CNS-15-018, License Amendment Request (LAR) to Adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Plants, 120-Day Response to NRC RAI: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Kelvin Henderson EERYDUKE ENERGY.
{{#Wiki_filter:}}
Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station Duke Energy CN01VP 1 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745 CNS-1 5-018                                                                          o:.803.701.4251 f: 803.701.3221 February 27, 2015                                                        10 CFR 50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
 
==Subject:==
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Numbers 50-413 and 50-414 License Amendment Request (LAR) to Adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Plants 120-Day Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI)
(TAC Nos. MF2936 and MF2937)
 
==References:==
: 1. Letter from Duke Energy to the NRC, "License Amendment Request (LAR) to Adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Plants", dated September 25, 2013 (ADAMS Accession Number ML13276A503)
: 2. Letter from the NRC to Duke Energy, "Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2: Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Implement a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program (TAC Nos. MF2936 and MF2937)",
dated November 20, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Number ML14308A037)
: 3. Letter from Duke Energy to the NRC, "License Amendment Request (LAR) to Adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Plants", dated January 13, 2015 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15015A409)
: 4. Letter from Duke Energy to the NRC, "License Amendment Request (LAR) to Adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Plants", dated January 28, 2015 (ADAMS Accession Number ML15029A697)
A0Coý:
www.duke-energy.com
 
Document Control Desk Page 2 February 27, 2015 The Reference 1 letter requested NRC review and approval for adoption of a new fire protection licensing basis which complies with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.48(a), 10 CFR 50.48(c), and the guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.205, "Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants",
Revision 1, dated December 2009. This LAR was developed in accordance with the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-02, "Guidance for Implementing a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program Under 10 CFR 50.48(c)",
Revision 2.
The Reference 2 letter transmitted RAIs necessary for the NRC to continue its review of the Reference 1 LAR and the Reference 3 and Reference 4 letters, respectively, provided Duke Energy's 75-day and 90-day responses to the Reference 2 RAIs.
The purpose of this letter is to provide the docketed response to the 120-day RAIs.
Duke Energy indicated during the October 27-30, 2014 NRC audit of the Catawba LAR that the 120-day responses would be provided to the NRC by February 27, 2015. to this letter provides this response. The format of Enclosure 1 is to restate each RAI question, followed by its associated response. Note that the responses to RAIs FM 01.1 and PRA 02.a are being revised to 150-day responses, as indicated in  for these RAIs. This was communicated to the NRC via electronic mail.
Note that the LAR revisions necessary as a result of RAI responses (75-day, 90-day, or 120-day) are also included in this submittal providing the 120-day RAI responses. The only exception is that the revised Attachment J (Fire Modeling V&V) LAR pages will be provided along with the response to RAI FM 01.1 in the 150-day response. The LAR revisions are contained in Enclosure 2 to this letter.
The conclusions of the No Significant Hazards Consideration and the Environmental Consideration contained in the Reference 1 letter are unaffected by this RAI response.
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter or its enclosures.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this LAR supplement is being sent to the appropriate State of South Carolina official.
Inquiries on this matter should be directed to L.J. Rudy at (803) 701-3084.
 
Document Control Desk Page 3 February 27, 2015 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on February 27, 2015.
Very truly yours, Kelvin Henderson Vice President, Catawba Nuclear Station LJR/s Enclosures
 
Document Control Desk Page 4 February 27, 2015 xc (with enclosures):
V.M. McCree Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 G.A. Hutto, III Senior Resident Inspector (Catawba)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Catawba Nuclear Station G.E. Miller (addressee only)
NRC Project Manager (Catawba)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 8 G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 S.E. Jenkins Manager Radioactive and Infectious Waste Management Division of Waste Management South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull St.
Columbia, SC 29201
 
Enclosure 1 Response to 120-Day NRC RAIs
 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ADOPT NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION STANDARD 805 PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARD FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTOR GENERATING PLANTS DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-413 AND 50-414 By letter dated September 25, 2013, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13276A503), Duke Energy Carolinas (Duke) submitted a license amendment request (LAR) to change its fire protection program to one based on the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 805, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants," 2001 Edition, as incorporated into Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Section 50.48(c). In order for the NRC staff to complete its review of the LAR, the following additional information is requested.
Fire Modeling (FM) RAI 01.1 During the audit walkdowns, the NRC staff observed significant amounts of fixed non-cable combustibles in a number of fire areas. For example, large amounts of exposed above-ground high-density polyethylene (HDPE) piping, which may be involved in specific scenarios as intervening combustibles, were observed in the turbine and auxiliary buildings. Explain how non-cable intervening combustibles (e.g., HDPE piping) were identified and accounted for in the fire modeling analyses.
Duke Energy Response:
This response will be provided as a 150-day response with a due date of March 30, 2015.
This was indicated to the NRC in an electronic mail dated February 18, 2015.
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) RAI 01 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA-805 states that the probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) (PSA is also referred to as PRA) approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ), which is the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.205 identifies NUREG/CR-6850 as documenting a methodology for conducting a Fire PRA and endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, NEI 04-02, Revision 2, as providing Enclosure 1 Page 1
 
methods acceptable to the NRC staff for adopting a fire protection program consistent with NFPA-805. RG 1.200 describes a peer review process utilizing an associated ASME/ANS standard (currently ASME/ANS-RA-Sa-2009) as one acceptable approach for determining the technical adequacy of the PRA once acceptable consensus approaches or models have been established for evaluations that could influence the regulatory decision. The primary result of a peer review are the facts and observations (F&Os) recorded by the peer review and the subsequent resolution of these F&Os.
Clarify the following dispositions to fire F&Os and Supporting Requirement (SR) assessment identified in LAR Attachment V that have the potential to impact the Fire PRA (FPRA) results and do not appear to be fully resolved:
a) FSS-Al-01: The disposition to this F&O indicates that analysis documentation was updated to identify ignition sources screened from quantification. A review of the documentation reveals a large number of scenarios identified as having an "insignificant fire risk contribution;" however, the criteria used for reaching this conclusion are unclear.
In addition, the licensee's analysis appears to indicate that the risk contribution from the "non-severe" portion of some Bin 15 ignition sources may have also been dismissed as being already captured by random failure probabilities within the FPRA model. As a result, describe and justify the criteria used to screen non-propagating fixed and transient ignition sources, or portions thereof. Note that Section 8.5.3 of NUREG/CR-6850 provides guidance on screening non-propagating fixed ignition sources and that Tables 7-2 and 7-3 of NUREG/CR-6850 provide quantitative screening criteria, which, according to Section 7.2, may also be implemented for screening fire scenarios, in general.
Duke Energy Response:
The F&O concern was related to fixed ignition sources that were excluded from the quantification without an attendant documented basis. To address the F&O concern, the fixed ignition sources that were excluded from quantification were collected into one or more "place-holder" scenarios for each compartment along with the exclusion disposition. Consistent with Section 8.5.3 of NUREG/CR-6850, example bases for exclusion are: 1) cabinets that were well-sealed and robustly-secured with no FPRA impact (i.e., not modeled directly in the FPRA and no internal damage to credited cables or resulting plant trip) and 2) pumps and motors not credited in the FPRA and having no impact on targets based on the zone of influence and the source-to-target separation distance. The Catawba FPRA did not credit the random equipment failure probability for excluding an ignition source. The FPRA documentation included multiple passages that would appear to have allowed the non-severe fire to be dismissed due to consideration of the ignition source's random failure probability.
However, that approach was not applied to the FPRA credited components; i.e., a non-severe fire scenario evaluates damage to the ignition source, or all components within the ignition source in the case of a Bin 15 electrical cabinet. Spurious operation internal to motor control center enclosures is addressed consistent with NUREG/CR-6850, Section 8.5.3, as discussed in the response to RAI PRA 17b. The FPRA documentation will be updated to include this distinction. The only instances Enclosure 1 Page 2
 
where the non-severe portion of a fire scenario was excluded involved components that were not credited in the FPRA. For example, a non-credited pump could be modeled as a severe fire which impacted tray targets; the non-severe case would be limited to loss of the pump itself and could be excluded if the pump's failure does not lead to a plant trip or a loss of a mitigating function credited in the FPRA.
PRA RAI 02 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA-805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC, RG 1.205 identifies NUREG/CR-6850 as documenting a methodology for conducting a FPRA and endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, NEI 04-02, Revision 2, as providing methods acceptable to the NRC staff for adopting a fire protection program consistent with NFPA-805. RG 1.200 describes a peer review process utilizing an associated ASME/ANS standard (currently ASME/ANS-RA-Sa-2009) as one acceptable approach for determining the technical adequacy of the PRA once acceptable consensus approaches or models have been established. The primary results of a peer review are the F&Os recorded by the peer review and the subsequent resolution of these F&Os.
Clarify the following dispositions to Internal Events F&Os and SR assessments identified in LAR Attachment U that have the potential to impact the FPRA results and do not appear to be fully resolved:
a) F&Os IE-06, DE-04 and TH-06 identify that loss of HVAC was not modeled in the PRA and that there is no room heat-up analysis to support this assumption. The dispositions to these F&Os conclude that any additional risk incurred from modeling loss of HVAC would be small and would not have a significant impact on the FPRA results or results for the NFPA-805 application. Discuss generally the evaluations performed to reach this conclusion and specifically address a) how HVAC dependencies were considered, b) the evaluations performed for the switchgear and battery rooms, and c) the cable routing sensitivity analysis performed to support this conclusion. Also, define what is meant by small and non-significant impact. The response should address small and non-significant in the context of both the RG 1.174 risk guidelines for transition and the post-transition change evaluation criteria, which is two orders-of magnitude less than the RG 1.174 risk guidelines.
Duke Energy Response:
This response will be provided as a 150-day response with a due date of March 30, 2015. This was indicated to the NRC in an electronic mail dated February 18, 2015.
PRA RAI 03 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA-805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC. Section 2.4.4.1 of NFPA-805 further states that the change in public health risk arising from transition from the current fire protection program to an NFPA-805 based program, and all future plant changes to the program, shall be acceptable to the NRC.
RG 1.174 provides quantitative guidelines on core damage frequency (CDF), large early Enclosure 1 Page 3
 
release frequency (LERF), and identifies acceptable changes to these frequencies that result from proposed changes to the plant's licensing basis and describes a general framework to determine the acceptability of risk-informed changes. The NRC staff review of the information in the LAR has identified additional information that is required to fully characterize the risk estimates.
The PRA methods currently under review in the LAR include:
* PRA RAI 01.b regarding the Fire PRA HRA
* PRA RAI 02.a regarding not modeling loss of HVAC
* PRA RAI 02.b regarding consistency of time available for recovery actions
* PRA RAI 02.c regarding updating the success criteria
* PRA RAI 05 regarding application of state of knowledge correlation (SOKC)
* PRA RAI 08 regarding deviations from NRC guidance
* PRA RAI 09 regarding reduced circuit failure probabilities
* PRA RAI 10 regarding ignition bins missing from the sensitivity study
* PRA RAI 11 regarding main control room (MCR) abandonment on loss of habitability
* PRA RAI 12 regarding treatment of recovery actions
    "  PRA RAI 14 regarding sensitive electronics
* PRA RAI 15 regarding reduced heat release rate (HRR) for transients
* PRA RAI 17.a regarding fire propagation from electrical cabinets and fire frequency allocation/screening
* PRA RAI 17.b regarding treatment of spurious actuation for cabinet fires
* PRA RAI 17.c regarding well-sealed cabinets less than 440V in the Bin 15 count
* PRA RAI 18 regarding the multi-compartment analysis (MCA)
* PRA RAI 19 regarding modeling of multiple spurious operations (MSOs)
    "  PRA RAI 20 regarding modeling of junction boxes
    "  PRA RAI 21 regarding modeling of cable fires caused by welding and cutting (CFWC)
* FM RAI 01.i regarding fire propagation from armored cable
* FM RAI 01.a, b, c, d regarding MCR abandonment timing analysis
* FM RAI 01.1 regarding non-cable intervening combustibles Provide the following:
a) Results of an aggregate analysis that provides the integrated impact on the fire risk (i.e., the total transition CDF, LERF, ACDF, ALERF) of replacing specific methods identified above with alternative methods that are acceptable to the NRC. In this aggregate analysis, for those cases where the individual issues have a synergistic impact on the results, a simultaneous analysis must be performed. For those cases where no synergy exists, a one-at-a-time analysis may be done. For those cases that have a negligible impact, a qualitative evaluation may be done. It should be noted that this list may expand depending on NRC's review of the responses to other RAIs in this document.
Enclosure 1 Page 4
 
Duke Energy Response:
As previously indicated in an electronic mail communication to the NRC on January 16, 2015, the response to this question will be provided as a 180-day RAI response, due to the NRC on April 28, 2015.
b) For each method (i.e., each bullet) above, explain how the issue will be addressed in
: 1) the final aggregate analysis results provided in support of the LAR, and 2) the PRA that will be used at the beginning of the self-approval of post-transition changes. In addition, provide a process to ensure that all changes will be made, that a focused-scope peer review will be performed on changes that are PRA upgrades as defined in the PRA standard, and that any findings will be resolved before self-approval of post-transition changes.
Duke Energy Response:
As previously indicated in an electronic mail communication to the NRC on January 16, 2015, the response to this question will be provided as a 180-day RAI response, due to the NRC on April 28, 2015.
c) In the response, explain how the RG 1.205 risk acceptance guidelines are satisfied for the aggregate analysis. If applicable include a description of any new modifications or operator actions being credited to reduce delta risk as well as a discussion of the associated impacts to the fire protection program.
Duke Energy Response:
As previously indicated in an electronic mail communication to the NRC on January 16, 2015, the response to this question will be provided as a 180-day RAI response, due to the NRC on April 28, 2015.
d) If any unaccepted methods will be retained in the PRA and will be used to estimate the change in risk of post-transition changes to support self-approval, explain how the quantification results for each future change will account for the use of these methods.
Duke Energy Response:
As previously indicated in an electronic mail communication to the NRC on January 16, 2015, the response to this question will be provided as a 180-day RAI response, due to the NRC on April 28, 2015.
PRA RAI 09 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA-805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC. Section 2.4.4.1 of NFPA-805 further states that the change in public health risk arising from transition from the current fire protection program to an NFPA-805 Enclosure 1 Page 5
 
based program, and all future plant changes to the program, shall be acceptable to the NRC.
RG 1.174 provides quantitative guidelines on CDF, LERF, and identifies acceptable changes to these frequencies that result from proposed changes to the plant's licensing basis and describes a general framework to determine the acceptability of risk-informed changes. The NRC staff review of the information in the LAR has identified additional information that is required to fully characterize the risk estimates.
LAR Section V.2.2 states that reduced circuit failure probabilities for circuits with control power transformers (CPTs) was not credited in the FPRA. LAR Section V.2.1 states that credit for hot short duration probability was applied in accordance with FAQ 08-0051. Recently, new guidance on using conditional probabilities of spurious operation for control circuits was issued by the NRC in Section 7 of NUREG/CR-7150, Volume 2. This guidance included:
a) replacement of the conditional hot short probability tables in NUREG/CR-6850 for Option #1 with new circuit failure probabilities for single break and double break control circuits, b) Option #2 in NUREG/CR-6850 is not an adequate method and should not be used, c) replacement of the probability of spurious operation duration figure in FAQ 08-0051 for AC control circuits, d) aggregate values for circuit failure probabilities should be used unless it is demonstrated that a cable is only susceptible to a single failure mode, e) incorporation of the uncertainty values for the circuit failure probabilities and spurious operation duration in the SOKC for developing the mean CDF/LERF, and f) recommendations on the hot short probabilities to use for other cable configurations, including panel wiring, trunk cables, and instrument cables. Provide an assessment of the assumptions used in the CNS FPRA relative to the updated guidance in NUREG/CR-7150, Volume 2, specifically addressing each of these items. If the FPRA assumptions are not bounded by the new guidance provide a justification for each difference or provide updated risk results as part of the aggregate change-in-risk analysis requested in PRA RAI 03, utilizing the guidance in NUREG/CR-7150.
Duke Energy Response:
An assessment of each of the items listed in this RAI is provided below.
Item a: Replacement of the conditional hot short probability tables in NUREG/CR-6850 for Option #1 with new circuit failure probabilities for single break and double break control circuits.
Response: The conditional hot short probabilities in the Catawba FPRA have either been updated to the appropriate circuit failure probabilities for single break or double break control circuits in NUREG/CR-7150 Volume 2, or have been confirmed to bound the NUREG/CR-7150 values. All updated values will be included in the updated risk results as part of the aggregate change-in-risk analysis provided in response to RAI PRA 03.
Item b: Option #2 in NUREG/CR-6850 is not an adequate method and should not be used.
Response: Option #2 of NUREG/CR-6850 was not used in the original Catawba FPRA for developing any of the conditional hot short probabilities. Therefore elimination of this option in NUREG/CR-7150 has no impact on the Catawba FPRA results.
Enclosure 1 Page 6
 
Item c: Replacement of the probability of spurious operation duration figure in FAQ 08-0051 for AC control circuits.
Response: The values previously applied in the Catawba FPRA for hot short duration probability bounded the values in Table 6-3 of NUREG/CR-7150. The previously applied values have been updated to the new values from NUREG/CR-7150. All updated values will be included in the updated risk results as part of the aggregate change-in-risk analysis provided in response to RAI PRA 03.
Item d: Aggregate values for circuit failure probabilities should be used unless it is demonstrated that a cable is only susceptible to a single failure mode.
Response: The conditional hot short probabilities in the Catawba FPRA have either been updated to the appropriate aggregate circuit failure probabilities for single break or double break control circuits in NUREG/CR-7150, have been confirmed to bound the NUREG/CR-7150 aggregate values, or it has been demonstrated that the cable is only susceptible to a single failure mode. All updated values will be included in the updated risk results as part of the aggregate change-in-risk analysis provided in response to RAI PRA 03.
Item e: Incorporation of the uncertainty values for the circuit failure probabilities and spurious operation duration in the SOKC for developing the mean CDF/LERF.
Response: Uncertainty values for circuit failure probabilities and spurious operation duration will be incorporated into the updated SOKC analysis provided in response to RAI PRA 03 and RAI PRA 05.
Item f: Recommendations on the hot short probabilities to use for other cable configurations, including panel wiring, trunk cables, and instrument cables.
Response: Section 7.4 of NUREG/CR-7150 provides recommendations for conditional hot short probabilities for panel wiring, trunk cables, and instrument cables. For panel wiring and trunk cables, Section 7.4 recommends the use of the aggregate values from the tables in Sections 4 and 5 of the NUREG. The conditional hot short probabilities in the Catawba FPRA for trunk cables and panel wiring have either been updated to the appropriate aggregate circuit failure probabilities, or have been confirmed to bound those values (refer to the RAI PRA 17b response for motor control center treatment). For instrument cables, the Catawba FPRA assumed that the instrument cable fails to the worst-case state whenever impacted by a fire. No conditional probabilities have been applied. All updated values will be included in the updated risk results as part of the aggregate change-in-risk analysis provided in the response to RAI PRA 03.
Enclosure 1 Page 7
 
PRA RAI 11 .b.
An explanation of how the CCDPs account for the range of probabilities for properly shutting down the plant, and discussion of how they were applied in the scenario analysis. In doing so, provide examples over the full range of values utilized, a characterization of the scenarios to which these values are applied, and a summary of how each value is developed.
This information should include explanations of how the following scenarios are addressed:
: i. Scenarios where the fire fails few functions aside from MCR habitability and successful shutdown is straightforward.
ii. Scenarios where the fire could cause some recoverable functional failures or spurious operations that complicate the shutdown but successful shutdown is likely.
iii. Scenarios where the fire induced failures cause great difficulty for shutdown by failing multiple functions and/or causing complex spurious operations that make successful shutdown unlikely.
Duke Energy Response:
The FPRA analysis was developed in a manner that addresses the impact of fire-induced failures on the ability from an alternate location (SSF). Both MCR abandonment scenarios encompass the range of results from few functional failures to multiple functional failures, with each condition (b.i, b.ii, and b.iii) leading to the most severe end state where the SSF is the sole remaining success path after abandonment. In the Catawba FPRA, for the abandonment scenarios, the number of fire-induced failures and spurious operations is based on the panel of origin that produces the highest CCDP. Therefore, the abandonment scenarios account for the worst-case impacts on the SSF regardless of a potentially more favorable outcome.
The underlying assumption is that in the abandonment scenarios, any of the MCR fires could lead to conditions that require abandonment, and that once abandonment occurs, no credit is taken for any equipment that would require continued presence in the MCR. In other words, the entire control room's main control board frequency was applied in the quantification of the abandonment scenario for the main control board (MCB) fire. The remaining fire area-wide ignition frequency (including electrical cabinet and transient frequency) was applied to the abandonment scenario for the non-MCB fires in the control room.
PRA RAI 12 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA-805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC. Section 2.4.4.1 of NFPA-805 further states that the change in public health risk arising from transition from the current fire protection program to an NFPA-805 based program, and all future plant changes to the program, shall be acceptable to the NRC.
RG 1.174 provides quantitative guidelines on CDF, LERF, and identifies acceptable changes to Enclosure 1 Page 8
 
these frequencies that result from proposed changes to the plant's licensing basis and describes a general framework to determine the acceptability of risk-informed changes. The NRC staffs review of the information in the LAR has identified additional information that is required to fully characterize the risk estimates.
LAR Section V.2.7 states "Control room abandonment is only considered for cases where the Control Room environment (temperature and smoke) reaches the criteria specified in NUREG/CR 6850. For non-abandonment cases credit may be taken at the Primary Control Station (PCS) as needed to control functions impacted for a given Control Room panel fire."
LAR Table G-1 identifies PCS actions for the following 12 fire areas: 01 (Ul and U2), 02 (U2),
03 (Ul), 04 (Ul and U2), 09 (Ul and U2), 10 (Ul and U2), 11 (Ul and U2), 16 (Ul and U2), 17 (Ul and U2), 18 (Ul and U2), 21 (Ul and U2), and 22 (Ul and U2). If primary command and control is retained in the MCR (i.e., the MCR is not abandoned), then RG 1.205 states,
''operation of dedicated or alternative shutdown controls while the main control room remains the command and control location would normally be considered a recovery action." In light of this, provide the following:
a) Clarify if primary command and control is retained in the MCR for fire scenarios in each of these 12 fire areas and explain how this decision is reached. If primary command and control is retained in the MCR, actions taken at the PCSs should be recovery actions. If these actions are not considered recovery actions in your analysis, please justify. Provide the additional risk of all recovery actions for each fire area if not already provided in the LAR. Also, discuss the results of the feasibility and reliability evaluation in accordance with FAQ 07-0030.
Duke Energy Response:
The compliance assessment for the aforementioned fire areas relies upon transfer of primary command and control to the SSF as the success strategy. However, many of the fire scenarios in the FPRA for these fire areas do not rely on the SSF as the primary success path. Additionally, the Abnormal Procedures will direct the operators to implement SSF functions such as reactor coolant pump seal cooling while still maintaining command and control in the Main Control Room (MCR). Only a loss of control room habitability will cause a transfer of primary command and control to the SSF.
The Main Control Room (FA 21) and the Cable Rooms (Unit I FA 17 and Unit 2 FA
: 16) at Catawba, which are "typical" alternative shutdown fire areas per Chapter 9.5.1 C.5.b.3 of NUREG-0800, have been addressed consistent with the guidance in RG 1.205 and FAQ 07-0030. Several recovery actions were identified by the deterministic analysis and were included in the LAR analysis consistent with the feasibility and reliability criteria established in FAQ 07-0030.
A sensitivity study was performed to review the scenarios in Fire Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 18, and 22 for modeled actions taken outside of the MCR that might be deemed a recovery action (actions credited to mitigate fire-specific failures).
These actions were not included in the LAR analysis because the actions were Enclosure 1 Page 9
 
not identified as recovery actions by the deterministic analysis. The feasibility and reliability criteria for recovery actions (FAQ 07-0030) are not applicable as the events are not relied upon in the deterministic analysis to demonstrate the availability of a success path to meet the Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
The following table contains the results of this sensitivity study for actions outside the MCR that are not already explicitly addressed in the LAR.
Table 1: Recovery Action Risk Results Fire Area      Unit I CDF    Unit I LERF  Unit 2 CDF  Unit 2 LERF 1          O.OOE+00      0.OOE+00    0.OOE+00      O.OOE+00 3 (U1) or 2 (U2)      8.29E-09      8.29E-09    8.29E-09      8.29E-09 4          0.OOE+00      0.OOE+00    0.OOE+00      0.OOE+00 9          0.OOE+00      0.OOE+00    1.73E-11      1.56E-12 10          2.76E-09      4.23E-11    0.OOE+00      0.OOE+00 11            1.18E-08      1.75E-10    1.11E-08      2.40E-10 18            3.70E-07      4.98E-09    3.79E-07      5.44E-09 22          0.OOE+00      0.OOE+00    0.OOE+00      0.OOE+00 b) If command and control is not retained in the MCR and is transferred to the PCS, the actions taken at the primary control station are not recovery actions. Describe how PCS actions are modeled in the FPRA. In the response, describe the cues that result in the decision to transfer control and the timing of these cues, and identify the instruments being relied upon to make this decision. Discuss whether these instruments are protected.
Duke Energy Response:
When command and control is not retained in the MCR, the actions taken at the primary control station are not recovery actions. The response to RAI PRA 11 describes how PCS actions are modeled in the FPRA including considerations of the cues that result in the decision to activate the SSF and the timing of these cues. However, the RAI PRA 11 response does not address the instruments relied on to make the abandonment decision. Per the plant fire procedure AP1OA155001045 Section C, only control room habitability due to the fire will cause a complete abandonment of the MCR (as opposed to implementing SSF functions while maintaining command and control in the MCR as discussed in the response to RAI PRA 12.a). This decision does not rely on instrumentation.
c) Discuss how failure to transfer control to the primary control stations is taken into account.
Duke Energy Response:
The response to RAI PRA 11 describes how a failure to transfer control to the PCS is taken into account.
Enclosure 1 Page 10
 
PRA RAI 14 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA-805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC. RG 1.205 identifies NUREG/CR-6850 as documenting a methodology for conducting a FPRA and endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, NEI 04-02, Revision 2, as providing methods acceptable to the NRC staff for adopting a fire protection program consistent with NFPA-805. Methods that have not been determined to be acceptable by the NRC staff or acceptable methods that appear to have been applied differently than described require additional justification to allow the NRC staff to complete its review of the proposed method.
In regard to modeling fire damage to sensitive electronics, neither Appendix H of the LAR or the licensee's procedures refer to use of FAQ 13-0004, "Clarifications on Treatment of Sensitive Electronics," dated December 3, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13322A085). Describe the treatment of sensitive electronics for the FPRA and explain whether it is consistent with the guidance in FAQ 13-0004, including the caveats about configurations that can invalidate the approach (i.e., sensitive electronic mounted on the surface of cabinets and the presence of louver or vents). If the approach is not consistent with FAQ 13-0004, justify the approach or replace the current approach with an acceptable approach in the integrated analysis performed in response to PRA RAI 3.
Duke Energy Response:
In the Catawba FPRA, when a target cabinet is within the Zone of Influence (ZOI) of another ignition source (based on thermoset cable damage criteria), its contents are assumed to fail with no credit for the protection provided by the enclosure. This methodology is consistent with Fire PRA FAQ 13-0004 for addressing damage to sensitive electronics mounted inside the cabinet due to heat flux exposure to the cabinet (i.e., the thermoset damage criterion applies to sensitive electronics protected by the enclosure). For cabinets which contain sensitive electronics mounted inside them, which are outside the ZOI of the ignition source but which have louvers, the impact of a Hot Gas Layer (HGL) on the sensitive electronics was assessed per the FAQ. The Catawba FPRA HGL analysis expands the ZOI for a given ignition source based on the expected maximum HGL temperature prior to fire brigade response, to account for the reduced critical heat flux given the higher ambient temperature caused by the HGL. That is, less heat flux is required from the ignition source to cause damage to the target, so the ZOI from the ignition source is increased. Initially, the time for the upper layer HGL temperature to reach 80 0 C is determined. If the expected fire brigade response time is greater than the time for the HGL to reach 80°C (i.e., an 80°C HGL will occur), the ZOI for the ignition source is increased. This same approach applies to sensitive electronics, except that a 65 0 C threshold would apply. However, the initial 80 0 C evaluation is based on the upper gas layer temperature reaching 80*C, not the gas layer temperature at the target. This is done since cables are often located near the ceiling of a room such that they would be in the upper gas layer. However, this is conservative relative to sensitive electronic equipment in cabinets which are located well below the upper layer. That is, an 80 0 C temperature in the upper gas layer would result in a lower temperature at a Enclosure 1 Page 11
 
target farther from the ceiling. Further, the protection provided by the enclosure (even considering the louvers) provides some additional time for the interior of the floor-mounted cabinets to reach the temperature of the HGL that it is immersed in. Given this, the difference between the 80 0 C used in the initial evaluation and the 650 C damage criterion for sensitive electronics is considered to have a negligible impact on the actual time to damage for sensitive electronics contained within cabinets.
The above discussion does not apply to sensitive electronics mounted on the outside of cabinets, or those which penetrate the cabinet surface. In order to address these, Catawba used a successive screening approach to identify such equipment. The result of this was the identification of electronic equipment that is mounted on the outside of cabinets or which penetrate the cabinet surface. The majority of these are located in the main control room (MCR). No specific treatment of these is required since the impact on sensitive electronics located in the MCR is adequately addressed with the MCR abandonment scenarios. Electronics mounted on the outside of cabinets or which penetrate the cabinet surface, and which are located outside the MCR, will now be assumed to be targets for nearby ignition sources having a direct line of sight to the device(s) based on the lower recommended critical radiant flux of 3 kW/m 2 in the FAQ.
Any additional or updated fire scenarios resulting from use of this lower critical radiant heat flux will be included in the updated risk results as part of the aggregate change-in-risk analysis provided in response to RAI PRA 03.
PRA RAI 17 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA-805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC. RG 1.205 identifies NUREG/CR-6850 as documenting a methodology for conducting a FPRA and endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, NEI 04-02, Revision 2, as providing methods acceptable to the NRC staff for adopting a fire protection program consistent with NFPA-805. Methods that have not been determined to be acceptable by the NRC staff or acceptable methods that appear to have been applied differently than described require additional justification to allow the NRC staff to complete its review of the proposed method.
The licensee's analysis appears to indicate that fires within some Bin 15 cabinets above 440V (e.g., motor control centers (MCCs)) are not assumed to propagate outside of the cabinet. In addition, it is indicated that the damage from non-severe fires within some Bin 15 cabinets is limited by not considering spurious actuations. Guidance in Frequently Asked Question 08-0042 from Supplement 1 of NUREG/CR-6850 applies to electrical cabinets below 440 V.
With respect to Bin 15 as discussed in Chapter 6, it clarifies the meaning of "robustly- or well-sealed" when used in conjunction with these lower voltage cabinets. For those cabinets of 440 V and higher, the original guidance in Chapter 6 remains: "Also note that panels that house circuit voltages of 440 V or greater are counted because an arcing fault could compromise panel integrity (an arcing fault could burn through the panel sides, but this should not be confused with the high energy arcing fault type fires)." Therefore, propagation of fire outside the ignition source panel must be evaluated for all Bin 15 panels that house circuits of 440 V or greater.
Enclosure 1 Page 12
 
a)      Describe how fire propagation outside of well-sealed cabinets greater than 440 V is evaluated.
Duke Energy Response:
The treatment described here applies only to Motor Control Centers (MCCs) and Load Centers (LCs) operating at 600 V that meet the criteria in FAQ 08-0042 for being well-sealed and robustly-secured.
Load center and switchgear fires are modeled as propagating outside of the electrical cabinet, even if the cabinet has no observed openings.
Well-sealed and robustly-secured MCCs, which are all 600 VAC at Catawba, were evaluated as non-propagating cabinet fires. The impact on the total CDFILERF and delta CDF/LERF due to fire propagating outside of well-sealed and robustly-secured MCCs will be further assessed in the integrated analysis performed in response to RAI PRA 03, using the methods outlined in draft Fire PRA FAQ 14-0009, Treatment of Electrical Panels Greater than 440 V.
b)      Discuss how spurious actuation is considered for non-severe fire within Bin 15 cabinets. Discuss the sensitivity of the risk results to this evaluation, considering the guidance in NUREG/CR-7150 Sections 6.6.3 and 7.4 regarding hot short probabilities for panel wiring.
Duke Energy Response:
Spurious operations are evaluated for non-MCC electrical cabinets using the aggregate hot short probabilities, consistent with the guidance in NUREG/CR-7150, Volume 1, Section 6.6.3, and Volume 2, Section 7.4. Refer to the RAI PRA 10 response for additional discussion relative to NUREG/CR-7150.
A non-propagating MCC fire scenario that damages the entire MCC includes a complete loss of power within the MCC due to the fire interaction.
There is a concern that a fault originating within the control circuit of a particular load could damage the control circuit and cause a spurious operation, without impacting the power circuit for that same load. This concern is addressed by the random failure probabilities captured within the internal events model. Therefore, consistent with NUREGICR-6850, Section 8.5.3, the Internal Events PRA adequately addresses this potential scenario.
The integrated analysis performed in response to RAI PRA 03 will evaluate fires propagating outside of well-sealed and robustly-secured MCCs using the methods outlined in draft Fire PRA FAQ 14-0009, as previously mentioned. The targets impacted by the propagating fire will be evaluated for spurious operations using the aggregate hot short probabilities.
Enclosure 1 Page 13
 
Catawba considers the approach taken in the Fire PRA to be consistent with the guidance in NUREGICR-7150, Sections 6.6.3 and 7.4, given:
* NUREG/CR-7150, Volume 1, Section 6.6.3, and Volume 2, Section 7.4 do not specifically address the unique characteristics of an internal MCC scenario, with respect to damaging the control and power circuits of a given load
" The methodology used in the Fire PRA does not contradict the guidance in NUREG/CR-7150, Volume 1, Section 6.6.3, and Volume 2, Section 7.4
* The use of aggregate hot short probabilities in both non-MCC cabinet fire scenarios and in externally propagating MCC fire scenarios c)      If well-sealed cabinets less than 440 V are included in the Bin 15 count provide a qualitative or quantitative justification that using this approach will identify risk contributors that may be important and does not inappropriately dilute the ignition frequency in greater than 440V cabinets.
Duke Energy Response:
Guidance was provided to the team that binned Fire PRA ignition sources through plant walkdowns. The ignition source walkdown criteria and results are documented in calculation CNC-1435.00-00-0048, "NFPA 805 Ignition Source Walkdown Record", Attachment A. Consistent with NUREGICR-6850, Section 6.5.6, Bin 15 criteria include (note that this is a partial list):
* Terminal boxes (labeled TB) or unlabeled electrical cabinets with any dimension greater than 6'. (Most TBs are low voltage; typically they are labeled as high voltage if they have voltage greater than 440 VAC. If labeled as high voltage, they shall be counted.)
* Count wall-mounted panels not excluded by the rules below. Exclusions:
    -  Well-sealed, secured doors, less than 440 V and less than four switches or lights Upon review, wall-mounted electrical cabinets that are well-sealed, robustly-secured, and housing circuits below 440 V have been identified as having been included in Bin 15. A portion of these cabinets have been evaluated as ignition sources in the Fire PRA, and therefore, have contributed risk and insights to the Fire PRA results. While Catawba acknowledges that a larger population of Bin 15 cabinets inherently results in a lower per-cabinet Bin 15 fire frequency, the resulting Fire PRA has captured additional risk and insights that may otherwise have been excluded, resulting in a more thorough and robust PRA. Thus, the impact of removing appropriate wall-mounted cabinets from Bin 15 will be an increase in the Bin 15 per-cabinet fire frequency, resulting in a corresponding Enclosure 1 Page 14
 
increase in the Bin 15 Fire CDF. This will be slightly offset by the Bin 15 Fire CDF reduction obtained by removing the few fire scenarios for wall-mounted electrical cabinets that were previously included in Bin 15.
All large floor-mounted cabinets capable of being a fire ignition source were included in Bin 15, without consideration given to the voltage values contained within these cabinets.
The impact of the per-cabinet Bin 15 fire frequency on the Fire PRA results will be assessed in the integrated analysis performed in response to RAI PRA 03.
Appropriate electrical cabinets will be removed from Bin 15 by following the guidance in NUREG/CR-6850. This revised Bin 15 count, along with the corresponding per-cabinet fire frequency, will be used in the final post-transition Fire PRA quantification.
PRA RAI 19 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA-805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC. RG 1.205 identifies NUREG/CR-6850 as documenting a methodology for conducting a FPRA and endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, NEI 04-02, Revision 2, as providing methods acceptable to the staff for adopting a fire protection program consistent with NFPA-805. Methods that have not been determined to be acceptable by the NRC staff or acceptable methods that appear to have been applied differently than described require additional justification to allow the NRC staff to complete its review of the proposed method.
The licensee's analysis describes how each MSO from the industry generic list was addressed in the FPRA model. This list is not consistent with the generic MSO list in Appendix G of NEI 00-01, Revision 2 which, according to Attachment F of the LAR, may not have been the source of the generic MSO list used in the FPRA. Identify the MSOs in Appendix G of NEI 00-01, Revision 2, that are not identified in Table A-1 of the Fire Model Development Report and describe how these are dispositioned in the FPRA model. Provide justification for any generic MSOs not identified in Table A-1 or provide updated risk results as part of the aggregate change-in-risk analysis requested in PRA RAI 03 that incorporates the additional MSOs in the FPRA model.
Duke Energy Response:
The MSOs listed in the Catawba Fire PRA Model Development Report, Table A-I, are based on those listed in Attachment A of the Catawba MSO expert panel calculation, CNC-1435.00-00-0043, Revision 0. This calculation was updated by Catawba Engineering to provide a comparison and reconciliation of the original MSO list in CNC-1435.00 0043, Revision 0, with the MSO lists in Revision 2 (and 3) of NEI 00-01.
In summary, the following scenarios were either added or revised based on Revision 2 of NEI 00-01:
Enclosure 1 Page 15
* Added new Scenario 14 - Charging pump runout when RCS is depressurized.
* Revised Scenario 26 (old Scenario 25) - Expanded scenario to include search for other steam loads and not just steam header drain valves.
* Added new Scenario 52 - Pump damage from operation outside design flow either at shutoff head or pump runout conditions.
* Added new Scenario 53 - Spurious operation of various valves causing flow diversion.
* Added new Scenario 56f - RCS makeup pump failure due to spurious recirculation actuation signal (RAS) causing alignment to dry containment sump.
The Revision I update to CNC-1435.00-00-0043 dispositioned Scenarios 26 and 56f as not applicable to Catawba and therefore no further action is necessary to address these in the Fire PRA. Also, Scenarios 14 and 53 were dispositioned as currently addressed via the combination of existing MSOs. Scenario 52, however, has not been accounted for in the Fire PRA analysis. An MSO expert panel will be held to establish and document an official position regarding Fire PRA modeling impacts of new MSO Scenarios 14, 52, and 53. Any Fire PRA model impact, or justification of non-applicability as a result of this further evaluation, will be included in the response to RAI PRA 03.
PRA RAI 20 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA 805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC. RG 1.205 identifies NUREG/CR-6850 as documenting a methodology for conducting a FPRA and endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, NEI 04-02, Revision 2, as providing methods acceptable to the NRC staff for adopting a fire protection program consistent with NFPA-805. Methods that have not been determined to be acceptable by the NRC staff or acceptable methods that appear to have been applied differently than described require additional justification to allow the NRC staff to complete its review of the proposed method.
The CNS FPRA does not employ junction boxes and therefore there were no Bin 18 fires assumed in the CNS FPRA. However, per FAQ 13-0006, it is noted that junction box frequencies should be included for both thermoplastic and thermoset cables as the fire event experience suggests that these fires start due to small arcs generated by bad connections, which is not influenced by the cable insulation or jacket type. Provide further justification for not including junction box fires in the FPRA by specifically addressing the definition and characteristics of junction boxes in FAQ 13-0006. If the apportioning method used is not in conformance with the acceptable methods defined in NUREG/CR-6850 or FAQ 13-0006, provide a detailed justification for the alternate method that includes a discussion of conservatisms and non-conservatisms relative to the accepted methods and assesses the associated impacts on the fire total and delta risk results, or replace the current approach with an acceptable approach in the integrated analysis performed in response to PRA RAI 3.
Duke Energy Response:
Catawba has a quantity of electrical enclosures that meet the intent of the descriptive definition of a Bin 18 junction box found in Fire PRA FAQ 13-0006: a fully enclosed metal Enclosure 1 Page 16
 
box containing terminals for joining or splicing cables. The cable and raceway database system at Catawba may be queried to identify the electrical enclosures that are most likely to meet the intention of a Bin 18 junction box provided in Fire PRA FAQ 13-0006.
While the Catawba Fire PRA quantification provided in Duke Energy's LAR to change its fire protection program to one based on NFPA-805 did not employ junction boxes, the impact of Bin 18 junction boxes on the Fire PRA results will be assessed in the integrated analysis performed in response to RAI PRA 03. Appropriate electrical enclosures will be analyzed as Bin 18 junction boxes by following the guidance in Fire PRA FAQ 13-0006. The revised Bin 18 count and quantified Bin 18 impact on the Fire PRA will be used in the final post-transition Fire PRA quantification.
Enclosure 1 Page 17
 
Enclosure 2 LAR Revisions
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.1.2 Results of the Evaluation Process 4.1.2.1    NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Met or Previously Approved by the NRC Attachment A contains the NEI 04-02 Table B-I, Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements. This table provides the compliance basis for the requirements in NFPA 805 Chapter 3. Except as identified in Section 4.1.2.3, Attachment A demonstrates that the fire protection program at CNS either:
    " Complies directly with the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3,
    " Complies with clarification with the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3,
    " Complies through the use of existing engineering equivalency evaluations which are valid and of appropriate quality, or
    " Complies with a previously NRC approved alternative to NFPA 805 Chapter 3 and therefore the specific requirement of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 is supplanted.
    " Not applicable to the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.
4.1.2.2    NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Requiring Clarification of Prior NRC Approval NFPA 805 Section 3.1 states in part, "Previously approved alternatives from the fundamental protection program attributes of this chapter by the Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) take precedence over the requirements contained herein." In some cases prior NRC approval of an NFPA 805 Chapter 3 program attribute may be unclear.
Duke Energy requests that the NRC concur with their finding of prior approval for the following sections of NFPA 805 Chapter 3:
0 None.
4.1.2.3    NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Not Met and Not Previously Approved by NRC The following sections of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 are not specifically met nor do previous NRC approvals of alternatives exist:
E 3.2.3(1) - Approval is requested for the use of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Report TR1006756, Surveillance Frequency Optimization and Maintenance Guide.
0 3.3.5.1 - Approval is requested for existing wiring above suspended ceilings.
0 3.3.5.2 - Approval is requested for embedded/buried Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) conduit.
0 3.3.12(1) - Approval is requested for potential oil misting from the reactor coolant pumps/motors.
0 3.5.5 - Approval is requested for lack of protection of the B Main Fire Pump power cable.
0 3.9.2 - Approval is requested for lack of a water flow alarm on the manual water-based suppression systems.
Rev I1                                                                              Page 14 Rev                                                                                Page 14
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 806 Requirements documented in a calculation entitled, "NFPA 805 Transition NEI 04-02 B-2 Table/Report
- Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology Review."
Results from Evaluation Process The method used to perform the CNS existing post-fire SSA with respect to selection of systems and equipment, selection of cables, and identification of the location of equipment and cables, either meets the NRC endorsed guidance from NEI 00-01, Revision 1, Chapter 3 (as supplemented by the gap analysis) directly with the following modifications:
  " For NEI guidance criteria 3.5.2.1, the following Inverter was identified as requiring modification for elimination of the routing of the KSI inverter cables from SSF shutdown area issues in the CNS corrective action program:
o 2KSI See Committed Modification in Table S-2b of Attachment S, Item 01.
  " For NEI guidance criteria 3.3.1.7, the following MCCs were identified as requiring modification for elimination of breaker coordination issues in the CNS corrective action program:
0  1EMXA 0  1EMXB 0  1EMXC 0  1EMXD 0  1EMXI 0  1EMXJ 0  1EMXK 0  1EMXL 0  2EMXA 0  2EMXB 0  2EMXC 0  2EMXD 0  2EMXI 0  2EMXJ 0  2EMXK 0  2EMXL See Committed Modifications in Table S-2b of Attachment S, Items 02 and 03.
Page 17 Rev II                                                                                Page 17
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements For NEI guidance criteria 3.3.1.7, the following DC panels were identified as requiring modification for elimination of specific breaker coordination issues in the CNS corrective action program:
o 1EDE o 1EDF o 2EDE o 2EDF See Committed Modifications in Table S-2b of Attachment S, Item 04.
For NEI guidance criteria 3.1C and 3.3.1.7, the control circuits for the following components were identified as requiring modification for elimination of specific spurious operations affecting breaker coordination issues in the CNS corrective action program:
o 1CA VA0050A o 2CA VA0050A o 1WLSS5900 for 1WL PUATS o 2WLSS5900 for 2WL PUATS See Committed Modifications in Table S-2b of Attachment S, Items 05 and 06.
For NEI guidance criteria 3.5.2.3, the following TDCAP circuits were identified as requiring modification for elimination of the hot shorts with fault in ETA or ETB issues in the CNS corrective action program:
o 1TDCAP o 2TDACP See Committed Modifications in Table S-2b of Attachment S, Item 07.
Page 18 Rev II                                                                                Page 18
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements The following long term actions can be instituted as needed:
    " The site emergency organization can be established.
    " More resources can be made available.
    " Additional material can be available from both within and outside the corporation.
    " Damage repairs can be completed resulting in additional success paths being made available.
    " Offsite power, although not required, is expected to be restored and may also result in additional success paths.
Safe and stable conditions at HSB may continue long term with the following activities:
Fuel oil
    " For SSF train - The SSF Diesel Generator (DG) fuel tank needs replenishing approximately every 72 hours. Fuel oil may also be obtained from offsite vendors.
    " For A or B train - The safety related DGs need replenishing approximately every 7 days per design basis accident. Alternatively, the fire affected train's respective DG fuel can be pumped to the non-fire affected train DG providing approximately 14 days of fuel. Fuel oil may also be obtained from offsite vendors.
Feedwater
    " For SSF train - the embedded Condenser Circulating Water piping volume will provide suction to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump for 72 hours.
This piping is normally isolated, but may be aligned via valves which receive power from the SSF. Pressure transmitters will automatically align RN and/ or this suction source or it may be aligned manually. Manual actions can replenish the water in this piping if required.
    " For A or B train, although Lake Wylie is expected to be available, the assured source is the SNSWP via Nuclear Service Water.
An additional 225,000 gallons of condensate grade water is available per unit for A train, B train, or SSF success path.
Reactor Coolant (NC) inventory
    " For SSF train - The SFP will provide available inventory via the Standby Makeup Pump for at least 72 hours. SFP makeup can be provided from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST) as well as several other sources to extend the available supply.
    " For A or B train - Charging flow to the Reactor Coolant Pump seals will provide a steady state supply of inventory. The assured source is the FWST (approximately 380,000 gal.) and then realignment to containment sump.
Page 21 Rev 1I Rev                                                                                Page 21
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements buildings will be added to the fire strategies. See Implementation Item 1 in Table S-3 of Attachment S.
Training of the fire brigade personnel is a line of defense in preventing the radioactive release during fire fighting activities. A review of the lesson plans and fire brigade standard operating procedures found no objectives that address fire fighting concerns for controlling radioactive smoke or runoff. Limited statements to coordinate with radiation protection were identified in procedures but with no direct relationship to preventing radioactive release. These statements will be added to procedures. See Implementation Item 1 in Table S-3 of Attachment S.
The radioactive release review determined the fire protection program will be compliant with the requirements of NFPA 805 and the guidance in NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205 upon completion of the Implementation Items identified in Attachment S.
4.5    Fire PRA and Performance-Based Approaches RI-PB evaluations are an integral element of an NFPA 805 fire protection program. Key parts of RI-PB evaluations include:
    " A Fire PRA (discussed in Section 4.5.1 and Attachments U, V, and WN).
    " NFPA 805 Performance-Based Approaches (discussed in Section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Fire PRA Development and Assessment In accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, a Fire PRA model was developed for CNS consistent with the requirements of Part 4 "Requirements for Fires At Power PRA,"
of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and American Nuclear Society (ANS) combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, "Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Application," (hereafter referred to as Fire PRA Standard). Duke Energy conducted a peer review by independent industry analysts in accordance with RG 1.200 prior to a risk-informed submittal. The resulting fire risk assessment model is used as the analytical tool to perform Fire Risk Evaluations during the transition process.
Section 4.5.1.1 describes the Internal Events PRA model. Section 4.5.1.2 describes the Fire PRA model. Section 4.5.1.3 describes the results and resolution of the peer review of the Fire PRA, and Section 4.5.1.4 describes insights gained from the Fire PRA.
4.5.1.1    Internal Events PRA The CNS base internal events PRA model cr3a was the starting point for the Fire PRA.
The most recent full scope CNS Internal Events PRA Peer Review was performed in March 2002 using the peer review process described in NEI 00-02. More recently, focused scope peer reviews have been conducted on the CNS Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) PRA model and the CNS Internal Flooding PRA model. The CNS Internal Events PRA was judged to meet Capability Category II consistent with RG 1.205 guidance. The Internal Events PRA quality and results are discussed in Attachment U.
Page 36 Rev 1I Rev                                                                                    Page 36
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC 0                                                              4 Attachment A - NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundament Fire Protection Program & Design Elements A. NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program & Design Elements 41 Pages Attached Page A-I Rev I                                                                                                                  Page A-1
 
