderationof spuriousactuation.

Closed Thefaulttreemodel developmentomittedthe DCpowerdependency requirementfortheRCP breakertripfunction.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

Thefaulttreemodelappliedtothe firePRAwasupdatedtoinclude theDCpowerdependencyforthe primarycoolantpumpbreakertrip function.Thislogicwasaddedat modelgatesPCPSEALSSW20, PCPSEALSSW22,PCPSEALSSW 21,andPCPSEALSSW23foreach ofthefourprimarycoolantpumps.

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

PRMB302 (Finding)

IDENTIFYanynewinitiating eventsarisingfromthe considerationsoftheESandCS technicalelementsthatmight resultfromafireeventthatwere notincludedintheInternal EventsPRAincludingthose Closed SpuriousSIisnotincluded asapotentialinitiating event Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

AcompletereviewofSafety InjectionSignal(SIS),Containment HighPressure(CHP),Containment ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation arisingfromtheconsiderationof spuriousactuation.

HighRadiation(CHR),Containment IsolationSignal(CIS)and RecirculationActuationSignal (RAS)logicwasperformedto identifypotentialadverse componentactuationsthatcould occurduetoaspurioussignalfrom anyofthesesources.

Logicwasaddedfor45PRA componentstoconsiderspurious operationfromanyofthe automaticactuationcircuits.

Report0247070005.04,Ref(4),

Section5.71wasupdatedtoreflect thesechanges.

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

PRMB501 (Finding)

Forthosefireinducedinitiating eventsincludedintheInternal EventsPRAmodel,REVIEWthe correspondingaccidentsequence modelsand (a)IDENTIFYanyexistingaccident sequencesthatwillrequire modificationbasedonunique aspectsoftheplantfireresponse proceduresinaccordancewith HLRASAandHLRASBofPart2 andtheirsupporting requirements And (b)IDENTIFYanynewaccident sequencesthatmightresultfrom afireeventthatwerenot includedintheInternalEvents PRAinaccordancewithHLRASA Closed TheMSOexpertpanel issueshavenotbeen completelyresolvedand incorporatedintothePRA model.Thus,allmodeling workassociatedwithMSO incorporationhasnotbeen doneatthistime.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

AllMSOexpertpanelissueshave beenresolvedandintegratedinto thefinalPRAfiremodelas appropriate.AllMSOscenario dispositionsaredocumentedinthe finalMSOreport0247070005.04, Ref(4).

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation andHLRASBofPart2andtheir supportingrequirements.

PRMB901 (Finding)

Foranycaseswherenewsystem modelsorsplitfractionsare needed,orexistingmodelsor splitfractionsneedtobe modifiedtoincludefireinduced equipmentfailures,firespecific operatoractions,and/orspurious actuations,PERFORMthe systemsanalysisportionofthe FirePRAmodelinaccordance withHLRSYAandHLRSYBand theirSRsinPart2withthe followingclarifications,and DEVELOPadefinedbasisto supporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyofthese requirementsinPart2:

AlltheSRsunderHLRSYAand HLRSYBinPart2aretobe addressedinthecontextoffire scenariosincludingeffectson systemoperability/functionality accountingforfiredamageto equipmentandassociated cabling.

Closed FailuretotripPressurizer heatersisnotexplicitly addressed Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation andmodelupdate.Noimpactto NFPA805analysis.

FaulttreePZRSPURHTRFT(45) wasaddedtothefirePRAto modelspuriousoperationof pressurizerheatersandfailureof pressurizerspray.Failureofthis faulttreeresultsinapotential stuckopenpressurizersafety valve,orvalves.

Section5.45ofreport024707 0005.04,MultipleSpurious OperationReport,Ref(4),was updatedtoreflectthischange.

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponse model(PRM)technicalelementwasmostly completeduringthePhase1review.A limitedreviewwasconductedduringthe Final.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwas reviewedwithveryfewfindings.There werenotechnicalF&Osonthescopeor contentofthePRMmodelitself.TheF&Os assignedtoPRMwereeithera)cross referencedfromothertasks[HRAandES]

orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

Thefindingwasnotfullyresolvedforthe FinalPeerreview,butwassubsequently closedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

QLSB201 (Finding)

DOCUMENTthedispositionof eachphysicalanalysisunit definedbytheplantpartitioning analysisaseither"screenedout" or"retainedforquantitative analysis"andinamannerthat Closed SeePPC201.

Phase1 (reviewed not applicable)

Final (met)

Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section2.1.2.2ofReport024707 0005.02,Ref(2),hasbeenupdated tosatisfytheexclusioncriteriaof Reviewofthequalitativescreening(QLS) elementwascompletedduringthePhase2 Peerreview.Fromthefinalreport:

Technicalworkwascompletedand reviewedinAugust2010;Noadditional reviewinMarch2011.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation facilitatesFirePRAapplications, upgrades,andPeerreview.

theServiceBuildingand AdministrativeBuilding.The buildingscommonboundarywith theAuxiliaryBuildinghasbeen detailedandthePAUsareretained forMCAanalysis.

