RIS 2017-04, Clarification on the Implementation of Compensatory Measures for Protective Strategy Deficiencies or Degraded or Inoperable Security Systems, Equipment, or Components: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:ML16110A366 UNITED STATES  
                            NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                        OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
                                  OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS
OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS  
                                WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 August 30, 2017 NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2017-04 CLARIFICATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001  
  PROTECTIVE STRATEGY DEFICIENCIES OR DEGRADED OR INOPERABLE SECURITY
 
                          SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS
August 30, 2017  
 
NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2017-04 CLARIFICATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR  
PROTECTIVE STRATEGY DEFICIENCIES OR DEGRADED OR INOPERABLE SECURITY  
SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS  


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor operating license or construction permit, and all holders of and applicants for a limited work authorization, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, including those that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor operating license or construction permit, and all holders of and applicants for a limited work authorization, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, including those that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.


All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit or combined license under
All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit or combined license under  
10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.
10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.


==INTENT==
==INTENT==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this regulatory issue summary (RIS)
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this regulatory issue summary (RIS)  
to remind addressees of the requirements for implementation of compensatory measures to ensure their physical protection program maintains, at all times, the capability to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to and including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, as identified in 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i), General performance objective and requirements. Additionally, this RIS reminds licensees that protective strategy deficiencies identified during performance evaluation exercises and drills should be assessed to determine if these deficiencies meet the criteria identified in 10 CFR 73.55(o) for implementation of compensatory measures.
to remind addressees of the requirements for implementation of compensatory measures to ensure their physical protection program maintains, at all times, the capability to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to and including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, as identified in 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i), General performance objective and requirements. Additionally, this RIS reminds licensees that protective strategy deficiencies identified during performance evaluation exercises and drills should be assessed to determine if these deficiencies meet the criteria identified in 10 CFR 73.55(o) for implementation of compensatory measures.


==BACKGROUND INFORMATION==
==BACKGROUND INFORMATION==
As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i) and (ii), each licensee is required to ensure that the sites physical protection program maintains, at all times, the capability to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to and including the design-basis threat for radiological sabotage, as identified in 10 CFR 73.1, and provide defense-in-depth through the integration of systems, technologies, programs, equipment, supporting processes, and implementing procedures as needed to ensure the effectiveness of the physical protection program.
As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i) and (ii), each licensee is required to ensure that the sites physical protection program maintains, at all times, the capability to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to and including the design-basis threat for radiological sabotage, as identified in 10 CFR 73.1, and provide defense-in-depth through the integration of systems, technologies, programs, equipment, supporting processes, and implementing procedures as needed to ensure the effectiveness of the physical protection program.


As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(n)(1)(v), each licensee is required to Implement compensatory measures that ensure the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection program when there is a failure or degraded operation of security-related components or equipment. Additionally, as stated in 10 CFR 73.55(o)(1), each licensee must identify criteria and measures to compensate for degraded or inoperable equipment, systems, and components to meet the ML16110A366 requirements of this section. Compensatory measures must: (1) provide a level of protection that is equivalent to the protection that was provided by the equipment, system, or components before it was degraded or inoperable; (2) be implemented within specific timeframes necessary to meet the requirements stated in 10 CFR 73.55(b); and (3) be described in the licensees security plans.
As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(n)(1)(v), each licensee is required to Implement compensatory measures that ensure the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection program when there is a failure or degraded operation of security-related components or equipment. Additionally, as stated in 10 CFR 73.55(o)(1), each licensee must identify criteria and measures to compensate for degraded or inoperable equipment, systems, and components to meet the requirements of this section. Compensatory measures must: (1) provide a level of protection that is equivalent to the protection that was provided by the equipment, system, or components before it was degraded or inoperable; (2) be implemented within specific timeframes necessary to meet the requirements stated in 10 CFR 73.55(b); and (3) be described in the licensees security plans.