Attachment A NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program & Design Elements Compliance NFPA 805 Ch. 3 Reference          Requirements I Guidance                                                      Statement        Compliance Basis 3.3.5.2 [Electrical Raceway      3.3.5.2                                                                      Comply            Cable trays are constructed of galvanized steel. All exposed conduit is hot-Construction Limits]              Only metal tray and metal conduits shall be used for electrical raceways.                      dipped, rigid galvanized steel or rigid aluminum. Thinned wall electrical Thin wall metallic tubing shall not be used for power, instrumentation, or                      metallic tubing (EMT) is not used for power, control, or instrumentation.
control cables. Flexible metallic conduits shall only be used in short lengths to connect components.
References                        Document ID CNS-1465.00-00-0006 Rev. 22 [App. A.1, Section 4.c.1] - Design Basis Specification for the Plant Fire Protection DC-3.06 Rev. 3 [Section 4.1.1] - Conduit Systems for Power Plants Submit for NRC    PVC conduit is permitted in embedded and buried locations. See Approval          Attachment L of the License Amendment Request for further details on the request for NRC approval for evaluation of PVC conduits.
References                        Document ID DC-3.06 Rev. 3 [Section 4.2, 4.3] - Conduit Systems for Power Plants 3.3.5.3 [Electrical Cable Flame  3.3.5.3*                                                                      Comply            The cable used at CNS, classified as either power, control or Propagation Limits]              Electric cable construction shall comply with a flame propagation test as acceptable to the AHJ.
instrumentation, passed the IEEE 383-1974 Flame Test, or equivalent flame propagation test, which is acceptable as outlined in FAQ 06-0022, "Acceptable Electrical Cable Construction Tests."
I References                        Document ID CNS-1465.00-00-0006 Rev. 22 [App. A.1, Section 4.c.6] - Design Basis Specification for the Plant Fire Protection 3.3.6 Roofs.                      3.3.6 Roofs.                                                                  Comply            Roofs are concrete or noncombustible metal construction.
Metal roof deck construction shall be designed and installed so the roofing system will not sustain a self-propagating fire on the underside of the deck                    The Reactor Buildings, Auxiliary Building, Diesel Generator Buildings, and when the deck is heated by a fire inside the building. Roof coverings shall                      the Nuclear Service Water Pump Structure all have reinforced concrete be Class A as determined by tests described in NFPA 256, Standard                              roofs. The Turbine Building has rigid fiber glass insulation and built up Methods of Fire Tests of Roof Coverings.                                                        roof on top a metal deck. The roof construction was designed in accordance with ASTM 446-1972.
References                        Document ID CNS-1 123.00-00-0001 Rev. 0 - Galvanized Metal Roof Deck CNS-1465.00-00-0006 Rev. 22 [App. A.1, Section 4.a.5] - Design Basis Specification for the Plant Fire Protection 3.3.7 Bulk Flammable Gas          3.3.7 Bulk Flammable Gas Storage.                                            Comply            Bulk flammable gas is not stored in structures housing systems, Storage.                          Bulk compressed or cryogenic flammable gas storage shall not be                                equipment, or components important to nuclear safety.
permitted inside structures housing systems, equipment, or components important to nuclear safety.
References                        Document ID CNS-1465.00-00-0006 Rev. 22 [App. A.1, Section 4.b.2] - Design Basis Specification for the Plant Fire Protection Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:22:33 Page:10of4l
 
0 Attachment A NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program & Design Elements Compliance NFPA 805 Ch. 3 Reference        Requirements / Guidance                                                      Statement          Compliance Basis 3.5.4 [Water Supply Pump        3.5.4                                                                        Complies with      CNS does not utilize diesel-engine driven fire water pumps. CNS uses Diversity and Redundancy]        At least one diesel engine-driven fire pump or two more seismic Category    previous NRC      three electric fire pumps capable of each providing 100% of the required I Class IE electric motor-driven fire pumps connected to redundant Class    Approval          flow and pressure.
IE emergency power buses capable of providing 100 percent of the required flow rate and pressure shall be provided.                                              The 1983 NRC Safety Evaluation Report states: "The water supply system consists of three fire pumps separately connected to a buried 12-in.
cement-lined water main loop around the station. All three fire pumps are electrically driven, each rated 2,500 gpm at 144 psig. The three fire pumps have independent power supplies and controls. Two fire pumps are supplied by separate station diesel generators." "Based on its review, the staff concluses that the water supply system meets the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.b, and is, therefore, acceptable."
There have been no changes to invalidate the basis for this approval.
References                      Document ID 1983-02-01 NRC Safety Evaluation Report [Section 9.5.1.7] - NRC Safety Evaluation Report CNS-1465.00-00-0006 Rev. 22 [App. A.1, Section 5.b.3] - Design Basis Specification for the Plant Fire Protection 3.5.5 [Water Supply Pump        3.5.5                                                                        Complies with      There are three fire pumps at CNS. Each fire pump has an independent Separation Requirements]        Each pump and its driver and controls shall be separated from the            previous NRC      power supply.
remaining fire pumps and from the rest of the plant by rated fire barriers. Approval The 1983 NRC Safety Evaluation Report states: "Two of the three fire pumps are located in the same bay of the intake structure and are separated by a three-hour rated fire barrier. The third pump is located in an adjacent bay." "Based on its review, the staff concludes that the water supply system meets the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.b, and is, therefore, acceptable."
The NRC performed a site audit and indicated the licensee should protect the pumps and cables. Catawba provided a response in the February 10, 1984 letter: "To conform with Section C.6.6 of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, the fire pumps and related cables should be protected so that one fire pump will remain undamaged and functional after a fire. We observed that all three fire pumps could be rendered inoperable if a fire occurred at the intake structure. To meet this guideline, the applicant should protect the pumps and cables so that at least one wi]F remain undamaged after a fire.
Response: A hour fire rated "wrap" will be installed on the conduit containing cables for Pump B from the location where the cables penetrate the intake structure beneath Pump B to the east side of the intake structure, The fire rated block wall between Pumps A and B will be extended westward to the edge of the trench drain and south approximately 5 feet to effect an "L"shaped configuration."
The July 1984 NRC Safety Evaluation Report (No. 3) states: "The staff was concerned that all three fire pumps could be rendered inoperable ifa fire occurred at the intake structure. This was also observed for the related cables serving these pumps. By letter dated February 10, 1984, the applicant committed to install a 1-hour fire rated wrap on the conduit and Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:22:38 Page: 22 of 41
 
S Attachment A NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program & Design Elements Compliance NFPA 805 Ch. 3 Reference        Requirements I Guidance                                                      Statement          Compliance Basis supports containing cables for fire Pump B from the location where the cables penetrate the intake structure beneath Pump B to the east side of the intake structure. The fire rated block wall between Pumps A and B will be extended westward to the edge of the trench drain and south approximately 5 feet to effect an "L"shape configuration. The staff finds this acceptable."
The basis for this approval remain valid with the exception the 1-hour fire wrap for the B Fire Pump power cable is no longer credited. See the Submit for NRC Approval Compliance Statement and Attachment L of the License Amendment Request for further details on the power cable protection.
References                      Document ID 1983-02-01 NRC Safety Evaluation Report [Section 9.5.1.7] - NRC Safety Evaluation Report 1984-02-10 Letter - H.B. Tucker Letter to Denton 1984-07-01 NRC Safety Evaluation Report [Section 9.5.1.7] - Supplement 3                                                                                                    I Comply              The A Fire Pump, B Fire Pump, and C Fire Pump are spatially separated in the Low Pressure Service Water Pumphouse. The A and B Fire Pumps are separated by a fire rated wall. The C Fire Pump is separated from the B Fire Pump via distance. Power and control cables are muted in steel conduit under the operating deck. See the previous approval and approval request for the complete compliance basis.
References                      Document ID CN-1340-10 Rev. 13 - Low Pressure Service Water Intake Structure General Arrangement Plan, Sections & Details CN-1939-01 Rev. 23 - Electrical Equipment Layout Low Pressure Service Water Intake Structure Plan & Sections Submit for NRC      The power cable for the B Main Fire Pump are not protected. See Approval            Attachment Lof the License Amendment Request for further details on the request for NRC approval of the lack of protection of the B Main Fire Pump Power Cable.
3.5.6 [Water Supply Pump        3.5.6                                                                        Comply              The Main Fire Pumps are provided with automatic start upon system Start/Stop Requirements]        Fire pumps shall be provided with automatic start and manual stop only.                          pressure drop. Once actuated the Main Fire Pumps can only be shut off by the manual stop.
References                      Document ID CNS-1465.00-00-0006 Rev. 22 [Section 3.3.1.1] - Design Basis Specification for the Plant Fire Protection CNS-1599.RF-00-0001 Rev. 20 [Section 3.2.2.1.2] - Design Basis Specification for the Fire Protection System (RF/RY) 3.5.7 (Water Supply Pump        3.5.7                                                                        Comply              Each Main Fire Pump is provided with a separate connection to the Connection Requirements]        Individual fire pump connections to the yard fire main loop shall be                            underground main fire loop. Sectional control valves are provided to provided and separated with sectionalizing valves between connections.                          isolate portions of the yard fire main.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:22:38 Page: 23 of 41
 
Attachment A NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program & Design Elements Compliance NFPA 805 Ch. 3 Reference        Requirements I Guidance                                                    Statement            Compliance Basis 3.9.2 [Fire Suppression System  3.9.2                                                                      Complies            Automatic water-based suppression systems are provided with a water Flow Alarm]                      Each system shall be equipped with a water flow alarm.                                          flow alarm.
References                      Document ID CNS-1599.RF-00-0001 Rev. 20 [Section 3.2.2.1] - Design Basis Specification for the Fire Protection System (RF/RY)
Submit for NRC      The manual water-based suppression systems do not have water flow Approval            alarms. See Attachment L of the License Amendment Request for further details on the request for NRC approval for lack of water flow alarms on the manual water-based suppression systems.
3.9.3 [Fire Suppression System  3.9.3                                                                      Comply              Fire suppression systems that are equipped with alamrs annunciate in the Alarm Locations]                All alarms from fire suppression systems shall annunciate in the control                        Control Room.
room or other suitable constantly attended location.
References                      Document ID CNS-1465.00-00-0006 Rev. 22 - Design Basis Specification for the Plant Fire Protection CNS-1599.RF-00-0001 Rev. 20 - Design Basis Specification for the Fire Protection System (RF/RY) 3.9.4 [Fire Suppression System  3.9.4                                                                      N/A                  CNS does not utilize diesel driven fire water pumps.
Diesel Pump Sprinkler            Diesel-driven fire pumps shall be protected by automatic sprinklers.
Protection]
References                      Document ID CNC-1435.00-00-0055 Rev. 0 - NFPA 20 Code Conformance Review for NFPA 805 Transition 3.9.5 [Fire Suppression System  3.9.5                                                                      Complies with        With respect to valves that are nolt specifically UL Listed or FM Approved, Shutoff Controls]                Each system shall be equipped with an OS&Y gate valve or other              previous NRC        the 1983 SER states:
approved shutoff valve.                                                    Approval Several isolation, vent, check, or drain RF (interior fire protection system) valves located within nuclear safety-related areas, particularly within the reactor buildings, are not UL listed or Factory Mutual (FM) approved. Of the 38 RF valves located within each reactor building, 14 valves are not UL listed. These unlisted valves are constructed of stainless steel or carbon steel bodies.
The sprinkler isolation valve and hose connection supply piping for each unit's auxiliary feedwater pump room also are unlisted. These valves are seismically qualifed and were utilized so that piping within these areas could be seismically designed and a pressure boundary maintained.
The four RF valves (three motor operated, one vent) located within the auxiliary building for the three RF supply pipes to the reactor building also are unlisted. These valves required seismic qualification to maintain the reactor pressure boundary. Suitable seismically qualified UL-listed valves were not available.
The two auxiliary building RY (exterior fire protection) supply lines from the Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:22:41    Page: 31 of 41
 
Attachment A NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program & Design Elements Compliance NFPA 805 Ch. 3 Reference        Requirements I Guidance                                                          Statement    Compliance Basis 3.11.3 Fire Barrier              3.11.3* Fire Barrier Penetrations.
Penetrations.                    Penetrations in fire barriers shall be provided with listed fire-rated door assemblies or listed rated fire dampers having a fire resistance rating consistent with the designated fire resistance rating of the barrier as determined by the performance requirements established by Chapter 4.
(See 3.11.3.4 for penetration seals for through penetration fire stops.)
Passive fire protection devices such as doors and dampers shall conform with the following NFPA standards, as applicable: (see subsections)
Exception: Where fire area boundaries are not wall-to-wall, floor-to-ceiling boundaries with all penetrations sealed to the fire rating required of the boundaries, a performance-based analysis shall be required to assess the adequacy of fire barrier forming the fire boundary to determine if the barrier will withstand the fire effects of the hazards in the area. Openings in fire barriers shall be permitted to be protected by other means as acceptable to the AHJ.
3.11.3 Fire Barrier              3.11.3- (1) NFPA 80, Standard for Fire Doors and Fire Windows                    Complies with Some doors at CNS are un-labeled and modified in order to satisfy field Penetrations. (1)                                                                                                previous NRC  requirements. The 1983 SER evaluated these configurations and states Approval      the following:
                                                                                                                                "Door openings in fire-rated barriers are, for the most part, equipped with labeled fire doors. By letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, the applicant identified number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. Non-fire-rated, hollow metal doors are located in the operator's room and interface office (Fire Area 35). Several hollow metal doors with louvered grills for radiological purposes are located in the station. The fire load on both sides of these doors is low. The doors are of substantial metal construction. Therefore, they will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade.
Pressure doors as well as bullet- and missile-resistant doors are located in some fire boundaries. These doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour-fire-rated doors. Certificates from the manufacturers are on file that verify the construction of the doors. They are not labeled because modifications necessary to satisfy leakage rates, bullet resistance, and pressure loadings are not incorporated in UL procedures. However, it is the staffs opinion that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors. The staff finds use of unlabeled fire doors in the above referenced areas to be an acceptable deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1."
There have been no changes that invalidate the basis for this approval.
References                        Document ID 1983-02-01 NRC Safety Evaluation Report [Section 9.5.1.5] - NRC Safety Evaluation Report Complies with Fire doors have been evaluated in accordance with NFPA 80, 2007 edition Use of EEEE  and other engineering evaluations as referenced below.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:22:44 Page: 38 of 41
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability System and Equipment Selection NEI 00-01 Ref.                                  NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.1 [C, Spurious Operations] Safe Shutdown      In addition to the above listed functions, Generic Letter 81-12 specifies consideration of associated circuits with the potential for spurious equipment Systems and Path Development                    operation and/or loss of power source, and the common enclosure failures. Spurious operations/actuations can affect the accomplishment of the post-fire safe shutdown functions listed above. Typical examples of the effects of the spurious operations of concern are the following:
                                                " A loss of reactor pressure vessel/reactor coolant inventory in excess of the safe shutdown makeup capability
                                                " A flow loss or blockage in the inventory makeup or decay heat removal systems being used for the required safe shutdown path.
Spurious operations are of concern because they have the potential to directly affect the ability to achieve and maintain hot shutdown, which could affect the fuel and cause damage to the reactor pressure vessel or the primary containment. Common power source and common enclosure concems could also affect these and must be addressed.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                            Alignment Basis                                                                      Reference Aligns                                          Spurious operations are considered in both the selection of safe shutdown            CNC-1 435.00-00-0043 Rev. 0- NFPA 805 Transition Expert Panel functions and systems as well as the cabling associated with the components          Report for Addressing Potential Catawba Multiple Spurious              I relied upon to achieve those functions. A special subset of components              Operations considered for spurious operation involves reactor coolant pressure boundary components whose spurious operation can lead to an unacceptable loss of reactor pressure vessel / Reactor Coolant System inventory via an interfacing system loss of coolant accident. These components are defined as high/low pressure interface valves and are subject to more stringent circuit analysis.
This high/low pressure interface boundary valve definition is in alignment with those in NEI 00-01, NEI-00-01 Appendix C and FAQ 06-0006 to NEI 04-02, but Is limited to those components potentially subject to interfacing LOCAs in excess of makeup capability.
Section C.3 of NEI 00-01 Rev. 2 further clarifies the criterion for the determination of a high-low pressure interface valve:
                                                "A valve whose spurious opening could result in a loss of RPV/RCS inventory and, due to the lower pressure rating on the downstream piping, an interfacing LOCA outside of Primary Containment (i.e., pipe rupture in the low pressure piping)."
I Catawba aligns with the guidance of NEI 00-01 Rev. 2.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:02 Page: 4 of 103
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability System and Equipment Selection NEI 00-01 Ref.                                  NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.1.1.3 [Pressurizer Heaters]                    [PWR] Generic Letter 86-10, Enclosure 2, Section 5.3.5 specifies that hot shutdown can be maintained without the use of pressurizer heaters (i.e.,
pressure control is provided by controlling the makeup/charging pumps). Hot shutdown conditions can be maintained via natural circulation of the RCS through the steam generators. The cooldown rate must be controlled to prevent the formation of a bubble in the reactor head. Therefore, feedwater (either auxiliary or emergency) flow rates as well as steam release must be controlled.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                  Reference Aligns                                          Catawba does not credit pressurizer heaters for fire areas where shutdown        EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 does not use the SSF. For fire areas that require the use of the SSF,            NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis          I pressurizer heaters are not relied on, but one sub-bank of pressurizer heaters are powered from the SSF control panel to provide an additional method to assure subcooling is not lost and a bubble form in the reactor vessel. Due to the high desirability of pressurizer heaters to assist in pressure control, the pressurizer heaters are analyzed as required in the deterministic analysis.
Steam release rates and auxiliary feedwater flow rates are controlled to prevent formation of a bubble in the reactor head for all fire scenarios.
This analysis exceeds the guidance.
I Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:02 Page: 8 of 103
 
0 Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability System and Equipment Selection NE100-01 Ref.                                  NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.1.1.7 [ Offsite Power]                        For the case of redundant shutdown, offsite power may be credited ifdemonstrated to be free of fire damage. Offsite power should be assumed to remain available for those cases where its availability may adversely impact safety (i.e., reliance cannot be placed on fire causing a loss of offsite power ifthe consequences of offsite power availability are more severe than its presumed loss). No credit should be taken for a fire causing a loss of offsite power. For areas where train separation cannot be achieved and alternative shutdown capability is necessary, shutdown must be demonstrated both where offsite power is available and where offsite power is not available for 72 hours.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                            Alignment Basis                                                                    Reference Aligns                                          Catawba does not credit offsite power for redundant safe shutdown.                  EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2            I Emergency diesel generators are relied upon for electrical power. Offsite          NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis power has not been analyzed or demonstrated to be free of fire damage for redundant shutdown. The cascading power supply analysis determines fire impact to credited power sources and is utilized in the analysis of fire areas for safe shutdown. This analysis ensures power is available to operate credited safe shutdown equipment. Power supply/cable failures are analyzed for effects of loss with and without offsite power. For alternate shutdown, a dedicated diesel generator is provided independent of emergency diesel generator systems that can supply the necessary electrical power for hot standby. Since Catawba does not credit offsite power, it is not required to demonstrate it is free of fire damage. Thus, Catawba aligns with the guidance.                                                                                                  I Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:02    Page: 12 of 103
 
0 Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability System and Equipment Selection NEI 00-01 Ref.                                  NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.1.1.11 [Multiple Affected Units]              Where a single fire can impact more than one unit of a multi-unit plant, the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown for each affected unit must be demonstrated.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                      Reference Aligns                                          Fire impacts at the component level have been evaluated for each unit                EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 separately and for both units collectively where required. That is, Catawba          NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis analyzed the effects on both units from a fire in each fire area.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:03 Page: 16 of 103
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability System and Equipment Selection NEI 00-01 Ref.                                  NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.1.2.5 Process Monitoring                      The process monitoring function is provided for all safe shutdown paths. IN 84-09, Attachment 1, Section IX"Lessons Learned from NRC Inspections of Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Systems (1 OCFR50 Appendix R)" provides guidance on the instrumentation acceptable to and preferred by the NRC for meeting the process monitoring function. This instrumentation is that which monitors the process variables necessary to perform and control the functions specified in Appendix R Section IIIL.. Such instrumentation must be demonstrated to remain unaffected by the fire. The IN 84-09 list of process monitoring is applied to alternative shutdown (III.G.3). IN 84-09 did not identify specific instruments for process monitoring to be applied to redundant shutdown (III.G.1 and III.G.2). In general, process monitoring instruments similar to those listed below are needed to successfully use existing operating procedures (including Abnormal Operating Procedures).
BWR
                                                @Reactor coolant level and pressure
* Suppression pool level and temperature
                                                " Emergency or isolation condenser level o Diagnostic instrumentation for safe shutdown systems
* Level indication for tanks needed for safe shutdown PWR
                                                " Reactor coolant temperature (hot leg / cold leg)
                                                " Pressurizer pressure and level
* Neutron flux monitoring (source range)
                                                " Level indication for tanks needed for safe shutdown
                                                " Steam generator level and pressure
                                                " Diagnostic instrumentation for safe shutdown systems The specific instruments required may be based on operator preference, safe shutdown procedural guidance strategy (symptomatic vs. prescriptive),
and systems and paths selected for safe shutdown.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                    Reference Aligns                                          For shutdown from the control room sufficient instrumentation channels remain      CNS-1560.SS-00-0001 Rev. 25 - Design Basis Specification for the        I available to provide all of the necessary monitoring requirements. If some          Standby Shutdown Facility monitoring parameters are found to not be available in the control room, the        EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 dedicated SSF instrumentation is available. For shutdown from the SSF,              NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis dedicated channels of instrumentation are available to provide all of the necessary monitoring requirements.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:04 Page: 22 of 103
 
0 Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Circuit Analysis NEI 00-01 Ref.                                    NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.3.1.3 [Isolation Devices]                      Electrical devices such as relays, switches and signal resistor units are considered to be acceptable isolation devices. In the case of instrument loops, review the isolation capabilities of the devices in the loop to determine that an acceptable isolation device has been installed at each point where the loop must be isolated so that a fault would not impact the performance of the safe shutdown instrument function.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                        Reference Aligns                                          The cables were selected using the component's electrical elementary                  EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 diagram as a guide. A point to point review of the associated connection              NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis diagrams and/or wire tabulations was performed to identify all associated circuits. This includes instrument loops. All circuits/cables that are electrically connected to the circuit under analysis were identified up to a credited isolation device. Isolation devices were analyzed for the credited train in a given fire area.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:07 Page: 51 of 103
 
0 Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Circuit Analysis NEI 00-01 Ref.                                    NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.3.1.6 [Auto Initiation Logic]                  The automatic initiation logics for the credited post-fire safe shutdown systems are not required to support safe shutdown. Each system can be controlled manually by operator actuation in the main control room or emergency control station. If operator actions outside the MCR are necessary, those actions must conform to the regulatory requirements on manual actions. However, if not protected from the effects of fire, the fire-induced failure of automatic initiation logic circuits must not adversely affect any post-fire safe shutdown system function.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                        Reference Aligns                                          Automatic initiation logic was not credited for performance of safe shutdown            EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 functions. Manual operation of components from the Main Control Room, SSF              NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis            I or locally were identified during the fire area compliance assessment task as needed. To preclude adverse impact from automatic initiation logic circuits or control logic circuits where multiple components receive signals from common control logic, the control logic was analyzed as a primary component and a pseudo component was created for the logic with cables selected accordingly.
This same methodology was used for similar circuit scenarios such as common power supplies. In this way the effects of a fire induced failure causing spurious component operation were fully evaluated. Variances From the Deterministic Requirements (VFDRs) were identified and evaluated in the Fire Risk Evaluations to assess the impact of the VFDR and any necessary recovery actions to mitigate the effects of the VFDR.
The cables were selected using the component's electrical elementary diagram as a guide and performing a point to point review of the associated connection diagrams. During the cable selection process, a circuit fault analysis for each safe shutdown component was not initially performed. This made the initial compliance analysis bounding. Further analysis to determine the effects of a fire induced hot short, open circuit and short to ground as applicable was performed during the fire area compliance assessment task.
Component interlocks affecting operation were either specifically identifed, routed, and incorporated into the component's function and analyzed, or, alternatively the interlock can be analyzed to show acceptability for operation in either state during analysis and thus its cabling, routing etc. is not required.
This approach analyzes automatic actuation as component interlocks. This approach exceeds the guidance.                                                                                                                                I Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:07  Page: 54 of 103
 
0 Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Circuit Analysis NEI 00-01 Ref.                                  NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.3.1.7 [Circuit Coordination]                  Cabling for the electrical distribution system is a concern for those breakers that feed associated circuits and are not fully coordinated with upstream breakers. With respect to electrical distribution cabling, two types of cable associations exist. For safe shutdown considerations, the direct power feed to a primary safe shutdown component is associated with the primary component. For example, the power feed to a pump is necessary to support the pump. Similarly, the power feed from the load center to an MCC supports the MCC. However, for cases where sufficient branch-circuit coordination is not provided, the same cables discussed above would also support the power supply. For example, the power feed to the pump discussed above would support the bus from which it is fed because, for the case of a common power source analysis, the concern is the loss of the upstream power source and not the connected load. Similarly, the cable feeding the MCC from the load center would also be necessary to support the load center.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                      Reference Aligns                                          The protective devices were reviewed to determine if adequate coordination          CNC-1381.05-00-0251 Rev. 1 - Catawba Units 1 and 2 NFPA 805 was provided to prevent potential loss of the power sources. This review is          Breaker and Fuse Coordination Study (AREVA 32-9139535-000)            I documented in the breaker coordination calculation and was prepared for all required buses. Cables for those breakers that were not coordinated were included in the 'at power' (Safe and stable) and the Non-Power Operation (NPO) analysis. The breakers that affected safe and stable conditions that required resolution are being modified for coordination.
Comments See Breaker Coordination modifications identified in the committed modification Table S-2 of Attachment S.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP13)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:07 Page: 55 of 103
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Circuit Analysis NEI 00-01 Ref.                                  NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.5.1.3 [Duration of Circuit Failures]          Assume that circuit failure types resulting in spurious operations exist until action has been taken to isolate the given circuit from the fire area, or other actions have been taken to negate the effects of circuit failure that is causing the spurious actuation. The fire is not assumed to eventually clear the circuit fault. Note that RIS 2004-03 indicates that fire-induced hot shorts typically self-mitigate after a limited period of time.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                      Reference Aligns                                          Multiple fire induced failures and multiple spurious actuations were considered      EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 to occur concurrently in accordance with the guidance provided in NEI 00-01,          NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis                I Section 3.5.1.5[BJ. This methodology is applied at the safe shutdown component level regardless of how many components that may share a common multi conductor cable. Based on this methodology, Catawba considers any and all potential spurious actuations that may result from intractable shorting, which may occur concurrently regardless of number. The fire was not assumed to eventually clear the circuit fault. All potential hot shorts always failed the equipment and no probability was used in the deterministic analysis. Details of faults were provided but credit was not taken to clear them.                                                                                                                                                  I Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:09 Page: 68 of 103
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Circuit Analysis NEI 00-01 Ref.                                    NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.5.2.1 Circuit Failures Due to an Open Circuit  This section provides guidance for addressing the effects of an open circuit for safe shutdown equipment. An open circuit is a fire-induced break in a conductor resulting in the loss of circuit continuity. An open circuit will typically prevent the ability to control or power the affected equipment. An open circuit can also result in a change of state for normally energized equipment. For example, a loss of power to the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) solenoid valves [for BWRs] due to an open circuit will result in the closure of the MSIV.
NOTE: The EPRI circuit failure testing Indicated that open circuits are not likely to be the initial fire-induced circuit failure mode. Consideration of this may be helpful within the safe shutdown analysis. Consider the following consequences in the safe shutdown circuil analysis when determining the effects of open circuits:
Loss of electrical continuity may occur within a conductor resulting in de-energizing the circuit and causing a loss of power to, or control of, the required safe shutdown equipment.
In selected cases, a loss of electrical continuity may result in loss of power to an interlocked relay or other device. This loss of power may change the state of the equipment. Evaluate this to determine if equipment fails safe.
Open circuit on a high voltage (e.g., 4.16 kV) ammeter current transformer (CT) circuit may result in secondary damage.
Figure 3.5.2-1 shows an open circuit on a grounded control circuit.
[Refer to hard copy of NEI 00-01 for Figure 3.5.2-1]
Open circuit No. 1:
An open circuit at location No. 1 will prevent operation of the subject equipment.
Open circuit No. 2:
An open circuit at location No. 2 will prevent opening/starting of the subject equipment, but will not impact the ability to close/stop the equipment.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                          Reference Aligns                                            Open circuits are analyzed as shown on the referenced figures from NEI 00-              EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2
: 01. Current transformers (CTs) may induce secondary fires through the fire-              NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis            I induced opening of circuitry associated with the secondary side windings of the CT. Where such circuitry exits in a fire area or provides a common enclosure concern within a fire area, the impact of such secondary fires was properly considered. The following information is being provided to demonstrate that metering and relaying circuits have been analyzed for the potentially adverse impact of fire damage, including, but not limited to open secondary CT windings:
                                                  " Cables associated to suspect secondary CT circuits (4 KV and above) are included in the cable selection of the associated buses as part of the cable selection performed for the EIR, PRA, and NPO required equipment.
                                                  " The cable routing for these circuits and fire areas that the raceways are located in are documented.
                                                  " The cable impacts for secondary CT circuits are evaluated on a Fire Area basis.
The following additional design features were considered:
* CT circuits which do not leave the fire area which contains power supply of Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:10 Page:74of103
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Circuit Analysis Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                    Reference concern were not required to be modeled.
                                                  " CT circuits associated with switchgear feeders to motors, etc. stay within the fire area of the switchgear.
                                                  "Transducers were considered an isolation device and further modeling of the transducer's secondary cables were not required.
                                                  ' CT circuits may provide input into transformer or generator differential circuits. Any imbalance or disturbance on these circuits was considered to isolate the protected device within a few cycles. These were considered to trip the respective feeder as a source of power, however there should be only a low likelihood of a secondary fire.
                                                  " CTs wired in a delta configuration, versus that of a wye configuration, are not subject to failure due to an open circuit on external cables Any imbalance or disturbance on these circuits was considered to isolate the protected device within a few cycles. These were considered to trip the respective feeder as a source of power, however not to cause a secondary fire. The results from the analysis of the secondary CT circuits were used to demonstrate whether or not the redundant systems (i.e. SSF, Train A or Train B as credited) used to achieve and maintain safe and stable conditions were impacted by the failure of the secondary CT open circuit. The results from the analysis were also used to determine whether or not redundant system (i.e.
SSF, Train A or Train B as credited) cables or components were located in the areas of the CT or secondary CT circuit routing. Impact concerns were documented as VFDRs, as necessary. This analysis satisfies the criteria of NFPA 805 and the guidance provided in NEI 00-01, Revision 1. Based on this information, Catawba aligns with the guidance.
Gap Analysis: NEI 00-01 Revision 2 added additional guidance on the open circuit of a high voltage ammeter current transformer (CT) circuit. Catawba properly considered this additional guidance in EIR 51-9183972-002 (Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:10 Page:75of103
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Circuit Analysis NEI 00-01 Ref.                                      NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.5.2.3 Circuit Failures Due to a Hot Short [A,    A Hot Short on Grounded Circuits Grounded Circuits]
A short-to-ground is another failure mode for a grounded control circuit. A short-to-ground as described above would result in de-energizing the circuit. This would further reduce the likelihood for the circuit to change the state of the equipment either from a control switch or due to a hot short.
Nevertheless, a hot short still needs to be considered. Figure 3.5.2-4 shows a typical grounded control circuit that might be used for a motor-operated valve. However, the protective devices and position indication lights that would normally be included in the control circuit for a motor-operated valve have been omitted, since these devices are not required to understand the concepts being explained in this section. In the discussion provided below, it is assumed that a single fire in a given fire area could cause any one of the hot shorts depicted. The following discussion describes how to address the impact of these individual cable faults on the operation of the equipment controlled by this circuit.
[Refer to hard copy of NEI 00-01 Rev. 1 for Figure 3.5.2-4]
Hot short No. 1:
A hot short at this location would energize the close relay and result in the undesired closure of a motor-operated valve.
Hot short No. 2:
A hot short at this location would energize the open relay and result in the undesired opening of a motor-operated valve.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                                Alignment Basis                                                                      Reference Aligns                                              Catawba evaluated fire-induced failure modes such as hot shorts, open                EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - CatawbaNuclear Station Units 1 & 2 circuits, and shorts to ground as required by NEI 00-01. Shorts to ground            NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis included grounded and ungrounded circuits. In the case of a grounded circuit, a short-to-ground on any part of the circuit would present a concern for tripping the circuit isolation device thereby causing a loss of control power. In the case of an ungrounded circuit, postulating only a single short-to-ground on any part of the circuit may not result in tripping the circuit isolation device; another short
                                                    -to-ground on the circuit or another circuit from the same source would need to exist to cause a loss of control power to the circuit. There were no limits on the number of shorts-to-ground that could be caused by the fire. Thus, Catawba aligns with the guidance.
Gap Analysis: NEI 00-01 Revision 2 added additional guidance on the treatment of MOVs per the IN 92-18 failure mode. This included consideration of location of operation of the affected valve, such as remote shutdown panel or local manual operation using the handwheel. The guidance discussed the need to perform additional analysis to ensure the valve can be operated using the handwheel and does not damage the MOV pressure boundary. The Catawba Manual Action Feasibility analysis would have considered this guidance in its analysis but there were no MOV which required recovery actions as a result of the FREs.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                      Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:11 Page: 80 of 103
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Circuit Analysis NEI 00-01 Ref.                                      NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.5.2.3 Circuit Failures Due to a Hot Short [B,    A Hot Short on Ungrounded Circuits Ungrounded Circuits]
In the case of an ungrounded circuit, a single hot short may be sufficient to cause a spurious operation. A single hot short can cause a spurious operation ifthe hot short comes from a circuit from the positive leg of the same ungrounded source as the affected circuit.
In reviewing each of these cases, the common denominator is that in every case, the conductor in the circuit between the control switch and the start/stop coil must be involved.
Figure 3.5.2-5 depicted below shows a typical ungrounded control circuit that might be used for a motor-operated valve. However, the protective devices and position indication lights that would normally be included in the control circuit for a motor-operated valve have been omitted, since these devices are not required to understand the concepts being explained in this section.
In the discussion provided below, it is assumed that a single fire in a given fire area could cause any one of the hot shorts depicted. The discussion provided below describes how to address the impact of these cable faults on the operation of the equipment controlled by this circuit.
[Refer to hard copy of NEI 00-01 Rev. 1 for Figure 3.5.2-5]
Hot short No. 1:
A hot short at this location from the same control power source would energize the close relay and result in the undesired closure of a motor operated valve.
Hot short No. 2:
A hot short at this location from the same control power source would energize the open relay and result in the undesired opening of a motor operated valve.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                                Alignment Basis                                                                      Reference Aligns                                              Catawba evaluated fire-induced failure modes such as hot shorts, open                EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 circuits, and shorts to ground as required by NEI 00-01. Shorts to ground            NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis included grounded and ungrounded circuits. In the case of a grounded circuit, a short-to-ground on any part of the circuit would present a concem for tripping the circuit isolation device thereby causing a loss of control power. In the case of an ungrounded circuit, postulating only a single short-to-ground on any part of the circuit may not result in tripping the circuit isolation device; another short
                                                    -to-ground on the circuit or another circuit from the same source would need to exist to cause a loss of control power to the circuit. There were no limits on the number of shorts-to-ground that could be caused by the fire. Thus, Catawba aligns with the guidance.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                      Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:11 Page: 81 of 103
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.4 Fire Area Assessment.
NEI 00-01 Ref.                                  NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.4.1.4 [Manual Actions]                        Use manual actions where appropriate to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown conditions in accordance with NRC requirements.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                            Alignment Basis                                                                  Reference Aligns                                          VFDR resolutions in the performance based FREs included recovery actions        EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 as potential mitigating actions to maintain a safe and stable condition for the  NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis operational effects of fire damage. Recovery actions are demonstrated to be feasible in accordance with the NRC endorsed requirements in FAQ 07-0030.
These requirements included demonstrating action can be performed, required systems and indications are available, necessary communications are available, emergency lighting, as necessary, is available, any tools, equipment, or keys required are provided, written procedures are provided, sufficient staff is available, actions in the fire area, where necessary, can be performed, actions can be performed in the required time, and training/drills are provided. Thus, Catawba aligns with the guidance.
Comments Manual actions may be justified under the performance-based requirements of NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:12 Page: 92 of 103
 
Attachment B NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review 2.4.2.4 Fire Area Assessment NEI 00-01 Ref.                                  NEI 00-01 Guidance 3.4.1.7 [Consider Additional Equipment)          Consider selecting other equipment that can perform the same safe shutdown function as the impacted equipment. In addressing this situation, each equipment impact, including spurious operations, is to be addressed in accordance with regulatory requirements and the NPP's current licensing basis.
Applicability Applicable Alignment Statement                              Alignment Basis                                                                Reference Aligns                                          Catawba analyzed the affect of fires on all of the plant's safe shutdown        EIR 51-9183972-002 Rev. 2 - Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2 equipment to determine the Variances from the Deterministic Requirements        NFPA-805 Transition - Deterministic Safe Shutdown Analysis (VFDRs) affecting a success path. For the train with the least impact due to the fire, each VFDR was then dispositioned sufficiently to assure a safe shutdown with that train. Thus, Catawba aligns with the guidance.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPD1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:20:13 Page: 95 of 103
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC            Attachment C - NEI 04-02 Table B-3 Fire Area Transition C.      NEI 04-02 Table B Fire Area Transition Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3) 695 Pages Table C NFPA 805 Required Fire Protection Systems and Features 27 Pages 722 Pages Attached Page C-I Rev II                                                                              Page C-1
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  01 (U1) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 01                ND Pump Rm lB El 522 02                ND Pump Rm 1A El 522 03                NS Pump Rm 1B El 522 04                NS Pump Rm 1A El 522 05                ND Pump Rm 2B El 522 06                ND Pump Rm 2A El 522 07                NS Pump Rm 2B El 522 08                NS Pump Rm 2A El 522 212                UO AB FW Recirc Pump Rm El 522 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:07:48 Page: 1 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    01 (Ul) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                      Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                  Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity Control by injecting water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection flow path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                    Pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D"pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                  Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/G B and C. Main feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                  Process monitoring is available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                            Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the I
suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:49 Page: 2 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  01 (Ul) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                  Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                07. Deviation from Item C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 related to standpipe protection in the annulus and pipe tunnel.
Licensing Basis                During the site audit, the NRC observed that manual firefighting capability was deficient throughout the various elevations of the annulus. In addition, the existing hose stations in Fire Area 1 are not capable of reaching all areas of the pipe tunnel.
By letter dated January 17 and February 10, 1984, CNS committed to install an automatic sprinkler system having branch lines on etevations 561 feet, 604 feet and 664 feet. In addition to the automatic sprinklers, CNS committed to install additional line-type heat detectors on six levels of the annulus, located at every other level. CNS also committed to provide additional fire hose, stored in the fire brigade equipment storage area for use in fighting a fire in the pipe tunnel. On the basis of this commitment, the NRC concluded that the fire protection provided for the annulus and pipe tunnel provides an acceptable deviation from Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:49 Page: 3 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    01 (Ul) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression        Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                      System            System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 01                      ND Pump Rm 1B El 522              -                -                  R                        ND pump room walls: R 02                      ND Pump Rm 1A El 522                                                    R                        ND pump room walls: R 03                      NS Pump Rm 1B El 522 04                      NS Pump Rm 1A El 522 05                      ND Pump Rm 2B El 522                                                    R                        ND pump room walls: R 06                      ND Pump Rm 2A El 522                                                    R                        ND pump room walls: R 07                      NS Pump Rm 2B El 522 08                      NS Pump Rm 2A El 522 212                      UO AB FW Recirc Pump Rm El 522 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:49 Page: 4 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    01 (Ul) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                                                Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance oasis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 01 (Ul)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
ACDF                              Units: [1] 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [1] 0.00E+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
The interior, non-fire area boundary, 3 hour rated walls enclosing the individual residual heat removal pump rooms within the fire area are credited to limit the zone of influence, but no automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for SIGs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through these S/Gs (via CA-48 and/or CA-52) did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:49 Page: 5 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    01 (U1) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          1 (U1)-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Equipment Sump 1A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/1612015 14:07:49    Page: 6 of 695
 
O,                                                                                  0                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  01 (U2) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 01                ND Pump Rm 1B El 522 02                ND Pump Rm 1A El 522 03                NS Pump Rm 1B El 522 04                NS Pump Rm 1A El 522 05                ND Pump Rm 2B El 522 06                ND Pump Rm 2A El 522 07                NS Pump Rm 2B El 522 08                NS Pump Rm 2A El 522 212                UO AB FW Recirc Pump Rm El 522 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:49 Page: 7 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    01 (U2) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                      Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                  Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection flow path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                    Pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D"pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                  Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/G B and C. Main feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring function                  Process monitoring is available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                            Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                        I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:50 Page: 8 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    01 (U2) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                  Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                07. Deviation from Item C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 related to standpipe protection in the annulus and pipe tunnel.
Licensing Basis                  During the site audit, the NRC observed that manual firefighting capability was deficient throughout the various elevations of the annulus. In addition, the existing hose stations in Fire Area 1 are not capable of reaching all areas of the pipe tunnel.
By letter dated January 17 and February 10, 1984, CNS committed to install an automatic sprinkler system having branch lines on elevations 561 feet, 604 feet and 664 feet. In addition to the automatic sprinklers, CNS committed to install additional line-type heat detectors on six levels of the annulus, located at every other level. CNS also committed to provide additional fire hose, stored in the fire brigade equipment storage area for use in fighting a fire in the pipe tunnel. On the basis of this commitment, the NRC concluded that the fire protection provided for the annulus and pipe tunnel provides an acceptable deviation from Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02116/2015 14:07:50      Page: 9 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    01 (U2) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 01                      ND Pump Rm 1B El 522              -                -                  R                        ND pump room walls: R 02                      ND Pump Rm IA El 522                                                    R                        ND pump room walls: R 03                      NS Pump Rm 1B El 522 04                      NS Pump Rm 1A El 522 05                      ND Pump Rm 2B El 522                                                    R                        ND pump room walls: R 06                      ND Pump Rm 2A El 522                                                    R                        ND pump room walls: R 07                      NS Pump Rm 2B El 522 08                      NS Pump Rm 2A El 522 212                    UO AB FW Recirc Pump Rm El 522 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:50 Page: 10 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    01 (U2) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                                                Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 01 (U2)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1 E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
The interior, non-fire area boundary, 3 hour rated walls enclosing the individual residual heat removal pump rooms within the fire area are credited to limit the zone of influence, but no automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through these S/Gs (via CA-48 and/or CA-52) clid not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:50 Page: 11 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    01 (U2) - ND & NS Pump Room El 522 (Common)                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          1 (U2)-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Equipment Sump 2A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:50 Page: 12 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                              Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 19GEN            Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:51  Page: 13 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/G B and C. Main Feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                            I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:51  Page: 14 of 695
 