SFA101 (Finding)

Forthosephysicalanalysisunits withintheFirePRAglobal analysisboundary, (a)LOOKforfireignitionsource scenariosthatmightariseasthe resultofanearthquakethat wouldbeuniquefromthose postulatedduringthegeneral analysisofeachphysicalanalysis

unit, and (b)PROVIDEaqualitative assessmentofthepotentialrisk significanceofanyuniquefire ignitionsourcescenarios identified Open Thecurrentseismicfire interactionsanalysisrelies ontheIPEEEstudy.The reportneedsto demonstratethatthescope ofthatworkmeetsthe objectivesoftheStandard andthatplantchangessince theworkwasperformeddo notcompromisethe conclusions.

Phase1 (reviewed notmet)

Final (notmet)

Findingopen.NoimpacttoNFPA 805quantifiedresults.

Report0247070005.05,Seismic FireInteraction,Ref(5),evaluates Palisadeswithrespectto NUREG/CR6850Task13,Seismic FireInteractionsAssessment..

Theseismicfireinteractions analysishasnotbeenupdated.

However,sincetheStandardonly requiresaqualitativeanalysis, thereisnoimpactonthe quantifiedresultsinfirePRA model.

Reviewoftheseismicfire(SF)elementwas completedduringthePhase1Peerreview.

Fromthefinalreport:

CompletedinJanuary2010andnotre reviewedinAugust2010orMarch2011.

Thisfindingremainsopen,butthishasno impactonthequantifiedresults.

UNCA101 (Finding)

PERFORMtheuncertainty analysisinaccordancewithHLR QUEanditsSRsinPart2aswell asSRsLEF2andLEF3under HLRLEFinPart2andDEVELOPa definedbasistosupportthe claimofnonapplicabilityofany oftherequirementsunderthese sectionsinPart2.

Closed Onlyalimitednumberof parameterandmodeling uncertaintiesandassociated assumptionshavebeen identified.Thelistis incompleteandnotdefined insufficientdetailto supportareasonable characterizationor evaluation.Uncertainties havebeenpropagated Phase1/

Phase2 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet) 1 Findingresolvedbydocumentation update.NoimpacttoNFPA805 analysis.

Section7.1ofthefirerisk summaryreport,0247070005.01, Ref(1),wasrevisedtoinclude additionaldiscussionand evaluationofthestateof knowledgecorrelationandthe impactofuncertaintyassociated withseverityfactorsandnon Theuncertaintyandsensitivitysupporting requirementswerenotreviewedduring thePhase1andPhase2Peerreviewsas themodelprogresswasnotsufficiently complete.Thisfindingwasidentified duringtheFinalPeerreview,butwas subsequentlyaddressedpriortotheLAR submittal.

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation throughaMonteCarlo approach.However, correlationofstateof knowledgeuncertaintieshas notbeenaddressed,i.e.all initiatorshavebeentreated asindependentvariables, SeverityFactor(SF)andNon SuppressionProbabilities (NSP)andspurious actuationprobabilitiesare notcorrelated.

(Uncertaintiescarriedover fromtheinternalevents analysisarecorrelated).This approachhasledto unrealisticallynarrow predictionsofCDFandLERF distributions(errorfactorof 2)andthepotential underestimationofthe meanvaluesforscenarios whicharequantifiedbased ontheproductoflike distributions(e.g.multiple spuriousactuation probabilities).

suppressionprobability.The discussionindicatedthatthe distributionsmightbemorebroad ifamoredetailedparametric uncertaintyassessmentweretobe performed.

UNCA201 (Finding)

INCLUDEthetreatmentof uncertainties,includingtheir documentation,ascalledoutin SRsPRMA4,FQF1,IGNA10, IGNB5,FSSE3,FSSE4,FSSH5, FSSH9,andCFA2andthat requiredbyperformingPart2 referencedrequirements Open Theuncertaintyintervals assignedtoFireIEs,Severity FactorsandNon SuppressionProbabilities arenotbasedonacceptable systematicmethods.

1)Uncertaintydistributions forfireIEshavebeen Phase1/

Phase2 (not reviewed)

Final (notmet)

Findingopenastheapproachfor performingtheparametric uncertaintyevaluationhasnotyet beenupdated.

NoimpacttoNFPA805analysisas theresultsarebasedonthepoint estimatevalueswhich Theuncertaintyandsensitivitysupporting requirementswerenotreviewedduring thePhase1andPhase2Peerreviewsas themodelprogresswasnotsufficiently complete.Thisfindingwasidentified duringtheFinalPeerreview,butas indicatedthisdoesnotimpactthepoint estimatevaluesusedintheNFPA805

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Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation throughoutthisStandard.

assignedthesameerror factorof10ratherthan usingposteriordistributions fromBayesianupdate 2)SFdistributionshave beenassignedwithoutan underlyingbasis.

