RNP-RA/16-0038, Transition Report, Revision 1, Transition to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, with Attachments a, I, J, L, M, and V. Pages 22-174: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:Duke Energy H. B Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) - NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Transition Report Revision 1 May 27, 2016
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Duke Energy                                                                              NFPA 805 Transition Report TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ..................................................................................................... iv Acronym List ................................................................................................................. v
 
==1.0 INTRODUCTION==
..................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Background ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1.1 NFPA 805 - Requirements and Guidance ................................................. 1 1.1.2 Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c).................................................................... 2 1.2 Purpose ............................................................................................................. 3 2.0 OVERVIEW OF EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ................................ 4 2.1 Current Fire Protection Licensing Basis ............................................................. 4 2.2 NRC Acceptance of the Fire Protection Licensing Basis ................................... 4 3.0 TRANSITION PROCESS ........................................................................................ 8 3.1 Background ........................................................................................................ 8 3.2 NFPA 805 Process ............................................................................................ 8 3.3 NEI 04 NFPA 805 Transition Process........................................................ 9 3.4 NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) .............................................. 10 4.0 COMPLIANCE WITH NFPA 805 REQUIREMENTS ............................................ 12 4.1 Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements .......................... 12 4.1.1 Overview of Evaluation Process .............................................................. 12 4.1.2 Results of the Evaluation Process ........................................................... 14 4.1.3 Definition of Power Block and Plant ......................................................... 15 4.2 Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria ............................................................... 15 4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology ............................... 15 4.2.2 Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluation Transition ......................... 22 4.2.3 Licensing Action Transition ...................................................................... 23 4.2.4 Fire Area Transition ................................................................................. 24 4.3 Non-Power Operational Modes ........................................................................ 27 4.3.1 Overview of Evaluation Process .............................................................. 27 4.3.2 Results of the Evaluation Process ........................................................... 30 4.4 Radioactive Release Performance Criteria ...................................................... 30 4.4.1 Overview of Evaluation Process .............................................................. 31 4.4.2 Results of the Evaluation Process ........................................................... 31 4.5 Fire PRA and Performance-Based Approaches .............................................. 32 4.5.1 Fire PRA Development and Assessment ................................................. 32 HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                        Page i
 
Duke Energy                                                                                NFPA 805 Transition Report 4.5.2 Performance-Based Approaches ............................................................. 34 4.6 Monitoring Program ......................................................................................... 39 4.6.1 Overview of NFPA 805 Requirements and NEI 04-02 Guidance on the NFPA 805 Fire Protection System and Feature Monitoring Program ...... 39 4.6.2 Overview of Post-Transition NFPA 805 Monitoring Program ................... 39 4.7 Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality Assurance ........ 45 4.7.1 Compliance with Documentation Requirements in Section 2.7.1 of NFPA 805 ........................................................................................................... 45 4.7.2 Compliance with Configuration Control Requirements in Section 2.7.2 and 2.2.9 of NFPA 805 ................................................................................... 47 4.7.3 Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805 .... 50 4.8 Summary of Results......................................................................................... 54 4.8.1 Results of the Fire Area Review .............................................................. 54 4.8.2 Plant Modifications and Items to be Completed During the Implementation Phase....................................................................................................... 54 4.8.3 Supplemental Information -Other Licensee Specific Issues .................... 55
 
==5.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION==
............................................................................. 58 5.1 Introduction - 10 CFR 50.48 ............................................................................ 58 5.2 Regulatory Topics ............................................................................................ 63 5.2.1 License Condition Changes ..................................................................... 63 5.2.2 Technical Specifications .......................................................................... 63 5.2.3 Orders and Exemptions ........................................................................... 63 5.3 Regulatory Evaluations .................................................................................... 63 5.3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration ..................................................... 63 5.3.2 Environmental Consideration ................................................................... 64 5.4 Revision to the UFSAR ...................................................................................... 64 5.5 Transition Implementation Schedule ................................................................ 64
 
==6.0 REFERENCES==
...................................................................................................... 65 ATTACHMENTS ........................................................................................................... 70 A. NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program &
Design Elements ............................................................................................... A-1 B. NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review ................................................................................................................ B-1 C. NEI 04-02 Table B Fire Area Transition ..................................................... C-1 D. NEI 04-02 Non-Power Operational Modes Transition ..................................... D-1 E. NEI 04-02 Radioactive Release Transition ....................................................... E-1 HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                        Page ii
 
Duke Energy                                                                          NFPA 805 Transition Report F. Fire-Induced Multiple Spurious Operations Resolution ................................. F-1 G. Recovery Actions Transition ............................................................................ G-1 H. NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Question Summary Table ................................ H-1 I. Definition of Power Block ................................................................................... I-1 J. Fire Modeling V&V ............................................................................................. J-1 K. Existing Licensing Action Transition .............................................................. K-1 L. NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval (10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii)) ... L-1 M. License Condition Changes ............................................................................. M-1 N. Technical Specification Changes .................................................................... N-1 O. Orders and Exemptions .................................................................................... O-1 P. RI-PB Alternatives to NFPA 805 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4) ........................................ P-1 Q. No Significant Hazards Evaluations ................................................................ Q-1 R. Environmental Considerations Evaluation ..................................................... R-1 S. Modifications and Implementation Items ......................................................... S-1 T. Clarification of Prior NRC Approvals................................................................ T-1 U. Internal Events PRA Quality ............................................................................. U-1 V. Fire PRA Quality ................................................................................................. V-1 W. Fire PRA Insights .................................................................................................. 1 HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                  Page iii
 
Duke Energy                                                            Executive Summary Executive Summary Duke Energy will transition the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 (HBRSEP) fire protection program to a new Risk-Informed, Performance-Based (RI-PB) alternative per 10 CFR 50.48(c) which incorporates by reference NFPA 805. The licensing basis per License Condition 3.E will be superseded.
The transition process consisted of a review and update of HBRSEP documentation, including the development of a Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) using NUREG/CR-6850 as guidance. This Transition Report summarizes the transition process and results. This Transition Report contains information:
* Required by 10 CFR 50.48(c).
* Recommended by guidance document Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-02 Revision 2 and appropriate Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs).
* Recommended by guidance document Regulatory Guide 1.205 Revision 1.
Section 4 of the Transition Report provides a summary of compliance with the following NFPA 805 requirements:
* Fundamental Fire Protection Program Elements and Minimum Design Requirements
* Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria, including:
o Non-Power Operational Modes o Fire Risk Evaluations
* Radioactive Release Performance Criteria
* Monitoring Program
* Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality Assurance Section 5 of the Transition Report provides regulatory evaluations and associated attachments, including:
* Changes to License Condition
* Changes to Technical Specifications, Orders, and Exemptions,
* Determination of No Significant Hazards and evaluation of Environmental Considerations.
The attachments to the Transition Report include detail to support the transition process and results.
Attachment H contains the approved FAQs not yet incorporated into the endorsed revision of NEI 04-02. These FAQs have been used to clarify the guidance in RG 1.205, NEI 04-02, and the requirements of NFPA 805 and in the preparation of this License Amendment Request.
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Duke Energy                                                    Acronym List Acronym List AC      Alternating Current ADAMS      Agency wide Documents Access and Management System AFW      Auxiliary Feedwater AHJ      Authority having jurisdiction ANS      American Nuclear Society AO      Auxiliary Operator APCSB    Auxiliary Power Conversion Systems Branch TM ARC      Safe Shutdown Analysis software package ASME      American Society of Mechanical Engineers BNP      Brunswick Nuclear Plant BTP      Branch Technical Position CAFTA    Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis CAT      Capability Category CC      Capability Category CC I    Capability Category I CCDP      Conditional Core Damage Probability CCW      Component Cooling Water CDF      Core Damage Frequency CFAST    Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport CFR      Code of Federal Regulation CO2    Carbon Dioxide CP&L    Carolina Power and Light CR3      Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant CSDB      Component Selection Database CST      Condensate Storage Tank CT      Current Transformer CV      Containment Vessel CVCS      Chemical and Volume Control System DBD      Design Basis Document HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                    Page v
 
Duke Energy                                                    Acronym List DC      Direct Current DID      Defense-in-Depth DSDG      Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator EC      Engineering Change EDB      Equipment Database EDG      Emergency Diesel Generator EEE      Engineering Equivalency Evaluations EEEE      Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations EOOS      Equipment Out of Service EPRI    Electric Power Research Institute ESP      Engineering Support Personnel F&O      Facts and Observations FA      Fire Area FAQ      Frequently Asked Question FC      Fire Compartment FDT      Fire Dynamics Tools FHA      Fire Hazards Analysis FHB      Fuel Handling Building FMEA      Failure Modes and Effects Analysis FP      Fire Protection FPIP    Fire Protection Initiatives Project FPP      Fire Protection Program FPRA      Fire Probabilistic Risk Analysis or Assessment FRE      Fire Risk Evaluation FRN      Federal Register Notice FSA      Fire Safety Analysis FSS      Fire Scenario Selection FSSPMD    Fire Safe Shutdown Program Manager Database FTL      Fault Tree Logic FZ      Fire Zone GDC      General Design Criterion HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                    Page vi
 
Duke Energy                                                          Acronym List HBRSEP    H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 (i.e., RNP)
HEAF      High Energy Arcing Fault HNP    Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant HRE    Higher Risk Evolutions HSS    High Safety Significance HVAC      Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning INPO    Institute of Nuclear Power Operations ISFSI    Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation KSF    Key Safety Function kV    Kilovolt LA    Licensing Action LAR    License Amendment Request LERF      Large Early Release Frequency LFS    Limiting Fire Scenario LOCA      Loss of Coolant Accident LSS    Low Safety Significance MCA      Multi-Compartment Analysis MCC      Motor Control Center MCR      Main Control Room MDAFW      Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater MEFS      Maximum Expected Fire Scenario MHIF    Multiple High Impedance Fault MSO      Multiple Spurious Operation MTC    Moderator Temperature Coefficient NEI    Nuclear Energy Institute NFPA      National Fire Protection Association NFPA 805    National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 NGG      Nuclear Generation Group NPO    Non-Power Operations NRC    Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSCA      Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                          Page vii
 
Duke Energy                                                  Acronym List NSEL    Nuclear Safety Equipment List OL      Operating License OMA      Operator Manual Action OOS      Out-of-Service PAP      Personnel Access Point PB      Performance Based PORV      Power Operated Relief Valves POS      Plant Operational State PRA      Probabilistic Risk Assessment or Analysis PSA      Probabilistic Safety Assessment or Analysis PVC      Polyvinyl-chloride PWR      Pressurized Water Reactor PWROG      Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group PWST      Primary Water Storage Tank QA      Quality Assurance RA      Recovery Action RAB      Reactor Auxiliary Building RA-DID    Recovery Action - Defense-in-Depth RAI    Request for Additional Information RAW      Risk Achievement Worth RCA      Radiologically Controlled Area RCP      Reactor Coolant Pump RCS      Reactor Coolant System RG      Regulatory Guide RHR      Residual Heat Removal RI-PB    Risk-Informed Performance-Based RIS    Regulatory Issues Summary RMA      Risk Mitigating Action RWST      Refueling Water Storage Tank SBO      Station Blackout SDAFW      Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                Page viii
 
Duke Energy                                                    Acronym List SE      Safety Evaluation SER      Safety Evaluation Report SFPE    Society of Fire Protection Engineers SI    Safety Injection SISBO    Self-Induced Station Blackout SM      Safety Margin SR      Supporting Requirement SSA      Safe Shutdown Analysis SSC      Structures, Systems, and Components SSD      Safe Shutdown SW      Service Water UET      Unfavorable Exposure Time UFSAR    Updated Final Safety Analysis Report V&V      Verification and Validation VCT      Volume Control Tank VFDR      Variances from the deterministic requirements ZOI    Zone of Influence HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                    Page ix
 
Duke Energy                                                                            1.0 Introduction
 
==1.0    INTRODUCTION==
 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has promulgated an alternative rule for fire protection requirements at nuclear power plants, 10 CFR 50.48(c), National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805). Duke Energy is implementing the Nuclear Energy Institute methodology NEI 04-02, Guidance for Implementing a Risk-informed, Performance-based Fire Protection Program Under 10 CFR 50.48(c)
(NEI 04-02), to transition H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 (HBRSEP) from its current fire protection licensing basis to the new requirements as outlined in NFPA 805. This report describes the transition methodology utilized and documents how HBRSEP complies with the new requirements.
1.1    Background 1.1.1 NFPA 805 - Requirements and Guidance On July 16, 2004 the NRC amended 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection, to add a new subsection, 10 CFR 50.48(c), which establishes new Risk-Informed, Performance-Based (RI-PB) fire protection requirements. 10 CFR 50.48(c) incorporates by reference, with exceptions, the National Fire Protection Associations NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants - 2001 Edition, as a voluntary alternative to 10 CFR 50.48 Section (b), Appendix R, and Section (f), Decommissioning.
As stated in 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(i), any licensees adoption of a RI-PB program that complies with the rule is voluntary. This rule may be adopted as an acceptable alternative method for complying with either 10 CFR 50.48(b), for plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, or the fire protection license conditions for plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979, or 10 CFR 50.48(f), plants shutdown in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1).
NEI developed NEI 04-02 to assist licensees in adopting NFPA 805 and making the transition from their current fire protection licensing basis to one based on NFPA 805.
The NRC issued Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.205, Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, which endorses NEI 04-02, with exceptions, in December 2009.1 A depiction of the primary document relationships is shown in Figure 1-1:
1 Where referred to in this document NEI 04-02 is Revision 2 and RG 1.205 is Revision 1.
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Duke Energy                                                                  1.0 Introduction Figure 1-1 NFPA 805 Transition - Implementation Requirements/Guidance 1.1.2 Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) 1.1.2.1    Start of Transition CP&L submitted a letter of intent to the NRC on June 10, 2005 (ML051720404), for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP) to adopt NFPA 805 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c). This letter of intent also addressed other CP&L plants (Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units No. 1 and 2, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2, and Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant). The letter of intent requested three years of enforcement discretion and proposed that HNP be considered a Pilot Plant for the NFPA 805 transition process.
By letter dated April 29, 2007 (ML070590625), the NRC granted a three year enforcement discretion period. In accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, the enforcement discretion period will continue until the NRC approval of the license amendment request (LAR) is completed.
The NRC expected approximately 23 LARs by the end of June 2011. As a result, the Commission worked with industry to develop and create a staggered LAR submittal schedule. On April 14, 2011, the NRC held a public meeting, during which the staff and stakeholders discussed the staggered approach method. In a letter (ML111101452)
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Duke Energy                                                                  1.0 Introduction dated April 20, 2011, the Commission approved the staffs recommendation to develop a staggered submittal and review process for these reviews, and submit a revision to the Enforcement Policy for Commission approval which would propose to extend enforcement discretion to correspond with the new LAR submittal dates. In a letter (ML11164A047) dated June 10, 2011, the Commission approved the staffs recommendation to publish the Federal Register Notice (FRN) announcing the revision to the Enforcement Policy to extend the enforcement discretion to correspond with a staggered LAR submittal schedule. On June 29, 2011, Progress Energy submitted a letter (ML11188A058) requesting extension of their enforcement discretion and committed to the submittal date of September 30, 2013.
1.1.2.2    Transition Process The transition to NFPA 805 includes the following high level activities:
* Complete Safe Shutdown Analysis Reconstitution (activities started in 2003)
* A new Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) using NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities, as guidance and a revision to the Internal Events PRAs to support the Fire PRAs
* Completion of activities required to transition the pre-transition licensing basis to 10 CFR 50.48(c) as specified in NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205 The project was implemented using a comprehensive project plan and individual procedures/instructions for individual scopes of work. These procedures/instructions (e.g., Project Instruction FPIP series procedures referenced in this report) were developed for the purposes of NFPA 805 transition. Appropriate technical content from these procedures were and will be incorporated into technical documents and configuration control procedures, as required.
1.2    Purpose The purpose of the Transition Report is as follows:
: 1) Describe the process implemented to transition the current fire protection program to comply with the additional requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c)
: 2) Summarize the results of the transition process
: 3) Explain the bases for conclusions that the fire protection program complies with 10 CFR 50.48(c) requirements
: 4) Describe the new fire protection licensing basis
: 5) Describe the configuration management processes used to manage post-transition changes to the station and the fire protection program, and resulting impact on the licensing basis HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page 3
 
Duke Energy                                        2.0 Overview of Existing Fire Protection Program 2.0    OVERVIEW OF EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM 2.1    Current Fire Protection Licensing Basis H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 was licensed to operate on July 31, 1970, with a Renewed Facility Operating License, dated June 27, 2007. As a result, the HBRSEP fire protection program is based on compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(a), 10 CFR 50.48(b), and the following License Condition:
Duke Energy HBRSEP License Condition 3.E states:
E. Fire Protection Program Carolina Power & Light Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report dated February 28, 1978, and supplements thereto. Carolina Power & Light Company may make changes to the approved Fire Protection Program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
2.2    NRC Acceptance of the Fire Protection Licensing Basis In response to the NRCs May 11, 1976 request, CP&L performed a fire hazards analysis which analyzed the HBRSEP fire protection program against the guidance of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1. CP&L submitted the HBRSEP Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and response to Appendix A on December 29, 1976. Subsequent to the submittal of the FHA, additional NRC review of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) took place in the form of written staff questions and CP&L responses, meetings and telephone conferences with the staff. The NRC accepted certain aspects of the program, while CP&L committed to make changes to other portions of the program. The final acceptance of the HBRSEP Fire Protection Program was documented in NRC SER dated February 28, 1978. Open issues from this SER were documented in supplements to the SER dated September 4, 1979, February 21, 1980, and December 8, 1980.
The NRC forwarded Section 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to CP&L on November 24, 1980. This regulation became effective on February 17, 1981. Since HBRSEP was licensed prior to January 1, 1979, it was required to meet only certain provisions of Appendix R. CP&L sought and received such an exemption from the Appendix R requirements.
Supplemental SER for Sections III.G and III.L was issued on November 21, 1985 resolving the open items concerning spurious operations of high-low pressure interface valves due to a postulated fire (hot short). Exemptions from certain requirements of Section III.G.2 and III.G.3 were also granted by the NRC in letters dated November 13, 1981, November 25, 1983, October 25, 1984, September 17, 1986, June 30, 1988, and October 17, 1990.
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Duke Energy                                      2.0 Overview of Existing Fire Protection Program In addition to the approval of HBRSEP alternative shutdown design, the NRC granted the following:
02/28/78      NLU-78-71      Amendment 31 to Operating License (OL) adds license conditions, revises Technical Specifications and issues Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Fire Protection SER.
09/04/79      NLU-79-398      Amendment 40 to OL, changing Fire Protection license conditions and Suppl. 1 to Appendix A Fire Protection SER extending completion dates for modifications.
02/21/80      NLU-80-106      NRC evaluations of issues relating to Appendix A Fire Protection SER, identifying completed, open and not acceptable issues.
12/08/80      NLU-80-623      SER closing several Fire Protection issues related to Appendix A Fire Protection SER.
05/15/81      NLU-81-245      Amendment 57 to OL, revising Technical Specifications.
11/13/81      NLU-81-564      NRC grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.G.3 for a fixed fire suppression system in the control room.
05/10/82      NLU-82-248      NRC grants exemption to 10 CFR 50.48c schedular requirements with criteria for evaluation.
12/10/82      NLU-82-709      NRC Letter Regarding DRAFT SER on Appendix R Exemption Request for Sections III.G.2, III.G.3, III.L, III.M and III.O 11/22/83      NLU-83-772      SER related to Appendix R Sections III.G.3 and III.L.
Also denies CP&L request for exemption to achieve cold shutdown using onsite power within 72 hours.
Superceded by 8/8/84 SER.
11/25/83      NLU-83-777      NRC grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.G.2 requirements for FZ 27 for 3-hour fire barrier separation between redundant trains and FZ 29 for automatic suppression and 20 foot separation. NRC also grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.M.2 for fire barrier penetration seal backface temperatures and approval of seals having a 2-hour fire rating.
05/21/84      NLS-84-155      Informal forwarding of DRAFT Supplemental SER on III.G.3 and III.L.
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Duke Energy                              2.0 Overview of Existing Fire Protection Program 08/08/84  NLU-84-516 SER for Appendix R Sections III.G.3 and III.L.
Supersedes 11/22/83 SER (sometimes referred to as SSER or Revised SER).
10/25/84  NLU-84-687 NRC grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.G.2 for FZ 5 from area wide automatic fire suppression.
03/07/85  NLS-85-146 NRC Letter Regarding Exemption To Appendix R Section III.O, Notice of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact 03/07/85  NLU-85-176 NRC grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.O from installation of reactor coolant pump oil collection system.
11/21/85  NLS-85-732 Supplemental SER for Appendix R Sections III.G. and III.L resolving open item concerning spurious operation of the high-low pressure interface valves due to a postulated fire (hot short).
09/09/86  NLS-86-552 NRC Letter Regarding Additional Information Regarding Exemption From Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 09/11/86  NLS-86-551 NRC Letter Regarding Environmental Assessment on Exemption Request from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2.f and III.G.3 09/17/86  NLU-86-570 NRC Letter Granting Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2.f for radiant heat shield in FZ 24 and III.G.3 for partial fire detection and suppression in Fire Areas A (FZs 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23),
B (FZ 4), and G (FZs 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33) 07/30/87  NLS-87-422 NRC Letter Regarding Exemptions from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J. Superseded by June 30, 1988.
06/30/88  NRC-88-390 NRC Letter Granting Exemptions From Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J for cold shutdown equipment areas, along alternate egress routes outside buildings and use of dedicated portable hand held lighting. Supersedes July 30, 1987 Exemption due to inconsistencies between CP&L letters and NRC SER.
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Duke Energy                            2.0 Overview of Existing Fire Protection Program 10/09/90  NRC-90-600 NRC Letter Regarding Environmental Assessment For Appendix R III.G.2 Exemption 10/17/90  NRC-90-622 NRC Letter Granting Exemption From Requirements of Section III.G.2.b of Appendix R for increased combustible loading up to a 1 hour in CCW Pump Room (FZ 5) 10/02/92  NRC-92-563 NRC Letter Regarding Environmental Assessment Related to Exemption From Section III.J of Appendix R 10/08/92  NRC-92-581 NRC Letter Granting Exemption From The Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Section III.J for cold shutdown equipment areas and use of dedicated portable hand held lighting. SER also clarifies 6/30/88 Exemption allowing use of portable lights at the intake structure (FZ 29).
12/07/92  NRC    NRC Issues Amendment No. 142 to Facility Operating 0702      License No. DPR-23 Regarding Fire Protection - Revising Fire Protection License Condition of Operating License and relocates the Fire Protection Tech Specs to plant procedures and UFSAR 02/09/96  NRC    Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant 0080      Impact Regarding and Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J 06/03/96  NRC    Exemption From Certain Requirements of 0235      10CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J for access to and egress from, and operation of valves in outside areas which are illuminated by diesel backed security lighting.
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Duke Energy                                                            3.0 Transition Process 3.0    TRANSITION PROCESS 3.1    Background Section 4.0 of NEI 04-02 describes the process for transitioning from compliance with the current fire protection licensing basis to the new requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c).
NEI 04-02 contains the following steps:
: 1) Licensee determination to transition the licensing basis and devote the necessary resources to it;
: 2) Submit a Letter of Intent to the NRC stating the licensees intention to transition the licensing basis in accordance with a tentative schedule;
: 3) Conduct the transition process to determine the extent to which the current fire protection licensing basis supports compliance with the new requirements and the extent to which additional analyses, plant and program changes, and alternative methods and analytical approaches are needed;
: 4) Submit a LAR;
: 5) Complete transition activities that can be completed prior to the receipt of the License Amendment;
: 6) Receive a Safety Evaluation; and
: 7) Complete implementation of the new licensing basis, including completion of modifications identified in Attachment S.
3.2    NFPA 805 Process Section 2.2 of NFPA 805 establishes the general process for demonstrating compliance with NFPA 805. This process is illustrated in Figure 3-1. It shows that except for the fundamental fire protection requirements, compliance can be achieved on a fire area basis either by deterministic or RI-PB methods. Consistent with the guidance in NEI 04-02, Duke Energy has implemented the NFPA 805 Section 2.2 process by first determining the extent to which its current fire protection program supports findings of deterministic compliance with the requirements in NFPA 805. RI-PB methods are being applied to the requirements for which deterministic compliance could not be shown.
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Duke Energy                                                                        3.0 Transition Process Figure 3-1 NFPA 805 Process [NEI 04-02 Figure 3-1 based on Figure 2-2 of NFPA 805]2 3.3      NEI 04 NFPA 805 Transition Process NFPA 805 contains technical processes and requirements for a RI-PB fire protection program. NEI 04-02 was developed to provide guidance on the overall process (programmatic, technical, and licensing) for transitioning from a traditional fire protection licensing basis to a new RI-PB method based upon NFPA 805, as shown in Figure 3-2.
2 Note: 10 CFR 50.48(c) does not incorporate by reference Life Safety and Plant Damage/Business Interruption goals, objectives and criteria. See 10 CFR 50.48(c) for specific exceptions to the incorporation by reference of NFPA 805.
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Duke Energy                                                                3.0 Transition Process Section 4.0 of NEI 04-02 describes the detailed process for assessing a fire protection program for compliance with NFPA 805, as shown in Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2 Transition Process (Simplified) [based on NEI 04-02 Figure 4-1]
3.4    NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
The NRC has worked with NEI and two Pilot Plants (Oconee Nuclear Station and Harris Nuclear Plant) to define the licensing process for transitioning to a new licensing basis under 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805. Both the NRC and the industry recognized the need for additional clarifications to the guidance provided in RG 1.205, NEI 04-02, and the requirements of NFPA 805. The NFPA 805 FAQ process was jointly developed by NEI and NRC to facilitate timely clarifications of NRC positions. This process is described in a letter from the NRC dated July 12, 2006, to NEI (ML061660105) and in Regulatory Issues Summary (RIS) 2007-19, Process for Communicating Clarifications HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                          Page 10
 
Duke Energy                                                          3.0 Transition Process of Staff Positions Provided in RG 1.205 Concerning Issues Identified during the Pilot Application of NFPA Standard 805, dated August 20, 2007 (ML071590227).
Under the FAQ Process, transition issues are submitted to the NEI NFPA 805 Task Force for review, and subsequently presented to the NRC during public FAQ meetings.
Once the NEI NFPA 805 Task Force and NRC reach agreement, the NRC issues a memorandum to indicate that the FAQ is acceptable. NEI 04-02 will be revised to incorporate the approved FAQs. This is an on-going revision process that will continue through the transition of NFPA 805 plants. Final closure of the FAQs will occur when future revisions of RG 1.205, endorsing the related revisions of NEI 04-02, are approved by the NRC. It is expected that additional FAQs will be written and existing FAQs will be revised as plants continue NFPA 805 transition after the Pilot Plant Safety Evaluations.
Attachment H contains the list of approved FAQs not yet incorporated into the endorsed revision of NEI 04-02. These FAQs have been used to clarify the guidance in RG 1.205, NEI 04-02, and the requirements of NFPA 805 and in the preparation of this LAR.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.0    COMPLIANCE WITH NFPA 805 REQUIREMENTS 4.1    Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements The Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements are established in Chapter 3 of NFPA 805. Section 4.3.1 of NEI 04-02 provides a systematic process for determining the extent to which the pre-transition licensing basis and plant configuration meets these criteria and for identifying the fire protection program changes that would be necessary for compliance with NFPA 805. NEI 04-02 Appendix B-1 provides guidance on documenting compliance with the program requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.
4.1.1 Overview of Evaluation Process The comparison of the HBRSEP Fire Protection Program to the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 was performed and documented in Attachment A, Table B-1, NFPA 805 Ch. 3 Transition Details. The analysis used the guidance contained in NEI 04-02, Section 4.3.1 and Appendix B-1 (See Figure 4-1).
Each section and subsection of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 was reviewed against the current fire protection program. Upon completion of the activities associated with the review, the following compliance statement(s) was used:
* Complies - For those sections/subsections determined to meet the specific requirements of NFPA 805
* Complies with Clarification - For those sections/subsections determined to meet the requirements of NFPA 805 with clarification
* Complies via previous NRC approval - For those sections/subsections where the specific NFPA 805 Chapter 3 requirements are not met but previous NRC approval of the configuration exists.
* Complies with use of Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations (EEEEs) -
For those sections/subsections determined to be equivalent to the NFPA 805 Chapter 3 requirements as documented by engineering analysis
* License Amendment Required - For those sections/subsections for which approval is sought in this LAR submittal in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii). A summary of the bases of acceptability is provided (See Attachment L for details).
In some cases multiple compliance statements have been assigned to a specific NFPA 805 Chapter 3 section/subsection. Where this is the case, each compliance/compliance basis statement clearly references the corresponding requirement of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.
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Duke Energy                                                                                                  4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4 Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements Transition Process
[Based on NEI 04-02 Figure 4-2]3 3
Figure 4-1 depicts the process used during the transition and therefore contains elements (i.e., open items) that represent interim resolutions. Additional detail on the transition of EEEEs is included in Section 4.2.2.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.1.2 Results of the Evaluation Process 4.1.2.1    NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Met or Previously Approved by the NRC Attachment A contains the NEI 04-02 Table B-1, Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements. This table provides the compliance basis for the requirements in NFPA 805 Chapter 3. Except as identified in Section 4.1.2.3, Attachment A demonstrates that the fire protection program at HBRSEP either:
* Complies directly with the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3,
* Complies with clarification with the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3,
* Complies through the use of existing engineering equivalency evaluations which are valid and of appropriate quality, or
* Complies with a previously NRC approved alternative to NFPA 805 Chapter 3 and therefore the specific requirement of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 is supplanted.
4.1.2.2    NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Requiring Clarification of Prior NRC Approval NFPA 805 Section 3.1 states in part, Previously approved alternatives from the fundamental protection program attributes of this chapter by the AHJ take precedence over the requirements contained herein. In some cases prior NRC approval of an NFPA 805 Chapter 3 program attribute may be unclear. Duke Energy does not have any requests for the NRC to concur with their finding of prior approval for any sections of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.
4.1.2.3    NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Not Met and Not Previously Approved by NRC The following sections of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 are not specifically met nor do previous NRC approvals of alternatives exist:
3.3.5.1- Approval is requested for the use electrical wiring above suspended ceilings.
3.3.5.2- Approval is requested for the use of electrical raceway construction that may not comply.
3.5.16- Approval is requested for the use of fire protection water for specific plant evolutions.
3.2.3(1)- Approval is requested for the use of EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features credited by the fire protection program.
The specific deviation and a discussion of how the alternative satisfies 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii) requirements are provided in Attachment L. Duke Energy requests NRC approval of these performance-based methods.
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Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.1.3 Definition of Power Block and Plant Where used in NFPA 805 Chapter 3 the terms Power Block and Plant refer to structures that have equipment required for nuclear plant operations, such as Containment, Auxiliary Building, Service Building, Control Building, Fuel Building, Radioactive Waste, Water Treatment, Turbine Building, and intake structures or structures that are identified in the facilitys pre-transition licensing basis.
The HBRSEP FHA assigned fire protection properties to defined Fire Areas and Fire Zones that are important for the safe shutdown of the plant. The Fire PRA analysis fire compartments are equivalent to defined Fire Zones in the plant. Therefore, detection systems, suppression systems and floor areas for defined Fire Zones are the same for Fire PRA fire compartments. The current Appendix R series drawings and the Fire Hazards analysis were utilized in the partitioning determination. For Fire Compartments FC400 through FC500 there are no current Fire Areas or Zones defined. These areas are currently considered to be part of the yard.
These structures are listed in Attachment I and define the power block and plant.
4.2    Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria The Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria are established in Section 1.5 of NFPA 805.
Chapter 4 of NFPA 805 provides the methodology to determine the fire protection systems and features required to achieve the performance criteria outlined in Section 1.5. Section 4.3.2 of NEI 04-02 provides a systematic process for determining the extent to which the pre-transition licensing basis meets these criteria and for identifying any necessary fire protection program changes. NEI 04-02, Appendix B-2 provides guidance on documenting the transition of Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology and the Fire Area compliance strategies.
4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology The Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA) Methodology review consists of four processes:
* Establishing compliance with NFPA 805 Section 2.4.2
* Establishing the Safe and Stable Conditions for the Plant
* Establishing Recovery Actions
* Evaluating Multiple Spurious Operations The methodology for demonstrating reasonable assurance that a fire during non-power operational (NPO) modes will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition is an additional requirement of 10 CFR 50.48(c) and is addressed in Section 4.3.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.1.1    Compliance with NFPA 805 Section 2.4.2 Overview of Process NFPA 805 Section 2.4.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment states:
The purpose of this section is to define the methodology for performing a nuclear safety capability assessment. The following steps shall be performed:
(1) Selection of systems and equipment and their interrelationships necessary to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria in Chapter 1 (2) Selection of cables necessary to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria in Chapter 1 (3) Identification of the location of nuclear safety equipment and cables (4) Assessment of the ability to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria given a fire in each fire area The NSCA methodology review evaluated the existing post-fire safe shutdown analysis (SSA) methodology against the guidance provided in NEI 00-01, Revision 1 (ML050310295) Chapter 3, Deterministic Methodology, as discussed in Appendix B-2 of NEI 04-02. The methodology is depicted in Figure 4-2 and consisted of the following activities:
Each specific section of NFPA 805 2.4.2 was correlated to the corresponding section of Chapter 3 of NEI 00-01 Revision 1. Based upon the content of the NEI 00-01 methodology statements, a determination was made of the applicability of the section to the station.
The plant-specific methodology was compared to applicable sections of NEI 00-01 and one of the following alignment statements and its associated basis were assigned to the section:
o Aligns o Aligns with intent o Not in Alignment o Not in Alignment, but Prior NRC Approval o Not in Alignment, but no adverse consequences o For those sections that do not align, an assessment was made to determine if the failure to maintain strict alignment with the guidance in NEI 00-01 could have adverse consequences. Since NEI 00-01 is a guidance document, portions of its text could be interpreted as good practice or intended as an example of an efficient means of performing the analyses. If the section has no adverse consequences, these sections of NEI 00-01 can be dispositioned without further review.
The comparison of the HBRSEP existing post-fire SSA methodology to NEI 00-01 Chapter 3 (NEI 04-02 Table B-2) was performed and documented in Attachment B.
In addition, a review of NEI 00-01, Revision 2, (ML091770265) Chapter 3, was conducted to identify the substantive changes from NEI 00-01, Revision 1 that are applicable to an NFPA 805 fire protection program. This review was performed and documented in Attachment B.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Results from Evaluation Process The method used to perform the existing post-fire SSA with respect to selection of systems and equipment, selection of cables, and identification of the location of equipment and cables, either meets the NRC endorsed guidance from NEI 00-01, Revision 1, Chapter 3 (as supplemented by the gap analysis) directly or met the intent of the endorsed guidance with adequate justification as documented in Attachment B.
Figure 4 Summary of Nuclear Safety Methodology Review Process (FAQ 07-0039)
Comparison to NEI 00-01 Revision 2 An additional review was performed of NEI 00-01, Revision 2, Chapter 3, for specific substantive changes in the guidance from NEI 00-01, Revision 1 that are applicable to an NFPA 805 transition. The results of this review are summarized below:
* Post fire manual operation of rising stem valves in the fire area of concern (NEI 00-01 Section 3.2.1.2)
A review of the NSCA results indicated that there are defense-in-depth recovery actions that require manual operation of a rising stem valve in the fire area of concern. There are no ignition sources or in situ combustibles that would affect these valves, and operation of the valves would not be required for about two hours.
* Analysis of open circuits on a high voltage (e.g., 4.16 kV) ammeter current transformers (NEI 00-01 Section 3.5.2.1)
The evaluation concludes that this failure mode is unlikely for CTs that could pose a threat to safe shutdown equipment.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.1.2      Safe and Stable Conditions for the Plant Overview of Process The nuclear safety goals, objectives and performance criteria of NFPA 805 allow more flexibility than the previous deterministic programs based on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and NUREG-0800, Section 9.5-1 (and NEI 00-01, Chapter 3) since NFPA 805 only requires the licensee to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition rather than achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
NFPA 805, Section 1.6.56, defines Safe and Stable Conditions as follows For fuel in the reactor vessel, head on and tensioned, safe and stable conditions are defined as the ability to maintain Keff <0.99, with a reactor coolant temperature at or below the requirements for hot shutdown for a boiling water reactor and hot standby for a pressurized water reactor. For all other configurations, safe and stable conditions are defined as maintaining Keff <0.99 and fuel coolant temperature below boiling.
The nuclear safety goal of NFPA 805 requires "...reasonable assurance that a fire during any operational mode and plant configuration will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition" without a specific reference to a mission time or event coping duration.
For the plant to be in a safe and stable condition, it may not be necessary to perform a transition to cold shutdown as currently required under 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
Therefore, the unit may remain at or below the temperature defined by a hot standby/hot shutdown plant operating state for the event.
Results Based on the criteria discussed in NSCA calculation RNP-E/ELEC-1216, The Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis for H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant, the NFPA 805 licensing basis for HBRSEP is to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions following any fire occurring prior to establishing cold shutdown. Specifically, the conditions include:
* the reactor operating at power,
* a shutdown condition prior to aligning the RHR system for shutdown cooling, or
* the transition mode between these two operational phases.
Immediately following the reactor scram, RCS inventory and pressure control is maintained using the charging system, or the safety injection system if the charging pumps are not available (applies to one fire area). Pressurizer safety relief valves provide overpressure protection for the RCS. Main Steam line safety relief valves provide for initial decay heat removal. Cycling of the steam generator power-operated relief valves (PORVs) provide for continued decay heat removal, with steam generator inventory replenished by either the steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump or the motor-driven AFW pumps. When the CST is depleted, the suction of the AFW pumps is manually aligned to the service water system. These actions are required in about two hours, and are considered defense in depth recovery actions. Since the valves requiring operation are all manual valves and are not electrically supervised, they are not considered to be VFDRs.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Following stabilization at hot standby, a long term strategy for decay heat removal and inventory/pressure control would be determined based on the extent of equipment damage. If an assessment of the post-fire conditions indicated that the residual heat removal (RHR) system should be in operation, then activities would commence in a safe and controlled manner to align plant equipment required for reactor cooldown.
The long-term actions required to maintain safe and stable conditions are largely routine and within the normal capabilities of site personnel, even in the face of fire damage.
These include the previously mentioned actions to align the suction of the AFW pump(s) to the service water system, and opening CVC-358 to maintain the charging pump suction path to the RWST. LCV-115B will initially provide this suction path, but is conservatively assumed to fail closed after about four (4) hours. These are straightforward actions performed by operators and covered by plant procedures. Repairs to safe shutdown equipment would not be required and the management of the onsite inventories of makeup water, nitrogen and diesel fuel would not require resources beyond those available from normal operations staff, maintenance, and emergency response personnel.
Demonstration of the Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria for safe and stable conditions was performed in two analyses.
* At-Power analysis, Modes 1-4. This analysis is discussed in Section 4.2.4. The at-power analysis goes beyond safe and stable to include Mode 4.
* Non-Power Operations analysis that includes cold shutdown and below (Modes 5 and 6). This analysis is discussed in Section 4.3.
4.2.1.3    Establishing Recovery Actions Overview of Process NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205 suggest that a licensee submit a summary of its approach for addressing the transition of OMAs as recovery actions in the LAR (Regulatory Position 2.2.1 and NEI-04-02, Section 4.6). As a minimum, NEI 04-02 suggests that the assumptions, criteria, methodology, and overall results be included for the NRC to determine the acceptability of the licensees methodology.
The discussion below provides the methodology used to transition pre-transition OMAs and to determine the population of post-transition recovery actions. This process is based on FAQ 07-0030 (ML110070485) and consists of the following steps:
* Step 1: Clearly define the primary control station(s) and determine which pre-transition OMAs are taken at primary control station(s) (Activities that occur in the Main Control Room are not considered pre-transition OMAs). Activities that take place at primary control station(s) or in the Main Control Room are not recovery actions, by definition.
* Step 2: Determine the population of recovery actions that are required to resolve variances from deterministic requirements (VFDRs) (to meet the risk acceptance criteria or maintain a sufficient level of defense-in-depth).
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements
* Step 3: Evaluate the additional risk presented by the use of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path
* Step 4: Evaluate the feasibility of the recovery actions
* Step 5: Evaluate the reliability of the recovery actions Results The review results are documented in RNP-0170 and RNP-0202. Refer to Attachment G for the detailed evaluation process and summary of the results from the process.
4.2.1.4    Evaluation of Multiple Spurious Operations Overview of Process NEI 04-02 suggests that a licensee submit a summary of its approach for addressing potential fire-induced MSOs for NRC review and approval. As a minimum, NEI 04-02 suggests that the summary contain sufficient information relevant to methods, tools, and acceptance criteria used to enable the NRC to determine the acceptability of the licensees methodology. The methodology utilized to address MSOs for HBRSEP is summarized below.
As part of the NFPA 805 transition project, a review and evaluation of HBRSEP susceptibility to fire-induced MSOs was performed. The process was conducted in accordance with NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205, as supplemented by FAQ 07-0038 Revision 3 (ML110140242). The PWR Generic MSO list from NEI 00-01, Revision 3 was utilized.
The approach outlined in Figure 4-3 (based on Figure XX from FAQ 07-0038) is one acceptable method to address fire-induced MSOs. This method used insights from the Fire PRA developed in support of transition to NFPA 805 and consists of the following:
* Identifying potential MSOs of concern.
* Conducting an expert panel to assess plant specific vulnerabilities (e.g., per NEI 00-01, Rev. 1 Section F.4.2).
* Updating the Fire PRA model and existing post-fire NSCA to include the MSOs of concern.
* Evaluating for NFPA 805 Compliance.
* Documenting Results.
This process is intended to support the transition to a new licensing basis.
Post-transition changes would use the RI-PB change process. The post-transition change process for the assessment of a specific MSO would be a simplified version of this process, and may not need the level of detail shown in the following section (e.g.,
An expert panel may not be necessary to identify and assess a new potential MSO.
Identification of new potential MSOs may be part of the plant change review process and/or inspection process).
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Duke Energy                                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Identify Potential MSOs of Concern SSA Step 1                Generic List of MSOs Self Assessments PRA Insights Operating Experience Expert Panel Step 2            Identify and Document MSOs of Concern Update PRA model & NSCA (as appropriate) to include MSOs of concern Step 3                      ID equipment ID logical relationships ID cables ID cable routing Evaluate for NFPA 805 No Compliance Step 4                                                      Pursue other resolution options Compliant with NFPA 805?
Yes Step 5                    Document Results Figure 4 Multiple Spurious Operations - Transition Resolution Process (Based on FAQ 07-0038)
Results Refer to Attachment F for the process used and the results.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.2 Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluation Transition Overview of Evaluation Process The EEEEs that support compliance with NFPA 805 Chapter 3 or Chapter 4 (both those that existed prior to the transition and those that were created during the transition) were reviewed using the methodology contained in NEI 04-02. The methodology for performing the EEEE review included the following determinations:
* The EEEE is not based solely on quantitative risk evaluations,
* The EEEE is an appropriate use of an engineering equivalency evaluation,
* The EEEE is of appropriate quality,
* The standard license condition is met,
* The EEEE is technically adequate,
* The EEEE reflects the plant as-built condition, and
* The basis for acceptability of the EEEE remains valid In accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 2.3.2 and NEI 04-02, as clarified by FAQ 07-0054, Demonstrating Compliance with Chapter 4 of NFPA 805, EEEEs that demonstrate that a fire protection system or feature is adequate for the hazard are summarized in the LAR as follows:
If not requesting specific approval for adequate for the hazard EEEEs, then the EEEE was referenced where required and a brief description of the evaluated condition was provided.
If requesting specific NRC approval for adequate for the hazard EEEEs, then EEEE was referenced where required to demonstrate compliance and was included in Attachment L for NRC review and approval.
In all cases, the reliance on EEEEs to demonstrate compliance with NFPA 805 requirements was documented in the LAR.
Results The review results for EEEEs are documented in Attachment A. In all cases the EEEEs reflect the plant as-built condition and the basis for acceptability of the evaluation remains the same.
In accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 2.3.2, NEI 04-02, as clarified by FAQ 07-0054, Demonstrating Compliance with Chapter 4 of NFPA 805, EEEEs used to demonstrate compliance with Chapters 3 and 4 of NFPA 805 are referenced in the Attachments A and C as appropriate.
None of the transitioning EEEEs require NRC approval.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.3 Licensing Action Transition Overview of Evaluation Process The existing licensing actions (i.e., Appendix R exemptions) review was performed in accordance with NEI 04-02. The methodology for the licensing action review included the following:
* Determination of the bases for acceptability of the licensing action.
* Determination that these bases for acceptability are still valid and required for NFPA 805.
* Additionally, variances from the deterministic requirements were identified in the NEI 04-02, Table B-3 (See Attachment C). Some of these variances were subsequently dispositioned via the use of the performance-based approach.
Results Attachment K contains the detailed results of the Licensing Action Review.
This review concluded that the only Licensing Action that would be transitioned to the new licensing basis under NFPA 805 is the Exemption from the Requirements of Section III.O of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, which pertains to the requirement that a lube oil collection system be installed for the reactor coolant pumps. This Licensing Action is being transitioned based on prior approval and is considered compliant with 10CFR50.48(c).
The licensing action review resulted in the identification of licensing actions that would be transitioned to the new 10 CFR 50.48(c) licensing basis and those that would no longer be necessary. Attachment K of the Transition Report contains the results of the Licensing Action Review.
Since all exemptions are either compliant with 10 CFR 50.48(c) or no longer necessary, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(i), CP&L requests that the exemptions listed in Attachment K be rescinded as part of the LAR process. It is CP&Ls understanding that implicit in the superseding of the current license condition, all prior fire protection program Safety Evaluations and commitments will be superseded in their entirety.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page 23
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.4 Fire Area Transition Overview of Evaluation Process The Fire Area Transition (NEI 04-02 Table B-3) was performed using the methodology contained in NEI 04-02 and FAQ 07-0054. The methodology for performing the Fire Area Transition, depicted in Figure 4-4, is outlined as follows:
Step 1 - Assembled documentation. Gathered industry and plant-specific fire area analyses and licensing basis documents.
Step 2 - Documented fulfillment of nuclear safety performance criteria.
Assessed accomplishment of nuclear safety performance goals. Documented the method of accomplishment, in summary level form, for the fire area.
Documented evaluation of effects of fire suppression activities. Documented the evaluation of the effects of fire suppression activities on the ability to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria.
Performed licensing action reviews. Performed a review of the licensing aspects of the selected fire area and document the results of the review. See Section 4.2.3.
Performed existing engineering equivalency evaluation reviews. Performed a review of existing engineering equivalency evaluations (or created new evaluations) documenting the basis for acceptability. See Section 4.2.2.
Pre-transition OMA reviews. Performed a review of pre-transition OMAs to determine those actions taking place outside of the main control room or outside of the primary control station(s). See Section 4.2.1.3.
Step 3 - VFDR Identification and characterization and resolution considerations.
Identified variances from the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.
Documented variances as either a separation issue or a degraded fire protection system or feature. Developed VFDR problem statements to support resolution.
Step 4 - Performance-Based evaluations (Fire Modeling or Fire Risk Evaluations) See Section 4.5.2 for additional information.
Step 5 - Final Disposition.
Documented final disposition of the VFDRs in Attachment C (NEI 04-02 Table B-3).
For recovery action compliance strategies, ensured the manual action feasibility analysis of the required recovery actions was completed. Note: if a recovery action cannot meet the feasibility requirements established per NEI 04-02, then alternate means of compliance was considered.
Documented the post transition NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance basis.
Step 6 - Documented required fire protection systems and features. Reviewed the NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3 compliance strategies (including fire area licensing actions and engineering evaluations) and the NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4 compliance strategies (including simplifying deterministic assumptions) to determine the scope of fire protection systems and features required by NFPA 805 Chapter 4. The required fire HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page 24
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements protection systems and features are subject to the applicable requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.
Figure 4 Summary of Fire Area Review
[Based on FAQ 07-0054 Revision 1]
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page 25
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Results of the Evaluation Process Attachment C contains the results of the Fire Area Transition review (NEI 04-02 Table B-3). On a fire area basis, Attachment C summarizes compliance with Chapter 4 of NFPA 805.
* NEI 04-02 Table B-3 includes the following summary level information for each fire area:
* Regulatory Basis - NFPA 805 post-transition regulatory bases are included.
* Performance Goal Summary - An overview of the method of accomplishment of each of the performance criteria in NFPA 805 Section 1.5 is provided.
* Reference Documents - Specific references to Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Documents are provided.
* Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria - A summary of the method of accomplishment is provided.
* Licensing Actions - HBRSEP is transitioning one Licensing Action. This exemption will remain part of the post-transition licensing basis. The exemption from Section III.O of Appendix R was granted by the NRC to the extent that a reactor coolant pump lube oil collection system is not provided. In lieu of installing such a system, fixed fire suppression is maintained and additional detection and dikes were installed in the pump bays. Also, the Containment Spray system serves as a backup fire suppression system with Sodium Hydroxide isolated. This is further explained in Attachment K.
* EEEE - Specific references to EEEE that rely on determinations of adequate for the hazard that will remain part of the post-transition licensing basis. A brief description of the condition and the basis for acceptability should be provided.
* VFDRs - Specific variances from the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3. Refer to Section 4.5.2 for a discussion of the performance-based approach.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 26
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.3    Non-Power Operational Modes 4.3.1 Overview of Evaluation Process HBRSEP implemented the process outlined in NEI 04-02 and FAQ 07-0040, Clarification on Non-Power Operations. The goal (as depicted in Figure 4-5) is to ensure that contingency plans are established when the plant is in a Non-Power Operational (NPO) mode where the risk is intrinsically high. During low risk periods, normal risk management controls and fire prevention/protection processes and procedures will be utilized.
The process to demonstrate that the nuclear safety performance criteria are met during NPO modes involved the following steps:
Reviewed the existing Outage Management Processes Identified Equipment/Cables:
o Reviewed plant systems to determine success paths that support each of the defense-in-depth Key Safety Functions (KSFs), and o Identified cables required for the selected components and determined their routing.
Performed Fire Area Assessments (identify pinch points - plant locations where a single fire may damage all success paths of a KSF).
Managed pinch-points associated with fire-induced vulnerabilities during the outage.
The process is depicted in Figures 4-5 and 4-6. The results are presented in Section 4.3.2.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page 27
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4-5 Review POSs, KSFs, Equipment, and Cables, and Identify Pinch Points HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page 28
 