S                                                                                                                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                    Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                  " B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
                                  " C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                  " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                  " F-AX-348-W-088
                                  " J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure.
* Limited combustibles.
                                  " Fire brigade response.
* Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
* Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 03 Fire Penetration Evaluation for AFW Pump Ceiling Penetrations with Seal Material Beyond the Barrier Plane Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the large blockouts within the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room hatch covers that contain seal material that is not located within the barrier plane and are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006.
The evaluation determined that penetrations C-AX-217-F-026, C-AX-217-F-029, C-AX-260-F-027, and C-AX-260-F-028 are not considered qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. However they are considered acceptable for the fire hazards present and acceptable based on the following:
                                  "Seal sidewalls perpendicular to the ceiling surface are protected from direct flame impingement by either a vertical wall barrier or a steel member.
                                  " Penetration sides protected by a wall are considered to perform in a manner consistent with the fire tested configurations of detail M-6 per DPC 1435.00                                    0006.
                                  "Seal sidewall is considered equivalent to locating the seal within the barrier plane because it is protected by concrete construction.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPD1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:51 Page:15of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                    Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                " H-AX-515-W-01 3
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                "Acceptable for the Category I (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                "The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP 1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:51 Page: 16 of 695
 
S                                                                                            0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
* Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 14 Evaluation of Gaps in Concrete Hatch Covers Revision                        4 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the gaps (maximum 1 inch x I inch) in the six hatch openings that exist in a floor that separates redundant shutdown trains. The six hatch openings are in barriers that separate Fire Areas (FAs) 2 from 7, 3 from 8, 7 from 14, 8 from 15, 14 from 19 and 15 from 20.
The evaluation determined the hatch openings to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
e floor area of approximately 2800 sq. ft. or greater in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 15, 19, and 20,
* ceiling heights of 16 ft. in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, and 15, Oforced ventilation of 3000 cfm in FA's 2 and 3,
                                &forced ventilation of 10,400 cfm in FA's 7, 8, 14, and 15, e limited ignition sources, 0 limited in situ combustibles, e automatic water suppression systems are not installed above hatch openings,
* existing flood control features.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:51      Page: 17 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                    Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 19GEN                  Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543        E, R              E, R                E, D                    Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Gaseous Suppression, Installed Automatic C02: E R Transient Control: D Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/1612015 14:07:52 Page: 18 of 695
 
0                                                                                                                                                                                            S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 02 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF. The delta risk results for delta CDF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 1.67E-07 A LERF                            Units: [2] 5.91E-09 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF and the delta risk results for CDF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
The C02 system was credited in preventing room burnout due to HGL formation. Automatic and manual suppression is credited in screening this fire area from development of MCA scenarios. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient and hotwork fires are a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore it is recommended for DID to make the area within coordinates AA-BB1/62-63 an exclusion area. Present hot work controls are sufficient and no enhancements are required.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through these S/Gs (via CA-48 and/or CA-52) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The risk of the associated operator action did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause both valves to spuriously open. Also, it may not be possible to close the isolation valve due to a possible loss of offsite power. However primary control station actions to swap the SSF disconnect plugs will cause the PORVs to fail closed and no additional actions are required for DID.
No Risk enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:52 Page: 19 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          2-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Drven Pump Flow to S/G 2C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may cause maloperation of the solenoid, action may be taken to manually fail the valve open from the Control Room via controllers. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2C Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          2-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2B, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may cause maloperation of the solenoid, action may be taken to manually fail the valve open from the Control Room via controllers. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2B Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          2-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Condenser Cooling Water to Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Suction, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by HEMYC wrapped cable failures (2CA 673, 2 CA 693, and 2 CA 875). Suction from Hotwell remains available. Suction from circ water shows cables that are wrapped with HEMYC. Once opened, will not fail shut but controls will fault due to cable failures. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0174 - Condenser Cooling Water to Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:52 Page: 20 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          2-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Condenser Cooling Water to Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Suction, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by HEMYC wrapped cable failures (2 CA 674, 2 CA 694, and 2 CA 875). Suction from Hotwell remains available. Suction from circ water shows cables that are wrapped with HEMYC. Once opened, will not fail shut but controls will fault due to cable failures. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0175 - Condenser Cooling Water to Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          2-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 2EPEMXEMXS, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by coordination concem for 2EPEMXEMXS.
Cables 2*WL 561 and 2*WL 790 are routed in a raceway that is wrapped with a HEMYC fire barrier (see CN -2891-01.01). Failure of either of these cables will cause a loss of motive (2*WL 561) and control (2*WL 790) power. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2EPEMXEMXS-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 2EPEMXEMXS Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          2-VFDR-09 VFDR                              Pressurizer Heater Group 2A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 2A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:52 Page: 21 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        2-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2B, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 2B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        2-VFDR-18 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power (loss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area) before closure can be accomplished. Also, all PORVs can spuriously open due to cable failures prior to the swapping of the SSF disconnect plugs. The PORVs will fail closed once the SSF disconnects are pulled. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        2-VFDR-19 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power (loss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area) before closure can be accomplished. Also, all PORVs can spuriously open due to cable failures prior to the swapping of the SSF disconnect plugs. The PORVs will fail closed once the SSF disconnects are pulled. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:53 Page: 22 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    02 - Unit 2 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          2-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power floss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area) before closure can be accomplished. Also, all PORVs can spuriously open due to cable failures prior to the swapping of the SSF disconnect plugs. The PORVs will fail closed once the SSF disconnects are pulled. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          2-VFDR-21 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Stop Valve, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits that could spuriously open/close valve.
The cables required for control from the SSF (SDSP2 Breaker 2) are all fire wrapped with HEMYC. (2*CA 743, 2*CA 760, 2*CA 761, 2*CA 762, 2*CA 763, 2*CA 770, 2*CA 795). These cables could spuriously open/close the valve. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SA VA0145 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Stop Valve Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          2-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Sump Pump 2A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by a coordination concern for 2EPEMXEMXSA.
Cables 2*WL 561 and 2*WL 790 are routed in a raceway that is wrapped with a HEMYC fire barrier (see CN -2891-01.01). Failure o1 either of these cables will cause a loss of motive (2*WL 561) and control (2*WL 790) power. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2WL PUATS - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Sump Pump 2A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:53 Page: 23 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                              Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 9GEN              Unit 1 CA Pump Rm Gen Area El 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:53 Page: 24 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D"pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/G B and C. Main Feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the I
suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:54 Page: 25 of 695
 
S                                                                                            0                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
e B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
* C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                " F-AX-348-W-088
* J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                " Limited combustibles.
                                " Fire brigade response.
                                " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
                                " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 03 Fire Penetration Evaluation for AFW Pump Ceiling Penetrations with Seal Material Beyond the Barrier Plane Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the large blockouts within the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room hatch covers that contain seal material that is not located within the barrier plane and are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006.
The evaluation determined that penetrations C-AX-217-F-026, C-AX-217-F-029, C-AX-260-F-027, and C-AX-260-F-028 are not considered qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. However they are considered acceptable for the fire hazards present and acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Seal sidewalls perpendicular to the ceiling surface are protected from direct flame impingement by either a vertical wall barrier or a steel member.
                                  " Penetration sides protected by a wall are considered to perform in a manner consistent with the fire tested configurations of detail M-6 per DPC 1435.00                                    0006.
                                  " Seal sidewall is considered equivalent to locating the seal within the barrier plane because it is protected by concrete construction.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:54 Page: 26 of 695
 
O                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                    Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  "C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029 "C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, "C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                  " H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                  " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010 "J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008 "J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                  "Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                  "Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                  " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:54 Page: 27 of 695
 
S                                                                                              S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
e Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
* Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 14 Evaluation of Gaps in Concrete Hatch Covers Revision                        4 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the gaps (maximum 1 inch x 1 inch) in the six hatch openings that exist in a floor that separates redundant shutdown trains. The six hatch openings are in barriers that separate Fire Areas (FA's) 2 from 7, 3 from 8, 7 from 14, 8 from 15, 14 from 19 and 15 from 20.
The evaluation determined the hatch openings to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
9floor area of approximately 2800 sq. ft. or greater in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 15, 19, and 20,
* ceiling heights of 16 ft. in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, and 15, "forced ventilation of 3000 cfm in FA's 2 and 3,
                                  *forced ventilation of 10,400 cfm in FA's 7, 8, 14, and 15,
                                  " limited ignition sources,
* limited in situ combustibles,
* automatic water suppression systems are not installed above hatch openings, e existing flood control features.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:54 Page: 28 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                    Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 9GEN                    Unit 1 CA Pump Rm Gen Area El      E, R              E, R                E, D                    Combustible Loading: E 543                                                                                              Detection System, Installed: E R Gaseous Suppression, Installed Automatic C02: E R Transient Control: D Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:54 Page: 29 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 03 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF. The delta risk results for delta CDF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
ACDF                            Units: [1] 2.08E-07 A LERF                          Units: [1] 6.60E-09 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF and the delta risk results for CDF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
The C02 system was credited in preventing room burnout due to HGL formation. Automatic and manual suppression is credited in screening this fire area from development of MCA scenarios. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient and hot-work fires are a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore make the area within coordinates AA-BB/51-52 a transient exclusion area. Present hot work controls are sufficient and no enhancements are required.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through these S/Gs (via CA-48 and/or CA-52) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The risk of the associated operator action did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause both valves to spuriously open. Also, it may not be possible to close the isolation valve due to a possible loss of offsite power. However primary control station actions to swap the SSF disconnect plugs will cause the PORVs to fail closed and no additional actions are required for DID.
No Risk enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:54    Page: 30 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        3-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G IC, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may cause maloperation of the solenoid. Action may be taken to manually fail the valve open from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1C Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        3-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1B, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable failures may cause maloperation of the solenoid. Action may be taken to manually fail the valve open from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1B Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        3-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Condenser Cooling Water to Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Suction, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits which may cause loss of control. Once opened, valve will not fail shut but controls will fault. Cables required for operation from the SSF are shown as HEMYC wrapped (1 CA 673).
Suction from Hotwell remains available. Suction from circ water shows cables that are wrapped with HEMYC. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0174 - Condenser Cooling Water to Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:07:55 Page: 31 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          3-VFDR-05 VFDR                              Condenser Cooling Water to Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Suction, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits which may cause loss of control. Once opened, valve will not fail shut but controls will fault. Cables required for operation from the SSF are shown as HEMYC wrapped (1 CA 674).
Suction from Hotwell remains available. Suction from circ water shows cables that are wrapped with HEMYC. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1CA VA0175 - Condenser Cooling Water to Turbine Auxiliary Feedwater Suction Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          3-VFDR-07 VFDR                              Non-Coordinated Loads fed from IEPEMXEMXS, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by a coordination concern for 1EPEMXEMSE due to cable hits for 1WL PUATS (IVWL 561) routed through Fire Area 3. However, the raceway containing the cable is covered with the HEMYC wrap fire barrier. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1EPEMXEMXS-NCL - Non-Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXS Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          3-VFDR-08 VFDR                              Pressurizer Heater Group 1A, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1iLE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 1A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:55 Page: 32 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          3-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1B, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 1B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        3-VFDR-18 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures and a possible loss of power (loss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area). PORV can spuriously open due to cable failures prior to the pulling of the SSF disconnect plugs. The PORVs will fail closed once the SSF disconnects are pulled. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        3-VFDR-19 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures and a possible loss of power (loss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area). PORV can spuriously open due to cable failures prior to the pulling of the SSF disconnect plugs. The PORVs will fail closed once the SSF disconnects are pulled. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02116/2015 14:07:55 Page: 33 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    03 - Unit 1 CA Pump Room El 543                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          3-VFDR-20 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures and a possible loss of power (loss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area). PORV can spuriously open due to cable failures prior to the pulling of the SSF disconnect plugs. The PORVs will fail closed once the SSF disconnects are pulled. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          3-VFDR-37 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Stop Valve, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits which may cause the valve to spuriously open or close. The cables required for control from the SSF (SDSPI Breaker 2) are all fire wrapped with HEMYC. (1*CA 743, 1*CA 760, 1*CA 761, I-CA 762, 1*CA 763, 1*CA 770, 1*CA 795). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1SA VA0145 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Steam Stop Valve Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDRID                            3-VFDR-38 VFDR                              Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Sump Pump 1A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of either 1*WL 561 or I*WL 790 which will cause a loss of motive (I*WL 561) or control (1 *WL 790) power. These cables are routed in a raceway that is wrapped with a HEMYC fire barrier.
This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safely Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1WL PUATS - Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Sump Pump 1A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:56 Page: 34 of 695
 
0                                    ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U1) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 10                Ul AB Mech Pen Rm El 543 11                U1 AB SE Corridor El 543 12                U1 PD Pump Rm El 543 13                NI Pump Rm 1B El 543 14                NI Pump Rm 1A El 543 15                NV Pump Rm 1B El 543 16                NV Pump Rm 1A El 543 17                U1 AB Open Area El 543 18                U1 AB Cable Shaft Area El 543 185                U2 AB Rm 203, 205, 205A, 206A, 206B, 207 & 209A El 543 20                U2 AB Mech Pen Rm El 543 21                U2 AB NE Corridor El 543 22                U2 PD Pump Rm El 543 23                NI Pump Rm 2B El 543 24                NI Pump Rm 2A El 543 25                NV Pump Rm 2B El 543 26                NV Pump Rm 2A El 543 27                U2 AB Open Area El 543 28                U2 AB Cable Shaft Area El 543 31                Ul AB Mech Pen Rm West El 560 32                U1 AB Mech Pen Rm East El 560 43                U2 AB Mech Pen Rm West El 560 44                U2 AB Mech Pen Rm East El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:56 Page: 35 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FireArea ID:
Fire Area ID:                    04 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/G B and C. Main Feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:56 Page: 36 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  04 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                        Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                "Area is normally attended "The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                "The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:57 Page: 37 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
* B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
* C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                  " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                  " F-AX-348-W-088
                                  " J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                  " Limited combustibles.
                                  " Fire brigade response.
                                  " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
                                  " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 04 Fire Protection Evaluation for Floor Blockout Penetrations with a Free Area in Excess of 9 sqft. and Structural Framing Spans Exceeding 42 in. without a Cross Member Framing Revision                          1 Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following floor blockouts regarding the framing support provided for the Silicone Foam free areas exceeding 9 sqft. that are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
* H-AX-517A-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517A-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-003
                                  " K-AX-653-F-001 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:57 Page: 38 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  04 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
                                " K-AX-653-F-032
                                " K-AX-653-F-003
* J-AX-650A-F-001 The evaluation determined that the Unit 1 and 2 Exterior Doghouse penetrations (J-AX-650A-F-001) are qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. The remaining penetrations above are considered adequate for the area fire hazards based on the following:
* Detection available in fire areas of concern.
* Area hose stations and fire extinguishers.
                                " Fire brigade response.
                                " Seal and framing configurations for the penetrations are considered adequate.
                                " Seal integrity is not anticipated to be compromised by fire exposure.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 12 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrants with Nonstandard Seal Configurations Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following penetrations, which are located in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers, regarding non-standard seal configurations not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                " D-AX-354A-W-052 through D-AX-354A-W-056
                                " D-AX-354A-W-095, D-AX-354A-W-096 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                " No combustibles are present in the proximity of the penetration and barrier interface.
                                " Penetration types are non-combustible.
                                " Penetrations are located in covered pipe trenches not subject to direct flame impingement.
                                " Pipe trenches contain limited combustibles.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:57 Page: 39 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U1) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                " Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
                                " Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:57 Page: 40 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                      System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 10                      U1 AB Mech Pen Rm El 543          -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R 11                      Ul AB SE Corridor El 543 12                      Ul PD Pump Rm El 543 13                      NI Pump Rm 1B El 543 14                      NI Pump Rm 1A El 543 15                      NV Pump Rm lB El 543                                                    R                        Fire rated pump room walls: R 16                      NV Pump Rm 1A El 543                                                    R                        Fire rated pump room walls: R 17                      U1 AB Open Area El 543 18                      U1 AB Cable Shaft Area El 543                                          E                        Combustible Loading: E 185                    U2 AB Rm 203, 205, 205A, 206A, 206B, 207 & 209A El 543 20                      U2 AB Mech Pen Rm El 543                            E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R 21                      U2 AB NE Corridor El 543 22                      U2 PD Pump Rm El 543 23                      NI Pump Rm 2B El 543 24                      NI Pump Rm 2A El 543 25                      NV Pump Rm 28 El 543                                                    R                        Fire rated pump room walls: R 26                      NV Pump Rm 2A El 543                                                    R                        Fire rated pump room walls: R 27                      U2 AB Open Area El 543 28                      U2 AB Cable Shaft Area El 543                                          E                        Combustible Loading: E 31                      Ul AB Mech Pen Rm West El 560 32                      Ul AB Mech Pen Rm East El 560 43                      U2 AB Mech Pen Rm West El 560 44                      U2 AB Mech Pen Rm East El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:07:57 Page: 41 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  04 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                                  Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 04 (Ul)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: (1] 2.20E-09 A LERF                          Units: [1] 3.56E-11 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
The interior, non-fire area boundary, 3 hour rated walls enclosing the individual charging pump rooms within the fire area are credited to limit the zone of influence for a pump fire. Manual suppression was credited in HGL evaluations for FZ 10 and 20. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not significant sources of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through these S/Gs (via CA-48 and/or CA-52) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The risk of the associated operator action did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended. Valves CA-48 and CA-52 are located in Fire Area 4; thus valves CA-50A and CA-54B will be throttled instead.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:57 Page: 42 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  04 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        4 (U1)-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #1 to S/G 1D, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may cause the valve to fail to operate on demand. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0036 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #1 to S/G 1D Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        4 (U1)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure AP/0/A/5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challengethe Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) for 1CA VA0050A required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        4 (U1)-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1B, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure APIO/A/5500/045 or OP/O/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 1B Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) for 1CA VA0054B required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        4 (Ul)-VFDR-21 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 1*NI 557 and INI 587. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INI VA0010B - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:58 Page: 43 of 695
 
0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          4 (U1)-VFDR-26 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and not utilized for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable I*NV 506. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          4 (Ul )-VFDR-27 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and not utilized for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 1*NV 545. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          4 (U1)-VFDR-28 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated fiowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02116/2015 14:07:58 Page: 44 of 695
 
0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          4 (U1)-VFDR-31 VFDR                            Solenoid operated valve providing floor drain sump D discharge to RHR and containment spray sump, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by the cable, valves and switches located in the fire area that may cause spurious operation or failure to operate. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1WL VA0847 - Solenoid operated valve providing floor drain sump D discharge to RHR and containment spray sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          4 (U1)-VFDR-32 VFDR                              Solenoid operated valve providing floor drain sump D discharge to turbine building sump, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by the cable, valves and switches located in the fire area that may cause spurious operation or failure to operate. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1WL VA0848 - Solenoid operated valve providing floor drain sump D discharge to turbine building sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:58 Page: 45 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 10                U1 AB Mech Pen Rm El 543 11                U1 AB SE Corridor El 543 12                U1 PD Pump Rm El 543 13                NI Pump Rm 1B El 543 14                NI Pump Rm 1A El 543 15                NV Pump Rm 1B El 543 16                NV Pump Rm 1A El 543 17                U1 AB Open Area El 543 18                U1 AB Cable Shaft Area El 543 185                U2 AB Rm 203, 205, 205A, 206A, 206B, 207 & 209A El 543 20                U2 AB Mech Pen Rm El 543 21                U2 AB NE Corridor El 543 22                U2 PD Pump Rm El 543 23                NI Pump Rm 2B El 543 24                NI Pump Rm 2A El 543 25                NV Pump Rm 2B El 543 26                NV Pump Rm 2A El 543 27                U2 AB Open Area El 543 28                U2 AB Cable Shaft Area El 543 31                U1 AB Mech Pen Rm West El 560 32                U1 AB Mech Pen Rm East El 560 43                U2 AB Mech Pen Rm West El 560 44                U2 AB Mech Pen Rm East El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:07:59 Page: 46 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/G B and C. Main Feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:59 Page: 47 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                        Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
* Area is normally attended "The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                "The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements.. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:59 Page: 48 of 695
 
S                                                                                            0                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
a B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
                                  *C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023 "C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                  " F-AX-348-W-088
* J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
* Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                  " Limited combustibles.
                                  " Fire brigade response.
* Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
e Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 04 Fire Protection Evaluation for Floor Blockout Penetrations with a Free Area in Excess of 9 sqft. and Structural Framing Spans Exceeding 42 in. without a Cross Member Framing Revision                          1 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following floor blockouts regarding the framing support provided for the Silicone Foam free areas exceeding 9 sqft. that are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
* H-AX-517A-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517A-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-003
                                  " K-AX-653-F-001 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:59 Page: 49 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
                                " K-AX-653-F-032
                                " K-AX-653-F-003
                                " J-AX-650A-F-001 The evaluation determined that the Unit I and 2 Exterior Doghouse penetrations (J-AX-650A-F-001) are qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. The remaining penetrations above are considered adequate for the area fire hazards based on the following:
* Detection available in fire areas of concern.
                                " Area hose stations and fire extinguishers.
* Fire brigade response.
                                " Seal and framing configurations for the penetrations are considered adequate.
                                " Seal integrity is not anticipated to be compromised by fire exposure.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 12 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrants with Nonstandard Seal Configurations Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following penetrations, which are located in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers, regarding non-standard seal configurations not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
* D-AX-354A-W-052 through D-AX-354A-W-056
                                " D-AX-354A-W-095, D-AX-354A-W-096 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                " No combustibles are present in the proximity of the penetration and barrier interface.
                                " Penetration types are non-combustible.
* Penetrations are located in covered pipe trenches not subject to direct flame impingement.
                                " Pipe trenches contain limited combustibles.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:07:59 Page: 50 of 695
 
a Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                              Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential In situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
o Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:00 Page: 51 of 695
 
0                                                                                      0                                                                                      1 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 10                      U1 AB Mech Pen Rm El 543          -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R 11                      U1 AB SE Corridor El 543 12                      U1 PD Pump Rm El 543 13                      NI Pump Rm 1B El 543 14                      NI Pump Rm 1A El 543 15                      NV Pump Rm 1B El 543                                                    R                        Fire rated pump room walls: R 16                      NV Pump Rm 1A El 543                                                    R                        Fire rated pump room walls: R 17                      Ul AB Open Area El 543 18                      U1 AB Cable Shaft Area El 543                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 185                      U2 AB Rm 203, 205, 205A, 206A, 206B, 207 & 209A El 543 20                      U2 AB Mech Pen Rm El 543                            E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R 21                      U2 AB NE Corridor El 543 22                      U2 PD Pump Rm El 543 23                      NI Pump Rm 2B El 543 24                      NI Pump Rm 2A El 543 25                      NV Pump Rm 2B El 543                                                    R                        Fire rated pump room walls: R 26                      NV Pump Rm 2A El 543                                                    R                        Fire rated pump room walls: R 27                      U2 AB Open Area El 543 28                      U2 AB Cable Shaft Area El 543                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 31                      U1 AB Mech Pen Rm West El 560 32                      Ul AB Mech Pen Rm East El 560 43                      U2 AB Mech Pen Rm West El 560 44                      U2 AB Mech Pen Rm East El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:00 Page: 52 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                                  Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 04 (U2)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 2.07E-10 A LERF                            Units: [2] 2.70E-12 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
The interior, non-fire area boundary, 3 hour rated walls enclosing the individual charging pump rooms within the fire area are credited to limit the zone of influence for a pump fire. Manual suppression was credited in HGL evaluations for FZ 10 and 20. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through these S/Gs (via CA-48 and/or CA-52) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The risk of the associated operator action did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended. Valves CA-48 and CA-52 are located in Fire Area 4; thus valves CA-50A and CA-54B will be throttled instead.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:00 Page: 53 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          4 (U2)-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #2 to S/G 2D, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may cause the valve to fail to operate on demand. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2CA VA0036 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #2 to S/G 2D Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          4 (U2)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by being located in the fire area which may cause the valve to not fail as required. It would normally fail open on transfer to the SSS. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2C Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) for 2CA VA0050A required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          4 (U2)-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2B, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by being located in the fire area which may cause the valve to not fail as required. It would normally fail open on transfer to the SSS. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2B Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) for 2CA VA0054B required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          4 (U2)-VFDR-24 VFDR                              NV PMP C/L INJ ISOL, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 2*NI 557 and 2*NI 587. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NI VA0010B - NV PMP C/L INJ ISOL Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:00 Page: 54 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        4 (U2)-VFDR-35 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and not utilized for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 2*NV 506. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        4 (U2)-VFDR-36 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and not utilized for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 2*NV 545. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        4 (U2)-VFDR-37 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:01      Page: 55 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    04 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & NV Pump Room El 543 (Common)                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          4 (U2)-VFDR-40 VFDR                            Solenoid operated valve providing floor drain sump C discharge to RHR and Containment Spray sump, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by the cable, valves and switches located in the fire area that may cause spurious operation or failure to operate. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4-2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2WL VA0847 - Solenoid operated valve providing floor drain sump C discharge to RHR and Containment Spray sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          4 (U2)-VFDR-41 VFDR                            Solenoid operated valve providing floor drain sump C discharge to turbine building sump, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by the cable, valves and switches located in the fire area that may cause spurious operation or failure to operate. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2WL VA0848 - Solenoid operated valve providing floor drain sump C discharge to turbine building sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:01 Page: 56 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                      Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 42                U2 AB Elect Pen Rm El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:01 Page: 57 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                          Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                    Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                          Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                      Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                      Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                      Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:01 Page: 58 of 695
 
0                                              0                                                                                                0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                            Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Perfonrnance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
* Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:02 Page: 59 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                              Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                  " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                  " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                  " H-AX-515-W-0 13
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                  " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                  " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                  " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
* Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                  'The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 08 Deletion of U1/U2, A and B Train Switchgear Room/Elect Pen Room Walls from Scope of Committed Fire Bariers (CNCE-10095)
Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:02 Page: 60 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                  Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the technical justification for removing the walls between the Essential Switchgear Rooms and their respective penetration rooms from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Essential Switchgear Room/Electrical Pen Room walls can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                  " Areas adjacent to walls have smoke detection.
                                  " Fire and smoke would be obstructed from propagating.
                                  " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                  " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                  " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                  " Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
                                  ' Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:02 Page: 61 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                            Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required      Required Suppression    Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System        System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 42                      U2 AB Elect Pen Rm El 560            -              E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:02 Page: 62 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 05 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 3.18E-07 A LERF                            Units: [2] 3.08E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from dosing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:02 Page: 63 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basisz                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Flow to SIG 2B, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2 CA 726) which may fail valve open.
This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0056 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A Flow to SIG 2B Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A to SIG 2A, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2 CA 727) which may fail valve open. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0060 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2A to SIG 2A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-04 VFDR                              2A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge to 2A S/G, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 2*CA 559 that may cause valve to spuriously open or close. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0062A - 2A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Discharge to 2A SIG Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-05 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV Block Valve, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2*ATC 515, 2*ATC 539, 2*ATC 667, 2*NC 579, 2*NC 583, 2*NC 586, 2*NC 814, 2*NC 815 and 2*NC 816 and loss of power prevent block valve operation. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NC VA0031 B - Pressurizer PORV Block Valve Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:03  Page: 64 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2*ATC 623, 2*NC 760, 2*NC 821, 2*NC 830, 2*NC 836, 2*NC 956 and 2*NV 818 may cause spurious operation of PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV block valve, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2*ATC 515, 2*ATC 539, 2*ATC 667, 2*NC 579, 2*NC 583, 2*NC 586, 2*NC 814, 2*NC 815 and 2*NC 816 and loss of power prevent block valve operation. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV block valve Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2*ATC 623, 2*NC 760, 2*NC 821, 2*NC 830, 2*NC 836, 2*NC 956 and 2*NV 818 may cause spurious operation of PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-09 VFDR                            2B Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS PUB (2*NS 549, 2*RN 660) along with an SSPS permissive which may spuriously start the pump. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS PUB - 2B Containment Spray Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:03 Page: 65 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 2B Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a loss of power. Valve will remain open resulting in possible diversion of FWST to the containment. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0003B - Containment Spray Pump 2B Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 2B Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2*NS 561) may spuriously open valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0012B - Containment Spray Header 2B Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-12 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 2B Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2*NS 561) may spuriously open valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VAOO15B - Containment Spray Header 2B Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2*NV 638) may spuriously open valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA01 22B - Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:03 Page: 66 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-14 VFDR                            Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2*NV 638) may spuriously open valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0123B - Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-15 VFDR                            2A and 2B Chemical and Volume Control Pumps recirculation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2*RN 665) may spuriously close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0202B - 2A and 2B Chemical and Volume Control Pumps recirculation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-16 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a potential loss of instrument air (IAnot credited). 2NV VA0294 fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:04 Page: 67 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-17 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by various cable hits which may spuriously operate valve. 2NV VA0309 fails open on loss of air, this may require manually operating manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-31 1. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-19 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by spurious SSPS and various cable hits (2*CA 611, 2*NV 534, 2*NV 545) which may spuriously close valve and open SI valves. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA03148 - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-20 VFDR                            S/G 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0013 - S/G 2B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-21 VFDR                            S/G 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits (2*SV 633, 2*SV 639), loss of IA and limited supply of nitrogen which will require manual operation after 8 hours. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - S/G 2A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run.: 02/16/2015 14:08:04 Page: 68 of 695
* 0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    05 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          5-VFDR-22 VFDR                            2A S/G PORV isolation, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation the S/G PORV block valve due to failure of cable 2*SV 662 that may cause the valve to open or close. Cable hits may spuriously open the PORV, and prevent closing the block valve. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0027A - 2A S/G PORV isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:04 Page: 69 of 695
 
S                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                      Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 30                U1 AB Elect Pen Rm El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:04 Page: 70 of 695
 
0                                                                                              0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                        Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                    Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                          Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                      Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks with manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                      Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                      Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:05 Page: 71 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                            P reviously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:05 Page: 72 of 695
* 0                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    06 - Unit I Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                              Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                  " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                  " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                  " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                  " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                  " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                  " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                  " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 08 Deletion of U1/U2, A and B Train Switchgear Room/Elect Pen Room Walls from Scope of Committed Fire Bariers (CNCE-10095)
Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:05 Page: 73 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                  Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the technical justification for removing the walls between the Essential Switchgear Rooms and their respective penetration rooms from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Essential Switchgear Room/Electrical Pen Room walls can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                " Areas adjacent to walls have smoke detection.
                                " Fire and smoke would be obstructed from propagating.
* Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
* Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:05 Page: 74 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                            Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required      Required Suppression    Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System        System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 30                      Ul AB Elect Pen Rm El 560            -              E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:05 Page: 75 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 06 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 5.82E-07 A LERF                            Units: [1] 6.51E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:06 Page: 76 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A to S/G 1A, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 1*CA 559 that may spuriously open or close valve. If valve closes and cannot be re-opened, S/G 1A would be isolated from auxiliary feedwater flow, leaving only S/G 1B available for decay heat removal cooldown. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0062A - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A to S/G 1A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failure and loss of power to 1FW VA0055B which then cannot be shut from the MCR. Failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indications may cause a FWST Low Level signal which will open 1NI-184B and cause a diversion path from the FWST to the containment sump. 1FW-55B fails as is (normally open) on a loss of power. Valves 1NI-184B or 1FW-55B are required to be closed to maintain FWST supply. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1FW VA0055B - Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits (I*ATC 515, I*ATC 539, IPATC 667, 1*NC 579, I*NC 583, 1*NC 586, 1*NC 814, 1*NC 815 and I*NC 816) which may spuriously open PORV and prevent closing PORV isolation. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0031 B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:06 Page: 77 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits (1*ATC 623, 1*NC 760, I*NC 821, 1*NC 830, 1*NC 836, 1*NC 956 and I*NV 818)) which may spuriously open PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-10 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits (I*ATC 515, 1*ATC 539, I*ATC 667, I*NC 579, I*NC 583, I*NC 586, 1*NC 814, I*NC 815 and I*NC 816) which may spuriously open PORV and prevent closing PORV isolation. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits (I*ATC 623, I*NC 760, I*NC 821, 1*NC 830, I*NC 836, 1*NC 956 and I*NV 818) which may spuriously open PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-12 VFDR                              Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B Containment Sump Suction, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by cable hits which may cause spurious operation of the valve resulting in possible diversion of the FWST to the containment. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NI VA0184B - Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B Containment Sump Suction Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02116/2015 14:08:06 Page: 78 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    06 - Unit I Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-13 VFDR                            1B Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1*ATC 979, I*NS 549 along with SSPS permissive may spuriously start NS pump. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS PUB - 1B Containment Spray Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-14 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 1B Suction from FWST Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits causing spurious operation of the valve concurrent with the Containment Spray Pump A starting and NS-29A or NS-32A opening may drain the FWST to the containment via the spray header.
However, if NS-20A, NS-1 8A and NI-1 85A are open then the FWST may drain to the containment sump. This path has been determined not to fail. This will only result in a loss of power and the closed valves in the path will not inadvertently open (MSO). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS VA0003B - Containment Spray Pump 1B Suction from FWST Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          6-VFDR- 15 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 1B Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits causing spurious operation of the valve concurrent with the Containment Spray Pump A starting and NS-29A or NS-32A opening may drain the FWST to the containment via the spray header.
However, if NS-20A, NS-18A and NI-185A are open then the FWST may drain to the containment sump. This path has been determined not to fail. This will only result in a loss of power and the closed valves in the path will not inadvertently open (MSO). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1INS VA0012B - Containment Spray Header 1B Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:07 Page: 79 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        6-VFDR-16 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header lB Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits causing spurious operation of the valve concurrent with the Containment Spray Pump A starting and NS-29A or NS-32A opening may drain the FWST to the containment via the spray header.
However, if NS-20A, NS-18A and NI-185A are open then the FWST may drain to the containment sump. This path has been determined not to fail. This will only result in a loss of power and the closed valves in the path will not inadvertently open (MSO). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    iNS VA0015B - Containment Spray Header lB Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        6-VFDR-17 VFDR                            Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that impact both excess flow letdown isolation valves. Downstream isolation valves have interlock hits and may open. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0122B - Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-18 VFDR                            1Aand 1B chemical and volume control pumps recirculation, which Is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a cable hit on I*RN 665 which can cause spurious closure of this valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0202B - IA and 1B chemical and volume control pumps recirculation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02116/2015 14:08:07 Page: 80 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        6-VFDR-19 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a cable hit on 1 NV 1010, a loss of power, and a loss of IAwhich may cause valve to fail open. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &IB Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Controller Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        6-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow Control, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by failure of valve NV-309 resulting in need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-311. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        6-VFDR-22 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and not utilized for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 1*NV 545 that may open or close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:07 Page: 81 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    06 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 560                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-24 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by a loss of instrument air or a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1SV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-25 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits which may spuriously open the PORV, and prevent closing the block valve.
This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1SV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          6-VFDR-26 VFDR                              1A S/G PORV isolation, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable I*SV 662 that may open or close valve. Cable hits may spuriously open the PORV, and prevent closing the block valve. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1SV VA0027A - 1A S/G PORV isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:08 Page: 82 of 695
 
S                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 41                U2 AB B-SWGR Rm El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:08 Page: 83 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
Fire Area ID:                    07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual cotnrol of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:08 Page: 84 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                      Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
* Area is normally attended "The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:08 Page: 85 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  " C-AX-217-W-008, -013,-014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                  " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                  " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                  " H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                  " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                  " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                  " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concem are limited.
* Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
* The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 08 Deletion of U1/U2, A and B Train Switchgear Room/Elect Pen Room Walls from Scope of Committed Fire Bariers (CNCE-10095)
Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:09 Page: 86 of 695
 
S                                                                                            0                                                                                              0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the technical justification for removing the walls between the Essential Switchgear Rooms and their respective penetration rooms from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Essential Switchgear Room/Electrical Pen Room walls can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                  -Areas adjacent to walls have smoke detection.
                                  " Fire and smoke would be obstructed from propagating.
                                  "Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                  " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                  " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                  " Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
                                  " Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 14 Evaluation of Gaps in Concrete Hatch Covers Revision                          4 Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the gaps (maximum 1 inch x 1 inch) in the six hatch openings that exist in a floor that separates redundant shutdown trains. The six hatch openings are in barriers that separate Fire Areas (FA's) 2 from 7, 3 from 8, 7 from 14, 8 from 15, 14 from 19 and 15 from 20.
The evaluation determined the hatch openings to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                  -floor area of approximately 2800 sq. ft. or greater in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8.14, 15, 19, and 20, "ceiling heights of 16 ft. in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, and 15, "forced ventilation of 3000 cfm in FA's 2 and 3, "forced ventilation of 10,400 cfm in FA's 7, 8, 14, and 15, Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:09 Page: 87 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions a limited ignition sources,
* limited in situ combustibles,
* automatic water suppression systems are not installed above hatch openings, o existing flood control features.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:09  Page: 88 of 695
 
S                                                                                                                                                                            0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 41                      U2 AB B-SWGR Rm El 560            -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:09 Page: 89 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 07 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta CDF and delta LERF risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 1.02E-07 A LERF                          Units: [2] 2.86E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria for delta CDF and LERF, but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for a limited number of scenarios and for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely brigade response.
The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:09 Page: 90 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 2EPLDCEDD, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable hits causing power loss. Failure may cause FWST low level signal which will open 2NI VA0184B resulting in a diversion path to the containment sump. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2EPLDCEDD-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 2EPLDCEDD Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 2EPLDCEDF, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable hits causing power loss. Failure may cause FWST low level signal which will open 2NI VA0184B resulting in a diversion path to the containment sump. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2EPLDCEDF-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 2EPLDCEDF Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Borated Water Storage Tank Level Ch #3, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable failure of 2*FW 564. Failure may cause FWST low level signal which could result in a diversion path to the containment sump. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2FW P 5120 - Borated Water Storage Tank Level Ch #3 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Borated Water Storage Tank Level Ch #4, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable failure of 2*FW 565. Failure may cause FWST low level signal which could result in a diversion path to the containment sump. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2FW P 5130 - Borated Water Storage Tank Level Ch #4 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:10 Page:91of695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-06 VFDR                              2B Residual Heat Removal suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a possible power loss due to cable hits that result in this valve failing as is (normally open). Valve is required closed to maintain FWST inventory. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2FW VA0055B - 2B Residual Heat Removal suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-07 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2*NC 814) which prevents closing 2NC VA0031B. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NC VA0031B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-08 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2*NC 956) which could spuriously open 2NC VA0032B. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-09 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2*NC 814) which prevents closing 2NC VA0035B. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:10 Page: 92 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        7-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (2*NC 956) which could spuriously open 2NC VA0036B. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        7-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            2B RHR Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously start the pump. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ND PUB - 2B RHR Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        7-VFDR-12 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits along with a spurious SSPS and power loss which prevents closing valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0010B - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        7-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Containment Sump Suction, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by cable hits on FWST level instruments may cause a low level signal which will open 2NI VA0184B. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0184B - Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Containment Sump Suction Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:10 Page:93of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-14 VFDR                            2B Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits on 2NS PUB can cause a spurious start of this pump. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS PUB - 2B Containment Spray Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-15 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 2B Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits on 2NS PUB can cause a spurious start of the pump. Cable hit on 2*NS 529 or in panel 2CPCC2 could produce a hot short and spuriously open valves 2NS VA0012B, 2NS VA0015B (powered from 2EPEMXEMXJ) which can cause inadvertent operation of the Containment Spray. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0003B - Containment Spray Pump 2B Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-16 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 2B Header Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits on 2NS PUB can cause a spurious start of the pump. Cable hit on 2*NS 529 or in panel 2CPCC2 could produce a hot short and spuriously open valves 2NS VAOO12B, 2NS VA001 5B (powered from 2EPEMXEMXJ) which can cause inadvertent operation of the Containment Spray. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0012B - Containment Spray Pump 2B Header Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:11  Page:94of695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        7-VFDR-17 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 2B Header Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits on 2NS PUB can cause a spurious start of this pump. The pump is fed from 2EPCSWETB which is located in FA07. Cable hit on 2*NS 529 or in panel 2CPCC2 could produce a hot short and spuriously open valves 2NS VA0012B, 2NS VA0015B (powered from 2EPEMXEMXJ) which can cause inadvertent operation of the Containment Spray. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0015B - Containment Spray Pump 2B Header Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        7-VFDR-18 VFDR                            2B Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously start the pump. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0038B - 2B Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        7-VFDR-19 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by power loss and loss of IA which prevents throttling valve. 2NV VA0294 fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:11 Page: 95 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    07 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow Control, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by a potential loss of air (IAnot creidted). 2 NV VA0309 fails open on loss of air, this may require manually operating manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-31 1. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cables 2*ATC 577 and 2*NV 545 which have a possible IN 92-18 concerns. SSPS closes and prevents opening of valve. This valve may need to be manually operated. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-24 VFDR                            S/G 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air that may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VAOO13 - S/G 2B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          7-VFDR-25 VFDR                            S/G 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air that may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen ifinstrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - S/G 2A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/1612015 14:08:11 Page: 96 of 695
 
0                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 29                U1 AB B-SWGR Rm El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:11 Page: 97 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FIreArea ID:
Fire Area ID:                    08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:12 Page: 98 of 695
 
0                                                                                              0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                      Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
* The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:12 Page: 99 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  "C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029 "C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                  " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                  " H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094 "J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010 "J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008 "J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions thai impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
* Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
* The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 08 Deletion of U1/U2, A and B Train Switchgear Room/Elect Pen Room Walls from Scope of Committed Fire Bariers (CNCE-10095)
Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPD1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:12 Page:100of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the technical justification for removing the walls between the Essential Switchgear Rooms and their respective penetration rooms from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Essential Switchgear Room/Electrical Pen Room walls can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                  ' Areas adjacent to walls have smoke detection.
                                  " Fire and smoke would be obstructed from propagating.
* Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                  ' Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                  " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                  *Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
                                  ' Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 14 Evaluation of Gaps in Concrete Hatch Covers Revision                        4 Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the gaps (maximum 1 inch x 1 inch) in the six hatch openings that exist in a floor that separates redundant shutdown trains. The six hatch openings are in barriers that separate Fire Areas (FA's) 2 from 7, 3 from 8, 7 from 14, 8 from 15, 14 from 19 and 15 from 20.
The evaluation determined the hatch openings to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                  ' floor area of approximately 2800 sq. ft. or greater in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 15, 19, and 20,
                                  " ceiling heights of 16 ft. in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, and 15,
                                  ' forced ventilation of 3000 cfm in FA's 2 and 3,
                                  ' forced ventilation of 10,400 cfm in FA's 7, 8, 14, and 15, Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:12 Page: 101 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
* limited ignition sources,
                                " limited in situ combustibles,
                                " automatic water suppression systems are not installed above hatch openings,
* existing flood control features.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                            Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:12  Page: 102 of 695
 
0                                        0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 29                      UI AB B-SWGR Rm El 560              -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:13 Page: 103 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 08 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta CDF risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr. The delta LERF risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 3.00E-08 A LERF                            Units: [1] 1.59E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF. The delta risk results for LERF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for a limited number of scenarios and for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:13 Page: 104 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          8-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit to 1*NC 814 which prevents closing the valve. Other cable hits could spuriously open PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0031 B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          8-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit to I*NC 956 which could spuriously open 1NC VA0032B. Cable hit to 1*NC 814 prevents closing the block valve. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          8-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit to I*NC 814 which prevents closing 1NC VA0035B. Other cable hits could spuriously open PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          8-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit to I*NC 956 could spuriously open INC VA0032B and 1NC VA0036B. Cable hit to I*NC 814 prevents closing INC VA0031B and INC VA0035B. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:13 Page: 105 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-05 VFDR                            1B Residual Heat Removal Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by various cable hits which causes a spurious start of the ND pump. With spurious operation of valve 1NS VA0038B, this may provide a flow diversion path from FWST to containment spray. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ND PUB - 1B Residual Heat Removal Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by cable failures, SSPS and power loss that prevent opening valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0010B - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-07 VFDR                            lB Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits on 1NS PUB which can cause a spurious start of this pump. With spurious operation of valves INS VA0012B, 1NS VA0015B (powered from 1EPEMXEMXJ), this can cause inadvertent operation of the Containment Spray. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1INS PUB - 1B Containment Spray Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:08:14 Page: 106 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  08 - Unit I 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 1B Suction from FWST Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a potential loss of power to 1NS VA003B powered from 1EPEMXEMXJ (1*EPE510, 546, 547 and 560) which is fed from 1EPELXELXD (located in Fire Area 8). This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header if the spray pump spuriously starts. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INS VA0003B - Containment Spray Pump 1B Suction from FWST Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 1B Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits on iNS PUB could cause a spurious start of the pump. Cable hit on I*NS 529 or in panel 1CPCC2 could produce a hot short and spuriously open valve 1NS VA0012B, INS VA0015B (powered from 1EPEMXEMXJ) which can cause inadvertent operation of the Containment Spray. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INS VA0012B - Containment Spray Header I B Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 1B Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits on 1NS PUB could cause a spurious start of the pump. Cable hit on I*NS 529 or in panel ICPCC2 could produce a hot short and spuriously open valve 1NS VA0012B, 1 NS VA0015B (powered from 1EPEMXEMXJ) which can cause inadvertent operation of the Containment Spray. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INS VA0015B - Containment Spray Header lB Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:14 Page: 107 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-11 VFDR                            1B Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray header, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits which could cause spurious operation of valve 1NS VA0038B. Other hits could cause a spurious start of the ND pump that would provide a flow diversion path from FWST to containment spray. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS VA0038B - 1B Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray header Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-12 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &IB Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          8-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow Control, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable hits, loss of power and IAfailure which can fail valve open.
Failure of valve NV-309 would result in the need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-31 1. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/1612015 14:08:14 Page: 108 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  08 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 560                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          8-VFDR-15 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open f*r HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 1*ATC 577 or 1*NV 545 that may open or close valve. This valve may need to be manually operated. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-17 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by possible loss of instrument air or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ISV VA0013 - S/G lB PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        8-VFDR-18 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by possible loss of instrument air or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02116/2015 14:08:15 Page:109of695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                              Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 214                U2 AB Aux Cntrl Batt Rm 2CBA & 2CBB El 554 28A                U2 AB South Cable Shaft El 543 49                Vital Batt Rm 2EBA & 2EBB El 554 50                Vital Batt Rm 2EBC & 2EBD El 554 51                U2 AB Batt Rm El 554 69A                U2 AB South Cable Shaft El 574 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:15  Page:110of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main Feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:15 Page: 111 of 695
 