3)NSPuncertainty distributionhasbeen derivedonthebasisof NUREG/CR1278.This providesguidanceonHEP uncertaintyassessment.

However,NSPtermsarean outputofacombinationof firegrowthandsuppression modelingandguidancein NUREG/CR1278has thereforelittlerelevance.A validapproachwouldbeto addresstheuncertaintiesin damagetimesin combinationwith uncertaintiesinsuppression probabilitiesbasedon specificcontributingfactors.

4)Uncertaintiesassociated withspuriousactuation probabilitieshavebeen characterizedaccordingtoa setofrulesdefinedfor severityfactors.Inthiscase spuriousactuation probabilitieswithafailure probabilityof>0.25are assignedanerrorfactorof approximatethemeanvalues.The parametricuncertaintyanalysisis presentedinSection7.1ofthefire risksummaryreport,024707 0005.01,Ref(1).Theissues identifiedhavenotbeenfully addressed,butthisprimarily impactsthepotentialrangeofthe uncertaintydistributionanddoes nothaveasignificantimpacton themeanvalue;andhasnoimpact onthepointestimatemeanvalues usedintheanalysis.

analysis.

Thisfindingremainsopen.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 2: Supplemental Information to Table V-1 Page 63 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryII Text)

Status 2

FindingorSuggestion SRInitial Peer Review Status SR Subsequent Peer Review Status Disposition SupplementalInformation 1.0.IncontrastNUREG/CR 6850recommenduseofa uniformdistributionwith thefollowinglimits Cableswith15orless conductors:+20%

Cableswithmorethan15 conductors:+50%

Alternativelythevalues includedintables101to 105NUREG/CR6850could beusedwherelimitsappear tobewider.ThePalisades analysishasnotaccounted forlargeruncertainties associatedwithcableswith

>15conductors.

1)ThesupportingrequirementwascategorizedasnotmetatcompletionoftheFinalPeerreviewconductedduringtheweekofMarch21,2011.Thesupportingrequirementwassubsequentlyaddressedand categorizedasmet/closed(perthedispositiondiscussion),priortotheLARsubmittalinDecember2012.

2)StatusClosedimpliesF&OdispositionissufficienttomeetCategoryII.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 3: Supporting Requirements with Status of Not Reviewed Page 64 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryIIText)

Status PeerReviewBasisforAssessment Disposition PRMA3 CONSTRUCTtheFirePRAplantresponsemodelso thatitiscapableofdeterminingthesignificant contributorstothefireinducedriskwith42.7.12.

Not Reviewed ThisSRisnotreviewedbecausethesequence infrastructuretoprovidethiscapabilityisnot availableatthistime.Thecapabilityto calculateriskimportanceinasinglescenariois availableatthepresenttime.Theinternal eventsPRAprovidesanacceptablemethodfor developmentofriskimportance.Palisadesuses SAPHIREforquantification,whichclaimstobe abletointegrateallfirescenariosintoaglobal coredamageequationandcalculateglobal importanceusingreplacementeventsforbasic eventsthathavedifferentprobabilitiesin differentrooms.Palisadesclaimsthishasbeen doneininternalflooding,whichhasthesame multipleeventquantificationchallenges.Ifthis methodissuccessful,Palisadeswouldbean industryleadingplantinthedevelopmentof globalimportance.

ThissupportingrequirementismeanttorefertotheFireRiskQuantification supportingrequirementsinSection42.12(asthereisnoSection42.7.12in thePRAstandard).SincetheFireRiskQuantificationSRswerefully reviewedduringthePhase2andFinalPeerreviews,thePRMA3supporting requirementwasimplicitlyreviewedduringthatprocessasthemodelhad tobeconstructedtodeterminethesignificantcontributorstoperformthe FQreview.ForthefinalPeerreview,FRANCwasusedtoquantifythe PalisadesFirePRA.FRANCprovidesCCDPandCLERPresultsonafire scenariobasisand,whencombinedwiththescenariofirefrequencies, calculatesanddisplaysCDFandLERF.Theseresultswerepresentedtothe firePRApeerreviewteamintheinitialissueofthecompletedFireRiskand QuantificationSummaryReport,0247070005.01(Rev.0[17],March2011).

Additionally,thedispositionsforthefindingsoftheFQelementinTable2 areapplicabletoPRMA3.

Thefireriskquantification(FQ)elementwasreviewedindetailinboththe Phase2andFinalPeerreviews.

WithrespecttotheFQelementtheFinalreportstates:

Overallprocessisconsistentwithprevailinggoodpractices.Resultsarenot finalandthuscertainSRscannotbedemonstratedtohavebeenmet.

Continuingtherefinementinprocessandplannedprovidesconfidencethis technicalelementwillmeettheStandard.