Duke Energy                                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Equipment Out of Service (OOS)
KSF                Fire Protection Equipment              Defense-in-No Availability                Depth Changed?                  Actions Yes Fire Protection Higher Risk Evolution as Defined by Plant Specific        Higher Risk              Defense-in-No Outage Risk Criteria for example                          Evolution?                  Depth
: 1) Time to Boil                                                                      Actions
: 2) Reactor Coolant System and Fuel Pool Inventory
: 3) Decay Heat Removal Yes Determine Fire Area Impact based on NPO Fire Area Assessments Fire Protection KSF                  Defense-in-No Lost?                  Depth Actions Yes Implement Contingency Plan for Specific KSF Figure 4-6 Manage Pinch Points HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                    Page 29
 
Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.3.2 Results of the Evaluation Process HBRSEP outage management processes were reviewed. Based on FAQ 07-0040, the Plant Operating States considered for equipment and cable selection are documented in calculation RNP-E/ELEC-1217, Non-Power Operations Analysis. Using a CAFTA fault tree that models NPO requirements, systems and components were identified to provide the following KSFs: Decay Heat Removal; Reactivity Control; Inventory Control; Pressure Control; Spent Fuel Pit Cooling; and Electrical Power Availability (to the extent that it supports the other KSFs).
For those components not already in the HBRSEP Access Database or those with a functional state for non-power operations differing from that in the At-Power Analysis, circuit analysis, cable selection and routing were performed as described in the plants NSCA methodology. Once all information had been entered into the HBRSEP Access Database, the ARCTM software package in conjunction with the NPO fault tree was used to determine KSF Pinch Points.
Calculation RNP-E/ELEC-1217 provides the results of the fire area assessments for the Pinch Point analysis and provides recommendations for changes to fire risk and outage management procedures and other administrative controls. These include:
* Prohibition or limitation of hot work in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability.
* Prohibition or limitation of combustible materials in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability.
* Provision of additional fire watches in affected fire areas during increased vulnerability.
* Identification and monitoring of in-situ ignition sources for fire precursors (e.g.,
equipment temperatures).
* Review of work activities for possible rescheduling.
* Equipment realignment (e.g., swing pumps or Backfeed)
* Identification of procedures to be briefed or walked down.
* Posting of protected equipment.
* Consideration of pre-emptive or recovery actions to mitigate potential losses of KSF success paths.
Attachment D provides a more detailed discussion. Based on incorporation of the recommendations from RNP-E/ELEC-1217 into appropriate plant procedures in conjunction with establishment of the NFPA 805 fire protection program, the performance goal for NPO modes (i.e., to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition) is fulfilled and the requirements of NFPA 805 are met.
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Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.4      Radioactive Release Performance Criteria 4.4.1 Overview of Evaluation Process The review of the fire protection program against NFPA 805 requirements for fire suppression related radioactive release was performed using the methodology contained in NEI 04-02, Table E-1, and was performed using the methodology contained in Project Instruction FPIP-0121, Radiological Release Reviews During Fire Fighting Operations, Rev. 1. The methodology consisted of the following:
* A review of fire pre-plans and fire brigade training materials to identify fire protection program elements (e.g., systems / components / procedural control actions / flow paths) that are being credited to meet the radioactive release goals, objectives, and performance criteria during all plant operating modes, including full power and non-power conditions. Specifically for HBRSEP, a review was conducted by a review panel to ensure specific steps are included for containment and monitoring of potentially contaminated materials so as to limit the potential for release of radioactive materials due to firefighting operations.
The review panel consisted of representatives from Operations, Engineering (i.e.,
Fire Protection, HVAC Systems), Operations Fire Brigade Training, and Radiation Protection. Site pre-fire plans were screened to identify those locations that have the potential for radiological contamination based on location within plant Radiological Controlled Areas, areas containing potentially contaminated systems, or locations where radioactive materials are routinely stored. In addition, the site fire brigade training materials were reviewed by the same review panel to ensure specific steps are included addressing containment and monitoring of potentially contaminated materials and monitoring of potentially contaminated fire suppression products following a fire event.
A review of engineering controls to ensure containment of gaseous and liquid effluents (i.e., smoke and fire fighting agents). This review included all plant operating modes (i.e., including full power and non-power conditions). Otherwise, provided a bounding analysis, quantitative analysis, or other analysis that demonstrates that the limitations for instantaneous release of radioactive effluents specified in the units Technical Specifications are met.
4.4.2 Results of the Evaluation Process The review determined the Fire Protection Program (i.e., Pre-Fire Plans) meets the radioactive release performance criteria by ensuring that radioactive materials (i.e.,
radiation) generated as a direct result of fire suppression activities is contained and monitored prior to release to unrestricted areas, such that release would be as low as reasonably achievable and would not exceed applicable 10 CFR, Part 20 limits.
Containment and monitoring is ensured through elements of the fire brigade training, guidance provided in pre-fire plans and certain plant features (i.e., engineering controls) such as curbs and ventilation systems or actions provided to control smoke management or fire suppression water run-off.
Site specific review of associated fire event and fire suppression related radioactive release is summarized in Attachment E, NEI 04-02, Table E-1. Containment and HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page 31
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements monitoring actions associated with firefighting operations are included in the pre-fire plans for fire areas as appropriate based on the screening criteria previously stated (Attachment E) to meet the radiological performance criteria.
The standardized pre-fire plan outline identifies typical fixed radiological hazards for each area. All HBRSEP pre-fire plans were screened for applicability. Pre-fire plans that address areas where there is no possibility of radiological hazards were screened out from further review. This information was included as input to the individual fire area Fire Safety Analyses (FSAs) calculations. The FSA is the Design Basis Document for NFPA 805 compliance for each fire area and will serve as the location for maintenance and configuration control of the radioactive release review results. Change, modification, or revision to the FSAs is controlled under existing plant engineering configuration control processes.
4.5    Fire PRA and Performance-Based Approaches RI-PB evaluations are an integral element of an NFPA 805 fire protection program. Key parts of RI-PB evaluations include:
* A Fire PRA (discussed in Section 4.5.1 and Attachments U, V, and W).
* NFPA 805 Performance-Based Approaches (discussed in Section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Fire PRA Development and Assessment In accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, a Fire PRA model was developed for HBRSEP in compliance with the requirements of Part 4 Requirements for Fires At Power PRA, of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Application, (hereafter referred to as Fire PRA Standard). Duke Energy conducted a peer review by independent industry analysts in accordance with RG 1.200 prior to a risk-informed submittal. The resulting fire risk assessment model is used as the analytical tool to perform Fire Risk Evaluations during the transition process.
Section 4.5.1.1 describes the Internal Events PRA model. Section 4.5.1.2 describes the Fire PRA model. Section 4.5.1.3 describes the results and resolution of the peer review of the Fire PRA, and Section 4.5.1.4 describes insights gained from the Fire PRA.
4.5.1.1    Internal Events PRA The HBRSEP base internal events PRA, Calculation RNP-F/PSA-0006 was the starting point for the Fire PRA.
Attachment U provides a discussion of the internal events PRA and the results and disposition of the most recent peer review. Attachment U demonstrates that the internal events PRA is met at Capability Category II for all applicable supporting requirements according to peer review and/or disposition.
4.5.1.2    Fire PRA The internal events PRA was modified to capture the effects of fire both as an initiator of an event and as a potential failure mode of affected circuits and individual targets. The HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 32
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Fire PRA was developed using the guidance for Fire PRA development in NUREG/CR-6850/EPRI TR 1011989, approved FAQs, and EPRI TR 1016735.
The Fire PRA quality and results are discussed in the subsequent sections and in Attachments V and W, respectively.
Fire Model Utilization in the Application As part of the NFPA 805 transition, fire modeling was performed as part of the Fire PRA development (i.e., NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.2) and, therefore, maximum expected fire scenario (MEFS)/limiting fire scenario (LFS) were not analyzed separately. RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 4.2 and Section 5.1.2 of NEI 04-02, provide guidance to identify fire models that are acceptable to the NRC for plants implementing a risk-informed, performance-based licensing basis.
The following fire models were used:
* Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs)
* Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport (CFAST)
The approach taken at HBRSEP to simplify the analysis process incorporates features of several fire model tools covered by NUREG-1824, as well as additional features. The approach is collectively referred to as the Fire Modeling Generic Treatments. The analysis basis and Verification and Validation (V&V) documentation was provided in a proprietary Hughes Associates, Inc. report to the NRC on January 24, 2008. The report entitled Generic Fire Modeling Treatments is effectively a technical reference guide, a users guide, and the V&V basis.
The use of the Generic Treatments in specific applications at HBRSEP falls within their limitations as described in the Generic Fire Modeling Treatments. In addition to the generic fire modeling treatments that were used in the hazard analysis, several calculations were produced that used CFAST and the FDTs as documented in NUREG-1824.
The acceptability of the use of these fire models is included in Attachment J.
4.5.1.3    Results of Fire PRA Peer Review The HBRSEP Fire PRA Calculation RNP-F/PSA-0094 was peer reviewed against the requirements of ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Part 4.
The results (i.e., Supporting Requirement capability assessments and Facts &
Observations (F&Os)) documented in the Fire PRA peer review report (March 2013) and subsequent focused-scope peer-review report (July 2013) were used to support the Fire PRA for the NFPA 805 application.
The Fire PRA update addressed the Supporting Requirement assessed deficiencies (i.e., Not Met or Capability Category I (CC I)). Completion of recommendations related to Supporting Requirement assessments and Finding F&Os results in a Capability Category II assessment for the associated Supporting Requirements. Any Supporting Requirements found not to meet Category II are considered Open, but were justified to HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 33
 
Duke Energy                                                  4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements have an insignificant impact on the NFPA 805 application through disposition. The results of the peer review and dispositions are summarized in Attachment V.
4.5.1.4    Risk Insights Risk insights were documented as part of the development of the Fire PRA. The total plant fire CDF/LERF was derived using the NUREG/CR-6850 methodology for fire PRA development and is useful in identifying the areas of the plant where fire risk is greatest.
A review of the fire scenarios contributing more than 1% to the overall risk is included as Attachment W.
4.5.2 Performance-Based Approaches NFPA 805 outlines the approaches for performing performance-based analyses. As specified in Section 4.2.4, there are generally two types of analyses performed for the performance-based approach:
* Fire Modeling (NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.1).
* Fire Risk Evaluation (NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.2).
4.5.2.1    Fire Modeling Approach The fire modeling approach was not utilized for demonstrating compliance with NFPA 805 for HBRSEP.
4.5.2.2    Fire Risk Approach Overview of Evaluation Process The Fire Risk Evaluations were completed as part of the HBRSEP NFPA 805 transition.
These Fire Risk Evaluations were developed using the process described below. This methodology is based upon the requirements of NFPA 805, industry guidance in NEI 04-02, and RG 1.205. These are summarized in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1 Fire Risk Evaluation Guidance Summary Table Document                        Section(s)                                    Topic NFPA 805                2.2(h), 4.2.4, A.2.2(h), A.2.4.4, D.5    Change Evaluation (2.2(h), 2.2.9, 2.4.4 A.2.2(h), A.2.4.4, D.5)
Risk of Recovery Actions (4.2.4)
Use of Fire Risk Evaluation (4.2.4.2)
NEI 04-02 Revision 2    4.4, 5.3, Appendix B, Appendix I,        Change Evaluation, Change Evaluation Appendix J                                Forms (App. I), No specific discussion of Fire Risk Evaluation RG 1.205 Revision 1    C.2.2.4, C.2.4, C.3.2                    Risk Evaluations (C.2.2.4)
Recovery Actions (C.2.4)
During the transition to NFPA 805, variances from the deterministic approach in Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805 were evaluated using a Fire Risk Evaluation per Section 4.2.4.2 of NFPA 805. A Fire Safety Analysis was performed for each fire area containing variances from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805 (VFDRs), a Fire Risk Evaluation was performed for each fire area containing VFDRs HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                        Page 34
 
Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements If the Fire Risk Evaluation meets the acceptance criteria, this is confirmation that a success path effectively remains free of fire damage and that the performance-based approach is acceptable per Section 4.2.4.2 of NFPA 805.
The Fire Risk Evaluation process consists of the following steps (Figure 4-7 depicts the Fire Risk Evaluation process used during transition. This is generally based on FAQ 07-0054 Revision 1:
Step 1 - Preparation for the Fire Risk Evaluation.
Definition of the Variances from the Deterministic Requirements. The definition of the VFDR includes a description of problem statement and the section of NFPA 805 that is not met, type of VFDR (e.g., separation issue or degraded fire protection system), and proposed evaluation per applicable NFPA 805 section.
Preparatory Evaluation - Fire Risk Evaluation Team Review. Using the information obtained during the development of the NEI 04-02 B-3 Table and the Fire PRA, a team review of the VFDR was performed. Depending on the scope and complexity of the VFDR, the team may include the Safe shutdown/NSCA Engineer, the Fire Protection Engineer, and the Fire PRA Engineer. The purpose and objective of this team review was to address the following; o Review of the Fire PRA modeling treatment of VFDR o Ensure discrepancies were captured and resolved Step 2 - Performed the Fire Risk Evaluation The Evaluator coordinated as necessary with the Safe shutdown/NSCA Engineer, Fire Protection Engineer and Fire PRA Engineer to assess the VFDR using the Fire Risk Evaluation process to perform the following:
o Change in Risk Calculation with consideration for additional risk of recovery actions and required fire protection systems and features due to fire risk.
o Fire area change in risk summary Step 3 - Reviewed the Acceptance Criteria The acceptance criteria for the Fire Risk Evaluation consist of two parts. One is quantitatively based and the other is qualitatively based. The quantitative figures of merit are CDF and LERF. The qualitative factors are defense-in-depth and safety margin.
o Risk Acceptance Criteria. The transition risk evaluation was measured quantitatively for acceptability using the CDF and LERF criteria from RG 1.174, as clarified in RG 1.205 Regulatory Position 2.2.4.
o Defense-in-Depth. A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth was performed, using the guidance NEI 04-02. NFPA 805 defines defense-in-depth as:
            - Preventing fires from starting
            - Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page 35
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements
          -  Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the defense-in-depth requirement was considered to be satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of defense-in-depth was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Defense-in-depth was performed on a fire area basis.
Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure defense-in-depth were identified as a result of the assessment of defense-in-depth.
o Safety Margin Assessment. A review of the impact of the change on safety margin was performed. An acceptable set of guidelines for making that assessment is summarized below. Other equivalent acceptance guidelines may also be used.
          - Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and
          - Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., UFSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The requirements related to safety margins for the change analysis are described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the FRE.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 36
 
Duke Energy                                            4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Prepare for Fire Risk Evaluation Identification of VFDRs (From B-3 Tables)
Discuss and Document in Determine How to Model Fire PRA and Fire Risk the VFDR in the Fire PRA Evaluation Documentation Perform Fire Risk Evaluation Calculate VFDR Delta CDF And Delta LERF Review of Acceptance Criteria Evaluate Delta CDF And Delta LERF Evaluate the Maintenance of                      Discuss and Document in Defense-In-Depth                    Fire Risk Evaluation And                              Calculation Safety Margin Figure 4 Fire Risk Evaluation Process (NFPA 805 Transition)
[Based on FAQ 07-0054 Revision 1]
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                          Page 37
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Results of Evaluation Process Disposition of VFDRs The HBRSEP existing post-fire SSA and the NFPA 805 transition project activities have identified a number of variances from the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3. These variances were dispositioned using the fire risk evaluation process.
Each variance dispositioned using a Fire Risk Evaluation was assessed against the Fire Risk Evaluation acceptance criteria of CDF and LERF; and maintenance of defense-in-depth and safety margin criteria from Section 5.3.5 of NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205. The results of these calculations are summarized in Attachment C.
Following completion of transition activities and planned modifications and program changes, the plant will be compliant with 10 CFR 50.48(c).
Risk Change Due to NFPA 805 Transition In accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, Section C.2.2.4, Risk Evaluations, risk increases or decreases for each fire area using Fire Risk Evaluations and the overall plant should be provided. Note that the risk increase due to the use of recovery actions was included in the risk change for transition for each fire area.
RG 1.205 Section C.2.2.4.2 states in part The total increase or decrease in risk associated with the implementation of NFPA 805 for the overall plant should be calculated by summing the risk increases and decreases for each fire area (including any risk increases resulting from previously approved recovery actions). The total risk increase should be consistent with the acceptance guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.174. Note that the acceptance guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.174 may require the total CDF, LERF, or both, to evaluate changes where the risk impact exceeds specific guidelines. If the additional risk associated with previously approved recovery actions is greater than the acceptance guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.174, then the net change in total plant risk incurred by any proposed alternatives to the deterministic criteria in NFPA 805, Chapter 4 (other than the previously approved recovery actions), should be risk neutral or represent a risk decrease.
The risk increases and decreases are provided in Attachment W.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 38
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.6  Monitoring Program 4.6.1 Overview of NFPA 805 Requirements and NEI 04-02 Guidance on the NFPA 805 Fire Protection System and Feature Monitoring Program Section 2.6 of NFPA 805 states:
A monitoring program shall be established to ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained and to assess the performance of the fire protection program in meeting the performance criteria.
Monitoring shall ensure that the assumptions in the engineering analysis remain valid.
As part of the transition review, the adequacy of the inspection and testing program to address fire protection systems and equipment within plant inspection and the compensatory measures programs should be reviewed. In addition, the adequacy of the plant corrective action program in determining the causes of equipment and programmatic failures and minimizing their recurrence should also be reviewed as part of the transition to a risk-informed, performance-based licensing basis.
4.6.2 Overview of Post-Transition NFPA 805 Monitoring Program This section describes the process that will be utilized to implement the post-transition NFPA 805 monitoring program. The monitoring program will be implemented after the safety evaluation issuance as part of the fire protection program transition to NFPA 805.
See item for implementation in Attachment S. The monitoring process is comprised of four phases.
* Phase 1 - Scoping
* Phase 2 - Screening Using Risk Criteria
* Phase 3 - Risk Target Value Determination
* Phase 4 - Monitoring Implementation Figure 4-8 provides detail on the Phase 1 and 2 processes.
The results of these phases will be documented in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scoping document developed during implementation.
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Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Phase 1 - Scoping In order to meet the NFPA 805 requirements for monitoring, the following categories of SSCs and programmatic elements will be reviewed during the implementation phase for inclusion in the NFPA 805 monitoring program:
o Structures, Systems, and Components required to comply with NFPA 805, specifically:
o Fire protection systems and features
            - Required by the Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment
            - Modeled in the Fire PRA
            - Required by Chapter 3 of NFPA 805 o Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment equipment4
            - Nuclear safety equipment
            - Fire PRA equipment
            - NPO equipment o Structures, systems and components relied upon to meet radioactive release criteria o Fire Protection Programmatic Elements Phase 2 - Screening Using Risk Criteria The equipment from Phase 1 scoping will be screened to determine the appropriate level of NFPA 805 monitoring. As a minimum, the SSCs identified in Phase 1 will be part of an inspection and test program and system/program health reporting. If not in the current program, the SSCs will be added in order to assure that the criteria can be met reliably.
The following screening process will be used to determine those SSCs that may require additional monitoring beyond normal inspection and test program and system/program health reporting and will be documented in NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scoping document.
: 1. Fire Protection Systems and Features Those fire protection systems and features identified in Phase 1 are candidates for additional monitoring in the NFPA 805 program commensurate with risk significance.
Risk significance is determined at the component, programmatic element, and/or functional level on an individual fire area basis. Compartments smaller than fire areas may be used provided the compartments are independent (i.e., share no fire protection SSCs). If compartments smaller than fire areas are used the basis will be documented in the calculation, RNP-F/PSA-0095, RNP Fire PSA NFPA 805 Transition.
4 For the purposes of the NFPA 805 Monitoring, NSCA equipment is intended to include Nuclear Safety Equipment, Fire PRA equipment, and NPO equipment.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements The Fire PRA is used to establish the risk significance based on the following screening criteria:
Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) of the monitored parameter  2.0 (AND) either Core Damage Frequency (CDF) x (RAW)  1.0E-7 per year (OR)
Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) x (RAW)  1.0E-8 per year CDF, LERF, and RAW(monitored parameter) are calculated for each fire area. The monitored parameter will be established at a level commensurate with the amenability of the parameter to risk measurement (e.g., a fire barrier may be more conducive to risk measurement than an individual barrier penetration) and will be documented in the calculation, RNP-F/PSA-0095.
Fire protection systems and features that meet or exceed the criteria identified above are considered High Safety Significant (HSS) and will be included in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program. The HSS fire protection systems and features not already monitored via an existing inspection and test program and/or in the existing system /
program health reporting, as described in procedure EGR-NGGC-0010, will be added to the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program and documented in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scoping document.
: 2. Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Equipment Required NSCA equipment, except the NPO scope, identified in Phase 1 will be screened for safety significance using the Fire PRA and the Maintenance Rule guidelines differentiating HSS equipment from Low Safety Significant (LSS) equipment.
The screening will also ensure that the Maintenance Rule functions are consistent with the required functions of the NSCA equipment.
HSS NSCA equipment not currently monitored in Maintenance Rule will be included in Maintenance Rule. All NSCA equipment that are not HSS are considered LSS and need not be included in the monitoring program.
For non-power operational modes, the qualitative use of fire prevention to manage fire risk during Higher Risk Evolutions does not lend itself to quantitative risk measurement.
Therefore, fire risk management effectiveness is monitored programmatically similar to combustible material controls and other fire prevention programs. Additional monitoring beyond inspection and test programs and system/program health reporting is not considered necessary.
: 3. SSCs Relied upon for Radioactive Release Criteria The evaluations performed to meet the radioactive release performance criteria are qualitative in nature. The SSCs relied upon to meet the radioactive release performance criteria are not amenable to quantitative risk measurement. Additionally, since 10 CFR Part 20 limits (which are lower than releases due to core damage and containment breach) for radiological effluents are not being exceeded, equipment relied upon to meet the radioactive release performance criteria is considered inherently low HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 41
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements risk. Therefore, additional monitoring beyond inspection and test programs and system/program health reporting is not considered necessary.
: 4. Fire Protection Programmatic Elements Monitoring of programmatic elements is required in order to assess the performance of the fire protection program in meeting the performance criteria. These programs form the bases for many of the analytical assumptions used to evaluate compliance with NFPA 805 requirements Programmatic aspects include:
o Prompt Detection, including incipient detection fire watch and hot work fire watch o Transient Combustible Controls Program Violations against FIR-NGGC-0009 o Fire Brigade Effectiveness including Fire Brigade Response Time, Fire Brigade Fire Drill, and Fire Brigade Fire Drill Objectives Monitoring of programmatic elements is more qualitative in nature since the programs do not lend themselves to the numerical methods of reliability and availability.
Therefore, monitoring is conducted using the existing system and program health programs. Fire protection health reports, self-assessments, regulator and insurance company reports provide inputs to the monitoring program.
Phase 3 - Risk Target Value Determination Failure criteria is established by an expert panel based on the required fire protection and nuclear safety capability SSCs and programmatic elements assumed level of performance in the supporting analyses established in Phase 2. Action levels are established for the SSCs at the component level, program level, or functionally through the use of the pseudo system or performance monitoring group concept. The actual action level is determined based on the number of component, program or functional failures within a sufficiently bounding time period (i.e., ~2-3 operating cycles).
Since the HSS NSCA equipment have been identified using the Maintenance Rule guidelines, the associated equipment specific performance criteria will be established as in the Maintenance Rule, provided the criteria are consistent with Fire PRA assumptions.
When establishing the action level threshold for reliability and availability, the action level will be no lower than the fire PRA assumptions. Adverse trends and unacceptable levels of availability, reliability, and performance will be reviewed against established action levels.
Documentation of the monitoring program failure criteria and action level targets will be contained in a documented evaluation. It is anticipated that the availability and reliability criterion for High Safety Significant Performance Monitoring Groups will use the guidance included in several industry documents tempered by site-specific operating experience, Fire PRA assumptions, and equipment types (and vendor data or valid design input when available). Industry documents such as the EPRI Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide TR-1006756, Final Report July 2003, NFPA codes, and/or the NRC Fire Protection Significance Determination Process in addition to site specific operating experience data may be used. The monitoring program failure criteria and action level targets will be documented in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scoping document.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Note that fire protection systems and features, NSCA equipment, SSCs required to meet the radioactive release criteria, and fire protection program elements that do not meet the screening criteria in Phase 2 will be included in the existing inspection and test programs and the system and program health programs. Reliability and availability criteria will not be assigned.
Phase 4 - Monitoring Implementation Phase 4 is the implementation of the monitoring program, once the monitoring scope and criteria are established. Monitoring consists of periodically gathering, trending, and evaluating information pertinent to the performance, and/or availability of the equipment and comparing the results with the established goals and performance criteria to verify that the goals are being met. Results of monitoring activities will be analyzed in timely manner to assure that appropriate action is taken. The corrective action process will be used to address performance of fire protection and nuclear safety SSCs that do not meet performance criteria.
For fire protection systems and features and NSCA HSS equipment that are monitored, unacceptable levels of availability, reliability, and performance will be reviewed against the established action levels. If an action level is triggered, corrective action in accordance with procedure, CAP-NGGC-0200 will be initiated to identify the negative trend. A corrective action plan will then be developed to ensure the performance returns to the established level.
When applicable, a sensitivity study can be performed to determine the margin below the action level that still provides acceptable fire PRA results to help prioritize corrective actions if the action level is reached.
A periodic assessment will be performed (i.e., at a frequency of approximately every two to three operating cycles), taking into account, where practical, industry wide operating experience. Issues that will be addressed include:
o Review systems with performance criteria. Do performance criteria still effectively monitor the functions of the system? Do the criteria still monitor the effectiveness of the fire protection and NSCA systems?
o Have the supporting analyses been revised such that the performance criteria are no longer applicable or new fire protection and NSCA SSCs, programmatic elements and/ or functions need to be in scope?
o Based on the performance during the assessment period, are there any trends in system performance that should be addressed that are not being addressed?
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4 NFPA 805 Monitoring - Scoping and Screening Since the HSS SSCs have been identified using the Maintenance Rule guidelines, the associated SSC specific performance criteria will be established as in the Maintenance Rule, provided the criteria are consistent with Fire PRA assumptions. The actual action level is determined based on the number of component, program or functional failures within a sufficiently bounding time period (~2-3 operating cycles). Adverse trends and unacceptable levels of availability, reliability, and performance will be reviewed against established action levels. The Monitoring Program failure criteria and action level targets will be documented, as described in FAQ 10-0059.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.7      Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality Assurance 4.7.1 Compliance with Documentation Requirements in Section 2.7.1 of NFPA 805 In accordance with the requirements and guidance in NFPA 805 Section 2.7.1 and NEI 04-02, HBRSEP has documented analyses to support compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c). The analyses are being performed in accordance with Duke Energys processes for ensuring assumptions are clearly defined, that results are easily understood, that results are clearly and consistently described, and that sufficient detail is provided to allow future review of the entire analyses.
Analyses, as defined by NFPA 805 Section 2.4, performed to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) will be maintained for the life of the plant and organized to facilitate review for accuracy and adequacy. Note these analyses do not include items such as periodic tests, hot work permits, fire impairments, etc.
The Fire Protection Design Basis Document described in Section 2.7.1.2 of NFPA 805 and necessary supporting documentation described in Section 2.7.1.3 of NFPA 805 have been created as part of transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) to ensure program implementation following receipt of the safety evaluation. Figure 4-9 shows the Planned Post-Transition Documents.
The Fire Protection licensing basis documents under NFPA 805 consist of the following:
* The Transition Report/LAR
* The NFPA 805 SE
* The Revised License Condition
* The revised (U)FSAR The Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document (DBD) will contain or reference sub-tier documents that also form part of the fire protection program. The DBD's as described in NFPA 805 section 2.7.1.2, are the Fire Safety Analysis (FSA) calculations provided for each plant fire area. Also included, is the NFPA 805 Code Compliance Calculation which will maintain certain supporting elements of the LAR such as Tables B-1, B-2 and E-1. These and other supporting calculations are developed under fleet procedure EGR-NGGC-0017, Preparation and Control of Design Analyses and Calculations, and are maintained as design documents / controlled documents as described in the procedure.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4 NFPA 805 Planned Post-Transition Documents and Relationships HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page 46
 
Duke Energy                                                4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.7.2 Compliance with Configuration Control Requirements in Section 2.7.2 and 2.2.9 of NFPA 805 Program documentation established, revised, or utilized in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) is subject to Duke Energy configuration control processes that meet the requirements of Section 2.7.2 of NFPA 805. This includes the appropriate procedures and configuration control processes for ensuring that changes impacting the fire protection program are reviewed appropriately. The RI-PB post transition change process methodology is based upon the requirements of NFPA 805, and industry guidance in NEI 04-02, and RG 1.205. These requirements are summarized in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2 Change Evaluation Guidance Summary Table Document                        Section(s)                                    Topic NFPA 805        2.2(h), 2.2.9, 2.4.4, A.2.2(h), A.2.4.4,  Change Evaluation D.5 NEI 04-02      5.3, Appendix B, Appendix I,              Change Evaluation, Change Evaluation Appendix J                                Forms (Appendix I)
RG 1.205        C.2.2.4, C.3.1, C.3.2, C.4.3              Risk Evaluation, Standard License Condition, Change Evaluation Process, Fire PRA The Plant Change Evaluation Process consists of the following 4 steps and is depicted in Figure 4-10:
* Defining the Change
* Performing the Preliminary Risk Screening.
* Performing the Risk Evaluation
* Evaluating the Acceptance Criteria Configuration control is and will be maintained going forward in accordance with existing procedures and processes which satisfy the NFPA 805 requirements. Procedure FIR-NGGC-0010, Fire Protection Program Impact Review, provides review of configuration, process, and procedure changes to ensure applicable requirements of NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program (Fundamental Elements, NSCA, NPO, Radioactive Release and FPRA) are maintained.
Change Definition The Change Evaluation process begins by defining the change or altered condition to be examined and the baseline configuration as defined by the Design Basis and Licensing Basis (NFPA 805 Licensing Basis post-transition).
: 1. The baseline is defined as that plant condition or configuration that is consistent with the Design Basis and Licensing Basis (NFPA 805 Licensing Basis post-transition).
: 2. The changed or altered condition or configuration that is not consistent with the Design Basis and Licensing Basis is defined as the proposed alternative.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Preliminary Risk Review Once the definition of the change is established, a screening is then performed to identify and resolve minor changes to the fire protection program. This screening is consistent with fire protection regulatory review processes in place at nuclear plants under traditional licensing bases. This screening process is modeled after the NEI 02-03 process. This process will address most administrative changes (e.g.,
changes to the combustible control program, organizational changes, etc.).
The characteristics of an acceptable screening process that meets the assessment of the acceptability of risk requirement of Section 2.4.4 of NFPA 805 are:
* The quality of the screen is sufficient to ensure that potentially greater than minimal risk increases receive detailed risk assessments appropriate to the level of risk.
* The screening process must be documented and be available for inspection by the NRC.
* The screening process does not pose undue evaluation or maintenance burden.
If any of the above is not met, proceed to the Risk Evaluation step.
Risk Evaluation The screening is followed by engineering evaluations that may include fire modeling and risk assessment techniques. The results of these evaluations are then compared to the acceptance criteria. Changes that satisfy the acceptance criteria of NFPA 805 Section 2.4.4 and the license condition can be implemented within the framework provided by NFPA 805. Changes that do not satisfy the acceptance criteria cannot be implemented within this framework. The acceptance criteria require that the resultant change in CDF and LERF be consistent with the license condition. The acceptance criteria also include consideration of defense-in-depth and safety margin, which would typically be qualitative in nature.
The risk evaluation involves the application of fire modeling analyses and risk assessment techniques to obtain a measure of the changes in risk associated with the proposed change. In certain circumstances, an initial evaluation in the development of the risk assessment could be a simplified analysis using bounding assumptions provided the use of such assumptions does not unnecessarily challenge the acceptance criteria discussed below.
Acceptability Determination The Change Evaluations are assessed for acceptability using the CDF (change in core damage frequency) and LERF (change in large early release frequency) criteria from the license condition. The proposed changes are also assessed to ensure they are consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy and that sufficient safety margins were maintained.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4-10 Plant Change Evaluation [NEI 04-02 Figure 5-1]
Note references in Figure refer to NEI 04-02 Sections HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 49
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements The HBRSEP Fire Protection Program configuration is defined by the program documentation. The existing configuration control processes for modifications, calculations and analyses, and Fire Protection Program License Basis Reviews will be utilized to maintain configuration control of the Fire Protection program documents. The configuration control procedures which govern the various HBRSEP documents and databases that currently exist will be revised to reflect the new NFPA 805 licensing bases requirements (Implementation Item in Attachment S).
Several NFPA 805 document types, such as NSCA Supporting Information, Non-Power Mode NSCA Treatment, generally require new control procedures and processes to be developed since they are new documents and databases created as a result of the transition to NFPA 805. The new procedures will be modeled after the existing processes for similar types of documents and databases. System level design basis documents will be revised to reflect the NFPA 805 role that the system components now play.
The process for capturing the impact of proposed changes to the plant on the Fire Protection Program will continue to be a multiple step review. The first step of the review is an initial screening for process users to determine if there is a potential to impact the Fire Protection program as defined under NFPA 805 through a series of screening questions/checklists contained in one or more procedures depending upon the configuration control process being used. Reviews that identify potential Fire Protection program impacts will be sent to qualified individuals (Fire Protection, Safe Shutdown/NSCA, Fire PRA) to ascertain the program impacts, if any. If Fire Protection program impacts are determined to exist as a result of the proposed change, the issue would be resolved by one of the following:
Deterministic Approach: Comply with NFPA 805, Chapter 3 and 4.2.3 requirements Performance-Based Approach: Utilize the NFPA 805 change process developed in accordance with NEI 04-02, RG 1.205, and the NFPA 805 fire protection license condition to assess the acceptability of the proposed change. This process would be used to determine if the proposed change could be implemented "as-is" or whether prior NRC approval of the proposed change is required.
This process follows the requirements in NFPA 805 and the guidance outlined in RG 1.174, which requires the use of qualified individuals, procedures that require calculations be subject to independent review and verification, record retention, peer review, and a corrective action program that ensures appropriate actions are taken when errors are discovered. The plant documents that ensure these requirements are met are:
CAP-NGGC-0200 - Condition Identification and Screening Process EGR-NGGC-0005 - Engineering Change ESG0101N - Safe Shutdown Engineer (Post-NFPA 805 Transition)
ESG0102N - Fire Protection Plant Change Impact Review ESG0103N - Circuit Analysis (Post-NFPA 805 Transition)
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements ESG0104N - Fire Protection Engineer (Post-NFPA 805 Transition)
ESG0105N - Basic Fire Modeling 4.7.3 Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Quality Duke Energy will maintain the existing Fire Protection Quality Assurance program.
During the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), HBRSEP performed work in accordance with the quality requirements of Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805.
Any future NFPA 805 analyses will be conducted in accordance with the Quality Requirements described in NFPA 805, section 2.7.3 under the design controls in place and required by the Fire Protection portions of the NGGM-PM-0007, Quality Assurance Program Manual.
Fire PRA Quality Configuration control of the Fire PRA model will be maintained by integrating the Fire PRA model into the existing processes used to ensure configuration control of the internal events PRA model. This process complies with Section 1-5 of the ASME PRA Standard and ensures that Duke Energy maintains an as-built, as-operated PRA model of the plant. The process has been peer reviewed. Quality assurance of the Fire PRA is assured via the same processes applied to the internal events model.
This process follows the guidance outlined in RG 1.174, which requires the use of qualified individuals, procedures that require calculations be subject to independent review and verification, record retention, peer review, and a corrective action program that ensures appropriate actions are taken when errors are discovered. Although the entire scope of the formal 10 CFR 50, Appendix B program is not applied to the PRA models or processes in general, often parts of the program are applied as a convenient method of complying with the requirements of RG 1.174. For instance, the procedure which addresses independent review of calculations for 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, is applied to the PRA model calculations, as well.
With respect to Quality Assurance Program requirements for independent reviews of calculations and evaluations, those existing requirements for Fire Protection Program documents will remain unchanged. Duke Energy specifically requires that the calculations and evaluations in support of the NFPA 805 LAR, exclusive of the Fire PRA, be performed within the scope of the QA program which requires independent review as defined by plant procedures. As recommended by NUREG/CR-6850, the sources of uncertainty in the Fire PRA were identified and specific parameters were analyzed for sensitivity in support of the NFPA 805 Fire Risk Evaluation process.
Specifically with regard to uncertainty, an uncertainty and sensitivity matrix was developed and included with RNP-F/PSA-0094. In addition, sensitivity to uncertainty associated with specific Fire PRA parameters was quantitatively addressed in RNP-F/PSA-0095.
While the removal of conservatism inherent in the Fire PRA is a long-term goal, the Fire PRA results were deemed sufficient for evaluating the risk associated with this application. While Duke Energy continues to strive toward a more "realistic" estimate of HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 51
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements fire risk, use of mean values continues to be the best estimate of fire risk. During the Fire Risk Evaluation process, the uncertainty and sensitivity associated with specific Fire PRA parameters were considerations in the evaluation of the change in risk relative to the applicable acceptance thresholds.
Specific Requirements of NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3 The following discusses how the requirements of NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3 were met during the transition process. Post-transition, Duke Energy will perform work in accordance with NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3 requirements.
Reference plant procedures:
EGR-NGGC-0003 - Design Review Requirements EGR-NGGC-0005 - Engineering Change EGR-NGGC-0017 - Preparation and Control of Design Analyses and Calculations Review and approval of corporate or fleet-wide procedures applied to HBRSEP and other Duke Energy Progress sites are controlled under PRO-NGGC-0204, Procedure Review and Approval. Site specific impact and technical reviews are completed under this process to ensure each individual plant's requirements and configurations are incorporated and maintained.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.1 - Review Analyses, calculations, and evaluations performed in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are performed in accordance with Duke Energy procedures that require independent review.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.2 - Verification and Validation Calculational models and numerical methods used in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) were verified and validated as required by Section 2.7.3.2 of NFPA 805.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.3 - Limitations of Use Engineering methods and numerical models used in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) were applied appropriately as required by Section 2.7.3.3 of NFPA 805.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.4 - Qualification of Users Cognizant personnel who use and apply engineering analysis and numerical methods in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are competent and experienced as required by Section 2.7.3.4 of NFPA 805.
During the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), work was performed in accordance with the quality requirements of Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805. Personnel who used and applied engineering analysis and numerical methods (e.g. fire modeling) in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are competent and experienced as required by NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.4.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Post-transition, for personnel performing fire modeling or Fire PRA development and evaluation, Duke Energy will develop and maintain qualification requirements for individuals assigned various tasks. Position Specific Guides will be developed to identify and document required training and mentoring to ensure individuals are appropriately qualified per the requirements of NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.4 to perform assigned work. The following Training Guides have been developed and implemented.
ESG0089N - Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment Engineer (Quantification),
ESG0093N - Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment Engineer (Initial Development), and ESG0094N - Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment Engineer (Data Development), and ESG0105N - Basic Fire Modeling HBRSEP and NGG Fleet engineering personnel (design, programs and systems engineering) are provided training commensurate with the job responsibility through the INPO accredited Engineering Support Personnel (ESP) training program. This is provided in either ESP Continuing Training or Work Group Specific Continuing Training.
Specific, qualification for performance of the FIR-NGGC-0010, Fire Protection Program Change Process, is documented using Training Guide (Qual. Card) ESG0102N, Fire Protection Plant Change Impact Review.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.5 - Uncertainty Analysis Uncertainty analyses were performed as required by 2.7.3.5 of NFPA 805 and the results were considered in the context of the application. This is of particular interest in fire modeling and Fire PRA development. Note: 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(iv) states that NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.5 is not required for the deterministic approach because conservatism is included in the deterministic criteria.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.8    Summary of Results 4.8.1 Results of the Fire Area Review A summary of the NFPA 805 compliance basis and the required fire protection systems and features is provided in Attachment C. The table provides the following information from the NEI 04-02 Table B-3:
Fire Area / Fire Zone: Fire Area/Zone Identifier.
 