0                                        ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                  Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
* Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                "The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Licensing Action                12. Deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding protection of HVAC penetrations of fire barriers Licensing Basis                  In some fire rated walls and floor/ceiling assemblies, openings were provided for HVAC duct access which are larger than the ducts themselves. To support fire damper sleeves in this opening a steel plate was used to form a rigid frame, to which a layer of fireproofing was applied. The remainder of the opening was protected by a fire rated silicone foam. While the composite design has not been tested by an independent laboratory, the individual components have been tested. The testing was found to be acceptable based on the following:
* The fireproofing and foam sealant has successfully passed the acceptance criteria of ASTM E-1 19 individually as documented in the U.L. Building Materials Directory, 1983.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:15 Page:112of695
 
0                                        ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                    Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  "C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, ý028, -029 "C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, "C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074 "D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107 "D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063 "F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115 "F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044 "F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094 "J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010 "J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008 "J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                  " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                  " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 12 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrants with Nonstandard Seal Configurations Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:15 Page:113of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following penetrations, which are located in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers, regarding non-standard seal configurations not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-052 through D-AX-354A-W-056
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-095, D-AX-354A-W-096 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                  " No combustibles are present in the proximity of the penetration and barrier interface.
                                  " Penetration types are non-combustible.
* Penetrations are located in covered pipe trenches not subject to direct flame impingement.
                                  " Pipe trenches contain limited combustibles.
                                  " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                  " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                  " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
* Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:16 Page: 114 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                    Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection            Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feal ture and System Details 214                      U2 AB Aux Cntrl Batt Rm 2CBA &      -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R 2CBB El 554 28A                      U2 AB South Cable Shaft El 543      -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R 49                      Vital Batt Rm 2EBA & 2EBB El        -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R 554 50                      Vital Batt Rm 2EBC & 2EBD El        -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R 554 51                      U2 AB Batt Rm El 554                -                E, R                E                      Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R 69A                      U2 AB South Cable Shaft El 574      -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:16 Page: 115 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 09 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 5.77E-07 A LERF                          Units: [2] 7.27E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria for delta CDF and LERF, but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for a limited number of scenarios and for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area to satisfy Risk or DID criteria.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through the Unit 2 S/Gs (via 2CA-48 and/or 2CA-52) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The recovery action made a significant contribution to risk in this fire area and was identified as being required for risk; the additional risk was determined to be bounded by the VFDR delta risk. The action to throttle CA flow through the Unit I S/Gs (via 1CA-48 and/or 1CA-52) did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended. Also, due to the contribution to risk of the reactor coolant pump variances, a DID recovery action is recommended to locally trip the Unit 2 reactor coolant pumps in the turbine building.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause both valves to spuriously open. Also, it may not be possible to close the isolation valve due to a possible loss of offsite power. However primary control station actions to swap the SSF disconnect plugs will cause the PORVs to fail closed and no additional actions are required for DID.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:16 Page: 116 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-02 VFDR                            120 VAC Power Panelboard SKXP, which is normally energized and energized for HSB, is affected by cables related to 2EXABIKSI and OETLPLSKXP that are routed though Fire Area 9, which credits the SSF as the assured safe shutdown train in the event of a fire. This is a breaker coordination issue, also. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    0ETLPLSKXP - 120 VAC Power Panelboard SKXP Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable hits and SSF control limitations. To control S/G level and prevent overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/O/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 2CA-52 and 2CA-48 per procedure AP/O/A15500/045 or OP/0IB/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2C Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy risk criteria VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-27 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 28, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable hits and SSF control limitations. To control S/G level and prevent overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0IB/6100/013. Manually throttle open 2CA-52 and 2CA-48 per procedure APIO/AI5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2B Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy risk criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:16 Page:117of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-28 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump discharge to 2B S/G, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits and SSF control limitations.
To control S/G level and prevent overfill, operate 2CA-54B per procedure AP/0/A/5500/045. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0054B - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump discharge to 2B S/G Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-38 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2A, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by power and cable hits that may result in Backup Pressurizer Heater Groups 2A and 2B not able to be de-energized from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 2A Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-39 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2B, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by power and cable hits that may result in Backup Pressurizer Heater Groups 2A and 2B not able to be de-energized from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 2B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-47 VFDR                            2A Reactor Coolant Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable and power failures which may prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUA - 2A Reactor Coolant Pump Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:08:17 Page:118of695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-48 VFDR                            2B Reactor Coolant Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable and power failures which may prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUB - 2B Reactor Coolant Pump Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-49 VFDR                            2C Reactor Coolant Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable and power failures which may prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUC - 2C Reactor Coolant Pump Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-50 VFDR                            2D Reactor Coolant Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable and power failures which may prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUD - 2D Reactor Coolant Pump Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        9-VFDR-51 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures and possible loss of power (loss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area) which could prevent closing valve. Pressurizer PORV may open due to cable failures. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0031 B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:17 Page: 119 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    09 - Unit 2 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          9-VFDR-52 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits which can open the PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          9-VFDR-53 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures and possible loss of power (loss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area) which could prevent closing valve. Pressurizer PORV may open due to cable failures. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          9-VFDR-54 VFDR                              Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits which can open the PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          9-VFDR-65 VFDR                              Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:18 Page: 120 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                              Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 18A                Ul AB North Cable Shaft El 543 213                Ul AB Aux Cntrl Batt Rm 1CBA & 1CBB El 554 37                Vital Batt Rm 1EBA & 1EBB El 554 38                Vital Batt Rm 1EBC & 1EBD El 554 39                Ul Batt Rm El 554 60A                Ul AB North Cable Shaft El 574 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:18 Page: 121 of 695
* 0                                                                              S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main Feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02116/2015 14:08:18 Page: 122 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                  Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
e Area is normally attended
* The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
e The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullettmissile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Licensing Action                12. Deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding protection of HVAC penetrations of fire barriers Licensing Basis                  In some fire rated walls and floor/ceiling assemblies, openings were provided for HVAC duct access which are larger than the ducts themselves. To support fire damper sleeves in this opening a steel plate was used to form a rigid frame, to which a layer of fireproofing was applied. The remainder of the opening was protected by a fire rated silicone foam. While the composite design has not been tested by an independent laboratory, the individual components have been tested. The testing was found to be acceptable based on the following:
* The fireproofing and foam sealant has successfully passed the acceptance criteria of ASTM E-1 19 individually as documented in the U.L. Building Materials Directory, 1983.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02116/2015 14:08:18 Page: 123 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                    Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 04 Fire Protection Evaluation for Floor Blockout Penetrations with a Free Area in Excess of 9 sqft. and Structural Framing Spans Exceeding 42 in. without a Cross Member Framing Revision                        1 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following floor blockouts regarding the framing support provided for the Silicone Foam free areas exceeding 9 sqft. that are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                " H-AX-517A-F-001
                                " H-AX-517A-F-002
                                " H-AX-517B-F-001
                                " H-AX-517B-F-002
                                " H-AX-517B-F-003
                                " K-AX-653-F-001
                                " K-AX-653-F-032
                                " K-AX-653-F-003
                                " J-AX-650A-F-001 The evaluation determined that the Unit 1 and 2 Exterior Doghouse penetrations (J-AX-650A-F-001) are qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. The remaining penetrations above are considered adequate for the area fire hazards based on the following:
                                " Detection available in fire areas of concern.
                                " Area hose stations and fire extinguishers.
* Fire brigade response.
                                " Seal and framing configurations for the penetrations are considered adequate.
                                " Seal integrity is not anticipated to be compromised by fire exposure.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029 "C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:18 Page: 124 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
                                  " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
* F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                  " H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                  " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                  " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                  " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
o Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
o The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 15 Fire Protection Evaluation for OZ Gedney Plug Seal Located Beyond the Barrier Plane Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following penetrations that utilize OZ Gedney Plug Seals regarding seal configurations that do not conform to typical detail M-8 per DPC 1435.00-00-0006, which requires the plug to be located in the barrier plane:
a H-AX-517-W-098, -099, -100, -102, -103 The evaluation determined that the penetrations will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                  " The Type CFSF Gedney Plug utilized is an approved sealing device capable of achieving a 3-hour F rating.
                                  " No combustibles are present in proximity to the penetrations in a manner that would result in a fire on the unexposed side as a result of heat transmission through the penetrations.
                                  " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:19 Page: 125 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
9 Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:19      Page: 126 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                    Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feat ure and System Details 18A                      Ul AB North Cable Shaft El 543      -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R 213                      Ul AB Aux Cntr1 Batt Rm 1CBA &      -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R 1CBB El 554 37                      Vital Batt Rm 1EBA & 1EBB El        -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R 554 38                      Vital Batt Rm 1EBC & 1EBD El        -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R 554 39                      U1 Batt Rm El 554                    -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E F 60A                      U1 AB North Cable Shaft El 574      -                R                  -                        Detection System.r Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:19 Page: 127 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 10 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A COF                            Units: [1] 5.09E-07 A LERF                          Units: [1] 5.68E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria for delta CDF and LERF, but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for a limited number of scenarios and for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through the Unit 1 S/Gs (via 1CA-48 and/or 1CA-52) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The recovery action made a significant contribution to risk in this fire area and was identified as being required for risk; the additional risk was determined to be bounded by the VFDR delta risk. The action to throttle CA flow through the Unit 2 S/Gs (via 2CA-48 and/or 2CA-52) did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended. Also, due to the contribution to risk of the reactor coolant pump variances, a DID recovery action is recommended to locally trip the Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps in the turbine building.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause both valves to spuriously open. Also, it may not be possible to close the isolation valve due to a possible loss of offsite power. However primary control station actions to swap the SSF disconnect plugs will cause the PORVs to fail closed and no additional actions are required for DID.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:19 Page: 128 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        10-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG IC, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure AP/0/A/5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 1C Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria VFDR ID                        10-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG IB, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure AP/O/AI5500/045 or OP/OIB/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 1B Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria VFDR ID                        10-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to SIG IB Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits which may spuriously operate the valve and prevent operation with the controls. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0054B - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to SIG 1B Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:19 Page:129of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit I Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by power and cable hits which could result in the Backup Pressurizer Heater Group 1A not able to be de-energized from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 1A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1B, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by power and cable hits which could result in the Backup Pressurizer Heater Group 1B not able to be de-energized from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 1B Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1A, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable and power failures which may prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUA - Reactor Coolant Pump 1A Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-14 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1B, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable and power failures which may prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUB - Reactor Coolant Pump 1B Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:20 Page: 130 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-15 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1C, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable and power failures which may prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUC - Reactor Coolant Pump 1C Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-16 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1D, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable and power failures which may prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC PUD - Reactor Coolant Pump 1D Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-17 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power (loss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area) could prevent closing valve. This would be an issue ifthe PORV spuriously opened before closure can be accomplished when the SSF actions are completed. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0031 B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:20 Page: 131 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-18 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and dosed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures which may open the valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-19 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and dosed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power (loss of offsite power and safety diesels not credited for this area) could prevent closing valve. This would be an issue if the PORV spuriously opened before closure can be accomplished when the SSF actions are completed. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally dosed and dosed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures which may open the valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-29 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0876 - Residual Heat Removal to Pressurizer Spray Outside Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:21 Page: 132 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    10 - Unit 1 Battery Room El 554                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          10-VFDR-36 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2B, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by interlock cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 2B Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:21 Page: 133 of 695
 
0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (U1) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 184                U1 AB Rm 331 &332 El 560 186                U2 AB Rm 301, 302, 305 & 307 El 560 1AB-2              U1 AB General Area El 560 (Filter Bunker Rooms) 33                U1 AB SE Corridor El 560 34                U1 AB Open Area & KC Pumps El 560 35                MCC Rm 1EMXJ & 1EMXB El 560 36                U1 AB Cable Tray Access Rm El 560 45                U2 AB NE Corridor El 560 46                U2 AB Open Area & KC Pumps El 560 47                MCC Rm 2EMXJ & 2EMXB El 560 48                U2 AB Cable Tray Access Rm El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:08:21 Page: 134 of 695
 
0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D"pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs C and D. Main Feedwater is isolated.                                                                                                                              I
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                            I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:21  Page: 135 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & Ul KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                    Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                - Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPD1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:21    Page: 136 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & Ul KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
* B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
                                *C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                " F-AX-348-W-088
                                " J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                " Limited combustibles.
                                " Fire brigade response.
                                " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
                                " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  "C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                  " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, "C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:22 Page: 137 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions e F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                - H-AX-515-W-013
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
* Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
* The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:22 Page: 138 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      11 (U1) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 1R4                      IU1ARBRm 31    & 33  El 560 186                      U2 AB Rm 301, 302, 305 & 307 El 560 1AB-2                    Ul AB General Area El 560 (Filter Bunker Rooms) 33                      U1 AB SE Corridor El 560 34                      Ul AB Open Area & KC Pumps        R                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E El 560                                                                                            Water Suppression, Installed Fixed Sprinkler: R 35                      MCC Rm 1EMXJ & 1EMXB El 560 36                      U1 AB Cable Tray Access Rm El 560 45                      U2 AB NE Corridor El 560 46                      U2 AB Open Area & KC Pumps        R                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E El 560                                                                                            Water Suppression, Installed Fixed Sprinkler: R 47                      MCC Rm 2EMXJ & 2EMXB El 560 48                      U2 AB Cable Tray Access Rm El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:22 Page: 139 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & Ul KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 11 (Ul)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                              Units: [1] 4.53E-09 A LERF                            Units: [1] 1.80E-10 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Automatic suppression was credited for severe KC pump fires, but no credit was taken for manual suppression for HGL and MCA evaluations. The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for SIGs C and D are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through these S/Gs (via CA-48 and/or CA-36) did not contribute I
significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:22 Page: 140 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & Ul KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          11 (Ul )-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1B, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 1B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          11 (U1)-VFDR-15 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable I*NI 561. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          11 (Ul )-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and not utilized for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 1*NV 545. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          11 (Ul)-VFDR-21 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated fiowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:22    Page: 141 of 695
 
0                                                                                    0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  11 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 184                U1 AB Rm 331 & 332 El 560 186                U2 AB Rm 301, 302, 305 & 307 El 560 1AB-2              UI AB General Area El 560 (Filter Bunker Rooms) 33                U1 AB SE Corridor El 560 34                U1 AB Open Area & KC Pumps El 560 35                MCC Rm 1EMXJ & 1EMXB El 560 36                U1 AB Cable Tray Access Rm El 560 45                U2 AB NE Corridor El 560 46                U2 AB Open Area & KC Pumps El 560 47                MCC Rm 2EMXJ & 2EMXB El 560 48                U2 AB Cable Tray Access Rm El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:23 Page: 142 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. SIG feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs C and D. Main Feedwater is isolated.
I
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02116/2015 14:08:23 Page: 143 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                    Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                ' Area is normally attended
                                ' The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:23 Page: 144 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                    Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                " B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001 "C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023 "C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                " F-AX-348-W-088 "J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                " Limited combustibles.
                                " Fire brigade response.
                                " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
                                " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:08:23 Page: 145 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  11 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                " H-AX-515-W-013
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                " Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:08:23 Page: 146 of 695
 
0                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & Ul KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 1R8                    IJ1.AR Rm 3,1 A 332 ElFI&
56 186                    U2 AB Rm 301, 302, 305 & 307 El 560 1AB-2                  U1 AB General Area El 560 (Filter Bunker Rooms) 33                      Ul AB SE Corridor El 560 34                      U1 AB Open Area & KC Pumps        R                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E El 560                                                                                            Water Suppression, Installed Fixed Sprinkler: R 35                      MCC Rm 1EMXJ & 1EMXB El 560 36                      Ul AB Cable Tray Access Rm El 560 45                      U2 AB NE Corridor El 560 46                      U2 AB Open Area & KC Pumps        R                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E El 560                                                                                            Water Suppression, Installed Fixed Sprinkler: R 47                      MCC Rm 2EMXJ & 2EMXB El 560 48                      U2 AB Cable Tray Access Rm El 560 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:24 Page: 147 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U1 KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 11 (U2)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 6.70E-0g A LERF                            Units: [2] 3.g0E-10 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Automatic suppression was credited for severe KC pump fires, but no credit was taken for manual suppression for HGL and MCA evaluations. The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for SIGs C and D are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through these S/Gs (via CA-48 and/or CA-36) did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.                                            I No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:24 Page: 148 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    11 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & Ul KC Pump Room El 560 (Common)                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          11 (U2)-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2B, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 2B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          11 (U2)-VFDR-16 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 2*NI 561. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          11 (U2)-VFDR-22 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and not utilized for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 2*NV 545. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          11 (U2)-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02116/2015 14:08:24 Page: 149 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                        Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 63                U2 AB Elect Pen Rm El 577 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:24 Page: 150 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                          Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                    Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                          Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                      Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORV and block and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                      Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                      Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:25 Page: 151 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                          Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                "Area is normally attended "The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                "The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullettmissile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:25 Page: 152 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overiap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115 "F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044 "F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
* J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category I (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
* Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
* The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 08 Deletion of U1/U2, A and B Train Switchgear Room/Elect Pen Room Walls from Scope of Committed Fire Bariers (CNCE-10095)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:25 Page: 153 of 695
 
0                                              0                                                                                            0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the technical justification for removing the walls between the Essential Switchgear Rooms and their respective penetration rooms from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Essential Switchgear Room/Electrical Pen Room walls can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                  *Areas adjacent to walls have smoke detection.
e Fire and smoke would be obstructed from propagating.
* Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                  " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                  " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                  *Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
* Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:25 Page: 154 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                              Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required      Required Suppression    Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System        System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 63                      U2 AB Elect Pen Rm El 577            -              E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:25 Page: 155 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 12 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 3.01E-08 A LERF                            Units: [2] 5.57E-09 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited in HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:25 Page: 156 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Train B Related Incore Thermocouples, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable and power hits to monitoring devices. Both Hot Leg (loops A, B, C, D) and Incore Thermocouple temperature monitoring success paths are impacted. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ENATETRAINB - Train B Related Incore Thermocouples Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by multiple power and cable hits to 2ENBDTNSDTOOO1. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ENBDTNSDT0001 - Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31)
Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable hits to 2ENBDTNSDT0005.
This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ENBDTNSDT0005 - Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32),
Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Non Coordination Loads fed from 2EPLPLEPD, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by 2EPD BKR # 05 not coordinated (Refer to AREVA calculation 32-9139535-000). Cable 2*IRE 761 does not coordinate for this FA. This causes loss of 2EPD and all credited loads from this bus. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2EPLPLEPD-NCL - Non Coordination Loads fed from 2EPLPLEPD Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:26 Page: 157 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        12-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits (2*FW 563 and 2*FW 562) which can cause failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indication that may cause a FWST Low Level signal (concurrent with a spurious SI signal) which will open 2NI-185A. There is a potential loss of power to both 2FW VA0027A and 2NI VA0185A. Partial operation of these valves and subsequent loss of power can cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. 2FW-27A and 2NI-185A fail as is on a loss of power. Valves 2NI-185A or 2FW-27A are required to be closed to maintain FWST supply. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2FW VA0027A - Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        12-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by A train 4KV bus assumed to fail, and 21LE-PZRHTRA has numerous cable hits. The B train electrical bus is available, with the exception of 2EPLPLEPD, which causes loss of control of 21LE-PZRHTRB. Hits to cables 2*NC 608 and 2*NC 615 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (2NC P 5153 and 2NC P 5164) and/or spuriously energize relay KE, which is designed to cut power to the 21LE-PZRHTRB heaters on low pressurizer level. All four banks of pressurizer heaters may be unavailable. One set of pressurizer heater banks (either 21LE-PZRHTRA or 21LE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Pressurizer heater bank B (2ILE-PZRHTRB) is credited in this Fire Area. Fuses AA-6 (1A) and AA-8 (1A) in 2EATC1 (Fire Area 5) (shown on CNEE-0211-03.09-02) can be removed to allow control room operation of 21LE-PZRHTRB, with 2EPLPLEPD resolved. This causes loss of the low pressurizer level cutout circuit. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 2A Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        12-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2B, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by A train 4KV bus assumed to fail, and 21LE-PZRHTRA has numerous cable hits. The B train electrical bus is available, with the exception of 2EPLPLEPD, which causes loss of control of 21LE-PZRHTRB. Hits to cables 2*NC 608 and 2*NC 615 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (2NC P 5153 and 2NC P 5164) and/or spuriously energize relay KE, which is designed to cut power to the 21LE-PZRHTRB heaters on low pressurizer level. All four banks of pressurizer heaters may be unavailable. One set of pressurizer heater banks (either 21LE-PZRHTRA or 2[LE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Pressurizer heater bank B (21LE-PZRHTRB) is credited in this Fire Area. Fuses AA-6 (1A) and AA-8 (1A) in 2EATC1 (Fire Area 5) (shown on CNEE-0211-03.09-02) can be removed to allow control room operation of 21LE-PZRHTRB, with 2EPLPLEPD resolved. This causes loss of the low pressurizer level cutout circuit. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 2B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02116/2015 14:08:26 Page: 158 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-12 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2C, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by A train 4KV bus assumed to fail, and 21LE-PZRHTRA has numerous cable hits. The B train electrical bus is available, with the exception of 2EPLPLEPD, which causes loss of control of 21LE-PZRHTRB. Hits to cables 2*NC 608 and 2*NC 615 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (2NC P 5153 and 2NC P 5164) and/or spuriously energize relay KE, which is designed to cut power to the 21LE-PZRHTRB heaters on low pressurizer level. All four banks of pressurizer heaters may be unavailable. One set of pressurizer heater banks (either 21LE-PZRHTRA or 21LE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Pressurizer heater bank B (21LE-PZRHTRB) is credited in this Fire Area. Fuses AA-6 (1A) and AA-8 (1A) in 2EATC1 (Fire Area 5) (shown on CNEE-0211-03.09-02) can be removed to allow control room operation of 21LE-PZRHTRB, with 2EPLPLEPD resolved. This causes loss of the low pressurizer level cutout circuit. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRC - Pressurizer Heater Group 2C Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-15 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by a cable hit to cable 2*NC 615 which results in loss of the instrument.
This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC P 5153 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 2 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-17 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 1, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable and power hits to cable 2*NC 608 to LT, or power 2EPGPLERPA. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC P 5164 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 1 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:27 Page: 159 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-18 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 3, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by a hit to the power to 2EPGPLERPC. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC P 5174 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 3 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        12-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits which may spuriously energize the PORV and prevent closing the block valve. SSF disconnects will close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        12-VFDR-24 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by spurious SSPS and power loss which will prevent closing valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        12-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Suction from Containment Sump, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may cause a FWST Low Level signal (concurrent with a spurious SI signal) which will open 2Ni-185A. There is a potential loss of power to both 2FW VA0027A and 2NI VA0185A. Partial operation of these valves and subsequent loss of power can cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. 2FW-27A and 2NI-185A fail as is on a loss of power. Valves 2NI-185A or 2FW-27A are required to be closed to maintain FWST supply. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0185A - Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Suction from Containment Sump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:27 Page: 160 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-26 VFDR                            2A Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by a cable hit on 2*NS 534 which can provide a permissive for a 2NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 2*ATC 853 can provide a 2NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 2*RN 661 along with a 2EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 2NS PUA pump start. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS PUA - 2A Containment Spray Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-27 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 2A suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to 2NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0020A - Containment Spray Pump 2A suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-28 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS PUA (2*NS 534 and 2*ATC 853) that can cause a spurious start of the NS pump. A hot short on 2*NS 528 or a hot short on cable 2*NS 544 along with a spurious SSPS permissive can cause spurious opening of valves 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A_ There is a potential loss of power to 2NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0029A - Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:27 Page: 161 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-29 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS PUA (2*NS 534 and 2*ATC 853) that can cause a spurious start of the NS pump. A hot short on 2*NS 528 or a hot short on cable 2*NS 544 along with a spurious SSPS permissive can cause spurious opening of valves 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A. There is a potential loss of power to 2NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0032A - Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-30 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can spuriously energize and open 2NV VA0001A. SSF disconnect will close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0001A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-31 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can spuriously energize and open 2NV VA0002A. SSF disconnect will close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0002A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/1612015 14:08:28 Page: 162 of 695
 
0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-32 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 2B Containment Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can spuriously energize and open 2NV VA0010A. SSF disconnect will close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0010A - Letdown Orifice 2B Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-33 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 2C Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can spuriously energize and open 2NV VA0011A. SSF disconnect will close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA001 1A - Letdown Orifice 2C Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-34 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 2A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can spuriously energize and open 2NV VA0013A. SSF disconnect will close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0013A - Letdown Orifice 2A Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-35 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air which fails valve full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:28 Page: 163 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-36 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a spurious SI signal and subsequent loss of power. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-37 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by a cable hit on 2*IRE 761 that may cause loss of power for 2EPD which will cause the PORV to open. Instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-38 VFDR                            S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by a cable hit on 2*IRE 761 that may cause loss of power for 2EPD which will cause the PORV to open. Instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:29  Page: 164 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    12 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          12-VFDR-39 VFDR                            SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable hits. Train A power is not credited in this Train B shutdown area. Train A indicator 2SM P 5140 is not available due to cable hits and Train A indicator 2SM P 5160 is not availabe due to Train A power not credited. Pressure monitoring is available on Steam Generator D. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SM P 5150 - SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #2 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:29 Page: 165 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                      Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 54                Ul AB Elect Pen Rm El 577 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:29 Page: 166 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                          Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                    Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                          Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                      Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                      Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                      Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:29 Page: 167 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                " H-AX-515-W-0 13
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029. -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 08 Deletion of UI/U2, A and B Train Switchgear Room/Elect Pen Room Walls from Scope of Committed Fire Bariers (CNCE-10095)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:29 Page: 168 of 695
* 0                                                                                              0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                  Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the technical justification for removing the walls between the Essential Switchgear Rooms and their respective penetration rooms from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Essential Switchgear Room/Electrical Pen Room walls can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                " Areas adjacent to walls have smoke detection.
                                " Fire and smoke would be obstructed from propagating.
                                " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:30      Page: 169 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                              Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required      Required Suppression    Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System        System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 54                      U1 AB Elect Pen Rm El 577            -              E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:30 Page: 170 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                      Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 13 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 5.07E-08 A LERF                            Units: [11 8.50E-09 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited in HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:30 Page: 171 of 695
 
0                                                                                                                                                                                  0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Train B Related Incore Thermocouples, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable and power hits to monitoring devices. Both Hot Leg (loops A, B, C, D) and Incore Thermocouple temperature monitoring success paths are impacted. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ENATETRAIN_B -Train B Related Incore Thermocouples Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by power and multiple cable hits to 1ENBDTNSDT0001. Open conductors on the cable hit could receive spurious signal from the detectors. Wide range detector is available (1ENCDTNSDT0014, 1ENCP 5050). This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ENBDTNSDT0001 - Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31),
Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits to 1ENBDTNSDT0005. Open conductors on the cable hit could receive spurious signal from the detectors. Wide range detector is available (1ENCDTNSDT0014, 1ENCP 5050). This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ENBDTNSDT0005 - Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32),
Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:30 Page: 172 of 695
 
0                                        ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPLPLEPD. which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by non-coordinated 1EPD BKR # 05. Also, cable 1*IRE 761 does not coordinate for this FA. This causes loss of 1EPD and all credited loads from this bus. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1EPLPLEPD-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPLPLEPD Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits (2*FW 563 and 2*FW 562) which can cause failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indication that may cause a FWST Low Level signal (concurrent with a spurious SI signal) which will open 2NI-185A. There is a potential loss of power to both 2FW VA0027A and 2NI VA0185A. Partial operation ofilhese valves and subsequent loss of power can cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. 2FW-27A and 2NI-185A fail as is on a loss of power. Valves 2NI-185A or 2FW-27A are required to be closed to maintain FWST supply. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1FW VA0027A - Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by A train 4KV bus assumed to fail, and 1ILE-PZRHTRA has numerous cable hits. The B train electrical bus is available, with the exception of 1EPLPLEPD, which causes loss of control of 1 ILE-PZRHTRB. Hits to cables 1*NC 608 and 1*NC 615 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (1NC P 5153 and 1NC P 5164) and/or spuriously energize relay KE, which is designed to cut power to the 1ILE-PZRHTRB heaters on low pressurizer level. All four banks of pressurizer heaters may be unavailable. One set of pressurizer heater banks (either 1ILE-PZRHTRA or 1ILE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Pressurizer heater bank B (11LE-PZRHTRB) is credited in this Fire Area. Fuses AA-8 (1A) and AA-6 (1A) in 1EATC1 (Fire Area 6) (shown on CNEE-01 11-03.09-02) can be removed to allow control room operation of 1ILE-PZRHTRB, with 1EPLPLEPD resolved. This causes loss of the low pressurizer level cutout circuit. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    I ILE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 1A Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:31 Page: 173 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-12 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group lB, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by A train 4KV bus assumed to fail, and 1ILE-PZRHTRA has numerous cable hits. The B train electrical bus is available, with the exception of 1EPLPLEPD, which causes loss of control of 1ILE-PZRHTRB. Hits to cables 1*NC 608 and 1*NC 615 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (1NC P 5153 and INC P 5164) and/or spuriously energize relay KE, which is designed to cut power to the I LE-PZRHTRB heaters on low pressurizer level. All four banks of pressurizer heaters may be unavailable. One set of pressurizer heater banks (either 1ILE-PZRHTRA or 1ILE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Pressurizer heater bank B (1 ILE-PZRHTRB) is credited in this Fire Area. Fuses AA-8 (1A) and AA-6 (1A) in 1EATC1 (Fire Area 6) (shown on CNEE-01 11-03.09-02) can be removed to allow control room operation of 1ILE-PZRHTRB, with 1EPLPLEPD resolved. This causes loss of the low pressurizer level cutout circuit. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1 ILE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 1B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1C, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by Atrain 4KV bus assumed to fail, and 11LE-PZRHTRA has numerous cable hits. The B train electrical bus is available, with the exception of 1EPLPLEPD, which causes loss of control of 1ILE-PZRHTRB. Hits to cables 1*NC 608 and 1*NC 615 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (INC P 5153 and 1 NC P 5164) and/or spuriously energize relay KE, which is designed to cut power to the 1ILE-PZRHTRB heaters on low pressurizer level. All four banks of pressurizer heaters may be unavailable. One set of pressurizer heater banks (either 1ILE-PZRHTRA or 1ILE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Pressurizer heater bank B (1 ILE-PZRHTRB) is credited in this Fire Area. Fuses AA-8 (1A) and AA-6 (1 A) in 1EATC1 (Fire Area 6) (shown on CNEE-01 11-03.09-02) can be removed to allow control room operation of 1ILE-PZRHTRB, with 1EPLPLEPD resolved. This causes loss of the low pressurizer level cutout circuit. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRC - Pressurizer Heater Group 1C Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-16 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by a cable hit (I*NC 615) to the PT that could make component unavailable. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5153 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 2 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:31 Page: 174 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    13 - Unit I Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-18 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 1, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by a power and cable hit (I*NC 608) that could make component unavailable. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5164 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 1 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-19 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 3, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by a power hit that could make component unavailable. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5174 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 3 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-24 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a cable hit which may spuriously open the PORV, and prevent closing the block valve. Removing Unit 1 Train A Disconnect plug and placing it in the SSF receptacle will close PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by a spurious SSPS and a power loss that prevents closing valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:31    Page: 175 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-26 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Suction from Containment Sump, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by cable hits (I*FW 563 and 1*FW 562) which can cause failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indication that may cause a FWST Low Level signal (concurrent with a spurious SI signal) which will open 1NI-185A. There is a potential loss of power to both 1FW VA0027A and 1NI VA01185A. Partial operation of these valves and subsequent loss of power can cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. 1FW-27A and 1NI-185A fail as is on a loss of power. Valves 1NI-185A or 1FW-27A are required to be closed to maintain FWST supply. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0185A - Residual Heat Removal Pump IA Suction from Containment Sump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-27 VFDR                            IA Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1NS PUA that can cause spurious slart of NS pump. Cable hits on 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to 1NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. Cable 1*NS 534 can provide a permissive for a 1NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 1*ATC 853 can provide a 1NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 1*RN 661 along with a 1EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 1NS PUA pump start. Ahot short on cable I*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A, ora short on cable I*NS 544 along with a IIPE-SSPSA permissive can provide an Open signal to both 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS PUA - 1A Containment Spray Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-28 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 1A suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1NS PUA that can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to 1NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. Cable 1*NS 534 can provide a permissive for a 1INS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 1*ATC 853 can provide a 1NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 1*RN 661 along with a 1EQB
                                -DGLSA permissive can provide a 1NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 1*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both INS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A, or a short on cable 1*NS 544 along with a 1IPE-SSPSA permissive can provide an Open signal to both 1INS VA0029A and INS VA0032A. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1INS VA002OA - Containment Spray Pump 1A suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:32 Page: 176 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-29 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 1A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on INS PUA that can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to 1NS VA0020A.
This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. Cable 1*NS 534 can provide a permissive for a 1NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 1*ATC 853 can provide a 1NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 1*RN 661 along with a 1EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 1NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 1*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A, or a short on cable 1*NS 544 along with a 1IPE-SSPSA permissive can provide an Open signal to both 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1INS VA0029A - Containment Spray Pump 1A Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-30 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 1A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on INS PUA that can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to 1NS VA0020A.
This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. Cable 1*NS 534 can provide a permissive for a 1NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 1*ATC 853 can provide a 1NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable I*RN 661 along with a 1EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 1NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 1*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A, or a short on cable 1*NS 544 along with a 1IPE-SSPSA permissive can provide an Open signal to both 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS VA0032A - Containment Spray Pump 1A Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-31 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously energize and open the letdown isolations. Open Breaker 1EDE-F01J to de-energize valves 1NV-1A, 1NV-2A, 1NV-39A, 1NV-186A, and 1NV-238A. Swapping SSF disconnects will also ensure these valves are shut. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0001A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:32 Page: 177 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-32 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously energize and open the letdown isolations. Open Breaker 1EDE-FO1J to de-energize valves 1NV-1A, 1NV-2A, 1 NV-39A, 1NV-186A, and 1NV-238A. Swapping SSF disconnects will also ensure these valves are shut. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0002A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-33 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1B Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits which may spuriously energize and open the letdown isolations. Open Breaker 1EDE-F01J to de-energize valves 1NV-1A, 1NV-2A, 1NV-39A, 1NV-186A, and 1NV-238A. The actions required on PH-13
                                -100 (Swapping SSF disconnects) will also ensure these valves are shut. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VAOO1OA - Letdown Orifice 1B Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-34 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1C Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits which may spuriously energize and open the letdown isolations. Open Breaker 1EDE-F01J to de-energize valves 1NV-1A, 1NV-2A, 1NV-39A, 1NV-186A, and 1NV-238A. The actions required on PH-13-100 (Swapping SSF disconnects) will also ensure these valves are shut. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA001 1A - Letdown Orifice 1C Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:33 Page: 178 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-35 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1A Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits which may spuriously energize and open the letdown isolations. Open Breaker IEDE-F01J to de-energize valves 1NV-1A, 1NV-2A, 1NV-39A, 1NV-186A, and INV-238A. The actions required on PH-13
                                -100 (Swapping SSF disconnects) will also ensure these valves are shut. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0013A - Letdown Orifice 1A Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-36 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-37 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by spurious SSPS which closes valve and power loss which will prevent opening valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:33 Page: 179 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-38 VFDR                            S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ISV VA0001 - S/G 1D PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-39 VFDR                            1C S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        13-VFDR-40 VFDR                            SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by cable hits. Train A power is not credited in this Train B shutdown area. Train A indicator 1SM P 5140 is not available due to cable hits and Train A indicator 1SM P 5160 is not availabe due to Train A power not credited. Pressure monitoring is available on Steam Generator D. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SM P 5150 - SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #2 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:33 Page: 180 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    13 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 577                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          13-VFDR-41 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals may prevent normal control of charging flow. Valve fails open on loss of air. Failure of valve NV-309 would result in need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-31 1. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:33 Page: 181 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 62                U2 AB A-SWGR Rm El 577 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP13)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02116/2015 14:08:34 Page: 182 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:34 Page: 183 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                - H-AX-515-W-013
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                " Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
* Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 08 Deletion of U1/U2, A and B Train Switchgear Room/Elect Pen Room Walls from Scope of Committed Fire Bariers (CNCE-10095)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:08:34 Page: 184 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the technical justification for removing the walls between the Essential Switchgear Rooms and their respective penetration rooms from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Essential Switchgear Room/Electrical Pen Room walls can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                -Areas adjacent to walls have smoke detection.
e Fire and smoke would be obstructed from propagating.
* Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                " Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
                                " Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 14 Evaluation of Gaps in Concrete Hatch Covers Revision                        4 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the gaps (maximum 1 inch x 1 inch) in the six hatch openings that exist in a floor that separates redundant shutdown trains. The six hatch openings are in barriers that separate Fire Areas (FA's) 2 from 7, 3 from 8, 7 from 14, 8 from 15, 14 from 19 and 15 from 20.
The evaluation determined the hatch openings to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
e floor area of approximately 2800 sq. ft. or greater in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8. 14, 15, 19, and 20,
* ceiling heights of 16 ft. in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, and 15, e forced ventilation of 3000 cfm in FA's 2 and 3.
                                *forced ventilation of 10,400 cfm in FA's 7, 8, 14, and 15, Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:34 Page: 185 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
* limited ignition sources, 0 limited in situ combustibles,
                                " automatic water suppression systems are not installed above hatch openings,
                                " existing flood control features.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:34 Page: 186 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 62                      U2 AB A-SWGR Rm El 577              -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:34 Page: 187 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 14 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
"CDF                              Units: [2] 9.12E-07 A LERF                            Units: [2] 6.67E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria for delta CDF and LERF, but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for a limited number of scenarios and for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:35 Page: 188 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures. Spurious operation of FW-27A, ND PUA, and NS-43A may cause a diversion of FWST to the containment sump. A combination of FW-27A being open, the spurious start of the ND pump (due to interlock and/or cable failure), and spurious opening of the ND auxiliary containment spray valve could cause inadvertent FWST depletion to the containment sump via the Train A containment spray ring. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2FW VA0027A - Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 2*ATC 521 that may open or close valve. Hits may also spuriously energize (open) the PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0033A - Pressurizer PORV isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits that may spuriously energize (open) the PORV. They may also prevent closing the block valve. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:35 Page: 189 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-07 VFDR                            2A RHR Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures of components FW-27A, ND PUA, and NS-43A may cause a diversion of FWST to the containment sump. A combination of FW-27A being open, the spurious start of the ND pump (due to interlock and/or cable failure), and spurious opening of the ND auxiliary containment spray valve could cause inadvertent FWST depletion to the containment sump via the Train A containment spray ring. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ND PUA - 2A RHR Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by a spurious SSPS and power loss prevent operating valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-10 VFDR                            2A Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS PUA which can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 2NS VA0029A, and 2NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to 2NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. NS pump breaker is in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NS PUA - 2A Containment Spray Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:35 Page: 190 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 2A suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a potential loss of power.
Cable hits on 2NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. NS pump breaker is in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0020A - Containment Spray Pump 2A suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-12 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A which can cause spurious opening of valves. Cable hits on 2NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. There is a potential loss of power to 2NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. NS pump breaker is in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0029A - Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A which can cause spurious opening of valves. Cable hits on 2NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. There is a potential loss of power to 2NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. NS pump breaker is in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0032A - Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:36 Page: 191 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-14 VFDR                            2A Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures of components FW-27A, ND PUA, and NS-43A may cause a diversion of FWST to the containment sump. A combination of FW-27A being open, the spurious start of the ND pump (due to interlock and/or cable failure), and spurious opening of the ND auxiliary containment spray valve could cause inadvertent FWST depletion to the containment sump via the Train A containment spray ring. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0043A - 2A Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-17 VFDR                            2A Charging Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by a spurious start signal created from cable hits on 2*ATC 1006 & 2*NV 599.
APIOIA15500/045 contains a step to start the Train B NV pump and trip the Train A NV pump, however the power feed (2ETA BKR #12) and the 125VDC control power feed (2EDE BKR #F01C) panels are both located in FA 14. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV PUACC - 2A Charging Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-19 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults (2*NV 632) that may spuriously energize (keep open) 2NV VA0001A, 2A, 11A and 13A (2NV VA0010A and 2NV VA0015B will close on demand). Letdown header over pressure relief path to the PRT will be via 2NV VA001 4. KC cooling to the letdown heat exchanger may be lost due to SSPS isolation of non essential KC header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0001A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:36 Page: 192 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults (2*NV 632) that may spudously energize (keep open) 2NV VA0001A, 2A, 11A, and 13A (2NV VA0010A and 2NV VA0015B will close on demand). Letdown header over pressure relief path to the PRT will be via 2NV VA0014. KC cooling to the letdown heat exchanger may be lost due to SSPS isolation of non essential KC header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0002A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-21 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 2C Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults (2*NV 632) may spuriously energize (keep open) 2NV VA0001A, 2A, 11A and 13A (2NV VA0010A and 2NV VA0015B will close on demand). Letdown header over pressure relief path to the PRT will be via 2NV VA0014. KC cooling to the letdown heat exchanger may be lost due to SSPS isolation of non essential KC header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA001 1A - Letdown Orifice 2C Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          14-VFDR-22 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 2A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults (2*NV 632) may spuriously energize (keep open) 2NV VA0001A, 2A, 11A and 13A (2NV VA0010A and 2NV VA0015B will close on demand). Letdown header over pressure relief path to the PRT will be via 2NV VA0014. KC cooling to the letdown heat exchanger may be lost due to SSPS isolation of non essential KC header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0013A - Letdown Orifice 2A Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:36 Page: 193 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        14-VFDR-23 VFDR                            2A and 2B Chemical and Volume Control Pumps recirculation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by hot shorts on cable 2*NV 630 that my cause spurious closure of charging mini flow recirculation path (2NV VA203A) and normal charging flow path (2NV VA0312A). Alternate charging path through 2NI VA0010B remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0203A - 2A and 2B Chemical and Volume Control Pumps recirculation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        14-VFDR-24 VFDR                            2A &2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, power, and SSPS signals. 2NV VA0294 fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        14-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, power, and SSPS signals. 2NV VA0309 fails open on loss of air which may require manually operating manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-311. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/1612015 14:08:37 Page: 194 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  14 - Unit 2 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        14-VFDR-26 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a spurious SSPS that closes and a power loss that prevents opening valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        14-VFDR-28 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by the possible loss of instrument air or a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen ifinstrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        14-VFDR-29 VFDR                            S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by the possible loss of instrument air or a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen ifinstrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP 1D)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:37 Page: 195 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 53                Ul AB A-SWGR Rm El 577 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:37 Page: 196 of 695
 
0                                                                                                                                                                            0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:38 Page: 197 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                    Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
* Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:38 Page: 198 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10          Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  "C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029 "C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, "C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094 "J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010 "J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                  " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                  *Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
* The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 08 Deletion of U1/U2, A and B Train Switchgear Room/Elect Pen Room Walls from Scope of Committed Fire Barners (CNCE-10095)
Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:08:38 Page: 199 of 695
 
0                                                                                            0                                                                                            0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the technical justification for removing the walls between the Essential Switchgear Rooms and their respective penetration rooms from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Essential Switchgear Room/Electrical Pen Room walls can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                "Areas adjacent to walls have smoke detection.
                                " Fire and smoke would be obstructed from propagating.
                                " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
o Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 14 Evaluation of Gaps in Concrete Hatch Covers Revision                        4 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the gaps (maximum 1 inch x 1 inch) in the six hatch openings that exist in a floor that separates redundant shutdown trains. The six hatch openings are in barriers that separate Fire Areas (FA's) 2 from 7, 3 from 8, 7 from 14, 8 from 15, 14 from 19 and 15 from 20.
The evaluation determined the hatch openings to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                " floor area of approximately 2800 sq. ft. or greater in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 15, 19, and 20,
                                " ceiling heights of 16 ft. in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, and 15,
                                " forced ventilation of 3000 cfm in FA's 2 and 3,
                                *forced ventilation of 10,400 cfm in FA's 7, 8, 14, and 15, Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:38 Page: 200 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions 0 limited ignition sources, 0 limited in situ combustibles,
* automatic water suppression systems are not installed above hatch openings, e existing flood control features.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:38 Page: 201 of 695
 