PRMB2 VERIFYthepeerreviewexceptionsanddeficiencies fortheInternalEventsPRAaredispositioned,and thedispositiondoesnotadverselyaffectthe developmentoftheFirePRAplantresponsemodel.

Not Reviewed NotcompletedyetbecausethefinalInternal EventsPRAPeerReviewhasnotbeenprovided toPalisades ThefirePeerreviewteamdidnotformallyreviewtheresolutionofthefull powerinternaleventsfindingsandobservations.Theresolutionsare discussedinAttachmentUoftheLARandtheirimpactsonthefirePRAare noted.NoneoftheopenitemsimpacttheNFPA805submittal.

Thefullpowerinternalevents(FPIE)peerreviewreport,datedMarch12, 2010wasreceivedbetweenthePhase1andPhase2firePRApeerreviews.

ResolutionoffindingsfromthisreportwereinprogressduringthePhase2 andFinalfirepeerreviews.

Withrespecttotheinternaleventsmodel,theFinalreportstates:

TheFirePRAandInternalEventsPRAusethesamemodel,thusthefidelity betweenthetwoisgood.TheinternaleventsPRAunderwentaRG1.200 peerreviewinOctober2009.TheF&Oshavebeenformallyaddressedand incorporatedintotheFirePRAmodel.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Table 3: Supporting Requirements with Status of Not Reviewed Page 65 of 79 SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryIIText)

Status PeerReviewBasisforAssessment Disposition PRMB4 MODELanynewinitiatingeventsidentifiedperSR PRMB2inaccordancewithHLRIEA,HLRIEB,and HLRIECandtheirSRsinPart2withthefollowing clarifications:

(a)AllSRsunderHLRIEAandHLRIEB,andSRsIE C4,IEC6,IEC7,IEC8,IEC9,andIEC12inPart2are tobeaddressedinthecontextofafireinducingthe initiatingeventsexcludinginitiatingeventsthat cannotbeinducedbyafire and (b)DEVELOPadefinedbasistosupporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyoftheserequirementsinPart 2.

Not Reviewed Nonewinitiatingeventswereidentified,so thisSRwasnotrequired.However,PRMB3 indicatesspuriousSIshouldbeconsidered,so thattheSRmustbecompleted.

Asstatedinthepeerreviewassessment,nonewinitiatingeventswere identifiedsothisSRwasnotrequired.

TwofindingswerenotedinthePRMB3SRandwereclosedasdescribedin Table2above.

ReviewofthefirePRAplantresponsemodel(PRM)technicalelementwas mostlycompleteduringthePhase1review.Alimitedreviewwas conductedduringtheFinal.

FromtheFinalPeerreviewsummary:

TheFirePRAplantresponsemodelwasreviewedwithveryfewfindings.

TherewerenotechnicalF&OsonthescopeorcontentofthePRMmodel itself.TheF&OsassignedtoPRMwereeithera)crossreferencedfromother tasks[HRAandES]orb)wereforincompletedocumentation.

ThePRMB3findingswerenotfullyresolvedfortheFinalPeerreview,but weresubsequentlyclosedpriortotheLARsubmittal.

PRMB14 IDENTIFYanynewaccidentprogressionsbeyondthe onsetofcoredamagethatwouldbeapplicableto theFirePRAthatwerenotaddressedforLERF estimationintheInternalEventsPRA.

Not Reviewed LERFanalysisdidnotlookforanyLERF phenomenaapplicabletothefirePRAwhich werenotincludedintheinternaleventsPRA.

F&Owasnotwritten.Thereviewersarenot awareofanyFirePRAwhichlookedfor beyondinternalevents"LERFphenomena.

TherearenoopenF&OsassociatedwiththeLERFelementfromtheinternal eventsPRA.NonewLERFphenomenawereidentifiedforthePalisadesfire PRA.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 66 of 79 References for Question 1 Response

1)

Report 0247-07-0005.01 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Risk Quantification and Summary.

2)

Report 0247-07-0005.02 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Plant Partitioning and Fire Ignition Frequency Development.

3)

Report 0247-07-0005.03 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model Development Report.

4)

Report 0247-07-0005.04 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Multiple Spurious Operations Report.

5)

Report 0247-07-0005.05 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Seismic/Fire Interaction Report.

6)

Report 0247-07-0005.06 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Scenario Development Report.

7)

Report 0247-07-0005.07 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Multi-Compartment Analysis.

8)

Report 0247-07-0005.08 Rev. 1, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Exposed Structural Steel Analysis.

9)

EA-APR-95-004 Rev. 5, 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Associated Circuits Analysis for Common Power Supply and Common Enclosure.

10)

PLP-RPT-12-00134 Rev. 0, Validation of Appendix R Non-Safe Shutdown Cable Routing to Support the Fire PRA.

11)

Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-ETSC Rev. 3, Event Trees and Success Criteria.

12)

EA-PSA-FPIE-FIRE-12-04 Rev. 0, Palisades Full Power Internal Events and Fire Model.