As required by 10 CFR 73.55(b)(4), each licensee is required to identify and analyze site-specific conditions that may affect the measures needed to implement the licensees physical protection program. The licensee may use this site-specific analysis to identify security equipment, systems, or components relied upon to implement its physical protection program.
As required by 10 CFR 73.55(b)(4), each licensee is required to identify and analyze site-specific conditions that may affect the measures needed to implement the licensees physical protection program. The licensee may use this site-specific analysis to identify security equipment, systems, or components relied upon to implement its physical protection program.


This site-specific analysis may also be used to identify the impact of a degradation of such equipment, systems, or components on the physical protection program, including, for example, the physical protection system, and address safety interface requirements contained in
This site-specific analysis may also be used to identify the impact of a degradation of such equipment, systems, or components on the physical protection program, including, for example, the physical protection system, and address safety interface requirements contained in  
10 CFR 73.58. This site-specific analysis may also be used to identify the specific criteria and measures, associated timelines, and level of protection required to compensate for degraded or inoperable security equipment, systems, or components.
10 CFR 73.58. This site-specific analysis may also be used to identify the specific criteria and measures, associated timelines, and level of protection required to compensate for degraded or inoperable security equipment, systems, or components.


Furthermore, when identifying security equipment, systems, and components that would require implementation of a compensatory measure, a licensee should evaluate the impact that a degradation or inoperability has on the overall physical protection program, as well as the function that was performed by the affected security equipment, systems, or components, considering all available information, including the impact on the physical security strategy and contingency response plan.
Furthermore, when identifying security equipment, systems, and components that would require implementation of a compensatory measure, a licensee should evaluate the impact that a degradation or inoperability has on the overall physical protection program, as well as the function that was performed by the affected security equipment, systems, or components, considering all available information, including the impact on the physical security strategy and contingency response plan.


==SUMMARY OF ISSUE==
==SUMMARY OF ISSUE==
As directed by the Commission in Staff Requirements Memorandum SECY-14-0088, Proposed Options to Address Lessons Learned Review of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Force-on-Force Inspection Program in Response to Staff Requirements Memorandum COMGEA/COMWCO 14-0001 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14139A231), the NRC staff conducted a lessons-learned review of the NRCs force-on-force inspection program. As a result of this review, the NRC identified that in certain cases, licensees are applying immediate compensatory measures where such measures are not required by NRC regulations and guidance.
As directed by the Commission in Staff Requirements Memorandum SECY-14-0088, Proposed Options to Address Lessons Learned Review of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Force-on-Force Inspection Program in Response to Staff Requirements Memorandum COMGEA/COMWCO 14-0001 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14139A231), the NRC staff conducted a lessons-learned review of the NRCs force-on-force inspection program. As a result of this review, the NRC identified that in certain cases, licensees are applying immediate compensatory measures where such measures are not required by NRC regulations and guidance.


As stated above, 10 CFR 73.55(o)(1) requires that a licensee identify critieria and measures to compensate for degraded or inoperable security equipment, systems, or components needed to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. The criteria established by each licensee should describe how the licensee will identify and assess a degradation or the inoperability of security equipment, systems, or components relied upon to implement the requirements of
As stated above, 10 CFR 73.55(o)(1) requires that a licensee identify critieria and measures to compensate for degraded or inoperable security equipment, systems, or components needed to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. The criteria established by each licensee should describe how the licensee will identify and assess a degradation or the inoperability of security equipment, systems, or components relied upon to implement the requirements of  
10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i) and (ii). The licensee should identify the specific function or functions performed by the degraded or inoperable equipment, system, or component and adopt measures to compensate for that function or functions. Based on the lessons-learned review, the NRC has learned that some licensees may be implementing compensatory measures for security equipment, systems, or components that were installed to provide margin, but are not relied upon by the licensee to implement its physical protection program, specifically the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i) and (ii).
10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i) and (ii). The licensee should identify the specific function or functions performed by the degraded or inoperable equipment, system, or component and adopt measures to compensate for that function or functions. Based on the lessons-learned review, the NRC has learned that some licensees may be implementing compensatory measures for security equipment, systems, or components that were installed to provide margin, but are not relied upon by the licensee to implement its physical protection program, specifically the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i) and (ii).  
Degraded or inoperable security systems, equipment, or components, and protective strategy deficiencies identified during performance evaluation exercises and drills, should be evaluated to determine if they are relied upon to meet the licensees physical protection program and, therefore, meet the criteria for implementation of compensatory measures in accordance with
 