== Description:==
Fire Area/Zone Description.
NFPA 805 Regulatory Basis: Post-transition NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance basis Required Fire Protection System / Feature: Detection / suppression required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance. Other Required Features may include Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems, fire barriers, etc.
The documentation of required fire protection systems and features does not include the documentation of the fire area boundaries. Fire area boundaries are required and documentation of the fire area boundaries has been performed as part of reviews of engineering evaluations, licensing actions, or as part of the reviews of the NEI 04-02 Table B-1 process. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system / feature is designated as follows:
o S - Separation Criteria: Systems/Features required for Chapter 4 Separation Criteria in Section 4.2.3 o E - EEEE/LA Criteria: Systems/Features required for acceptability of Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations / NRC approved Licensing Action (i.e.,
Exemptions/Deviations/Safety Evaluations) (Section 2.2.7) o R - Risk Criteria: Systems/Features required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (Section 4.2.4) o D - Defense-in-depth Criteria: Systems/Features required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (Section 4.2.4)
Attachment W contains the results of the Fire Risk Evaluations, additional risk of recovery actions, and the change in risk on a fire area basis.
4.8.2 Plant Modifications and Items to be Completed During the Implementation Phase Planned modifications, studies, and evaluations to comply with NFPA 805 are described in Attachment S.
In Attachment S, three tables are listed. Table S-1 identifies completed Plant Modifications, Table S-2 identifies Plant Modifications required to be completed.
Table S-3 identifies training, programs, personnel equipment, and document changes and upgrades required to be completed.
The Fire PRA model will represent the as-built, as-operated and maintained plant following completion of the risk related modifications identified in Attachment S. In the event the PRA model requires revision following completion of the modifications and HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 54
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements implementation items listed in Attachment S, the changes will be controlled through normal HBRSEP processes. These changes are not expected to be significant.
4.8.3 Supplemental Information -Other Licensee Specific Issues 4.8.3.1    Fire PRA Qualitative Review The following methods and modeling aspects are qualitatively characterized as having a minimal impact or a conservative impact:
4.8.3.1.1 RCP Shutdown Seals The HBRSEP FPRA applied credit for the installation of the Westinghouse Generation III SHIELD Shutdown Seal (SDS) in the Reactor Coolant Pumps as described in PWROG-14001, Rev. 1 An implementation item has been created in Attachment S to update the FPRA prior to self-approval to incorporate the NRC-accepted SDS failure model.
4.8.3.1.2 NSCA Power Supply Strategy HBRSEP is changing the strategy used in a number of fire areas in the plant that were previously approved under the Appendix R licensing basis. The current strategy is to perform a fire incused load shed and recovery to limit operational uncertainties relative to circuit failure and spurious actuations. This strategy has been compared to what is often called self-induced station blackout (SISBO) in the industry. The strategy going forward is to use a symptom based operator response approach in response to fire events. The Attachment G recovery actions have been informed with the new strategy. The current fire PRA conservatively modeled the plant using the current load shed strategy. As part of program implementation, the operations procedures will be finalized and the Fire PRA updated. Therefore, there is a separate implementation item relative to this in Attachment S.
4.8.3.2    Fire PRA Sensitivity Analyses The following methods and modeling aspects are quantitatively evaluated. Each sensitivity analysis modifies an applied fire PRA method and then recalculates total risk metrics from Attachment W in order to determine the impact of a given fire PRA method.
The total plant risk and the total change in risk associated with the transition to NFPA 805 are reported for each sensitivity with the percentage change from the numbers reported in Attachment W.
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Duke Energy                                                4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.8.3.2.1 FAQ 08-0048 Sensitivity Analysis In order to use the updated fire bin ignition frequencies provided in Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850, a sensitivity analysis must be performed comparing the impact of those bins characterized by an alpha from the EPRI TR-1016735 analysis that is less than or equal to 1. While the new point estimates for the bin ignition frequencies better represent the data, uncertainties are large and a sensitivity analysis using the old frequencies was required to assess the potential impact of using the new frequencies.
The sensitivity was simplified by replacing the select EPRI TR-1016735 ignition frequencies with values from NUREG/CR-6850. The results of the sensitivity for the EPRI ignition frequencies are provided below.
Table 4 Ignition Frequency Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF Results CDF [/yr]      LERF [/yr]
(Change from      (Change from baseline)1        baseline)1 6.9E-06          6.0E-07 Net Fire Risk Evaluation
(+38%)            (+30%)
Differences in percentages are due to rounding.
: 1. Baseline numbers are those presented in Attachment W, Table W-5.
Table 4 Ignition Frequency Sensitivity Total CDF and LERF CDF [/yr]        LERF [/yr]
(Change from      (Change from baseline)1        baseline)1 Internal Events plus External Flooding and              3.6E-06          8.8E-07 High Winds 4.8E-05          6.0E-06 Fire
(+66%)            (+71%)
5.2E-05          6.9E-06 Total
(+58%)            (+57%)
Differences in percentages are due to rounding.
: 1. Baseline numbers are those presented in Attachment W, Table W-5.
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Duke Energy                                                4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.8.3.2.2 Cable Spread Room Area Wide Incipient Detection Sensitivity Analysis As permitted by Appendix P of NUREG/CR-6850 Volume 2 and draft NUREG-2180 guidance, the FPRA credits the use of air-aspirated incipient detection, also known as Very Early Warning Fire Detection Systems (VEWFDS) for area wide detection in the Unit 2 cable spread room. The fire PRA applies the credit outlines in the draft NUREG-2180 with a modification to the event tree allowing for credit of conventional detection and suppression systems, as they are independent of the success or failure of area-wide incipient detection. Plant procedures will be developed and implemented to ensure that VEWFDS alarms are promptly addressed with qualified plant personnel who will be present in the immediate area prior to fire growth, allowing for fire prevention or prompt fire response.
The area-wide incipient detector credit will be removed, leaving in place the existing conventional detection and suppression systems for this sensitivity analysis. The results of removing the area-wide VEWFDS and maintaining existing system credits are below.
Table 4 Area Wide Incipient Detection Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF Results CDF [/yr]      LERF [/yr]
(Change from      (Change from baseline)1        baseline)1 5.9E-06            5.7E-07 Net Fire Risk Evaluation
(+18%)            (+24%)
Differences in percentages are due to rounding.
: 1. Baseline numbers are those presented in Attachment W, Table W-5.
Table 4 Area Wide Incipient Detection Sensitivity Total CDF and LERF Results CDF [/yr]        LERF [/yr]
(Change from      (Change from baseline)1        baseline)1 Internal Events plus External Flooding and                3.6E-06            8.8E-07 High Winds 3.1E-05            3.7E-06 Fire
(+7%)              (+6%)
3.5E-05            4.6E-06 Total
(+6%)              (+5%)
Differences in percentages are due to rounding.
: 1. Baseline numbers are those presented in Attachment W, Table W-5.
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Duke Energy                                                        5.0 Regulatory Evaluation
 
==5.0    REGULATORY EVALUATION==
 
5.1    Introduction - 10 CFR 50.48 On July 16, 2004 the NRC amended 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection, to add a new subsection, 10 CFR 50.48(c), which establishes alternative fire protection requirements.
10 CFR 50.48 endorses, with exceptions, NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants - 2001 Edition (NFPA 805), as a voluntary alternative for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 50.48 Section (b), Appendix R, and Section (f), Decommissioning.
The voluntary adoption of 10 CFR 50.48(c) by HBRSEP does not eliminate the need to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) including the provision for nuclear plants licensed prior to 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 3, Fire Protection, becoming effective as is the case for HBRSEP5. The NRC addressed the overall adequacy of the regulations during the promulgation of 10 CFR 50.48(c) (Reference FR Notice 69 FR 33536 dated June 16, 2004, ML041340086).
NFPA 805 does not supersede the requirements of GDC 3, 10 CFR 50.48(a), or 10 CFR 50.48(f). Those regulatory requirements continue to apply to licensees that adopt NFPA 805. However, under NFPA 805, the means by which GDC 3 or 10 CFR 50.48(a) requirements may be met is different than under 10 CFR 50.48(b). Specifically, whereas GDC 3 refers to SSCs important to safety, NFPA 805 identifies fire protection systems and features required to meet the Chapter 1 performance criteria through the methodology in Chapter 4 of NFPA 805. Also, under NFPA 805, the 10 CFR 50.48(a)(2)(iii) requirement to limit fire damage to SSCs important to safety so that the capability to safely shut down the plant is ensured is satisfied by meeting the performance criteria in Section 1.5.1 of NFPA 805. The Section 1.5.1 criteria include provisions for ensuring that reactivity control, inventory and pressure control, decay heat removal, vital auxiliaries, and process monitoring are achieved and maintained.
This methodology specifies a process to identify the fire protection systems and features required to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria in Section 1.5 of NFPA 805. Once a determination has been made that a fire protection system or feature is required to achieve the performance criteria of Section 1.5, its design and qualification must meet any applicable requirements of NFPA 805, Chapter 3. Having identified the required fire protection systems and features, the licensee selects either a deterministic or performance-based approach to 5
The General Design Criteria (GDC) in existence at the time HBRSEP was licensed (July, 1970) for operation were contained in Proposed Appendix A to 10CFR50, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, published in the Federal Register on July 11, 1967. (Appendix A to 10CFR50, effective in 1971 and subsequently amended, is somewhat different from the proposed 1967 criteria.) HBRSEP was evaluated with respect to the proposed 1967 GDC and the original FSAR contained a discussion of the criteria as well as a summary of the criteria by groups.
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Duke Energy                                                                          5.0 Regulatory Evaluation demonstrate that the performance criteria are satisfied. This process satisfies the GDC 3 requirement to design and locate SSCs important to safety to minimize the probability and effects of fires and explosions. (Reference FR Notice 69 FR 33536 dated June 16, 2004, ML041340086)
The new rule provides actions that may be taken to establish compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(a), which requires each operating nuclear power plant to have a fire protection program plan that satisfies GDC 3, as well as specific requirements in that section. The transition process described in 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(ii) provides, in pertinent parts, that a licensee intending to adopt the new rule must, among other things, modify the fire protection plan required by paragraph (a) of that section to reflect the licensees decision to comply with NFPA 805. Therefore, to the extent that the contents of the existing fire protection program plan required by 10 CFR 50.48(a) are inconsistent with NFPA 805, the fire protection program plan must be modified to achieve compliance with the requirements in NFPA 805. All other requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 (a) and GDC 3 have corresponding requirements in NFPA 805.
A comparison of the current requirements in Appendix R with the comparable requirements in Section 3 of NFPA 805 shows that the two sets of requirements are consistent in many respects. This was further clarified in FAQ 07-0032, 10 CFR 50.48(a) and GDC 3 clarification (ML081400292). The following tables provide a cross reference of fire protection regulations associated with the post-transition HBRSEP fire protection program and applicable industry and HBRSEP documents that address the topic.
10 CFR 50.48(a)
Table 5-1 10 CFR 50.48(a) - Applicability/Compliance Reference 10 CFR 50.48(a) Section(s)                        Applicability/Compliance Reference (1) Each holder of an operating license issued under this      See below part or a combined license issued under part 52 of this chapter must have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part. This fire protection plan must:
(i) Describe the overall fire protection program for the  NFPA 805 Section 3.2 facility;                                                  NEI 04-02 Table B-1 (ii) Identify the various positions within the licensee's  NFPA 805 Section 3.2.2 organization that are responsible for the program;        NEI 04-02 Table B-1 (iii) State the authorities that are delegated to each of  NFPA 805 Section 3.2.2 these positions to implement those responsibilities; and  NEI 04-02 Table B-1 (iv) Outline the plans for fire protection, fire detection NFPA 805 Section 2.7 and Chapters 3 and 4 and suppression capability, and limitation of fire        NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tables damage.
(2) The plan must also describe specific features              See below necessary to implement the program described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section such as:
(i) Administrative controls and personnel requirements    NFPA 805 Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4 for fire prevention and manual fire suppression            NEI 04-02 Table B-1 activities; HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                        Page 59
 
Duke Energy                                                                              5.0 Regulatory Evaluation Table 5-1 10 CFR 50.48(a) - Applicability/Compliance Reference 10 CFR 50.48(a) Section(s)                            Applicability/Compliance Reference (ii) Automatic and manually operated fire detection and    NFPA 805 Sections 3.5 through 3.10 and suppression systems; and                                    Chapter 4 NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tables (iii) The means to limit fire damage to structures,        NFPA 805 Section 3.3 and Chapter 4 systems, or components important to safety so that the      NEI 04-02 B-3 Table capability to shut down the plant safely is ensured.
(3) The licensee shall retain the fire protection plan and      NFPA 805 Section 2.7.1.1 requires that each change to the plan as a record until the              documentation (Analyses, as defined by NFPA 805 Commission terminates the reactor license. The              Section 2.4, performed to demonstrate compliance licensee shall retain each superseded revision of the      with this standard) be maintained for the life of the procedures for 3 years from the date it was                plant.
superseded.                                                RDC-NGGC-0001 (4) Each applicant for a design approval, design                Not applicable. HBRSEP is licensed under certification, or manufacturing license under part 52 of    10 CFR 50.
this chapter must have a description and analysis of the fire protection design features for the standard plant necessary to demonstrate compliance with Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part.
General Design Criterion 3 Table 5-2 GDC 3 - Applicability/Compliance Reference GDC 3, Fire Protection, Statement                        Applicability/Compliance Reference Structures, systems, and components important to            NFPA 805 Chapters 3 and 4 safety shall be designed and located to minimize,            NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tables consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions.
Noncombustible and heat resistant materials shall be        NFPA 805 Sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.11.4 used wherever practical throughout the unit,                NEI 04-02 B-1 Table particularly in locations such as the containment and control room.
Fire detection and fighting systems of appropriate          NFPA 805 Chapters 3 and 4 capacity and capability shall be provided and designed      NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tables to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures, systems, and components important to safety.
Firefighting systems shall be designed to assure that        NFPA 805 Sections 3.4 through 3.10 and 4.2.1 their rupture or inadvertent operation does not              NEI 04-02 Table B-3 significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                Page 60
 
Duke Energy                                                                            5.0 Regulatory Evaluation 10 CFR 50.48(c)
Table 5-3 10 CFR 50.48(c) - Applicability/Compliance Reference 10 CFR 50.48(c) Section(s)                                Applicability/Compliance Reference (1) Approval of incorporation by reference. National Fire Protection Association    General Information.
(NFPA) Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for        NFPA 805 (2001 edition) is Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition (NFPA 805),        the edition used.
which is referenced in this section, was approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) Exceptions, modifications, and supplementation of NFPA 805. As used in          General Information.
this section, references to NFPA 805 are to the 2001 Edition, with the          NFPA 805 (2001 edition) is following exceptions, modifications, and supplementation:                        the edition used.
(i) Life Safety Goal, Objectives, and Criteria. The Life Safety Goal,            The Life Safety Goal, Objectives, and Criteria of Chapter 1 are not endorsed.                          Objectives, and Criteria of Chapter 1 of NFPA 805 are not part of the LAR.
(ii) Plant Damage/Business Interruption Goal, Objectives, and Criteria. The      The Plant Damage/Business Plant Damage/Business Interruption Goal, Objectives, and Criteria of            Interruption Goal, Objectives, Chapter 1 are not endorsed.                                                      and Criteria of Chapter 1 of NFPA 805 are not part of the LAR.
(iii) Use of feed-and-bleed. In demonstrating compliance with the                Feed and bleed is not utilized performance criteria of Sections 1.5.1(b) and (c), a high-pressure              as the sole fire-protected safe charging/injection pump coupled with the pressurizer power-operated relief      shutdown methodology.
valves (PORVs) as the sole fire-protected safe shutdown path for maintaining reactor coolant inventory, pressure control, and decay heat removal capability (i.e., feed-and-bleed) for pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) is not permitted.
(iv) Uncertainty analysis. An uncertainty analysis performed in accordance      Uncertainty analysis was not with Section 2.7.3.5 is not required to support deterministic approach          performed for deterministic calculations.                                                                    methodology.
(v) Existing cables. In lieu of installing cables meeting flame propagation      Electrical cable construction tests as required by Section 3.3.5.3, a flame-retardant coating may be          complies with a flame applied to the electric cables, or an automatic fixed fire suppression system    propagation test that was may be installed to provide an equivalent level of protection. In addition, the  found acceptable to the NRC italicized exception to Section 3.3.5.3 is not endorsed.                        as documented in NEI 04-02 Table B-1.
(vi) Water supply and distribution. The italicized exception to Section 3.6.4 is HBRSEP complies as not endorsed. Licensees who wish to use the exception to Section 3.6.4          documented in Attachment A.
must submit a request for a license amendment in accordance with                See NEI 04-02 Table B-1.
paragraph (c)(2)(vii) of this section.
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Duke Energy                                                                            5.0 Regulatory Evaluation Table 5-3 10 CFR 50.48(c) - Applicability/Compliance Reference 10 CFR 50.48(c) Section(s)                                Applicability/Compliance Reference (vii) Performance-based methods. Notwithstanding the prohibition in              The use of performance-Section 3.1 against the use of performance-based methods, the fire                based methods for NFPA 805 protection program elements and minimum design requirements of                    Chapter 3 is requested. See Chapter 3 may be subject to the performance-based methods permitted              Attachment L.
elsewhere in the standard. Licensees who wish to use performance-based methods for these fire protection program elements and minimum design requirements shall submit a request in the form of an application for license amendment under &sect; 50.90. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or a designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or designee determines that the performance-based approach; (A) Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; (B) Maintains safety margins; and (C) Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).
(3) Compliance with NFPA 805.                                                        See below (i) A licensee may maintain a fire protection program that complies with          The LAR was submitted in NFPA 805 as an alternative to complying with paragraph (b) of this section        accordance with for plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, or the fire protection    10 CFR 50.90. The LAR license conditions for plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. The      included applicable license licensee shall submit a request to comply with NFPA 805 in the form of an        conditions, orders, technical application for license amendment under &sect; 50.90. The application must            specifications/bases that identify any orders and license conditions that must be revised or                needed to be revised and/or superseded, and contain any necessary revisions to the plants technical          superseded.
specifications and the bases thereof. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or a designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or designee determines that the licensee has identified orders, license conditions, and the technical specifications that must be revised or superseded, and that any necessary revisions are adequate. Any approval by the Director or the designee must be in the form of a license amendment approving the use of NFPA 805 together with any necessary revisions to the technical specifications.
(ii) The licensee shall complete its implementation of the methodology in        The LAR and transition report Chapter 2 of NFPA 805 (including all required evaluations and analyses)          summarize the evaluations and, upon completion, modify the fire protection plan required by paragraph      and analyses performed in (a) of this section to reflect the licensees decision to comply with NFPA 805,  accordance with Chapter 2 of before changing its fire protection program or nuclear power plant as            NFPA 805.
permitted by NFPA 805.
(4) Risk-informed or performance-based alternatives to compliance with                No risk-informed or NFPA 805. A licensee may submit a request to use risk-informed or                performance-based performance-based alternatives to compliance with NFPA 805. The request          alternatives to compliance must be in the form of an application for license amendment under &sect; 50.90 of      with NFPA 805 (per this chapter. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or        10 CFR 50.48(c)(4)) were designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or          utilized. See Attachment P.
designee determines that the proposed alternatives:
(i) Satisfy the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; (ii) Maintain safety margins; and (iii) Maintain fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).
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Duke Energy                                                          5.0 Regulatory Evaluation 5.2    Regulatory Topics 5.2.1 License Condition Changes The current HBRSEP fire protection license condition 3.E is being replaced with the standard license condition based upon Regulatory Position 3.1 of RG 1.205, as shown in Attachment M.
5.2.2 Technical Specifications HBRSEP conducted a review of the Technical Specifications to determine which Technical Specifications are required to be revised, deleted, or superseded. HBRSEP determined that the changes to the Technical Specifications and applicable justification listed in Attachment N are adequate for the HBRSEP adoption of the new fire protection licensing basis.
5.2.3 Orders and Exemptions A review was conducted of the HBRSEP docketed correspondence to determine if there were any orders or exemptions that needed to be superseded or revised. A review was also performed to ensure that compliance with the physical protection requirements, security orders, and adherence to those commitments applicable to the plant are maintained. A discussion of affected orders and exemptions is included in Attachment O.
5.3    Regulatory Evaluations 5.3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration A written evaluation of the significant hazards consideration of a proposed license amendment is required by 10 CFR 50.92. According to 10 CFR 50.92, a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
* Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
* Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
* Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
This evaluation is contained in Attachment Q.
Based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. HBRSEP has evaluated the proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration.
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Duke Energy                                                        5.0 Regulatory Evaluation 5.3.2 Environmental Consideration Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an evaluation of the LAR has been performed to determine whether it meets the criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c). That evaluation is discussed in Attachment R. The evaluation confirms that this LAR meets the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the need for an environmental impact assessment or statement.
5.4 Revision to the UFSAR After the approval of the LAR, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e), the HBRSEP UFSAR will be revised. The format and content will be consistent with NEI 04-02 FAQ 12-0062. This will occur during the implementation phase. Changes to the UFSAR are controlled under procedure REG-NGGC-0101, Final Safety Analysis Report Revisions.
5.5    Transition Implementation Schedule The following schedule for transitioning HBRSEP to the new fire protection licensing basis requires NRC approval of the LAR in accordance with the following schedule:
Implementation of new NFPA 805 fire protection program includes procedure changes, process updates, and training to affected plant personnel. This will occur 12 months after NRC approval. This implementation window is being driven by a planned refueling outage and the availability to schedule operator training to support transition.
Modifications will be completed by the startup of the third refueling outage after issuance of the Safety Evaluation (SE), this is Refueling outage 32, currently scheduled for September/October 2020. Appropriate compensatory measures will be maintained until modifications are complete.
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Duke Energy                                                              6.0 References
 
==6.0    REFERENCES==
 
The following references were used in the development of the TR. Additional references are in the NEI 04-02 Tables in the various Attachments.
Industry References
: 1. NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities Volume 2 Detailed Methodology, EPRI 1008239 Final Report, NUREG/CR-6850 / EPRI 1023259, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, MD, September, 2005.
: 2. NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1, Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods Enhancements, EPRI 1019259, Technical Report, NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, MD, September, 2010.
: 3. NUREG-1824, Volume 1, V&V of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications Volume 1: Main Report, NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., May, 2007.
: 4. NUREG-1824, Volume 3, Verification & Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Volume 3: Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTS), NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P.,
NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., May, 2007.
: 5. NUREG-1934, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1934/EPRI-1019195, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Research, Washington, D. C., November, 2012.
: 6. NUREG-1805, Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTS), Iqbal, N. and Salley, M. H.,
NUREG-1805, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., October, 2004.
: 7. NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis
: 8. NEI 02-03, Guidance for Performing a Regulatory Review of Proposed Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program
: 9. NEI 04-02, Guidance for Implementation of a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program under 10 CFR 50.48(c), Rev. 2, 09-2005.
[ML0608800500]
: 10. NEI 04-06, Guidance for Self-Assessment of Circuit Failures
: 11. NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition
: 12. NIST SP 1026, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Technical Reference Guide, Jones, W. W., Peacock, HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                Page 65
 
Duke Energy                                                                  6.0 References R. D., Forney, G. P., and Reneke, P. A., National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, April, 2009.
: 13. NIST SP 1041, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Users Guide, Peacock, R. D., Jones, W. W., Reneke, P. A., and Forney, G. P., National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, December, 2008.
: 14. NIST SP 1086, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Software Development and Model Evaluation Guide, Peacock, R. D., McGrattan, K., Klein, B., Jones, W. W., and Reneke, P. A.,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, December, 2008.
: 15. NRL/MR/6180-04-8746, Verification and Validation Final Report for Fire and Smoke Spread Modeling and Simulation Support of T-AKE Test and Evaluation, Tatem, P.A., Budnick, E.K., Hunt, S.P., Trelles, J., Scheffey, J.L.,
White, D.A., Bailey, J., Hoover, J., and Williams, F.W., Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, 2004.
: 16. Hughes Associates, Generic Fire Modeling Treatments, Project Number 1SPH02902.030, Revision 0, January 15, 2008.
: 17. Heskestad, G., Peak Gas Velocities and Flame Heights of Buoyancy-Controlled Turbulent Diffusion Flames, Eighteenth Symposium on Combustion, The Combustion Institute, Pittsburg, PA, pp. 951-960, 1981.
: 18. Heskestad. G., Engineering Relations for Fire Plumes, Fire Safety Journal, 7:25-32, 1984.
: 19. Yokoi, S., Study on the Prevention of Fire Spread Caused by Hot Upward Current, Report Number 34, Building Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan, 1960.
: 20. Yuan, L. and Cox, F., An Experimental Study of Some Line Fires, Fire Safety Journal, 27, 1996.
: 21. SFPE, The SFPE Engineering Guide for Assessing Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires, Society of Fire Protection Engineers, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, June, 1999.
: 22. SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Section 3-1, Heat Release Rates, Babrauskas, V., The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition, P. J. DiNenno, Editor-in-Chief, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2008.
: 23. NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition
: 24. ASME/ANS Ra-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS Ra-Sa-2008, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, American Society of Mechanical Engineers/American Nuclear Society, New York, HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 66
 
Duke Energy                                                              6.0 References
: 25. NUREG-1824, Volume 5, Verification and Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications Volume 5: Consolidated Fire Growth and Transport Model, NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., May, 2007.
: 26. EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756, EPRI Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide Plant Specific References
: 1. AOP-014, Loss of CCW
: 2. AOP-022, Loss of Service Water
: 3. AOP-041, Response to Fire Event
: 4. CAP-NGGC-0200, Condition Identification and Screening Process
: 5. DSP-001, Alternate Shutdown Diagnostic
: 6. DSP-002, Hot Shutdown Using the Dedicated/Alternate Shutdown System
: 7. EDMG-001, Extreme Damage Event Early Actions
: 8. EDMG-002, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
: 9. EDMG-003, Condensate Storage Tank (CST)
: 10. EDMG-005, Containment Vessel (CV)
: 11. EDMG-011, Spent Fuel Pit Casualty
: 12. EDMG-012, Core Cooling Using Alternate Water Source
: 13. EDMG-013, Airborne Release Scrubbing
: 14. EGR-NGGC-0003, Design Review Requirements
: 15. EGR-NGGC-0005, Engineering Change
: 16. EGR-NGGC-0010, System & Component Trending Program and System Notebooks
: 17. EGR-NGGC-0017, Preparation and Control of Design Analyses and Calculations
: 18. EPP-001, Loss of All AC Power
: 19. FIR-NGGC-0009, NFPA 805 Transient Combustibles and Ignition Source Controls Program
: 20. FIR-NGGC-0010, Fire Protection Program Change Process
: 21. FIR-NGGC-0101, Fire Protection Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA)
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                Page 67
 
Duke Energy                                                              6.0 References
: 22. FPIP-0121, Radiological Release Reviews During Fire Fighting Activities
: 23. HBR2-0B060, Electrical Installation Practices, Notes and Details
: 24. RNP-M/MECH-1826, Hot Gas Layer Calculation
: 25. NED-M/MECH-1006, Generic Fire Modeling Treatments
: 26. NED-M/MECH-1007, Radiant Energy Target Damage Profile
: 27. NED-M/MECH-1008, Fire Zone of Influence Calculation
: 28. NED-M/MECH-1009, Thermal Damage Time of Cables Above a Burning Ignition Source
: 29. OMA-NGGC-0203, Shutdown Risk Management
: 30. OMM-002, Fire Protection Manual
: 31. OMM-003, Fire Protection Pre-Plan
: 32. OMM-033, Implementation of CV Closure
: 33. OMP-003, Shutdown Safety Function Guidelines
: 34. PRO-NGGC-0204, Procedure Review and Approval
: 35. RDC-NGGC-0001, NGG Standard Records Management Program
: 36. REG-NGGC-0101, Final Safety Analysis Report Revisions
: 37. Report Number 0004-0042-412-002, Evaluation of Main Control Room Abandonment Times at the H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant
: 38. Report Number 0004-0042-000-001, Evaluation of the Development and Timing of Hot Gas Layer Conditions in RNP Fire Zone 20
: 39. Report Number P2217-1021-01-01, Robinson Fire PRA Quantification Calculation
: 40. Report Number P2217-1021-01-03
: 41. RNP-E/ELEC-1216, The Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis for H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant
: 42. RNP-E/ELEC-1217, Non-Power Operations
: 43. RNP-F/PSA-0006, RNP Initiating Events Assessment
: 44. RNP-F/PSA-0014, Post Initiator Human Reliability Analysis
: 45. RNP-F/PSA-0018, PSA Model Appendix A - System Notebooks
: 46. RNP-F/PSA-0043, RNP PRA - Accident Sequence Notebook
: 47. RNP-F/PSA-0066, RNP Fire PRA Component Selection
: 48. RNP-F/PSA-0067, RPN Fire PRA Plant Partitioning and Ignition Frequency
: 49. RNP-F/PSA-0074, RNP Uncertainty Analysis
: 50. RNP-F/PSA-0077, RNP Quantification Calculation HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                Page 68
 
Duke Energy                                                          6.0 References
: 51. RNP-F/PSA-0094, RNP Fire PSA Quantification
: 52. RNP-F/PSA-0095, RNP Fire PRA - NFPA 805 Transition Support
: 53. RNP-M/MECH-1826, Hot Gas Layer Calculation
: 54. RNP-M/MECH-1884, Verfication and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Robinson Nuclear Plant (RNP) Fire PRA
: 55. SAM-1, Inject into the Steam Generator
: 56. SAM-3, Inject into the RCS
: 57. SAM-4, Inject into Containment
: 58. SAM-6, Control Containment Conditions
: 59. SAM-8, Flood Containment HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                            Page 69
 
Attachment A - NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Duke Energy                                                                                        Fire Protection Program & Design Elements Table B-1 NFPA 805 Ch.3 Transition Details Chapter 3
 
==Reference:==
3.3.4 Insulation Materials Chapter 3 Requirement:        3.3.4 Insulation Materials.
Thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials, ventilation duct materials, and soundproofing materials shall be noncombustible or limited combustible.
Compliance Statement                              Compliance Basis License Amendment Required                        NRC approval is being requested in Attachment L.
Reference Document                                                          Doc Details UFSAR,HBR 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)                      Appendix 9.5.1.B-6 CPL-HBR2-M-025,Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC)            Section II-2.01 Main Plant Fabrication and Installation CPL-HBR2-M-028,Specification for RHR Pump Pit to HVE-5 Exhaust              Section II-2.01 Tie-In Fabrication and Installation L2-M-039,Piping and Equpment Thermal Insulation                              Section 4.4.1.4 GID/87038-0014,Fire Barrier System                                          ALL Table B-1 NFPA 805 Ch.3 Transition Details Chapter 3
 
==Reference:==
3.3.5 Electrical.
Chapter 3 Requirement:        N/A Compliance Statement                              Compliance Basis N/A                                              N/A - General statement; No technical requirements.
Table B-1 NFPA 805 Ch.3 Transition Details Chapter 3
 
==Reference:==
3.3.5.1 [Electrical Wiring Above Suspended Ceiling Limitations]
Chapter 3 Requirement:        3.3.5.1 Wiring above suspended ceiling shall be kept to a minimum. Where installed, electrical wiring shall be listed for plenum use, routed in armored cable, routed in metallic conduit, or routed in cable trays with solid metal top and bottom covers.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                                                                    Page A-14
 
Duke Energy                            Attachment I - Definition of Power Block I. Definition of Power Block 1 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                        Page I-1
 
Duke Energy                                                Attachment I - Definition of Power Block The structures in the Owner Controlled Area were evaluated to determine those structures that contain equipment that is required to meet the nuclear safety performance criteria and radioactive release performance criteria described in Section 1.5 of NFPA 805.
For the purposes of establishing the structures included in the Fire Protection program in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805, plant structures listed in the following table are considered to be part of the power block.
Table I Power Block Definition Power Block                  Fire Areas                                Notes Structures A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, Includes Waste evaporator area A9, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, Auxiliary Building A15, A16, A17, A19, B, C, D, E, G4 Control Room            A18                            Includes Hagan Room Containment Building    F G1                              Includes the Dedicated Shutdown Transformer, Main and Auxiliary Start-Up Transformer Yard, Turbine Building Refueling Water Storage Tank, Primary Water Storage Tank, Condensate Storage Tank Diesel Fuel Oil Storage G2 Tank Intake Structure        G3 G4                              Includes the Cask Preparation Area, Hot Fuel Handling Building                                  Machine Shop and Fuel Building, Radwaste Building, Purge inlet valve room, 115kV and 230kV        G5                              Includes Unit 1 and 2 Switchyard Switchyards Dedicated Shutdown      G7 Diesel Generator Enclosure Residual Heat Removal  H Pump Room YARD                            Secondary Sampling Building, Nitrogen Storage and C Auxiliary Boiler, Condensate Polishing Building, Deepwell Pump A Area South of Unit YARD                                                    1 Service Building, Deepwell Pump C area North side of O&M Building, and the Deepwell Pump D Enclosure, Diesel Fuel Oil Unloading/Transfer Area The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Area was considered for Radioactive Release fire fighting activities. This area is not included in the NFPA 805 definition of power block or any analysis because it is licensed under 10 CFR Part 72.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                  Page I-2
 
Duke Energy                          Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V J. Fire Modeling V&V 23 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                              Page J-1
 
Duke Energy                                                Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V INTRODUCTION This attachment documents the verification and validation (V&V) of the fire models as applied to the Robinson Fire PRA following the guidance documented in NUREG-1824, and NUREG-1934. These documents are relatively recent joint publications by the US NRC and the Electric Power Research Institute intended to provide guidance on how to conduct and document fire modeling studies, as well as develop the necessary V&V material for supporting these studies.
The analysis summarized in this appendix is based on the technical material documented in RNP-M/MECH-1884, Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Robinson Nuclear Plant (HBRSEP) Fire PRA. The summary covers all the fire models and the fire modeling applications within the Robinson Nuclear Plant Fire PRA as documented in the different calculations prepared for those purposes during the development of the Fire PRA. Each of the models used in the different calculations is identified and a V&V discussion is provided. The report also includes a summary table listing the fire models with the corresponding V&V results.
SCOPE The scope of this study includes the V&V of fire models based on the guidance available in NUREG-1824 and NUREG-1934 as applied in the HBRSEP Fire PRA. The following subsections list and describe the HBRSEP fire modeling calculations within the scope of the V&V study.
Zone Models (CFAST)
The computer model CFAST, is used in the main control room abandonment study documented in Report 0004-0042-412-002, Rev. 1, Evaluation of Control Room Abandonment Times at the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant and to document hot gas layer conditions in Fire Zone 20 in Report 0004-0042-000-001, Rev. 1, Evaluation of the Development and Timing of Hot Gas Layer Conditions in HBRSEP Fire Zone 20, respectively. The V&V for CFAST in the HBRSEP main control room abandonment study and in the Fire Zone 20 hot gas layer calculation is included in the respective report and is summarized in this document for completeness purposes.
Engineering Calculations (Hand Calculations)
The HBRSEP Fire PRA is characterized by a number of engineering (i.e., hand calculations) used throughout the analysis for various purposes. The following subsections provide a brief description of these calculations.
Hot Gas Layer Calculations The report RNP-M/MECH-1826, Rev. 1, "Hot Gas Layer Calculation", documents the approach for determining the damage time for cables immersed in a hot gas layer. The hand calculations used for this analysis are the MHQ room temperature correlation for rooms assuming an open door (NUREG-1805, Chapter 2.1) and the Beyler room temperature correlation for closed doors room (NUREG-1805, Chapter 2.3). The document also includes an analysis for screening multi compartment combinations. In general, hot gas layer temperatures are calculated for selected fire zones. If the hot gas HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                    Page J-2
 
Duke Energy                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V layer temperature is calculated to be lower than the damage thresholds for cables, the multi compartment scenario is screened.
Cable Tray Fire Propagation NED-M/MECH-1009, Rev. 0, "Thermal Damage Time of Cables Above a Burning Ignition Source". This calculation describes the approach for determining the time to damage or ignition of the closest cable tray or conduit to an ignition source and subjected to fire plume conditions. The calculation produces a look up table for damage or ignition times that are used in the quantification process for calculating non suppression probabilities. The fire model within the scope of this validation and verification study is the Heskestad Plume Temperature Correlation documented in Chapter 9 of NUREG-1805.
ZOI Calculations The ZOI calculations in the HBRSEP Fire PRA are based on hand calculations. These calculations are documented in the following reports:
* NED-M/MECH-1008, "Fire Zone of Influence Calculation". The goal of this calculation is to calculate ZOI values for various fire sizes that are conservative, encompass a broad set of fuel packages, and integrate more effectively with the scoping fire modeling process. The fire models within the scope of this V&V study are the Heskestad Plume Temperature Correlation documented in Chapter 9 of NUREG-1805 and the solid flame radiation model documented in Section 5.2 of NUREG-1805.
* NED-M/MECH-1007, "Radiant Energy Target Damage Profile": The purpose of this document is to provide a refinement of the radiant energy ZOI calculation used for identification of transients from electrical cabinet fires. The fire models within the scope of this V&V and the solid flame radiation model documented in Section 5.2 of NUREG-1805.
* NED-M/MECH-1006, "Generic Fire Modeling Treatments": The generic treatments document offers a set of pre-defined ZOI calculations. A number of fire models are subjected to V&V. These models are listed in Table J-1.
* RNP-0206, Analysis of Oil Fires for Compressors in the Lower Hallway (Fire Zone 7). This report calculates damage that may occur in the vicinity of equipment (i.e., compressors) due to radiant affects and due to plume affects after an oil spill fire scenario. The report evaluates the fire size and determines whether resulting damage to cables and components takes place. The fire ZOI is determined using methods and tools provided by NUREG-1805, Fire Dynamics Tools.
* P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3, Robinson Fire PRA Exposed Structural Steel-Fire Interaction Analysis. This report analyzes the potential risk for structural damage due to a high hazard fire affecting the integrity of exposed structural steel. If a high hazard fire source was identified, it was determined if the fire source was located within the ZOI, where exposed steel could be damaged by the plume or by flame radiation. The Heskestad Plume Temperature Correlation HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                      Page J-3
 
Duke Energy                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V documented in Chapter 9 of NUREG 1805 and the point source radiation model documented in Chapter 5 of NUREG 1805.
REFERENCES This section lists the references utilized in this report to perform the fire model V&V.
References are classified as Industry and plant specific.
Industry References
: 1. NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities Volume 2 Detailed Methodology, EPRI 1008239 Final Report, NUREG/CR-6850 / EPRI 1023259, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, MD, September, 2005.
: 2. NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1, Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods Enhancements, EPRI 1019259, Technical Report, NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, MD, September, 2010.
: 3. NUREG-1824, Volume 1, V&V of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications Volume 1: Main Report, NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., May, 2007.
: 4. NUREG-1824, Volume 3, Verification & Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Volume 3: Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTS), NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P.,
NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., May, 2007.
: 5. NUREG-1934, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1934/EPRI-1019195, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Research, Washington, D. C., November, 2012.
: 6. NUREG-1805, Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTS), Iqbal, N. and Salley, M. H.,
NUREG-1805, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., October, 2004.
: 7. NIST SP 1026, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Technical Reference Guide, Jones, W. W., Peacock, R. D., Forney, G. P., and Reneke, P. A., National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, April, 2009.
: 8. NIST SP 1041, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Users Guide, Peacock, R. D., Jones, W. W., Reneke, P. A., and Forney, G. P., National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, December, 2008.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                      Page J-4
 
Duke Energy                                                Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V
: 9. NIST SP 1086, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Software Development and Model Evaluation Guide, Peacock, R. D., McGrattan, K., Klein, B., Jones, W. W., and Reneke, P. A.,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, December, 2008.
: 10. NRL/MR/6180-04-8746, Verification and Validation Final Report for Fire and Smoke Spread Modeling and Simulation Support of T-AKE Test and Evaluation, Tatem, P.A., Budnick, E.K., Hunt, S.P., Trelles, J., Scheffey, J.L.,
White, D.A., Bailey, J., Hoover, J., and Williams, F.W., Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, 2004.
: 11. Hughes Associates, Generic Fire Modeling Treatments, Project Number 1SPH02902.030, Revision 0, January 15, 2008.
: 12. Heskestad, G., Peak Gas Velocities and Flame Heights of Buoyancy-Controlled Turbulent Diffusion Flames, Eighteenth Symposium on Combustion, The Combustion Institute, Pittsburg, PA, pp. 951-960, 1981.
: 13. Heskestad. G., Engineering Relations for Fire Plumes, Fire Safety Journal, 7:25-32, 1984.
: 14. Yokoi, S., Study on the Prevention of Fire Spread Caused by Hot Upward Current, Report Number 34, Building Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan, 1960.
: 15. Yuan, L. and Cox, F., An Experimental Study of Some Line Fires, Fire Safety Journal, 27, 1996.
: 16. SFPE, The SFPE Engineering Guide for Assessing Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires, Society of Fire Protection Engineers, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, June, 1999.
: 17. SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Section 3-1, Heat Release Rates, Babrauskas, V., The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition, P. J. DiNenno, Editor-in-Chief, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2008.
: 18. NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition
: 19. ASME/ANS Ra-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS Ra-Sa-2008, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, American Society of Mechanical Engineers/American Nuclear Society, New York,
: 20. NUREG-1824, Volume 5, Verification and Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications Volume 5: Consolidated Fire Growth and Transport Model, NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., May, 2007.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                  Page J-5
 