13)

Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-HR Rev. 4, Human Reliability Analysis Notebook Volume 1 (Post Initiator Operator Actions).

14)

Palisades Probabilistic Safety Assessment Notebook NB-PSA-CC Rev. 1, PSA Model Configuration Control.

15)

ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS RA-S-2008 Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, 2009.

16)

SCIENTECH report 17825-1, Palisades Fire PRA Peer Review to Requirements in Part 4 of the ASME/ANS Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessments for Nuclear Power Plant Applications.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 67 of 79

17)

Report 0247-07-0005.01 Rev. 0, Palisades Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Fire Risk Quantification and Summary.

NRC Request

2. There is no indication which Supporting Requirements were ranked below Capability Category II by the Peer Review Team (i.e., no Table V-2,) provide Table V-2.

ENO Response

2. Table V-2 is provided below:

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 68 of 79 Table V-2 Fire PRA - Category I Summary SR Topic(ASMEStandardCategoryIIText)

Status 1

FindingorSuggestion Disposition HRAA3 Foreachfirescenario,IDENTIFYanynew,undesired operatoractionthatcouldresultfromspurious indicationsresultingfromfailureofasingleinstrument, perSRESC2(e.g.,duetoverbatimcompliancewiththe instructioninanalarmresponseprocedure,when separateconfirmationisnotavailableorrequired).

Closed Section6.3oftheHRANotebookdiscussesthe reviewthatwasperformedwiththelicensed operatorsfortheidentificationofthenew, undesiredoperatoractionsinresponseto spuriousindications.However,thedetailed documentationfortheevaluationprocessand thejustificationsfortheconclusionthatno undesiredoperatoractionswillbetakenin theseinstrumentationfailureconditionswas notyetcompletedforthereviewerstoconfirm theconclusionthatnoundesiredoperator actionsneedtobeconsidered.

Findingresolvedbydocumentationandmodelupdate.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysis.

AsimulatorexercisewasperformedwithcurrentPalisadeslicenseholders inwhichseveralscenarioswereevaluatedtodeterminehowOperators wouldrespondgivenspuriousorfalseinstrumentindications.Theresultsof theseexerciseswereconsideredintheHFEdevelopmentprocess.The processandevaluationresultsaredocumentedinthePalisadesProbabilistic SafetyAssessmentNotebookNBPSAHR,HumanReliabilityAnalysis NotebookVolume1(PostInitiatorOperatorActions),Rev.4.

HRAB4 INCLUDEHFEsforcaseswherefireinduced instrumentationfailureofanysingleinstrumentcould causeundesiredoperatoraction,consistentwithHLR ESCofthisPartandinaccordancewithHLRHRFand itsSRsinPart2 and DEVELOPadefinedbasistosupporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyoftherequirementsunderHLR HRF Part2.

Closed SameasHRAA301.ThisSRwasassignedCCI basedontherelatedfindingHRAA301.

Findingresolvedbydocumentationandmodelupdate.NoimpacttoNFPA 805analysis.

AsimulatorexercisewasperformedwithcurrentPalisadeslicenseholders inwhichseveralscenarioswereevaluatedtodeterminehowOperators wouldrespondgivenspuriousorfalseinstrumentindications.Theresultsof theseexerciseswereconsideredintheHFEdevelopmentprocess.The processandevaluationresultsaredocumentedinthePalisadesProbabilistic SafetyAssessmentNotebookNBPSAHR,HumanReliabilityAnalysis NotebookVolume1(PostInitiatorOperatorActions),Rev.4.

HRAC1 Foreachselectedfirescenario,QUANTIFYtheHEPsfor allHFEsandACCOUNTFORrelevantfirerelatedeffects usingdetailedanalysesforsignificantHFEsand conservativeestimates(e.g.,screeningvalues)for nonsignificantHFEs,inaccordancewiththeSRsforHLR HRGinPart2setforthunderatleastCapability CategoryII,withthefollowingclarification:

(a)Attentionistobegiventohowthefiresituation altersanypreviousassessmentsinnonfireanalysesas totheinfluencingfactorsandthetimingconsiderations coveredinSRsHRG3,HRG4,andHRG5inPart2And (b)DEVELOPadefinedbasistosupporttheclaimof nonapplicabilityofanyoftherequirementsunderHLR HRGinPart2.

Open FireresponseHFEsmodeledwithscreening valueshavenotyetbeenevaluatedina manneraccountingforrelevantPSFs(e.g.,ACP DGOTB5BDG,FPSPMOESTARTL,ACP PMOE38311A,ACPPMOE38312A,etc.).

Also,HRACalculatorevaluationsheetcannot belocatedforPCPPMOFP50XLOCandEDG PMOEPORTPUMP,andAFWAVOACV2010 D,SWSAVOACV082326,andSWSAVOBCV 082447Mstillneedtobemodifiedforfire relatedconditions.Thistaskisnotcompleted.