10 CFR 73.55(o). Additionally, as stated in 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, Section (VI)(C)(3)(i),
Degraded or inoperable security systems, equipment, or components, and protective strategy deficiencies identified during performance evaluation exercises and drills, should be evaluated to determine if they are relied upon to meet the licensees physical protection program and, therefore, meet the criteria for implementation of compensatory measures in accordance with  
10 CFR 73.55(o). Additionally, as stated in 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, Section (VI)(C)(3)(i),  
Findings, deficiencies, and failures identified during tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises that adversely affect or decrease the effectiveness of the protective strategy and physical protection program shall be entered into the licensees corrective action program to ensure that timely corrections are made to the appropriate program areas.
Findings, deficiencies, and failures identified during tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises that adversely affect or decrease the effectiveness of the protective strategy and physical protection program shall be entered into the licensees corrective action program to ensure that timely corrections are made to the appropriate program areas.


Guidance addressing the timeframes for implementing compensatory measures is contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.76, Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear Power Reactors (SGI),
Guidance addressing the timeframes for implementing compensatory measures is contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.76, Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear Power Reactors (SGI),  
which also describes acceptable methods for evaluation of the timeframes associated with the implementation of compensatory measures. Because RG 5.76 contains safeguards information, it is a non-publicly available document; however, applicable non-safeguards portions are summarized herein. Section 14.1 of RG 5.76 discusses that compensatory measures should be evaluated to ensure they provide an equivalent level of protection. This evaluation should include, for example, the impact of a degradation on the physical protection system, and address safety/security interface requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.58.
which also describes acceptable methods for evaluation of the timeframes associated with the implementation of compensatory measures. Because RG 5.76 contains safeguards information, it is a non-publicly available document; however, applicable non-safeguards portions are summarized herein. Section 14.1 of RG 5.76 discusses that compensatory measures should be evaluated to ensure they provide an equivalent level of protection. This evaluation should include, for example, the impact of a degradation on the physical protection system, and address safety/security interface requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.58.


Sections 14.1.5 and 14.1.6 of RG 5.76 further discuss that the evaluation of compensatory measures should consider the minimum complement of security manpower, and identify whether additional manpower beyond the minimum complement are needed.
Sections 14.1.5 and 14.1.6 of RG 5.76 further discuss that the evaluation of compensatory measures should consider the minimum complement of security manpower, and identify whether additional manpower beyond the minimum complement are needed.


==BACKFITTING AND ISSUE FINALITY DISCUSSION==
==BACKFITTING AND ISSUE FINALITY DISCUSSION==
This RIS reminds addressees of NRCs expectations regarding the implementation of compensatory measures. These expectations do not represent new or changed staff positions.
This RIS reminds addressees of NRCs expectations regarding the implementation of compensatory measures. These expectations do not represent new or changed staff positions.


In addition, this RIS does not require any action or written response on the part of any licensee or applicant. Accordingly, issuance of this RIS in final form would not represent backfitting as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1), or be inconsistent with any applicable issue finality provision in
In addition, this RIS does not require any action or written response on the part of any licensee or applicant. Accordingly, issuance of this RIS in final form would not represent backfitting as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1), or be inconsistent with any applicable issue finality provision in  
10 CFR Part 52. Therefore, the NRC did not prepare a backfit analysis for this RIS, or further address the issue finality criteria in Part 52.
10 CFR Part 52. Therefore, the NRC did not prepare a backfit analysis for this RIS, or further address the issue finality criteria in Part 52.


===FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION===
===FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION===
The NRC published a notice of opportunity for public comment on this RIS in the Federal Register (81 FR 10686) on March 1, 2016. The agency received comments from two commenters. The staff considered all comments, which resulted in minor revisions to the RIS.
The NRC published a notice of opportunity for public comment on this RIS in the Federal Register (81 FR 10686) on March 1, 2016. The agency received comments from two commenters. The staff considered all comments, which resulted in minor revisions to the RIS.