Duke Energy                                                  Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Plant Specific References
: 1. RNP-M/MECH-1826, "Hot Gas Layer Calculation".
: 2. NED-M/MECH-1008, "Fire Zone of Influence Calculation".
: 3. NED-M/MECH-1009, "Thermal Damage Time of Cables Above a Burning Ignition Source".
: 4. NED-M/MECH-1006, "Generic Fire Modeling Treatments".
: 5. NED-M/MECH-1007, "Radiant Energy Target Damage Profile".
: 6. Report Number 0004-0042-412-002, Evaluation of Main Control Room Abandonment Times at the H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant.
: 7. Report Number 0004-0042-000-001, Evaluation of the Development and Timing of Hot Gas Layer Conditions in RNP Fire Zone 20.
: 8. RNP-0206, Analysis of Oil Fires for Compressors in the Lower Hallway (Fire Zone 7).
: 9. Report Number P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3, Robinson Fire PRA Exposed Structural Steel-Fire Interaction Analysis.
: 10. RNP-M/MECH-1884, Rev. 1, Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Robinson Nuclear Plant (RNP) Fire PRA VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION This section includes Table J-1 and Table J-2, which present a summary of the fire models with the corresponding V&V results. Specifically, Table J-1 summarizes the verification and validation results for the different fire modeling calculations listed earlier under the scope section. Table J-2 is specifically devoted to discussing the validation for the fire models used in the generic fire modeling treatment document. The technical material supporting the summary presented in these tables is documented in RNP-M/MECH-1884, Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Robinson Nuclear Plant (HBRSEP) Fire PRA.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                      Page J-6
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation        Section            Application      Fire Models              Verification                          Validation The ZOI calculations for the Fire Froude number present a few out of range results. All of the out of range cases are due to calculations exceeding the upper limit of the range, suggesting high intensity fires for the selected fire diameter. One reason for exceeding the upper limit is the use of the 98th percentile heat release rates for the corresponding fire diameters. Based on the guidance in Chapter 8 of NUREG, 98th percentile heat release rate values are used for screening and can be The verification of the models Heskestad                                        considered on the high end of the Use of U.S. Nuclear                      used in support of calculation Plume                                            values assigned to ignition sources. In Regulatory                              NED-M/MECH-1008, is Temperature                                      addition, setting the Froude number Commission (NRC)                        provided in NUREG-1805, Correlation                                      calculation to the upper range limit of Fire Dynamics Tools                      which contains pre-s                documented in                                    2.4 for the 98th percentile heat release (FDT ) [NUREG-                          programmed Microsoft Excel NED-M/MECH-1008,                                            Chapter 9 of                                    rate values would result in a larger 5.1            1805.0] to determine                    Spreadsheets. The Fire ZOI Calculations                                      NUREG-1805.                                      diameter. With a larger diameter, the the ZOI of a fire                        spreadsheets from NUREG Solid flame                                      flame height calculation would result in scenario in support of                  1805 are used directly in radiation model                                  shorter flame lengths, and plume scenario development                    NED-M/MECH-1008, documented in                                    temperature calculations would suggest for the HBRSEP Fire                      (Attachment 1) and therefore Section 5.2 of                                  lower temperatures. The out of range PRA                                      additional verification is not NUREG-1805.                                      results are based on conservative ZOI needed.
calculations for the Fire PRA.
Parameters are in range for the fire plume application.
Parameters are out of range for the use of the solid flame radiation model.
The reason for number of ZOI results are out of range is because the ZOI distances are close to the flames and the experiments selected for validation purposes measured radiation at longer distances from the flames. This is a limitation on the available data for validation and not necessarily a HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                Page J-7
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation    Section            Application          Fire Models              Verification                          Validation limitation on the use of the solid flame radiation model for calculating horizontal components of the ZOI for Fire PRA applications. To account for this limitation, it is noted that validation results from Figure 6-8 in Volume 3 of NUREG-1824 suggest significant heat flux over predictions over the intensity levels used for ZOI calculations (i.e.,
2 between 6 and 11 kW/m ) that would result in longer, and therefore conservative, horizontal distances.
The Fire Froude Number for all the cases in the vertical ZOI calculations are within the validation range, indicating the heat release rates relative to the fire diameters for the scenarios described by calculation RNP-0206, are Use of U.S. Nuclear                      The verification of the models within the scope of NUREG-1824. With Regulatory              Heskestad      used in support of calculation regards to the flame length ratio Commission (NRC)        Plume          NED-M/MECH-1008, is            dimensionless parameter, the majority Fire Dynamics Tools      Temperature    provided in NUREG-1805,        of the unconfined cases are above the s                  Correlation    which contains (FDT )                                                                  valid range, an indication that the flame RNP-0206, Analysis                                        documented in  pre-programmed Microsoft
[NUREG-1805.0] to                                                      height exceeds the distance of the of Oil Fires for                                          Chapter 9 of    Excel Spreadsheets. The determine a fire ZOI for                                                target above the fire for both Compressors in the 5.2                                    NUREG-1805. spreadsheets from two pieces of                                                          compressors. These are conservative Lower Hallway                                                              NUREG-1805 are used equipment, the Station  Solid flame                                    calculations for the Fire PRA given that (Fire Zone 7)                                                              directly in Air Compressor Motor,    radiation model                                the thermoplastic cables would be in and the Instrument Air  documented in  NED-M/MECH-1008,              direct contact with the flame and could Compressor B for      Section 5.2 of  (Attachment 1) and therefore  ignite. That is if even with the out of unconfined and          NUREG-1805. additional verification is not range results the cables are set to fail confined fire scenarios.                needed.                        in the fire PRA quantification The confined fire scenario calculation for both compressors results in Fire Froude number and a flame length ratio within the validation ranges included in NUREG-1824.
The Fire Froude numbers calculated for HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-8
 
Duke Energy                                                                                            Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation    Section            Application        Fire Models                Verification                      Validation both the unconfined and confined cases for the horizontal ZOI are within the validation range reported by NUREG-1824.
Most of the radial distance ratio parameters for unconfined fire scenarios are below the valid range for this parameter, indicating that the ZOI for these fire scenarios is characterized by distances close to the flames. These calculations were conducted with the solid flame radiation model described in Chapter 5.2 of NUREG-1805. A review of Figure 6-8 in Volume 3 of NUREG-1824 suggests that the majority of the validation results (with a few exceptions for Cable G in radiation ranges larger 2
than the 6 and 11 kW/m for ZOI calculations) over predict flame radiation, which result in longer horizontal distances for the ZOI. This is a limitation on the available data for validation and not necessarily a limitation on the use of the solid flame radiation model for calculating horizontal components of the ZOI for Fire PRA applications.
The confined fire scenario calculation for both compressors for fire scenarios 2 and 3 results in a Fire Froude number and a radial distance ratio parameter within the validation ranges included in the NUREG-1824 Calculation NED-      Heskestad        The Calculation              Several Fire Froude Numbers fall out NED-M/MECH-1009, M/MECH-1009,          Plume            NED-M/MECH-1009, was        of range either under or over the valid Thermal Damage  5.3            determines the time at Temperature      developed under a QA        range. All of the out of range cases Time of Cables which damage occurs    Correlation      program. During the design  exceeding the upper limit of the range, Above a Burning to cables suspended    documented in    verification review, an      suggest high intensity fires for the HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                        Page J-9
 
Duke Energy                                                                                            Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation Section            Application      Fire Models              Verification                        Validation Ignition Source              over a burning        Chapter 9 of      independent check of the      selected fire diameter. One reason for electrical cabinet. NUREG-1805        quantitative results was      exceeding the upper limit is the use of performed, therefore, results the 98th percentile heat release rates for were found to be consistent  the corresponding fire diameters.
and the calculations included Based on the guidance in Chapter 8 of th in the report have been      NUREG, 98 percentile heat release verified.                    rate values are used for screening and can be considered on the high end of the values assigned to ignition sources.
In addition, setting the Froude number calculation to the upper range limit of 2.4 for the 98th percentile heat release rate values would result in a larger diameter. With a larger diameter, the flame height calculation would result in shorter flame lengths, and plume temperature calculations would suggest lower temperatures. The out of range results are based on conservative ZOI calculations for the Fire PRA.
Cases where the Fire Froude Number results below the validation range indicate low intensity fires where the fire HRR is low compared to the pool fire area. This occurs for the lowest three HRR cases included in the calculation (i.e., 69, 143 and 211 kW) at different fire diameters. These are cases where the thermal plume that is expected from the ignition source fire could be wider than the range evaluated in NUREG-1824. A wider thermal plume will have a greater entrainment rate than one associated with a similar heat release rate fire that has a smaller diameter. This means that the conditions relative to a source fire that falls within the validation range will be less severe in terms of temperature.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                      Page J-10
 
Duke Energy                                                                                            Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation  Section            Application        Fire Models              Verification                        Validation These are cases where damage to the target occurs most likely due to direct flame impingement before damage time to the target occurs.
Several flame length ratio calculations resulted out of range. All of these results are above the high end of the validation range, meaning that the length of the flame was always greater than the height of the target above the fire source causing direct flame impingement on the target. For these cases, given the diameter and HRR of the fire, direct flame impingement occurred to the target cable. Thus, a larger fire diameter would result in flame length ratios within the validation range but lower Fire Froude Numbers. Thus, the values of flame length ratio that are not within the validation range are based on conservative calculations for the Fire PRA.
To ensure the equations were The comparison of dimensionless coded correctly in the      parameters with the validation range Calculation NED-                                                      suggest a number of out of range spreadsheets used in the M/MECH-1007, utilizes                                                results, which are expected for both the calculation, the spreadsheet the U.S. Nuclear                                                      Fire Froude Number and the radial results were checked against Regulatory                                                            distance ratio dimensionless parameter.
Solid flame    the results of the NED-M/MECH-1007,                Commission (NRC)                                                      For the radial distance ratio radiation model NUREG-1805 FDTs Solid Radiant Energy                  Fire Dynamics Tools                                                  dimensionless parameter, all the 5.4                                    documented in  Flame Model 2 spreadsheet Target Damage                  (FDTs) [NUREG-                                                        calculations that are out of range are Section 5.2 of  for identical inputs. Both Profile                        1805.0] to determine a                                                on the low side of the range. This NUREG-1805. spreadsheet models were radiative ZOI from                                                    happens because the target is close to found to produce the same electrical cabinet fires                                              the flames and the experiments results (NED-M/MECH-1007),
to qualified and                                                      selected for validation purposes therefore the spreadsheets unqualified cables.                                                  measured radiation at longer distances used in the calculations are considered verified.        of the target from the flames. This is a limitation on the available data for HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                      Page J-11
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation    Section            Application        Fire Models              Verification                          Validation validation and not necessarily a limitation on the use of the solid flame radiation model for calculating horizontal components of the ZOI for Fire PRA applications. To account for this limitation, it is noted that validation results, from Figure 6-8 in Volume 3 of NUREG-1824, suggest significant heat flux over predictions over the intensity levels used for ZOI calculations (i.e.,
2 between 6 and 11 kW/m ) that would result in longer, and therefore conservative, horizontal distances.
The Beyler room temperature Calculation correlation was developed using data RNP-M/MECH-1826, with a maximum temperature rise of determines the fire heat The hand 150&deg;C. Extrapolation of this correlation release rate necessary  calculations to higher temperatures (330&deg;C) is to generate a damaging  used for this justified by using the Beyler correlation hot gas layer within a  analysis are the only when it is the most conservative compartment or          MHQ room The fire modeling documented    result (i.e., lower estimate of HRR for multicompartment for a  temperature in this calculation is a        room-wide damage to cables),
given floor area.        correlation for Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet    compared to the MQH correlation, Furthermore, this        rooms supplemented with VBA          which is validated at higher calculation describes    assuming an RNP-M/MECH-1826,                                                          Macros. The spreadsheet is a    temperatures the process for          open door Hot Gas Layer    5.5                                                      custom built fire modeling tool The results show that the majority of the crediting the heat      (NUREG-1805, Calculation                                                              that uses the same closed-      compartment ratio parameters are soak time. The heat    Chapter 2.1) form room temperature          within the valid range, suggesting that soak time refers to the and the Beyler correlations (Sections 5.1 and  the room size of these fire scenarios lag time between the    room 5.3 of NUREG-1805) that are    was included in the V&V study temperature              temperature provided in NUREG-1824          described in NUREG-1824. Those surrounding the cable    correlation for targets and the          closed doors                                    compartment aspect ratios that fall temperatures inside the  room                                            outside the application range do so on cable targets            (NUREG-1805,                                    both ends of the range. This can be generating the          Chapter 2.3).                                    explained by the limited experiments electrical damage                                                        selected for the validation study. As and/or ignition.                                                          indicated in NUREG-1934, the selected experiments are representative of HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-12
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation        Section            Application        Fire Models            Verification                          Validation various types of spaces in commercial NPPs, but do not encompass all possible geometries or applications.
This is a limitation on the available data for validation and not necessarily a limitation on the use of the model for calculating HGL scenarios applicable to the Fire PRA. To address this limitation, it is noted that both the MQH and Beyler room temperature models are reported to overpredict room temperatures for most configurations in Table 3-1 of NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (which lists a yellow-plus) and Table 4-1 in NUREG-1934 (which suggests an average bias of 1.44). This over prediction throughout the evaluated scenarios suggest that the configurations that are outside the validation range in this application will also result in temperature over predictions.
The Generic Fire Modeling Treatments,                    The calculation development Revision 0 document is                  and review process in place at used to establish ZOI                    the time the Generic Fire NED-M/MECH-1006,                    for specific classes of  Listed in Table Modeling Treatments Generic Fire          5.6            ignition sources and    2 later in this document was prepared          Listed in Table 2 later in this section.
Modeling Treatments                  primarily serves as a    section        included contributions from a screening calculation in                calculation preparer, a the Fire PRA under                      calculation reviewer, and a NUREG/CR-6850                            calculation approver.
Sections 8 and 11.
Report No.                          Calculation of main                      Attachment 4 of Report        A full validation study for the analysis is 0004-0042-412-002,                  control room            CFAST,          0004-0042-412-002, includes    described in Section A4.5.1 of Report Evaluation of Control 5.7            abandonment times.                      a software description and    0004-0042-412-002. The Version 6.1.1 Room Abandonment                    The abandonment                          benchmark V&V. The            non-dimensional parameters that affect Times at the H. B.                  times are then used as                  attachment provides a          the model results as documented in HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                Page J-13
 
Duke Energy                                                                                              Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation Section            Application        Fire Models              Verification                            Validation Robinson Nuclear            inputs to the risk                      description of the verification  NUREG-1824, Volumes 1 and 5 and Plant                        quantification of main                  documentation for CFAST.        NUREG-1934, include the model control room fire                        The primary documents            geometry, the equivalence ratio, the fire scenarios. The report                    applicable to this effort are    Froude Number, and the flame length provides operator                        NIST SP 1086 (Ref. 9),          ratio.
abandonment times in                    NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref.      All non-dimensional geometry the HBRSEP MCR due                      3), and NUREG-1824, Volume      parameters fall within the to visibility reduction                  5 (Ref. 20). A benchmark        NUREG-1824, Vol. 1 validation range of and/or temperature                      installation and verification    0.6 - 5.7.
increase for fire                        procedure is provided by NIST scenarios in the                        (Ref. 8) to ensure correct      Table A4-5 of Report 0004-0042-412-HBRSEP MCR. Fire                        installation and proper function 002, shows the approximate Fire sizes are postulated                    of the CFAST model              Froude Number for NUREG/CR-6850, using the discretized                    components. This procedure      Appendix E Case 8 (Transient Fires).
distributions for specific              was performed as part of the    The table indicates that the Fire Froude types of electronic                      verification process.            Number falls below the NUREG-1824 equipment fires and                                                      validation range of 0.4 - 2.4 in nearly transient combustible                                                    all cases, which means that the thermal fires as described in                                                    plume that is expected from the ignition NUREG/CR-6850.                                                            source fire could be wider than the range evaluated in NUREG-1824. A wider thermal plume will have a greater entrainment rate than one associated with a similar heat release rate fire that has a smaller diameter. This means that the conditions relative to a source fire that falls within the validation range will be less severe both in terms of the concentration of combustion products and the temperature. In the case of the Main Control Room the results are conservative when applied to low Fire Froude Number fire scenarios.
Regarding the equivalence ratio calculation, Report 0004-0042-412-002, demonstrates that all cases fall within the NUREG-1824 validation range (i.e.,
0.04-0.6). The global equivalence ratio for normal air supply to the MCR is HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                          Page J-14
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation      Section            Application        Fire Models              Verification                          Validation assessed using the ratio of the maximum supported fire size to the fire size postulated. The report indicates that the fresh air supply and the initial oxygen concentration within the HBRSEP MCR is capable of supporting a fire on the order of 1,990 kW (1890 Btu/s) for twenty-five minutes when the HVAC system is providing outside air and 1,440 kW (1,360 kW) when the HVAC system is not providing outside air. At an equivalence ratio of 0.6, the maximum fire size would be about 1,194 kW (1,132 Btu/s). This is larger than the transient, single bundle electrical panel, and multiple bundle electrical panel fire scenarios.
However, the workstation and the propagating MCB panel fire scenarios (Bin 7 and above) have fire sizes that are greater than 1,194 kW (1,132 Btu/s) at least for a portion of the scenario.
When the time at which the abandonment is predicted is factored into the equivalence ratio calculation, it is shown that all cases have equivalence ratios less than 0.6 up to the time that abandonment is predicted.
Analysis of the hot gas                  Attachment B of Report          Tables A2-7 through A2-10 of Report Report No.                          layer temperature and                    0004-0042-000-001, describes    0004-0042-000-001, summarize the 0004-0042-000-001,                  soot concentration                      the Verification for the CFAST  non-dimensional parameters for a Evaluation of the                  conditions in the                        model Version 6.1.1.54. The    transient fuel package fire and the Development and                    Robinson Nuclear Plant  CFAST Version    attachment provides a          electrical panel fires as located in the 5.8 Timing of the Hot                  (HBRSEP) fire          6.1.1.54        description of the verification E1/E2 Switchgear Room and the Gas Layer Conditions                compartments for                        documentation for CFAST.        Safeguards Room for the initial ignition in HBRSEP Fire                      transient ignition                      The primary documents          source. The tables indicate that the Zone 20                            sources and electronic                  applicable to this effort are  transient fire scenario parameters and panel ignition sources                  NIST SP 1086 (Ref. 9),          most of the panel fire scenario HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-15
 
Duke Energy                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation  Section            Application      Fire Models              Verification                        Validation that involve secondary                  NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. parameters fall within the combustibles (cable                      3), and NUREG-1824, Volume  NUREG-1824, Volume 1 parameter trays). Fire scenarios                  5 (Ref. 20).                space range. Several of the panel fires are evaluated in the                                                  have fire Froude Numbers that are E1/E2 Switchgear                                                      somewhat below or above the Room and the                                                          NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. 3) range.
Safeguards Room, in                                                  In addition, the flame height to the Reactor Auxiliary                                                enclosure ratio is greater than the Building (RAB).                                                      NUREG, Vol. 1 (Ref. 3) range for the smallest diameter panel (MCCs) in the Safeguards Room.
The large flame length predicted for the Safeguards Room panel fire scenario is not expected to adversely affect the calculation results. In the case of the Halon actuation, the fire size at the time the smoke detectors actuate is much smaller than the peak fire size upon which the values in Table A2-8 are derived. In this case, the flame length will be shorter than the ceiling and the application will be within the NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. 3) range.
Although this line of reasoning does not apply to the hot gas layer temperature calculation, it may be inferred that the overall treatment of the electronic panel fire, especially in the MCCs, is not representative of the way in which they will actually behave if ignited. The MCCs are relatively well sealed and external combustion may occur at gaps or seams in the MCC enclosure. The CFAST model conservatively removes the metal enclosure and places the fire 0.3 m (1 ft) below the panel top.
The actual flame length will be shorter and within the NUREG-1824, Vol. 1 HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                    Page J-16
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation          Section            Application      Fire Models              Verification                          Validation (Ref. 3) test basis.
The fire Froude Numbers for several panels are shown in Tables A2-7 and A2-8 of Report 0004-0042-000-001 to be either lower or higher than the range evaluated in NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. 3). A similar argument that was developed for the flame length applies to the fire Froude Number. The characteristic length is somewhat arbitrarily established using the panel plan dimensions. The actual characteristic length is difficult to assess since the panel is not a simple two-dimensional fuel package. Burning will occur at the vents, if present, and gaps and seams, all of which are smaller than the characteristic dimension. From a macroscopic perspective, the 464 kW (440 Btu/s) electronic panel fire is a common plant ignition source and is not significantly different from the types of source fires considered in the NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. 3) test series.
The verification of the models The vertical ZOI calculations for the Fire Heskestad used in support of calculation Froude number present several out of Use of U.S. Nuclear    Plume P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3, is    range results. Most of the out of Regulatory            Temperature provided in NUREG-1805,        range cases are due to calculations Commission (NRC)      Correlation P2217-2300-01-03,                                                              which contains pre-            exceeding the upper limit of the range, Fire Dynamics Tools    documented in Rev 3, Structural                                                              programmed Microsoft Excel    suggesting high intensity fires for the (FDTs) [NUREG-        Chapter 9 of Steel-Fire Interaction 5.9                                                    Spreadsheets. The              selected fire diameter. One reason for 1805.0] to determine  NUREG 1805.
Analysis Fire ZOI                                                              spreadsheets from NUREG        exceeding the upper limit is the use of the ZOI of a fire      Point source Calculations                                                                  1805 are used directly in      the 98th percentile heat release rates scenario in support of radiation model P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3,      for the corresponding fire diameters.
scenario development  documented in (Attachment B) and therefore  Based on the guidance in Chapter 8 of for the RNP Fire PRA  Section 5.3.1 of additional verification is not NUREG, 98th percentile heat release NUREG 1805.
needed.                        rate values are used for screening and HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                Page J-17
 
Duke Energy                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation  Section        Application          Fire Models              Verification                        Validation can be considered on the high end of the values assigned to ignition sources.
In addition, setting the Froude number calculation to the upper range limit of 2.4 for the 98th percentile heat release rate values would result in a larger diameter. With a larger diameter, the flame height calculation would result in shorter flame lengths, and plume temperature calculations would suggest lower temperatures. The out of range results are based on conservative ZOI calculations for the Fire PRA.
In the transient case, with the fire in the center of the room, the Fire Froude number is out of range on the lower limit. The other two transient cases, with a fire on the wall and in the corner, have higher HRR values and are within the validation range of the Fire Froude number. Both of these scenarios (wall and corner) are more conservative than the transient fire in the center of the room. Since all three of the transient scenarios were screened out in the structural steel-impact analysis (P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3), including the more conservative wall and corner scenarios, the use of the model for the transient scenarios is justified.
Flame length ratio is within the validation range for all scenarios.
Parameters are out of range for the use of the point source radiation model.
The reason for number of ZOI results are out of range is because the ZOI distances are close to the flames and the experiments selected for validation purposes measured radiation at longer HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                    Page J-18
 
Duke Energy                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation  Section        Application          Fire Models              Verification                        Validation distances from the flames. This is a limitation on the available data for validation and not necessarily a limitation on the use of the point source radiation model for calculating horizontal components of the ZOI for Fire PRA applications. The model limitations presented in Chapter 5.5 of NUREG 1805, indicate that the point source radiation model overestimates the intensity of thermal radiation at target locations close to the fire.
Therefore, the results are conservative and no further justification for the use of the point source radiation model is required.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                    Page J-19
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                      Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                                Subsequent    Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation    Modeling                        Application          Original Correlation Range        Validation and  Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                  Verification*          (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Flame Height  Page 18            Heskestad      Provides a limit                                          Directly (Ref. 19);    on the use of the                                        NUREG-1824, Heskestad      ZOI                5  log 5  Volume 3 (Ref.
(Ref. 20)                                                                23)               
                                                                                                                                < 3000 Indirectly In practice, wood and hydrocarbon      NUREG-1824, fuels, momentum or buoyancy            Volume 5 (Ref.
dominated, with diameters between      42) 0.05 - 10 m (0.16 - 33 ft).
(Correlation used in CFAST)
Point Source  Page 19            Modak (Ref. Lateral extent of  Isotropic flame radiation. Compared    NUREG-1824,    Predicted heat flux at Model                            45)            ZOI -              with data for 0.37 m (1.2 ft) diameter Volume 3 (Ref. target is less than 5 comparison to      PMMA pool fire and a target located    23);            kW/m&#xb2; (0.4 4 Btu/s-ft&#xb2;)
other methods      at a ratio of 10.                      SFPE (Ref. 24)  per SFPE.
Method of    Page 19            Shokri et al. Lateral extent of  Pool aspect ratio less than 2.5.      SFPE (Ref. 24)  Ground based vertical Shokri and                      (Ref. 46)      ZOI -              Hydrocarbon fuel in pools with a      NUREG-1824,    target.
Beyler                                          comparison to      diameter between 1 - 30 m (3.3 -      Volume 3 (Ref.
other methods      98 ft).                                23)
Vertical target, ground level.
Method of    Page 20            Mudan (Ref. Lateral extent of  Round pools;                          SFPE (Ref. 24)  Total energy emitted by Mudan (and                      47)            ZOI -              Hydrocarbon fuel in pools with a                      thermal radiation less Croce)                                          comparison to      diameter between 0.5 - 80 m (1.64 -                    than total heat released.
other methods      262 ft).
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                            Page J-20
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                      Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                                Subsequent    Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation    Modeling                        Application          Original Correlation Range        Validation and    Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                  Verification*          (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Method of    Page 20            Shokri et al. Lateral extent of  Round pools;                          SFPE (Ref. 24)  Predicted heat flux at Shokri and                      (Ref. 46)      ZOI                Hydrocarbon fuel in pools with a                      target is greater than 5 Beyler                                                            diameter between 1 - 50 m (3.3 -                      kW/m&#xb2; (0.44 Btu/s-ft&#xb2;)
NUREG-1824,      per SFPE (Ref. 24).
164 ft).                              Volume 3 (Ref. 23)        Shown to produce most conservative heat flux over range of scenarios considered among all methods considered.
Plume heat    Page 22            Wakamatsu      Vertical extent of Fires with an aspect ratio of about 1 Wakamatsu et    Area source fires with fluxes                          et al. (Ref. ZOI                and having a plan area less than 1    al. (Ref. 48)    aspect ratio ~ 1. Used
: 48)                              m&#xb2; (0.09 ft&#xb2;).                        (larger fires)  with plume centerline SFPE Handbook    temperature correlation; of Fire          most severe of the two is Protection      used as basis for the ZOI Engineering,    dimension. This is not a Section 2-14    constraint in the fire (Ref. 49)        model analysis for the cases evaluated.
Plume        Page 23            Yokoi (Ref. Vertical extent of Alcohol lamp assumed to effectively  NUREG-1824,      Area source fires with centerline                      21);          ZOI                be a fire with a diameter ~0.1 m      Volume 3        aspect ratio ~ 1. Used temperature                      Beyler (Ref.                      (0.33 ft).                            (Ref. 23);      with plume flux
: 50)                                                                    SFPE Handbook    correlation; most severe of Fire          of the two is used as Protection      basis for the ZOI Engineering,    dimension.
Section 2-1 (Ref. 51)
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                          Page J-21
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                      Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                              Subsequent      Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation      Modeling                          Application          Original Correlation Range      Validation and    Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                Verification*            (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Hydrocarbon    Page 51            SFPE          Determine heat    Hydrocarbon spill fires on concrete None. Based on    None. Transition from spill fire size                    Handbook of    release rate for  surfaces ranging from ~1 to ~10 m  limited number    unconfined spill fire to Fire          unconfined        (3.3 - 33 ft) in diameter.          of observations. deep pool burning Protection    hydrocarbon                                                              assumed to be abrupt.
Engineering,  spill fires.
Section 2-15 (Ref. 52)
Flame          Page 100          SFPE          Determine the      Corner fires ranging from ~10 to    None. Based on    None. Offset is assumed extension                          Handbook of    fire offset for    ~1,000 kW (9.5 - 948 Btu/s). Fires  limited number    equal to the depth of the Fire          open panel fires. included gas burners and            of observations. ceiling jet from the Protection                        hydrocarbon pans.                                      experiments.
Engineering, Section 2-14 (Ref. 53)
Line source    Page 101          Delichatsios  Determine the      Theoretical development.            SFPE Handbook      None. Transition to area flame height                      (Ref. 54)      vertical extent of                                    of Fire            source assumed for the ZOI                                                Protection        aspect plan ratios less Engineering,      than four. Maximum of Section 2-14      area and line source (Ref. 49)          predictions used in this region.
Corner flame    Page 108          SFPE          Determine the      Corner fires ranging from ~10 to    None.              None.
height                            Handbook of    vertical extent of ~1,000 kW (9.5 - 948 Btu/s). Fires  Correlation form Fire          the ZOI            included gas burners and            is consistent with Protection                        hydrocarbon pans.                  other methods; Engineering,                                                          comparison to Section 2-14                                                          dataset from (Ref. 53)                                                            SFPE Handbook, Section 2-14 (Ref. 53) provides basis.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-22
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                                Subsequent        Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation      Modeling                          Application          Original Correlation Range        Validation and      Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                  Verification*            (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Air mass flow  Page 140          Kawagoe        Compare            Small scale,  scale, and full scale  Drysdale          None. SFPE (Ref. 57) through                            (Ref. 55)      mechanical        single rooms with concrete and steel  (Ref. 56);        spaces with a wide range opening                                          ventilation and    boundaries. Vent sizes and thus      SFPE (Ref. 57)    of opening factors.
natural            opening factor varied. Wood crib ventilation        fuels.
Line fire flame Page 210          Yuan et al. Provides a limit                                        None.              None.
height                            (Ref. 22)      on the use of the                                        Correlation form ZOI (ZOI);                  0.002 <        < 0.6        is consistent with other methods; Extent of ZOI for In practice, from the base to several comparison to cable tray fires.
times the flame height based on      dataset from 0.015 - 0.05 m (0.05 - 0.16 ft) wide  Yuan et al.
gas burners.                          (Ref. 22) provides basis.
Cable heat      Page 210          NBSIR 85-      Provides          Cables with heat release rates per    None.              Correlation predicts a release rate                      3196 (Ref. assurance that    unit area ranging from about 100 -                      lower heat release rate per unit area                      58)            the method used    1,000 kW/m&#xb2; (8.8 - 88 Btu/s-ft&#xb2;).                        than assumed in the is bounding                                                                Treatments and is based on test data.
Line fire plume Page 212          Yuan et al. Provides a limit                                        None.              None.
centerline                        (Ref. 22)      on the use of the                                        Correlation form temperature                                      ZOI (ZOI);                  0.002 <        < 0.6        is consistent with other methods; Extent of ZOI for In practice, from the base to several comparison to cable tray fires.
times the flame height based on      dataset from 0.015 - 0.05 m (0.05 - 0.16 ft) wide  Yuan et al.
gas burners.                          (Ref. 22) provides basis.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-23
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                              Subsequent    Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation        Modeling                          Application        Original Correlation Range        Validation and  Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                Verification*          (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Ventilation      Page 283          Babrauskas    Assessing the      Ventilation factors between 0.06 -    SFPE (Ref. 57)  None. Provides depth in limited fire size                    (Ref. 59)      significance of    7.51.                                                the analysis of the vent position on  Fire sizes between 11 - 2,800 kW                      selected vent positions.
the hot gas layer  (10 - 2,654 Btu/s)                                    The global equivalence temperature                                                              ratio provides an Wood, plastic, and natural gas fuels.                alternate measure of the applicability of the analysis and for reported output is within the validation range of CFAST.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                Page J-24
 
Duke Energy              Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval L. NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii) 15 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                            Page L-1
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 1 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.1 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.1 states:
Wiring above suspended ceiling shall be kept to a minimum. Where installed, electrical wiring shall be listed for plenum use, routed in armored cable, routed in metallic conduit, or routed in cable trays with solid metal top and bottom covers.
HBRSEP has wiring above suspended ceilings that may not comply with the requirements of this code section.
Suspended ceilings are noncombustible and exist only in the Control Room (FZ 23),
Inside AO Office and old Turbine Building RCA Entrance (FZ 25A). Combustibles in concealed spaces are minimal.
The three areas currently with suspended ceilings inside the NFPA 805 defined power block are in the Control Room (FZ 23), Inside AO Office and old Turbine Building RCA Entrance (FZ 25A). The Inside AO Office and old Turbine Building RCA Entrance (FZ 25A) are not risk significant. Neither of the rooms nor the cables are safety-related.
Most electrical wiring above the Control Room partial suspended ceiling is in conduit except for short flexible connectors to lighting fixtures. There is one eight-foot length of eight-inch diameter UL approved flexible air duct with flame spread rating of 25 or less.
The quantity of cabling above the suspended ceilings in the Control Rooms is very low and results in limited combustible loading. The existing fire detection capability and/or the Control Room Operators who are continuously present in the area would identify the presence of smoke. In addition, no equipment important to nuclear safety is located in the vicinity of these cables.
Video/communication/data cables that have been field routed above suspended ceilings are low voltage. Existing cables for video, communication, and networking may not be plenum rated, but are not generally susceptible to shorts that would result in a fire.
Basis for Request:
The basis for the approval request of this deviation is:
* All electrical wiring above the control room partial suspended ceiling is in conduit except for short flexible connectors to lighting fixtures. According to FAQ 06-0021, cable air drops of limited length (~3 feet) are considered acceptable.
* No equipment important to nuclear safety is located in the vicinity of these cables.
* Minimum amount of cables exist above the Control Room ceiling, which results in limited combustible loading.
* Smoke Detectors are installed both above and below the partial suspended ceiling in the Control Room.
* The Inside AO Office and old Turbine Building RCA Entrance (FZ 25A) are not risk significant. Neither of the rooms nor the cables are safety related.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-2
 
Duke Energy                    Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval
* Existing fleet procedures will be used to ensure that changes moving forward are considered for NFPA 805 impacts. (FIR-NGGC-0010)
Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
The location of wiring above suspended ceilings does not affect nuclear safety. No equipment important to nuclear safety is located in the vicinity of these cables.
Therefore, there is no impact on the nuclear safety performance criteria.
The location of cables above suspended ceilings has no impact on the radiological release performance criteria. The radiological release review was performed based on the manual fire suppression activities in areas containing or potentially containing radioactive materials and is not dependent on the type of cables or locations of suspended ceilings. The location of cables does not change the radiological release evaluation performed that potentially contaminated water is contained and smoke monitored. The cables do not add additional radiological materials to the area or challenge system boundaries that contain such.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page L-3
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
The use of these materials has been defined by the limitations of the analytical methods used in the development of the FPRA. Therefore, the inherent safety margin and conservatisms in these methods remain unchanged.
The three echelons of defense-in-depth are 1) to prevent fires from starting (combustible/hot work controls), 2) rapidly detect, control and extinguish fires that do occur thereby limiting damage (fire detection systems, automatic fire suppression, manual fire suppression, pre-fire plans), and 3) provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed (fire barriers, fire rated cable, success path remains free of fire damage, recovery actions). The prior introduction of non-listed video/communication/data cables routed above suspended ceilings does not impact fire protection defense-in-depth. Echelon 1 is maintained by the current cable installation procedures documenting the requirements of NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.1. The control room is a continuously manned area of the plant. The introduction of cables above suspended ceilings does not affect echelons 2 and 3. The video/communication/data cables routed above suspended ceilings does not result in compromising automatic fire suppression functions, manual fire suppression functions, fire protection for systems and structures, or post-fire safe shutdown capability.
 
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Conclusion:==
 
HBRSEP determined that the performance based approach satisfies the following criteria:
* Satisfies the performance goals performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release
* Defense in Depth
* Safety Margin HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-4
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 2 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.2 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.2 states:
Only metal tray and metal conduits shall be used for electrical raceways. Thin wall metallic tubing shall not be used for power, instrumentation, or control cables. Flexible metallic conduits shall only be used in short lengths to connect components.
The use of PVC piping for underground embedded conduit is permitted by HBRSEP per HBR2-0B060 Sht D6 for electrical raceway installations. Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) or High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) type ducts (conduits) are permitted when embedded in compacted sand or reinforced concrete. In addition, some PVC conduit was found in reinforced concrete wall. The PVC/HDPE conduit is embedded within a noncombustible enclosure which provides protection from mechanical damage and from damage resulting from either an exposure fire or from a fire within the conduit impacting other targets.
Basis for Request:
* The PVC/HDPE conduit, while a combustible material, is not subject to flame/heat impingement from an external source which would result in structural failure, contribution to fire load, and damage to the circuits contained within where the conduit is embedded in concrete or compacted sand.
* Failure of circuits within the conduit resulting in a fire would not result in damage to external targets.
Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
The use of PVC/HDPE conduit in embedded locations does not affect nuclear safety as the material in which conduits are run within an embedded location is not subject to the failure mechanisms potentially resultant in circuit damage or resultant damage to external targets. Therefore there is no impact on the nuclear safety performance criteria.
The use of PVC/HDPE conduits in embedded installations has no impact on the radiological release performance criteria. The radiological release review was performed based on the manual fire suppression activities in areas containing or potentially containing radioactive materials and is not dependent on the type of conduit material. The conduit material does not change the radiological release evaluation performed that concluded that potentially contaminated water is contained and smoke is monitored. The conduits do not add additional radiological materials to the area or challenge systems boundaries that contain such as the PVC/HDPE conduits are embedded.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page L-5
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
The PVC/HDPE conduit material is embedded in a non-combustible configuration. The material is protected when embedded from mechanical damage and from damage resulting from either an exposure fire or from a fire within the conduit impacting other targets. The areas with PVC/HDPE conduit have been analyzed in their current configuration. The precautions and limitations on the use of these materials do not impact the analysis of the fire event. Therefore, the inherent safety margin and conservatisms in these analysis methods remain unchanged.
The three echelons of defense-in-depth are 1) to prevent fires from starting (combustible/hot work controls), 2) rapidly detect, control and extinguish fires that do occur thereby limiting damage (fire detection systems, automatic fire suppression, manual fire suppression, pre-fire plans), and 3) provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed (fire barriers, fire rated cable, success path remains free of fire damage, recovery actions). The use of PVC/HDPE conduits in embedded installations does not impact fire protection defense-in-depth. The PVC/HDPE conduit in embedded installations does not affect echelons 1, 2, and 3. The PVC/HDPE conduits do not directly result in compromising automatic fire suppression functions, manual fire suppression functions, or post-fire safe shutdown capability.
 
==
Conclusion:==
 
HBRSEP determined that the performance based approach satisfies the following criteria
* Satisfies the performance goals performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release
* Defense in Depth
* Safety Margin HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-6
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 3 NFPA 805 Section 3.5.16 NFPA 805 Section 3.5.16 states:
The fire protection water supply system shall be dedicated for fire protection use only.
Exception No. 1: Fire protection water supply systems shall be permitted to be used to provide backup to nuclear safety systems, provided the fire protection water supply systems are designed and maintained to deliver the combined fire and nuclear safety flow demands for the duration specified by the applicable analysis.
Exception No. 2: Fire protection water storage can be provided by plant systems serving other functions, provided the storage has a dedicated capacity capable of providing the maximum fire protection demand for the specified duration as determined in this section.
The review of plant flow diagrams show no hard connections to other plant systems, besides those for fire protection use. It should be noted that although there are no hard pipe connections to other plant systems, there are procedures that utilize the fire protection water supply. They are as follows:
* AOP-014 - Loss of CCW
* AOP-022 - Loss of Service Water
* EDMG-001 - Extreme Damage Event Early Actions
* EDMG-002 - Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
* EDMG-003 - Condensate Storage Tank (CST)
* EDMG-005 - Containment Vessel (CV)
* EDMG-011 - Spent Fuel Pit Casualty
* EDMG-012 - Core Cooling Using Alternate Water Source
* EDMG-013 - Airborne Release Scrubbing
* SAM Inject into the Steam Generator
* SAM Inject into the RCS
* SAM Inject into Containment
* SAM Control Containment Conditions
* SAM Flood Containment The use of the fire protection water for these non-fire protection system water demands would have no adverse impact on the ability of the fire protection system to provide required flow and pressure. OMM-002, Section 8.15, details restrictions and allowances for use of the fire protection water supply system at HBRSEP.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-7
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Basis for Request:
The use of the fire protection water for these non-fire protection system water demands would have no adverse impact on the ability of the fire protection system to provide required flow and pressure. This is based on how fire water usage is restricted (CR 99-01247), in the following ways:
: 1. Fire service related activities (emergency, testing and training).
: 2. When the use of fire water is specifically called out in approved plant procedures (i.e., AOPs).
: 3. During plant emergencies when fire water is needed to protect safety related equipment.
: 4. When usage is deemed necessary AND sufficient justification is provided to show that the use of the fire water system for the proposed activity does not cause the fire water system to be in a condition outside of its design basis (i.e., the quantity of water needed for the proposed activity does not drop supply and pressure below that required/defined in UFSAR Section 9.5.1).
Permission shall have the approval of the Shift Manager (CR 96-00729 and CR 96-00730).
The water supply system is capable of maintaining the pressure in the main plant loop at 70 psi or higher with the largest deluge system in operation and with the system supplying an additional 1000 gpm to hoses.
Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
The use of fire protection water for non-fire protection plant evolutions is an occurrence that requires Shift Manager review and concurrence. The flow limitations to those non-fire protection functions ensure that there is no impact in the ability of the automatic suppression systems to perform Therefore, there is no impact on the nuclear safety performance criteria.
The use of fire protection water for plant evolutions other than fire protection has no impact on the radiological release performance criteria. The radiological release performance criteria is satisfied based on the determination of limiting radioactive release (Attachment E), which is not affected by impacts on the fire protection system due its use for non-fire protection purposes.
Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
The use of the fire water system, including the use of hydrants and hose, for non-fire protection uses does not impact fire protection defense-in-depth. The fire pumps have the excess capacity to supply the demands of the fire protection system as well as the non-fire protection uses identified above. This does not compromise automatic or manual fire suppression functions, fire suppression for systems and structures, or the nuclear safety capability assessment. Since both the automatic and manual fire suppression functions are maintained, defense-in-depth is maintained.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-8
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval The methods, input parameters, and acceptance criteria used in this analysis were reviewed and found to be in accordance with NFPA 805 Chapter 3. The methods, input parameters, and acceptance criteria used to calculate flow requirements for the automatic and manual suppression systems were not altered. Therefore, the safety margin inherent in the analysis for the fire event has been preserved.
 