Findingopen,giventhattheprocedures,modificationdetail,operations review,anddetailedHRAmodeldevelopmentarenotyetcomplete.

SignificantHFEswereevaluatedanddevelopedinfurtherdetailas documentedinthePalisadesProbabilisticSafetyAssessmentNotebookNB PSAHR,HumanReliabilityAnalysisNotebookVolume1(PostInitiator OperatorActions),Rev.4.ScreeningvaluesarestillappliedforfireHEPs pendingdevelopmentoffinalprocedures,modifications,andoperations reviews.

1)

StatusClosedimpliesF&OdispositionissufficienttomeetCategoryII.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 69 of 79 NRC Request

3. Individual VFDRs and the associated disposition are documented for each fire area in LAR Attachment C. However, the dispositions of the VFDRs in Attachment C state no modifications are required and the fire area Risk Summary in Attachment C contains the following generic statement: There were no additional modifications identified that are specific to a given VFDR resolution in this fire area. However, LAR Attachment S, Table S-2, contains modifications that are described as resolving VFDRs. Clarify the discrepancy in Attachment S wherein certain modifications are identified as resolving VFDRs and Attachment C where no VFDRs are identified as being resolved by modifications.

ENO Response

3. Based on plant knowledge and risk analysis insights, it was decided to identify and evaluate modifications for overall plant fire risk reduction, prior to an evaluation of specific variances from deterministic requirements (VFDRs). These plant modifications were developed independently of whether or not specific VFDRs may or may not have been resolved. Modifications identified with this approach, in combination with modifications identified to resolve code-compliance issues, lowered overall plant fire risk and eliminated the need for any additional modifications to be postulated to address specific VFDRs during the fire risk evaluation process.

In the Palisades LAR, Attachment C was meant to communicate that no additional modifications were required - beyond the set of modifications identified in Attachment S - to address any residual risk from any given VFDR.

Attachment S indicated whether a modification explicitly modeled in the PRA resolved any VFDRs, but did not identify the specific VFDRs resolved or distinguish between partial and full resolution. Attachment S therefore designated modifications that partially resolve VFDRs as modifications required for compliance. Modifications that partially resolve VFDRs are considered required (necessary) but not alone sufficient for compliance.

The tables below provide the correlation of each modification to specific VFDRs resolved, either partially or fully. The first column, Item, contains a modification identifier corresponding to the modification identifier in Attachment S. The second column contains the set of VFDRs by fire area (if any) that are fully or partially resolved by the modification. The third column contains additional clarifying comments.

As discussed above, not all modifications were designed to resolve VFDRs:

some were designed for overall plant fire risk reduction (and intentionally, risk

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 70 of 79 reduction with respect to other hazards), while others were purely code-compliance type modifications. Likewise, not all VFDRs are fully or partially resolved by a modification.

The residual risk of all VFDRs not resolved fully by modification has been evaluated as acceptable, either with our without credit for recovery actions, as indicated in the Palisades LAR, Attachments G and W.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 71 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-1: Plant Modifications Completed Item VFDRs Resolved /

  • Partially Resolved Comments S1-1 None Completed modification resolved an Appendix R non-compliance issue.

S1-2 None Completed modification resolved an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S1-3 FA-01:

VFDR-0231/ENP-1270*

FA-02:

VFDR-0232/ENP-1269*

FA-04:

VFDR-0177/ENP-1177*

FA-09:

VFDR-0091/ENP-1348*

FA-23:

VFDR-0218/ENP-1195*

Completed modification resolved an Appendix R non-compliance issue.

Modification does not eliminate need for ex-primary control station actions to align fire protection pumps for long term AFW supply.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification. Modification ensures survivability of fire pump such that ex-primary control station action remains feasible.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 72 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

  • Partially Resolved Comments S2-1 None Modification provides overall plant risk reduction for combinations of failures of recovery actions, fire-induced failures and random failures in secondary side decay heat removal.

S2-2 FA-03:

VFDR-0146/ENP-1092*

VFDR-0343/ENP-1408*

FA-04:

VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-3 FA-03:

VFDR-0146/ENP-1092*

VFDR-0343/ENP-1408*

FA-04:

VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-4 FA-01:

VFDR-0323/ENP-1387 FA-02:

VFDR-0330/ENP-1394 FA-03:

VFDR-0134/ENP-1078 Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

S2-5 FA-01:

VFDR-0086/ENP-1051 FA-02:

VFDR-0055/ENP-1007 FA-03:

VFDR-0154/ENP-1100 FA-04:

VFDR-0188/ENP-1128 FA-06:

VFDR-0364/ENP-1470 FA-13:

VFDR-0362/ENP-1467 FA-14:

VFDR-0247/ENP-1210 FA-21:

VFDR-0363/ENP-1468 FA-23:

VFDR-0216/ENP-1193 Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

S2-6 FA-03:

VFDR-0128/ENP-1071*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for AFW pump operation.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 73 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

  • Partially Resolved Comments FA-04:

VFDR-0166/ENP-1138*

FA-13:

VFDR-0266/ENP-1256*

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-7 FA-13:

VFDR-0272/ENP-1262*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to align and support HPSI pump operation for inventory control.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-8 None Modification ensures additional time margin is available for ventilation alignment for EDG room cooling.