The evaluation of these comments and the resulting changes to the RIS are discussed in a publicly-available memorandum which is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML16110A370.
The evaluation of these comments and the resulting changes to the RIS are discussed in a publicly-available memorandum which is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML16110A370.


===CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT===
===CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT===
This RIS is not a rule as defined in the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808).
This RIS is not a rule as defined in the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808).  


===PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT===
===PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT===
This RIS does not contain new or amended information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval number 3150-0002. Public Protection Notification The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.
This RIS does not contain new or amended information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval number 3150-0002. Public Protection Notification  
 
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
Please direct any question about this matter to the technical contact listed below.
Please direct any question about this matter to the technical contact listed below.


/ra/                                         /ra/ (Paul G. Krohn for)
/ra/  
John R. Tappert, Director                     Timothy J. McGinty, Director Division of Decommissioning, Uranium         Division of Construction Inspection and Recovery, and Waste Programs                   Operational Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety             Office of New Reactors and Safeguards
 
        /ra/ (Gregory Bowman for)                   /ra/ (Andrew Pretzello)
/ra/ (Paul G. Krohn for)  
Louise Lund, Director Division               Marissa G. Bailey, Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking             Division of Security Operations Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation         Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response  
 
John R. Tappert, Director Timothy J. McGinty, Director Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Division of Construction Inspection and Recovery, and Waste Programs Operational Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety Office of New Reactors and Safeguards  
 
/ra/ (Gregory Bowman for)  
/ra/ (Andrew Pretzello)  
 
Louise Lund, Director Division Marissa G. Bailey, Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Security Operations Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office of Nuclear Security  
 
and Incident Response


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Carl L. Grigsby, NSIR
Carl L. Grigsby, NSIR  
                        (301) 287-3681 e-mail: Carl.Grigsby@nrc.gov Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library/Document Collections.
(301) 287-3681 e-mail: Carl.Grigsby@nrc.gov  
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library/Document Collections.