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Conclusion:==
 
HBRSEP determined that the performance based approach satisfies the following criteria:
* Satisfies the performance goals performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release
* Defense in Depth
* Safety Margin HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-9
 
Duke Energy                          Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 4 NFPA 805 Section 3.2.3(1)
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii), Performance-based methods, the fire protection program elements and minimum design requirements of Chapter 3 may be subject to the performance-based methods permitted elsewhere in the standard.
In accordance with NFPA 805 Section 2.2.8, the performance-based approach to satisfy the nuclear safety, radiation release, life safety, and property damage/business interruption performance criteria requires engineering analyses to evaluate whether the performance criteria are satisfied.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii), the engineering analysis performed shall determine that the performance-based approach utilized to evaluate a variance from the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3:
A. Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; B. Maintains safety margins; and C. Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire nuclear safety capability).
Duke Energy, HBRSEP requests formal approval of performance-based exception to the requirements in Chapter 3 of NFPA 805 as follows:
NFPA 805, Section 3.2.3(1)
    "Procedures shall be established for implementation of the fire protection program.
In addition to procedures that could be required by other sections of the standard, the procedures to accomplish the following shall be established:
Inspection, testing, and maintenance for fire protection systems and features credited by the fire protection program."
Duke Energy, HBRSEP requests the ability to utilize performance-based methods to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features required by NFPA 805. Performance-based inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies will be established as described in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Technical Report TR-1006756, "Fire Protection Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide for Fire Protection", Final Report, July 2003.
Basis for Request:
NFPA 805 Section 2.6, "Monitoring," requires that "A monitoring program shall be established to ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained and to assess the performance of the fire protection program in meeting the performance criteria.
Monitoring shall ensure that the assumptions in the engineering analysis remain valid."
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-10
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval NFPA 805 Section 2.6.1, "Availability, Reliability, and Performance Levels," requires that "Acceptable levels of availability, reliability, and performance shall be established."
NFPA 805 Section 2.6.2, "Monitoring Availability, Reliability, and Performance,"
requires that "Methods to monitor availability, reliability, and performance shall be established. The methods shall consider the plant operating experience and industry operating experience."
The scope and frequency of the inspection, testing, and maintenance activities for fire protection systems and features required in the fire protection program have been established based on the previously approved Technical Specifications / License Controlled Documents and appropriate NFPA codes and standard. This request does not involve the use of the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 to establish the scope of those activities as that is determined by the required systems review identified in Attachment C This request is specific to the use of EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features credited by the fire protection program. As stated in EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 Section 10.1, "The goal of a performance-based surveillance program is to adjust test and inspection frequencies commensurate with equipment performance and desired reliability." This goal is consistent with the stated requirements of NFPA 805 Section 2.6. The EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 provides an accepted method to establish appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies which ensure the required NFPA 805 availability, reliability, and performance goals are maintained.
The target tests, inspections, and maintenance will be those activities for the NFPA 805 required fire protection systems and features. The reliability and frequency goals will be established to ensure the assumptions in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis remain valid. The failure criterion will be established based on the required fire protection systems and features credited functions and will ensure those functions are maintained.
Data collection and analysis will follow the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 document guidance. The failure probability will be determined based on EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 guidance and a 95% confidence level will be utilized. The performance monitoring will be performed in conjunction with the Monitoring Program required by NFPA 805 Section 2.6 and it will ensure site specific operating experience is considered in the monitoring process. The following is a flow chart that identifies the basic process that will be utilized.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-11
 
Duke Energy                  Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval EPRI TR-1006756 - Figure 10-1 Flowchart for Performance-Based Surveillance Program HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                              Page L-12
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Duke Energy, HBRSEP does not intend to revise any fire protection surveillance, test or inspection frequencies until after transitioning to NFPA 805. Existing fire protection surveillance, test and inspection will remain consistent with applicable station, Insurer, and NFPA Code requirements. HBRSEP's intent is to obtain approval via the NFPA 805 Safety Evaluation to use EPRI Technical Report TR1006756 guideline in the future as opportunities arise. Duke Energy, HBRSEP reserves the ability to evaluate fire protection features with the intent of using the EPRI performance-based methods to provide evidence of equipment performance beyond that achievable under traditional prescriptive maintenance practices to ensure optimal use of resources while maintaining reliability.
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
Use of performance-based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, Monitoring Program, will ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis. Therefore, there is no adverse impact to Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria by the use of the performance-based methods in EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756.
The radiological release performance criteria are satisfied based on the determination of limiting radioactive release. Fire Protection Systems and Features may be credited as part of that evaluation. Use of performance-based test frequencies established per the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, Monitoring Program, will ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis which includes those assumptions credited to meet the Radioactive Release performance criteria. Therefore, there is no adverse impact to Radioactive Release performance criteria.
Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
Use of performance-based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods combined with NFPA 805, Section 2.6, Monitoring Program, will ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis which includes those assumptions credited in the Fire Risk Evaluation safety margin discussions. In addition, the use of these methods in no way invalidates the inherent safety margins contained in the codes and standards used for design and maintenance of fire protection systems and features. Therefore, the safety margin inherent and credited in the analysis has been preserved.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-13
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval The three echelons of defense-in-depth described in NFPA 805 Section 1.2 are
: 1) to prevent fires from starting (combustible/hot work controls),
: 2) rapidly detect, control and extinguish fires that do occur thereby limiting damage (fire detection systems, automatic fire suppression, manual fire suppression, pre-fire plans), and
: 3) provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed (fire barriers, fire rated cable, success path remains free of fire damage, recovery actions).
Echelon 1 is not affected by the use of the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods. Use of performance-based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, Monitoring Program, will ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features credited for defense-in-depth are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis. Therefore, there is no adverse impact to echelons 2 and 3 for defense-in-depth.
 
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Conclusion:==
 
NRC approval is requested for use of the performance-based methods contained in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Technical Report TR-1006756, "Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide", Final Report, July 2003 to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features required by NFPA 805. As described above, this approach is considered acceptable because it:
A. Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; B. Maintains safety margins; and C. Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-14
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 5 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.4 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.4 states:
Thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials, ventilation duct materials, and soundproofing materials shall be noncombustible or limited combustible.
Insulation materials such as Armaflex , Neoprene, Styrofoam and other foam based insulating materials are used at HBRSEP. These insulation materials meet flame spread and smoke developed criteria, but do not meet the NFPA 805 definition of non or limited combustible regarding heat value content.
Duke Energy, HBRSEP requests the ability to use thermal insulation materials that meet the flame spread and smoke developed criteria, but do not meet the heat value content criteria of NFPA 805.
Basis for Request:
Armaflex insulation meets the Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5.1/ Appendix R requirements for limited combustibles by meeting the flame spread rating of 25 or less as measured using the test method of ASTM E-84, but does not meet the current heat value content requirement based on an initial review of the definition of a limited combustible due to the heat value exceeding 3500 Btu/Lb.
NFPA 805 Section 3.3.4 requires: Thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials, ventilation duct materials, and soundproofing materials shall be noncombustible or limited combustible. The definition of a limited combustible for NFPA 805 uses the definition from NFPA 220 which states:
1.6.36 Limited Combustible. Material that, in the form in which it is used, has a potential heat value not exceeding 3500 Btu/lb (8141 kJ/kg) and either has a structural base of noncombustible material with a surfacing not exceeding a thickness of 1/8 in. (3.2 mm) that has a flame spread rating not greater than 50, or has another material having neither a flame spread rating greater than 25 nor evidence of continued progressive combustion, even on surfaces exposed by cutting through the material on any plane. (See NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction).
The insulation materials used in the plant have flame spread and smoke developed ratings of 50 or less. Interior walls and structural components, radiation shielding, soundproofing, and interior finishes are non- combustible or are listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factor Mutual (FM) or UL, or have flame-spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less and are considered acceptable per the original BTP/Appendix R requirements. The materials do not contribute appreciably to the spread of fire.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                    Page L-15
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
The use of insulation material other than non-combustible and more than limited combustible in the plant does not affect nuclear safety. The Fire PRA development requires the inclusion of the effect of intervening combustibles to be documented and included in the analysis where determined to have fire effects as part of the performance-based approach. General area walkdowns and personnel interviews found that there were no large concentration installations of this insulation in the plant.
The use of insulation material other than non-combustible and more than limited combustible has no impact on the radiological release performance criteria. The radiological release review was performed based on the manual fire suppression activities in areas containing or potentially containing radioactive materials and is not dependent on the type of insulation material. The insulation material does not change the radiological release evaluation performed that concluded that potentially contaminated water is contained and smoke is monitored. The insulation materials do not add additional radiological materials to the area or challenge systems boundaries.
Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
The insulation materials in their current configuration are considered as non-cable intervening combustibles. The precautions and limitations on the use of these materials do not impact the fire safety analysis of the fire event. Therefore, the inherent safety margin and conservatisms in these analysis methods remain unchanged.
The three echelons of defense-in-depth are 1) to prevent fires from starting (combustible/hot work controls), 2) rapidly detect, control and extinguish fires that do occur thereby limiting damage (fire detection systems, automatic fire suppression, manual fire suppression, pre-fire plans), and 3) provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed (fire barriers, fire rated cable, success path remains free of fire damage, recovery actions). The use of insulation material which is non-combustible or more than limited combustible does not impact fire protection defense-in-depth. The insulation material does not affect echelons 1, 2, and 3. The insulation material does not directly result in compromising automatic fire suppression functions, manual fire suppression functions, or post-fire safe shutdown capability.
 
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Conclusion:==
 
NRC approval is requested for use of thermal insulation materials that meet the flame spread criteria, but do not meet the heat value content criteria of NFPA 805 based on these materials meeting BTP APCSB 9.5.1/Appendix R requirements. HBRSEP has determined that the approach satisfies the following criteria:
* Satisfies the performance goals performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release
* Defense in Depth
* Safety Margin HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                    Page L-16
 
Duke Energy                          Attachment M - License Condition Changes M. License Condition Changes 3 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                      Page M-1
 
Duke Energy                                              Attachment M - License Condition Changes Replace the current HBRSEP fire protection license condition 3.E with the standard license condition from Regulatory Guide 1.205, modified as shown below. No other license conditions need to be superseded or revised.
HBRSEP implemented the following process for determining that these are the only license conditions required to be either revised or superseded to implement the new fire protection program which meets the requirements in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 50.48(c):
A review was conducted of the HBRSEP Operating License DPR-23, by HBRSEP licensing staff and Duke Energy fire protection staff. The review was performed by reading the Operating License and performing electronic searches. Outstanding License Amendment Requests that have been submitted to the NRC were also reviewed for potential impact on the license conditions.
Supersede the existing license condition 3.E, in its entirety, as shown below:
E. Fire Protection Program Carolina Power & Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report dated February 28, 1978, and supplements thereto.
Carolina Power & Light Company may make changes to the approved Fire Protection Program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
It is HBRSEPs understanding that implicit in the superseding of this license condition, all prior fire protection program SEs and commitments have been superseded in their entirety by the revised license condition.
The proposed license condition follows:
===============================================================
Duke Energy shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified in the license amendment request dated September 16, 2012, and as approved in the safety evaluation report dated _________. Except where NRC approval for changes or deviations is required by 10 CFR 50.48(c), and provided no other regulation, Technical Specification, license condition or requirement would require prior NRC approval, the licensee may make changes to the fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission if those changes satisfy the provisions set forth in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), the change does not require a change to a Technical Specification or a license condition, and the criteria below are satisfied.
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Duke Energy                                        Attachment M - License Condition Changes Risk-Informed Changes that May Be Made Without Prior NRC Approval A risk assessment of the change must demonstrate that the acceptance criteria below are met. The risk assessment approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC and shall be appropriate for the nature and scope of the change being evaluated, be based on the as-built, as-operated, and maintained plant, and reflect the operating experience at the plant. Acceptable methods to assess the risk of the change may include methods that have been used in the peer-reviewed fire PRA model, methods that have been approved by NRC through a plant-specific license amendment or NRC approval of generic methods specifically for use in NFPA 805 risk assessments, or methods that have been demonstrated to bound the risk impact.
(a)    Prior NRC review and approval is not required for changes that clearly result in a decrease in risk. The proposed change must also be consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy and must maintain sufficient safety margins. The change may be implemented following completion of the change evaluation.
(b)    Prior NRC review and approval is not required for individual changes that result in a risk increase less than 1E-7/yr for CDF and less than 1E-8/yr for LERF. The proposed change must also be consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy and must maintain sufficient safety margins. The change may be implemented following completion of the change evaluation.
Other Changes that May Be Made Without Prior NRC Approval (1) Changes to NFPA 805, Chapter 3, Fundamental Fire Protection Program.
Prior NRC review and approval are not required for changes to the NFPA 805, Chapter 3, fundamental fire protection program elements and design requirements for which an engineering evaluation demonstrates that the alternative to the Chapter 3 element is functionally equivalent or adequate for the hazard. The licensee may use an engineering evaluation to demonstrate that a change to NFPA 805, Chapter 3 element is functionally equivalent to the corresponding technical requirement. A qualified fire protection engineer shall perform the engineering evaluation and conclude that the change has not affected the functionality of the component, system, procedure, or physical arrangement, using a relevant technical requirement or standard.
The licensee may use an engineering evaluation to demonstrate that changes to certain NFPA 805, Chapter 3 elements are acceptable because the alternative is adequate for the hazard. Prior NRC review and approval would not be required for alternatives to four specific sections of NFPA 805, Chapter 3, for which an engineering evaluation demonstrates that the alternative to the Chapter 3 element is adequate for the hazard.
A qualified fire protection engineer shall perform the engineering evaluation and HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page M-3
 
Duke Energy                                      Attachment M - License Condition Changes conclude that the change has not affected the functionality of the component, system, procedure, or physical arrangement, using a relevant technical requirement or standard.
The four specific sections of NFPA 805, Chapter 3, are as follows:
* Fire Alarm and Detection Systems (Section 3.8);
* Automatic and Manual Water-Based Fire Suppression Systems (Section 3.9);
* Gaseous Fire Suppression Systems (Section 3.10); and
* Passive Fire Protection Features (Section 3.11).
This License Condition does not apply to any demonstration of equivalency under Section 1.7 of NFPA 805.
(2) Fire Protection Program Changes that Have No More than Minimal Risk Impact Prior NRC review and approval are not required for changes to the licensees fire protection program that have been demonstrated to have no more than a minimal risk impact. The licensee may use its screening process as approved in the NRC safety evaluation dated ___________ to determine that certain fire protection program changes meet the minimal criterion. The licensee shall ensure that fire protection defense-in-depth and safety margins are maintained when changes are made to the fire protection program.
Transition License Conditions (1) Before achieving full compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified by (2) below, risk-informed changes to the licensees fire protection program may not be made without prior NRC review and approval unless the change has been demonstrated to have no more than a minimal risk impact, as described in (2) above.
(2) The licensee shall implement the modifications described in Attachment S, Table S-2, Plant Modifications Committed, by the end of the unit refueling outage currently scheduled for September/October 2020 (R232). The licensee shall maintain appropriate compensatory measures in place until completion of the modifications delineated above.
(3) The licensee shall implement the items as listed in Attachment S, Table S-3, Implementation Items, within 365 days after receipt of the safety evaluation/license amendment with the exception of implementation items S-3.11, 12, and 14, which are associated with modifications and will be completed after all procedure updates, modifications and training are complete.
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Duke Energy                          Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality V. Fire PRA Quality 26 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                            Page V-1
 
Duke Energy                                                  Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality In accordance with RG 1.205 position 4.3:
The licensee should submit the documentation described in Section 4.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.200 to address the baseline PRA and application-specific analyses. For PRA Standard supporting requirements important to the NFPA 805 risk assessments, the NRC position is that Capability Category II is generally acceptable. Licensees should justify use of Capability Category I for specific supporting requirements in their NFPA 805 risk assessments, if they contend that it is adequate for the application. Licensees should also evaluate whether portions of the PRA need to meet Capability Category III, as described in the PRA Standard.
The HBRSEP Combined Internal Events and Fire PRA was peer reviewed March 2013.
The peer review was conducted by a team of industry personnel (utility and vendor).
The Westinghouse Owners Group performed the review and have documented the outcome via LTR-RAM-13-06 Fire PRA Peer Review of the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Against the Fire PRA Standard Supporting Requirements from Section 4 of the ASME/ANS Standard. As noted in LTR-RAM 06, the HBRSEP Fire PRA was found to be consistent with the ASME/ANS Standard and is suitable for supporting risk-informed applications.
The peer review team noted a number of Facts and Observations (F&Os). As documented in LTR-RAM-13-06, 85% of the Supporting Requirements (SRs) were assessed at Capability Category II or higher. Approximately eighteen Finding level and nine Suggestion level F&Os were identified during the peer review conducted in March 2013. Duke Energy recognized that the Core Damage and Large Early Release Frequencies were relatively high, as noted in LTR-RAM-13-06. Based on the CDF and LERF values at the time of the initial peer review, coupled with the number of findings associated with the Fire Scenario Selection (FSS) Technical Element (18), Duke Energy decided to have a focused peer review.
The focused peer review was conducted July 2013 and evaluated the FSS Technical Element based on refinements to approved methodologies and updated documentation.
The focused peer review was conducted by Frederick Mowrer (C P Fire, LLC) and Bijan Najafi (Hughes Associates) and is documented via Hughes Calculation No. 0004-0042-415-RPT-001, Robinson Nuclear Plant Fire PRA Focused Peer Review, Revision 2. As noted in LTR-RAM-13-06 and Hughes Calculation No. 0004-0042-415-RPT-001, the Fire PRA does apply the methodologies outlined in NUREG/CR-6850 correctly, is consistent with the ASME/ANS Standard and is applicable for supporting risk-informed applications. Although several of the initial F&Os were resolved, six new findings and four new suggestions were identified during the focused-scope peer review.
Both of these peer reviews were performed to RG 1.200 Revision 2 and account for the clarifications defined there.
Table V-1 documents the Finding level F&Os associated with both the initial and focused peer reviews.
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Duke Energy                                                                                                                              Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition CF-A1              REVIEW the conditional failure    Dispositioned RNP-0153 is Attachment 9 of RNP-F/PRA-0094        RNP-0153 (Attachment 7 of P2217-1021-01-03)
(CAT III)          probabilities for fire-induced                  and describes cable failure analyzed for the      has been updated to reflect all HBRSEP circuit failures                                HBRSEP Fire PRA, RNP-0153. The third bullet      information. Additionally, Reference 5.1 has been and                                              of RNP-0153, Section 3.0 states, "All cables are  updated to RNP Fire Safe Shutdown Program CF-B1              ASSIGN        the    appropriate                assumed to be Thermoset. This is consistent      Database, Rev 19.
(CAT I/II/III)      industry-wide generic values                    with the cable specifications for safety related for risk-significant contributors                cable at BNP and there are no substantive based on the specific circuit                    differences in failure probabilities for the two configuration              under                cable types for the purposes of this analysis."
consideration                                    Reference 5.1 of RNP-0153 is "BNP Fire Safe Shutdown Program Database, Rev. 26." In response to a Peer Review question, it was advised that BNP should be RNP, that cable should be Thermo-plastic rather than Thermo-set and the HBRSEP FSSPMD should be referenced instead.
The determination of meeting the requirements of CF-A1 depends on the information in RNP-0153. As presently written, RNP-0153 leads to questions of whether it is really applicable to HBRSEP.
Revise and update RNP-0153. Perform a confirmation that the balance of information in RNP-0153 is valid for H.B. Robinson.
CF-A2              CHARACTERIZE                  the Dispositioned No characterization of the uncertainty associated The basic events associated with hot short uncertainty associated with the                  with the applied conditional circuit failure      probabilities have been assigned an error factor (NOT MET)          applied      conditional  failure              probabilities was documented in EPM Report        when the combined cutset is created using the P2217-1021-01-01,      Robinson    Fire    PRA  UNCERT        code. Although  important    for probability assigned per CF-Quantification Calculation, as captured in EC    determining the statistical uncertainty of the PRA A1.                                              90905.                                            cutsets, the criteria needed for the LAR are based on the mean values which are not significantly impacted by the uncertainty analysis.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Based on the above disposition, SR CF-A2 is considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
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Duke Energy                                                                                                                          Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                      Disposition CS-A1              IDENTIFY cables whose fire-      Dispositioned Attachment 7 of RNP-F/PSA-0066 (Equipment        All cables identified in Attachment 7 of induced failure could adversely                Selection) contains a list of equipment which is RNP-F/PSA-0066 have been routed and added (CAT I/II/III)      affect  selected    equipment                to be credited in the Fire PRA, but which does  to FSSPMD with the exception of components and/or credited functions in the              not have cables identified and routed. A spot    that were not installed prior to RNP-F/PSA-0066 CS-A2              Fire PRA plant response                        check review of the cable database (RNP          being completed.
(CAT III) model.                                        FSSPMD R21_Read Only QA Record.mdb)
CS-A10                                                            reveals that several of the components listed in (CAT III)                                                          Attachment 7 are not included in the cable database. For example, Attachment 7 includes "Fire      Tag"      CHG-C-INDICATING-LIGHT corresponding to PRA BE JILCHGPCTF; however, CHG-C-INDICATINGLIGHT is not in the cable database, hence BE JILCHGPCTF will never be affected by fires. Others identified by spot check include 480V-52/11A, 480V-52/13B, EDGA-AMMETER, etc. Thus, there are some PRA components which are being credited in the PRA which do not have cable routing incorporated into the cable database; hence, they will never fail.
Review Attachment 7 of RNP-F/PSA-0066, identify components which are not in the cable database, and update the cable database to include all credited PRA components.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-4
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                            Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                Status                            Finding                                          Disposition CS-A11              If assumed cable routing used                The scope and extent of assumed cable routing      As noted in HBRSEP Change Package (CAT I/II/III)      in the Fire PRA, IDENTIFY the                for non-credited components (i.e., components      RNP-0152          (Attachment        19        of scope    and    extent,  and  Open          assumed to fail for all fires) is documented in    P2217-1021-01-03), cable toning was used to PROVIDE a basis for the                      Table 4 of RNP-F/PSA-0066. Although a basis is    confirm cable routes. There were some instances assumed cable routing.                        not provided for the assumed routing, it is a      where cable toning was not possible within a CS-C3                                                            generally accepted practice to omit certain        specific compartment (embedded cable, etc.). In systems which do not perform a safety function    these instances, the cable was assumed to be (NOT MET)
(but may back up a safety system) and would        failed throughout the entire compartment that it require immense amount of work to manually        was known to traverse through.
trace the cables. The credited components with assumed routing are contained in the FSSPMD,      As noted in HBRSEP change package however, there is no documented basis for the      RNP-0205,          (Attachment        19      of routing, and it is unclear if the scope and extent P2217-1021-01-03), the assumed cable route is understood. The basis for assumed routing is    data determines the cable-to-fire zone correlation not documented. Furthermore, to understand,        (which is sufficient for NSCA), but does not and to be able to evaluate the uncertainty        determine the cable-to-raceway-to-fire zone associated with assumed routing some form of      correlation (which is needed for PRA). Based on documentation should be assembled describing      this assumption, any ignition source within a the scope and extent of the assumed routing.      given fire zone will impact all cables with For example, are there fire compartments with a    assumed cable routes in the ignition sources fire significant amount of assumed routing, are there  zone.
high significance fire compartments, systems, trains or components dominated by cable failure    RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY of cables which have an assumed routing, etc.      CLASSIFICATION:
As part of an overall Task 3 documentation        As the Fire PRA documentation has not been package, describe the scope and extent of          updated to further describe the scope and extent assumed routing used in the HBRSEP Fire PRA.      of the assumed routing, no improvement has been made to the capability category assessment for SR CS-C3. However, RNP considers the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable for the NFPA 805 application because documentation of the scope and extent of the assumed routing will not change the quantified risk metrics.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                  Page V-5
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                      Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                      Topic                Status                          Finding                                        Disposition CS-C1          DOCUMENT        the      cable Dispositioned There is no notebook encompassing Task 3          In the process at HBRSEP, Fire Protection/NSCA (NOT MET)      selection    and      location              (Cable Selection) making review and update        develops and maintains the cable selection and methodology applied in the Fire              difficult. There are numerous change packages,    circuit analysis data. This data is then referenced PRA in a manner that                          and a database (FSSPMD) which is a repository    as inputs to the Component Selection and facilitates    Fire        PRA                for the cable routing information; however, there Quantification FPRA calculations. This process applications, upgrades, and                  is no document explaining what tasks were        and associated results are easily reviewable, has peer review.                                  performed, which procedures or guidelines were    been peer reviewed multiple times for our other employed, and in which document the analysis is  sites and found to be acceptable. There is no contained.                                        requirement to have a separate PRA notebook.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
With no change being made, HBRSEP considers the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable for the NFPA 805 application and this finding to be sufficiently resolved for SR CS-C1 to be assessed as CAT I/II/III.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-6
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                Status                          Finding                                            Disposition ES-A2              REVIEW          power  supply,  Dispositioned Power supplies, support systems, interlock          A detailed review of the modeling of associated (NOT MET)          interlock              circuits,              circuits and instrumentation are included in the    circuits for all components functional states in the instrumentation, and support                    internal events PRA model. For fire PRA specific    fire PRA CAFTA model was performed. The ES-B4                                                                                                                  details of the review are provided in Attachment 2 system dependencies and                        logic, examples indicate that not all support (NOT MET)                                                                                                              of        Hughes      Associates    Inc.      (HAI)
IDENTIFY              additional                system      dependencies        were    completely 1RCS04042.414.031-002, and revisions to the equipment whose fire-induced                    considered. The area of concern is the lack of      fire PRA CAFTA model, the RR file table BE, and CS-A3              failure,    including  spurious                modeling of instrumentation power dependency        Component Selection Database (CSDB) table (CATI/II/III)      actuation, could adversely                      (self-identified by the utility). For example, see  PRA_SSEL as a result of this detailed review are affect any of the equipment                    gate HRAPORV-455C "PORV FAILS TO                    listed in 1RCS04042.414.031-001, Attachments identified per SR ES-A1.                        CLOSE DUE TO HRA", one of its inputs is an          3, 4, and 5, respectively. Revision 4 of the HBRSEP fire PRA calculation for component AND gate for "INDICATIONS THAT PORV IS selection (RNP-F/PSA-0066) incorporates all of OPEN FAIL." For the indicators modeled here, if    the changes required to the fire PRA CAFTA there is a loss of power, the indicators will scale model as a result of the detailed review of the low, potentially preventing the operators from      associated circuits.
taking necessary actions. For the indication discussed in the example above, a loss of power    Review credited components to ensure that will cause the indicators to scale low, potentially power supplies, support systems, interlock circuits, and instrumentation dependencies are preventing the operators from taking necessary adequately captured.
actions, and thus could adversely impact fire risk.                                              RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
With the above described changes incorporated, these SRs are considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                      Page V-7
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                    Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                    Status                          Finding                                            Disposition ES-A3              INCLUDE equipment whose              Dispositioned The "RCP Seal No. 1 Leak-Off" and "SI test line"      RNP-0148, Multiple Spurious Operation Expert (NOT MET)          fire-induced      failure,      not              are both ISLOCA paths that were screened from        Panel Report, did consider spurious isolation of including spurious operation,                      the Internal Events analysis; however these          the RCP Seal No. 1 leakoff valves. As noted in contributes to or causes                            screened paths are not explicitly dispositioned in the report, 125V DC power will be removed within (a) fire-induced          initiating              the fire PRA component selection calculation.
events treated in the Fire Safe                    These items were discussed with the host utility      ten minutes as noted in HBRSEP Dedicated Shutdown / Appendix R                              that provided the following input on the two          Shutdown Procedure (DSP-002).
analysis                                            ISLOCA paths mentioned above: The seal leak-(b) Internal Events PRA                                                                                  As noted in Attachment 3 of the HBRSEP off is normally open and seal leak-off is part of initiators as identified using the                                                                        Component Selection Calculation, RCP Seal No.
IE requirements in Part 2                          the normal cooling path. Failure in either 1 Leak-Off is not consequential. Leakoff is not (including      any    gradations                  direction is non-consequential" and "The test line required to maintain adequate seal cooling in the across capability categories in                    has 3+ locked closed manual valves." Based on PRA model. Furthermore, seal leakoff is not that standard) as modified per                      this feedback, it is judged that this is a 4-2.5, or                                                                                                modeled in the Fire PRA.
documentation issue with no impact on the (c) unique fire-induced initiating                  analysis. This finding is related to the events not addressed or                            consideration of previously screened ISLOCA          RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY otherwise screened from the                        pathways from the Internal Events PRA for            CLASSIFICATION:
above two analyses if SR                            inclusion in the Fire PRA. Include, in the IE-C4 in Part 2 cannot be met.                      component selection calculation, a discussion of      Based on the above disposition, this SR is screened paths and why or why not they contain        considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
components that warrant inclusion in the fire PRA.
FQ-B1              PERFORM the quantification in        Dispositioned In review of the fire PRA documentation there no      RNP-F/PSA-0077        documented      proof    of (CAT I/II/III)      accordance with HLR-QU-B                            convergence study was performed in support of        convergence for CDF and LERF for the internal and its SRs in Part 2                              the selection of truncation level for quantification. events PRA. As the fire PRA model is largely and                                                                                                      dependent on the internal events PRA, it can be DEVELOP a defined basis to                                                                                concluded that there is convergence for CDF and support the claim of non-                                                                                LERF in the fire PRA applicability of any of the requirements under HLR-QU-B                                                                              The model was quantified based on a CDF in Part 2.                                                                                                quantification of 1E-12. This is about seven orders of magnitude below the final CDF. This is generally accepted as a good bounding truncation level HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                          Page V-8
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                Status                        Finding                                      Disposition FQ-F1              DOCUMENT the CDF and              Dispositioned The contents of the elements of applicable SRs The HBRSEP Fire PRA was developed using the (CAT I/II/III)      LERF analyses in accordance                    of Part 2 were addressed in the FQ and        Internal Events PRA. The Internal Events PRA is with HLR-QU-F and HLR-LE-G                      associated documents; however, no explicit    aligned with RG 1.200 and was peer reviewed.
and their SRs in Part 2 with the                connections were established in the documents  Therefore, the back-references associated with following clarifications:                      to associate with the "back-references"        requirements LE-G2, LE-G4 and LE-G5 are (a) SRs QU-F2 and QU-F3 of                      requirements LE-G2, LE-G4 and LE-G5.          considered to be met.
Part 2 are to be met including identification of which fire scenarios and which physical analysis units (consistent with the level of resolution of the Fire PRA such as fire area or fire      compartment)        are significant contributors (as defined in Part 1);
(b) SR QU-F4 of Part 2 is to be met consistent with 4-2.13 (c)    SRs LE-G2 (uncertainty discussion) and LE-G4 of Part 2 are to be met consistent with 4-2.13, and DEVELOP a defined basis to support      the    claim    of non-applicability of any of the requirements      under    these sections in Part 2.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-9
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                          Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                        Disposition FSS-B1              DEFINE and JUSTIFY the          Dispositioned The conditions and timing that lead to Main      Section 5.9.2 of P2217-1021-01-03 provides a (CAT I/II/III)      conditions that are assumed to                Control Room (MCR) abandonment due to            discussion of Main Control Room abandonment cause MCR abandonment                          environmental conditions and reliance on ex-      due to environment conditions.
FSS-A6              and/or reliance on ex-control                  control room actions are described in main (CAT III)          room operator actions including                control    room    analysis  report    (Report The probability associated with main control room remote      and/or    alternate              0004-0042-412-002).                              abandonment due to a loss of habitability has FSS-B2              shutdown actions.                                                                                been incorporated into the quantification of the (CAT III)                                                          Abandonment due to equipment damage and to        Fire PRA.
loss of habitability is based on the guidelines provided      in    Section    11.5.2.11    of NUREG/CR-6850.        The    analysis    method described in NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix L is used to assess scenarios in the MCB.
This SR is considered met. A new Finding (FSS-B1-01) has been assigned to this SR because all conditions requiring reliance on remote/alternate shutdown are not identified.
Fires in the MCR or other location in the plant that may lead to loss of control room functions such that use of remote/alternate shutdown capability is required are not characterized and evaluated. Such scenarios for MCR habitability are identified and analyzed.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                Page V-10
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                            Disposition FSS-C2              CHARACTERIZE            ignition Dispositioned Section 5.6.2 of the Quantification Calculation        Section 5.6.2 of the Fire PRA Quantification (CAT II/III)        source intensity using a                        (EPM Report No. P2217-1021-01-01, Rev. 1,              Calculation discusses the growth profile used.
realistic time-dependent fire                  dated February 2013 included in EC 90905) and          This can also be seen in the RNP_EVAL_Rev2 growth profile (i.e., a time-                  in particular the third bullet under Figure 7 on      spreadsheet used during the quantification dependent heat release rate)                    Page 51 of 113 indicates that "The HGL                process. This spreadsheet includes a cable tray for significant contributors as                threshold assumes a constant HRR up to HGL            propagation model (HGL_Time worksheet).
appropriate to the ignition                    formation." The basis for using the time versus source.                                        HGL based on a constant HRR and then                  Furthermore, Calculation NED-M/MECH-1009 compare it to a curve based on a variable HRR          also provides a time to damage based on fire has not been provided. At the top of Page 52 of        growth.
113 in the Quantification Calculation it states that, "The net effect of these uncertainties is generally a conservative time to HGL. For ignition sources that are high risk, more detailed fire modeling may be pursued on a case by case basis."
The intent of the Standard is that conservative =
Category I, and that realistic = Category II/III, therefore this SR is evaluated at Category I. An example of a more realistic analysis is Hughes Report Number: 0004-0042-000-001 for Fire Compartment 20.
Finding FSS-C2-01 has not been resolved.
For each scenario, the ignition source intensity is characterized using a time-dependent heat release rate, consistent with the Category II/III requirement for this SR; however, the total heat release required to cause hot gas layer formation is based on a fire that is initiated at full peak intensity, consistent with the Category I requirement for this SR. Suggestion FSS-C2-02 has been prepared to suggest further justification and validation of the methodology used to determine the total heat release required to cause hot gas layer formation.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-11
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                            Disposition FSS-C4          If a severity factor is credited in Dispositioned The severity factors, as described in Section          Section 5.5.4.5 of the Quantification Calculation (CAT II)        the analysis, ENSURE that                        5.5.4.5 of the Quantification Calculation (EPM        (EPM Report No. P2217-1021-01-03) has been Report      No. P2217-1021-01-01,          dated  updated to provide more detail as to why specific
: a. the severity factor remains                February 2013 included in EC 90905) are                severity factors are applied in the MakeSScen independent      of    other              apparently evaluated using the calculation logic      module.
quantification factors                      in Attachment 20 of the Quantification Calculation. This is not explained in a clear and
: b. the severity factor reflects                concise way in Section 5.5.4.5, nor is any the fire event set used to                  reference to Attachment 20 found in that section.
estimate fire frequency                    The general reference to module "MakeSScen" and the fact that its contents are listed in
: c. the severity factor reflects Attachment 20 in the introductory paragraph of the      conditions      and Section 5.5.4 is not considered to be sufficient.
assumptions        of    the Further, the descriptions in Section 5.5.4.5 specific fire scenarios (pages 41-42 of 113) of how the Severity Factor under analysis, and determination is done do not appear to exactly
: d. a      technical      basis                match with the programming logic found on supporting the severity                    pages 7-12 of Attachment 20. This needs to be factors determination is                  clarified and clearly documented to support provided.                                  future use, update, and peer review of the Severity Factor calculations.
In addition, the use of generic fire modeling data and severity factors for different ignition source Bins      from    NUREG/CR-6850            without considering mode of exposure and position (i.e.,
not just distance) of the targets relative to the fire source may not fully constitute "explicit consideration" in quantifying the severity factor such that it reflects the conditions and assumptions of the specific fire scenario under analysis.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-12
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                              Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                Status                          Finding                                              Disposition FSS-C7              If multiple suppression paths    Dispositioned Credit is given for both automatic sprinkler        No credit has been applied for manual actuation (NOT MET)          are credited, EVALUATE and                    suppression and manual firefighting, but mutual      or recovery of fixed suppression systems. The PROPERLY                MODEL                  dependency on the common water supply                common water supply at HBRSEP is sufficient to dependencies        among    the              system has not been evaluated or properly            provide water to both the automatic suppression credited      paths  including              modeled.                                            system as well as the manual firefighting. The dependencies associated with                                                                        reliability/unavailability of the fire pump and recovery of a failed fire                                                                          associated sprinkler has already been accounted suppression system, if such                                                                        for in the non-suppression probability.
recovery is credited.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-C7 is considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
FSS-D2              USE fire models that have        Dispositioned This finding recommends that the HGL                Attachment J of the LAR provides a discussion (CAT I/II/III)      sufficient capability to model                calculation (RNP-M/MECH-1826) be subjected          on the software used during the development of the conditions of interest and                to validation and verification in order to establish the          HBRSEP          HGL        Calculation FSS-D6              only within known limits of                    its technical basis and known limits of              (RNP-M/MECH-1826).
(CAT I/II/III)      applicability.                                applicability.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-13
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                            Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition FSS-D7            In crediting fire detection and  Dispositioned There is a failure to meet the Category I          Currently, system performance is monitored and (NOT MET)        suppression systems, USE                        requirement of having systems installed and        maintained at a high level as part of the System generic estimates of total                      maintained in accordance with applicable codes      Health Reporting and System Notebook FSS-F1            system unavailability provided                  and standards. The Main Turbine Lube Oil            processes. Outlier behavior with respect to (CAT III)        that                                            Deluge system must be replaced to account for      system availability would be evident to the (a) the credited system is                      system deficiencies identified in NCR-425437        system engineer and plant management through installed and maintained in                    where a simultaneous actuation of the Turbine      the health data (available for the previous accordance with applicable                      Lube Oil suppression system, along with the        12 months), which indicates overall Excellent codes and standards                            mezzanine and ground level sprinkler systems,      (Green) performance.
(b) the credited system is in a                could place a higher system demand on the fully operable state during plant              water supply than can be provided by a single      Furthermore, during the periods when key fire operation, and                                  fire pump.                                          protection systems are unavailable due to testing (c) the system has not                                                                              and maintenance, compensatory actions are experienced outlier behavior                    This was not identified, nor is a comparison        taken such that the risk associated with the relative        to        system                provided in the Fire PRA of all installed detection system being unavailable does not increase.
unavailability.                                and suppression systems vs. the corresponding Code Compliance calculation.                        RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Finding FSS-D7-01 has not been resolved.
Because evidence is not provided to support that    Using plant-specific information to quantify total credited detection/suppressions systems are        unavailability factors is a CAT III requirement and installed and maintained in accordance with        was not done.
applicable codes and standards. System health report for period Q2-2013 for systems              With no change being made, HBRSEP considers 6185/6181/6175/6195/6205/6180 notes that age,      the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable obsolescence        and      replacement      part for the NFPA 805 application and this finding to procurement is an issue. This system health        be sufficiently resolved for SR FSS-D7 to be report also notes that "There are LTAMs            assessed as CAT II is MET.
budgeted for 2014 and 2015 which study and replace the detection, CO2, and Halon Systems." This report suggests that some of the fire protection systems at HBRSEP may be experiencing outlier behavior relative to system unavailability and may not be in a fully operable state during plant operation. Consequently, this SR is still considered to be not met.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-14
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                      Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition FSS-D7          In crediting fire detection and  Dispositioned Evidence needs to be provided to support that    Currently, system performance is monitored and (NOT MET)      suppression systems, USE                        credited detection/suppressions systems are      maintained at a high level as part of the System generic estimates of total                      installed and maintained in accordance with      Health Reporting and System Notebook system unavailability provided                                                                    processes. Outlier behavior with respect to applicable codes and standards. System health that (a) the credited system is                                                                  system availability would be evident to the installed and maintained in                    report for period Q2-2013 for systems            system engineer and plant management through accordance with applicable                      6185/6181/6175/6195/6205/6180 notes that age,    the health data (available for the previous 12 codes and standards, and (b)                    obsolescence      and      replacement      part months), which indicates overall Excellent the credited system is in a fully              procurement is an issue for multiple fire        (Green) performance.
operable state during plant                    protection systems. This system health report operation.                                      also notes that "There are LTAMs budgeted for    Furthermore, during the periods when key fire protection systems are unavailable due to testing 2014 and 2015 which study and replace the and maintenance, compensatory actions are detection, CO2, and Halon Systems." This report  taken such that the risk associated with the suggests that some of the fire protection        system being unavailable does not increase.
systems at HBRSEP may be experiencing outlier behavior relative to system unavailability and    RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY may not be in a fully operable state during plant CLASSIFICATION:
operation.
Using plant-specific information to quantify total unavailability factors is a CAT III requirement and was not done.
With no change being made, HBRSEP considers the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable for the NFPA 805 application and this finding to be sufficiently resolved for SR FSS-D7 to be assessed as CAT II is MET.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                Page V-15
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                        Finding                                      Disposition FSS-E1              For      any    fire  modeling  Open      Section 4.3 of Calculation No. P2217-2100-00,    Section 4.3 of Calculation P2217-2100-01-01 will (CAT I/II/II)      parameters not covered by the                Fire Scenario Data, RNP-F/PSA-0079, dated        be updated appropriately at a later date. This is a requirements of HLR-FSS-C or                  January 2013 contains information about fire    documentation issue that will not impact fire FSS-H4              HLR-FSS-D,          USE    plant-modeling parameters that were used. However,    scenario development or quantification.
(CAT II)            specific parameter estimates for fire modeling if available, or            Section 4.4 through 4.7 should be completed because they are missing information about      As stated in the response to FPRA RAI 1A, use      generic    information modified as discussed in SR                  other relevant fire modeling parameters.        parametric uncertainty for fire ignition frequency, FSS-E2;        USE        generic                                                              non-suppression probability, and hot short information for the remaining                Add relevant information to the report.          probability have been assessed for their impact parameter estimates.                                                                          to CDF and LERF in the integrated analysis Finding FSS-E1-01 has not been resolved.        performed in response to FPRA RAI 3.
Sections 4.3 through 4.7 still make reference to databases for the parameters used in the fire modeling. These parameters should be added to the report.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                Page V-16
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                      Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                      Topic                Status                            Finding                                        Disposition FSS-E3          PROVIDE a mean value of,          Open      No statistical representation of uncertainty    HBRSEP used the HRRs and applied them using (CAT I)          and statistical representation                intervals (e.g., NUREG/CR-6850 Table E-1 or      the guidance found in NUREG/CR-6850. As of, the uncertainty intervals for            G-1 for HRR, Tables E-2 through E-9 for severity NUREG/CR-6850 is the consensus methodology, the parameters used for factor) is documented for the mean values of    a detailed uncertainty analysis on these modeling the significant fire scenarios.                                    parameter estimates used for fire modeling the  parameters is not needed and does not add to significant fire scenarios.                      the credibility of the results. The majority of applied values are based on the 98th and 75th percentile fires from NUREG/CR-6850, and the ZOIs are applied conservatively. It is not believed that reducing these values would allow the use of reduced impacts for the applications being pursued.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Although no change has yet been made that would improve the Capability Category assessments, HBRSEP considers the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable for the NFPA 805 application because documenting the statistical representation of uncertainty intervals will not change the quantified risk metrics.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-17
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                              Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                        Finding                                            Disposition FSS-E4              PROVIDE a characterization of    Dispositioned There is some assumed cable routing applied        As noted in HBRSEP Change Package (NOT MET)          the uncertainties associated                    directly in FSSPMD. These routings are            RNP-0152          (Attachment        19        of with cases where cable routing                  identified in RNP-0152. Components with            P2217-1021-01-03), cable toning was used to FSS-A1              has been assumed based on                                                                          confirm cable routes. There were some instances unknown routing are otherwise assumed to fail in (CAT I/II/III)      SRs CS-A10 and/or CS-A11.                                                                          where cable toning was not possible within a the PRA model. However, there is no discussion    specific compartment (embedded cable, etc.). In that characterizes the uncertainties associated    these instances, the cable was assumed to be with cases where cable routing has been            failed throughout the entire compartment that it assumed. A more detailed characterization of      was known to traverse through.
the uncertainties associated with cases where cable routing has been assumed is needed for      As noted in HBRSEP change package RNP-0205 (Attachment 19 of P2217-1021-01-03), the SR FSS-E4 to be met.
assumed cable route data determines the cable-to-fire zone correlation (which is sufficient Provide a detailed uncertainty characterization    for NSCA), but does not determine the discussion in appropriate reports related to      cable-to_raceway-to-fire zone correlation (which circuits with assumed routing.                    is needed for PRA). Based on this assumption, any ignition source within a given fire zone will impact all cables with assumed cable routes in the ignition sources fire zone.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-E is considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
FSS-F3              In crediting fire detection and  Dispositioned Section 2.4 of the Structural Steel report        The unavailability of the Turbine Lube Oil Deluge (CAT I/II/III)      suppression systems, USE                        (P2217-2300-01-03) states that "It is assumed      system has been updated to 0.05 in Rev. 3 of generic estimates of total                      that an unavailability value of 0.01 will be      P2217-1021-01-03 (Fire PRA Quantification FSS-D7              system unavailability provided                                                                    Calculation). This change was made based on bounding and conservative for the deluge (NOT MET)          that (a) the credited system is                                                                    engineering judgment.
installed and maintained in                    sprinkler system." What is the basis for this? Has accordance with applicable                      this value been confirmed against the plant-      RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY codes and standards, and (b)                    specific experience for availability of the        CLASSIFICATION:
the credited system is in a fully              detection/suppression systems?
operable state during plant                                                                        Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-D7 is operation.                                                                                        considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                  Page V-18
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                            Finding                                          Disposition FSS-G2              APPLY all the supporting          Dispositioned Fire modeling performed in support of the Multi-      A detailed multi-compartment analysis was (CAT I/II/III)      requirements listed in SRs                      Compartment Analysis (MCA) failed to consider        performed      and      is    documented    in FSS-C1 through FSS-C8 for                      the acute effect of hot gas flow through openings    RNP-F/PSA-0089. The Fire PRA Quantification FSS-G3 fire modeling of single physical                and ducts on local potential targets. In addition,    Calculation only updated results based on new (CAT II) analysis units to the modeling                  the consideration and evaluation of additional        CCDPs and a new HGL Calculation. The open of    multi-compartment      fire              aspects of multi-compartment fire scenarios was      Turbine Building was discussed in the HGL scenarios.                                      not documented and/or done, i.e., the fact that      Calculation (RNP-M/MECH-1826). The detailed the Turbine Building has no exterior walls was        review of hot gas flow through openings has not not identified and the impact of this evaluated.      been performed. The impact of hot gas flow Treatment of MCA in only 7 pages of the              through openings and ducts on local targets is Quantification Calculation does not appear to be      expected to be minimal.
adequate. Furthermore, in their evaluation of compartments subject to a hot gas layer,              RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY HBRSEP used a criterion of 1E-07 for total            CLASSIFICATION:
ignition frequency. Based on this, HBRSEP Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-G2 is excluded all but two compartments. A review of considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
the table that was subject to the review showed there were two additional compartments that met the criterion for inclusion. This is an error rate of 100%.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-19
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                          Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                    Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition FSS-G6          QUANTIFY          the    risk  Dispositioned Table B-5 of this report defines lists fourteen (14) Section 5.10 of P2217-1021-01-03 provides a (CAT I)          contribution of any selected                  unscreened multi-compartment fire scenarios.        discussion of the multi-compartment scenarios multi-compartment          fire              Attachment E of the same report offers risk          quantified in the Fire PRA. There are five scenarios    in    a    manner associated      with    these    scenario. The  scenarios that do not screen currently based on consistent    with    the  FQ requirements.                                Quantification    Report    (P2217-1021-01-02)    an        updated        HGL        Calculation Section 5.10 states that "Based on updated Hot      (RNP-M/MECH-1826, Rev. 0). These scenarios Gas Layer frequencies, all of the fire              have been quantified in a manner consistent with compartments previously analyzed in the Multi-      the FQ requirements.
Compartment Analysis (Reference 3.14), have now      screen."    Reference        3.14    is RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY RNP-F/PSA-0089 Rev 0 and it does not support        CLASSIFICATION:
the statement that all MC fire is screened.
Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-G6 is considered to be Met at CAT II/III.
Finding FSS-G6-01 has been resolved. Hughes Calculation No. 1RCS04042.414.031, Revision 0 (Multi-Compartment Analysis for the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment at Robinson Nuclear Plant), provides a detailed multi-compartment analysis. This analysis has been included in Section 5.10 of the HBRSEP Fire PRA Quantification Calculation. Based on updated Hot Gas Layer data, the scenarios identified in the Hughes calculation screen from further analysis.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-20
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                      Topic                  Status                          Finding                                        Disposition FSS-H2          DOCUMENT a basis for target      Dispositioned The fire modeling in Hughes Report No.            Plant modifications in addition to intumastic cable (CAT I)          damage      mechanisms      and                0004-0042-000-001 for Fire Compartment 20        coating are incorporated into the Fire PRA thresholds used in the analysis,                credits fire coating. Category II of this SR      Calculation        (EPM          Report        No.
including references for any                                                                      P2217-1021-01-03). These plant modifications requires documentation of the references for any plant-specific or target-specific                                                                are discussed in Attachment S of the LAR. The performance criteria applied in                plant-specific or target-specific performance    ten minute time until cable damage (per the analysis.                                  criteria applied in the analysis, and a basis for NUREG/CR-6850) is achieved via plant target damage mechanisms and thresholds used      modifications discussed in Attachment S.
in the analysis, which has not been provided.
Finding FSS-H2-01 has not been resolved.          RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY Plant-specific documentation should be provided  CLASSIFICATION:
for the performance criteria used to evaluate Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-H2 is damage to coated cables and cable trays with      considered to be Met at CAT II/III.
solid bottoms.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                Page V-21
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                          Finding                                        Disposition HRA-C1              For each selected fire scenario,    Dispositioned The fire-specific operator actions are evaluated  All fire response actions have been updated such (CAT II)            QUANTIFY the HEPs for all                        using only the Cause-Based Decision Tree          that they are quantified using the CBDTM and HFEs and ACOUNT FOR                              method (CBDTM). The HRAs from the Internal        HCR/ORE combination method similar to Internal FQ-C1              relevant fire-related effects                    Events methods used both CBDTM and                Events operator actions. P2217-1022-01-03 (CAT I/II/III)      using detailed analyses for                      HCR/ORE to address the cognitive risk of the      documents the Fire HRA.
significant        HFEs        and                operator actions. The HCR/ORE method is conservative estimates (e.g.,                    generally the dominant risk value for actions with screening values) for non-                        short system time windows or very long median significant        HFEs,        in              response times. Events 0FIREOMA01 and accordance with the SRs for                      0FIREOMA02 are events with short time HLR-HR-G in Part 2 set forth                      windows where the HCR/ORE method would be under at least Capability                        the dominant cognitive risk. The cognitive risk is Category II, with the following                  underestimated by an order of magnitude.
clarification:
The HRA needs to be revised to better address
: a. Attention is to be given to                the cognitive risk portion for each HEP.
how the fire situation alters any previous assessments in non-fire analyses as to the influencing factors and the timing considerations covered in SRs HR-G3, HR-G4, and HR-G5 in Part 2 and
: b. Develop a defined basis to support the claim of non-applicability of any of the requirements          under HLR-HR-G in Part 2.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-22
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                            Finding                                        Disposition IGN-A7              USE a plant-wide consistent        Dispositioned In general the SR was met. There are areas          Transient fire scenarios have been postulated in methodology        based      on                such as the transient ignition sources related      each fire compartment as noted in Hughes (CAT I/II/III)      parameters that are expected                    identification are still required, some of these is  Calculation No. 1RCS04042.414.031-002.
to influence the likelihood of                  already self-identified as part of the "lead review" ignition to apportion high-level                activities as indicated in the -0067 notebook. For ignition frequencies (e.g., plant-              instance, fire zone 22 and others are identified in wide values) to estimate                        the "lead reviews" as additional effort is needed.
physical analysis unit or ignition      source        level              Address the transient ignition sources for frequencies.                                    application fire zones. Providing a complete and through ignition sources identification is important.
IGN-A9              POSTULATE the possibility of      Dispositioned HBRSEP did postulate transient combustibles          Transient fire ignition frequency has been transient combustible fires for                  for all physical analysis units except for one,      assigned to FC490. Transient Influence Factors (CAT I/II/III)      all physical analysis units                      FC490.      This physical analysis unit is the      of Low(1), Low(1), and Low(1) replaced factors regardless of the administrative                deepwell pump D enclosure. HBRSEP needs to          No(0), No(0), and No(0) for maintenance, restrictions.                                    provide      justification  for    why    transient occupancy, and storage, since entry to FC490, combustibles are not postulated for FC490.          which requires using a crane to remove the concrete enclosure, is not precluded.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-23
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                              Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition PP-B6              ENSURE                            Dispositioned Underground cabling was not addressed in          The cable routing database system FSSPMD RNP-F/PSA-0067. The HBRSEP project team          was reviewed determining which manholes had (CAT I/II/III)      a. that    collectively,    the                noted a comment was included in this calculation  cables within the scope of the Fire PRA defined physical analysis                  that a Yard fire zone should be included in the associated with them. The manholes where units    encompass      all              next revision of the report.                      cables were identified have been included as locations within the global                                                                  plant partitioning elements (i.e., Physical Analysis analysis boundary                                                                            Units) in the Fire PRAs. The following manholes and                                                                                                have been included as plant partitioning elements: MH M-34, MH M-35, MH-1, and
: b. that    defined    physical                                                                  MH-34. The cables that were identified as routed analysis units      do not                                                                    through MH-35, MH-36 and MH have been overlap                                                                                      included      in  the    Intake    Structure    Fire Compartment, FC290. The cable loading for the manholes have been assessed following the same approach documented in the HBRSEP combustible loading calc. The approach consists of multiplying the factor of 5,515 BTU/ln-ft to each linear ft of cable. Under this approach, a total of 496350 BTUs have been estimated for each manhole. This assumes nine 10 long exposed cables per manhole. Nine cables is the average number of cables identified in the manholes.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-24
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                Status                          Finding                                        Disposition PRM-B11            MODEL all operator actions      Dispositioned Main control room abandonment is discussed in    Fire response and Main Control Room (NOT MET)          and operator influences in                    Section 7.1.4 of Calculation P2217-1022-01-01,  Abandonment HFEs have not been incorporated accordance with the HRA                      "Fire Human Reliability Analysis" and Table 7.1  in the combined Internal Events/Fire PRA. The PRM-B2              element of this Standard.
lists the human failure events (HFEs) associated Main Control Room Abandonment HFEs from (CAT I/II/III)                                                    with main control room abandonment. However,    Hughes              Calculation            No.
these HFEs have not yet been incorporated into  RSC-CALKNX-2013-0301 has been incorporated HRA-B2                                                            the HBRSEP fire PRA model. Without the HFEs      into the recovery rule files used during the (NOT MET)                                                        for main control room abandonment, the          quantification process as appropriate based on HBRSEP fire PRA is incomplete.                  the fire compartment being quantified.
Incorporate the main control room abandonment    RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY HFEs into the fire PRA model.                    CLASSIFICATION:
Based on the abovementioned details, these SRs are considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-25
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                    Status                          Finding                                          Disposition PRM-B15            MODEL any new accident                Dispositioned Quantification of the HBRSEP fire PRA model        Following additional refinements to the model, progressions beyond the onset                      indicates that the fire-related LERF is about      LERF is more in line with typical results.
(CAT I/II/III)      of core damage identified per                      90 percent of the fire-related CDF. This result is PRM-B13 to determine the                            exceptionally high and has been self-identified fire-induced        LERF          in              by the utility. The result is produced by MSO accordance with HLR-LE-A,                          events in the switchgear and cable spreading HLR-LE-B, HLR-LE-C, and                            rooms that cause a core damaging accident HLR-LE-D and their SRs in                          sequence and also result in the spurious Part 2 with the following                          opening of several containment isolation valves.
clarifications:                                    Fire-related LERF for HBRSEP is an unusually (a) All the SRs under                              high proportion of the fire-related CDF. Typically, HLR-LE-A,              HLR-LE-B,                  fire-related LERF is 10 - 25 percent of the HLR-LE-C, and HLR-LE-D in                          fire-related CDF. At HBRSEP, fire-related LERF Part 2 are to be addressed in                      is about 90 percent of the fire-related CDF.
the context of fire scenarios including effects on system                        Investigate ways to remove conservatisms from operability    /    functionality,                the HBRSEP fire PRA model, particularly for the operator      actions,    accident                MSOs in the switchgear and cable spreading progression,      and      possible                rooms.
containment                failures accounting for fire damage to equipment and associated cabling.
(b) LE-C2 and LE-C6 in Part 2 are to be met in a manner consistent with 4-2.10.
(c) LE-C6 in Part 2 is to be met in a manner consistent with PRM-B9 above.
(d) LE-C8 in Part 2 is to be met in a manner consistent with PRM-B6 above.
and DEVELOP a defined basis to support      the      claim      of nonapplicability of any of these requirements in Part 2.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                        Page V-26
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                            Finding                                        Disposition PRM-C1              DOCUMENT the Fire PRA              Dispositioned Documentation of development of the plant          The development of the plant response model is (CAT I/II/III)      plant response model in a                        response model is spread over several              documented in Attachment 9 of RNP-/PSA-0066 manner        consistent      with              calculations and documents. The primary            via a model change log. RNP-F/PSA-0066 also HLR-IE-D,              HLRAS-C,                  documents are RNP-F/PSA-0066 (component discusses assumptions made during the HLR-SC-C, HLR-SY-C, and                          selection)          and        P2217-1021-01-01 HLR-DA-E and their SRs in                        (quantification). Thus, key elements of the PRM    development of the model.
Part 2 as well as 4-2.10 with                    development (e.g., assumptions that are made the following clarifications:                    while developing the model) being dispersed and (a) HLR-IE-D in Part 2 is to be                  difficult to assimilate and comprehend. The met in a manner consistent                      dispersion of pertinent information about with that required under                        development of the PRM makes understanding HLR-IGN-B of this Standard.                      of the development difficult for reviewers and for (b) Document any defined                        utility staff who will make future modifications to bases to support the claim of                    the      HBRSEP        fire  PRA    model    and nonapplicability of any of the                  documentation.
referenced requirements in Part 2 beyond that already                      Develop a PRM-specific calculation or notebook covered by the clarifications in                which combines the pertinent portions of PRM this section.                                    documentation from existing documents or calculations.
UNC-A2              INCLUDE the treatment of          Dispositioned To comply with Section 2 applicable SRs intent      Section 7.0 of the HBRSEP Fire PRA (CAT I/II/III)      uncertainties, including their                  for UNC, a final documentation of importance        Quantification Calculation, provides an analysis documentation, as called out in                  rankings considering various sensitivity studies    of uncertainty regarding the quantification of the IGN-B5              SRs        PRM-A4,        FQ-F1,                along with applicable sequences is suggested to    HBRSEP Fire PRA. Importance rankings are also (CAT I/II/III)      IGN-A10, IGN-B5, FSS-E3,                        be included in the UNC discussion in an            discussed    in  this  section. Additionally, FSS-E4, FSS-H5, FSS-H9, and                      independent document.                              Section 9.0 provides a discussion of sensitivities CF-A2 and that required by                                                                          that were evaluated.
performing Part 2 referenced requirements throughout this Standard.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-27
 