0                                    ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 53                      Ul AB A-SWGR Rm El 577              -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:38 Page: 202 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 15 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A COF                            Units: [1] 5.55E-07
" LERF                            Units: [1] 4.11E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria for delta CDF and LERF, but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for a limited number of scenarios and for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:38 Page: 203 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        15-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXL, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by a coordination concern for 1EPEMXEMXL in Fire Area 15 due to the failure of cable I*NC 972. Cable 1*NC 972 is fed from breaker FOIC. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1EPEMXEMXL-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXL Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                        15-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or loss of power and control due to the cable failures. Spurious operation of FW-27A, ND PUA, and NS-43A may cause a diversion of FWST to the containment sump. A combination of FW-27A being open, the spurious start of the ND pump (due to interlock and/or cable failure), and spurious opening of the ND auxiliary containment spray valve could cause inadvertent FWST depletion to the containment sump via the Train A containment spray ring. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1FW VA0027A - Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        15-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 1*ATC 521 that may open or close valve. Multiple cable hits may spuriously energize the PORV and prevent closing the block. valve. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0033A - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:39 Page: 204 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hits that may spuriously energize the PORV. These cable hits may also prevent closing the block valve. The block valve cable hit (1*ATC 521) can spuriously open or close the block valve. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-09 VFDR                            1A Residual Heat Removal Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by a spurious operation or loss of power and control due to the cable failures of components FW-27A, ND PUA, and NS-43A that may cause a diversion of FWST to the containment sump. A combination of FW-27A being open, the spurious start of the ND pump (due to interlock and/or cable failure), and spurious opening of the ND auxiliary containment spray valve could cause inadvertent FWST depletion to the containment sump via the Train A containment spray ring. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ND PUA - 1A Residual Heat Removal Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by a spurious SSPS and power loss prevent closing the valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:39 Page: 205 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-12 VFDR                            IA Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1NS PUA that can cause spurious slart of NS pump. Cable hits on 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to INS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS PUA - 1A Containment Spray Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 1A suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1NS PUA that can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on INS VA0029A and 1INS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to 1NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS VA0020A - Containment Spray Pump 1A suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-14 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 1A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1NS PUA that can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to 1NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INS VA0029A - Containment Spray Header 1A Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:40 Page: 206 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-15 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 1A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1NS PUA that can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. There is a potential loss of power to 1NS VA0020A. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS VA0032A - Containment Spray Header 1A Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-16 VFDR                            1A Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header, which is normally closed and as-is for HSB, is affected by a spurious operation or loss of power and control due to the cable failures of components FW-27A, ND PUA, and NS-43A may cause a diversion of FWST to the containment sump. A combination of FW-27A being open, the spurious start of the ND pump (due to interlock and/or cable failure), and spurious opening of the ND auxiliary containment spray valve could cause inadvertent FWST depletion to the containment sump via the Train A containment spray ring. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS VA0043A - 1A Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-18 VFDR                            1A Charging Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by a spurious start signal created from cable hits on 1*ATC 1006 and 1*NV 599. The power feed (1ETA BKR #12) and the 125VDC control power feed (1EDE BKR #F01C) panels are both located in FA 15. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV PUACC - 1A Charging Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:40 Page: 207 of 695
 
S                                                                                          0                                                                                          S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        15-VFDR-21 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may keep valve open. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0001A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-22 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may keep valve open. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0002A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1B Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may keep valve open. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VAOO1OA - Letdown Orifice lB Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-24 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1C Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may keep valve open. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA001 IA - Letdown Orifice 1C Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:40 Page: 208 of 695
 
S                                                                                                                                                                                        S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area 10:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1A Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may keep valve open. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INV VA0013A - Letdown Orifice IA Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-26 VFDR                            IA and 1B chemical and volume control pumps recirculation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously close valve.
This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0203A - IA and 1B chemical and volume control pumps recirculation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-27 VFDR                            IA &l B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals may prevent normal control of charging flow. Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &l B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:41 Page: 209 of 695
 
0                                                                                                                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-28 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals may prevent normal control of charging flow. Valve fails open on loss of air. Failure of valve NV-309 would result in need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-31 1. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-29 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a spurious SSPS signal that closes and prevents opening valve.
This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-31 VFDR                            1A Nuclear Service Water Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits that cause spurious signal to start RN PUA and spurious operation of other A train components (1 RN-3A, 1RN-28A, and 1RN-847A) which may cause drain down of the NSW pond to the lake via the A diesel. RN PUA needs to be disabled and ensuring RN PUB is running. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN PUA - 1A Nuclear Service Water Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:41 Page:210of'695
 
e                                                                                                                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-32 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that cause spurious signal to start RN PUA and spurious operation of other A train components (1RN-3A, 1RN-28A, and 1RN-847A) which may cause drain down of the NSW pond to the lake via the A diesel. RN PUA needs to be disabled and ensuring RN PUB is running. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    I RN VA0003A - Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-33 VFDR                            1A Nuclear Service Water Pump Discharge Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits that cause spurious signal to start RN PUA and spurious operation of other A train components (1RN-3A, 1RN-28A, and 1RN-847A) which may cause drain down of the NSW pond to the lake via the A diesel. RN PUA needs to be disabled and ensuring RN PUB is running. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    IRN VA0028A - 1A Nuclear Service Water Pump Discharge Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          15-VFDR-34 VFDR                            1A DIG Heat Exchanger Return to Lake, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that cause spurious signal to start RN PUA and spurious operation of other A train components (1 RN-3A, 1RN-28A, and 1RN-847A) which may cause drain down of the NSW pond to the lake via the A diesel.
RN PUA needs to be disabled and ensuring RN PUB is running. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0847A - 1A D/G Heat Exchanger Return to Lake Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:41    Page: 211 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  15 - Unit 1 4160V Essential SWGR Room El 577                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        15-VFDR-35 VFDR                            S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by possible loss of instrument air or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VAOOO1 - S/G 1D PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        15-VFDR-36 VFDR                            S/G 1C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by possible loss of instrument air or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - lC S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:42 Page: 212 of 695
 
0                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation wit6 simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 69                U2 AB Cable Rm El 574 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:42 Page: 213 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Let down as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D"pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02116/2015 14:08:42 Page: 214 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                    Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
* Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:42 Page: 215 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
* J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008 "J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                  "Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                  "Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                  "The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 06 Deletion of Control Room Floor from Scope of Committed Fire Barriers (CNCE-9584)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:42 Page: 216 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the technical justification for removing the Control Room floor from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Control Room floor can be removed from the scope of the committed fire baniers based on the following:
                                  " Insignificant amount of combustible loading.
                                  " Lack of ignition sources.
                                  " Cable spreading room and main control boards are supplied with ionization smoke detectors.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10          Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                  " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                  " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
9 Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:43 Page: 217 of 695
 
0                                    ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 69                      U2 AB Cable Rm El 574            -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:43 Page:218of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 16 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [211.27E-07 A LERF                            Units: [2] 3.06E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria for delta CDF and LERF, but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for a limited number of scenarios and for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient welding and cutting fires are a significant contributor to risk in this fire area. However, present hot work controls are sufficient and no enhancement is required.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area to satisfy Risk or DID criteria.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through the Unit 2 S/Gs (via 2CA-48 and/or 2CA-52) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The recovery action made a significant contribution to risk in this fire area and was identified as being required for risk; the additional risk was determined to be bounded by the VFDR delta risk. The action to throttle CA flow through the Unit 1 S/Gs (via 1CA-48 and/or 1CA-52) did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the Unit 1 auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended. Also, due to the contribution to risk of the reactor coolant pump variances, a DID recovery action is recommended to locally trip the Unit 2 reactor coolant pumps in the turbine building.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause both valves to spuriously open. Also, it may not be possible to close the isolation valve due to a possible loss of offsite power. However primary control station actions to swap the SSF disconnect plugs will cause the PORVs to fail closed and no additional actions are required for DID.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:43 Page:219of695
 
9                                        ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        16-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1A, which is normally cycle and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRA        .- Pressurizer Heater Group 1A Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        16-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump flow to S/G 2C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes SIG throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump flow to S/G 2C Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria VFDR ID                        16-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump discharge to S/G 2C, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0050A - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump discharge to S/G 2C Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        16-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 26, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent SIG overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0052      - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2B Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:43  Page: 220 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump discharge to 2B S/G, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0054B - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump discharge to 2B S/G Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-15 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable, power, and interlock hits that may spuriously energize pressurizer heater. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 2A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-16 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2B, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable, power, and interlock hits that may spuriously energize pressurizer heater. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 2B Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-17 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2C, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable, power, and interlock hits that may spuriously energize pressurizer heater. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRC - Pressurizer Heater Group 2C Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/1612015 14:08:44 Page: 221 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-18 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2D, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable, power, and interlock hits that may spuriously energize pressurizer heater. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRD - Pressurizer Heater Group 2D Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-25 VFDR                            2A Reactor Coolant Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures that may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (2NC VA0027 and 2NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUA - 2A Reactor Coolant Pump Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-26 VFDR                            2B Reactor Coolant Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures that may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (2NC VA0027 and 2NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUB - 2B Reactor Coolant Pump Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:44 Page: 222 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-27 VFDR                            2C Reactor Coolant Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures that may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (2NC VA0027 and 2NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUC - 2C Reactor Coolant Pump Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        16-VFDR-28 VFDR                            2D Reactor Coolant Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures that may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (2NC VA0027 and 2NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUD - 2D Reactor Coolant Pump Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        16-VFDR-29 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Isolation, which is normally Open and Closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power could fail valve open. PORV can spuriously open due to various cable failures. Multiple PORVs opeing could challenge makeup, due to timing of closure of valves with the SSF disconnects. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0031 B - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02116/2015 14:08:44 Page: 223 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        16-VFDR-30 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable failures can fail valve open. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, could fail from spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power. Multiple PORVs opening could challenge makeup, due to timing of closure of valves with the SSF disconnects. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0032B - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        16-VFDR-31 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power could fail valve open. PORV can spuriously open due to various cable failures. Multiple PORVs opeing could challenge makeup, due to timing of closure of valves with the SSF disconnects. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0033A - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-32 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable failures can fail valve open. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, could fail from spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power. Multiple PORVs opening could challenge makeup, due to timing of closure of valves with the SSF disconnects. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:45 Page: 224 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    16 - Unit 2 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-33 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power could fail valve open. PORV can spuriously open due to various cable failures. Multiple PORVs opeing could challenge makeup, due to timing of closure of valves with the SSF disconnects. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0035B - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-34 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable failures can fail valve open. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, could fail from spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power. Multiple PORVs opening could challenge makeup, due to timing of closure of valves with the SSF disconnects. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          16-VFDR-51 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Equipment Sump 2A Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:45 Page: 225 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  17 - Unit I Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 60                U1 AB Cable Rm El 574 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02116/2015 14:08:45 Page: 226 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity Control by injecting water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D"pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:46 Page: 227 of 695
 
0                                                                                              0                                                                                              S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                    Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                "Area is normally attended "The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                "The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:46 Page: 228 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                  " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                  " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
* F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                  " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                  " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                  " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                  "Acceptable for the Category I (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overiap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                  " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                  "The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 06 Deletion of Control Room Floor from Scope of Committed Fire Barriers (CNCE-9584)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02116/2015 14:08:46 Page: 229 of 695
 
0                                                                                            0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the technical justification for removing the Control Room floor from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Control Room floor can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                " Insignificant amount of combustible loading.
                                " Lack of ignition sources.
                                " Cable spreading room and main control boards are supplied with ionization smoke detectors.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                "Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
                                " Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02116/2015 14:08:46 Page: 230 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 60                      Ul AB Cable Rm El 574              -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:46 Page: 231 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                  Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 17 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta LERF risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF. The delta CDF risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
ACDF                              Units: [1] 1.17E-07 A LERF                            Units: [1] 6.41E-09 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF and the delta risk results for CDF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for a limited number of scenarios and for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient welding and cutting fires are a significant contributor to risk in this fire area. However, present hot work controls are sufficient and no enhancement is required.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area to satisfy Risk or DID criteria.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for SiGs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through the Unit 1 S/Gs (via 1CA-48 and/or 1CA-52) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The recovery action made a significant contribution to risk in this fire area and was identified as being required for risk; the additional risk was determined to be bounded by the VFDR delta risk. The action to throttle CA flow through the Unit 2S/Gs (via 2CA-48 and/or 2CA-52) did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended. Also, due to the contribution to risk of the reactor coolant pump variances, a DID recovery action is recommended to locally trip the Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps in the turbine building.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause both valves to spuriously open. Also, it may not be possible to close the isolation valve due to a possible loss of offsite power. However primary control station actions to swap the SSF disconnect plugs will cause the PORVs to fail closed and no additional actions are required for DID.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:46 Page: 232 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven PumpFlow to SIG 1C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes SIG throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent SIG overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure AP/O/A/5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ICA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven PumpFlow to SIG 1C Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to SIG 1C Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously valve. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ICA VA0050A - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to SIG 1C Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 1B, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes SIG throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent SIG overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/O/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure AP/O/AI5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 1B Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:47 Page: 233 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to S/G 1B Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously valve. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ICA VA0054B - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to S/G 1B Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1A, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits, and loss of power and control that may prevent de-energizing pressurizer heaters from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group IA Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1B, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits, and loss of power and control that may prevent de-energizing pressurizer heaters from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 1B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-12 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1C, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits, and loss of power and control that may prevent de-energizing pressurizer heaters from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRC - Pressurizer Heater Group IC Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:47 Page: 234 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1D, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits, and loss of power and control that may prevent de-energizing pressurizer heaters from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRD - Pressurizer Heater Group 1D Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1A, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures that may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (1 NC VA0027 and INC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUA - Reactor Coolant Pump IA Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-21 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1B, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures that may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (INC VA0027 and 1NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUB - Reactor Coolant Pump 1B Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:47 Page: 235 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-22 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1C, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures that may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (INC VA0027 and INC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC PUC - Reactor Coolant Pump IC Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump ID, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures that may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (1NC VA0027 and 1NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUD - Reactor Coolant Pump 1D Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-24 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may open all Pressurizer PORVs. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power before closure can be accomplished. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0031 B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:08:48 Page: 236 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may open all Pressurizer PORVs. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power before closure can be accomplished. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-26 VFDR                            Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may open all Pressurizer PORVs. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power before closure can be accomplished. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0033A - Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          17-VFDR-27 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may open all Pressurizer PORVs. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power before closure can be accomplished. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:48 Page: 237 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table 8-3)
Fire Area ID:                  17 - Unit 1 Cable Room El 574                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        17-VFDR-28 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may open all Pressurizer PORVs. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power before closure can be accomplished. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        17-VFDR-29 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures which may open all Pressurizer PORVs. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB, is affected by spurious cable failures and a possible loss of power before closure can be accomplished. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        17-VFDR-44 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated fiowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Equipment Sump Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:48 Page: 238 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (U1) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 219                U1 AB Mech Pen Rm El 577 220                U2 AB Mech Pen Rm El 577 55                U1 AB SE Area El 577 56                U1 AB Above Filter Pits East El 577 57                U1 AB Above Filter Pits West El 577 58                U1 AB Area East of KC Pumps El 577 59                MCC Rm 1EMXA & 1EMXI El 577 64                U2 AB NE Area El 577 65                U2 AB Above Filter Pits East El 577 66                U2 AB Above Filter Pits West El 577 67                U2 AB Area East of KC Pumps El 577 68                MCC Rm 2EMXA & 2EMXI El 577 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:48 Page: 239 of 695
 
0                                                                                                                                                                              0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
Fire Area ID:                    18 (U1) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate Systemor condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:49 Page: 240 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  18 (U1) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                    Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                *Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 0211612015 14:08:49 Page: 241 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 17 Fire Protection Evaluation For Unprotected Spiral Stairs Located at Col. GG-61 and GG-53 Connecting Elevations 577' and 594' Revision                        0 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to provide justification for the unprotected sprial stairs located at column line GG-61 and GG-53 connecting fire areas (FA's) 18 and 22.
The evaluation determined the portions of the barrier containing the stairs to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                  "combustible controls, "lack of in situ combustibles,
* minimal ignition sources,
* availability of SSS.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:49 Page: 242 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                        18 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                    NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            DescriptV  Ion                        System            System              Protection Feature        Required Fire Protection Featture and System Details 219                      U1 AB Miech Pen Rm El 577            -                -                  -                        -
220                      U2 AB Miech Pen Rm El 577            -                -                  -                        -
55                      U1 AB SEEArea El 577                  -                -                  -                        -
I I1 AR Al 56                                  ov          PR Filte*121r EasIE    -                -                  -                        -
577 57                      Ul AB Above Filter Pits West El 577 58                      U1 AB Area East of KC Pumps El        R                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E 577                                                                                                  Water Suppression, Installed Fixed Sprinkler: R 59                      MCC Rm 1EMXA& 1EMXI El 577 64                      U2 AB NE Area El 577 65                      U2 AB Above Filter Pits East El 577 66                      U2 AB Above Filter Pits West El 577 67                      U2 AB Area East of KC Pumps El        R                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E 577                                                                                                  Water Suppression, Installed Fixed Sprinkler: R 68                      MCC Rm 2EMXA & 2EMXI El 577 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:49 Page: 243 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 18 (Ul)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1) 1.51E-08 A LERF                            Units: [1]8.21E-10 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results for CDF and LERF are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
Automatic suppression is credited for severe KC pump fires, but manual suppression was not credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through S/G C (via CA-48) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The risk of the associated operator action did not contribute significantly to risk. The action to throttle CA flow through S/G B (via CA-52) did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:49 Page: 244 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          18 (U1)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure AP/O/A15500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1C Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          18 (U1)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to S/G 1B Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits may spuriously close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0054B - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to S/G 1B Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          18 (U1 )-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1A, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 1A Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:50 Page: 245 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          18 (U1)-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concem due to spurious operation from failure of cable I*NI 561. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          18 (U1)-VFDR-27 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Equipmemnt Sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:50 Page: 246 of 695
 
0                                                                                    0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 219                U1 AB Mech Pen Rm El 577 220                U2 AB Mech Pen Rm El 577 55                U1 AB SE Area El 577 56                U1 AB Above Filter Pits East El 577 57                U1 AB Above Filter Pits West El 577 58                U1 AB Area East of KC Pumps El 577 59                MCC Rm 1EMXA & 1EMXI El 577 64                U2 AB NE Area El 577 65                U2 AB Above Filter Pits East El 577 66                U2 AB Above Filter Pits West El 577 67                U2 AB Area East of KC Pumps El 577 68                MCC Rm 2EMXA & 2EMXI El 577 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:08:50 Page: 247 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main Feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02116/2015 14:08:50 Page: 248 of 695
 
0                                                                                            0                                                                                                0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                    Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
* Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:51    Page: 249 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 17 Fire Protection Evaluation For Unprotected Spiral Stairs Located at Col. GG-61 and GG-53 Connecting Elevations 577' and 594' Revision                        0 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to provide justification for the unprotected sprial stairs located at column line GG-61 and GG-53 connecting fire areas (FA's) 18 and 22.
The evaluation determined the portions of the barrier containing the stairs to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
* combustible controls,
                                " lack of in situ combustibles,
                                " minimal ignition sources,
* availability of SSS.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:51 Page: 250 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      18 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feat ure and System Details 219                      U1 AB Meech Pen Rm El 577          -                -                  -                        -
220                      U2 AB Meech Pen Rm El 577          -                -                  -                        -
55                      U1 AB SE Area El 577              -                -                  -                        -
56                      U1 AB Ab ove Filter Pits East El  -                -                  -                        -
577 57                      Ul AB Above Filter Pits West El 577 58                      U1 AB Area East of KC Pumps El    R                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E 577                                                                                              Water Suppression, Installed Fixed Sprinkler: R 59                      MCC Rm 1EMXA & 1EMXI El 577 64                      U2 AB NE Area El 577 65                      U2 AB Above Filter Pits East El 577 66                      U2 AB Above Filter Pits West El 577 67                      U2 AB Area East of KC Pumps El    R                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E 577                                                                                              Water Suppression, Installed Fixed Sprinkler: R 68                      MCC Rm 2EMXA & 2EMXI El 577 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:51  Page: 251 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 18 (U2)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1 E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A COF                            Units: [2] 1.53E-08 A LERF                            Units: [2] 1.09E-10 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07lrx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Automatic suppression is credited for severe KC pump fires, but manual suppression was not credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. The action to throttle CA flow through S/G C (via CA-48) was evaluated for additional risk in this fire area with a related VFDR. The risk of the associated operator action did not contribute significantly to risk. The action to throttle CA flow through S/G B (via CA-52) did not contribute significantly to risk. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.
No Risk or DID enhancements or modifications are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:51 Page: 252 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          18 (U2)-VFDR-02 VFDR,                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2C Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          18 (U2)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump discharge to 2B S/G, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits may spuriously close valve and prevent control from the control room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0054B - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump discharge to 2B S/G Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          18 (U2)-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that can cause a heater to remain on and fail to automatically de-energize. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 2A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          18 (U2)-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 1*NI 561. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:51  Page: 253 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    18 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area & U2 KC Pump Room El 577 (Common)                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          18 (U2)-VFDR-27 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Equipment Sump 2A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:52 Page: 254 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    19 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                        Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 79                U2 AB Elect Pen Rm El 594 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:52 Page: 255 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FireArea ID:
Fire Area ID:                    19 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                          Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                    Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                          Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                      Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                      Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unsed S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                      Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:52 Page: 256 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    19 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                          Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                "Area is normally attended "The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
* The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02116/2015 14:08:52 Page: 257 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    19 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                                  Engineeri ng Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation i0        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10          Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials, e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 14 Evaluation of Gaps in Concrete Hatch Covers Revision                        4 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the gaps (maximum 1 inch x 1 inch) in the six hatch openings that exist in a floor that separates redundant shutdown trains. The six hatch openings are in barriers that separate Fire Areas (FA's) 2 from 7, 3 from 8, 7 from 14, 8 from 15, 14 from 19 and 15 from 20.
The evaluation determined the hatch openings to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
e floor area of approximately 2800 sq. ft. or greater in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 15, 19, and 20,
                                'ceiling heights of 16 ft. in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, and 15,
                                " forced ventilation of 3000 cfm in FA's 2 and 3,
                                " forced ventilation of 10,400 cfm in FA's 7, 8, 14, and 15,
                                *limited ignition sources,
                                'limited in situ combustibles,
                                ' automatic water suppression systems are not installed above hatch openings,
                                *existing flood control features.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:52 Page: 258 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      19 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                            Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required      Required Suppression  Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System        System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 79                      U2 AB Elect Pen Rm El 594            -            R                  E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:52 Page: 259 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    19 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 19 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
ACDF                              Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited in HGL and MCA evaluation risk screening criteria. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:53 Page: 260 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    19 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          19-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air and SSPS signals.
2NV VA0294 fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid.
This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          19-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a spurious SSPS which closes and prevents opening valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          19-VFDR-04 VFDR                            S/G 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0013 - S/G 2B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:53 Page: 261 of 695
 
0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    19 - Unit 2 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          19-VFDR-05 VFDR                            S/G 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - S/G 2A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:53 Page: 262 of 695
 
0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  20 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                        Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 71                U1 AB Elect Pen Rm El 594 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:53 Page: 263 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
20 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                          Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                    Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                          Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                      Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                      Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring function                      Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:54 Page: 264 of 695
 
0                                                                                              0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    20 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                            Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
* The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:54 Page: 265 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    20 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                                  Engineerl ng Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10          Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                  " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                  " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 14 Evaluation of Gaps in Concrete Hatch Covers Revision                        4 Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the gaps (maximum 1 inch x 1 inch) in the six hatch openings that exist in a floor that separates redundant shutdown trains. The six hatch openings are in barriers that separate Fire Areas (FA's) 2 from 7, 3 from 8, 7 from 14, 8 from 15, 14 from 19 and 15 from 20.
The evaluation determined the hatch openings to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
e floor area of approximately 2800 sq. ft. or greater in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, 15, 19, and 20,
                                  *ceiling heights of 16 ft. in FA's 2, 3, 7, 8, 14, and 15,
                                  " forced ventilation of 3000 cfm in FA's 2 and 3,
                                  " forced ventilation of 10,400 cfm in FA's 7, 8, 14, and 15,
* limited ignition sources,
* limited in situ combustibles, e automatic water suppression systems are not installed above hatch openings,
                                  @existing flood control features.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:54 Page: 266 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    20 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                            Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required      Required Suppression    Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System        System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 71                      Ul AB Elect Pen Rm El 594            -              R                  E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:54 Page: 267 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  20 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 20 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                          Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited in HGL and MCA evaluation risk screening criteria. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:54 Page: 268 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    20 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          20-VFDR-02 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals. Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          20-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals. Failure of valve NV-309 may result in need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-311. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          20-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a spuruios SSPS which closes and prevents opening valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:55 Page: 269 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  20 - Unit 1 Electrical Pen Room El 594                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        20-VFDR-06 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        20-VFDR-07 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0019 - S/G IA PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        20-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by is caused by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals. 2NV VA0309 fails open on loss of air, this may require manually operating manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-311. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection flow Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:55 Page: 270 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U1) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                        Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 72                U1 Control Rm El 594 80                U2 Control Rm El 594 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:55 Page: 271 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
21 (Ul) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                          Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fule pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring is available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable                                                  I conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:55 Page: 272 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  21 (Ul) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                            Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                "Area is normally attended "The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                ' The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:56 Page: 273 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area 10:                    21 (Ul) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                  En gineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 06 Deletion of Control Room Floor from Scope of Committed Fire Barrers (CNCE-9584)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the technical justification for removing the Control Room floor from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Control Room floor can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                " Insignificant amount of combustible loading.
                                " Lack of ignition sources.
                                " Cable spreading room and main control boards are supplied with ionization smoke detectors.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                " Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
* Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP13)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:56 Page: 274 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U1) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                            Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 72                      Ul Control Rm El 594                -                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R 80                      U2 Control Rm El 594                                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:08:56 Page: 275 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  21 (Ul) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                      Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 21 (Ul)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
" CDF                            Units: [1] 1.03E-06 A LERF                          Units: [1] 3.56E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results for CDF and LERF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited in the development of control board fires and MCR abondonment scenarios. Manual suppression was also credited in HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient and hot work fire scenarios are not significant contributors to risk, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or hot work in the area.
Therefore, Risk or DID enhancements and modifications to are not required. Due to signficant risk contribution of auxiliary feedwater flow control valve variants, recovery actions for manual control of auxiliary feedwater flow are required for risk. Also, due to reactor coolant pump variants, a DID recovery action is recommended to locally trip the reactor coolant pumps in the turbine building.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause both valves to spuriously open. Also, it may not be possible to close the isolation valve due to a possible loss of offsite power. However primary control station actions to swap the SSF disconnect plugs will cause the PORVs to fail closed and no additional actions are required for DID.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:56 Page: 276 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  21 (Ul) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        21 (U1)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 1C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes SIG throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent SIG overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and ICA-48 per procedure AP/0/A/5500/045 or OP/O/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 1C Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria VFDR ID                        21 (U1)-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to SIG 1C Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0050A - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to SIG 1C Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        21 (U1)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG IB, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes SIG throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent SIG overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure AP/0/A/5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ICA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 1B Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:56 Page: 277 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U1) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to S/G 1B Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hit may cause spurious valve closure. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1CA VA0054B - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge to S/G 1B Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-10 VFDR                              Pressurizer Heater Group 1A, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may energize and prevent de-energizing pressurizer heaters. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1ILE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 1A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-11 VFDR                              Pressurizer Heater Group 1B, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may energize and prevent de-energizing pressurizer heaters. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1ILE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 1B Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-12 VFDR                              Pressurizer Heater Group IC, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits, and loss of power and control that may prevent de-energizing all pressurizer heaters from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1ILE-PZRHTRC - Pressurizer Heater Group 1C Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:57 Page: 278 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (Ul) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1D, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits, and loss of power and control that may prevent de-energizing all pressurizer heaters from the MCR. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRD - Pressurizer Heater Group 1D Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1A, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (1 NC VA0027 and 1NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUA - Reactor Coolant Pump 1A Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-21 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1B, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (INC VA0027 and 1NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUB - Reactor Coolant Pump 1B Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:57 Page: 279 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  21 (Ul) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        21 (Ul )-VFDR-22 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable and power hits that may prevent the block valve from being closed.
This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0031 B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        21 (U1)-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable and interlock hits that could spuriously open PORV. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB may not be operaable.
This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        21 (U1)-VFDR-24 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable and power hits that may prevent the block valve from being closed.
This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0033A - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:58 Page: 280 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (Ul) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable and interlock hits that could spuriously open PORV. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB may not be operaable.
This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-26 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable and power hits that may prevent the block valve from being closed.
This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U1)-VFDR-27 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable and interlock hits that could spuriously open PORV. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB may not be operaable.
This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:58 Page: 281 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  21 (Ul) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        21 (U1)-VFDR-42 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Equipmemnt Sump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        21 (U1)-VFDR-46 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1C, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (1NC VA0027 and 1NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUC - Reactor Coolant Pump IC Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        21 (U1)-VFDR-47 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 1D, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (1NC VA0027 and 1NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC PUD - Reactor Coolant Pump ID Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:58 Page: 282 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                        Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 72                Ui Control Rm El 594 80                U2 Control Rm El 594 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:58 Page: 283 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                          Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D" pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring is available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:59 Page: 284 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                            Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:59 Page: 285 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                  En gineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 06 Deletion of Control Room Floor from Scope of Committed Fire Barriers (CNCE-9584)
Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the technical justification for removing the Control Room floor from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Control Room floor can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
* Insignificant amount of combustible loading.
                                  " Lack of ignition sources.
                                  " Cable spreading room and main control boards are supplied with ionization smoke detectors.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10          Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                  " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                  " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:59 Page: 286 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                              Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 72                      Ul Control Rm El 594                -                E. R                E                        Combustible Loadina: E Detection System, Installed: E IR 80                      U2 Contrc I Rm El 594                                E, R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02116/2015 14:08:59 Page: 287 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                          Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 21 (U2)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 1.03E-06 A LERF                          Units: [2] 3.56E-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results for CDF and LERF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited in the development of control board fires and MCR abondonment scenarios. Manual suppression was also credited in HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient and hot work fire scenarios are not a significant contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles in the area.
Therefore, Risk and DID enhancements or modifications are not required. Due to signficant risk contribution of auxiliary feedwater flow control valve variants, recovery actions for manual control of auxiliary feedwater flow are required for risk. Also, due to reactor coolant pump variants, a DID recovery action is recommended to locally trip the reactor coolant pumps in the turbine building.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause both valves to spuriously open. Also, it may not be possible to close the isolation valve due to a possible loss of offsite power. However primary control station actions to swap the SSF disconnect plugs will cause the PORVs to fail closed and no additional actions are required for DID.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:08:59 Page: 288 of 695
* 0                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        21 (U2)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 2C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 2CA-52 and 2CA-48 per procedure AP/0/N/5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 2C Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria VFDR ID                        21 (U2)-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump discharge to S/G 2C, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0050A - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump discharge to SIG 2C Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        21 (U2)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2B, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes SIG throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent SIG overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 2CA-52 and 2CA-48 per procedure AP/O/A/5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to SIG 2B Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy Risk criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPD1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:00 Page: 289 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine discharge to 2B S/G, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously close valve.
This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0054B - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine discharge to 2B S/G Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable, power, and interlock hits that may spuriously energize pressurizer heater. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 2A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-11 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2B, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable, power, and interlock hits that may spuriously energize pressurizer heater. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 2B Disposition                      Satisfies Risk. DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-12 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2C, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable, power, and interlock hits that may spuriously energize pressurizer heater. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRC - Pressurizer Heater Group 2C Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:00    Page: 290 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 2D, which is normally cycled and off for HSB, is affected by cable, power, and interlock hits that may spuriously energize pressurizer heater. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRD - Pressurizer Heater Group 2D Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 2A, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (2NC VA0027 and 2NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUA - Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        21 (U2)-VFDR-21 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 2B, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (2NC VA0027 and 2NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUB - Reactor Coolant Pump 2B Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:00 Page: 291 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        21 (U2)-VFDR-22 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures and a possible loss of power. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0031B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        21 (U2)-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failure which can spuriously open the PORV. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB may not be operaable. Fail valve closed by disconnecting power at the disconnect plugs and short the solenoids by connecting the connector to the receptacle per procedure OP/O/B/6100/013. This action is required for transfer to the SSF. (Reference MSO Scenarios # 17 and 18 CNC-1435.00-00-0043). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        21 (U2)-VFDR-24 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures and a possible loss of power. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0033A - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        21 (U2)-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failure which can spuriously open the PORV. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB may not be operaable. Fail valve closed by disconnecting power at the disconnect plugs and short the solenoids by connecting the connector to the receptacle per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. This action is required for transfer to the SSF. (Reference MSO Scenarios # 17 and 18 CNC-1435.00-00-0043). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:01 Page: 292 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-26 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failures and a possible loss of power. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-27 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable failure which can spuriously open the PORV. This would remain until the SSF plugs are switched to the SSF position. Pressurizer PORV Isolation Valve, which is normally open, required closed for HSB may not be operaable. Fail valve closed by disconnecting power at the disconnect plugs and short the solenoids by connecting the connector to the receptacle per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. This action is required for transfer to the SSF. (Reference MSO Scenarios # 17 and 18 CNC-1435.00-00-0043). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-44 VFDR                            Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Sump, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a combination of cable and/or interlock hits that could result in FWST draindown to containment sump from one or more normally isolated flowpaths. This is postulated to cause spurious operation (opening) of NV-876 due to flooding. There are no cables for NV-876 routed in the fire area that lead directly to fire-induced mispositioning of NV-876. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0876 - Standby Makeup Pump to Containment Equipment Sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:01 Page: 293 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    21 (U2) - Control Room El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-48 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pumlb 2C, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (2NC VA0027 and 2NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUC - Reactor Coolant Pump 2C Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          21 (U2)-VFDR-49 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pump 2D, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable failures may spuriously open or keep open the Pressurizer Spray valves (2NC VA0027 and 2NC VA0029). Cable failures may also spuriously start or prevent the trip of the Reactor Coolant Pumps from the Control Room. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC PUD - Reactor Coolant Pump 2D Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:01    Page: 294 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 221                Ul FB Cont Tool Storage Rm El 605 222                Ul FB Upper Cont Pal El 605 223                U2 FB Cont Tool Storage Rm El 605 224                U2 FB Upper Cont Pal El 605 73                Ul Control Rm Vent Equip Rm El 594 74                Ul AB Vent Equip Area West El 594 76                U1 AB Vent Equip Area East El 594 77                Ul AB RP Resp Issue/RIC El 594 81                U2 Control Rm Vent Equip Rm El 594 82                U2 AB Vent Equip Area West El 594 84                U2 AB Vent Equip Area East El 594 85                U2 AB HP Count Rm El 594 89A                U1 FB Access Hatch & Stairwell Areas 90A                U2 FB Access Hatch & Stairwell Areas Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP I)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:02 Page: 295 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (U1) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D"pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main Feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring is available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:02 Page: 296 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  22 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                      Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                "Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullettmissile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Licensing Action                12. Deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding protection of HVAC penetrations of fire barriers Licensing Basis                  In some fire rated walls and floor/ceiling assemblies, openings were provided for HVAC duct access which are larger than the ducts themselves. To support fire damper sleeves in this opening a steel plate was used to form a rigid frame, to which a layer of fireproofing was applied. The remainder of the opening was protected by a fire rated silicone foam. While the composite design has not been tested by an independent laboratory, the individual components have been tested. The testing was found to be acceptable based on the following:
* The fireproofing and foam sealant has successfully passed the acceptance criteria of ASTM E-1 19 individually as documented in the U.L. Building Materials Directory, 1983.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:02 Page: 297 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 04 Fire Protection Evaluation for Floor Blockout Penetrations with a Free Area in Excess of 9 sqft. and Structural Framing Spans Exceeding 42 in. without a Cross Member Framing Revision                          1 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following floor blockouts regarding the framing support provided for the Silicone Foam free areas exceeding 9 sqft. that are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                  " H-AX-517A-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517A-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-003
                                  " K-AX-653-F-001
                                  " K-AX-653-F-032
                                  " K-AX-653-F-003
* J-AX-650A-F-001 The evaluation determined that the Unit 1 and 2 Exterior Doghouse penetrations (J-AX-650A-F-001) are qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. The remaining penetrations above are considered adequate for the area fire hazards based on the following:
* Detection available in fire areas of concern.
* Area hose stations and fire extinguishers.
                                  " Fire brigade response.
                                  " Seal and framing configurations for the penetrations are considered adequate.
                                  " Seal integrity is not anticipated to be compromised by fire exposure.
                                  "The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                  " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:02 Page: 298 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (U1) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions "C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033 o H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094 "J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010 "J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008 "J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions thai impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                  "Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                  "The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 17 Fire Protection Evaluation For Unprotected Spiral Stairs Located at Col. GG-61 and GG-53 Connecting Elevations 577' and 594' Revision                        0 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to provide justification for the unprotected sprial stairs located at column line GG-61 and GG-53 connecting fire areas (FA's) 18 and 22.
The evaluation determined the portions of the barrier containing the stairs to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                  "combustible controls, "lack of in situ combustibles,
* minimal ignition sources,
* availability of SSS.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02/1612015 14:09:03 Page: 299 of 695
 
0                                              0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 18 Fire Protection Evaluation For Unprotected Spiral Stairs Located at Col. GG-61 and GG-53 Connecting Elevations 611+0' and 631+6' Revision                        0 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to provide justification for the unprotected sprial stairs between Elevation 631+6 (Fire Areas (FA) 38 and 47) and Elevation 611+0 (FA 22).
The evaluation determined the portions of the barrier containing the stairs to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                " combustible controls,
                                " lack of in situ combustibles,
* minimal ignition sources.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 07 Deletion of Aux Bldg Roof at U1/U2 VP Supply Rooms and YN Pump Bldg from Scope of Committed Fire Barriers (CNCE-9646)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the technical justification for removing the areas/rooms of the Auxiliary Building roof including the Unit 1 VP Supply Room, Unit 2 VP Supply Room, and the YN System Pump Building from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that these areas can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                " Insignificant combustible loading.
* Lack of ignition sources.
                                " No significant fire hazard exists at the specified locations.
* Areas contain non-safety related equipment.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 0211612015 14:09:03 Page: 300 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                              Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
* Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 11 Evaluation of Cryo Ice Machine Bldg on Aux Bldg Roof (NSM CN-50419)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to review NSM CN-50419 for the fire protection concerns of using a steel plate in the Auxiliary Budding Roof to separate the Auxiliary Building from the Cryo Ice Making Machine Room.
The evaluation determined that the Cryo Ice Making Machine Room does not present a significant unprotected fire hazard to the Auxiliary Building even with the steel plate access doors removed based on the following:
                                " Flame spread rating of the roof and wall insulation.
                                " Metal wall sandwich construction.
                                " No significant combustibles or fire hazards located on the Auxiliary Building Roof near the Cryo Ice Machine.
                                " No impact on the assured shutdown method or removal of decay heat.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:03 Page: 301 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      22 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 221                      Ul FB Cont Tool Storage Rm El      --                -                  E                        Combustible Loading: E 605 222                      Ul FB Upper Cont Pal El 605 223                      U2 FB Cont Tool Storage Rm El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 605 224                      U2 FB Upper Cont Pal El 605 73                      Ul Control Rm Vent Equip Rm El                      E                  E                        Combustible Loading: E 594                                                                                              Detection System, Installed: E 74                      U1 AB Vent Equip Area West El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 594 76                      Ul AB Vent Equip Area East El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 594 77                      Ul AB RP Resp Issue/RIC El 594 81                      U2 Control Rm Vent Equip Rm El                      E                  E                        Combustible Loading: E 594                                                                                              Detection System, Installed: E 82                      U2 AB Vent Equip Area West El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 594 84                      U2 AB Vent Equip Area East El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 594 85                      U2 AB HP Count Rm El 594 89A                      U1 FB Access Hatch & Stairwell Areas 90A                      U2 FB Access Hatch & Stairwell Areas Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:03 Page: 302 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  22 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                  Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 22 (Ul)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. Since there are no direct hits in this fire area, the VFDR delta risk was insignificant. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.
Risk or DID enhancements and modifications are not required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPi)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:03 Page: 303 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  22 (Ul) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        22 (U1)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/0/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure AP/0/A/5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1C Disposition                    Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                        22 (U1)-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1B, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by transfer to the SSF causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. Operate CAPT as required per procedure OP/O/B/6100/013. Manually throttle open 1CA-52 and 1CA-48 per procedure AP/0/A/5500/045 or OP/0/B/6100/013. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 1B Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDRID                          22 (Ul)-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from I EPLPLEPA, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by non-coordinated cables cause loss of ability to close Main Feedwater Isolation Valves, Main Feedwater Control Valves, Main Feedwater Control Bypass Valves from the MCR and cause loss of power to1ILE-PZRHTRA, and other KC, NC, ND, NV, NW, and SV equipment. A HSB action may be required to clear cable faults on non-coordinated loads to restore power to 1EPLPLEPA. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performanoe-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1EPLPLEPA-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPLPLEPA Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:04 Page: 304 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 221                Ul FB Cont Tool Storage Rm El 605 222                Ul FB Upper Cont Pal El 605 223                U2 FB Cont Tool Storage Rm El 605 224                U2 FB Upper Cont Pal El 605 73                Ul Control Rm Vent Equip Rm El 594 74                Ul AB Vent Equip Area West El 594 76                Ul AB Vent Equip Area East El 594 77                Ul AB RP Resp Issue/RIC El 594 81                U2 Control Rm Vent Equip Rm El 594 82                U2 AB Vent Equip Area West El 594 84                U2 AB Vent Equip Area East El 594 85                U2 AB HP Count Rm El 594 89A                U1 FB Access Hatch & Stairwell Areas 90A                U2 FB Access Hatch & Stairwell Areas Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:04 Page: 305 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                      Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Reactivity control by injecting borated water via the seal injection flow path using the spent fuel pool with the Standby Makeup Pump from the SSF.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control is provided by isolation of the reactor coolant system and makeup via the seal injection path from the spent fuel pool using the Standby Makeup Pump with control from the SSF. Letdown as necessary using the reactor head vents.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control is provided by isolating the reactor coolant system and makeup with spent fuel pool water and the Standby Makeup Pump. One sub-bank of "D"pressurizer heaters to maintain a steam bubble in the pressurizer. Pressurizer code safeties remain available.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Decay heat removal from the SSF using natural circulation and main steam safeties. S/G feed by turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump using the Condensate System or condenser circ water to S/Gs B and C. Main Feedwater is isolated.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring is available in the SSF.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Essential electrical power, auxiliaries and HVAC is available from or in the SSF.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:04 Page: 306 of 695
 
0                                                                                            0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                      Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
* Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Licensing Action                12. Deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding protection of HVAC penetrations of fire barriers Licensing Basis                  In some fire rated walls and floor/ceiling assemblies, openings were provided for HVAC duct access which are larger than the ducts themselves. To support fire damper sleeves in this opening a steel plate was used to form a rigid frame, to which a layer of fireproofing was applied. The remainder of the opening was protected by a fire rated silicone foam. While the composite design has not been tested by an independent laboratory, the individual components have been tested. The testing was found to be acceptable based on the following:
* The fireproofing and foam sealant has successfully passed the acceptance criteria of ASTM E-1 19 individually as documented in the U.L. Building Materials Directory, 1983.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:04 Page: 307 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 04 Fire Protection Evaluation for Floor Blockout Penetrations with a Free Area in Excess of 9 sqft. and Structural Framing Spans Exceeding 42 in. without a Cross Member Framing Revision                          1 Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following floor blockouts regarding the framing support provided for the Silicone Foam free areas exceeding 9 sqft. that are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                  " H-AX-517A-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517A-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-003
                                  " K-AX-653-F-001
                                  " K-AX-653-F-032
                                  " K-AX-653-F-003
                                  " J-AX-650A-F-001 The evaluation determined that the Unit 1 and 2 Exterior Doghouse penetrations (J-AX-650A-F-001) are qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. The remaining penetrations above are considered adequate for the area fire hazards based on the following:
                                  " Detection available in fire areas of concern.
                                  ' Area hose stations and fire extinguishers.
                                  ' Fire brigade response.
                                  " Seal and framing configurations for the penetrations are considered adequate.
                                  ' Seal integrity is not anticipated to be compromised by fire exposure.
                                  ' The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                  " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:05 Page: 308 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081. -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                " Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
* The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 17 Fire Protection Evaluation For Unprotected Spiral Stairs Located at Col. GG-61 and GG-53 Connecting Elevations 577' and 594' Revision                        0 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to provide justification for the unprotected sprial stairs located at column line GG-61 and GG-53 connecting fire areas (FA's) 18 and 22.
The evaluation determined the portions of the barrier containing the stairs to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                " combustible controls,
                                " lack of in situ combustibles,
* minimal ignition sources,
* availability of SSS.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:05 Page: 309 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 18 Fire Protection Evaluation For Unprotected Spiral Stairs Located at Col. GG-61 and GG-53 Connecting Elevations 611+0' and 631+6' Revision                        0 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to provide justification for the unprotected sprial stairs between Elevation 631+6 (Fire Areas (FA) 38 and 47) and Elevation 611+0 (FA 22).
The evaluation determined the portions of the barrier containing the stairs to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                "combustible controls, "lack of in situ combustibles,
* minimal ignition sources.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 07 Deletion of Aux Bldg Roof at U1/U2 VP Supply Rooms and YN Pump Bldg from Scope of Committed Fire Barriers (CNCE-9646)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the technical justification for removing the areas/rooms of the Auxiliary Building roof including the Unit 1 VP Supply Room, Unit 2 VP Supply Room, and the YN System Pump Building from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that these areas can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                " Insignificant combustible loading.
                                " Lack of ignition sources.
                                " No significant fire hazard exists at the specified locations.
* Areas contain non-safety related equipment.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10          Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/1612015 14:09:05    Page:310of695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 11 Evaluation of Cryo Ice Machine Bldg on Aux Bldg Roof (NSM CN-50419)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to review NSM CN-50419 for the fire protection concerns of using a steel plate in the Auxiliary Building Roof to separate the Auxiliary Building from the Cryo Ice Making Machine Room.
The evaluation determined that the Cryo Ice Making Machine Room does not present a significant unprotected fire hazard to the Auxiliary Building even with the steel plate access doors removed based on the following:
                                " Flame spread rating of the roof and wall insulation.
                                " Metal wall sandwich construction.
                                " No significant combustibles or fire hazards located on the Auxiliary Building Roof near the Cryo Ice Machine.
                                " No impact on the assured shutdown method or removal of decay heat.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:05 Page: 311 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Descripti[on                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feat ure and System Details Iil FR ("xnnt Tnnol 221                                        tnrone Rm Fl    -                -                  F                        Comhbutihbl  I ndinn: E 605 222                    Ul FB Upper Cont Pal El 605 223                    U2 FB Cont Tool Storage Rm El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 605 224                    U2 FB Upper Cont Pal El 605 73                      Ul Control Rm Vent Equip Rm El                        E                  E                        Combustible Loading: E 594                                                                                                Detection System, Installed: E 74                      Ul AB Vent Equip Area West El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 594 76                      U1 AB Vent Equip Area East El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 594 77                      U1 AB RP Resp Issue/RIC El 594 81                      U2 Control Rm Vent Equip Rm El                        E                  E                        Combustible Loading: E 594                                                                                                Detection System, Installed: E 82                      U2 AB Vent Equip Area West El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 594 84                      U2 AB Vent Equip Area East El                                            E                        Combustible Loading: E 594 85                      U2 AB HP Count Rm El 594 89A                    Ul FB Access Hatch & Stairwell Areas 90A                    U2 FB Access Hatch & Stairwell Areas Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:05 Page: 312 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                  Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 22 (U2)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenarios analyzed are not a significant source of risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Primary control station actions to activate the SSF will cause the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves to fail open. The valves for S/Gs B and C are required to be throttled to prevent overfilling the steam generators. Since there are no direct hits in this fire area, the VFDR delta risk was insignificant. However, a DID recovery action to manually operate the auxiliary feedwater flow control valves is recommended.
Risk or DID enhancements and modifications are not required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:05 Page: 313 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    22 (U2) - Aux Bldg Gen Area El 594 (Common)                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          22 (U2)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by operation from the SSS causes S/G throttle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0048 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2C Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria VFDR ID                          22 (U2)-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2B, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by operation from the SSS causes SIG trhottle valves to fail full open which requires actions to control CAPT and throttle valves to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0052 - Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Flow to S/G 2B Disposition                      Recovery Action(s) required to satisfy DID criteria Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPi)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:06 Page: 314 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  23 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                                          Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 90                U2 FB Fuel Pool Area El 605 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:06 Page: 315 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    23 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                                            Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via the normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/1612015 14:09:06 Page: 316 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  23 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                              Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:06 Page: 317 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    23 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                              Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection            Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 90                      U2 FB Fuel Pool Area El 605        -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:06 Page: 318 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    23 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                                                      Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 23 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for Risk in the HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:07 Page: 319 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    23 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          23-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          23-VFDR-02 VFDR                            S/G 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0013 - S/G 2B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDRID                          23-VFDR-03 VFDR                            S/G 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - S/G 2A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:07 Page: 320 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  24 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                                          Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 89                Ul FB Fuel Pool Area El 605 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:09:07 Page: 321 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    24 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                                            Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via the normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria I
Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02116/2015 14:09:08 Page: 322 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  24 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                              Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                *Area is normally attended
                                ' The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                *The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:08 Page: 323 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    24 - Unit I Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                              Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 89                      Ul FB Fuel Pool Area El 605        -                R                                            Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:09:08 Page: 324 of 695
 