S2-9 FA-04:

VFDR-0350/ENP-1417*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions for EDG alignment to safety-related 2400 VAC buses.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-10 FA-01:

VFDR-0231/ENP-1270 VFDR-0307/ENP-1351 FA-02:

VFDR-0232/ENP-1269 VFDR-0308/ENP-1352 FA-03:

VFDR-0151/ENP-1097 FA-04:

VFDR-0177/ENP-1177 VFDR-0309/ENP-1353 FA-05:

VFDR-0097/ENP-1107 FA-06:

VFDR-0108/ENP-1150 FA-07:

VFDR-0189/ENP-1154 FA-08:

VFDR-0191/ENP-1156 FA-09:

VFDR-0091/ENP-1348 FA-10:

FA-22:

VFDR-0197/ENP-1184 FA-23:

VFDR-0218/ENP-1195 VFDR-0306/ENP-1350 FA-24:

VFDR-0202/ENP-1199 FA-25:

VFDR-0208/ENP-1236 FA-26:

VFDR-0234/ENP-1205 FA-27:

VFDR-0195/ENP-1203 FA-28:

VFDR-0235/ENP-1208 FA-29:

VFDR-0275/ENP-1220 FA-30:

VFDR-0276/ENP-1221 FA-31:

VFDR-0278/ENP-1223 FA-32:

Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 74 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

  • Partially Resolved Comments VFDR-0209/ENP-1160 FA-11:

VFDR-0290/ENP-1271 FA-12:

VFDR-0292/ENP-1272 FA-13:

VFDR-0263/ENP-1253 FA-14:

VFDR-0243/ENP-1212 FA-15:

VFDR-0221/ENP-1161 FA-16:

VFDR-0212/ENP-1171 FA-17:

VFDR-0112/ENP-1158 FA-18:

VFDR-0116/ENP-1174 FA-19:

VFDR-0211/ENP-1175 FA-21:

VFDR-0118/ENP-1178 VFDR-0125/ENP-1266 FA-33:

VFDR-0200/ENP-1267 FA-34:

VFDR-0282/ENP-1227 FA-35:

VFDR-0284/ENP-1229 FA-36:

VFDR-0285/ENP-1230 FA-38:

VFDR-0286/ENP-1231 FA-39:

VFDR-0287/ENP-1232 FA-40:

VFDR-0288/ENP-1233 FA-41:

VFDR-0289/ENP-1234 FA-56:

VFDR-0359/ENP-1469 S2-11 FA-01:

VFDR-0088/ENP-1054*

FA-02:

VFDR-0058/ENP-1010*

FA-03:

VFDR-0143/ENP-1089 VFDR-0144/ENP-1090*

VFDR-0361/ENP-1464*

FA-04:

VFDR-0180/ENP-1120 FA-05:

VFDR-0101/ENP-1111 FA-06:

VFDR-0109/ENP-1151*

FA-13:

VFDR-0257/ENP-1247 FA-16:

VFDR-0026/ENP-0975*

FA-21:

VFDR-0193/ENP-1268*

Modification fully resolves the VFDRs that involve charging pump spurious actuation / loss of control only (i.e., those without asterisks).

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to eliminate spurious charging pump operation and support inventory control.

Therefore, only some VFDRs (those without asterisk) are fully resolved by this modification.

Since the modification partially resolves the VFDRs indicated with asterisk and fully resolves VFDRs without asterisks it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-12 None Modification provides overall plant risk reduction by supporting steam generator depressurization to provide alternate means of secondary side decay heat removal.

S2-13 FA-13:

VFDR-0272/ENP-1262*

Modification addresses some but not all conditions that require ex-primary control station actions to align and support HPSI pump operation for inventory control.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 75 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

  • Partially Resolved Comments However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDR it is considered a modification required for compliance.

S2-14 None Modification provides overall plant risk reduction by preventing spurious isolation of CCW to containment due to fire-induced valve-related cable faults.

S2-15 FA-01:

VFDR-0322/ENP-1386 FA-02:

VFDR-0329/ENP-1393 FA-03:

VFDR-0156/ENP-1102 FA-04:

VFDR-0176/ENP-1116 FA-14:

VFDR-0248/ENP-1211 FA-26:

VFDR-0241/ENP-1207 FA-34:

VFDR-0280/ENP-1225 Modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

S2-16 None Modification increases availability of a Non-Power Operation credited component under certain conditions.

S2-17 None Modification increases availability of a Non-Power Operation credited component under certain conditions.

S2-18 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-19 None Modification extends operation of EC-150 panel under certain conditions.