Duke Energy H. B Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) - NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition Transition Report Revision 1 May 27, 2016
 
Duke Energy                                                                              NFPA 805 Transition Report TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ..................................................................................................... iv Acronym List ................................................................................................................. v
 
==1.0 INTRODUCTION==
..................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Background ........................................................................................................ 1 1.1.1 NFPA 805 - Requirements and Guidance ................................................. 1 1.1.2 Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c).................................................................... 2 1.2 Purpose ............................................................................................................. 3 2.0 OVERVIEW OF EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ................................ 4 2.1 Current Fire Protection Licensing Basis ............................................................. 4 2.2 NRC Acceptance of the Fire Protection Licensing Basis ................................... 4 3.0 TRANSITION PROCESS ........................................................................................ 8 3.1 Background ........................................................................................................ 8 3.2 NFPA 805 Process ............................................................................................ 8 3.3 NEI 04 NFPA 805 Transition Process........................................................ 9 3.4 NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) .............................................. 10 4.0 COMPLIANCE WITH NFPA 805 REQUIREMENTS ............................................ 12 4.1 Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements .......................... 12 4.1.1 Overview of Evaluation Process .............................................................. 12 4.1.2 Results of the Evaluation Process ........................................................... 14 4.1.3 Definition of Power Block and Plant ......................................................... 15 4.2 Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria ............................................................... 15 4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology ............................... 15 4.2.2 Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluation Transition ......................... 22 4.2.3 Licensing Action Transition ...................................................................... 23 4.2.4 Fire Area Transition ................................................................................. 24 4.3 Non-Power Operational Modes ........................................................................ 27 4.3.1 Overview of Evaluation Process .............................................................. 27 4.3.2 Results of the Evaluation Process ........................................................... 30 4.4 Radioactive Release Performance Criteria ...................................................... 30 4.4.1 Overview of Evaluation Process .............................................................. 31 4.4.2 Results of the Evaluation Process ........................................................... 31 4.5 Fire PRA and Performance-Based Approaches .............................................. 32 4.5.1 Fire PRA Development and Assessment ................................................. 32 HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                        Page i
 
Duke Energy                                                                                NFPA 805 Transition Report 4.5.2 Performance-Based Approaches ............................................................. 34 4.6 Monitoring Program ......................................................................................... 39 4.6.1 Overview of NFPA 805 Requirements and NEI 04-02 Guidance on the NFPA 805 Fire Protection System and Feature Monitoring Program ...... 39 4.6.2 Overview of Post-Transition NFPA 805 Monitoring Program ................... 39 4.7 Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality Assurance ........ 45 4.7.1 Compliance with Documentation Requirements in Section 2.7.1 of NFPA 805 ........................................................................................................... 45 4.7.2 Compliance with Configuration Control Requirements in Section 2.7.2 and 2.2.9 of NFPA 805 ................................................................................... 47 4.7.3 Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805 .... 50 4.8 Summary of Results......................................................................................... 54 4.8.1 Results of the Fire Area Review .............................................................. 54 4.8.2 Plant Modifications and Items to be Completed During the Implementation Phase....................................................................................................... 54 4.8.3 Supplemental Information -Other Licensee Specific Issues .................... 55
 
==5.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION==
............................................................................. 58 5.1 Introduction - 10 CFR 50.48 ............................................................................ 58 5.2 Regulatory Topics ............................................................................................ 63 5.2.1 License Condition Changes ..................................................................... 63 5.2.2 Technical Specifications .......................................................................... 63 5.2.3 Orders and Exemptions ........................................................................... 63 5.3 Regulatory Evaluations .................................................................................... 63 5.3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration ..................................................... 63 5.3.2 Environmental Consideration ................................................................... 64 5.4 Revision to the UFSAR ...................................................................................... 64 5.5 Transition Implementation Schedule ................................................................ 64
 
==6.0 REFERENCES==
...................................................................................................... 65 ATTACHMENTS ........................................................................................................... 70 A. NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program &
Design Elements ............................................................................................... A-1 B. NEI 04-02 Table B Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment - Methodology Review ................................................................................................................ B-1 C. NEI 04-02 Table B Fire Area Transition ..................................................... C-1 D. NEI 04-02 Non-Power Operational Modes Transition ..................................... D-1 E. NEI 04-02 Radioactive Release Transition ....................................................... E-1 HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                        Page ii
 
Duke Energy                                                                          NFPA 805 Transition Report F. Fire-Induced Multiple Spurious Operations Resolution ................................. F-1 G. Recovery Actions Transition ............................................................................ G-1 H. NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Question Summary Table ................................ H-1 I. Definition of Power Block ................................................................................... I-1 J. Fire Modeling V&V ............................................................................................. J-1 K. Existing Licensing Action Transition .............................................................. K-1 L. NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval (10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii)) ... L-1 M. License Condition Changes ............................................................................. M-1 N. Technical Specification Changes .................................................................... N-1 O. Orders and Exemptions .................................................................................... O-1 P. RI-PB Alternatives to NFPA 805 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4) ........................................ P-1 Q. No Significant Hazards Evaluations ................................................................ Q-1 R. Environmental Considerations Evaluation ..................................................... R-1 S. Modifications and Implementation Items ......................................................... S-1 T. Clarification of Prior NRC Approvals................................................................ T-1 U. Internal Events PRA Quality ............................................................................. U-1 V. Fire PRA Quality ................................................................................................. V-1 W. Fire PRA Insights .................................................................................................. 1 HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                  Page iii
 
Duke Energy                                                            Executive Summary Executive Summary Duke Energy will transition the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 (HBRSEP) fire protection program to a new Risk-Informed, Performance-Based (RI-PB) alternative per 10 CFR 50.48(c) which incorporates by reference NFPA 805. The licensing basis per License Condition 3.E will be superseded.
The transition process consisted of a review and update of HBRSEP documentation, including the development of a Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) using NUREG/CR-6850 as guidance. This Transition Report summarizes the transition process and results. This Transition Report contains information:
* Required by 10 CFR 50.48(c).
* Recommended by guidance document Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-02 Revision 2 and appropriate Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs).
* Recommended by guidance document Regulatory Guide 1.205 Revision 1.
Section 4 of the Transition Report provides a summary of compliance with the following NFPA 805 requirements:
* Fundamental Fire Protection Program Elements and Minimum Design Requirements
* Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria, including:
o Non-Power Operational Modes o Fire Risk Evaluations
* Radioactive Release Performance Criteria
* Monitoring Program
* Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality Assurance Section 5 of the Transition Report provides regulatory evaluations and associated attachments, including:
* Changes to License Condition
* Changes to Technical Specifications, Orders, and Exemptions,
* Determination of No Significant Hazards and evaluation of Environmental Considerations.
The attachments to the Transition Report include detail to support the transition process and results.
Attachment H contains the approved FAQs not yet incorporated into the endorsed revision of NEI 04-02. These FAQs have been used to clarify the guidance in RG 1.205, NEI 04-02, and the requirements of NFPA 805 and in the preparation of this License Amendment Request.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page iv
 
Duke Energy                                                    Acronym List Acronym List AC      Alternating Current ADAMS      Agency wide Documents Access and Management System AFW      Auxiliary Feedwater AHJ      Authority having jurisdiction ANS      American Nuclear Society AO      Auxiliary Operator APCSB    Auxiliary Power Conversion Systems Branch TM ARC      Safe Shutdown Analysis software package ASME      American Society of Mechanical Engineers BNP      Brunswick Nuclear Plant BTP      Branch Technical Position CAFTA    Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis CAT      Capability Category CC      Capability Category CC I    Capability Category I CCDP      Conditional Core Damage Probability CCW      Component Cooling Water CDF      Core Damage Frequency CFAST    Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport CFR      Code of Federal Regulation CO2    Carbon Dioxide CP&L    Carolina Power and Light CR3      Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant CSDB      Component Selection Database CST      Condensate Storage Tank CT      Current Transformer CV      Containment Vessel CVCS      Chemical and Volume Control System DBD      Design Basis Document HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                    Page v
 
Duke Energy                                                    Acronym List DC      Direct Current DID      Defense-in-Depth DSDG      Dedicated Shutdown Diesel Generator EC      Engineering Change EDB      Equipment Database EDG      Emergency Diesel Generator EEE      Engineering Equivalency Evaluations EEEE      Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations EOOS      Equipment Out of Service EPRI    Electric Power Research Institute ESP      Engineering Support Personnel F&O      Facts and Observations FA      Fire Area FAQ      Frequently Asked Question FC      Fire Compartment FDT      Fire Dynamics Tools FHA      Fire Hazards Analysis FHB      Fuel Handling Building FMEA      Failure Modes and Effects Analysis FP      Fire Protection FPIP    Fire Protection Initiatives Project FPP      Fire Protection Program FPRA      Fire Probabilistic Risk Analysis or Assessment FRE      Fire Risk Evaluation FRN      Federal Register Notice FSA      Fire Safety Analysis FSS      Fire Scenario Selection FSSPMD    Fire Safe Shutdown Program Manager Database FTL      Fault Tree Logic FZ      Fire Zone GDC      General Design Criterion HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                    Page vi
 
Duke Energy                                                          Acronym List HBRSEP    H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 (i.e., RNP)
HEAF      High Energy Arcing Fault HNP    Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant HRE    Higher Risk Evolutions HSS    High Safety Significance HVAC      Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning INPO    Institute of Nuclear Power Operations ISFSI    Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation KSF    Key Safety Function kV    Kilovolt LA    Licensing Action LAR    License Amendment Request LERF      Large Early Release Frequency LFS    Limiting Fire Scenario LOCA      Loss of Coolant Accident LSS    Low Safety Significance MCA      Multi-Compartment Analysis MCC      Motor Control Center MCR      Main Control Room MDAFW      Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater MEFS      Maximum Expected Fire Scenario MHIF    Multiple High Impedance Fault MSO      Multiple Spurious Operation MTC    Moderator Temperature Coefficient NEI    Nuclear Energy Institute NFPA      National Fire Protection Association NFPA 805    National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 NGG      Nuclear Generation Group NPO    Non-Power Operations NRC    Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSCA      Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                          Page vii
 
Duke Energy                                                  Acronym List NSEL    Nuclear Safety Equipment List OL      Operating License OMA      Operator Manual Action OOS      Out-of-Service PAP      Personnel Access Point PB      Performance Based PORV      Power Operated Relief Valves POS      Plant Operational State PRA      Probabilistic Risk Assessment or Analysis PSA      Probabilistic Safety Assessment or Analysis PVC      Polyvinyl-chloride PWR      Pressurized Water Reactor PWROG      Pressurized Water Reactor Owners Group PWST      Primary Water Storage Tank QA      Quality Assurance RA      Recovery Action RAB      Reactor Auxiliary Building RA-DID    Recovery Action - Defense-in-Depth RAI    Request for Additional Information RAW      Risk Achievement Worth RCA      Radiologically Controlled Area RCP      Reactor Coolant Pump RCS      Reactor Coolant System RG      Regulatory Guide RHR      Residual Heat Removal RI-PB    Risk-Informed Performance-Based RIS    Regulatory Issues Summary RMA      Risk Mitigating Action RWST      Refueling Water Storage Tank SBO      Station Blackout SDAFW      Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                Page viii
 
Duke Energy                                                    Acronym List SE      Safety Evaluation SER      Safety Evaluation Report SFPE    Society of Fire Protection Engineers SI    Safety Injection SISBO    Self-Induced Station Blackout SM      Safety Margin SR      Supporting Requirement SSA      Safe Shutdown Analysis SSC      Structures, Systems, and Components SSD      Safe Shutdown SW      Service Water UET      Unfavorable Exposure Time UFSAR    Updated Final Safety Analysis Report V&V      Verification and Validation VCT      Volume Control Tank VFDR      Variances from the deterministic requirements ZOI    Zone of Influence HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                    Page ix
 
Duke Energy                                                                            1.0 Introduction
 
==1.0    INTRODUCTION==
 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has promulgated an alternative rule for fire protection requirements at nuclear power plants, 10 CFR 50.48(c), National Fire Protection Association Standard 805 (NFPA 805). Duke Energy is implementing the Nuclear Energy Institute methodology NEI 04-02, Guidance for Implementing a Risk-informed, Performance-based Fire Protection Program Under 10 CFR 50.48(c)
(NEI 04-02), to transition H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2 (HBRSEP) from its current fire protection licensing basis to the new requirements as outlined in NFPA 805. This report describes the transition methodology utilized and documents how HBRSEP complies with the new requirements.
1.1    Background 1.1.1 NFPA 805 - Requirements and Guidance On July 16, 2004 the NRC amended 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection, to add a new subsection, 10 CFR 50.48(c), which establishes new Risk-Informed, Performance-Based (RI-PB) fire protection requirements. 10 CFR 50.48(c) incorporates by reference, with exceptions, the National Fire Protection Associations NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants - 2001 Edition, as a voluntary alternative to 10 CFR 50.48 Section (b), Appendix R, and Section (f), Decommissioning.
As stated in 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(i), any licensees adoption of a RI-PB program that complies with the rule is voluntary. This rule may be adopted as an acceptable alternative method for complying with either 10 CFR 50.48(b), for plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, or the fire protection license conditions for plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979, or 10 CFR 50.48(f), plants shutdown in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1).
NEI developed NEI 04-02 to assist licensees in adopting NFPA 805 and making the transition from their current fire protection licensing basis to one based on NFPA 805.
The NRC issued Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.205, Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection for Existing Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, which endorses NEI 04-02, with exceptions, in December 2009.1 A depiction of the primary document relationships is shown in Figure 1-1:
1 Where referred to in this document NEI 04-02 is Revision 2 and RG 1.205 is Revision 1.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                Page 1
 
Duke Energy                                                                  1.0 Introduction Figure 1-1 NFPA 805 Transition - Implementation Requirements/Guidance 1.1.2 Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) 1.1.2.1    Start of Transition CP&L submitted a letter of intent to the NRC on June 10, 2005 (ML051720404), for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (HNP) to adopt NFPA 805 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c). This letter of intent also addressed other CP&L plants (Brunswick Steam Electric Plant Units No. 1 and 2, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2, and Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Plant). The letter of intent requested three years of enforcement discretion and proposed that HNP be considered a Pilot Plant for the NFPA 805 transition process.
By letter dated April 29, 2007 (ML070590625), the NRC granted a three year enforcement discretion period. In accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy, the enforcement discretion period will continue until the NRC approval of the license amendment request (LAR) is completed.
The NRC expected approximately 23 LARs by the end of June 2011. As a result, the Commission worked with industry to develop and create a staggered LAR submittal schedule. On April 14, 2011, the NRC held a public meeting, during which the staff and stakeholders discussed the staggered approach method. In a letter (ML111101452)
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page 2
 
Duke Energy                                                                  1.0 Introduction dated April 20, 2011, the Commission approved the staffs recommendation to develop a staggered submittal and review process for these reviews, and submit a revision to the Enforcement Policy for Commission approval which would propose to extend enforcement discretion to correspond with the new LAR submittal dates. In a letter (ML11164A047) dated June 10, 2011, the Commission approved the staffs recommendation to publish the Federal Register Notice (FRN) announcing the revision to the Enforcement Policy to extend the enforcement discretion to correspond with a staggered LAR submittal schedule. On June 29, 2011, Progress Energy submitted a letter (ML11188A058) requesting extension of their enforcement discretion and committed to the submittal date of September 30, 2013.
1.1.2.2    Transition Process The transition to NFPA 805 includes the following high level activities:
* Complete Safe Shutdown Analysis Reconstitution (activities started in 2003)
* A new Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) using NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities, as guidance and a revision to the Internal Events PRAs to support the Fire PRAs
* Completion of activities required to transition the pre-transition licensing basis to 10 CFR 50.48(c) as specified in NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205 The project was implemented using a comprehensive project plan and individual procedures/instructions for individual scopes of work. These procedures/instructions (e.g., Project Instruction FPIP series procedures referenced in this report) were developed for the purposes of NFPA 805 transition. Appropriate technical content from these procedures were and will be incorporated into technical documents and configuration control procedures, as required.
1.2    Purpose The purpose of the Transition Report is as follows:
: 1) Describe the process implemented to transition the current fire protection program to comply with the additional requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c)
: 2) Summarize the results of the transition process
: 3) Explain the bases for conclusions that the fire protection program complies with 10 CFR 50.48(c) requirements
: 4) Describe the new fire protection licensing basis
: 5) Describe the configuration management processes used to manage post-transition changes to the station and the fire protection program, and resulting impact on the licensing basis HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page 3
 
Duke Energy                                        2.0 Overview of Existing Fire Protection Program 2.0    OVERVIEW OF EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM 2.1    Current Fire Protection Licensing Basis H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 was licensed to operate on July 31, 1970, with a Renewed Facility Operating License, dated June 27, 2007. As a result, the HBRSEP fire protection program is based on compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(a), 10 CFR 50.48(b), and the following License Condition:
Duke Energy HBRSEP License Condition 3.E states:
E. Fire Protection Program Carolina Power & Light Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report dated February 28, 1978, and supplements thereto. Carolina Power & Light Company may make changes to the approved Fire Protection Program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
2.2    NRC Acceptance of the Fire Protection Licensing Basis In response to the NRCs May 11, 1976 request, CP&L performed a fire hazards analysis which analyzed the HBRSEP fire protection program against the guidance of Appendix A to Branch Technical Position (BTP) Auxiliary Power Conversion Systems Branch (APCSB) 9.5-1. CP&L submitted the HBRSEP Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) and response to Appendix A on December 29, 1976. Subsequent to the submittal of the FHA, additional NRC review of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) took place in the form of written staff questions and CP&L responses, meetings and telephone conferences with the staff. The NRC accepted certain aspects of the program, while CP&L committed to make changes to other portions of the program. The final acceptance of the HBRSEP Fire Protection Program was documented in NRC SER dated February 28, 1978. Open issues from this SER were documented in supplements to the SER dated September 4, 1979, February 21, 1980, and December 8, 1980.
The NRC forwarded Section 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 to CP&L on November 24, 1980. This regulation became effective on February 17, 1981. Since HBRSEP was licensed prior to January 1, 1979, it was required to meet only certain provisions of Appendix R. CP&L sought and received such an exemption from the Appendix R requirements.
Supplemental SER for Sections III.G and III.L was issued on November 21, 1985 resolving the open items concerning spurious operations of high-low pressure interface valves due to a postulated fire (hot short). Exemptions from certain requirements of Section III.G.2 and III.G.3 were also granted by the NRC in letters dated November 13, 1981, November 25, 1983, October 25, 1984, September 17, 1986, June 30, 1988, and October 17, 1990.
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Duke Energy                                      2.0 Overview of Existing Fire Protection Program In addition to the approval of HBRSEP alternative shutdown design, the NRC granted the following:
02/28/78      NLU-78-71      Amendment 31 to Operating License (OL) adds license conditions, revises Technical Specifications and issues Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 Fire Protection SER.
09/04/79      NLU-79-398      Amendment 40 to OL, changing Fire Protection license conditions and Suppl. 1 to Appendix A Fire Protection SER extending completion dates for modifications.
02/21/80      NLU-80-106      NRC evaluations of issues relating to Appendix A Fire Protection SER, identifying completed, open and not acceptable issues.
12/08/80      NLU-80-623      SER closing several Fire Protection issues related to Appendix A Fire Protection SER.
05/15/81      NLU-81-245      Amendment 57 to OL, revising Technical Specifications.
11/13/81      NLU-81-564      NRC grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.G.3 for a fixed fire suppression system in the control room.
05/10/82      NLU-82-248      NRC grants exemption to 10 CFR 50.48c schedular requirements with criteria for evaluation.
12/10/82      NLU-82-709      NRC Letter Regarding DRAFT SER on Appendix R Exemption Request for Sections III.G.2, III.G.3, III.L, III.M and III.O 11/22/83      NLU-83-772      SER related to Appendix R Sections III.G.3 and III.L.
Also denies CP&L request for exemption to achieve cold shutdown using onsite power within 72 hours.
Superceded by 8/8/84 SER.
11/25/83      NLU-83-777      NRC grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.G.2 requirements for FZ 27 for 3-hour fire barrier separation between redundant trains and FZ 29 for automatic suppression and 20 foot separation. NRC also grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.M.2 for fire barrier penetration seal backface temperatures and approval of seals having a 2-hour fire rating.
05/21/84      NLS-84-155      Informal forwarding of DRAFT Supplemental SER on III.G.3 and III.L.
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Duke Energy                              2.0 Overview of Existing Fire Protection Program 08/08/84  NLU-84-516 SER for Appendix R Sections III.G.3 and III.L.
Supersedes 11/22/83 SER (sometimes referred to as SSER or Revised SER).
10/25/84  NLU-84-687 NRC grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.G.2 for FZ 5 from area wide automatic fire suppression.
03/07/85  NLS-85-146 NRC Letter Regarding Exemption To Appendix R Section III.O, Notice of Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact 03/07/85  NLU-85-176 NRC grants exemption to Appendix R Section III.O from installation of reactor coolant pump oil collection system.
11/21/85  NLS-85-732 Supplemental SER for Appendix R Sections III.G. and III.L resolving open item concerning spurious operation of the high-low pressure interface valves due to a postulated fire (hot short).
09/09/86  NLS-86-552 NRC Letter Regarding Additional Information Regarding Exemption From Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 09/11/86  NLS-86-551 NRC Letter Regarding Environmental Assessment on Exemption Request from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2.f and III.G.3 09/17/86  NLU-86-570 NRC Letter Granting Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Sections III.G.2.f for radiant heat shield in FZ 24 and III.G.3 for partial fire detection and suppression in Fire Areas A (FZs 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 21, 23),
B (FZ 4), and G (FZs 25, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33) 07/30/87  NLS-87-422 NRC Letter Regarding Exemptions from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J. Superseded by June 30, 1988.
06/30/88  NRC-88-390 NRC Letter Granting Exemptions From Certain Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J for cold shutdown equipment areas, along alternate egress routes outside buildings and use of dedicated portable hand held lighting. Supersedes July 30, 1987 Exemption due to inconsistencies between CP&L letters and NRC SER.
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Duke Energy                            2.0 Overview of Existing Fire Protection Program 10/09/90  NRC-90-600 NRC Letter Regarding Environmental Assessment For Appendix R III.G.2 Exemption 10/17/90  NRC-90-622 NRC Letter Granting Exemption From Requirements of Section III.G.2.b of Appendix R for increased combustible loading up to a 1 hour in CCW Pump Room (FZ 5) 10/02/92  NRC-92-563 NRC Letter Regarding Environmental Assessment Related to Exemption From Section III.J of Appendix R 10/08/92  NRC-92-581 NRC Letter Granting Exemption From The Requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Section III.J for cold shutdown equipment areas and use of dedicated portable hand held lighting. SER also clarifies 6/30/88 Exemption allowing use of portable lights at the intake structure (FZ 29).
12/07/92  NRC    NRC Issues Amendment No. 142 to Facility Operating 0702      License No. DPR-23 Regarding Fire Protection - Revising Fire Protection License Condition of Operating License and relocates the Fire Protection Tech Specs to plant procedures and UFSAR 02/09/96  NRC    Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant 0080      Impact Regarding and Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J 06/03/96  NRC    Exemption From Certain Requirements of 0235      10CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J for access to and egress from, and operation of valves in outside areas which are illuminated by diesel backed security lighting.
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Duke Energy                                                            3.0 Transition Process 3.0    TRANSITION PROCESS 3.1    Background Section 4.0 of NEI 04-02 describes the process for transitioning from compliance with the current fire protection licensing basis to the new requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c).
NEI 04-02 contains the following steps:
: 1) Licensee determination to transition the licensing basis and devote the necessary resources to it;
: 2) Submit a Letter of Intent to the NRC stating the licensees intention to transition the licensing basis in accordance with a tentative schedule;
: 3) Conduct the transition process to determine the extent to which the current fire protection licensing basis supports compliance with the new requirements and the extent to which additional analyses, plant and program changes, and alternative methods and analytical approaches are needed;
: 4) Submit a LAR;
: 5) Complete transition activities that can be completed prior to the receipt of the License Amendment;
: 6) Receive a Safety Evaluation; and
: 7) Complete implementation of the new licensing basis, including completion of modifications identified in Attachment S.
3.2    NFPA 805 Process Section 2.2 of NFPA 805 establishes the general process for demonstrating compliance with NFPA 805. This process is illustrated in Figure 3-1. It shows that except for the fundamental fire protection requirements, compliance can be achieved on a fire area basis either by deterministic or RI-PB methods. Consistent with the guidance in NEI 04-02, Duke Energy has implemented the NFPA 805 Section 2.2 process by first determining the extent to which its current fire protection program supports findings of deterministic compliance with the requirements in NFPA 805. RI-PB methods are being applied to the requirements for which deterministic compliance could not be shown.
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Duke Energy                                                                        3.0 Transition Process Figure 3-1 NFPA 805 Process [NEI 04-02 Figure 3-1 based on Figure 2-2 of NFPA 805]2 3.3      NEI 04 NFPA 805 Transition Process NFPA 805 contains technical processes and requirements for a RI-PB fire protection program. NEI 04-02 was developed to provide guidance on the overall process (programmatic, technical, and licensing) for transitioning from a traditional fire protection licensing basis to a new RI-PB method based upon NFPA 805, as shown in Figure 3-2.
2 Note: 10 CFR 50.48(c) does not incorporate by reference Life Safety and Plant Damage/Business Interruption goals, objectives and criteria. See 10 CFR 50.48(c) for specific exceptions to the incorporation by reference of NFPA 805.
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Duke Energy                                                                3.0 Transition Process Section 4.0 of NEI 04-02 describes the detailed process for assessing a fire protection program for compliance with NFPA 805, as shown in Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2 Transition Process (Simplified) [based on NEI 04-02 Figure 4-1]
3.4    NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
The NRC has worked with NEI and two Pilot Plants (Oconee Nuclear Station and Harris Nuclear Plant) to define the licensing process for transitioning to a new licensing basis under 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805. Both the NRC and the industry recognized the need for additional clarifications to the guidance provided in RG 1.205, NEI 04-02, and the requirements of NFPA 805. The NFPA 805 FAQ process was jointly developed by NEI and NRC to facilitate timely clarifications of NRC positions. This process is described in a letter from the NRC dated July 12, 2006, to NEI (ML061660105) and in Regulatory Issues Summary (RIS) 2007-19, Process for Communicating Clarifications HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                          Page 10
 