0                                                                                                                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    24 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                                                      Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 24 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [1] 0.00E+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for Risk in the HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:08 Page: 325 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  24 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area El 605                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        24-VFDR-01 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &IB Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        24-VFDR-02 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA001 3 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        24-VFDR-03 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:08  Page: 326 of 695
 
0                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  25 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1A El 556                                                                                                          Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description DG1A              DG1A El 556 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:08 Page: 327 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    25 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1A El 556                                                                                                            Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:09 Page: 328 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    25 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1A El 556                                                                                              Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details DG1A                    DG1A El 556                        R                -                  -                        Gaseous Suppression, Installed Automatic C02: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:09 Page: 329 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    25 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1A El 556                                                                                                                      Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 25 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [1] 0.00E+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-O7/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Automatic C02 actuation was credited for Risk for severe DG fire scenarios. Manual suppression was not credited for the HGL and MCA evaluations. Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:09 Page: 330 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    25 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1A El 556                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          25-VFDR-01 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA001 OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          25-VFDR-02 VFDR                            S/G ID PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ISV VAOOOI - S/G ID PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        25-VFDR-03 VFDR                            1C S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007    - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:09 Page: 331 of 695
 
0                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  26 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1B El 556                                                                                                          Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description DG1B              DGIB El 556 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:09 Page: 332 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
26 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1B El 556                                                                                                            Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the main control room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02116/2015 14:09:10 Page:333of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    26 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1B El 556                                                                                              Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details DGIB                    DG1B El 556                        R                -                  -                        Gaseous Suppression, Installed Automatic C02: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:10 Page:334of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    26 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1B El 556                                                                                                                      Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 26 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: (1] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                            Units: [1] 0.00E+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Automatic C02 actuation was credited for Risk for severe DG fire scenarios. Manual suppression was not credited for the HGL and MCA evaluations. Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:10 Page: 335 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    26 - Diesel Generator Bldg 1B El 556                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          26-VFDR-01 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &IB Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          26-VFDR-04 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          26-VFDR-05 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:11  Page:336of695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  27 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2A El 556                                                                                                          Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description DG2A              DG2A El 556 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPD1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02116/2015 14:09:11  Page: 337 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    27 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2A El 556                                                                                                            Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                      Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                  Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual cotnrol of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitodng Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:11 Page:338of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    27 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2A El 556                                                                                              Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details DG2A                    DG2A El 556                        R                -                  -                        Gaseous Suppression, Installed Automatic C02: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:11 Page: 339 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  27 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2A El 556                                                                                                                      Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 27 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] 0.00E+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Automatic C02 actuation was credited for Risk for severe DG fire scenarios. Manual suppression was not credited for the HGL and MCA evaluations. Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:11 Page: 340 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    27 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2A El 556                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          27-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Critera. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A &2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          27-VFDR-02 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          27-VFDR-03 VFDR                            SIG 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:12  Page: 341 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    28 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2B El 556                                                                                                          Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description DG2B              DG2B El 556 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:12 Page: 342 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
Fire Area ID:                    28 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2B El 556                                                                                                            Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the main control room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                            I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:12  Page: 343 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    28 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2B El 556                                                                                              Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire FireDZmnelD            Descriotiion                        Svstem          Svstem              Protection Feature      Reouired Fire Protection Fealturn and System Details ne ID            Descrinti DG213                  DG2B El 556                        R                                    --                      Gaseous Suppression, Installed Automatic C02: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:12 Page: 344 of 695
* 0                                                                                            0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  28 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2B El 556                                                                                                                      Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 28 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                          Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Automatic C02 actuation was credited for Risk for severe DG fire scenarios. Manual suppression was not credited for the HGL and MCA evaluations. Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in this area and do not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:12 Page: 345 of 695
 
0                                    ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    28 - Diesel Generator Bldg 2B El 556                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          28-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          28-VFDR-04 VFDR                            S/G 28 PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0013 - S/G 2B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          28-VFDR-05 VFDR                            S/G 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - S/G 2A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:13 Page: 346 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  29 (U1) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                          Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 226                RN Pump House A Side Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:13 Page: 347 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (Ul) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                            Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:13 Page: 348 of 695
 
0                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  29 (Ul) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
* B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001 oC-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023 "C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                " F-AX-348-W-088
* J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
* Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                " Limited combustibles.
                                " Fire brigade response.
                                " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
                                "Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised, Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 2 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the large bore pipe penetration, K-NSWPS-662-W-020, which was added per Engineering Change CDO0091. The new large bore opening is installed in the committed fire boundary wall that separates the A and B train of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) Pump Structure (NSWPS). The penetration does not conform to the penetration seal limitations of typical detail of M-2 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006.
The evaluation determined that the large bore penetration K-NSWPS-662-W-020 is acceptable and was based on the following:
                                " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                " Low probability of fire exposure and limited combustibles.
                                " Continuity of combustibles and area separation.
                                " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:14 Page: 349 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  29 (Ul) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
                                *Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:14 Page: 350 of 695
 
S                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      29 (U1) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required            Required Suppression        Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System              System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 226                      RN Pump House A Side                                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:14 Page: 351 of 695
 
0                                                                                            S0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (Ul) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                        Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 29 (Ul)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02116/2015 14:09:14 Page: 352 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (Ul) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          29 (U1)-VFDR-01 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA001OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          29 (U1)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Lake, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 505, I*RN 506, and 2*RN 506 (and Valve 1RN VA0002B), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0002B and loss of control power to 1RN VA0006B, 4B, and 843B. These are train B components in a Fire Area where Train B is the credited success path for shutdown. IRN VA0002B is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    I RN VA0002B - Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Lake Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          29 (Ul)-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Waler Pond, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables I*RN 505, I*RN 506, and 2*RN 506 (and Valve 1RN VA0002B), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of IRN VA0002B and loss of control power to 1RN VA0006B, 4B, and 843B. These are train B components in a Fire Area where Train B is the credited success path for shutdown.
1RN VA0002B is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0004B - Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1i)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:09:14 Page: 353 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (Ul) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          29 (U1)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Lake, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 505, 1*RN 506, and 2*RN 506 (and Valve 1RN VA0002B), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0002B and loss of control power to 1RN VA0006B, 4B, and 843B. These are train B components in a Fire Area where Train B is the credited success path for shutdown. 1RN VA0002B is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1RN VA0006B - Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Lake Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          29 (U1)-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Station Nuclear Service Water Discharge to RL System, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 505, 1*RN 506, and 2*RN 506 (and Valve 1RN VA0002B), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0002B and loss of control power to 1RN VA0006B, 4B, and 843B. These are train B components in a Fire Area where Train B is the credited success path for shutdown. 1RN VA0002B is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1RN VA0843B - Station Nuclear Service Water Discharge to RL System Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          29 (Ul)-VFDR-06 VFDR                            S/G ID PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1SV VAOOO1 - S/G 1D PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:15 Page: 354 of 695
 
0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (Ul) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          29 (U1)-VFDR-07 VFDR                            1C S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:15 Page: 355 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  29 (U2) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                          Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 226                RN Pump House A Side Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:15  Page: 356 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
29 (U2) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                              Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the I
suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:15 Page: 357 of 695
 
0                                            0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (U2) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
* B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
* C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                  " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                  " F-AX-348-W-088
                                  " J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
* Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                  " Limited combustibles.
                                  " Fire brigade response.
                                  " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
                                  " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 2 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the large bore pipe penetration, K-NSWPS-662-W-020, which was added per Engineering Change CD00091. The new large bore opening is installed in the committed fire boundary wall that separates the A and B train of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) Pump Structure (NSWPS). The penetration does not conform to the penetration seal limitations of typical detail of M-2 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006.
The evaluation determined that the large bore penetration K-NSWPS-662-W-020 is acceptable and was based on the following:
                                  " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure and limited combustibles.
* Continuity of combustibles and area separation.
* Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/1612015 14:09:16 Page: 358 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (U2) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
                                *Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02116/2015 14:09:16 Page: 359 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (U2) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required            Required Suppression        Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                      System              System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 226                      RN Pump House A Side                                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:16 Page: 360 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (U2) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                      Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 29 (U2)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:16 Page: 361 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    29 (U2) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          29 (U2)-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          29 (U2)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          29 (U2)-VFDR-03 VFDR                            S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          29 (U2)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Lake, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 505, 1*RN 506, and 2*RN 506 (and Valve 1RN VA0002B), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0002B and loss of control power to 1RN VA0006B, 4B, and 843B. These are train B components in a Fire Area where Train B is the credited success path for shutdown. 1RN VA0002B is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0002B - Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Lake Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:16 Page: 362 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  29 (U2) - Train A RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        29 (U2)-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 505, 1*RN 506, and 2*RN 506 (and Valve 1RN VA0002B), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0002B and loss of control power to 1RN VA0006B, 4B, and 843B. These are train B components in a Fire Area where Train B is the credited success path for shutdown.
1RN VA0002B is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0004B - Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        29 (U2)-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Lake, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 505, I*RN 506, and 2*RN 506 (and Valve 1RN VA0002B), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0002B and loss of control power to 1RN VA0006B, 4B, and 843B. These are train B components in a Fire Area where Train B is the credited success path for shutdown. 1RN VA0002B is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0006B - Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Lake Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        29 (U2)-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Station Nuclear Service Water Discharge to RL System, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 505, I*RN 506, and 2*RN 506 (and Valve 1RN VA0002B), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0002B and loss of control power to 1RN VA0006B, 4B, and 843B. These are train B components in a Fire Area where Train B is the credited success path for shutdown. 1RN VA0002B is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0843B - Station Nuclear Service Water Discharge to RL System Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:17    Page: 363 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  30 (Ul) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                          Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 225                RN Pump House B Side Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:17 Page: 364 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FireArea ID:
Fire Area ID:                    30 (Ul) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                            Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02116/2015 14:09:17 Page: 365 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    30 (Ul) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                  " B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
                                  " C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                  " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                  " F-AX-348-W-088
                                  " J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                  " Limited combustibles.
                                  " Fire brigade response.
                                  " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
* Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 2 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the large bore pipe penetration, K-NSWPS-662-W-020, which was added per Engineering Change CDO0091. The new large bore opening is installed in the committed fire boundary wall that separates the A and B train of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) Pump Structure (NSWPS). The penetration does not conform to the penetration seal limitations of typical detail of M-2 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006.
The evaluation determined that the large bore penetration K-NSWPS-662-W-020 is acceptable and was based on the following:
                                  " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure and limited combustibles.
                                  " Continuity of combustibles and area separation.
                                  " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:18 Page: 366 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    30 (Ul) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
* Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:18 Page: 367 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      30 (UW)- Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression        Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 225                      RN Pump House B Side                                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:18 Page: 368 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  30 (Ul) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                        Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 30 (Ul)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:18 Page: 369 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    30 (U1) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          30 (U1)-VFDR-01 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          30 (U1)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Lake, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 511, I*RN 512, and 2*RN 512 (and Valve 1RN VA0005A), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0005A and loss of power to 1RN VA0001A, 3A, and 63A. 1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. These are train A components in a Train B Fire Area.
1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0001A - Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Lake Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          30 (U1 )-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 511, I*RN 512, and 2*RN 512 (and Valve IRN VA0005A), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of IRN VA0005A and loss of power to 1RN VA0001A, 3A, and 63A. 1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. These are train A components in a Train B Fire Area. IRN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0003A - Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:18 Page: 370 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    30 (Ul) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          30 (U1)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Lake, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables I*RN 511, I*RN 512, and 2*RN 512 (and Valve IRN VA0005A), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0005A and loss of power to 1RN VA001 A, 3A, and 63A. 1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. These are train A components in a Train B Fire Area.
1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0005A - Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Lake Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          30 (U1)-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Service Water Header A Return to Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 511, 1*RN 512, and 2*RN 512 (and Valve 1RN VA0005A), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0005A and loss of power to 1RN VA0001A, 3A, and 63A. 1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. These are train A components in a Train B Fire Area. IRN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0063A - Service Water Header A Return to Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          30 (Ul)-VFDR-07 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:19 Page:371of695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  30 (Ul) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        30 (U1)-VFDR-08 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4 Component(s)                    ISV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02116/2015 14:09:19 Page: 372 of 695
 
0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  30 (U2) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                            Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 225                RN Pump House B Side Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:19 Page:373of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
30 (U2) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                              Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Critsea Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1i)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:19 Page: 374 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    30 (U2) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
e B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
* C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                  " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                  " F-AX-348-W-088 o J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                  " Limited combustibles.
                                  " Fire brigade response.
                                  " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
* Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 2 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the large bore pipe penetration, K-NSWPS-662-W-020, which was added per Engineering Change CD00091. The new large bore opening is installed in the committed fire boundary wall that separates the A and B train of the Nuclear Service Water (RN) Pump Structure (NSWPS). The penetration does not conform to the penetration seal limitations of typical detail of M-2 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006.
The evaluation determined that the large bore penetration K-NSWPS-662-W-020 is acceptable and was based on the following:
                                  " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure and limited combustibles.
* Continuity of combustibles and area separation.
o Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:20 Page: 375 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  30 (U2) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions o Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:20 Page: 376 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      30 (U2) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required            Required Suppression        Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System              System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 225                      RN Pump House B Side                                                    E                        Combustible Loading: E Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:20 Page: 377 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    30 (U2) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                        Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 30 (U2)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] 0.00E+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:20 Page: 378 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    30 (U2) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        30 (U2)-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        30 (U2)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            S/G 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0013 - SIG 2B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        30 (U2)-VFDR-05 VFDR                            S/G 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - SIG 2A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        30 (U2)-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Lake, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 511, I*RN 512, and 2*RN 512 (and Valve 1RN VA0005A), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0005A and loss of power to 1RN VA0001A, 3A, and 63A. 1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. These are train A components in a Train B Fire Area.
1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1RN VA0001A - Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Lake Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:20 Page: 379 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    30 (U2) - Train B RN Pump Structure El 600 (Common)                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          30 (U2)-VFDR-07 VFDR                              Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 511, I*RN 512, and 2*RN 512 (and Valve 1RN VA0005A), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0005A and loss of power to 1RN VA0001A, 3A, and 63A. IRN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. These are train A components in a Train B Fire Area. 1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1RN VA0003A - Service Water P/H Pit A Isolation from Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          30 (U2)-VFDR-08 VFDR                              Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Lake, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables I*RN 511, 1*RN 512, and 2*RN 512 (and Valve 1RN VA0005A), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of 1RN VA0005A and loss of power to 1RN VA0001A, 3A, and 63A. 1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. These are train A components in a Train B Fire Area.
1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1RN VA0005A - Service Water P/H Pit B Isolation from Lake Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          30 (U2)-VFDR-09 VFDR                              Service Water Header A Return to Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by failure of cables 1*RN 511, 1*RN 512, and 2*RN 512 (and Valve 1RN VA0005A), which are located in the fire area. These failures can cause spurious operation of IRN VA0005A and loss of power to 1RN VA0001A, 3A, and 63A. 1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. These are train A components in a Train B Fire Area. 1RN VA0005A is required to be shut to prevent draining of the pond to the lake. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1RN VA0063A - Service Water Header A Return to Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/1612015 14:09:21 Page: 380 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  31 - Unit 2 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 19ASPA            U2 Train A Aux Shutdown Pni El 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:21  Page: 381 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    31 - Unit 2 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                            I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:21  Page: 382 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    31 - Unit 2 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
9 Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
* Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:22 Page: 383 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    31 - Unit 2 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                    Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required            Required Suppression        Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System              System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 19ASPA                  U2 Train A Aux Shutdown Pnl El      -                  R                                        Detection System, Installed: R 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:22 Page: 384 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  31 - Unit 2 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 31 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
" CDF                            Units: [2] 2.70E-08
" LERF                            Units: [2] 3.00E-10 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:22 Page: 385 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  31 - Unit 2 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        31-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve, which Is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2*NV 820, 2*NV 827, and 2*ND 589 could spuriously open 2NC VA0034A. These cables also enter the ASPA and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources. Cables 2*NC 817, 2*NC 819, and 2*NI 830 prevent closing 2NC VA0033A (These cables also enter ASPA). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0033A - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        31-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2*NV 820, 2*NV 827, and 2*ND 589 could spuriously open 2NC VA0034A. These cables also enter the ASPA and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources. Cables 2*NC 817, 2*NC 819, and 2*N1 830 prevent closing 2NC VA0033A (These cables also enter ASPA). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        31-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by hot shorts on cable 2*NV 630 and at ASPA which may cause spurious closure of charging mini flow recirculation path (2NV VA203A) and normal charging flow path (2NV VA0312A). Alternate charging path through 2NI VA0010B remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:22    Page: 386 of 695
* 0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    31 - Unit 2 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          31-VFDR-04 VFDR                            2A Charging Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may cause charging pump to run and charging flow through 2NI VA0009A and 10B. This is an MSO concern of overwhelming relief capacity. Control of 2NV PUACC and A train DG may be lost due to loss of the load sequencer power and diesel start circuitry. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condilion represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV PUACC - 2A Charging Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        31-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by hot shorts on cable 2*NV 630 and at ASPA my cause spurious closure of charging mini flow recirculation path (2NV VA203A) and normal charging flow path 2NV VA0312A). Altemate charging path through 2NI VA0010B remains available. Seat injection path remains available. This is to re-establish normal charging flowpath to support cooldown. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0203A - Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        31-VFDR-06 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0O1OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:22 Page: 387 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    31 - Unit 2 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          31-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by hot shorts on cable 2*NV 630 and at ASPA my cause spurious closure of charging mini flow recirculation path (2NV VA203A) and normal charging flow path 2NV VA0312A). Altemate charging path through 2NI VA0O1OB remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This is to re-establish normal charging flowpath to support cooldown. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          31-VFDR-08 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D SIG PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          31-VFDR-09 VFDR                            SIG 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - SIG 2C PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:23 Page: 388 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    31 - Unit 2 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          31-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals may prevent normal control of charging flow. Valve fails open on loss of air. Failure of valve NV-309 would result in need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-31 1. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:23 Page: 389 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 9ASPA              Ul Train A Aux Shutdown Pnl El 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:23 Page: 390 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/1612015 14:09:24 Page: 391 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                  " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                  " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033 o H-AX-515-W-013
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                  " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                  " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                  " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concem are limited.
                                  " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                  " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:24 Page: 392 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:24      Page: 393 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required            Required Suppression        Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System              System          Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 9ASPA                    Ul Train AAux Shutdown Pnl El      -                  E, R            E                        Combustible Loading: E 543                                                                                              Detection System, Installed: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/1612015 14:09:24 Page: 394 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 32 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08Irx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
" CDF                            Units: [1] 2.40E-08 A LERF                            Units: [1] 4.OOE-10 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meetnuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:24 Page: 395 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        32-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cables 1*NV 820, 1*NV 827, 1*NC 954, and I*ND 589 could spuriously open 1NC VA0034A. These cables also enter the ASPA and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources.
Cables I*NC 817, 1*NC 819, and 1*NI 830 prevent closing INC VA0033A (These cables also enter ASPA). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0033A - Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        32-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cables I*NV 820, 1*NV 827, I*NC 954, and 1*ND 589 could spuriously open 1NC VA0034A. These cables also enter the ASPA and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources. Cables 1*NC 817, I*NC 819, and I*NI 830 prevent closing 1NC VA0033A (These cables also enter ASPA). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        32-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by hot shorts on cable I*NV 630 and at ASPA may cause spurious closure of charging miniflow recirc path (1NV VA203A) and normal charging flow path (1NV VA0312A). Alternate charging path through 1NI VA0010B remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:09:24 Page: 396 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          32-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults (and internal faults in ASPA) that may spuriously energize (keep open) 1NV VA0001A, 2A, 11A, and 13A (1NV VA0010A and 1NV VA0015B will close on demand). Letdown header over pressure relief path to the PRT will be via 1NV VA0014. KC cooling to the letdown heat exchanger may be lost due to SSPS isolation of non essential KC header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NV VA0001A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          32-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice IC Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults (and internal faults in ASPA) that may spuriously energize (keep open) 1NV VA0001 A, 2A, 11A, and 13A (1 NV VA0010A and 1NV VA0015B will close on demand). Letdown header over pressure relief path to the PRT will be via 1NV VA0014. KC cooling to the letdown heat exchanger may be lost due to SSPS isolation of non essential KC header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NV VA001 1A - Letdown Orifice 1C Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          32-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1A Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults (and internal faults in ASPA) that may spuriously energize (keep open) 1NV VA0001A, 2A, 11 A, and 13A (1 NV VA001OA and 1NV VAOO1 5B will close on demand). Letdown header over pressure relief path to the PRT will be via 1NV VA0014. KC cooling to the letdown heat exchanger may be lost due to SSPS isolation of non essential KC header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NV VA0013A - Letdown Orifice 1A Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:25 Page: 397 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        32-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by hot shorts on cable I*NV 630 and at ASPA may cause spurious closure of charging miniflow recirc path (1NV VA203A) and normal charging flow path (1NV VA0312A). Alternate charging path through 1NI VA0010B remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0203A - Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        32-VFDR-08 VFDR                            IA &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA001OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - IA &l B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        32-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by hot shorts on cable I*NV 630 and at ASPA may cause spurious closure of charging miniflow recirc path (1NV VA203A) and normal charging flow path (1NV VA0312A). Alternate charging path through 1NI VA0010B remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:25 Page: 398 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  32 - Unit 1 Train A Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        32-VFDR-1 0 VFDR                            SIG 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen ifinstrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VAOOO1 - SIG 1D PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        32-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            1C SIG PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        32-VFDR-12 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals may prevent normal control of charging flow. Valve fails open on loss of air. Failure of valve NV-309 would result in need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-31 1. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:26 Page: 399 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 19ASPB            U2 Train B Aux Shutdown Pni El 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:26 Page: 400 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FireArea  ID:
Fire Area ID:                    33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                      Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02116/2015 14:09:26 Page: 401 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
* F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                " H-AX-515-W-0 13
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                *Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
* The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:26 Page: 402 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                " Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
                                " Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:26 Page: 403 of 695
 
0                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required            Required Suppression        Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Descr5pti on                        System              System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Featture and System Details 19ASPB                  U2 TrainI B Aux Shutdown Pnl El      -                  E, R            E                        Combustible Loading: E 543                                                                                                Detection System, Installed: E IR Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:26 Page: 404 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 33 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 4.10E-08 A LERF                          Units: [2] 2.80E-09 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:27 Page: 405 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cables 2*NV 821, 2*NV 836, 2*NC 956, and 2*NV 818 could spuriously open 2NC VA0032B and 36B. These cables also enter the ASPB and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources. Cables 2*NC 814, 2*NC 815, and 2*NC 816 prevent closing 2NC VA0031 B and 35B (These cables also enter ASPB). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0031 B - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cables 2*NV 821, 2*NV 836, 2*NC 956, and 2*NV 818 could spuriously open 2NC VA0032B and 36B. These cables also enter the ASPB and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources. Cables 2*NC 814, 2*NC 815, and 2*NC 816 prevent closing 2NC VA0031B and 35B (These cables also enter ASPB). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0032B - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cables 2*NV 821, 2*NV 836, 2*NC 956, and 2*NV 818 could spuriously open 2NC VA0032B and 36B. These cables also enter the ASPB and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources. Cables 2*NC 814, 2*NC 815, and 2*NC 816 prevent closing 2NC VA0031B and 35B (These cables also enter ASPB). This failure condition maychallenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0035B - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:27 Page: 406 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cables 2*NV 821, 2*NV 836, 2*NC 956, and 2*NV 818 could spuriously open 2NC VA0032B and 36B. These cables also enter the ASPB and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources. Cables 2*NC 814, 2*NC 815, and 2*NC 816 prevent closing 2NC VA0031B and 35B (These cables also enter ASPB). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS and power loss prevent closing valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0010B - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable fault (2*NV 638) (and internal faults in ASPB) may spuriously energize (keep open) 2NV VAO122B, 123B. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0122B - Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPD1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:27 Page: 407 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable fault (2*NV 638) (and internal faults in ASPB) may spuriously energize (keep open) 2NV VA0122B, 123B. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA01 23B - Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-09 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by hot short to 2*RN 665 can spuriously close valve (2NV VA0202B), and normal charging mini flow recirc path 2NV VA0314B. Alternate charging path through 2NI VA0009A remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:28 Page: 408 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  33 - Unit 2 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-12 VFDR                            S/G 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0013 - S/G 2B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-13 VFDR                            S/G 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - S/G 2A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        33-VFDR-14 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals may prevent normal control of charging flow. Valve fails open on loss of air. Failure of valve NV-309 would result in need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-31 1. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02116/2015 14:09:28 Page: 409 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 9ASPB              U1 Train B Aux Shutdown Pni El 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:28 Page: 410 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to preent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:29 Page: 411 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation Ib        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                "C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029 "C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, "C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
* H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                "Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                "The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation I0        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10        Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:29 Page: 412 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
* Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
                                "Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
                                " Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:29 Page: 413 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                    Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required            Required Suppression        Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System              System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 9ASPB                    UI Train B Aux Shutdown Pnl El      -                  R                E                      Combustible Loading: E 543                                                                                              Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:09:29 Page: 414 of 695
 
0                                                                                              0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                  Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 34 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 6.20E-08 A LERF                            Units: [1] 5.OOE-09 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and I E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:29      Page: 415 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  34 - Unit I Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A Flow to S/G 1A, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by failure of cable 1*CA 727 may prevent throttling of flow for this valve (Fails full flow). Flow control to S/G B remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ICA VA0060 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A Flow to S/G 1A Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cables 1*NC 821, 1*NV 836, 1*NC 956, and 1.*NV 818 could spuriously open INC VA0032B and 36B. These cables also enter the ASPB and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources.
Cables 1*NC 814, I*NC 815, and I*NC 816 prevent closing 1NC VA0031B and 35B (These cables also enter ASPB). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0031 B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cables I*NC 821, 1*NV 836, 1*NC 956, and 1*NV 818 could spuriously open 1NC VA0032B and 36B. These cables also enter the ASPB and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources. Cables 1*NC 814, I*NC 815, and I*NC 816 prevent closing INC VA0031B and 35B (These cables also enter ASPB). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:29 Page: 416 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cables I*NC 821, 1*NV 836, I*NC 956, and 1*NV 818 could spuriously open 1NC VA0032B and 36B. These cables also enter the ASPB and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources.
Cables I*NC 814, I*NC 815, and I*NC 816 prevent closing INC VA0031B and 35B (These cables also enter ASPB). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cables 1*NC 821, I*NV 836, I*NC 956, and 1*NV 818 could spuriously open 1NC VA0032B and 36B. These cables also enter the ASPB and could spuriously energize the pressurizer PORV from these cables or other sources. Cables I*NC 814, 1*NC 815, and 1*NC 816 prevent closing INC VA0031B and 35B (These cables also enter ASPB). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits on I*RN 665 and at ASPB that can cause spurious closure of charging mini flow recirc path (1NV VA202B) and normal charging flow path 1NV VA0314B). Alternate charging path through 1NI VA009A remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0010B - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPD1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:30 Page: 417 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-07 VFDR                            1B Charging Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may cause both charging pumps to run and charging flow through 1NI VA0009A and 10B. This is an MSO concem of overwhelming relief capacity. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV PUBCC - 1B Charging Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable fault (1*NV 638) (and internal faults in ASPB) that may spuriously energize (keep open) 1NV VA0122B, 123B. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0122B - Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by hot shorts on cable 1*RN 665 and at ASPB may cause spurious closure of charging miniflow recirc path (1NV VA202B) and normal charging flow path 1NV VA0314B). Alternate charging path through 1NI VA0009A remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0202B - Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:30 Page: 418 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          34-VFDR-10 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          34-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by cable hits on I*RN 665 and at ASPB that can cause spurious closure of charging mini flow recirc path (1NV VA202B) and normal charging flow path INV VA0314B). Alternate charging path through 1NI VA009A remains available. Seal injection path remains available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA03148 - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled In Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          34-VFDR-12 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ISV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:30 Page: 419 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  34 - Unit 1 Train B Aux Shutdown Panel El 543                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-13 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        34-VFDR-14 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection Flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals may prevent normal control of charging flow. Valve fails open on loss of air. Failure of valve NV-309 would result in need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-31 1. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0309 - Seal water Injection Flow Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:31 Page: 420 of 695
 
0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    35 (U1) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                      Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 72A              Control Rm Tagout Area El 594 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02116/2015 14:09:31  Page: 421 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
35 (U 1) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                      Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                    Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                          Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                      Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A or B train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A or B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A or B NC PORVS and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Femoval Function                      Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A or B train feeding S/Gs A and B or C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring function                      Process monitoring from train A or B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train A or B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:31 Page: 422 of 695
 
00                                                                                                                                                    S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    35 (Ul) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                      System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 72A                      Control Rm Tagout Area El 594    -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPu1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:31 Page: 423 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    35 (Ul) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                                        Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 35 (Ul)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1 E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-O7/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:32 Page: 424 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    35 (U1) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          35 (U1)-VFDR-01 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals. Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through N1 VA0009A or NI VA0G1OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          35 (U1)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0001 - S/G 1D PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          35 (Ul )-VFDR-03 VFDR                            1C S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:32 Page: 425 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  35 (Ul) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        35 (U1)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ISV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        35 (Ul )-VFDR-05 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/1612015 14:09:32 Page: 426 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    35 (U2) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                    Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 72A                Control Rm Tagout Area El 594 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:32 Page: 427 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
35 (U2) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                        Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A or B train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A or B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A or B train feeding S/Gs A and B or C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A or B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A or B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:33 Page: 428 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    35 (U2) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                            Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Descrino on                        System            Svstem              Protection Feature      Reauimd Fire Protection Feat turn and Svatam Details 72A                    Control Rm Tagout Area El 594      -                R                    --                      Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:33 Page: 429 of 695
 
00                                                                                                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  35 (U2) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                                        Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 35 (U2)
Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.00E+00 A LERF                          Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:33 Page: 430 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    35 (U2) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          35 (U2)-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A or NI VA0O1OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        35 (U2)-VFDR-02 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure conditioni may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VAOO0      - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        35 (U2)-VFDR-03 VFDR                            S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        35 (U2)-VFDR-04 VFDR                            S/G 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VAOO13 - S/G 2B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/1612015 14:09:33 Page: 431 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  35 (U2) - Control Room Tagout Area El 594                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        35 (U2)-VFDR-05 VFDR                            S/G 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - S/G 2A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:34 Page: 432 of 695
 
0                                        0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    36 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 19TDPNL            U2 CA Pump Turbine Pnl El 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:34 Page: 433 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FireArea ID:
Fire Area ID:                    36 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:34 Page: 434 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    36 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                "C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029 "C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                - H-AX-515-W-013
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                " Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:34 Page: 435 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  36 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential In situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:34 Page: 436 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    36 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System            System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 19TDPNL                U2 CA Pump Turbine Pnl El 543        -                R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:34 Page: 437 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  36 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 36 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2) O.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:35 Page: 438 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    36 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          36-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Flow to S/G 2D, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may cause valve to fail open. Valve is required to be cycled to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0040 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Flow to S/G 2D Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        36-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Flow to S/G 2C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may cause valve to fail open. Valve is required to be cycled to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2CA VA0044 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 2B Flow to S/G 2C Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        36-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS and power loss prevent closing valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        36-VFDR-05 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VAOO1OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:35 Page: 439 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    36 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          36-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS closes prevents opening valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          36-VFDR-08 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          36-VFDR-09 VFDR                            S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:35 Page: 440 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  37 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 9TDPNL            Ul CA Pump Turbine PHnEl 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:36 Page: 441 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FireArea ID:
Fire Area ID:                    37 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:36 Page: 442 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  37 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                "C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029 "C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, "C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
* Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10          Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02/1612015 14:09:36 Page: 443 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    37 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
o Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:36 Page: 444 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    37 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System            System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 9TDPNL                  Ul CA Pump Turbine Pni El 543        -                R                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:09:36 Page: 445 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  37 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 37 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of I E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                          Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:37 Page: 446 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    37 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          37-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump IB Flow to S/G ID, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may cause valve to fail open. Valve is required to be cycled to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0040 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B Flow to S/G 1D Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          37-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B Flow to S/G 1C, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may cause valve to fail open. Valve is required to be cycled to prevent S/G overfill. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ICA VA0044 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B Flow to S/G 1C Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        37-VFDR-04 VFDR                            IA &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA001OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &lB Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:37 Page: 447 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    37 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Control Panel Room El 543                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          37-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS closes prevents opening valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          37-VFDR-07 VFDR                            S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0001 - S/G 1D PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          37-VFDR-08 VFDR                            1C S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:37  Page: 448 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  38 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 129                Ul FB HVAC Rm El 631 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:37 Page: 449 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FireArea ID:
Fire Area ID:                    38 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A or B train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A or B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A or B train feeding S/Gs A and B or C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A or B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A or B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:38 Page: 450 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    38 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                    Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 18 Fire Protection Evaluation For Unprotected Spiral Stairs Located at Col. GG-61 and GG-53 Connecting Elevations 611+0' and 631+6' Revision                        0 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to provide justification for the unprotected spnal stairs between Elevation 631+6 (Fire Areas (FAý 38 and 47) and Elevation 611+0 (FA 22).
The evaluation determined the portions of the barrier containing the stairs to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                " combustible controls,
                                " lack of in situ combustibles,
                                ' minimal ignition sources.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:38 Page: 451 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    38 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                    Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 129                    Ul FB HVAC Rm El 631                -                R                  E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:09:38 Page: 452 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  38 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                                  Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 38 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.00E+00 A LERF                          Units: [1] O.00E+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:38 Page: 453 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  38 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        38-VFDR-01 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A or NI VA001 OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        38-VFDR-02 VFDR                            SIG 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0001 - SIG 1D PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        38-VFDR-03 VFDR                            1C SIG PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - IC SIG PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:39 Page: 454 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  38 - Unit 1 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        38-VFDR-04 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        38-VFDR-05 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ISV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02116/2015 14:09:39 Page: 455 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  39 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 19TDPIT            U2 TDCA Pump Pit El 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:09:39 Page: 456 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    39 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance CrIteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:39 Page: 457 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  39 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                  Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                13. Deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unprotected structural steel over the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump pit.
Licensing Basis                The NRC's fire protection site audit was conducted between November 1 and November 4, 1983. As a result of the audit, the NRC identified concerns pertaining to various commitments and the degree of compliance with Branch Technical Position APCSB (CMEB) 9.5-1. By letter dated May 11, 1984, Duke Energy requested a deviation regarding the unprotected structural steel over the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump pit.
The NRC approved the deviation based on the following information:
                                ' Limited quantities of material consisting of armor interlock cable, grease, sealite conduit, and lubricating oil. Because of the limited quantity and distribution of these materials, an uncontrolled fire would not be expected to develop sufficient duration and temperature to threaten the heavy steel members.
                                " A high pressure carbon dioxide system protects each pit providing additional assurance of barrier integrity.
                                " Photoelectric type smoke detectors are also installed in each pit providing early waming to the Control Room through the EFA system.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the absence of a fire resistive coating on the structural steel members is an acceptable deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP13)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:39 Page: 458 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    39 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                  " B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001 "C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                  " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                  " F-AX-348-W-088 "J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                  " Limited combustibles.
                                  " Fire brigade response.
                                  " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
                                  " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 03 Fire Penetration Evaluation for AFW Pump Ceiling Penetrations with Seal Material Beyond the Barrier Plane Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the large blockouts within the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room hatch covers that contain seal material that is not located within the barrier plane and are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006.
The evaluation determined that penetrations C-AX-217-F-026, C-AX-217-F-029, C-AX-260-F-027, and C-AX-260-F-028 are not considered qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. However they are considered acceptable for the fire hazards present and acceptable based on the following:
                                  "Seal sidewalls perpendicular to the ceiling surface are protected from direct flame impingement by either a vertical wall barrier or a steel member.
                                  " Penetration sides protected by a wall are considered to perform in a manner consistent with the fire tested configurations of detail M-6 per DPC 1435.00                                    0006.
                                  "Seal sidewall is considered equivalent to locating the seal within the barrier plane because it is protected by concrete construction.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:40 Page: 459 of 695
 
0                                                                                              0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    39 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028,-029
* C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                  " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                  " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                  " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                  " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                  " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                  " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                  " H-AX-515-W-0 13
                                  " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                  " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                  " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                  " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                  " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                  " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPi)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:40 Page: 460 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    39 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression        Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System            System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 19TDPIT                U2 TOCA Pump Pit El 543              E, R              E, R              E                      Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Gaseous Suppression, Installed Automatic C02: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02116/2015 14:09:40 Page: 461 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    39 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 39 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Automatic (C02) and manual suppression was credited for MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02116/2015 14:09:40 Page: 462 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    39 - Unit 2 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          39-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of air causing valve to fail full open.
Charging is assured through NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          39-VFDR-02 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          39-VFDR-03 VFDR                            SIG 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:40 Page: 463 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    40 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                  Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 9TDPIT            Ul TDCA Pump Pit El 543 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02116/2015 14:09:40 Page: 464 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FireArea  ID:
Fire Area ID:                    40 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary Feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                            I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:41  Page: 465 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID                    40 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                  Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                13. Deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unprotected structural steel over the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump pit.
Licensing Basis                  The NRC's fire protection site audit was conducted between November 1 and November 4, 1983. As a result of the audit, the NRC identified concerns pertaining to various commitments and the degree of compliance with Branch Technical Position APCSB (CMEB) 9.5-1. By letter dated May 11, 1984, Duke Energy requested a deviation regarding the unprotected structural steel over the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump pit.
The NRC approved the deviation based on the following information:
                                " Limited quantities of material consisting of armor interlock cable, grease, sealite conduit, and lubricating oil. Because of the limited quantity and distribution of these materials, an uncontrolled fire would not be expected to develop sufficient duration and temperature to threaten the heavy steel members.
                                " A high pressure carbon dioxide system protects each pit providing additional assurance of barrier integrity.
                                " Photoelectric type smoke detectors are also installed in each pit providing early warning to the Control Room through the EFA system.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the absence of a fire resistive coating on the structural steel members is an acceptable deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02116/2015 14:09:41 Page: 466 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    40 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                " B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
                                " C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                " F-AX-348-W-088
                                - J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                " Limited combustibles.
                                " Fire brigade response.
                                " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
                                *Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 03 Fire Penetration Evaluation for AFW Pump Ceiling Penetrations with Seal Material Beyond the Barrier Plane Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the large blockouts within the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room hatch covers that contain seal material that is not located within the barrier plane and are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006.
The evaluation determined that penetrations C-AX-217-F-026, C-AX-217-F-029, C-AX-260-F-027, and C-AX-260-F-028 are not considered qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. However they are considered acceptable for the fire hazards present and acceptable based on the following:
                                ' Seal sidewalls perpendicular to the ceiling surface are protected from direct flame impingement by either a vertical wall barrier or a steel member.
                                ' Penetration sides protected by a wall are considered to perform in a manner consistent with the fire tested configurations of detail M-6 per DPC 1435.00                                    0006.
                                ' Seal sidewall is considered equivalent to locating the seal within the barrier plane because it is protected by concrete construction.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:41 Page: 467 of 695
 
0                                                0                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  40 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                - H-AX-515-W-013
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions thai impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
                                " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:41 Page: 468 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    40 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression        Detection        Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                          System            System          Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 9TDPIT                  U1 TDCA Pump Pit El 543              E, R              E, R            E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E R Gaseous Suppression, Installed Automatic C02: E R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:41 Page: 469 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  40 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                                    Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 40 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 5.87E-08 A LERF                            Units: [1] 6.70E-10 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Automatic (C02) and manual suppression was credited for MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
Transient fires are not a contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore no change is required for the control of transient combustibles or control of ignition sources (Hot Work).
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:42 Page: 470 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  40 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        40-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits may cause spurious opening of PORV (I*NC 820 or 1*ND 589) and prevent closing the block valve (1*NC 819). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria.
This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0033A - Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        40-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits may cause spurious opening of PORV (1*NC 820 or 1*ND 589) and prevent closing the block valve (I*NC 819). This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        40-VFDR-03 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of air causing valve to fail full open.
Charging is assured through NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        40-VFDR-04 VFDR                            S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VAOOO1 - S/G 1D PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:42 Page: 471 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    40 - Unit 1 Turbine Driven CA Pump Pit El 543                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          40-VFDR-05 VFDR                              1C S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1SV VA0007 - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:42 Page: 472 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  41 - DGlA Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                              Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 215                DGIA Seq Tunnel El 556 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:42 Page: 473 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    41 - DG1A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                              Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                      Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                  Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                    Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                  Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                  Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                            Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Crtteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:43 Page: 474 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    41 - DG1A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                "Area is normally attended "The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                "The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:43 Page: 475 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      41 - DG1A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                  Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            DescriptiIon                      System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Featt are and System Details )
215                      DGIA Seq Tunnel El 556              --              R                    --                      Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:43 Page: 476 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    41 - DG1A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                          Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 41 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 1.10E-09 A LERF                            Units: [1] 5.10E-12 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:43 Page: 477 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  41 - DG1A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        41-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a hot short within 1TBOX0522 or cable 1*NC 955 that can cause spurious energization and opening of the Pressurizer PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory and Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        41-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS and power loss prevent closing valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        41-VFDR-03 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA001OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &I B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPD1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:43 Page: 478 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  41 - DG1A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        41-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS closes and loss of power prevents opening valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        41-VFDR-05 VFDR                            S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0001 - S/G ID PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        41-VFDR-06 VFDR                            S/G 1C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - S/G 1C PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:44  Page: 479 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  42 - DG1B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                            Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 216                DG1B Seq Tunnel El 556 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:44 Page: 480 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
42 - DGIB Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                      Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                  Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                    Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                  Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by train A feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                  Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                            Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:44 Page: 481 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  42 - DG1 B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:44 Page: 482 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    42 - DGIB Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection            Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 216                    DG1B Seq Tunnel El 556            -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:45 Page: 483 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    42 - DG1B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                          Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 42 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 8.OOE-11 A LERF                            Units: [1] 6.OOE-12 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:45 Page: 484 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    42 - DG1B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        42-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1*NC 956 and 957 (I*NC 956 cable internal hot short or in 1TBOX0523) can spuriously open PORVs. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        42-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on I*NC 956 and 957 (1*NC 956 cable internal hot short or in 1TBOX0523) can spuriously open PORVs. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        42-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS and power loss which prevents closing valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INI VA0010B - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        42-VFDR-04 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &IB Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:45 Page: 485 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  42 - DG1 B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        42-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS closes and loss of power which prevents opening valve.
This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        42-VFDR-06 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ISV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        42-VFDR-07 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure conditioni may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:45 Page: 486 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  43 - DG2A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                            Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 217                DG2A Seq Tunnel El 556 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:46 Page: 487 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    43 - DG2A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                              Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                      Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                  Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                    Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manul control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                  Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                  Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                            Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02/1612015 14:09:46 Page: 488 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    43 - DG2A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
* The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:46 Page: 489 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      43 - DG2A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                  Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Ilescrinti on                      SyVtem            Svstem              Protection Feature      Reaulred Fire Protection Featturn and Svstem Details 217                      DG2A Seq Tunnel El 556              --              R                    --                      Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:46 Page: 490 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  43 - DG2A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                          Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 43 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and I E-08Irx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [21 1.87E-08 A LERF                            Units: [2] 2.05E-10 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02116/2015 14:09:47 Page: 491 of 695
 
0                                                                                          0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  43 - DG2A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        43-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by hot short within 2TBOX0522 or cable 2*NC 955 can cause spurious energization and opening of the Pressurizer PORV. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        43-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS and power loss which prevents closing valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        43-VFDR-03 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        43-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS closes and loss of power which prevents opening valve.
This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:47 Page: 492 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  43 - DG2A Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        43-VFDR-05 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        43-VFDR-06 VFDR                            S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:47 Page: 493 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  44 - DG2B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                            Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 218                DG2B Seq Tunnel El 556 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:47 Page: 494 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FireArea ID:
Fire Area ID:                    44 - DG2B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                              Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                      Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                  Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                    Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                  Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A train feeding S/Gs A and B. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                  Process monitoring from train A is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                            Normal train A auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02116/2015 14:09:48 Page: 495 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  44 - DG2B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                - Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary'door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:48 Page: 496 of 695
 