ML16110A366                                   *via email                     TAC No.: MF6357 OFFICE     NSIR/DSO           Tech Editor*         NSIR/DSO                 NSIR/DSO*             OE/EB*                           NRR/PMDA*
ML16110A366  
NAME     DCardenas           JDougherty           CJohnson               APretzello               DFurst                         LHill DATE       02/23/2015         06/11/2015           02/24/2015               06/02/2015           08/12/2015                         08/13/2015 OFFICE     NMSS/RDB*         NSIR/DSP/DD*       NSIR/DSO/D*                   OIS*         NRR/DORL/D*                       NRR/DPR/PGCB
*via email TAC No.: MF6357 OFFICE  
NAME       JHickman           MThaggard           MLayton                 TDonnell               ABoland                           ELee DATE       06/30/2015           07/24/2015         07/21/2015               08/28/15           09/10/2015                       09/01/2015 OFFICE   NRR/DPR/PGCB           OGC (NLO)       NRR/DPR/PGCB             NRR/DPR/PGCB NRR/DPR/PGCP/BC                             NRO/DCIP/D
NSIR/DSO  
NAME       AGarmoe             NStAmour*             ELee                   AGarmoe               SStuchell                       MCheok DATE       09/02/2015           02/16/2016           12/29/15               01/07/2016           01/07/2016                       01/12/2016 OFFICE   NMSS/DUWP/D           NSIR/DSO/D         NRR/DPR/DD               NRR/DPR/D   NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA*                         OGC (NLO)*
Tech Editor*  
                                  MLayton NAME       JTappert                               AMohseni                LKokajko                ELee                        NStAmour (Apretzello for)
NSIR/DSO  
DATE       01/20/2016           02/02/2016       02/16/2016               02/18/2016         08/03/2017                       06/29/2017 OFFICE NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM*   NRR/DPR/PGCB/BC*       NSIR/DSO/D             NMSS/DUWP/D           NRO/DCIP/D                         NRR/DPR/D
NSIR/DSO*  
NAME       ASchwab           AGarmoe (A)     MBailey (APretzello for)       JTappert T M c G i n t y ( P K r o h n f o r ) LLund (GBowman for)
OE/EB*  
DATE     08/01/2017           08/01/2017       08/17/2017             08/17/2017             08/21/2017                       08/30/2017
NRR/PMDA*  
NAME  
DCardenas JDougherty CJohnson APretzello DFurst LHill DATE  
02/23/2015  
06/11/2015  
02/24/2015  
06/02/2015  
08/12/2015  
08/13/2015 OFFICE  
NMSS/RDB*  
NSIR/DSP/DD*  
NSIR/DSO/D*  
OIS*  
NRR/DORL/D*  
NRR/DPR/PGCB  
NAME  
JHickman MThaggard MLayton TDonnell ABoland ELee DATE  
06/30/2015  
07/24/2015  
07/21/2015  
08/28/15  
09/10/2015  
09/01/2015 OFFICE  
NRR/DPR/PGCB  
OGC (NLO)  
NRR/DPR/PGCB
NRR/DPR/PGCB NRR/DPR/PGCP/BC
NRO/DCIP/D  
NAME  
AGarmoe NStAmour*  
ELee AGarmoe SStuchell MCheok DATE  
09/02/2015  
02/16/2016  
12/29/15  
01/07/2016  
01/07/2016  
01/12/2016 OFFICE  
NMSS/DUWP/D  
NSIR/DSO/D  
NRR/DPR/DD  
NRR/DPR/D  
NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA*
OGC (NLO)*  
NAME  
JTappert MLayton (Apretzello for)  
AMohseni LKokajko ELee NStAmour DATE  
01/20/2016  
02/02/2016  
02/16/2016  
02/18/2016  
08/03/2017  
06/29/2017 OFFICE NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM*  
N R R / D P R / P G C B / B C *
NSIR/DSO/D  
NMSS/DUWP/D  
NRO/DCIP/D  
NRR/DPR/D  
NAME  
ASchwab AGarmoe (A)  
M B a i l e y  ( A P r e t z e l l o  f o r )
JTappert T M c G i n t y ( P K r o h n f o r ) LLund (GBowman for)
DATE  
08/01/2017  
08/01/2017  
08/17/2017  
08/17/2017  
08/21/2017  
08/30/2017
}}
}}


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Latest revision as of 00:59, 10 January 2025

Clarification on the Implementation of Compensatory Measures for Protective Strategy Deficiencies or Degraded or Inoperable Security Systems, Equipment, or Components
ML16110A366
Person / Time
Issue date: 08/30/2017
From: Marissa Bailey, Louise Lund, Mcginty T, John Tappert
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Division of Security Operations
To:
Schwab A
Shared Package
ML16110A363 List:
References
TAC MF6357 RIS-17-004
Download: ML16110A366 (5)
v • d • e


ML16110A366 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

August 30, 2017

NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2017-04 CLARIFICATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPENSATORY MEASURES FOR

PROTECTIVE STRATEGY DEFICIENCIES OR DEGRADED OR INOPERABLE SECURITY

SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS

ADDRESSEES

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor operating license or construction permit, and all holders of and applicants for a limited work authorization, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, including those that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit or combined license under

10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.

INTENT

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this regulatory issue summary (RIS)

to remind addressees of the requirements for implementation of compensatory measures to ensure their physical protection program maintains, at all times, the capability to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to and including the design basis threat of radiological sabotage, as identified in 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i), General performance objective and requirements. Additionally, this RIS reminds licensees that protective strategy deficiencies identified during performance evaluation exercises and drills should be assessed to determine if these deficiencies meet the criteria identified in 10 CFR 73.55(o) for implementation of compensatory measures.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i) and (ii), each licensee is required to ensure that the sites physical protection program maintains, at all times, the capability to detect, assess, interdict, and neutralize threats up to and including the design-basis threat for radiological sabotage, as identified in 10 CFR 73.1, and provide defense-in-depth through the integration of systems, technologies, programs, equipment, supporting processes, and implementing procedures as needed to ensure the effectiveness of the physical protection program.