Duke Energy                                                          3.0 Transition Process of Staff Positions Provided in RG 1.205 Concerning Issues Identified during the Pilot Application of NFPA Standard 805, dated August 20, 2007 (ML071590227).
Under the FAQ Process, transition issues are submitted to the NEI NFPA 805 Task Force for review, and subsequently presented to the NRC during public FAQ meetings.
Once the NEI NFPA 805 Task Force and NRC reach agreement, the NRC issues a memorandum to indicate that the FAQ is acceptable. NEI 04-02 will be revised to incorporate the approved FAQs. This is an on-going revision process that will continue through the transition of NFPA 805 plants. Final closure of the FAQs will occur when future revisions of RG 1.205, endorsing the related revisions of NEI 04-02, are approved by the NRC. It is expected that additional FAQs will be written and existing FAQs will be revised as plants continue NFPA 805 transition after the Pilot Plant Safety Evaluations.
Attachment H contains the list of approved FAQs not yet incorporated into the endorsed revision of NEI 04-02. These FAQs have been used to clarify the guidance in RG 1.205, NEI 04-02, and the requirements of NFPA 805 and in the preparation of this LAR.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.0    COMPLIANCE WITH NFPA 805 REQUIREMENTS 4.1    Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements The Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements are established in Chapter 3 of NFPA 805. Section 4.3.1 of NEI 04-02 provides a systematic process for determining the extent to which the pre-transition licensing basis and plant configuration meets these criteria and for identifying the fire protection program changes that would be necessary for compliance with NFPA 805. NEI 04-02 Appendix B-1 provides guidance on documenting compliance with the program requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.
4.1.1 Overview of Evaluation Process The comparison of the HBRSEP Fire Protection Program to the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 was performed and documented in Attachment A, Table B-1, NFPA 805 Ch. 3 Transition Details. The analysis used the guidance contained in NEI 04-02, Section 4.3.1 and Appendix B-1 (See Figure 4-1).
Each section and subsection of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 was reviewed against the current fire protection program. Upon completion of the activities associated with the review, the following compliance statement(s) was used:
* Complies - For those sections/subsections determined to meet the specific requirements of NFPA 805
* Complies with Clarification - For those sections/subsections determined to meet the requirements of NFPA 805 with clarification
* Complies via previous NRC approval - For those sections/subsections where the specific NFPA 805 Chapter 3 requirements are not met but previous NRC approval of the configuration exists.
* Complies with use of Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations (EEEEs) -
For those sections/subsections determined to be equivalent to the NFPA 805 Chapter 3 requirements as documented by engineering analysis
* License Amendment Required - For those sections/subsections for which approval is sought in this LAR submittal in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii). A summary of the bases of acceptability is provided (See Attachment L for details).
In some cases multiple compliance statements have been assigned to a specific NFPA 805 Chapter 3 section/subsection. Where this is the case, each compliance/compliance basis statement clearly references the corresponding requirement of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.
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Duke Energy                                                                                                  4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4 Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements Transition Process
[Based on NEI 04-02 Figure 4-2]3 3
Figure 4-1 depicts the process used during the transition and therefore contains elements (i.e., open items) that represent interim resolutions. Additional detail on the transition of EEEEs is included in Section 4.2.2.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.1.2 Results of the Evaluation Process 4.1.2.1    NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Met or Previously Approved by the NRC Attachment A contains the NEI 04-02 Table B-1, Transition of Fundamental Fire Protection Program and Design Elements. This table provides the compliance basis for the requirements in NFPA 805 Chapter 3. Except as identified in Section 4.1.2.3, Attachment A demonstrates that the fire protection program at HBRSEP either:
* Complies directly with the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3,
* Complies with clarification with the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3,
* Complies through the use of existing engineering equivalency evaluations which are valid and of appropriate quality, or
* Complies with a previously NRC approved alternative to NFPA 805 Chapter 3 and therefore the specific requirement of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 is supplanted.
4.1.2.2    NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Requiring Clarification of Prior NRC Approval NFPA 805 Section 3.1 states in part, Previously approved alternatives from the fundamental protection program attributes of this chapter by the AHJ take precedence over the requirements contained herein. In some cases prior NRC approval of an NFPA 805 Chapter 3 program attribute may be unclear. Duke Energy does not have any requests for the NRC to concur with their finding of prior approval for any sections of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.
4.1.2.3    NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements Not Met and Not Previously Approved by NRC The following sections of NFPA 805 Chapter 3 are not specifically met nor do previous NRC approvals of alternatives exist:
3.3.5.1- Approval is requested for the use electrical wiring above suspended ceilings.
3.3.5.2- Approval is requested for the use of electrical raceway construction that may not comply.
3.5.16- Approval is requested for the use of fire protection water for specific plant evolutions.
3.2.3(1)- Approval is requested for the use of EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features credited by the fire protection program.
The specific deviation and a discussion of how the alternative satisfies 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii) requirements are provided in Attachment L. Duke Energy requests NRC approval of these performance-based methods.
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Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.1.3 Definition of Power Block and Plant Where used in NFPA 805 Chapter 3 the terms Power Block and Plant refer to structures that have equipment required for nuclear plant operations, such as Containment, Auxiliary Building, Service Building, Control Building, Fuel Building, Radioactive Waste, Water Treatment, Turbine Building, and intake structures or structures that are identified in the facilitys pre-transition licensing basis.
The HBRSEP FHA assigned fire protection properties to defined Fire Areas and Fire Zones that are important for the safe shutdown of the plant. The Fire PRA analysis fire compartments are equivalent to defined Fire Zones in the plant. Therefore, detection systems, suppression systems and floor areas for defined Fire Zones are the same for Fire PRA fire compartments. The current Appendix R series drawings and the Fire Hazards analysis were utilized in the partitioning determination. For Fire Compartments FC400 through FC500 there are no current Fire Areas or Zones defined. These areas are currently considered to be part of the yard.
These structures are listed in Attachment I and define the power block and plant.
4.2    Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria The Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria are established in Section 1.5 of NFPA 805.
Chapter 4 of NFPA 805 provides the methodology to determine the fire protection systems and features required to achieve the performance criteria outlined in Section 1.5. Section 4.3.2 of NEI 04-02 provides a systematic process for determining the extent to which the pre-transition licensing basis meets these criteria and for identifying any necessary fire protection program changes. NEI 04-02, Appendix B-2 provides guidance on documenting the transition of Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology and the Fire Area compliance strategies.
4.2.1 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Methodology The Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA) Methodology review consists of four processes:
* Establishing compliance with NFPA 805 Section 2.4.2
* Establishing the Safe and Stable Conditions for the Plant
* Establishing Recovery Actions
* Evaluating Multiple Spurious Operations The methodology for demonstrating reasonable assurance that a fire during non-power operational (NPO) modes will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition is an additional requirement of 10 CFR 50.48(c) and is addressed in Section 4.3.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.1.1    Compliance with NFPA 805 Section 2.4.2 Overview of Process NFPA 805 Section 2.4.2 Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment states:
The purpose of this section is to define the methodology for performing a nuclear safety capability assessment. The following steps shall be performed:
(1) Selection of systems and equipment and their interrelationships necessary to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria in Chapter 1 (2) Selection of cables necessary to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria in Chapter 1 (3) Identification of the location of nuclear safety equipment and cables (4) Assessment of the ability to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria given a fire in each fire area The NSCA methodology review evaluated the existing post-fire safe shutdown analysis (SSA) methodology against the guidance provided in NEI 00-01, Revision 1 (ML050310295) Chapter 3, Deterministic Methodology, as discussed in Appendix B-2 of NEI 04-02. The methodology is depicted in Figure 4-2 and consisted of the following activities:
Each specific section of NFPA 805 2.4.2 was correlated to the corresponding section of Chapter 3 of NEI 00-01 Revision 1. Based upon the content of the NEI 00-01 methodology statements, a determination was made of the applicability of the section to the station.
The plant-specific methodology was compared to applicable sections of NEI 00-01 and one of the following alignment statements and its associated basis were assigned to the section:
o Aligns o Aligns with intent o Not in Alignment o Not in Alignment, but Prior NRC Approval o Not in Alignment, but no adverse consequences o For those sections that do not align, an assessment was made to determine if the failure to maintain strict alignment with the guidance in NEI 00-01 could have adverse consequences. Since NEI 00-01 is a guidance document, portions of its text could be interpreted as good practice or intended as an example of an efficient means of performing the analyses. If the section has no adverse consequences, these sections of NEI 00-01 can be dispositioned without further review.
The comparison of the HBRSEP existing post-fire SSA methodology to NEI 00-01 Chapter 3 (NEI 04-02 Table B-2) was performed and documented in Attachment B.
In addition, a review of NEI 00-01, Revision 2, (ML091770265) Chapter 3, was conducted to identify the substantive changes from NEI 00-01, Revision 1 that are applicable to an NFPA 805 fire protection program. This review was performed and documented in Attachment B.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Results from Evaluation Process The method used to perform the existing post-fire SSA with respect to selection of systems and equipment, selection of cables, and identification of the location of equipment and cables, either meets the NRC endorsed guidance from NEI 00-01, Revision 1, Chapter 3 (as supplemented by the gap analysis) directly or met the intent of the endorsed guidance with adequate justification as documented in Attachment B.
Figure 4 Summary of Nuclear Safety Methodology Review Process (FAQ 07-0039)
Comparison to NEI 00-01 Revision 2 An additional review was performed of NEI 00-01, Revision 2, Chapter 3, for specific substantive changes in the guidance from NEI 00-01, Revision 1 that are applicable to an NFPA 805 transition. The results of this review are summarized below:
* Post fire manual operation of rising stem valves in the fire area of concern (NEI 00-01 Section 3.2.1.2)
A review of the NSCA results indicated that there are defense-in-depth recovery actions that require manual operation of a rising stem valve in the fire area of concern. There are no ignition sources or in situ combustibles that would affect these valves, and operation of the valves would not be required for about two hours.
* Analysis of open circuits on a high voltage (e.g., 4.16 kV) ammeter current transformers (NEI 00-01 Section 3.5.2.1)
The evaluation concludes that this failure mode is unlikely for CTs that could pose a threat to safe shutdown equipment.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.1.2      Safe and Stable Conditions for the Plant Overview of Process The nuclear safety goals, objectives and performance criteria of NFPA 805 allow more flexibility than the previous deterministic programs based on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R and NUREG-0800, Section 9.5-1 (and NEI 00-01, Chapter 3) since NFPA 805 only requires the licensee to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition rather than achieve and maintain cold shutdown.
NFPA 805, Section 1.6.56, defines Safe and Stable Conditions as follows For fuel in the reactor vessel, head on and tensioned, safe and stable conditions are defined as the ability to maintain Keff <0.99, with a reactor coolant temperature at or below the requirements for hot shutdown for a boiling water reactor and hot standby for a pressurized water reactor. For all other configurations, safe and stable conditions are defined as maintaining Keff <0.99 and fuel coolant temperature below boiling.
The nuclear safety goal of NFPA 805 requires "...reasonable assurance that a fire during any operational mode and plant configuration will not prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining the fuel in a safe and stable condition" without a specific reference to a mission time or event coping duration.
For the plant to be in a safe and stable condition, it may not be necessary to perform a transition to cold shutdown as currently required under 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
Therefore, the unit may remain at or below the temperature defined by a hot standby/hot shutdown plant operating state for the event.
Results Based on the criteria discussed in NSCA calculation RNP-E/ELEC-1216, The Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis for H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant, the NFPA 805 licensing basis for HBRSEP is to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions following any fire occurring prior to establishing cold shutdown. Specifically, the conditions include:
* the reactor operating at power,
* a shutdown condition prior to aligning the RHR system for shutdown cooling, or
* the transition mode between these two operational phases.
Immediately following the reactor scram, RCS inventory and pressure control is maintained using the charging system, or the safety injection system if the charging pumps are not available (applies to one fire area). Pressurizer safety relief valves provide overpressure protection for the RCS. Main Steam line safety relief valves provide for initial decay heat removal. Cycling of the steam generator power-operated relief valves (PORVs) provide for continued decay heat removal, with steam generator inventory replenished by either the steam driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump or the motor-driven AFW pumps. When the CST is depleted, the suction of the AFW pumps is manually aligned to the service water system. These actions are required in about two hours, and are considered defense in depth recovery actions. Since the valves requiring operation are all manual valves and are not electrically supervised, they are not considered to be VFDRs.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Following stabilization at hot standby, a long term strategy for decay heat removal and inventory/pressure control would be determined based on the extent of equipment damage. If an assessment of the post-fire conditions indicated that the residual heat removal (RHR) system should be in operation, then activities would commence in a safe and controlled manner to align plant equipment required for reactor cooldown.
The long-term actions required to maintain safe and stable conditions are largely routine and within the normal capabilities of site personnel, even in the face of fire damage.
These include the previously mentioned actions to align the suction of the AFW pump(s) to the service water system, and opening CVC-358 to maintain the charging pump suction path to the RWST. LCV-115B will initially provide this suction path, but is conservatively assumed to fail closed after about four (4) hours. These are straightforward actions performed by operators and covered by plant procedures. Repairs to safe shutdown equipment would not be required and the management of the onsite inventories of makeup water, nitrogen and diesel fuel would not require resources beyond those available from normal operations staff, maintenance, and emergency response personnel.
Demonstration of the Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria for safe and stable conditions was performed in two analyses.
* At-Power analysis, Modes 1-4. This analysis is discussed in Section 4.2.4. The at-power analysis goes beyond safe and stable to include Mode 4.
* Non-Power Operations analysis that includes cold shutdown and below (Modes 5 and 6). This analysis is discussed in Section 4.3.
4.2.1.3    Establishing Recovery Actions Overview of Process NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205 suggest that a licensee submit a summary of its approach for addressing the transition of OMAs as recovery actions in the LAR (Regulatory Position 2.2.1 and NEI-04-02, Section 4.6). As a minimum, NEI 04-02 suggests that the assumptions, criteria, methodology, and overall results be included for the NRC to determine the acceptability of the licensees methodology.
The discussion below provides the methodology used to transition pre-transition OMAs and to determine the population of post-transition recovery actions. This process is based on FAQ 07-0030 (ML110070485) and consists of the following steps:
* Step 1: Clearly define the primary control station(s) and determine which pre-transition OMAs are taken at primary control station(s) (Activities that occur in the Main Control Room are not considered pre-transition OMAs). Activities that take place at primary control station(s) or in the Main Control Room are not recovery actions, by definition.
* Step 2: Determine the population of recovery actions that are required to resolve variances from deterministic requirements (VFDRs) (to meet the risk acceptance criteria or maintain a sufficient level of defense-in-depth).
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements
* Step 3: Evaluate the additional risk presented by the use of recovery actions required to demonstrate the availability of a success path
* Step 4: Evaluate the feasibility of the recovery actions
* Step 5: Evaluate the reliability of the recovery actions Results The review results are documented in RNP-0170 and RNP-0202. Refer to Attachment G for the detailed evaluation process and summary of the results from the process.
4.2.1.4    Evaluation of Multiple Spurious Operations Overview of Process NEI 04-02 suggests that a licensee submit a summary of its approach for addressing potential fire-induced MSOs for NRC review and approval. As a minimum, NEI 04-02 suggests that the summary contain sufficient information relevant to methods, tools, and acceptance criteria used to enable the NRC to determine the acceptability of the licensees methodology. The methodology utilized to address MSOs for HBRSEP is summarized below.
As part of the NFPA 805 transition project, a review and evaluation of HBRSEP susceptibility to fire-induced MSOs was performed. The process was conducted in accordance with NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205, as supplemented by FAQ 07-0038 Revision 3 (ML110140242). The PWR Generic MSO list from NEI 00-01, Revision 3 was utilized.
The approach outlined in Figure 4-3 (based on Figure XX from FAQ 07-0038) is one acceptable method to address fire-induced MSOs. This method used insights from the Fire PRA developed in support of transition to NFPA 805 and consists of the following:
* Identifying potential MSOs of concern.
* Conducting an expert panel to assess plant specific vulnerabilities (e.g., per NEI 00-01, Rev. 1 Section F.4.2).
* Updating the Fire PRA model and existing post-fire NSCA to include the MSOs of concern.
* Evaluating for NFPA 805 Compliance.
* Documenting Results.
This process is intended to support the transition to a new licensing basis.
Post-transition changes would use the RI-PB change process. The post-transition change process for the assessment of a specific MSO would be a simplified version of this process, and may not need the level of detail shown in the following section (e.g.,
An expert panel may not be necessary to identify and assess a new potential MSO.
Identification of new potential MSOs may be part of the plant change review process and/or inspection process).
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 20
 
Duke Energy                                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Identify Potential MSOs of Concern SSA Step 1                Generic List of MSOs Self Assessments PRA Insights Operating Experience Expert Panel Step 2            Identify and Document MSOs of Concern Update PRA model & NSCA (as appropriate) to include MSOs of concern Step 3                      ID equipment ID logical relationships ID cables ID cable routing Evaluate for NFPA 805 No Compliance Step 4                                                      Pursue other resolution options Compliant with NFPA 805?
Yes Step 5                    Document Results Figure 4 Multiple Spurious Operations - Transition Resolution Process (Based on FAQ 07-0038)
Results Refer to Attachment F for the process used and the results.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                          Page 21
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.2 Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluation Transition Overview of Evaluation Process The EEEEs that support compliance with NFPA 805 Chapter 3 or Chapter 4 (both those that existed prior to the transition and those that were created during the transition) were reviewed using the methodology contained in NEI 04-02. The methodology for performing the EEEE review included the following determinations:
* The EEEE is not based solely on quantitative risk evaluations,
* The EEEE is an appropriate use of an engineering equivalency evaluation,
* The EEEE is of appropriate quality,
* The standard license condition is met,
* The EEEE is technically adequate,
* The EEEE reflects the plant as-built condition, and
* The basis for acceptability of the EEEE remains valid In accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 2.3.2 and NEI 04-02, as clarified by FAQ 07-0054, Demonstrating Compliance with Chapter 4 of NFPA 805, EEEEs that demonstrate that a fire protection system or feature is adequate for the hazard are summarized in the LAR as follows:
If not requesting specific approval for adequate for the hazard EEEEs, then the EEEE was referenced where required and a brief description of the evaluated condition was provided.
If requesting specific NRC approval for adequate for the hazard EEEEs, then EEEE was referenced where required to demonstrate compliance and was included in Attachment L for NRC review and approval.
In all cases, the reliance on EEEEs to demonstrate compliance with NFPA 805 requirements was documented in the LAR.
Results The review results for EEEEs are documented in Attachment A. In all cases the EEEEs reflect the plant as-built condition and the basis for acceptability of the evaluation remains the same.
In accordance with the guidance provided in RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 2.3.2, NEI 04-02, as clarified by FAQ 07-0054, Demonstrating Compliance with Chapter 4 of NFPA 805, EEEEs used to demonstrate compliance with Chapters 3 and 4 of NFPA 805 are referenced in the Attachments A and C as appropriate.
None of the transitioning EEEEs require NRC approval.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page 22
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.3 Licensing Action Transition Overview of Evaluation Process The existing licensing actions (i.e., Appendix R exemptions) review was performed in accordance with NEI 04-02. The methodology for the licensing action review included the following:
* Determination of the bases for acceptability of the licensing action.
* Determination that these bases for acceptability are still valid and required for NFPA 805.
* Additionally, variances from the deterministic requirements were identified in the NEI 04-02, Table B-3 (See Attachment C). Some of these variances were subsequently dispositioned via the use of the performance-based approach.
Results Attachment K contains the detailed results of the Licensing Action Review.
This review concluded that the only Licensing Action that would be transitioned to the new licensing basis under NFPA 805 is the Exemption from the Requirements of Section III.O of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, which pertains to the requirement that a lube oil collection system be installed for the reactor coolant pumps. This Licensing Action is being transitioned based on prior approval and is considered compliant with 10CFR50.48(c).
The licensing action review resulted in the identification of licensing actions that would be transitioned to the new 10 CFR 50.48(c) licensing basis and those that would no longer be necessary. Attachment K of the Transition Report contains the results of the Licensing Action Review.
Since all exemptions are either compliant with 10 CFR 50.48(c) or no longer necessary, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(i), CP&L requests that the exemptions listed in Attachment K be rescinded as part of the LAR process. It is CP&Ls understanding that implicit in the superseding of the current license condition, all prior fire protection program Safety Evaluations and commitments will be superseded in their entirety.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.2.4 Fire Area Transition Overview of Evaluation Process The Fire Area Transition (NEI 04-02 Table B-3) was performed using the methodology contained in NEI 04-02 and FAQ 07-0054. The methodology for performing the Fire Area Transition, depicted in Figure 4-4, is outlined as follows:
Step 1 - Assembled documentation. Gathered industry and plant-specific fire area analyses and licensing basis documents.
Step 2 - Documented fulfillment of nuclear safety performance criteria.
Assessed accomplishment of nuclear safety performance goals. Documented the method of accomplishment, in summary level form, for the fire area.
Documented evaluation of effects of fire suppression activities. Documented the evaluation of the effects of fire suppression activities on the ability to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria.
Performed licensing action reviews. Performed a review of the licensing aspects of the selected fire area and document the results of the review. See Section 4.2.3.
Performed existing engineering equivalency evaluation reviews. Performed a review of existing engineering equivalency evaluations (or created new evaluations) documenting the basis for acceptability. See Section 4.2.2.
Pre-transition OMA reviews. Performed a review of pre-transition OMAs to determine those actions taking place outside of the main control room or outside of the primary control station(s). See Section 4.2.1.3.
Step 3 - VFDR Identification and characterization and resolution considerations.
Identified variances from the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805, Section 4.2.3.
Documented variances as either a separation issue or a degraded fire protection system or feature. Developed VFDR problem statements to support resolution.
Step 4 - Performance-Based evaluations (Fire Modeling or Fire Risk Evaluations) See Section 4.5.2 for additional information.
Step 5 - Final Disposition.
Documented final disposition of the VFDRs in Attachment C (NEI 04-02 Table B-3).
For recovery action compliance strategies, ensured the manual action feasibility analysis of the required recovery actions was completed. Note: if a recovery action cannot meet the feasibility requirements established per NEI 04-02, then alternate means of compliance was considered.
Documented the post transition NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance basis.
Step 6 - Documented required fire protection systems and features. Reviewed the NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3 compliance strategies (including fire area licensing actions and engineering evaluations) and the NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4 compliance strategies (including simplifying deterministic assumptions) to determine the scope of fire protection systems and features required by NFPA 805 Chapter 4. The required fire HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page 24
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements protection systems and features are subject to the applicable requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3.
Figure 4 Summary of Fire Area Review
[Based on FAQ 07-0054 Revision 1]
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Results of the Evaluation Process Attachment C contains the results of the Fire Area Transition review (NEI 04-02 Table B-3). On a fire area basis, Attachment C summarizes compliance with Chapter 4 of NFPA 805.
* NEI 04-02 Table B-3 includes the following summary level information for each fire area:
* Regulatory Basis - NFPA 805 post-transition regulatory bases are included.
* Performance Goal Summary - An overview of the method of accomplishment of each of the performance criteria in NFPA 805 Section 1.5 is provided.
* Reference Documents - Specific references to Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Documents are provided.
* Fire Suppression Activities Effect on Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria - A summary of the method of accomplishment is provided.
* Licensing Actions - HBRSEP is transitioning one Licensing Action. This exemption will remain part of the post-transition licensing basis. The exemption from Section III.O of Appendix R was granted by the NRC to the extent that a reactor coolant pump lube oil collection system is not provided. In lieu of installing such a system, fixed fire suppression is maintained and additional detection and dikes were installed in the pump bays. Also, the Containment Spray system serves as a backup fire suppression system with Sodium Hydroxide isolated. This is further explained in Attachment K.
* EEEE - Specific references to EEEE that rely on determinations of adequate for the hazard that will remain part of the post-transition licensing basis. A brief description of the condition and the basis for acceptability should be provided.
* VFDRs - Specific variances from the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3. Refer to Section 4.5.2 for a discussion of the performance-based approach.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.3    Non-Power Operational Modes 4.3.1 Overview of Evaluation Process HBRSEP implemented the process outlined in NEI 04-02 and FAQ 07-0040, Clarification on Non-Power Operations. The goal (as depicted in Figure 4-5) is to ensure that contingency plans are established when the plant is in a Non-Power Operational (NPO) mode where the risk is intrinsically high. During low risk periods, normal risk management controls and fire prevention/protection processes and procedures will be utilized.
The process to demonstrate that the nuclear safety performance criteria are met during NPO modes involved the following steps:
Reviewed the existing Outage Management Processes Identified Equipment/Cables:
o Reviewed plant systems to determine success paths that support each of the defense-in-depth Key Safety Functions (KSFs), and o Identified cables required for the selected components and determined their routing.
Performed Fire Area Assessments (identify pinch points - plant locations where a single fire may damage all success paths of a KSF).
Managed pinch-points associated with fire-induced vulnerabilities during the outage.
The process is depicted in Figures 4-5 and 4-6. The results are presented in Section 4.3.2.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page 27
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4-5 Review POSs, KSFs, Equipment, and Cables, and Identify Pinch Points HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page 28
 
Duke Energy                                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Equipment Out of Service (OOS)
KSF                Fire Protection Equipment              Defense-in-No Availability                Depth Changed?                  Actions Yes Fire Protection Higher Risk Evolution as Defined by Plant Specific        Higher Risk              Defense-in-No Outage Risk Criteria for example                          Evolution?                  Depth
: 1) Time to Boil                                                                      Actions
: 2) Reactor Coolant System and Fuel Pool Inventory
: 3) Decay Heat Removal Yes Determine Fire Area Impact based on NPO Fire Area Assessments Fire Protection KSF                  Defense-in-No Lost?                  Depth Actions Yes Implement Contingency Plan for Specific KSF Figure 4-6 Manage Pinch Points HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                    Page 29
 
Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.3.2 Results of the Evaluation Process HBRSEP outage management processes were reviewed. Based on FAQ 07-0040, the Plant Operating States considered for equipment and cable selection are documented in calculation RNP-E/ELEC-1217, Non-Power Operations Analysis. Using a CAFTA fault tree that models NPO requirements, systems and components were identified to provide the following KSFs: Decay Heat Removal; Reactivity Control; Inventory Control; Pressure Control; Spent Fuel Pit Cooling; and Electrical Power Availability (to the extent that it supports the other KSFs).
For those components not already in the HBRSEP Access Database or those with a functional state for non-power operations differing from that in the At-Power Analysis, circuit analysis, cable selection and routing were performed as described in the plants NSCA methodology. Once all information had been entered into the HBRSEP Access Database, the ARCTM software package in conjunction with the NPO fault tree was used to determine KSF Pinch Points.
Calculation RNP-E/ELEC-1217 provides the results of the fire area assessments for the Pinch Point analysis and provides recommendations for changes to fire risk and outage management procedures and other administrative controls. These include:
* Prohibition or limitation of hot work in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability.
* Prohibition or limitation of combustible materials in fire areas during periods of increased vulnerability.
* Provision of additional fire watches in affected fire areas during increased vulnerability.
* Identification and monitoring of in-situ ignition sources for fire precursors (e.g.,
equipment temperatures).
* Review of work activities for possible rescheduling.
* Equipment realignment (e.g., swing pumps or Backfeed)
* Identification of procedures to be briefed or walked down.
* Posting of protected equipment.
* Consideration of pre-emptive or recovery actions to mitigate potential losses of KSF success paths.
Attachment D provides a more detailed discussion. Based on incorporation of the recommendations from RNP-E/ELEC-1217 into appropriate plant procedures in conjunction with establishment of the NFPA 805 fire protection program, the performance goal for NPO modes (i.e., to maintain the fuel in a safe and stable condition) is fulfilled and the requirements of NFPA 805 are met.
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Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.4      Radioactive Release Performance Criteria 4.4.1 Overview of Evaluation Process The review of the fire protection program against NFPA 805 requirements for fire suppression related radioactive release was performed using the methodology contained in NEI 04-02, Table E-1, and was performed using the methodology contained in Project Instruction FPIP-0121, Radiological Release Reviews During Fire Fighting Operations, Rev. 1. The methodology consisted of the following:
* A review of fire pre-plans and fire brigade training materials to identify fire protection program elements (e.g., systems / components / procedural control actions / flow paths) that are being credited to meet the radioactive release goals, objectives, and performance criteria during all plant operating modes, including full power and non-power conditions. Specifically for HBRSEP, a review was conducted by a review panel to ensure specific steps are included for containment and monitoring of potentially contaminated materials so as to limit the potential for release of radioactive materials due to firefighting operations.
The review panel consisted of representatives from Operations, Engineering (i.e.,
Fire Protection, HVAC Systems), Operations Fire Brigade Training, and Radiation Protection. Site pre-fire plans were screened to identify those locations that have the potential for radiological contamination based on location within plant Radiological Controlled Areas, areas containing potentially contaminated systems, or locations where radioactive materials are routinely stored. In addition, the site fire brigade training materials were reviewed by the same review panel to ensure specific steps are included addressing containment and monitoring of potentially contaminated materials and monitoring of potentially contaminated fire suppression products following a fire event.
A review of engineering controls to ensure containment of gaseous and liquid effluents (i.e., smoke and fire fighting agents). This review included all plant operating modes (i.e., including full power and non-power conditions). Otherwise, provided a bounding analysis, quantitative analysis, or other analysis that demonstrates that the limitations for instantaneous release of radioactive effluents specified in the units Technical Specifications are met.
4.4.2 Results of the Evaluation Process The review determined the Fire Protection Program (i.e., Pre-Fire Plans) meets the radioactive release performance criteria by ensuring that radioactive materials (i.e.,
radiation) generated as a direct result of fire suppression activities is contained and monitored prior to release to unrestricted areas, such that release would be as low as reasonably achievable and would not exceed applicable 10 CFR, Part 20 limits.
Containment and monitoring is ensured through elements of the fire brigade training, guidance provided in pre-fire plans and certain plant features (i.e., engineering controls) such as curbs and ventilation systems or actions provided to control smoke management or fire suppression water run-off.
Site specific review of associated fire event and fire suppression related radioactive release is summarized in Attachment E, NEI 04-02, Table E-1. Containment and HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page 31
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements monitoring actions associated with firefighting operations are included in the pre-fire plans for fire areas as appropriate based on the screening criteria previously stated (Attachment E) to meet the radiological performance criteria.
The standardized pre-fire plan outline identifies typical fixed radiological hazards for each area. All HBRSEP pre-fire plans were screened for applicability. Pre-fire plans that address areas where there is no possibility of radiological hazards were screened out from further review. This information was included as input to the individual fire area Fire Safety Analyses (FSAs) calculations. The FSA is the Design Basis Document for NFPA 805 compliance for each fire area and will serve as the location for maintenance and configuration control of the radioactive release review results. Change, modification, or revision to the FSAs is controlled under existing plant engineering configuration control processes.
4.5    Fire PRA and Performance-Based Approaches RI-PB evaluations are an integral element of an NFPA 805 fire protection program. Key parts of RI-PB evaluations include:
* A Fire PRA (discussed in Section 4.5.1 and Attachments U, V, and W).
* NFPA 805 Performance-Based Approaches (discussed in Section 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Fire PRA Development and Assessment In accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, a Fire PRA model was developed for HBRSEP in compliance with the requirements of Part 4 Requirements for Fires At Power PRA, of the ASME and ANS combined PRA Standard, ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Application, (hereafter referred to as Fire PRA Standard). Duke Energy conducted a peer review by independent industry analysts in accordance with RG 1.200 prior to a risk-informed submittal. The resulting fire risk assessment model is used as the analytical tool to perform Fire Risk Evaluations during the transition process.
Section 4.5.1.1 describes the Internal Events PRA model. Section 4.5.1.2 describes the Fire PRA model. Section 4.5.1.3 describes the results and resolution of the peer review of the Fire PRA, and Section 4.5.1.4 describes insights gained from the Fire PRA.
4.5.1.1    Internal Events PRA The HBRSEP base internal events PRA, Calculation RNP-F/PSA-0006 was the starting point for the Fire PRA.
Attachment U provides a discussion of the internal events PRA and the results and disposition of the most recent peer review. Attachment U demonstrates that the internal events PRA is met at Capability Category II for all applicable supporting requirements according to peer review and/or disposition.
4.5.1.2    Fire PRA The internal events PRA was modified to capture the effects of fire both as an initiator of an event and as a potential failure mode of affected circuits and individual targets. The HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 32
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Fire PRA was developed using the guidance for Fire PRA development in NUREG/CR-6850/EPRI TR 1011989, approved FAQs, and EPRI TR 1016735.
The Fire PRA quality and results are discussed in the subsequent sections and in Attachments V and W, respectively.
Fire Model Utilization in the Application As part of the NFPA 805 transition, fire modeling was performed as part of the Fire PRA development (i.e., NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.2) and, therefore, maximum expected fire scenario (MEFS)/limiting fire scenario (LFS) were not analyzed separately. RG 1.205, Regulatory Position 4.2 and Section 5.1.2 of NEI 04-02, provide guidance to identify fire models that are acceptable to the NRC for plants implementing a risk-informed, performance-based licensing basis.
The following fire models were used:
* Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs)
* Consolidated Model of Fire and Smoke Transport (CFAST)
The approach taken at HBRSEP to simplify the analysis process incorporates features of several fire model tools covered by NUREG-1824, as well as additional features. The approach is collectively referred to as the Fire Modeling Generic Treatments. The analysis basis and Verification and Validation (V&V) documentation was provided in a proprietary Hughes Associates, Inc. report to the NRC on January 24, 2008. The report entitled Generic Fire Modeling Treatments is effectively a technical reference guide, a users guide, and the V&V basis.
The use of the Generic Treatments in specific applications at HBRSEP falls within their limitations as described in the Generic Fire Modeling Treatments. In addition to the generic fire modeling treatments that were used in the hazard analysis, several calculations were produced that used CFAST and the FDTs as documented in NUREG-1824.
The acceptability of the use of these fire models is included in Attachment J.
4.5.1.3    Results of Fire PRA Peer Review The HBRSEP Fire PRA Calculation RNP-F/PSA-0094 was peer reviewed against the requirements of ASME/ANS RA-Sa-2009, Part 4.
The results (i.e., Supporting Requirement capability assessments and Facts &
Observations (F&Os)) documented in the Fire PRA peer review report (March 2013) and subsequent focused-scope peer-review report (July 2013) were used to support the Fire PRA for the NFPA 805 application.
The Fire PRA update addressed the Supporting Requirement assessed deficiencies (i.e., Not Met or Capability Category I (CC I)). Completion of recommendations related to Supporting Requirement assessments and Finding F&Os results in a Capability Category II assessment for the associated Supporting Requirements. Any Supporting Requirements found not to meet Category II are considered Open, but were justified to HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 33
 
Duke Energy                                                  4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements have an insignificant impact on the NFPA 805 application through disposition. The results of the peer review and dispositions are summarized in Attachment V.
4.5.1.4    Risk Insights Risk insights were documented as part of the development of the Fire PRA. The total plant fire CDF/LERF was derived using the NUREG/CR-6850 methodology for fire PRA development and is useful in identifying the areas of the plant where fire risk is greatest.
A review of the fire scenarios contributing more than 1% to the overall risk is included as Attachment W.
4.5.2 Performance-Based Approaches NFPA 805 outlines the approaches for performing performance-based analyses. As specified in Section 4.2.4, there are generally two types of analyses performed for the performance-based approach:
* Fire Modeling (NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.1).
* Fire Risk Evaluation (NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.2).
4.5.2.1    Fire Modeling Approach The fire modeling approach was not utilized for demonstrating compliance with NFPA 805 for HBRSEP.
4.5.2.2    Fire Risk Approach Overview of Evaluation Process The Fire Risk Evaluations were completed as part of the HBRSEP NFPA 805 transition.
These Fire Risk Evaluations were developed using the process described below. This methodology is based upon the requirements of NFPA 805, industry guidance in NEI 04-02, and RG 1.205. These are summarized in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1 Fire Risk Evaluation Guidance Summary Table Document                        Section(s)                                    Topic NFPA 805                2.2(h), 4.2.4, A.2.2(h), A.2.4.4, D.5    Change Evaluation (2.2(h), 2.2.9, 2.4.4 A.2.2(h), A.2.4.4, D.5)
Risk of Recovery Actions (4.2.4)
Use of Fire Risk Evaluation (4.2.4.2)
NEI 04-02 Revision 2    4.4, 5.3, Appendix B, Appendix I,        Change Evaluation, Change Evaluation Appendix J                                Forms (App. I), No specific discussion of Fire Risk Evaluation RG 1.205 Revision 1    C.2.2.4, C.2.4, C.3.2                    Risk Evaluations (C.2.2.4)
Recovery Actions (C.2.4)
During the transition to NFPA 805, variances from the deterministic approach in Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805 were evaluated using a Fire Risk Evaluation per Section 4.2.4.2 of NFPA 805. A Fire Safety Analysis was performed for each fire area containing variances from the deterministic requirements of Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805 (VFDRs), a Fire Risk Evaluation was performed for each fire area containing VFDRs HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                        Page 34
 
Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements If the Fire Risk Evaluation meets the acceptance criteria, this is confirmation that a success path effectively remains free of fire damage and that the performance-based approach is acceptable per Section 4.2.4.2 of NFPA 805.
The Fire Risk Evaluation process consists of the following steps (Figure 4-7 depicts the Fire Risk Evaluation process used during transition. This is generally based on FAQ 07-0054 Revision 1:
Step 1 - Preparation for the Fire Risk Evaluation.
Definition of the Variances from the Deterministic Requirements. The definition of the VFDR includes a description of problem statement and the section of NFPA 805 that is not met, type of VFDR (e.g., separation issue or degraded fire protection system), and proposed evaluation per applicable NFPA 805 section.
Preparatory Evaluation - Fire Risk Evaluation Team Review. Using the information obtained during the development of the NEI 04-02 B-3 Table and the Fire PRA, a team review of the VFDR was performed. Depending on the scope and complexity of the VFDR, the team may include the Safe shutdown/NSCA Engineer, the Fire Protection Engineer, and the Fire PRA Engineer. The purpose and objective of this team review was to address the following; o Review of the Fire PRA modeling treatment of VFDR o Ensure discrepancies were captured and resolved Step 2 - Performed the Fire Risk Evaluation The Evaluator coordinated as necessary with the Safe shutdown/NSCA Engineer, Fire Protection Engineer and Fire PRA Engineer to assess the VFDR using the Fire Risk Evaluation process to perform the following:
o Change in Risk Calculation with consideration for additional risk of recovery actions and required fire protection systems and features due to fire risk.
o Fire area change in risk summary Step 3 - Reviewed the Acceptance Criteria The acceptance criteria for the Fire Risk Evaluation consist of two parts. One is quantitatively based and the other is qualitatively based. The quantitative figures of merit are CDF and LERF. The qualitative factors are defense-in-depth and safety margin.
o Risk Acceptance Criteria. The transition risk evaluation was measured quantitatively for acceptability using the CDF and LERF criteria from RG 1.174, as clarified in RG 1.205 Regulatory Position 2.2.4.
o Defense-in-Depth. A review of the impact of the change on defense-in-depth was performed, using the guidance NEI 04-02. NFPA 805 defines defense-in-depth as:
            - Preventing fires from starting
            - Rapidly detecting fires and controlling and extinguishing promptly those fires that do occur, thereby limiting damage HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page 35
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements
          -  Providing adequate level of fire protection for structures, systems and components important to safety; so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished will not prevent essential plant safety functions from being performed.
In general, the defense-in-depth requirement was considered to be satisfied if the proposed change does not result in a substantial imbalance among these elements (or echelons).
The review of defense-in-depth was qualitative and addressed each of the elements with respect to the proposed change. Defense-in-depth was performed on a fire area basis.
Fire protection features and systems relied upon to ensure defense-in-depth were identified as a result of the assessment of defense-in-depth.
o Safety Margin Assessment. A review of the impact of the change on safety margin was performed. An acceptable set of guidelines for making that assessment is summarized below. Other equivalent acceptance guidelines may also be used.
          - Codes and standards or their alternatives accepted for use by the NRC are met, and
          - Safety analysis acceptance criteria in the licensing basis (e.g., UFSAR, supporting analyses) are met, or provides sufficient margin to account for analysis and data uncertainty.
The requirements related to safety margins for the change analysis are described for each of the specific analysis types used in support of the FRE.
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Duke Energy                                            4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Prepare for Fire Risk Evaluation Identification of VFDRs (From B-3 Tables)
Discuss and Document in Determine How to Model Fire PRA and Fire Risk the VFDR in the Fire PRA Evaluation Documentation Perform Fire Risk Evaluation Calculate VFDR Delta CDF And Delta LERF Review of Acceptance Criteria Evaluate Delta CDF And Delta LERF Evaluate the Maintenance of                      Discuss and Document in Defense-In-Depth                    Fire Risk Evaluation And                              Calculation Safety Margin Figure 4 Fire Risk Evaluation Process (NFPA 805 Transition)
[Based on FAQ 07-0054 Revision 1]
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Results of Evaluation Process Disposition of VFDRs The HBRSEP existing post-fire SSA and the NFPA 805 transition project activities have identified a number of variances from the deterministic requirements of NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3. These variances were dispositioned using the fire risk evaluation process.
Each variance dispositioned using a Fire Risk Evaluation was assessed against the Fire Risk Evaluation acceptance criteria of CDF and LERF; and maintenance of defense-in-depth and safety margin criteria from Section 5.3.5 of NEI 04-02 and RG 1.205. The results of these calculations are summarized in Attachment C.
Following completion of transition activities and planned modifications and program changes, the plant will be compliant with 10 CFR 50.48(c).
Risk Change Due to NFPA 805 Transition In accordance with the guidance in RG 1.205, Section C.2.2.4, Risk Evaluations, risk increases or decreases for each fire area using Fire Risk Evaluations and the overall plant should be provided. Note that the risk increase due to the use of recovery actions was included in the risk change for transition for each fire area.
RG 1.205 Section C.2.2.4.2 states in part The total increase or decrease in risk associated with the implementation of NFPA 805 for the overall plant should be calculated by summing the risk increases and decreases for each fire area (including any risk increases resulting from previously approved recovery actions). The total risk increase should be consistent with the acceptance guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.174. Note that the acceptance guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.174 may require the total CDF, LERF, or both, to evaluate changes where the risk impact exceeds specific guidelines. If the additional risk associated with previously approved recovery actions is greater than the acceptance guidelines in Regulatory Guide 1.174, then the net change in total plant risk incurred by any proposed alternatives to the deterministic criteria in NFPA 805, Chapter 4 (other than the previously approved recovery actions), should be risk neutral or represent a risk decrease.
The risk increases and decreases are provided in Attachment W.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.6  Monitoring Program 4.6.1 Overview of NFPA 805 Requirements and NEI 04-02 Guidance on the NFPA 805 Fire Protection System and Feature Monitoring Program Section 2.6 of NFPA 805 states:
A monitoring program shall be established to ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained and to assess the performance of the fire protection program in meeting the performance criteria.
Monitoring shall ensure that the assumptions in the engineering analysis remain valid.
As part of the transition review, the adequacy of the inspection and testing program to address fire protection systems and equipment within plant inspection and the compensatory measures programs should be reviewed. In addition, the adequacy of the plant corrective action program in determining the causes of equipment and programmatic failures and minimizing their recurrence should also be reviewed as part of the transition to a risk-informed, performance-based licensing basis.
4.6.2 Overview of Post-Transition NFPA 805 Monitoring Program This section describes the process that will be utilized to implement the post-transition NFPA 805 monitoring program. The monitoring program will be implemented after the safety evaluation issuance as part of the fire protection program transition to NFPA 805.
See item for implementation in Attachment S. The monitoring process is comprised of four phases.
* Phase 1 - Scoping
* Phase 2 - Screening Using Risk Criteria
* Phase 3 - Risk Target Value Determination
* Phase 4 - Monitoring Implementation Figure 4-8 provides detail on the Phase 1 and 2 processes.
The results of these phases will be documented in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scoping document developed during implementation.
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Duke Energy                                          4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Phase 1 - Scoping In order to meet the NFPA 805 requirements for monitoring, the following categories of SSCs and programmatic elements will be reviewed during the implementation phase for inclusion in the NFPA 805 monitoring program:
o Structures, Systems, and Components required to comply with NFPA 805, specifically:
o Fire protection systems and features
            - Required by the Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment
            - Modeled in the Fire PRA
            - Required by Chapter 3 of NFPA 805 o Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment equipment4
            - Nuclear safety equipment
            - Fire PRA equipment
            - NPO equipment o Structures, systems and components relied upon to meet radioactive release criteria o Fire Protection Programmatic Elements Phase 2 - Screening Using Risk Criteria The equipment from Phase 1 scoping will be screened to determine the appropriate level of NFPA 805 monitoring. As a minimum, the SSCs identified in Phase 1 will be part of an inspection and test program and system/program health reporting. If not in the current program, the SSCs will be added in order to assure that the criteria can be met reliably.
The following screening process will be used to determine those SSCs that may require additional monitoring beyond normal inspection and test program and system/program health reporting and will be documented in NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scoping document.
: 1. Fire Protection Systems and Features Those fire protection systems and features identified in Phase 1 are candidates for additional monitoring in the NFPA 805 program commensurate with risk significance.
Risk significance is determined at the component, programmatic element, and/or functional level on an individual fire area basis. Compartments smaller than fire areas may be used provided the compartments are independent (i.e., share no fire protection SSCs). If compartments smaller than fire areas are used the basis will be documented in the calculation, RNP-F/PSA-0095, RNP Fire PSA NFPA 805 Transition.
4 For the purposes of the NFPA 805 Monitoring, NSCA equipment is intended to include Nuclear Safety Equipment, Fire PRA equipment, and NPO equipment.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements The Fire PRA is used to establish the risk significance based on the following screening criteria:
Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) of the monitored parameter  2.0 (AND) either Core Damage Frequency (CDF) x (RAW)  1.0E-7 per year (OR)
Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) x (RAW)  1.0E-8 per year CDF, LERF, and RAW(monitored parameter) are calculated for each fire area. The monitored parameter will be established at a level commensurate with the amenability of the parameter to risk measurement (e.g., a fire barrier may be more conducive to risk measurement than an individual barrier penetration) and will be documented in the calculation, RNP-F/PSA-0095.
Fire protection systems and features that meet or exceed the criteria identified above are considered High Safety Significant (HSS) and will be included in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program. The HSS fire protection systems and features not already monitored via an existing inspection and test program and/or in the existing system /
program health reporting, as described in procedure EGR-NGGC-0010, will be added to the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program and documented in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scoping document.
: 2. Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment Equipment Required NSCA equipment, except the NPO scope, identified in Phase 1 will be screened for safety significance using the Fire PRA and the Maintenance Rule guidelines differentiating HSS equipment from Low Safety Significant (LSS) equipment.
The screening will also ensure that the Maintenance Rule functions are consistent with the required functions of the NSCA equipment.
HSS NSCA equipment not currently monitored in Maintenance Rule will be included in Maintenance Rule. All NSCA equipment that are not HSS are considered LSS and need not be included in the monitoring program.
For non-power operational modes, the qualitative use of fire prevention to manage fire risk during Higher Risk Evolutions does not lend itself to quantitative risk measurement.
Therefore, fire risk management effectiveness is monitored programmatically similar to combustible material controls and other fire prevention programs. Additional monitoring beyond inspection and test programs and system/program health reporting is not considered necessary.
: 3. SSCs Relied upon for Radioactive Release Criteria The evaluations performed to meet the radioactive release performance criteria are qualitative in nature. The SSCs relied upon to meet the radioactive release performance criteria are not amenable to quantitative risk measurement. Additionally, since 10 CFR Part 20 limits (which are lower than releases due to core damage and containment breach) for radiological effluents are not being exceeded, equipment relied upon to meet the radioactive release performance criteria is considered inherently low HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 41
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements risk. Therefore, additional monitoring beyond inspection and test programs and system/program health reporting is not considered necessary.
: 4. Fire Protection Programmatic Elements Monitoring of programmatic elements is required in order to assess the performance of the fire protection program in meeting the performance criteria. These programs form the bases for many of the analytical assumptions used to evaluate compliance with NFPA 805 requirements Programmatic aspects include:
o Prompt Detection, including incipient detection fire watch and hot work fire watch o Transient Combustible Controls Program Violations against FIR-NGGC-0009 o Fire Brigade Effectiveness including Fire Brigade Response Time, Fire Brigade Fire Drill, and Fire Brigade Fire Drill Objectives Monitoring of programmatic elements is more qualitative in nature since the programs do not lend themselves to the numerical methods of reliability and availability.
Therefore, monitoring is conducted using the existing system and program health programs. Fire protection health reports, self-assessments, regulator and insurance company reports provide inputs to the monitoring program.
Phase 3 - Risk Target Value Determination Failure criteria is established by an expert panel based on the required fire protection and nuclear safety capability SSCs and programmatic elements assumed level of performance in the supporting analyses established in Phase 2. Action levels are established for the SSCs at the component level, program level, or functionally through the use of the pseudo system or performance monitoring group concept. The actual action level is determined based on the number of component, program or functional failures within a sufficiently bounding time period (i.e., ~2-3 operating cycles).
Since the HSS NSCA equipment have been identified using the Maintenance Rule guidelines, the associated equipment specific performance criteria will be established as in the Maintenance Rule, provided the criteria are consistent with Fire PRA assumptions.
When establishing the action level threshold for reliability and availability, the action level will be no lower than the fire PRA assumptions. Adverse trends and unacceptable levels of availability, reliability, and performance will be reviewed against established action levels.
Documentation of the monitoring program failure criteria and action level targets will be contained in a documented evaluation. It is anticipated that the availability and reliability criterion for High Safety Significant Performance Monitoring Groups will use the guidance included in several industry documents tempered by site-specific operating experience, Fire PRA assumptions, and equipment types (and vendor data or valid design input when available). Industry documents such as the EPRI Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide TR-1006756, Final Report July 2003, NFPA codes, and/or the NRC Fire Protection Significance Determination Process in addition to site specific operating experience data may be used. The monitoring program failure criteria and action level targets will be documented in the NFPA 805 Monitoring Program scoping document.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Note that fire protection systems and features, NSCA equipment, SSCs required to meet the radioactive release criteria, and fire protection program elements that do not meet the screening criteria in Phase 2 will be included in the existing inspection and test programs and the system and program health programs. Reliability and availability criteria will not be assigned.
Phase 4 - Monitoring Implementation Phase 4 is the implementation of the monitoring program, once the monitoring scope and criteria are established. Monitoring consists of periodically gathering, trending, and evaluating information pertinent to the performance, and/or availability of the equipment and comparing the results with the established goals and performance criteria to verify that the goals are being met. Results of monitoring activities will be analyzed in timely manner to assure that appropriate action is taken. The corrective action process will be used to address performance of fire protection and nuclear safety SSCs that do not meet performance criteria.
For fire protection systems and features and NSCA HSS equipment that are monitored, unacceptable levels of availability, reliability, and performance will be reviewed against the established action levels. If an action level is triggered, corrective action in accordance with procedure, CAP-NGGC-0200 will be initiated to identify the negative trend. A corrective action plan will then be developed to ensure the performance returns to the established level.
When applicable, a sensitivity study can be performed to determine the margin below the action level that still provides acceptable fire PRA results to help prioritize corrective actions if the action level is reached.
A periodic assessment will be performed (i.e., at a frequency of approximately every two to three operating cycles), taking into account, where practical, industry wide operating experience. Issues that will be addressed include:
o Review systems with performance criteria. Do performance criteria still effectively monitor the functions of the system? Do the criteria still monitor the effectiveness of the fire protection and NSCA systems?
o Have the supporting analyses been revised such that the performance criteria are no longer applicable or new fire protection and NSCA SSCs, programmatic elements and/ or functions need to be in scope?
o Based on the performance during the assessment period, are there any trends in system performance that should be addressed that are not being addressed?
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4 NFPA 805 Monitoring - Scoping and Screening Since the HSS SSCs have been identified using the Maintenance Rule guidelines, the associated SSC specific performance criteria will be established as in the Maintenance Rule, provided the criteria are consistent with Fire PRA assumptions. The actual action level is determined based on the number of component, program or functional failures within a sufficiently bounding time period (~2-3 operating cycles). Adverse trends and unacceptable levels of availability, reliability, and performance will be reviewed against established action levels. The Monitoring Program failure criteria and action level targets will be documented, as described in FAQ 10-0059.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.7      Program Documentation, Configuration Control, and Quality Assurance 4.7.1 Compliance with Documentation Requirements in Section 2.7.1 of NFPA 805 In accordance with the requirements and guidance in NFPA 805 Section 2.7.1 and NEI 04-02, HBRSEP has documented analyses to support compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c). The analyses are being performed in accordance with Duke Energys processes for ensuring assumptions are clearly defined, that results are easily understood, that results are clearly and consistently described, and that sufficient detail is provided to allow future review of the entire analyses.
Analyses, as defined by NFPA 805 Section 2.4, performed to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) will be maintained for the life of the plant and organized to facilitate review for accuracy and adequacy. Note these analyses do not include items such as periodic tests, hot work permits, fire impairments, etc.
The Fire Protection Design Basis Document described in Section 2.7.1.2 of NFPA 805 and necessary supporting documentation described in Section 2.7.1.3 of NFPA 805 have been created as part of transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c) to ensure program implementation following receipt of the safety evaluation. Figure 4-9 shows the Planned Post-Transition Documents.
The Fire Protection licensing basis documents under NFPA 805 consist of the following:
* The Transition Report/LAR
* The NFPA 805 SE
* The Revised License Condition
* The revised (U)FSAR The Fire Protection Program Design Basis Document (DBD) will contain or reference sub-tier documents that also form part of the fire protection program. The DBD's as described in NFPA 805 section 2.7.1.2, are the Fire Safety Analysis (FSA) calculations provided for each plant fire area. Also included, is the NFPA 805 Code Compliance Calculation which will maintain certain supporting elements of the LAR such as Tables B-1, B-2 and E-1. These and other supporting calculations are developed under fleet procedure EGR-NGGC-0017, Preparation and Control of Design Analyses and Calculations, and are maintained as design documents / controlled documents as described in the procedure.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4 NFPA 805 Planned Post-Transition Documents and Relationships HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page 46
 