0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    44 - DG2B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 218                    DG2B Seq Tunnel El 556            -                R                  -                        Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:48 Page: 497 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  44 - DG2B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                            Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 44 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 3.20E-09 A LERF                            Units: [2] 6.OOE-1 1 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:48 Page: 498 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    44 - DG2B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          44-VFDR-01 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults on 2*NC 956 and 957 (2*NC 956 cable internal hot short or in 2TBOX0523) can spuriously open PORVs. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0032B - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          44-VFDR-02 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults on 2*NC 956 and 957 (2*NC 956 cable internal hot short or in 2TBOX0523) can spuriously open PORVs. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          44-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS and power loss which prevents closing valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0010B - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          44-VFDR-04 VFDR                            2A &2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttied and throttled for HSB, is affected by failing full open. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:49 Page: 499 of 695
 
S                                                                                                                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  44 - DG2B Sequencer Tunnel El 556                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        44-VFDR-05 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS closes and loss of power which prevents opening valve.
This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        44-VFDR-06 VFDR                            SIG 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen ifinstrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA001 3 - SIG 2B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        44-VFDR-07 VFDR                            SIG 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen ifinstrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - SIG 2A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:49 Page: 500 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                        Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 18B              Ul AB South Cable  Shaft El 543 39A              Ul AB South Cable  Shaft El 554 60B              Ul AB South Cable  Shaft El 574 60C              Ul AB Cable Room    Corridor El 574 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:49 Page: 501 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                          Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injecting borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and the main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feedwater is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from B train is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:49 Page: 502 of 695
 
0                                                                                            0 Attachment C 0
Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                          Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullettmissile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Licensing Action                12. Deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding protection of HVAC penetrations of fire barriers Licensing Basis                  In some fire rated walls and floor/ceiling assemblies, openings were provided for HVAC duct access which are larger than the ducts themselves. To support fire damper sleeves in this opening a steel plate was used to form a rigid frame, to which a layer of fireproofing was applied. The remainder of the opening was protected by a fire rated silicone foam. While the composite design has not been tested by an independent laboratory, the individual components have been tested. The testing was found to be acceptable based on the following:
* The fireproofing and foam sealant has successfully passed the acceptance criteria of ASTM E-1 19 individually as documented in the U.L. Building Materials Directory, 1983.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02116/2015 14:09:50 Page: 503 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                " C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029
                                " C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030,
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
* H-AX-515-W-013
* H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concem are limited.
                                " Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 15 Fire Protection Evaluation for OZ Gedney Plug Seal Located Beyond the Barrier Plane Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:50 Page: 504 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following penetrations that utilize OZ Gedney Plug Seals regarding seal configurations that do not conform to typical detail M-8 per DPC 1435.00-00-0006, which requires the plug to be located in the barrier plane:
* H-AX-517-W-098, -099, -100, -102, -103 The evaluation determined that the penetrations will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
                                " The Type CFSF Gedney Plug utilized is an approved sealing device capable of achieving a 3-hour F rating.
                                " No combustibles are present In proximity to the penetrations in a manner that would result in a fire on the unexposed side as a result of heat transmission through the penetrations.
                                " The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 06 Deletion of Control Room Floor from Scope of Committed Fire Barriers (CNCE-9584)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the technical justification for removing the Control Room floor from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Control Room floor can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                " Insignificant amount of combustible loading.
                                " Lack of ignition sources.
                                " Cable spreading room and main control boards are supplied with ionization smoke detectors.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 09 Evaluation of Establishing the Single Point Acces (SPA) Vestibule as a Committed Fire Barrier (CNCE-61506)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to evaluate proposed modifications to the vestibule between the Auxiliary and Service buildings in order to qualify it as a NRC committed fire boundary. The proposed configuration of the vestibule has not been fire tested to demonstrate that it is qualified as a 3-hour fire barrier.
The evaluation determined the vestibule located on the Service Building side that encompasses the personnel access door will perform its intended function of preventing fire spread from the non-safety areas in the Service Building Corridor into the safety related Auxiliary Building areas based on the following:
                                " Walls and the personnel access door of the vestibule are qualified 3-hour fire rated assemblies.
                                " The roof of the vestibule will have gypsum wall board above the metal deck.
                                " Low combustible loading.
                                "Administrative and procedural controls in place for hot work ignition sources and storage of combustible materials.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:50 Page: 505 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                  Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine if the existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                  " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                  " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
e Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:50      Page: 506 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                            Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Descriptiion                      System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feat ure and System Details 18B                    Ul AB Scouth Cable Shaft El 543    -                R                  D                        Detection System, Installed: R Transient Control: D 39A                    Ul AB S outh Cable Shaft El 554    -                R                  D                        Detection System, Installed: R Transient Control: D 60B                    Ul AB Scouth Cable Shaft El 574    -                E, R                E, D                    Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: ER Transient Control: D 60C                    Ul AB Cable Room Corridor El                        R                  D                        Detection System, Installed: R 574                                                                                              Transient Control: D Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/1612015 14:09:50 Page: 507 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                        Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 45 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 1.89E-06 A LERF                          Units: [1] 3.09E-07 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results for CDF and LERF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is a significant contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore change is required for the control of transient combustibles to designate the area between columns DD-EE/55-56, including the cable shaft, as an exclusion area.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from dosing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk enhancements, risk or DID modifications or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:50    Page: 508 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Reactor Neutron Monitoring not being available due to power and cable hits to 1(2)ENBDTNSDT0001, and cable hits to 1(2)ENBDTNSDT0005. Wide range detector is available (1(2)
ENCDTNSDT0014, 1(2)ENCP 5050). Both source range channels may receive a spurious source range block signal. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ENBDTNSDTO0O1 - Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31),
Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Reactor Neutron Monitoring not being available due to power and cable hits to 1(2)ENBDTNSDT0001, and cable hits to 1(2)ENBDTNSDT0005. Wide range detector is available (1(2)
ENCDTNSDT0014, 1(2)ENCP 5050). Both source range channels may receive a spurious source range block signal. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ENBDTNSDT0005 - Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32),
Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-06 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXB, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by breaker 1EMXB-F08A is not coordinated.
Cable 1 EHM 598 coordinates 8.5 ft from Jct Pt 5913 (prior to Jct Pt 5912). This causes loss of 1EPEMXEMXB and all credited loads from this MCC. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1EPEMXEMXB-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXB Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:51 Page: 509 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #1, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indication and LOCA signal may cause a FWST Low Level signal which will open 1NI-184B and 1NI-185A 1FW P 5000 has loss of power and cable hits, 1FW P5010 has cable hits on all power, and 1FW P 5010 has a loss fo power. Opening of 1NI-185A valve will cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. I FW-27A may fail as is (normally open) on a loss of power. The A train valves mispositioning may cause loss of FWST inventory which is required for makeup. Valves 1NI-184B or 1FW-55B are required to be closed and will swapover as required and will not divert FWST inventory. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1FW P 5000 - Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #1 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indication and LOCA signal may cause a FWST Low Level signal which will open 1NI-184B and 1NI-185A 1FW P 5000 has loss of power and cable hits, 1FW P 5010 has cable hits on all power, and 1FW P 5010 has a loss fo power. Opening of 1NI-185A valve will cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. 1FW-27A may fail as is (normally open) on a loss of power. The A train valves mispositioning may cause loss of FWST inventory which is required for makeup. Valves 1NI-184B or 1FW-55B are required to be closed and will swapover as required and will not divert FWST inventory. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1FW P 5010 - Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #2 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #3, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indication and LOCA signal may cause a FWST Low Level signal which will open 1NI-184B and 1NI-185A 1FW P 5000 has loss of power and cable hits, 1FW P5010 has cable hits on all power, and 1FW P 5010 hasa loss fo power. Opening of 1NI-185A valve will cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. 1FW-27A may fail as is (normally open) on a loss of power. The A train valves mispositioning may cause loss of FWST inventory which is required for makeup. Valves 1NI-184B or 1FW-55B are required to be closed and will swapover as required and will not divert FWST inventory. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1FW P 5120 - Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #3 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:51  Page: 510 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures of FW-27A(1*FW 502, 1*N1 563, 1NI* 682) which may cause a diversion of FWST to the NO system. A combination of the failure of FW-27A and spurious operation of NI-185A may provide a diversion flowpath for FWST to the containment sump. There is also IN 92-18 concerns for FW-27A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1FW VA0027A - Residual Heat Removal Pump IA Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-14 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group IB, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by spurious cable hits which can cause a loss of power and control. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group I B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-15 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B, Pressurizer Level Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 1NC P5153 (INCLT5150) is not available due to cable (I*NC 615) and power hits. 1NC P5164 (INCLT5160) is not available due to cable (1*NC 608) and power hits while INC P5174 (1NCLT5170) is not available due to power hits. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC P 5153 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 2 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:52 Page: 511 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-16 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 1, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B, Pressurizer Level Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 1NC P5153 (INCLT5150) is not available due to cable (I*NC 615) and power hits. INC P5164 (INCLT5160) is not available due to cable (I*NC 608) and power hits while 1NC P5174 (1NCLT5170) is not available due to power hits. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC P 5164 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 1 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-17 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 3, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B, Pressurizer Level Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 1NC P5153 (INCLT5150) is not available due to cable (I*NC 615) and power hits. 1NC P5164 (INCLT5160) is not available due to cable (1*NC 608) and power hits while INC P5174 (1NCLT5170) is not available due to power hits. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC P 5174 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 3 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-18 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a hot short within cable I*ATC 670 causes spurious opening of the PORV. Loss of power and short on cable I*ATC 640 can prevent closing of the PORV block valve. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0033A - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:52 Page: 512 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-19 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a hot short within cable I*ATC 670 causes spurious opening of the PORV. Loss of power and short on cable I*ATC 640 can prevent closing of the PORV block valve. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-20 VFDR                            1A Residual Heat Removal Pump, which is normally off and not utilized for HSB, is affected by a spurious operation or loss of power and control due to the cable failures of components FW-27A, ND PUA, and NS-43A that may cause a diversion of FWST to the containment sump. A combination of FW-27A being open, the spurious start of the ND pump (due to interlock and/or cable failure), and spurious opening of the ND auxiliary containment spray valve could cause inadvertent FWST depletion to the containment sump via the Train A containment spray ring. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ND PUA - 1A Residual Heat Removal Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk. DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-22 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by the flowpath through the normal charging may be lost due to spurious SSPS, and cable hits on 1NV VA0312A. Cable hits on 1NI VA0009A may open the valve and prevent closing the valve to return the normal charging flowpath to service. This is a concern with going solid, and long term control of the plant. Charging flowpath is assured through 1NI VA0010B. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:52 Page: 513 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Safety Injection Pump 1A Suction, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hot shorts to NI Pump (1NI PUA) cause a spurious start. 1NI VA0103Aand 1NI VA0121A have hot shorts and these may spurious operate; and have IN-92-18 concerns. 1NI VA0100B has the breaker open and power removed. 1NV PUACC may also receive a start signal. This has the potential to overwhelm the pressuirzer relief capacity and affect seal cooling flow This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0103A - Safety Injection Pump 1A Suction Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-24 VFDR                            1A Safety Injection Pump to Hot Lets B&C, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hot shorts to NI Pump (1NI PUA) cause a spurious start. INI VA0103Aand INI VA0121A have hot shorts and these may spurious operate; and have IN-92-18 concerns. 1NI VA0100B has the breaker open and power removed. 1NV PUACC may also receive a start signal. This has the potential to overwhelm the pressuirzer relief capacity and affect seal cooling flow. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VAOI21A- IA Safety Injection Pump to Hot Lets B&C Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump IA Containment Sump Suction, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures of valves NS-18A, NS-20A, and NI- 85A may cause a diversion flowpath for FWST to the containment sump. This will cause a loss of FWST inventory and loss of primary makeup. Also, the valve is affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cables 1"ATC528, 1*NI 563 andl*NI 563 that may open or close valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NI VA0185A - Residual Heat Removal Pump 1A Containment Sump Suction Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:52 Page: 514 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach      - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-29 VFDR                            1A Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1NS PUA that can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 1NS VA0020A, 1NS VA0029A, and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. A hot short on cable I*ATC 853 can provide a INS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 1*RN 661 along with a 1EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a INS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 1*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 1NS VAG029A and 1INS VA0032A. A hot short on cable 1*NS 518 can provide an Open signal to 1NS VA0020A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INS PUA - 1A Containment Spray Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-30 VFDR                            NS PUMP A SUCT FROM CONT SUMP, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures of valves NS-18A, NS-20A, and NI-185A may cause a diversion fiowpath for FWST to the containment sump. This will cause a loss of FWST inventory and loss of primary makeup. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    iNS VA0018A - NS PUMP A SUCT FROM CONT SUMP Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-32 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 1A suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1INS VA0020A, 1NS VA0029A, and 1INS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. Cable hits on 1NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header. A hot short on cable I*ATC 853 can provide a 1NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 1*RN 661 along with a 1EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 1NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable I*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both INS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A.A hot short on cable 1*NS 518 can provide an Open signal to 1NS VA0020A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS VA0020A - Containment Spray Pump IA suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:53 Page: 515 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-33 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 1A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on INS VA0020A, 1NS VA0029A, and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. Cable hits on 1NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header.A hot short on cable I*ATC 853 can provide a 1NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 1*RN 661 along with a 1EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 1NS PUA pump start.A hot short on cable 1*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 1NS VA0029A and 1NS VA0032A.A hot short on cable I*NS 518 can provide an Open signal to 1INS VA0020A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INS VA0029A - Containment Spray Header 1A Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-34 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 1A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 1NS VA0020A, 1NS VA0029A, and 1NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. Cable hits on 1NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header.A hot short on cable 1*ATC 853 can provide a 1NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 1*RN 661 along with a 1EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a INS PUA pump start.A hot short on cable 1*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 1 NS VA0029A and INS VA0032A.A hot short on cable I*NS 518 can provide an Open signal to INS VA0020A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INS VA0032A - Containment Spray Header 1A Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-35 VFDR                            1A Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a hot short on cable I*ATC 853 can provide a INS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable I*RN 661 along with a 1EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a INS PUA pump start. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NS VA0043A - 1A Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:53 Page: 516 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                                  VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-36 VFDR                            1A Charging Pump, which is normally on and off for HSB, is affected by a spurious operation due to cable hits. This may overwhelmi PORV capability since NI pump also gets spurious start. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV PUACC - 1A Charging Pump Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-39 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that cause spurious operation of valve and prevent letdown isolation. Alternate valve for letdown path isolation is NV-15B (MSO issue, also). Pressure relief of letdown line via NV-14 to the PRT available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0001A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-40 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that cause spurious operation of valve and prevent letdown isolation. Alternate valve for letdown path isolation is NV- 15B (MSO issue, also). Pressure relief of letdown line via NV-14 to the PRT available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INV VA0002A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:53      Page: 517 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-41 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1B Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that cause spurious operation of valve and prevent letdown isolation. Alternate valve for letdown path isolation is NV-15B (MSO issue, also). Pressure relief of letdown line via NV-14 to the PRT available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0010A - Letdown Orifice 1B Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-42 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1C Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that cause spurious operation of valve and prevent letdown isolation. Alternate valve for letdown path isolation is NV-15B (MSO issue, also). Pressure relief of letdown line via NV-14 to the PRT available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0011A - Letdown Orifice 1C Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-43 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1A Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that cause spurious operation of valve and prevent letdown isolation. Altemate valve for letdown path isolation is NV-15B (MSO issue, also). Pressure relief of letdown line via NV-14 to the PRT available. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0013A - Letdown Orifice 1A Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:53 Page: 518 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-44 VFDR                            VCT Outlet Isolation, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that prevent auto swapover from VCT to FWST and provide inaccurate indication of level so operators will not be aware there is a problem. This can cause damage to the charging pump. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0188A - VCT Outlet Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-45 VFDR                            VCT Outlet Isolation, which is normally open and cycled for HSB, is affected by cable hits that prevent auto swapover from VCT to FWST and provide inaccurate indication of level so operators will not be aware there is a problem. This can cause damage to the charging pump. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0189B - VCT Outlet Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-46 VFDR                            Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by spurious cable hits may close 1NV VA0203A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0203A - Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-47 VFDR                            1A &I B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by valve failing open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA001OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:09:54 Page: 519 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-48 VFDR                            Seat Water Injection Flow Control, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by valve failing open on loss of air and cable hits. Failure of valve NV-309 may result in need to operate manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-311. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-49 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by the flowpath through the normal charging may be lost due to spurious SSPS, and cable hits on 1NV VA0312A. Cable hits on 1NI VA0009A may open the valve and prevent closing the valve to return the normal charging flowpath to service. This is a concern with going solid, and long term control of the plant. Charging flowpath is assured through INI VA0010B. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-51 VFDR                            SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #1, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Train Aand B Steam Generator IC Pressure Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 1SM P 5150 is not available due to cable hits (I*SM 657). 1SM P 5140 is not available due to cable (1*SM 656) and power hits while 1SM P 5160 is not available due to power hits. Pressure monitoring is available on Steam Generator D. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SM P 5140 - SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #1 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:54 Page: 520 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-52 VFDR                            SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B Steam Generator IC Pressure Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. ISM P 5150 is not available due to cable hits (I*SM 657). ISM P 5140 is not available due to cable (1*SM 656) and power hits while ISM P 5160 is not available due to power hits. Pressure monitoring is available on Steam Generator D. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    ISM P 5150 - SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #2 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-53 VFDR                            SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #3, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B Steam Generator IC Pressure Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. ISM P 5150 is not available due to cable hits (1*SM 657). ISM P 5140 is not available due to cable (I*SM 656) and power hits while ISM P 5160 is not available due to power hits. Pressure monitoring is available on Steam Generator D. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SM P 5160 - SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #3 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        45-VFDR-54 VFDR                            S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VAOOO1 - S/G 1D PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/1612015 14:09:54 Page: 521 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-55 VFDR                            1C S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-58 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Reactor Neutron Monitoring not being available due to power and cable hits to 1(2)ENBDTNSDT0001, and cable hits to 1(2)ENBDTNSDT0005. Wide range detector is available (1(2)
ENCDTNSDT0014, 1(2)ENCP 5050). Both source range channels may receive a spurious source range block signal. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ENBDTNSDT0001 - Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31),
Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-59 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32), which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Reactor Neutron Monitoring not being available due to power and cable hits to 1(2)ENBDTNSDTOOO1, and cable hits to 1(2)ENBDTNSDT0005. Wide range detector is available (1(2)
ENCDTNSDT0014, 1(2)ENCP 5050). Both source range channels may receive a spurious source range block signal. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ENBDTNSDT0005 - Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32),
Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02116/2015 14:09:54 Page: 522 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    45 - Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-60 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D SIG PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-61 VFDR                            SIG 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          45-VFDR-62 VFDR                            Control Foom Area Filter Inlet, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by both 1VC VA0006A and 2VC VA0006A experiencing cable hits (1*ATC1 004 and I*VC 541) that could spuriously close valves and create IN 92-18 concerns. Also, it may be affected by a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable I*VC 543 that may open or close valve. Control room make up supply not available. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2VC VA0006A - Control Room Area Filter Inlet Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:55 Page: 523 of 695
 
0                                                                                    0                                                                                      S Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                        Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 28B                U2 AB North Cable Shaft El 543 51A                U2 AB North Cable Shaft El 554 69B                U2 AB North Cable Shaft El 574 69C                U2 AB Cable Room Corridor El 574 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/1612015 14:09:55 Page: 524 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                          Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using B train charging pump via normal charging path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by B train feeding S/Gs C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:55 Page: 525 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                            Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                "Area is normally attended "The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                "The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Licensing Action                12. Deviation from Section C.5.a of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding protection of HVAC penetrations of fire barriers Licensing Basis                  In some fire rated walls and floor/ceiling assemblies, openings were provided for HVAC duct access which are larger than the ducts themselves. To support fire damper sleeves in this opening a steel plate was used to form a rigid frame, to which a layer of fireproofing was applied. The remainder of the opening was protected by a fire rated silicone foam. While the composite design has not been tested by an independent laboratory, the individual components have been tested. The testing was found to be acceptable based on the following:
* The fireproofing and foam sealant has successfully passed the acceptance criteria of ASTM E-1 19 individually as documented in the U.L. Building Materials Directory, 1983.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:55 Page: 526 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                            Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 04 Fire Protection Evaluation for Floor Blockout Penetrations with a Free Area in Excess of 9 sqft. and Structural Framing Spans Exceeding 42 in. without a Cross Member Framing Revision                          1 Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the following floor blockouts regarding the framing support provided for the Silicone Foam free areas exceeding 9 sqft. that are not bounded by typical details per DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                  " H-AX-517A-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517A-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-001
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-002
                                  " H-AX-517B-F-003
                                  " K-AX-653-F-001
                                  " K-AX-653-F-032
                                  " K-AX-653-F-003
* J-AX-650A-F-001 The evaluation determined that the Unit 1 and 2 Exterior Doghouse penetrations (J-AX-650A-F-001) are qualified for a 3-hour F and T rating. The remaining penetrations above are considered adequate for the area fire hazards based on the following:
* Detection available in fire areas of concern.
                                  *Area hose stations and fire extinguishers.
                                  ' Fire brigade response.
                                  "Seal and framing configurations for the penetrations are considered adequate.
                                  ' Seal integrity is not anticipated to be compromised by fire exposure.
                                  "The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 10 Fire Protection Evaluation for Penetrations that Do Not Conform to the Overlap Criteria of Typical Detail M-1 Revision Inactive                          No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of multiple penetrations regarding seal configuration that do not conform to the build out criteria of typical penetration seal detail M-1 from DPC 1435.00-00-0006. The penetrations below are in NRC committed 3-hour fire barriers:
                                  "C-AX-217-W-008, -013, -014, -021, -025, -028, -029 "C-AX-228-W-028, -029, -030, Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:56 Page: 527 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                              Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions
                                " C-AX-260-W-049, -050, -053, -068, -074
                                " D-AX-354A-W-033, -035, -058 through -064, -067, -070 through -078, -081, -083 through -092, -104, -105, -107
                                " D-AX-354-W-024, -025, -026, -027, -029 through -036, -041 through -063
                                " F-AX-348-W-085, -097, -114, -115
                                " F-AX-354A-W-035, -036, -039, -040, -044
                                " F-AX-354-W-021, -027, -028, -032, -033
                                " H-AX-515-W-01 3
                                " H-AX-517-W-003, -018 through -028, -042 through -052, -054 through -057, -062, -064, -065, -066, -069, -070, -071, -073, -075, -076, -083, -087, -088, -091, -
094
                                " J-AX-513-W-028, -029, -030, J-AX-515-W-005, -009, -010
                                " J-AX-518-W-001, -002, -005, -006, -008
                                " J-AX-533-W-001, -002 The evaluation determined that the penetrations identified above will adequately protect against fire propagation for a 3-hour duration. However, unexposed side temperatures may exceed CNS limitations, which is acceptable based on the following:
* Acceptable for the Category 1 (penetrations with only mechanical penetrations) and Category 3 (penetrations with obstructions that impact seal overlap beyond the opening sidewall) mechanical penetrations since combustibles near the penetrations of concern are limited.
* Acceptable for the Category 2 (penetrations with mechanical and/or electrical penetrations) electrical penetrations based on the area fire hazards, considering fire protection features (detection, hose stations, fire extinguishers) and fire brigade response.
* The ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 06 Deletion of Control Room Floor from Scope of Committed Fire Barriers (CNCE-9584)
Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the technical justification for removing the Control Room floor from the scope of committed fire barriers.
The evaluation concluded that the Control Room floor can be removed from the scope of the committed fire barriers based on the following:
                                " Insignificant amount of combustible loading.
                                " Lack of ignition sources.
* Cable spreading room and main control boards are supplied with ionization smoke detectors.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:56 Page: 528 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                  Engineerir ig Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0036, Attachment 10 Evaluation of Embedded Metal Junction Boxes in Block Walls Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the evaluation was to document the fire barrier analysis of the fire boundary walls that have embedded sheet metal boxes. The analytical method of this calculation was to evaluate the potential in situ and transient fire hazards in fire areas adjacent to the subject walls to determine ifthe existing configuration is robust enough to prevent fire spread between adjacent fire areas.
The evaluation determined that the walls with embedded sheet metal boxes are capable of providing adequate fire resistance based on the following:
                                " Lack of potential fire ignition sources and continuity of combustibles.
                                " Location of embedded boxes which would prevent the boxes from being immersed in a fire plume or hot gas layer.
* Administrative controls for storage and use of combustible materials.
o Robust configuration of walls with embedded sheet metal boxes.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:56 Page: 529 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                            Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feal ure and System Details 28B                      U2 AB North Cable Shaft El 543    -                R                  D                        Detection System, Installed: R Transient Control: D 51A                      U2 AB North Cable Shaft El 554    -                R                  D                        Detection System, Installed: R Transient Control: D 69B                      U2 AB North Cable Shaft El 574    -                E, R                E. D                    Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: ER Transient Control: D 69C                      U2 AB Cable Room Corridor El      -                R                  D                        Detection System, Installed: R 574                                                                                              Transient Control: D Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:56 Page: 530 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                        Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 46 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 1.77E-06 A LERF                          Units: [2] 2.99E-07 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results for CDF and LERF are above the screening acceptance criteria but within RG 1.174 acceptance limits.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is a significant contributor to risk in the fire area, therefore change is required for the control of transient combustibles to designate the area between columns DD-EE/58-59, including the cable shaft, as an exclusion area.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk enhancements, risk or DID modifications or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:56 Page: 531 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-03 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Reactor Neutron Monitoring not being available due to power and cable hits to 2ENBDTNSDT0001, and cable hits to 2ENBDTNSDT0005. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ENBDTNSDT0001 - Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31),
Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-04 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32), which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Reactor Neutron Monitoring not being available due to power and cable hits to 2ENBDTNSDT0001, and cable hits to 2ENBDTNSDT0005. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ENBDTNSDT0005 - Nuclear Instrumentation Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32)
Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #1, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indication and, with a spurious LOCA signal, will cause a FWST Low Level signal which will open 2NI-184B and 2NI-185A. 2FW P 5000 has loss of power and cable hits, 2FW P5010 has cable hits on all power and controls, and 2FW P 5020 has a loss of power. Opening of 2NI-185A valve will cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. 2FW-27A may fail as is (normally open) on a loss of power. The A train valves mispositioning may cause loss of FWST inventory which is required for makeup. Valves 2NI-184B or 2FW-55B are required to be closed and will swapover as required and will not divert FWST inventory. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2FW P 5000 - Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #1 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:56 Page: 532 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indication and, with a spurious LOCA signal, will cause a FWST Low Level signal which will open 2NI-184B and 2NI-185A. 2FW P5000 has loss of power and cable hits, 2FW P 5010 has cable hits on all power and controls, and 2FW P 5020 has a loss of power. Opening of 2NI-185A valve will cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. 2FW-27A may fail as is (normally open) on a loss of power. The A train valves mispositioning may cause loss of FWST inventory which is required for makeup. Valves 2NI-184B or 2FW-55B are required to be closed and will swapover as required and will not divert FWST inventory. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2FW P 5010 - Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #2 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #3, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by failure of at least 2 out of 4 FWST Level Indication and, with a spurious LOCA signal, will cause a FWST Low Level signal which will open 2NI-184B and 2NI-185A. 2FW P 5000 has loss of power and cable hits, 2FW P 5010 has cable hits on all power and controls, and 2FW P 5020 has a loss of power. Opening of 2NI-185A valve will cause a diversion path from FWST to the containment sump. 2FW-27A may fail as is (normally open) on a loss of power. The A train valves mispositioning may cause loss of FWST inventory which is required for makeup. Valves 2NI-184B or 2FW-55B are required to be closed and will swapover as required and will not divert FWST inventory. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2FW P 5120 - Borated Water Storage Tank Level Channel #3 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          46-VFDR- 10 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures. The failure of FW-27A combined with the spurious operation of valve NI-185A may provide a diversion flowpath for FWST to the containment sump. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2FW VA0027A - Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:57 Page: 533 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-13 VFDR                              Pressurizer Heater Group 2A, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by no ability to operate pressurizer heater 2A or 2B in auto due to cable and control power hits. All pressurizer heaters can be tripped from the control board. Pressurizer Heater 2A has control and power cable hits (2*ATC 664, 2*EPE 555, 2 ILE 654, 2*ILE 656 & 2*NR 577) resulting in the loss of manual and auto control to the heater. Pressurizer Heater 2B has a power cable hit (2 ETC 530) resulting in the loss of manual control; auto control has various cable hits.Unit 2 Pressurizer pressure and level signal cables (2*NC608 and 2"NC615) are hit and cause loss of input to the Process Control System. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 2A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-14 VFDR                              Pressurizer Heater Group 2B, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by no ability to operate pressurizer heater 2A or 2B in auto due to cable and control power hits. All pressurizer heaters can be tripped from the control board. Pressurizer Heater 2A has control and power cable hits (2*ATC 664, 2*EPE 555, 2 ILE 654, 2*ILE 656 & 2*NR 577) resulting in the loss of manual and auto control to the heater. Pressurizer Heater 2B has a power cable hit (2 ETC 530) resulting in the loss of manual control: auto control has various cable hits.Unit 2 Pressurizer pressure and level signal cables (2"NC608 and 2"NC615) are hit and cause loss of input to the Process Control System. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    21LE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 2B Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-15 VFDR                              Pressurizer Level CH. 2, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B, Pressurizer Level Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 2NC P5153 (2NCLT5150) is not available due to cable (2*NC 615) and power hits. 2NC P5164 (2NCLT5160) is not available due to cable (2*NC 608) and power hits while 2NC P5174 (2NCLT5170) is not available due to power hits. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      2NC P 5153 - Pressurizer Level CH. 2 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:57 Page: 534 of 695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-17 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level CH. 1, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B, Pressurizer Level Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 2NC P5153 (2NCLT5150) is not available due to cable (2*NC 615) and power hits. 2NC P5164 (2NCLT5160) is not available due to cable (2*NC 608) and power hits while 2NC P5174 (2NCLT5170) is not available due to power hits. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC P 5164 - Pressurizer Level CH. 1 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-18 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level CH. 3, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B, Pressurizer Level Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 2NC P5153 (2NCLT5150) is not available due to cable (2*NC 615) and power hits. 2NC P5164 (2NCLT5160) is not available due to cable (2*NC 608) and power hits while 2NC P5174 (2NCLT5170) is not available due to power hits. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC P 5174 - Pressurizer Level CH. 3 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-19 VFDR                            Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by a hot short within cable 2*ATC 677 causes spurious opening of the PORV. Loss of power can prevent closing of the PORV block valve (2NCVA0033A). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0033A - Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Isolation Valve Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:58 Page: 535 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by a hot short within cable 2*ATC 677 causes spurious opening of the PORV. Loss of power can prevent closing of the PORV block valve (2NCVA0033A). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-21 VFDR                            2A Residual Heat Removal Pump, which is normally off and not utilized for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures of components FW-27A, ND PUA, and NS-43A may cause a diversion of FWST to the containment sump. A combination of FW-27A being open, the spurious start of the Train A ND pump (due to interlock and/or cable failure), and spurious opening of the ND auxiliary containment spray valve could cause inadvertent FWST depletion to the containment sump via the containment spray ring. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2ND PUA - 2A Residual Heat Removal Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by the flowpath through the normal charging may be lost due to spurious SSPS, and cable hits on 2NV VA0312A. Cable hits on 2NI VA0009A may open the valve and prevent closing the valve to return the normal charging flowpath to service. This is a concern with going solid, and long term control of the plant. Charging flowpath is assured through 2NI VA0010B. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0009A - Charging Pump Cold Leg Injection Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:58 Page: 536 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-24 VFDR                            2A Safety Injection Pump Suction. which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hot shorts that may cause spurious operation and IN 18 concerns. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0103A - 2A Safety Injection Pump Suction Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-25 VFDR                            2A Safety Injection Pump to Hot Legs B&C, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by multiple cable hot shorts that may cause spurious operation and IN-92-18 concerns. This has the potential to overwhelm the pressuirzer relief capacity and affect seal cooling flow. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0121A - 2A Safety Injection Pump to Hot Legs B&C Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-26 VFDR                            Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Containment Sump Suction, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by spurious operation (2*NI 564) that may provide a diversion flowpath for FWST to the containment sump if FW-27A also fails open. Also, there is a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable 2*NI 564. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NI VA0185A - Residual Heat Removal Pump 2A Containment Sump Suction Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:58 Page: 537 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRS Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-30 VFDR                            2A Containment Spray Pump, which is normally off and off for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. Cable hits on 2NS VA0020A, 2NS VA0029A, and 2NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header.A hot short on cable 2*ATC 853 can provide a 2NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 2*RN 661 along with a 2EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 2NS PUA pump start.A hot short on cable 2*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A.A hot short on cable 2*NS 518 can provide an Open signal to 2NS VA0020A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS PUA - 2A Containment Spray Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-31 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump A Suction from Containment Sump, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures of valves NS-18A, NS-20A, and NI-185A may cause a diversion flowpath for FWST to the containment sump. This will cause a loss of FWST inventory and loss of primary makeup. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0018A - Containment Spray Pump A Suction from Containment Sump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-33 VFDR                            Containment Spray Pump 2A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS VA0020A, 2NS VA0029A, and 2NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. Cable hits on 2NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header.A hot short on cable 2*ATC 853 can provide a 2NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 2*RN 661 along with a 2EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 2NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 2*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A.A hot short on cable 2*NS 518 can provide an Open signal to 2NS VA0020A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0020A - Containment Spray Pump 2A Suction from Borated Water Storage Tank Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:59 Page: 538 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-34 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS VA0020A, 2NS VA0029A, and 2NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. Cable hits on 2NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header.A hot short on cable 2*ATC 853 can provide a 2NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 2*RN 661 along with a 2EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 2NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 2*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A.A hot short on cable 2*NS 518 can provide an Open signal to 2NS VA0020A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0029A - Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-35 VFDR                            Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits on 2NS VA0020A, 2NS VA0029A, and 2NS VA0032A can cause spurious opening of valves. Cable hits on 2NS PUA can cause spurious start of NS pump. This can cause a diversion of FWST inventory to the containment via the containment spray header.A hot short on cable 2*ATC 853 can provide a 2NS PUA pump start, or a hot short on cable 2*RN 661 along with a 2EQB-DGLSA permissive can provide a 2NS PUA pump start. A hot short on cable 2*NS 528 can provide an Open signal to both 2NS VA0029A and 2NS VA0032A.A hot short on cable 2*NS 518 can provide an Open signal to 2NS VA0020A. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VA0032A - Containment Spray Header 2A Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-36 VFDR                            2A Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header, which is normally closed and not utilized for HSB, is affected by spurious operation or a loss of power and control due to the cable failures of components FW-27A, ND PUA, and NS-43A may cause a diversion of FWST to the containment sump. A combination of FW-27A being open, the spurious start of the Train A ND pump (due to interlock and/or cable failure), and spurious opening of the ND auxiliary containment spray valve could cause inadvertent FWST depletion to the containment sump via the containment spray ring. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NS VAO043A - 2A Residual Heat Removal Pump to Containment Spray Header Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:59 Page: 539 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-37 VFDR                            2A Charging Pump, which is normally on and on for HSB, is affected by multiple cable shorts which may start pump 2NV PUACC. This has the potential to overwhelm the pressuirzer relief capacity and affect seal cooling flow. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV PUACC - 2A Charging Pump Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-38 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults (and internal faults in ASPA) that may spuriously energize (keep open) 2NV VA0001A, 2A, 11A, and 13A (2NV VA0010A and 2NV VA0015B will close on demand). Letdown header over pressure relief path to the PRT will be via 2NV VA0014. KC cooling to the letdown heat exchanger may be lost due to SSPS isolation of non essential KC header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0001A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-39 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable faults (and internal faults in ASPA) that may spuriously energize (keep open) 2NV VA0001A, 2A, 11A, and 13A (2NV VAOO10A and 2NV VAOO15B will close on demand). Letdown header over pressure relief path to the PRT will be via 2NV VA0014. KC cooling to the letdown heat exchanger may be lost due to SSPS isolation of non essential KC header. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0002A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:09:59 Page: 540 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-40 VFDR                            Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by spurious cable hits may close 1NV VA0203A. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0203A - Charging Pumps A & B Recirc Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-41 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by valve failing open on loss of air and cable hits.
2NV VA0294 fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VAOO1OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-42 VFDR                            Seal Water Injection flow, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by 2NV VA0309 failing open on loss of air, which may require manually operating manual valve NV-308 and possibly manual bypass valve NV-311. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0309 - Seal Water Injection flow Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:00 Page: 541 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corrdor El 574                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-43 VFDR                            Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by the flowpath through the normal charging may be lost due to spurious SSPS, and cable hits on 2NV VA0312A. Cable hits on 2NI VA0009A may open the valve and prevent closing the valve to return the normal charging flowpath to service. This is a concern with going solid, and long term control of the plant.Charging flowpath is assured through 2NI VA001OB. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-44 VFDR                            SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #1, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B Steam Generator C Pressure Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 2SM P 5150 is not available due to cable hits. 2SM P 5140 is not availabe due to cable and power hits while 2SM P 5160 is not availabe due to power hits. Pressure monitoring is available on Steam Generator D. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SM P 5140 - SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #1 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-45 VFDR                            SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #2, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B Steam Generator C Pressure Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 2SM P 5150 is not available due to cable hits. 2SM P 5140 is not availabe due to cable and power hits while 2SM P 5160 is not availabe due to power hits. Pressure monitoring is available on Steam Generator D. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SM P 5150 - SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #2 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:00 Page: 542 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                                VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-46 VFDR                            SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #3, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by Train A and B Steam Generator C Pressure Monitoring not being available due to cable and power hits to monitoring devices. 2SM P 5150 is not available due to cable hits. 2SM P 5140 is not availabe due to cable and power hits while 2SM P 5160 is not availabe due to power hits. Pressure monitoring is available on Steam Generator D. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SM P 5160 - SG C Steam Line Pressure CH #3 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-47 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        46-VFDR-48 VFDR                            S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:00 Page: 543 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    46 - Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor El 574                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-49 VFDR                              S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      ISV VA0001 - S/G 1D PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          46-VFDR-50 VFDR                              S/G 1C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1SV VA0007 - IC S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:01 Page:544of695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  47 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 183                U2 FB HVAC Rm El 631 Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:01 Page:545of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
FlreArea ID:
Fire Area ID:                    47 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A or B train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A or B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by train A or B feeding S/Gs A and B or C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A or B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A or B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:01 Page:546of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  47 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                      Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 18 Fire Protection Evaluation For Unprotected Spiral Stairs Located at Col. GG-61 and GG-53 Connecting Elevations 611+0' and 631+6' Revision                        0 Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent        No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to provide justification for the unprotected sprial stairs between Elevation 631+6 (Fire Areas (FA) 38 and 47) and Elevation 611+0 (FA 22).
The evaluation determined the portions of the barrier containing the stairs to be 'adequate for the hazard'. This is based on:
                                " combustible controls,
                                " lack of in situ combustibles,
                                *minimal ignition sources.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:01 Page:547of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      47 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                    Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System            Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 183                      U2 FB HVAC Rm El 631                -                R                  E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/1612015 14:10:01 Page:548of695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  47 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                            Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 47 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                          Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
Manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations, although MCA Is not directly applicable since this fire area contains very few credited cables and screened from further scenario refinement. Therefore, installed detection is required for risk to assure timely fire brigade response.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:02    Page: 549 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    47 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          47-VFDR-04 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a loss of insturment air, cable hits, loss of power, and SSPS signals. 2NV VA0294 fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A or NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          47-VFDR-07 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VAO001 - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          47-VFDR-08 VFDR                            S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:02 Page: 550 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    47 - Unit 2 Fuel Storage Area HVAC Room El 631                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          47-VFDR-09 VFDR                            SIG 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen ifinstrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0013 - S/G 2B PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          47-VFDR-10 VFDR                            SIG 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen ifinstrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - SIG 2A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:02 Page: 551 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                    Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 21NTDH            U2 Inner DH Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:02 Page: 552 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                      Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A or B train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A or B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A combination of A or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A and B train feeding S/Gs A and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A and B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train A and B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:03 Page: 553 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                      Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:03 Page: 554 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                          Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID        CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard          Yes Summary                          The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
                                  " B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
                                  " C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                  " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                  " F-AX-348-W-088
                                  " J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
                                  " Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                  " Low probability of fire exposure.
                                  " Limited combustibles.
                                  " Fire brigade response.
                                  " Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
                                  " Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/1612015 14:10:03 Page: 555 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zon te ID          Descriotion                        System          System              Protection Feature      Reauired Fire Protection Fealture and System Details elD            Descrintl 21NTDH                  U2 Inner DH                                                              E                        Combustible Loading: E Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:03 Page: 556 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 48 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [2] 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [2] O.00E+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is the only contributor to risk in this area, but the delta risk is very low. Therefore, no change is recommended for DID in the control of transient combustibles in the area.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:03 Page: 557 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        48-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Inside), which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 2EMXS breaker F04A, cable 2"CA881 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (2BB VA0060A and 2BB VA0019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of Band C S/G.Cable hits on 2BB VA0021B, 2BB VA0061B, 2BB VA00149B, and 2BB VA0150B can cause spurious operation and loss of power/control. Excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2BB VA0019A - 2B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Inside),
Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                        48-VFDR-02 VFDR                            2B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Outside), which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 2EMXS breaker F04A, cable 2"CA881 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (2BB VA0060A and 2BB VA0019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G.Cable hits on 2BB VA0021B, 2BB VA0061B, 2BB VA00149B, and 2BB VA0150B can cause spurious operation and loss of power/control. Excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2BB VA0021B - 2B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Outside)
Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        48-VFDR-03 VFDR                            2C S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Inside), which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 2EMXS breaker F04A, cable 2"CA881 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (2BB VA0060A and 2BB VA0019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G.Cable hits on 2BB VA0021B, 2BB VA0061B, 2BB VA00149B, and 2BB VA01 50B can cause spurious operation and loss of power/control. Excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2BB VA0060A - 2C S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Inside)
Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:03 Page: 558 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          48-VFDR-04 VFDR                            2C SIG Blowdown Containment Isolation (Outside), which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 2EMXS breaker F04A, cable 2"CA881 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train SIG blow down valves (2BB VA0060A and 2BB VA0019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G.Cable hits on 2BB VA0021B, 2BB VA0061B, 2BB VA00149B, and 2BB VA01 50B can cause spurious operation and loss of power/control. Excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2BB VA0061B - 2C SIG Blowdown Containment Isolation (Outside)
Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          48-VFDR-05 VFDR                            2C S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation Bypass, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 2EMXS breaker F04A, cable 2*CA881 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (2BB VA0060A and 2BB VA001 9A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G.Cable hits on 2BB VA0021B, 2BB VA0061B, 2BB VA00149B, and 2BB VA01 50B can cause spurious operation and loss of power/control. Excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2BB VA0149B - 2C S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation Bypass Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          48-VFDR-06 VFDR                            2B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation Bypass, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 2EMXS breaker F04A, cable 2"CA881 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train SIG blow down valves (2BB VA0060A and 2BB VA001 9A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G.Cable hits on 2BB VA0021B, 2BB VA0061B, 2BB VA00149B, and 2BB VA0150B can cause spurious operation and loss of power/control. Excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2BB VA0150B - 2B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation Bypass Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:04 Page: 559 of 695
 
0                                        ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          48-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Non-Coordinated Loads fed from 2EPEMXEMXS, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 2EMXS breaker F04A, cable 2"CA881 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (2BB VA0060A and 2BB VA001 9A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G. Cable hits on 2B1 VA0021B, 2BB VA0061B, 2BB VA00149B, and 2BB VA0150B can cause spurious operation and loss of power/control. Excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2EPEMXEMXS-NCL - Non-Coordinated Loads fed from 2EPEMXEMXS Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          48-VFDR-08 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of air causing valve to fail full open.
Charging is assured through NI VA0009A or NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          48-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            2D S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0001 - 2D S/G PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:04 Page: 560 of 695
 