As stated in 10 CFR 73.55(n)(1)(v), each licensee is required to Implement compensatory measures that ensure the effectiveness of the onsite physical protection program when there is a failure or degraded operation of security-related components or equipment. Additionally, as stated in 10 CFR 73.55(o)(1), each licensee must identify criteria and measures to compensate for degraded or inoperable equipment, systems, and components to meet the requirements of this section. Compensatory measures must: (1) provide a level of protection that is equivalent to the protection that was provided by the equipment, system, or components before it was degraded or inoperable; (2) be implemented within specific timeframes necessary to meet the requirements stated in 10 CFR 73.55(b); and (3) be described in the licensees security plans.

As required by 10 CFR 73.55(b)(4), each licensee is required to identify and analyze site-specific conditions that may affect the measures needed to implement the licensees physical protection program. The licensee may use this site-specific analysis to identify security equipment, systems, or components relied upon to implement its physical protection program.

This site-specific analysis may also be used to identify the impact of a degradation of such equipment, systems, or components on the physical protection program, including, for example, the physical protection system, and address safety interface requirements contained in

10 CFR 73.58. This site-specific analysis may also be used to identify the specific criteria and measures, associated timelines, and level of protection required to compensate for degraded or inoperable security equipment, systems, or components.

Furthermore, when identifying security equipment, systems, and components that would require implementation of a compensatory measure, a licensee should evaluate the impact that a degradation or inoperability has on the overall physical protection program, as well as the function that was performed by the affected security equipment, systems, or components, considering all available information, including the impact on the physical security strategy and contingency response plan.

SUMMARY OF ISSUE

As directed by the Commission in Staff Requirements Memorandum SECY-14-0088, Proposed Options to Address Lessons Learned Review of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissions Force-on-Force Inspection Program in Response to Staff Requirements Memorandum COMGEA/COMWCO 14-0001 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML14139A231), the NRC staff conducted a lessons-learned review of the NRCs force-on-force inspection program. As a result of this review, the NRC identified that in certain cases, licensees are applying immediate compensatory measures where such measures are not required by NRC regulations and guidance.

As stated above, 10 CFR 73.55(o)(1) requires that a licensee identify critieria and measures to compensate for degraded or inoperable security equipment, systems, or components needed to implement the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55. The criteria established by each licensee should describe how the licensee will identify and assess a degradation or the inoperability of security equipment, systems, or components relied upon to implement the requirements of

10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i) and (ii). The licensee should identify the specific function or functions performed by the degraded or inoperable equipment, system, or component and adopt measures to compensate for that function or functions. Based on the lessons-learned review, the NRC has learned that some licensees may be implementing compensatory measures for security equipment, systems, or components that were installed to provide margin, but are not relied upon by the licensee to implement its physical protection program, specifically the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(3)(i) and (ii).

Degraded or inoperable security systems, equipment, or components, and protective strategy deficiencies identified during performance evaluation exercises and drills, should be evaluated to determine if they are relied upon to meet the licensees physical protection program and, therefore, meet the criteria for implementation of compensatory measures in accordance with

10 CFR 73.55(o). Additionally, as stated in 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, Section (VI)(C)(3)(i),

Findings, deficiencies, and failures identified during tactical response drills and force-on-force exercises that adversely affect or decrease the effectiveness of the protective strategy and physical protection program shall be entered into the licensees corrective action program to ensure that timely corrections are made to the appropriate program areas.

Guidance addressing the timeframes for implementing compensatory measures is contained in Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.76, Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear Power Reactors (SGI),

which also describes acceptable methods for evaluation of the timeframes associated with the implementation of compensatory measures. Because RG 5.76 contains safeguards information, it is a non-publicly available document; however, applicable non-safeguards portions are summarized herein. Section 14.1 of RG 5.76 discusses that compensatory measures should be evaluated to ensure they provide an equivalent level of protection. This evaluation should include, for example, the impact of a degradation on the physical protection system, and address safety/security interface requirements contained in 10 CFR 73.58.