S2-20 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-21 FA-01:

VFDR-0077/ENP-1044*

FA-02:

VFDR-0042/ENP-0994*

FA-03:

VFDR-0140/ENP-1086*

FA-04:

VFDR-0165/ENP-1137*

FA-06:

VFDR-0104/ENP-1146*

FA-11:

VFDR-0006/ENP-0951*

FA-15:

VFDR-0224/ENP-1164*

FA-21:

VFDR-0122/ENP-1182*

Modification does not eliminate need for ex-primary control station actions to align charging suction from the SIRWT.

Therefore, no VFDRs are fully resolved by this modification. Modification ensures survivability of valve such that ex-primary control station action remains feasible.

However, since modification partially resolves the indicated VFDRs it is considered a modification required for compliance.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 76 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

  • Partially Resolved Comments S2-22 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-23 None Modifications prevent overall plant risk increase by ensuring electrical coordination remains consistent with PRA assumptions.

S2-24 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-25 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-26 FA-01:

VFDR-0070/ENP-1037 VFDR-0071/ENP-1038 FA-02:

VFDR-0050/ENP-1002 VFDR-0051/ENP-1003 FA-05:

VFDR-0095/ENP-1105 FA-11:

VFDR-0008/ENP-0954 FA-12:

VFDR-0012/ENP-0962 FA-21:

VFDR-0360/ENP-1463 Modification resolves VFDRs that exist during cross-train charger alignment only. Cross-train alignment is not the standard alignment modeled in the PRA.

S2-27 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-28 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-29 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-30 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-31 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-32 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-33 None Modification eliminates 3-phase proper polarity hot short potential for FOGG valves.

S2-34 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-35 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-36 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 77 of 79 Additional Information for Table S-2: Plant Modifications Committed Item VFDRs Resolved /

  • Partially Resolved Comments S2-37 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-38 FA-32:

VFDR-0123/ENP-1264 VFDR-0124/ENP-1265 Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue, and in addition modification fully resolves the indicated VFDRs.

S2-39 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-40 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-41 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

S2-42 None Modification resolves an NFPA code non-compliance issue.

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 78 of 79 NRC Request

4. LAR Attachment F describes the process for evaluating MSOs at Palisades, including use of the expert panel approach per FAQ 07-0038, Revision 3. In the Results of Step 1 section, generic industry sources of information used for both MSO reviews are cited but no plant-specific sources are cited. Describe how plant-specific insights were used to identify and evaluate MSOs at Palisades.

ENO Response

4. Experienced, multi-disciplined expert panel review teams at Palisades utilized the following types of plant-specific knowledge bases to postulate possible fire damage scenarios and brainstorm possible plant consequences involving multiple spurious operations:

first-hand operating experience, typical and off-normal equipment performance, original and as-modified plant design, actual and potential plant consequences resulting from upset conditions, thermal-hydraulic/neutronic licensing basis safety analysis, boundary conditions and assumptions, and integrated plant and operator response experience.

The expert panel included personnel with extensive Palisades-specific expertise in:

Operations, Fire Fighting (Fire Marshall),

Design Engineering, Electrical Engineering, System Engineering, Safe Shutdown Analysis, Circuit Analysis, Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis, Neutronics Analysis, and Probabilistic Risk Assessment The expert panel and/or multiple spurious operation (MSO) development teams included many of the same plant individuals that developed detailed logic models, containment analysis, and source term modeling supporting historic licensing basis activities, such as a 1982 SEP issue. The expert panel and/or MSO development teams also included individuals responsible for several areas

ATTACHMENT 1 Response to Clarification Request License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactors Page 79 of 79 of the FSAR Chapter 14 licensing analysis and basis, Appendix R, and Fire Protection safety reviews.

Plant specific data sources included:

piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs),

electrical single line and circuit drawings, training documents, internal and external events PRA models and insights, safe shutdown equipment list, safe shutdown logic diagrams, post-fire safe shutdown analysis (SSA),

plant operating procedures (normal, emergency, post-fire and abnormal operating procedures),

self-assessment results, operating experience, and walk-down notes and pictures.

These information sources provided insights that were used in conjunction with the expertise of the team and generic industry information sources to identify potential MSO scenarios of concern for Palisades. Plant-specific and generic industry information sources are explicitly referenced in Report #: 0247 0005.04, Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) Report, which was authored by plant personnel.

The effort to identify and evaluate potential MSOs did not end with the conclusion of the expert panel. NFPA 805 project staff continually evolved and refined the MSO work during NFPA 805 model development and analysis. The expert panel was re-convened at the conclusion of the work to ensure concurrence with any new MSOs, insights and evaluations, as documented in Report #: 0247 0005.04.

This report was then used to identify component MSO failure combinations to be included in the safe shutdown analysis to develop VFDRs and ensure the nuclear safety capability assessment also identified these MSO conditions. The results of this work are outlined in PLP-RPT-12-00110, Multiple Spurious Operation (MSO) Identification and Evaluation.

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