0                                                                                                                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  48 - Unit 2 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        48-VFDR-12 VFDR                            S/G 2A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0019 - S/G 2A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:04 Page: 561 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                    Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 1INTDH            Ul Inner DH Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:04 Page: 562 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    49 - Unit 1 1Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                      Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                    Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                          Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                      Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A or B train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A or B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                        Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A combination of A or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                      Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolation. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A and B train feeding S/Gs A and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                      Process monitoring from train A and B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                                Normal train A and B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:05 Page: 563 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                        Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
o Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:05 Page: 564 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                        Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Engineering Evaluation ID      CNC-1435.00-00-0035, Attachment 02, Rev. 0 Fire Protection Evaluation for Large Bore Pipes Revision Inactive                        No Functionally Equivalent          No Adequate for the Hazard        Yes Summary                        The purpose of the calculation was to evaluate the adequacy of the penetration seal configuration for the following large bore pipe penetrations that exceed the maximum diameter size allowed by the design detail provided by DPC 1435.00-00-0006:
e B-AX-217-W-002, B-AX-260-W-001
* C-AX-200-W-031, C-AX-217-W-001, C-AX-258-W-023
                                " C-AX-260-F-026, C-AX-260-W-005
                                " F-AX-348-W-088 "J-AX-655-F-008, J-AX-658B-F-007, J-NSWPS-662-W-001 The evaluation determined that the large bore penetrations are acceptable based on the following:
* Penetrations will prohibit the propagation of flame through the seal for a 3-hr. fire duration (F-rated).
                                " Low probability of fire exposure.
* Limited combustibles.
                                " Fire brigade response.
* Unexposed side temperatures will not result in auto-ignition of combustible materials.
* Ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is not compromised.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:05 Page: 565 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                          Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire emID Fire Zon eID            flescrintion                        System            System              Protection Feature      Renuired Fire Protection Feat turn and Svstem Details Descrinti 1INTDH                  Ul Inner DH                                                              E                        Combustible Loading: E Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:05 Page: 566 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 49 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1) 0.00E+00 A LERF                            Units: [1] O.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta DCF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is the only contributor to risk in this area, but the delta risk is very low. Therefore, no change is recommended for DID in the control of transient combustibles in the area.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:05 Page: 567 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-01 VFDR                              1B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Inside), which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 1EMXS breaker F04A, cable 1"CA910 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (188 VA0060A and 1BB VA0019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G (excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area).Open affected breaker and re-energize bus to close the affected valves. An alternate is evaluate location of cable versus fire sources. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1BB VA0019A- 1B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Inside),
Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-02 VFDR                              1B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Outside), which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 1EMXS breaker F04A, cable 1"CA910 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (18B VA0060A and 1BB VA0019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G (excessive cool down concem B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1B8 VA0021B - 1B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Outside),
Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-03 VFDR                              IC S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Inside), which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 1EMXS breaker F04A, cable 1*CA910 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (1BB VA0060A and 1BB VA0019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G (excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area).Open affected breaker and re-energize bus to close the affected valves. An alternate is evaluate location of cable versus fire sources. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1BB VA0060A - 1C S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Inside),
Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:05 Page: 568 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-04 VFDR                            1C S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Outside), which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 1EMXS breaker F04A, cable 1 CA91 0 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (1BB VA0060A and 1BB VA001 9A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G (excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area).Open affected breaker and re
                                -energize bus to close the affected valves. An alternate is evaluate location of cable versus fire sources. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1BB VA0061B - 1C S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation (Outside),
Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-05 VFDR                            1C S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation Bypass, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 1EMXS breaker F04A, cable 1"CA910 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (1BB VA0060A and 1BB VA0019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G (excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area).Open affected breaker and re
                                -energize bus to close the affected valves. An alternate is evaluate location of cable versus fire sources. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1BB VA0149B - 1C S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation Bypass Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-06 VFDR                            lB S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation Bypass, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 1EMXS breaker F04A, cable 1"CA910 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (1BB VA0060A and 1BB VAO019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G (excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area).Open affected breaker and re
                                -energize bus to close the affected valves. An alternate is evaluate location of cable versus fire sources. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1BB VA0150B - 1B S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation Bypass Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:06 Page: 569 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        49-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A Suction from Nuclear Service Water Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by breaker in 1EMXI R01A is not coordinated (Refer to AREVA Coordination calculation 32-9139535-000). Cable 1*SM 675 does not coordinate. This causes loss of 1EPEMXEMXI and all credited loads from this bus.This causes loss of power to 1CA VA001 5A (RN to A CA pump, Upper surge tank and condenser (requires breaking Vacuum) remain available. This affects feed to S/G A, S/G D remains available.This causes loss of power to 1EPLBCECC (125 VDC inverter feeding 1EDC), the battery will be available for two hours before there is a loss of DC supply. 1CA VA0060 will fail open on loss of power. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0015A - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A Suction from Nuclear Service Water Isolation Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                        49-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A Flow to S/G 1A, which is normally open and throttled for HSB, is affected by breaker in 1EMXI R01A is not coordinated (Refer to AREVA Coordination calculation 32-9139535-000). Cable I*SM 675 does not coordinate. This causes loss of IEPEMXEMXI and all credited loads from this bus.This causes loss of power to 1CA VA001 5A (RN to A CA pump, Upper surge tank and condenser (requires breaking Vacuum) remain available. This affects feed to S/G A, S/G D remains available.This causes loss of power to 1EPLBCECC (125 VDC inverter feeding 1EDC), the battery will be available for two hours before there is a loss of DC supply. 1CA VA0060 will fail open on loss of power. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heal Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1CA VA0060 - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1A Flow to S/G 1A Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                        49-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Non-Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXI, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by breaker in IEMXI R01A is not coordinated (Refer to AREVA Coordination calculation 32-9139535-000). Cable I*SM 675 does not coordinate. This causes loss of 1EPEMXEMXI and all credited loads from this bus.This causes loss of power to 1CA VA0015A (RN to A CA pump, Upper surge tank and condenser (requires breaking Vacuum) remain available.
This affects feed to S/G A, S/G D remains available.This causes loss of power to 1EPLBCECC (125 VDC inverter feeding 1EDC), the battery will be available for two hours before there is a loss of DC supply. 1CA VA0060 will fail open on loss of power. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1EPEMXEMXI-NCL - Non-Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXI Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:06 Page: 570 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                              VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-1 0 VFDR                              Non-Coordinated Loads fed from I EPEMXEMXS, which is normally Available and Available for HSB, is affected by non Coordinated load 1EMXS breaker F04A, cable 1"CA910 causes loss of power to affected SSD loads. A train S/G blow down valves (1BB VA0060A and 1BB VA0019A) are credited in this scenario and are not available for isolation of B and C S/G (excessive cool down concern B train valves have cable hits and are in the fire area).Open affected breaker and re
                                -energize bus to close the affected valves. An alternative is to evaluate location of cable versus fire sources. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1EPEMXEMXS-NCL - Non-Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXS Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                              1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A or NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NV VA0294 - 1A &IB Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-12 VFDR                              S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1SV VA0001 - S/G 1D PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:07 Page: 571 of 695
* 0                                                                                              0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    49 - Unit 1 Inner Doghouse                                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          49-VFDR-1 3 VFDR                              S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1SV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:07 Page: 572 of 695
 
0                                                                                      0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    50 - Unit 2 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                                    Fire Area Del finition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 2EXTDH            U2 Outer DH Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:07 Page: 573 of 695
 
0 Attachment C FireAreaID:Table                                    C-I  -  NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    50 - Unit 2 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                                      Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A or B train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A or B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A combination of A or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/G s are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A and B train feeding S/Gs B and C. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused SiGs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A and B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A and B auxiliary sustems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:07 Page: 574 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    50 - Unit 2 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 2EXTDH                  U2 Outer DH Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:07 Page: 575 of 695
* S                                                                                            0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  50 - Unit 2 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                                                  Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 50 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-081rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
ACDF                            Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                          Units: [2] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta DCF and I E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is the only contributor to risk in this area, but the risk is very low. Therfore, no change is recommended for the control of transient combustibles in the area.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:07 Page: 576 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    50 - Unit 2 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          50-VFDR-01 VFDR                            2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of air causing valve to fail full open.
Charging is assured through NI VA0009A or NI VA001 OB and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2NV VA0294 - 2A & 2B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        50-VFDR-02 VFDR                            S/G 2C PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0007 - S/G 2C PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        50-VFDR-03 VFDR                            S/G 2B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    2SV VA0013 - S/G 2B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:08 Page: 577 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  51 - Unit 1 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                                    Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 1EXTDH            Ul Outer DH Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:08 Page: 578 of 695
 
Attachment C FireAreaID:Table                                    C-I  -  NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    51 - Unit 1 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                                      Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A or B train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A or B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A combination of A or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/G s are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A and B train feeding S/Gs B and C. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A and B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A and B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:08 Page: 579 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    51 - Unit 1 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                        Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required          Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 1EXTDH                  Ul Outer DH Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02116/2015 14:10:08 Page: 580 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  51 - Unit 1 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                                                Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                          Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area 51 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 A LERF                          Units: [1] 0.OOE+00 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited in any scenario to meet the risk screening criteria. The transient fire scenario analyzed is the only contributor to risk in this area, but the risk is very low. Therefore, no change is recommended for the control of transient combustibles in the area.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:09 Page: 581 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  51 - Unit 1 Outer Doghouse                                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        51-VFDR-01 VFDR                            1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A or NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0294 - 1A &l B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        51-VFDR-02 VFDR                            1C S/G PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        51-VFDR-03 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02116/2015 14:10:09 Page: 582 of 695
 
0                                    ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    ASB - Auxiliary Service Building                                                                            Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.2 Deterministic Approach Fire Zone ID      Description 127                HP Hot Lab and Vent Equip 75                HP Cold Lab 78                Hot Machine Shop 83                HP Lab - AA Rm 86                Laundry 87                Storage/Compactor Area 88                Clothing Storage HMS1              Hot Machine Ship Area HPL1              Health Physics Lab Area Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                    Duke - Catawba                    Run: 02116/2015 14:10:09 Page: 583 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:
ASB - Auxiliary Service Building                                                                                                                Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.2 Deterministic Approach Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A or B train charging pump via normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A or B train charging pump and normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST. Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Functioin                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A or B train feeding S/Gs A and B or C and D. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A or B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A or B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:10 Page:584of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    ASB - Auxiliary Service Building                                                                                                  Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.2 Deterministic Approach Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                  In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:10 Page:585of695
 
0                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                      ASB - Auxiliary Service Building                                                                                          Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                  NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.2 Deterministic Approach Required          Required Suppression        Detection      Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System            System          Protection Feature Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 197                      HP Hnt I  h and Vent Inqin            ....
75                      HP Cold Lab 78                      Hot Machine Shop 83                      HP Lab - AA Rm 86                      Laundry 87                      Storage/Compactor Area 88                      Clothing Storage HMS1                    Hot Machine Ship Area HPL1                    Health Physics Lab Area Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:10 Page:586of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    ASB - Auxiliary Service Building                                                                            Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.2 Deterministic Approach Title                            Not Required - Deterministic Fire Area Risk Summary                    N/A A CDF                            Units: [1] N/A [2] N/A A LERF                          Units: [1] N/A [2] N/A DID Maintained Safety Margin Maintained Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                    Duke - Catawba                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:10 Page:587of695
 
0 Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit I Reactor Building                                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 1RB-1              Unit 1 RB Annulus.
I RB-2            Unit I Containment - Outside Shield Wall below El 591-2 1/2 IRB-3              Unit 1 Containment - Inside Shield Wall Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                            Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02116/2015 14:10:10 Page:588of695
 
0                                                                                    0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                    Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                Method of Accomplishment                                                          Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                      Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                  Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A and/or B train charging pump via available normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                    Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A and/or B train charging pump and available normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST.
Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                    Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A combination of A and/or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                  Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A and/or B train feeding S/Gs A, B, C or D, whichever two S/Gs are available. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                  Process monitoring from train A and B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                            Normal train A and B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                            Run: 02116/2015 14:10:10 Page:589of695
 
0                                        ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                    Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                01. Commitment to utilize metallic sheathed MI cable as a radiant energy shield in containment per Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 Licensing Basis                In the April 9, 1984 letter to the NRC, Duke committed to utilize metallic sheathed MI cable as a radiant energy shield in containment where incore thermocouple cabling is not separated by more than 20 feet free of intervening combustible materials.
This is acceptable based on the following:
o Meets criteria of BTP CMEB Section 9.5-1, C.7.a - redundant shutdown-related systems within the annulus should be protected by separation of a noncombustible radiant energy shield (one of three possible compliance methods).
o Mineral insulation is a radiant energy shield.
The 07/01/1984 Supplement 3 to the Safety Evaluation Report captured the commitment(s) from the above correspondence. On this basis, the staff concluded that the commitment to utilize metallic sheathed MI cable was acceptable.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Licensing Action                02. Deviation from Item C.5.a(5) of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 regarding unlabeled fire doors Licensing Basis                In letters dated July 29 and December 15, 1982, CNS identified a number of door openings that were provided with unlabeled doors. In the February 1, 1983 Safety Evaluation Report, the NRC found the unrated hollow metal doors with grills to be an equivalent level of protection due to:
                                " Area is normally attended
                                " The fire load on both sides of the doors is low.
                                " The doors are of substantial metal construction.
Therefore, the NRC concluded that the doors will be able to prevent the spread of fire until the fire is extinguished by the station fire brigade. The hollow metal doors with grills are in barriers no longer required to be 3-hour rated. This portion of the licensing action is not required for transition. The remaining licensing action discussing the unlabeled doors in the following paragraphs is still required for transition.
Several other doors serving as pressure doors and bullet/missile resistant doors have been fabricated in accordance with Underwriters Laboratories (UL) approved procedures for 3-hour fire rated doors. Manufacturers have certified that construction is in accordance with UL methods and requirements. Certificates are available for each fire boundary door. Pressure door material is more substantial than tested components.
Therefore, the NRC found that these doors will provide an equivalent level of fire protection to labeled fire doors.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:11 Page:590of695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Licensing Action                07. Deviation from Item C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 related to standpipe protection in the annulus and pipe tunnel.
Licensing Basis                  During the site audit, the NRC observed that manual firefighting capability was deficient throughout the various elevations of the annulus. In addition, the existing hose stations in Fire Area 1 are not capable of reaching all areas of the pipe tunnel.
By letter dated January 17 and February 10, 1984, CNS committed to install an automatic sprinkler system having branch lines on elevations 561 feet, 604 feet and 664 feet. In addition to the automatic sprinklers, CNS committed to install additional line-type heat detectors on six levels of the annulus, located at every other level. CNS also committed to provide additional fire hose, stored in the fire brigade equipment storage area for use in fighting a fire in the pipe tunnel. On the basis of this commitment, the NRC concluded that the fire protection provided for the annulus and pipe tunnel provides an acceptable deviation from Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9.5-1.
The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Licensing Action                18. Protection of penetrations of fire area boundaries in the Reactor Building Licensing Basis                The NRC's fire protection site audit was conducted between November 1 and November 4, 1983. The staff also expressed a number of concerns pertaining to previous applicant commitments and the degree of compliance with NRC's fire protection criteria. By letters dated April 9, 1984, Duke Energy provided additional information on the reactor building penetrations. In SSER #3 dated July 1984, the NRC evaluated the fire protection ability of the various reactor building penetrations. The NRC evaluations considered the following:
                                *The adequacy of interior walls and floor/ceiling assemblies which define fire area boundaries
* Two personnel access portals
                                " Instrumentation tubing and process piping
                                " Process piping penetrating the shell wall ranging in size from 1 inch to 34 inches in diameter.
                                *Penetration of cables through the shell wall of the Reactor Building When evaluating the penetrations the NRC also considered the following:
                                *Materials of construction "Thickness of the penetration
                                " Fire resistant material utilized
                                *Available fire detection "Type and amount of combustible material
                                ' Fire hazards present on either side of the penetrations The NRC found them acceptable.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02116/2015 14:10:11      Page:591of695
 
Attachment C Table C-I - NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                        Previously Approved Engineering Evaluations Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions The bases for acceptability remains valid.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                        Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:11 Page:592of695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit I Reactor Building                                                                                                      Required Systems and Features Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Required        Required Suppression      Detection          Required Fire Fire Zone ID            Description                        System          System              Protection Feature      Required Fire Protection Feature and System Details 1RB-1                  Unit 1 RB Annulus.                  E                E, D                E                        Combustible Loading: E Detection System, Installed: E D Water Suppression, 1-Annulus: E 1RB-2                  Unit 1 Containment - Outside                        E, D                E                        Combustible Loading: E Shield Wall below El 591-2 1/2                                                                    Detection System, Installed: E D 1RB-3                  Unit 1 Containment - Inside                          E, D                R, D                    Detection System, Installed: E D Shield Wall                                                                                      MI Cable: D RCP oil collection system: R Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                          Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:11 Page: 593 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                              Fire Risk Evaluation Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Title                            Fire Risk Evaluation for Fire Area RB1 Risk Summary                    All scenario CCDPs and CLERPs are less than 1.0 ensuring that the acceptance criteria is not solely met based on low fire ignition frequency. The delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr and 1E-08/rx-yr for delta CDF and delta LERF, respectively.
A CDF                            Units: [1] 3.60E-08 A LERF                            Units: [1] 1.OOE-08 DID Maintained                  A review of the risk evaluation results shows that the delta risk results are within the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-07/rx-yr for delta CDF and at the screening acceptance criteria of 1E-08/rx-yr for delta LERF.
No automatic or manual suppression was credited for HGL and MCA evaluations. Credit for the oil collection system on the reactor coolant pumps was taken in the development of the oil fire scenarios. Detection and the MI cable installed on incore thermocouples are credited for DID.
The transient fire scenario analyzed is not a significant source of risk in this area and does not require any improvement to existing controls.
The Pressurizer (NC) PORV and Pressurizer (NC) PORV isolation valves have cables in this fire area which could cause the PORV to spuriously open and prevent the isolation valves from closing. Other means of injection are available for inventory control from the credited safe shutdown train, no actions are required for DID.
Therefore, no Risk or DID enhancements, modifications, or recovery actions are required for this fire area.
Based on the adequacy of fire protection systems and features in the area, the ability to meet nuclear safety performance criteria is ensured.
Safety Margin Maintained        All analyses and assessment have been performed utilizing accepted techniques and industry accepted standards. In addition, safely analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., FSAR, supporting analyses) have been considered and provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty. As such, the Safety Margins are maintained.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:11 Page: 594 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-02 VFDR                            ID S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation - Inside, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1EMXL F09A, cable I*NI 540; 1EMXL F11B, cable 1*VX 530; and 1EMXL F12C, cable I*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0010B, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091 B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. Also, cable hits could cause loss of power to, or spurious operation of 1BB VA0008A and 1BB VA0056A, as well as possible IN 92-18 concerns (cable I*BB 523 or I*BB 570 for 1BB VA0008A, and cable 1*BB 524 or 1*BB 570 for 1BB VA0056A).
This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1BB VA0008A - 1D S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation      - Inside Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-03 VFDR                            1D S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation - Outside, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1EMXL F09A, cable I*NI 540; 1EMXL F11B, cable 1*VX 530; and 1EMXL F12C, cable I*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to IBB VA0010B, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1BB VA0010B - ID S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation - Outside Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                        RBl-VFDR-05 VFDR                            1A S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation - Inside, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1EMXL F09A, cable I*NI 540; 1EMXL F11B, cable 1*VX 530; and 1EMXL F12C, cable 1*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0010B, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. Also, cable hits could cause loss of power to, or spurious operation of 1BB VA0008A and 1BB VA0056A, as well as possible IN 92-18 concerns (cable 1*BB 523 or I*BB 570 for 1BB VA0008A, and cable I*BB 524 or 1*BB 570 for 1BB VA0056A).
This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1BB VA0056A - 1A S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation - Inside Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:11    Page:595of695
 
S Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit I Reactor Building                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RBl-VFDR-06 VFDR                            1A S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation - Outside, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1EMXL F09A, cable I*NI 540; 1EMXL Fli B, cable 1*VX 530; and 1EMXL F12C, cable 1*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0010B, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1BB VA0057B - 1A S/G Blowdown Containment Isolation - Outside Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification.
VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-07 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by both source range ex-core neutron detectors and wide range ex-core neutron detectors and related cables are in fire area RB1 for both A train and B train. Required separation between trains may exist, but can not be verified from analysis using cable routing drawings.Either one wide range or one source range ex-core neutron detector can be verified to have 20 foot separation from the other three. (This does not provide for BOTH one wide range and one source range detector.) The exception to this 20 foot separation is for the following locations:1) Fire zone 1RB-2, from 45AZ to 63AZ near penetrations, 2) Fire zone 1RB-1, around 45AZ and 140AZ near penetrations, 3) Fire zone 1RB-3, where detectors are around the reactor to where cables exit the reactor vessel shielding to the first conduit/raceway, locations are not shown. Routing can not be verified. Neutron detectors also provide a signal to 1NV VA0188A and 1NV VA0189B. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Component(s)                    1ENBDTNSDT0001 - Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 1 (N31),
Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RBl-VFDR-08 VFDR                            Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32), which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by both source range and wide range detector cables for both Train A and B are in the same fire area. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ENBDTNSDT0005 - Nuclear Instrument Source Range Detector Channel 2 (N32),
Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:12 Page: 596 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                            VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-09 VFDR                            Neutron Flux Detector Assembly Train A, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by both source range ex-core neutron detectors and wide range ex-core neutron detectors and related cables are in fire area RB1 for both A train and B train. Required separation between trains may exist, but can not be verified from analysis using cable routing drawings, including CN-1918-01.01 and CN-1910-01.01, where cables appear to be in close proximity. Either one wide range or one source range ex-core neutron detector can be verified to have 20 foot separation from the other three. (This does not provide for BOTH one wide range and one source range detector.) The exception to this 20 foot separation is for the following locations: 1) Fire zone 1RB-2, from 45AZ to 63AZ near penetrations, 2) Fire zone IRB-1, around 45AZ and 140AZ near penetrations, 3) Fire zone 1RB-3, where detectors are around the reactor to where cables exit the reactor vebssel shielding to the first conduit/raceway, locations are not shown. Routing can not be verified. Neutron detectors also provide a signal to 1NV VA0188A and 1NV VA0189B. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ENCDTNSDT0013 - Neutron Flux Detector Assembly Train A Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-10 VFDR                            Neutron Flux Detector Assembly Train B, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by both source range ex-core neutron detectors and wide range ex-core neutron detectors and related cables are in fire area RB1 for both A train and B train. Required separation between trains may exist, but can not be verified from analysis using cable routing drawings, including CN-1918-01.01 and CN-1910-01.01, where cables appear to be in close proximity. Either one wide range or one source range ex-core neutron detector can be verified to have 20 foot separation from the other three. (This does not provide for BOTH one wide range and one source range detector.) The exception to this 20 foot separation is for the following locations: 1) Fire zone 1RB-2, from 45AZ to 63AZ near penetrations, 2) Fire zone 1RB-1, around 45AZ and 140AZ near penetrations, 3) Fire zone 1RB-3, where detectors are around the reactor to where cables exit the reactor vessel shielding to the first conduit/raceway, locations are not shown. Routing can not be verified. Neutron detectors also provide a signal to 1NV VA0188A and 1NV VA0189B. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ENCDTNSDT001 4 - Neutron Flux Detector Assembly Train B Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-1 1 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXL, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by non-coordinated breakers that cause loss of power to all blowdown valves and loss of ability to isolate blowdown. This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1EPEMXEMXL-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from I EPEMXEMXL Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:12    Page: 597 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-12 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXS, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by non-coordinated breakers that cause loss of power to all blowdown valves and loss of ability to isolate blowdown. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1EPEMXEMXS-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPEMXEMXS Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-13 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPLDCEDE, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by non coordinated load (I EDE F01J, cable I*NV 833 between 1EDE and 1TBOX0001) causes loss of power to 1EPLDCEDE, causing loss of control power to numerous A train components, including switchgear 1ETA. Also, non coordinated load (1EDF FO1J, cable I*NV 834 between 1EDF and 1TBOX0002) causes loss of power to 1EPLDCEDF, causing loss of control power to numerous B train components, including switchgear 1ETB. Either 1EPLDCEDE or 1EPLDCEDF is required to be energized for SSD.Both of these cables are routed through fire area RB1, however analysis of the cable routing locations shows that sufficient (20 ft.) separation exists so that one train of power will exist for a fire in any location in fire area RB1, with one exception: The area of concern is in Fire zone I RB-1 (Annulus) from approximately 5AZ to 60AZ. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1EPLDCEDE-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPLDCEDE Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-14 VFDR                            Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPLDCEDF, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by non coordinated load (1EDE F01J, cable I*NV 833 between 1EDE and 1TBOX0001) causes loss of power to IEPLDCEDE, causing loss of control power to numerous A train components, including switchgear IETA. Also, non coordinated load (1EDF FO1J, cable I*NV 834 between 1EDF and 1TBOX0002) causes loss of power to 1EPLDCEDF, causing loss of control power to numerous B train components, including switchgear 1ETB. Either 1EPLDCEDE or 1EPLDCEDF is required to be energized for SSD.Both of these cables are routed through fire area RB1, however analysis of the cable routing locations shows that sufficient (20 ft.) separation exists so that one train of power will exist for a fire in any location in fire area RB1, with one exception: The area of concern is in Fire zone 1RB-1 (Annulus) from approximately 5AZ to 60AZ. This failure condition may challenge the Vital Auxiliary Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1EPLDCEDF-NCL - Non Coordinated Loads fed from 1EPLDCEDF Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                    Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:13 Page: 598 of 695
* 0                                                                                        0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-15 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group IA, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by the following. One set of pressurizer heaters banks (either 1 ILE-PZRHTRA or 1ILE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Both banks of pressurizer heaters are in fire area RB1 and have cable hits that may prevent energizing them. Hits to cables I*NC 608, 1*NC 613, I*NC 615 and I*NC 620 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (1 NC P 5153 and 1NC P 5164) and/or spuriously operate relays KB and KE, which are designed to cut power to the healers on low pressurizer level.
Other possible cable hits are to the power cables connecting the power panels to the heaters. Cables, sensing lines and level transmitters required for operation of pressurizer heater banks 1ILE-PZRHTRA and 1ILE-PZRHTRB are in close proximity. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1 ILE-PZRHTRA - Pressurizer Heater Group 1A Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-16 VFDR                            Pressurizer Heater Group 1B, which is normally cycled and cycled for HSB, is affected by the following. One set of pressurizer heaters banks (either 1ILE-PZRHTRA or I ILE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Both banks of pressurizer heaters are in fire area RB1 and have cable hits that may prevent energizing them. Hits to cables I*NC 608, I*NC 613, 1*NC 615 and 1*NC 620 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (INC P 5153 and iNC P 5164) and/or spuriously operate relays KB and KE, which are designed to cut power to the heaters on low pressurizer level.
Other possible cable hits are to the power cables connecting the power panels to the heaters. Cables, sensing lines and level transmitters required for operation of pressurizer heater banks 1ILE-PZRHTRA and 1ILE-PZRHTRB are in close proximity. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1ILE-PZRHTRB - Pressurizer Heater Group 1B Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-17 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Loop B Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by the following. All four channels of pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines are located in close proximity in fire area RB1 .NC Loop Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure indication sensing lines are in fire area RB1 for all three channels. These sensing lines appear to be in close proximity in the annulus.NC Loop Hot Leg pressure indication sensing lines for 1NC PT5140 and pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines for INC PT5171 have adequate separation, per the current design analysis. Therefore either INC PT5140 or 1NC PT5171 will survive any scenario.With nominal NC pressure at 2235 PSIG, a fire in the vicinity of the NC Loop Hot Leg pressure sensing lines or pressurizer pressure sensing lines could cause oscillations during the early stages, but would not cause significant deviation of indication after the initial heating. Per CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, the assured method of achieving safe shutdown and verifying natural circulation cooldown is the use of reactor coolant system pressure instrumentation along with incore thermocouples. (The use of alternate instrumentation to verify natural circulation cooldown is identified as an acceptable deviation in the CNS Safety Evaluation report.) Cables for the incore thermocouples are also located in fire area RB1, but according to CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, these cables are mineral insulated and qualify as a radiant energy shield. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5120 - Reactor Coolant Loop B Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP 1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:13 Page: 599 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-19 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Loop B Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by the following. All four channels of pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines are located in close proximity in fire area RB1. NC Loop Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure indication sensing lines are in fire area RB1 for all three channels. These sensing lines appear to be in close proximity in the annulus. NC Loop Hot Leg pressure indication sensing lines for INC PT5140 and pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines for INC PT5171 have adequate separation, per the current design analysis. Therefore either 1NC PT5140 or 1NC PT5171 will survive any scenario.With nominal NC pressure at 2235 PSIG, a fire in the vicinity of the NC Loop Hot Leg pressure sensing lines or pressurizer pressure sensing lines could cause oscillations during the eariy stages, but would not cause significant deviation of indication after the initial heating. Per CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, the assured method of achieving safe shutdown and verifying natural circulation cooldown is the use of reactor coolant system pressure instrumentation along with incore thermocouples. (The use of altemate instrumentation to verify natural circulation cooldown is identified as an acceptable deviation in the CNS Safety Evaluation report.) Cables for the incore thermocouples are also located in fire area RB1, but according to CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, these cables are mineral insulated and qualify as a radiant energy shield. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5140 - Reactor Coolant Loop B Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RBI-VFDR-20 VFDR                            Pressurizer Pressure Ch. 2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by the following. All four channels of pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines are located in close proximity in fire area RBI. NC Loop Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure indication sensing lines are in fire area RB1 for all three channels. These sensing lines appear to be in close proximity in the annulus. NC Loop Hot Leg pressure indication sensing lines for INC PT5140 and pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines for 1NC PT5171 have adequate separation, per the current design analysis.
Therefore either 1NC PT5140 or 1NC PT5171 will survive any scenario.With nominal NC pressure at 2235 PSIG, a fire in the vicinity of the NC Loop Hot Leg pressure sensing lines or pressurizer pressure sensing lines could cause oscillations during the eariy stages, but would not cause significant deviation of indication after the initial heating. Per CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, the assured method of achieving safe shutdown and verifying natural circulation cooldown is the use of reactor coolant system pressure instrumentation along with incore thermocouples. (The use of alternate instrumentation to verify natural circulation cooldown is identified as an acceptable deviation in the CNS Safety Evaluation report.) Cables for the incore thermocouples are also located in fire area RB1, but according to CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, these cables are mineral insulated and qualify as a radiant energy shield. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5150 - Pressurizer Pressure Ch. 2 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:13 Page: 600 of 695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit I Reactor Building                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-21 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 2, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by the following. One set of pressurizer heaters banks (either 11LE-PZRHTRA or 1ILE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Both banks of pressurizer heaters are in fire area RB1 and have cable hits that may prevent energizing them. Hits to cables I*NC 608, 1*NC 613, 1*NC 615 and I*NC 620 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (1 NC P 5153 and 1NC P 5164) and/or spuriously operate relays KB and KE, which are designed to cut power to the heaters on low pressurizer level.
Other possible cable hits are to the power cables connecting the power panels to the heaters. Cables, sensing lines and level transmitters required for operation of pressurizer heater banks 1ILE-PZRHTRA and 1ILE-PZRHTRB are in close proximity. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5153 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 2 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-23 VFDR                            Pressurizer Pressure Ch. 1, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by the following. All four channels of pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines are located in close proximity in fire area RB1. NC Loop Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure indication sensing lines are in fire area RB1 for all three channels. These sensing lines appear to be in close proximity in the annulus. NC Loop Hot Leg pressure indication sensing lines for INC PT5140 and pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines for 1NC PT5171 have adequate separation, per the current design analysis.
Therefore either INC PT5140 or INC PT5171 will survive any scenario.With nominal NC pressure at 2235 PSIG, a fire in the vicinity of the NC Loop Hot Leg pressure sensing lines or pressurizer pressure sensing lines could cause oscillations during the early stages, but would not cause significant deviation of indication after the initial heating. Per CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, the assured method of achieving safe shutdown and verifying natural circulation cooldown is the use of reactor coolant system pressure instrumentation along with incore thermocouples. (The use of alternate instrumentation to verify natural circulation cooldown is identified as an acceptable deviation in the CNS Safety Evaluation report.) Cables for the incore thermocouples are also located in fire area RB1, but according to CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, these cables are mineral insulated and qualify as a radiant energy shield. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5161 - Pressurizer Pressure Ch. 1 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-24 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 1, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by the following. One set of pressurizer heaters banks (either lILE-PZRHTRA or 1ILE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Both banks of pressurizer heaters are in fire area RB1 and have cable hits that may prevent energizing them. Hits to cables 1*NC 608, 1*NC 613, I*NC 615 and I*NC 620 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (1NC P 5153 and 1NC P 5164) and/or spuriously operate relays KB and KE, which are designed to cut power to the heaters on low pressurizer level.
Other possible cable hits are to the power cables connecting the power panels to the heaters. Cables, sensing lines and level transmitters required for operation of pressurizer heater banks 1ILE-PZRHTRA and 1ILE-PZRHTRB are in close proximity . This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5164 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 1 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:14 Page: 601 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                        VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-25 VFDR                            Pressurizer Pressure Ch. 3, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by the following. All four channels of pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines are located in close proximity in fire area RB1. NC Loop Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure indication sensing lines are in fire area RB1 for all three channels. These sensing lines appear to be in close proximity in the annulus. NC Loop Hot Leg pressure indication sensing lines for INC PT5140 and pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines for 1NC PT5171 have adequate separation, per the current design analysis.
Therefore either 1NC PT5140 or INC PT5171 will survive any scenario.With nominal NC pressure at 2235 PSIG, a fire in the vicinity of the NC Loop Hot Leg pressure sensing lines or pressurizer pressure sensing lines could cause oscillations during the early stages, but would not cause significant deviation of indication after the initial heating. Per CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, the assured method of achieving safe shutdown and verifying natural circulation cooldown is the use of reactor coolant system pressure instrumentation along with incore thermocouples. (The use of alternate instrumentation to verify natural circulation cooldown is identified as an acceptable deviation in the CNS Safety Evaluation report.) Cables for the incore thermocouples are also located in fire area RB1, but according to CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, these cables are mineral insulated and qualify as a radiant energy shield. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5170 - Pressurizer Pressure Ch. 3 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-26 VFDR                            Pressurizer Pressure Ch. 4, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by the following. All four channels of pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines are located in close proximity in fire area RBI. NC Loop Hot Leg Wide Range Pressure indication sensing lines are in fire area RB1 for all three channels. These sensing lines appear to be in close proximity in the annulus. NC Loop Hot Leg pressure indication sensing lines for 1NC PT5140 and pressurizer pressure indication cables, transmitters and sensing lines for 1NC PT5171 have adequate separation, per the current design analysis.
Therefore either 1NC PT5140 or INC PT5171 will survive any scenario.With nominal NC pressure at 2235 PSIG, a fire in the vicinity of the NC Loop Hot Leg pressure sensing lines or pressurizer pressure sensing lines could cause oscillations during the early stages, but would not cause significant deviation of indication after the initial heating. Per CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, the assured method of achieving safe shutdown and verifying natural circulation cooldown is the use of reactor coolant system pressure instrumentation along with incore thermocouples. (The use of alternate instrumentation to verify natural circulation cooldown is identified as an acceptable deviation in the CNS Safety Evaluation report.) Cables for the incore thermocouples are also located in fire area RB1, but according to CNS-1435.00-00-0002, Section 3.2.5.5, these cables are mineral insulated and qualify as a radiant energy shield. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5171 - Pressurizer Pressure Ch. 4 Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data.Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:14 Page: 602 of 695
* 0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-27 VFDR                            Pressurizer Level Ch. 3, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by the following. One set of pressurizer heaters banks (either 1ILE-PZRHTRA or 1ILE-PZRHTRB) is required to maintain hot standby (prevent solid plant operations). Both banks of pressurizer heaters are in fire area RB1 and have cable hits that may prevent energizing them. Hits to cables 1*NC 608, I*NC 613, I*NC 615 and I*NC 620 could cause the loss of two pressurizer level indications (1NC P 5153 and 1NC P 5164) and/or spuriously operate relays KB and KE, which are designed to cut power to the heaters on low pressurizer level.
Other possible cable hits are to the power cables connecting the power panels to the heaters. Cables, sensing lines and level transmitters required for operation of pressurizer heater banks 1ILE-PZRHTRA and 1ILE-PZRHTRB are in close proximity . This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC P 5174 - Pressurizer Level Ch. 3 Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-28 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can prevent closing the PORV block valve. All the pressurizer PORV and PORV block valve cables are in close proximity in the pressurizer enclosure and other portions of their route. Fire at 1TBOX0001 and 1TBOX0002 and containment penetrations can cause PORV spurious operation, from PORV or other equipment cables. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0031 B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                        RBl-VFDR-29 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can spuriously open pressurizer PORV. All the pressurizer PORV and PORV block valve cables are in close proximity in the pressurizer enclosure and other portions of their route. Fire at 1TBOX0001 and 1TBOX0002 and containment penetrations can cause PORV spurious operation, from PORV or other equipment cables. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0032B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                      Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:15 Page: 603 of 695
 
0                                      ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RBl-VFDR-30 VFDR                            Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can prevent closing the PORV block valve.
All the pressurizer PORV and PORV block valve cables are in close proximity in the pressurizer enclosure and other portions of their route. Fire at 1TBOXOO01 and 1TBOX0002 and containment penetrations can cause PORV spurious operation, from PORV or other equipment cables. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0033A - Unit 1 Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-31 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can spuriously open pressurizer PORV. All the pressurizer PORV and PORV block valve cables are in close proximity in the pressurizer enclosure and other portions of their route. Fire at 1TBOX0001 and 1TBOX0002 and containment penetrations can cause PORV spurious operation, from PORV or other equipment cables. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0034A - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-32 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can prevent closing the PORV block valve. All the pressurizer PORV and PORV block valve cables are in close proximity in the pressurizer enclosure and other portions of their route. Fire at 1TBOX0001 and 1TBOX0002 and containment penetrations can cause PORV spurious operation, from PORV or other equipment cables. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0035B - Pressurizer PORV Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:15 Page: 604 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-33 VFDR                            Pressurizer PORV, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by various cable hits that can spuriously open pressurizer PORV. All the pressurizer PORV and PORV block valve cables are in close proximity in the pressurizer enclosure and other portions of their route. Fire at 1TBOX0001 and 1TBOX0002 and containment penetrations can cause PORV spurious operation, from PORV or other equipment cables. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0036B - Pressurizer PORV Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-34 VFDR                            Unit 1 Reactor Head Vent Block Valve, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1 EMXL F09A, cable I*NI 540; 1EMXL F11B, cable I*VX 530; and 1EMXL F12C, cable I*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0010B, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0250A - Unit 1 Reactor Head Vent Block Valve Disposition                      VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-35 VFDR                            Unit 1 Reactor Head Vent, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1EMXL F09A, cable I*NI 540; 1EMXL F1IB, cable I*VX 530; and 1EMXL F 12C, cable I*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to 1BB VAO1OB, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091 B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0251B - Unit 1 Reactor Head Vent Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:15 Page: 605 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-36 VFDR                            Unit 1 Reactor Head Vent, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1EMXL F09A, cable I*NI 540; 1EMXL F11B, cable 1*VX 530; and 1EMXL F12C, cable 1*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0010B, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091 B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INC VA0252B - Unit 1 Reactor Head Vent Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-37 VFDR                            Unit 1 Reactor Head Vent, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1EMXL F09A, cable I*NI 540; 1EMXL F11B, cable 1*VX 530; and 1EMXL F12C, cable 1*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0010B, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091 B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. This failure condition may challenge the Pressure Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NC VA0253A - Unit 1 Reactor Head Vent Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-38 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously open or prevent closure of letdown valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    INV VA0001A - Reactor Coolant Letdown to Regenerative Heat Exchanger Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:16  Page: 606 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit I Reactor Building                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-39 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1B Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously open or prevent closure of letdown valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0010A - Letdown Orifice 1B Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-40 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1C Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously open or prevent closure of letdown valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA001 1A - Letdown Orifice 1C Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RBl-VFDR-41 VFDR                            Letdown Orifice 1A Outlet Containment Isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously open or prevent closure of letdown valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0013A - Letdown Orifice 1A Outlet Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RB1 -VFDR-42 VFDR                            Letdown Containment Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously open or prevent closure of letdown valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0015B - Letdown Containment Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:16 Page: 607 of 695
 
0                                    ~0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-43 VFDR                            Charging Supply to Loop A Isolation, which is normally open and not utilized for HSB, is affected by various control cable hot shorts that can spuriously close 1NV VA0032B. Other contol cable hot shorts can spuriously close (or prevent opening) 1NV VA0039A. One of the two valves is required open to return the normal charging flowpath. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0032B - Charging Supply to Loop A Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RBI-VFDR-44 VFDR                            Charging Supply to Loop D Isolation, which is normally closed and open for HSB, is affected by control cable hot shorts that can spuriously close (or prevent opening) 1NV VA0039A. Various control cable hot shorts can spuriously close 1NV VA0032B. One of the two valves is required open to return the normal charging fiowpath. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0039A - Charging Supply to Loop D Isolation Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-45 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pumps Seal Return Containment Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1 EMXL F09A, cable I*NI 540; 1EMXL F11B, cable 1*VX 530; and 1EMXL F12C, cable I*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA001 OB, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091 B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0089A - Reactor Coolant Pumps Seal Return Containment Isolation Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02116/2015 14:10:16 Page: 608 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-46 VFDR                            Reactor Coolant Pumps Seal Return Containment Isolation, which is normally open and closed for HSB, is affected by non coordinated loads (1 EMXL F09A, cable 1*NI 540; 1EMXL F11B, cable I*VX 530; and 1EMXL F12C, cable I*NV 530) cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXL. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA001 OB, 1BB VA0057B and 1NV VA0091 B and other B Train loads. Also, non coordinated loads cause loss of power to 1EPEMXEMXS. This causes loss of power to 1BB VA0008A, 1BB VA0056A and 1NV VA0089A and other A Train loads. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue.
Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0091 B - Reactor Coolant Pumps Seal Return Containment Isolation Disposition                    VFDR deterministically resolved by modification VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-47 VFDR                            Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously open excess letdown valves. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VAO1 22B - Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-48 VFDR                            Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation, which is normally closed and closed for HSB, is affected by cable hits that may spuriously open excess letdown valves. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1NV VA0123B - Loop C to excess letdown heat exchanger isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:17 Page: 609 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit 1 Reactor Building                                                                                                                                    VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-49 VFDR                              1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control, which is normally throttled and throttled for HSB, is affected by a loss of instrument air, which is not credited.
Valve fails open on loss of air. Charging is assured through NI VA0009A or NI VA0010B and seal injection. Throttling of NV VA0295 may be used to prevent going solid. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NV VA0294 - 1A &1B Charging Pumps Discharge Flow Control Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-50 VFDR                              Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS which closes and prevents opening valve. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NV VA0312A - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-51 VFDR                              Charging Line Containment Isolation, which is normally open and open for HSB, is affected by SSPS which closes and prevents opening valve. Also, a potential IN 92-18 concern due to spurious operation from failure of cable I*NV 545. Cable has hot conductor which could cause a hot short to open or close valve, bypassing torque switches. This failure condition may challenge the Inventory Control Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1NV VA0314B - Charging Line Containment Isolation Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                    Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:17 Page:610of695
 
0 Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  RB1 - Unit I Reactor Building                                                                                                                                          VFDRs Compliance Basis:              NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                        RBI-VFDR-53 VFDR                            S/G 1D PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0001 - SIG 1D PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-54 VFDR                            1C SIG PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0007 - 1C S/G PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        RBl-VFDR-55 VFDR                            S/G 1B PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0013 - S/G 1B PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                        RB1-VFDR-56 VFDR                            S/G 1A PORV, which is normally closed and cycled for HSB, is affected by instrument air which may be lost or it may get a spurious SSPS signal. Valve can be operated from the Control Room (using Nitrogen if instrument air is lost) for 8 hours (Nitrogen supply limitation). This failure condition may challenge the Decay Heat Removal Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805.
This is a pre-existing operator manual action. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                    1SV VA0019 - S/G 1A PORV Disposition                    Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                              Duke - Catawba                                                        Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:17 Page: 611 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB1 - Unit I Reactor Building                                                                                                                                      VFDRs Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-57 VFDR                              KC Heat Exchanger A Inlet Flow, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Train A KC Hx A Inlet flow not being available due to cable hits to 1KC P 5530. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1KC P 5530 - KC Heat Exchanger A Inlet Flow Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
VFDR ID                          RB1-VFDR-58 VFDR                              KC Heat Exchanger B Inlet Flow, which is normally available and available for HSB, is affected by Train B KC Hx B Inlet flow not being available due to cable hits to 1KC P 5540. This failure condition may challenge the Process Monitoring Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria. This condition represents a variance from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805. This is a separation issue. Evaluate for compliance using the performance-based approach of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.
Component(s)                      1KC P 5540 - KC Heat Exchanger B Inlet Flow Disposition                      Satisfies Risk, DID, and Safety Margin Criteria Without Further Action (VFDR not modeled in Fire PRA)
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SPI)                                                Duke - Catawba                                                  Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:18 Page: 612 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    RB2 - Unit 2 Reactor Building                                                                                                                Fire Area Definition Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Fire Zone ID      Description 2RB-1              U2 RB Annulus 2RB-2              Unit 2 Containment - Outside Shield Wall below El 591-2 1/2 2RB-3              Unit 2 Containment - Inside Shield Wall Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                            Duke - Catawba                                              Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:18 Page: 613 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                    R132 - Unit 2 Reactor Building                                                                                                                  Performance Goals Compliance Basis:                NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2 Performance-Based Approach - Fire Risk Evaluation with simplifying deterministic assumptions Performance Goal                                  Method of Accomplishment                                                        Comments
: 0. Plant Shutdown Location                        Shutdown to HSB from the Main Control Room (MCR).
: 1. Reactivity Control Function                    Manual reactor trip from the MCR. Shutdown margin maintained from the MCR by injection of borated water from the FWST using A and/or B train charging pump via available normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path.
: 2. Inventory Control Function                      Inventory control from the MCR is maintained by isolating the reactor coolant system and using A and/or B train charging pump and available normal charging flow path or seal injection flow path. Borated water from the FWST.
Letdown is available.
: 3. Pressure Control Function                      Reactor pressure control from the MCR using pressurizer code safeties. A combination of A and/or B train NC PORVs and blocks and manual control of heaters with NC system isolation assures pressure control.
: 4. Decay Heat Removal Function                    Natural circulation of reactor coolant and main steam safeties. S/Gs are isolated. Auxiliary feedwater is supplied by A and/or B train feeding S/Gs A, B, C or D, whichever two S/Gs are available. Main feed flow is stopped and auxiliary feed to unused S/Gs is controlled to prevent overfill.
: 5. Process Monitoring Function                    Process monitoring from train A and B is provided in the Main Control Room.
: 6. Vital Auxiliaries                              Normal train A and B auxiliary systems are used. This includes nuclear service water, component cooling water, switchgear, HVAC and diesel generators.
Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria Safe and stable conditions can be achieved and maintained utilizing equipment and cables outside of the area of fire suppression activity. Flooding of the                                          I suppression areas and discharge of suppression water to adjacent compartments is controlled and will not jeopardize achievement of safe and stable conditions.
Fire Safety Analysis Data Manager (FSA 4.2 SP1)                                                  Duke - Catawba                                          Run: 02/16/2015 14:10:18 Page: 614 of 695
 
Attachment C Table C NFPA 805 Ch 4 Compliance (NEI 04-02 Table B-3)
Fire Area ID:                  RB2 - Unit 2 Reactor Buildi}}

Latest revision as of 13:57, 10 January 2025

License Amendment Request (LAR) to Adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light-Water Reactor Generating Plants, 120-Day Response to NRC RAI
ML15065A107
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/27/2015
From: Henderson K
Duke Energy Carolinas, Duke Energy Corp
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CNS-15-018, TAC MF2936, TAC MF2937
Download: ML15065A107 (766)
v • d • e


Text

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=CNS-15-018,_License_Amendment_Request_(LAR)_to_Adopt_National_Fire_Protection_Association_(NFPA)_805_Performance-Based_Standard_for_Fire_Protection_for_Light-Water_Reactor_Generating_Plants,_120-Day_Response_to_NRC_RAI&oldid=5195229"