Sections 14.1.5 and 14.1.6 of RG 5.76 further discuss that the evaluation of compensatory measures should consider the minimum complement of security manpower, and identify whether additional manpower beyond the minimum complement are needed.

BACKFITTING AND ISSUE FINALITY DISCUSSION

This RIS reminds addressees of NRCs expectations regarding the implementation of compensatory measures. These expectations do not represent new or changed staff positions.

In addition, this RIS does not require any action or written response on the part of any licensee or applicant. Accordingly, issuance of this RIS in final form would not represent backfitting as defined in 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1), or be inconsistent with any applicable issue finality provision in

10 CFR Part 52. Therefore, the NRC did not prepare a backfit analysis for this RIS, or further address the issue finality criteria in Part 52.

FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION

The NRC published a notice of opportunity for public comment on this RIS in the Federal Register (81 FR 10686) on March 1, 2016. The agency received comments from two commenters. The staff considered all comments, which resulted in minor revisions to the RIS.

The evaluation of these comments and the resulting changes to the RIS are discussed in a publicly-available memorandum which is in ADAMS under Accession No. ML16110A370.

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT

This RIS is not a rule as defined in the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808).

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT

This RIS does not contain new or amended information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). Existing requirements were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval number 3150-0002. Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

CONTACT

Please direct any question about this matter to the technical contact listed below.

/ra/

/ra/ (Paul G. Krohn for)

John R. Tappert, Director Timothy J. McGinty, Director Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Division of Construction Inspection and Recovery, and Waste Programs Operational Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety Office of New Reactors and Safeguards

/ra/ (Gregory Bowman for)

/ra/ (Andrew Pretzello)

Louise Lund, Director Division Marissa G. Bailey, Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Security Operations Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Office of Nuclear Security

and Incident Response

Technical Contact:

Carl L. Grigsby, NSIR

(301) 287-3681 e-mail: Carl.Grigsby@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under NRC Library/Document Collections.

ML16110A366

NSIR/DSO

Tech Editor*

NSIR/DSO

NSIR/DSO*

OE/EB*

NRR/PMDA*

NAME

DCardenas JDougherty CJohnson APretzello DFurst LHill DATE

02/23/2015

06/11/2015

02/24/2015

06/02/2015

08/12/2015

08/13/2015 OFFICE

NMSS/RDB*

NSIR/DSP/DD*

NSIR/DSO/D*

OIS*

NRR/DORL/D*

NRR/DPR/PGCB

NAME

JHickman MThaggard MLayton TDonnell ABoland ELee DATE

06/30/2015

07/24/2015

07/21/2015

08/28/15

09/10/2015

09/01/2015 OFFICE

NRR/DPR/PGCB

OGC (NLO)

NRR/DPR/PGCB

NRR/DPR/PGCB NRR/DPR/PGCP/BC

NRO/DCIP/D

NAME

AGarmoe NStAmour*

ELee AGarmoe SStuchell MCheok DATE

09/02/2015

02/16/2016

12/29/15

01/07/2016

01/07/2016

01/12/2016 OFFICE

NMSS/DUWP/D

NSIR/DSO/D

NRR/DPR/DD

NRR/DPR/D

NRR/DPR/PGCB/LA*

OGC (NLO)*

NAME

JTappert MLayton (Apretzello for)

AMohseni LKokajko ELee NStAmour DATE

01/20/2016

02/02/2016

02/16/2016

02/18/2016

08/03/2017

06/29/2017 OFFICE NRR/DPR/PGCB/PM*

N R R / D P R / P G C B / B C *

NSIR/DSO/D

NMSS/DUWP/D

NRO/DCIP/D

NRR/DPR/D

NAME

ASchwab AGarmoe (A)

M B a i l e y ( A P r e t z e l l o f o r )

JTappert T M c G i n t y ( P K r o h n f o r ) LLund (GBowman for)

DATE

08/01/2017

08/01/2017

08/17/2017

08/17/2017

08/21/2017

08/30/2017


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