Duke Energy                                                4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.7.2 Compliance with Configuration Control Requirements in Section 2.7.2 and 2.2.9 of NFPA 805 Program documentation established, revised, or utilized in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) is subject to Duke Energy configuration control processes that meet the requirements of Section 2.7.2 of NFPA 805. This includes the appropriate procedures and configuration control processes for ensuring that changes impacting the fire protection program are reviewed appropriately. The RI-PB post transition change process methodology is based upon the requirements of NFPA 805, and industry guidance in NEI 04-02, and RG 1.205. These requirements are summarized in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2 Change Evaluation Guidance Summary Table Document                        Section(s)                                    Topic NFPA 805        2.2(h), 2.2.9, 2.4.4, A.2.2(h), A.2.4.4,  Change Evaluation D.5 NEI 04-02      5.3, Appendix B, Appendix I,              Change Evaluation, Change Evaluation Appendix J                                Forms (Appendix I)
RG 1.205        C.2.2.4, C.3.1, C.3.2, C.4.3              Risk Evaluation, Standard License Condition, Change Evaluation Process, Fire PRA The Plant Change Evaluation Process consists of the following 4 steps and is depicted in Figure 4-10:
* Defining the Change
* Performing the Preliminary Risk Screening.
* Performing the Risk Evaluation
* Evaluating the Acceptance Criteria Configuration control is and will be maintained going forward in accordance with existing procedures and processes which satisfy the NFPA 805 requirements. Procedure FIR-NGGC-0010, Fire Protection Program Impact Review, provides review of configuration, process, and procedure changes to ensure applicable requirements of NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program (Fundamental Elements, NSCA, NPO, Radioactive Release and FPRA) are maintained.
Change Definition The Change Evaluation process begins by defining the change or altered condition to be examined and the baseline configuration as defined by the Design Basis and Licensing Basis (NFPA 805 Licensing Basis post-transition).
: 1. The baseline is defined as that plant condition or configuration that is consistent with the Design Basis and Licensing Basis (NFPA 805 Licensing Basis post-transition).
: 2. The changed or altered condition or configuration that is not consistent with the Design Basis and Licensing Basis is defined as the proposed alternative.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Preliminary Risk Review Once the definition of the change is established, a screening is then performed to identify and resolve minor changes to the fire protection program. This screening is consistent with fire protection regulatory review processes in place at nuclear plants under traditional licensing bases. This screening process is modeled after the NEI 02-03 process. This process will address most administrative changes (e.g.,
changes to the combustible control program, organizational changes, etc.).
The characteristics of an acceptable screening process that meets the assessment of the acceptability of risk requirement of Section 2.4.4 of NFPA 805 are:
* The quality of the screen is sufficient to ensure that potentially greater than minimal risk increases receive detailed risk assessments appropriate to the level of risk.
* The screening process must be documented and be available for inspection by the NRC.
* The screening process does not pose undue evaluation or maintenance burden.
If any of the above is not met, proceed to the Risk Evaluation step.
Risk Evaluation The screening is followed by engineering evaluations that may include fire modeling and risk assessment techniques. The results of these evaluations are then compared to the acceptance criteria. Changes that satisfy the acceptance criteria of NFPA 805 Section 2.4.4 and the license condition can be implemented within the framework provided by NFPA 805. Changes that do not satisfy the acceptance criteria cannot be implemented within this framework. The acceptance criteria require that the resultant change in CDF and LERF be consistent with the license condition. The acceptance criteria also include consideration of defense-in-depth and safety margin, which would typically be qualitative in nature.
The risk evaluation involves the application of fire modeling analyses and risk assessment techniques to obtain a measure of the changes in risk associated with the proposed change. In certain circumstances, an initial evaluation in the development of the risk assessment could be a simplified analysis using bounding assumptions provided the use of such assumptions does not unnecessarily challenge the acceptance criteria discussed below.
Acceptability Determination The Change Evaluations are assessed for acceptability using the CDF (change in core damage frequency) and LERF (change in large early release frequency) criteria from the license condition. The proposed changes are also assessed to ensure they are consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy and that sufficient safety margins were maintained.
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Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Figure 4-10 Plant Change Evaluation [NEI 04-02 Figure 5-1]
Note references in Figure refer to NEI 04-02 Sections HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 49
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements The HBRSEP Fire Protection Program configuration is defined by the program documentation. The existing configuration control processes for modifications, calculations and analyses, and Fire Protection Program License Basis Reviews will be utilized to maintain configuration control of the Fire Protection program documents. The configuration control procedures which govern the various HBRSEP documents and databases that currently exist will be revised to reflect the new NFPA 805 licensing bases requirements (Implementation Item in Attachment S).
Several NFPA 805 document types, such as NSCA Supporting Information, Non-Power Mode NSCA Treatment, generally require new control procedures and processes to be developed since they are new documents and databases created as a result of the transition to NFPA 805. The new procedures will be modeled after the existing processes for similar types of documents and databases. System level design basis documents will be revised to reflect the NFPA 805 role that the system components now play.
The process for capturing the impact of proposed changes to the plant on the Fire Protection Program will continue to be a multiple step review. The first step of the review is an initial screening for process users to determine if there is a potential to impact the Fire Protection program as defined under NFPA 805 through a series of screening questions/checklists contained in one or more procedures depending upon the configuration control process being used. Reviews that identify potential Fire Protection program impacts will be sent to qualified individuals (Fire Protection, Safe Shutdown/NSCA, Fire PRA) to ascertain the program impacts, if any. If Fire Protection program impacts are determined to exist as a result of the proposed change, the issue would be resolved by one of the following:
Deterministic Approach: Comply with NFPA 805, Chapter 3 and 4.2.3 requirements Performance-Based Approach: Utilize the NFPA 805 change process developed in accordance with NEI 04-02, RG 1.205, and the NFPA 805 fire protection license condition to assess the acceptability of the proposed change. This process would be used to determine if the proposed change could be implemented "as-is" or whether prior NRC approval of the proposed change is required.
This process follows the requirements in NFPA 805 and the guidance outlined in RG 1.174, which requires the use of qualified individuals, procedures that require calculations be subject to independent review and verification, record retention, peer review, and a corrective action program that ensures appropriate actions are taken when errors are discovered. The plant documents that ensure these requirements are met are:
CAP-NGGC-0200 - Condition Identification and Screening Process EGR-NGGC-0005 - Engineering Change ESG0101N - Safe Shutdown Engineer (Post-NFPA 805 Transition)
ESG0102N - Fire Protection Plant Change Impact Review ESG0103N - Circuit Analysis (Post-NFPA 805 Transition)
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements ESG0104N - Fire Protection Engineer (Post-NFPA 805 Transition)
ESG0105N - Basic Fire Modeling 4.7.3 Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program Quality Duke Energy will maintain the existing Fire Protection Quality Assurance program.
During the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), HBRSEP performed work in accordance with the quality requirements of Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805.
Any future NFPA 805 analyses will be conducted in accordance with the Quality Requirements described in NFPA 805, section 2.7.3 under the design controls in place and required by the Fire Protection portions of the NGGM-PM-0007, Quality Assurance Program Manual.
Fire PRA Quality Configuration control of the Fire PRA model will be maintained by integrating the Fire PRA model into the existing processes used to ensure configuration control of the internal events PRA model. This process complies with Section 1-5 of the ASME PRA Standard and ensures that Duke Energy maintains an as-built, as-operated PRA model of the plant. The process has been peer reviewed. Quality assurance of the Fire PRA is assured via the same processes applied to the internal events model.
This process follows the guidance outlined in RG 1.174, which requires the use of qualified individuals, procedures that require calculations be subject to independent review and verification, record retention, peer review, and a corrective action program that ensures appropriate actions are taken when errors are discovered. Although the entire scope of the formal 10 CFR 50, Appendix B program is not applied to the PRA models or processes in general, often parts of the program are applied as a convenient method of complying with the requirements of RG 1.174. For instance, the procedure which addresses independent review of calculations for 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, is applied to the PRA model calculations, as well.
With respect to Quality Assurance Program requirements for independent reviews of calculations and evaluations, those existing requirements for Fire Protection Program documents will remain unchanged. Duke Energy specifically requires that the calculations and evaluations in support of the NFPA 805 LAR, exclusive of the Fire PRA, be performed within the scope of the QA program which requires independent review as defined by plant procedures. As recommended by NUREG/CR-6850, the sources of uncertainty in the Fire PRA were identified and specific parameters were analyzed for sensitivity in support of the NFPA 805 Fire Risk Evaluation process.
Specifically with regard to uncertainty, an uncertainty and sensitivity matrix was developed and included with RNP-F/PSA-0094. In addition, sensitivity to uncertainty associated with specific Fire PRA parameters was quantitatively addressed in RNP-F/PSA-0095.
While the removal of conservatism inherent in the Fire PRA is a long-term goal, the Fire PRA results were deemed sufficient for evaluating the risk associated with this application. While Duke Energy continues to strive toward a more "realistic" estimate of HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 51
 
Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements fire risk, use of mean values continues to be the best estimate of fire risk. During the Fire Risk Evaluation process, the uncertainty and sensitivity associated with specific Fire PRA parameters were considerations in the evaluation of the change in risk relative to the applicable acceptance thresholds.
Specific Requirements of NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3 The following discusses how the requirements of NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3 were met during the transition process. Post-transition, Duke Energy will perform work in accordance with NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3 requirements.
Reference plant procedures:
EGR-NGGC-0003 - Design Review Requirements EGR-NGGC-0005 - Engineering Change EGR-NGGC-0017 - Preparation and Control of Design Analyses and Calculations Review and approval of corporate or fleet-wide procedures applied to HBRSEP and other Duke Energy Progress sites are controlled under PRO-NGGC-0204, Procedure Review and Approval. Site specific impact and technical reviews are completed under this process to ensure each individual plant's requirements and configurations are incorporated and maintained.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.1 - Review Analyses, calculations, and evaluations performed in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are performed in accordance with Duke Energy procedures that require independent review.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.2 - Verification and Validation Calculational models and numerical methods used in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) were verified and validated as required by Section 2.7.3.2 of NFPA 805.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.3 - Limitations of Use Engineering methods and numerical models used in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) were applied appropriately as required by Section 2.7.3.3 of NFPA 805.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.4 - Qualification of Users Cognizant personnel who use and apply engineering analysis and numerical methods in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are competent and experienced as required by Section 2.7.3.4 of NFPA 805.
During the transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c), work was performed in accordance with the quality requirements of Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805. Personnel who used and applied engineering analysis and numerical methods (e.g. fire modeling) in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are competent and experienced as required by NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.4.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements Post-transition, for personnel performing fire modeling or Fire PRA development and evaluation, Duke Energy will develop and maintain qualification requirements for individuals assigned various tasks. Position Specific Guides will be developed to identify and document required training and mentoring to ensure individuals are appropriately qualified per the requirements of NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.4 to perform assigned work. The following Training Guides have been developed and implemented.
ESG0089N - Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment Engineer (Quantification),
ESG0093N - Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment Engineer (Initial Development), and ESG0094N - Fire Probabilistic Safety Assessment Engineer (Data Development), and ESG0105N - Basic Fire Modeling HBRSEP and NGG Fleet engineering personnel (design, programs and systems engineering) are provided training commensurate with the job responsibility through the INPO accredited Engineering Support Personnel (ESP) training program. This is provided in either ESP Continuing Training or Work Group Specific Continuing Training.
Specific, qualification for performance of the FIR-NGGC-0010, Fire Protection Program Change Process, is documented using Training Guide (Qual. Card) ESG0102N, Fire Protection Plant Change Impact Review.
NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.5 - Uncertainty Analysis Uncertainty analyses were performed as required by 2.7.3.5 of NFPA 805 and the results were considered in the context of the application. This is of particular interest in fire modeling and Fire PRA development. Note: 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(iv) states that NFPA 805 Section 2.7.3.5 is not required for the deterministic approach because conservatism is included in the deterministic criteria.
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Duke Energy                                      4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.8    Summary of Results 4.8.1 Results of the Fire Area Review A summary of the NFPA 805 compliance basis and the required fire protection systems and features is provided in Attachment C. The table provides the following information from the NEI 04-02 Table B-3:
Fire Area / Fire Zone: Fire Area/Zone Identifier.
 
== Description:==
Fire Area/Zone Description.
NFPA 805 Regulatory Basis: Post-transition NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance basis Required Fire Protection System / Feature: Detection / suppression required in the Fire Area based on NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance. Other Required Features may include Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems, fire barriers, etc.
The documentation of required fire protection systems and features does not include the documentation of the fire area boundaries. Fire area boundaries are required and documentation of the fire area boundaries has been performed as part of reviews of engineering evaluations, licensing actions, or as part of the reviews of the NEI 04-02 Table B-1 process. The basis for the requirement of the fire protection system / feature is designated as follows:
o S - Separation Criteria: Systems/Features required for Chapter 4 Separation Criteria in Section 4.2.3 o E - EEEE/LA Criteria: Systems/Features required for acceptability of Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluations / NRC approved Licensing Action (i.e.,
Exemptions/Deviations/Safety Evaluations) (Section 2.2.7) o R - Risk Criteria: Systems/Features required to meet the Risk Criteria for the Performance-Based Approach (Section 4.2.4) o D - Defense-in-depth Criteria: Systems/Features required to maintain adequate balance of Defense-in-Depth for a Performance-Based Approach (Section 4.2.4)
Attachment W contains the results of the Fire Risk Evaluations, additional risk of recovery actions, and the change in risk on a fire area basis.
4.8.2 Plant Modifications and Items to be Completed During the Implementation Phase Planned modifications, studies, and evaluations to comply with NFPA 805 are described in Attachment S.
In Attachment S, three tables are listed. Table S-1 identifies completed Plant Modifications, Table S-2 identifies Plant Modifications required to be completed.
Table S-3 identifies training, programs, personnel equipment, and document changes and upgrades required to be completed.
The Fire PRA model will represent the as-built, as-operated and maintained plant following completion of the risk related modifications identified in Attachment S. In the event the PRA model requires revision following completion of the modifications and HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 54
 
Duke Energy                                        4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements implementation items listed in Attachment S, the changes will be controlled through normal HBRSEP processes. These changes are not expected to be significant.
4.8.3 Supplemental Information -Other Licensee Specific Issues 4.8.3.1    Fire PRA Qualitative Review The following methods and modeling aspects are qualitatively characterized as having a minimal impact or a conservative impact:
4.8.3.1.1 RCP Shutdown Seals The HBRSEP FPRA applied credit for the installation of the Westinghouse Generation III SHIELD Shutdown Seal (SDS) in the Reactor Coolant Pumps as described in PWROG-14001, Rev. 1 An implementation item has been created in Attachment S to update the FPRA prior to self-approval to incorporate the NRC-accepted SDS failure model.
4.8.3.1.2 NSCA Power Supply Strategy HBRSEP is changing the strategy used in a number of fire areas in the plant that were previously approved under the Appendix R licensing basis. The current strategy is to perform a fire incused load shed and recovery to limit operational uncertainties relative to circuit failure and spurious actuations. This strategy has been compared to what is often called self-induced station blackout (SISBO) in the industry. The strategy going forward is to use a symptom based operator response approach in response to fire events. The Attachment G recovery actions have been informed with the new strategy. The current fire PRA conservatively modeled the plant using the current load shed strategy. As part of program implementation, the operations procedures will be finalized and the Fire PRA updated. Therefore, there is a separate implementation item relative to this in Attachment S.
4.8.3.2    Fire PRA Sensitivity Analyses The following methods and modeling aspects are quantitatively evaluated. Each sensitivity analysis modifies an applied fire PRA method and then recalculates total risk metrics from Attachment W in order to determine the impact of a given fire PRA method.
The total plant risk and the total change in risk associated with the transition to NFPA 805 are reported for each sensitivity with the percentage change from the numbers reported in Attachment W.
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Duke Energy                                                4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.8.3.2.1 FAQ 08-0048 Sensitivity Analysis In order to use the updated fire bin ignition frequencies provided in Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850, a sensitivity analysis must be performed comparing the impact of those bins characterized by an alpha from the EPRI TR-1016735 analysis that is less than or equal to 1. While the new point estimates for the bin ignition frequencies better represent the data, uncertainties are large and a sensitivity analysis using the old frequencies was required to assess the potential impact of using the new frequencies.
The sensitivity was simplified by replacing the select EPRI TR-1016735 ignition frequencies with values from NUREG/CR-6850. The results of the sensitivity for the EPRI ignition frequencies are provided below.
Table 4 Ignition Frequency Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF Results CDF [/yr]      LERF [/yr]
(Change from      (Change from baseline)1        baseline)1 6.9E-06          6.0E-07 Net Fire Risk Evaluation
(+38%)            (+30%)
Differences in percentages are due to rounding.
: 1. Baseline numbers are those presented in Attachment W, Table W-5.
Table 4 Ignition Frequency Sensitivity Total CDF and LERF CDF [/yr]        LERF [/yr]
(Change from      (Change from baseline)1        baseline)1 Internal Events plus External Flooding and              3.6E-06          8.8E-07 High Winds 4.8E-05          6.0E-06 Fire
(+66%)            (+71%)
5.2E-05          6.9E-06 Total
(+58%)            (+57%)
Differences in percentages are due to rounding.
: 1. Baseline numbers are those presented in Attachment W, Table W-5.
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Duke Energy                                                4.0 Compliance with NFPA 805 Requirements 4.8.3.2.2 Cable Spread Room Area Wide Incipient Detection Sensitivity Analysis As permitted by Appendix P of NUREG/CR-6850 Volume 2 and draft NUREG-2180 guidance, the FPRA credits the use of air-aspirated incipient detection, also known as Very Early Warning Fire Detection Systems (VEWFDS) for area wide detection in the Unit 2 cable spread room. The fire PRA applies the credit outlines in the draft NUREG-2180 with a modification to the event tree allowing for credit of conventional detection and suppression systems, as they are independent of the success or failure of area-wide incipient detection. Plant procedures will be developed and implemented to ensure that VEWFDS alarms are promptly addressed with qualified plant personnel who will be present in the immediate area prior to fire growth, allowing for fire prevention or prompt fire response.
The area-wide incipient detector credit will be removed, leaving in place the existing conventional detection and suppression systems for this sensitivity analysis. The results of removing the area-wide VEWFDS and maintaining existing system credits are below.
Table 4 Area Wide Incipient Detection Sensitivity Delta CDF and Delta LERF Results CDF [/yr]      LERF [/yr]
(Change from      (Change from baseline)1        baseline)1 5.9E-06            5.7E-07 Net Fire Risk Evaluation
(+18%)            (+24%)
Differences in percentages are due to rounding.
: 1. Baseline numbers are those presented in Attachment W, Table W-5.
Table 4 Area Wide Incipient Detection Sensitivity Total CDF and LERF Results CDF [/yr]        LERF [/yr]
(Change from      (Change from baseline)1        baseline)1 Internal Events plus External Flooding and                3.6E-06            8.8E-07 High Winds 3.1E-05            3.7E-06 Fire
(+7%)              (+6%)
3.5E-05            4.6E-06 Total
(+6%)              (+5%)
Differences in percentages are due to rounding.
: 1. Baseline numbers are those presented in Attachment W, Table W-5.
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Duke Energy                                                        5.0 Regulatory Evaluation
 
==5.0    REGULATORY EVALUATION==
 
5.1    Introduction - 10 CFR 50.48 On July 16, 2004 the NRC amended 10 CFR 50.48, Fire Protection, to add a new subsection, 10 CFR 50.48(c), which establishes alternative fire protection requirements.
10 CFR 50.48 endorses, with exceptions, NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants - 2001 Edition (NFPA 805), as a voluntary alternative for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 50.48 Section (b), Appendix R, and Section (f), Decommissioning.
The voluntary adoption of 10 CFR 50.48(c) by HBRSEP does not eliminate the need to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) including the provision for nuclear plants licensed prior to 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 3, Fire Protection, becoming effective as is the case for HBRSEP5. The NRC addressed the overall adequacy of the regulations during the promulgation of 10 CFR 50.48(c) (Reference FR Notice 69 FR 33536 dated June 16, 2004, ML041340086).
NFPA 805 does not supersede the requirements of GDC 3, 10 CFR 50.48(a), or 10 CFR 50.48(f). Those regulatory requirements continue to apply to licensees that adopt NFPA 805. However, under NFPA 805, the means by which GDC 3 or 10 CFR 50.48(a) requirements may be met is different than under 10 CFR 50.48(b). Specifically, whereas GDC 3 refers to SSCs important to safety, NFPA 805 identifies fire protection systems and features required to meet the Chapter 1 performance criteria through the methodology in Chapter 4 of NFPA 805. Also, under NFPA 805, the 10 CFR 50.48(a)(2)(iii) requirement to limit fire damage to SSCs important to safety so that the capability to safely shut down the plant is ensured is satisfied by meeting the performance criteria in Section 1.5.1 of NFPA 805. The Section 1.5.1 criteria include provisions for ensuring that reactivity control, inventory and pressure control, decay heat removal, vital auxiliaries, and process monitoring are achieved and maintained.
This methodology specifies a process to identify the fire protection systems and features required to achieve the nuclear safety performance criteria in Section 1.5 of NFPA 805. Once a determination has been made that a fire protection system or feature is required to achieve the performance criteria of Section 1.5, its design and qualification must meet any applicable requirements of NFPA 805, Chapter 3. Having identified the required fire protection systems and features, the licensee selects either a deterministic or performance-based approach to 5
The General Design Criteria (GDC) in existence at the time HBRSEP was licensed (July, 1970) for operation were contained in Proposed Appendix A to 10CFR50, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, published in the Federal Register on July 11, 1967. (Appendix A to 10CFR50, effective in 1971 and subsequently amended, is somewhat different from the proposed 1967 criteria.) HBRSEP was evaluated with respect to the proposed 1967 GDC and the original FSAR contained a discussion of the criteria as well as a summary of the criteria by groups.
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Duke Energy                                                                          5.0 Regulatory Evaluation demonstrate that the performance criteria are satisfied. This process satisfies the GDC 3 requirement to design and locate SSCs important to safety to minimize the probability and effects of fires and explosions. (Reference FR Notice 69 FR 33536 dated June 16, 2004, ML041340086)
The new rule provides actions that may be taken to establish compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(a), which requires each operating nuclear power plant to have a fire protection program plan that satisfies GDC 3, as well as specific requirements in that section. The transition process described in 10 CFR 50.48(c)(3)(ii) provides, in pertinent parts, that a licensee intending to adopt the new rule must, among other things, modify the fire protection plan required by paragraph (a) of that section to reflect the licensees decision to comply with NFPA 805. Therefore, to the extent that the contents of the existing fire protection program plan required by 10 CFR 50.48(a) are inconsistent with NFPA 805, the fire protection program plan must be modified to achieve compliance with the requirements in NFPA 805. All other requirements of 10 CFR 50.48 (a) and GDC 3 have corresponding requirements in NFPA 805.
A comparison of the current requirements in Appendix R with the comparable requirements in Section 3 of NFPA 805 shows that the two sets of requirements are consistent in many respects. This was further clarified in FAQ 07-0032, 10 CFR 50.48(a) and GDC 3 clarification (ML081400292). The following tables provide a cross reference of fire protection regulations associated with the post-transition HBRSEP fire protection program and applicable industry and HBRSEP documents that address the topic.
10 CFR 50.48(a)
Table 5-1 10 CFR 50.48(a) - Applicability/Compliance Reference 10 CFR 50.48(a) Section(s)                        Applicability/Compliance Reference (1) Each holder of an operating license issued under this      See below part or a combined license issued under part 52 of this chapter must have a fire protection plan that satisfies Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part. This fire protection plan must:
(i) Describe the overall fire protection program for the  NFPA 805 Section 3.2 facility;                                                  NEI 04-02 Table B-1 (ii) Identify the various positions within the licensee's  NFPA 805 Section 3.2.2 organization that are responsible for the program;        NEI 04-02 Table B-1 (iii) State the authorities that are delegated to each of  NFPA 805 Section 3.2.2 these positions to implement those responsibilities; and  NEI 04-02 Table B-1 (iv) Outline the plans for fire protection, fire detection NFPA 805 Section 2.7 and Chapters 3 and 4 and suppression capability, and limitation of fire        NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tables damage.
(2) The plan must also describe specific features              See below necessary to implement the program described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section such as:
(i) Administrative controls and personnel requirements    NFPA 805 Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4 for fire prevention and manual fire suppression            NEI 04-02 Table B-1 activities; HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                        Page 59
 
Duke Energy                                                                              5.0 Regulatory Evaluation Table 5-1 10 CFR 50.48(a) - Applicability/Compliance Reference 10 CFR 50.48(a) Section(s)                            Applicability/Compliance Reference (ii) Automatic and manually operated fire detection and    NFPA 805 Sections 3.5 through 3.10 and suppression systems; and                                    Chapter 4 NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tables (iii) The means to limit fire damage to structures,        NFPA 805 Section 3.3 and Chapter 4 systems, or components important to safety so that the      NEI 04-02 B-3 Table capability to shut down the plant safely is ensured.
(3) The licensee shall retain the fire protection plan and      NFPA 805 Section 2.7.1.1 requires that each change to the plan as a record until the              documentation (Analyses, as defined by NFPA 805 Commission terminates the reactor license. The              Section 2.4, performed to demonstrate compliance licensee shall retain each superseded revision of the      with this standard) be maintained for the life of the procedures for 3 years from the date it was                plant.
superseded.                                                RDC-NGGC-0001 (4) Each applicant for a design approval, design                Not applicable. HBRSEP is licensed under certification, or manufacturing license under part 52 of    10 CFR 50.
this chapter must have a description and analysis of the fire protection design features for the standard plant necessary to demonstrate compliance with Criterion 3 of appendix A to this part.
General Design Criterion 3 Table 5-2 GDC 3 - Applicability/Compliance Reference GDC 3, Fire Protection, Statement                        Applicability/Compliance Reference Structures, systems, and components important to            NFPA 805 Chapters 3 and 4 safety shall be designed and located to minimize,            NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tables consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions.
Noncombustible and heat resistant materials shall be        NFPA 805 Sections 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, 3.11.4 used wherever practical throughout the unit,                NEI 04-02 B-1 Table particularly in locations such as the containment and control room.
Fire detection and fighting systems of appropriate          NFPA 805 Chapters 3 and 4 capacity and capability shall be provided and designed      NEI 04-02 B-1 and B-3 Tables to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures, systems, and components important to safety.
Firefighting systems shall be designed to assure that        NFPA 805 Sections 3.4 through 3.10 and 4.2.1 their rupture or inadvertent operation does not              NEI 04-02 Table B-3 significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                Page 60
 
Duke Energy                                                                            5.0 Regulatory Evaluation 10 CFR 50.48(c)
Table 5-3 10 CFR 50.48(c) - Applicability/Compliance Reference 10 CFR 50.48(c) Section(s)                                Applicability/Compliance Reference (1) Approval of incorporation by reference. National Fire Protection Association    General Information.
(NFPA) Standard 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for        NFPA 805 (2001 edition) is Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition (NFPA 805),        the edition used.
which is referenced in this section, was approved for incorporation by reference by the Director of the Federal Register pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) Exceptions, modifications, and supplementation of NFPA 805. As used in          General Information.
this section, references to NFPA 805 are to the 2001 Edition, with the          NFPA 805 (2001 edition) is following exceptions, modifications, and supplementation:                        the edition used.
(i) Life Safety Goal, Objectives, and Criteria. The Life Safety Goal,            The Life Safety Goal, Objectives, and Criteria of Chapter 1 are not endorsed.                          Objectives, and Criteria of Chapter 1 of NFPA 805 are not part of the LAR.
(ii) Plant Damage/Business Interruption Goal, Objectives, and Criteria. The      The Plant Damage/Business Plant Damage/Business Interruption Goal, Objectives, and Criteria of            Interruption Goal, Objectives, Chapter 1 are not endorsed.                                                      and Criteria of Chapter 1 of NFPA 805 are not part of the LAR.
(iii) Use of feed-and-bleed. In demonstrating compliance with the                Feed and bleed is not utilized performance criteria of Sections 1.5.1(b) and (c), a high-pressure              as the sole fire-protected safe charging/injection pump coupled with the pressurizer power-operated relief      shutdown methodology.
valves (PORVs) as the sole fire-protected safe shutdown path for maintaining reactor coolant inventory, pressure control, and decay heat removal capability (i.e., feed-and-bleed) for pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) is not permitted.
(iv) Uncertainty analysis. An uncertainty analysis performed in accordance      Uncertainty analysis was not with Section 2.7.3.5 is not required to support deterministic approach          performed for deterministic calculations.                                                                    methodology.
(v) Existing cables. In lieu of installing cables meeting flame propagation      Electrical cable construction tests as required by Section 3.3.5.3, a flame-retardant coating may be          complies with a flame applied to the electric cables, or an automatic fixed fire suppression system    propagation test that was may be installed to provide an equivalent level of protection. In addition, the  found acceptable to the NRC italicized exception to Section 3.3.5.3 is not endorsed.                        as documented in NEI 04-02 Table B-1.
(vi) Water supply and distribution. The italicized exception to Section 3.6.4 is HBRSEP complies as not endorsed. Licensees who wish to use the exception to Section 3.6.4          documented in Attachment A.
must submit a request for a license amendment in accordance with                See NEI 04-02 Table B-1.
paragraph (c)(2)(vii) of this section.
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Duke Energy                                                                            5.0 Regulatory Evaluation Table 5-3 10 CFR 50.48(c) - Applicability/Compliance Reference 10 CFR 50.48(c) Section(s)                                Applicability/Compliance Reference (vii) Performance-based methods. Notwithstanding the prohibition in              The use of performance-Section 3.1 against the use of performance-based methods, the fire                based methods for NFPA 805 protection program elements and minimum design requirements of                    Chapter 3 is requested. See Chapter 3 may be subject to the performance-based methods permitted              Attachment L.
elsewhere in the standard. Licensees who wish to use performance-based methods for these fire protection program elements and minimum design requirements shall submit a request in the form of an application for license amendment under &sect; 50.90. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or a designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or designee determines that the performance-based approach; (A) Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; (B) Maintains safety margins; and (C) Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).
(3) Compliance with NFPA 805.                                                        See below (i) A licensee may maintain a fire protection program that complies with          The LAR was submitted in NFPA 805 as an alternative to complying with paragraph (b) of this section        accordance with for plants licensed to operate before January 1, 1979, or the fire protection    10 CFR 50.90. The LAR license conditions for plants licensed to operate after January 1, 1979. The      included applicable license licensee shall submit a request to comply with NFPA 805 in the form of an        conditions, orders, technical application for license amendment under &sect; 50.90. The application must            specifications/bases that identify any orders and license conditions that must be revised or                needed to be revised and/or superseded, and contain any necessary revisions to the plants technical          superseded.
specifications and the bases thereof. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or a designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or designee determines that the licensee has identified orders, license conditions, and the technical specifications that must be revised or superseded, and that any necessary revisions are adequate. Any approval by the Director or the designee must be in the form of a license amendment approving the use of NFPA 805 together with any necessary revisions to the technical specifications.
(ii) The licensee shall complete its implementation of the methodology in        The LAR and transition report Chapter 2 of NFPA 805 (including all required evaluations and analyses)          summarize the evaluations and, upon completion, modify the fire protection plan required by paragraph      and analyses performed in (a) of this section to reflect the licensees decision to comply with NFPA 805,  accordance with Chapter 2 of before changing its fire protection program or nuclear power plant as            NFPA 805.
permitted by NFPA 805.
(4) Risk-informed or performance-based alternatives to compliance with                No risk-informed or NFPA 805. A licensee may submit a request to use risk-informed or                performance-based performance-based alternatives to compliance with NFPA 805. The request          alternatives to compliance must be in the form of an application for license amendment under &sect; 50.90 of      with NFPA 805 (per this chapter. The Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or        10 CFR 50.48(c)(4)) were designee of the Director, may approve the application if the Director or          utilized. See Attachment P.
designee determines that the proposed alternatives:
(i) Satisfy the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; (ii) Maintain safety margins; and (iii) Maintain fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                              Page 62
 
Duke Energy                                                          5.0 Regulatory Evaluation 5.2    Regulatory Topics 5.2.1 License Condition Changes The current HBRSEP fire protection license condition 3.E is being replaced with the standard license condition based upon Regulatory Position 3.1 of RG 1.205, as shown in Attachment M.
5.2.2 Technical Specifications HBRSEP conducted a review of the Technical Specifications to determine which Technical Specifications are required to be revised, deleted, or superseded. HBRSEP determined that the changes to the Technical Specifications and applicable justification listed in Attachment N are adequate for the HBRSEP adoption of the new fire protection licensing basis.
5.2.3 Orders and Exemptions A review was conducted of the HBRSEP docketed correspondence to determine if there were any orders or exemptions that needed to be superseded or revised. A review was also performed to ensure that compliance with the physical protection requirements, security orders, and adherence to those commitments applicable to the plant are maintained. A discussion of affected orders and exemptions is included in Attachment O.
5.3    Regulatory Evaluations 5.3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration A written evaluation of the significant hazards consideration of a proposed license amendment is required by 10 CFR 50.92. According to 10 CFR 50.92, a proposed amendment to an operating license involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
* Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or
* Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
* Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
This evaluation is contained in Attachment Q.
Based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. HBRSEP has evaluated the proposed amendment and determined that it involves no significant hazards consideration.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page 63
 
Duke Energy                                                        5.0 Regulatory Evaluation 5.3.2 Environmental Consideration Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an evaluation of the LAR has been performed to determine whether it meets the criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c). That evaluation is discussed in Attachment R. The evaluation confirms that this LAR meets the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) for categorical exclusion from the need for an environmental impact assessment or statement.
5.4 Revision to the UFSAR After the approval of the LAR, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(e), the HBRSEP UFSAR will be revised. The format and content will be consistent with NEI 04-02 FAQ 12-0062. This will occur during the implementation phase. Changes to the UFSAR are controlled under procedure REG-NGGC-0101, Final Safety Analysis Report Revisions.
5.5    Transition Implementation Schedule The following schedule for transitioning HBRSEP to the new fire protection licensing basis requires NRC approval of the LAR in accordance with the following schedule:
Implementation of new NFPA 805 fire protection program includes procedure changes, process updates, and training to affected plant personnel. This will occur 12 months after NRC approval. This implementation window is being driven by a planned refueling outage and the availability to schedule operator training to support transition.
Modifications will be completed by the startup of the third refueling outage after issuance of the Safety Evaluation (SE), this is Refueling outage 32, currently scheduled for September/October 2020. Appropriate compensatory measures will be maintained until modifications are complete.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 64
 
Duke Energy                                                              6.0 References
 
==6.0    REFERENCES==
 
The following references were used in the development of the TR. Additional references are in the NEI 04-02 Tables in the various Attachments.
Industry References
: 1. NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities Volume 2 Detailed Methodology, EPRI 1008239 Final Report, NUREG/CR-6850 / EPRI 1023259, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, MD, September, 2005.
: 2. NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1, Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods Enhancements, EPRI 1019259, Technical Report, NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, MD, September, 2010.
: 3. NUREG-1824, Volume 1, V&V of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications Volume 1: Main Report, NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., May, 2007.
: 4. NUREG-1824, Volume 3, Verification & Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Volume 3: Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTS), NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P.,
NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., May, 2007.
: 5. NUREG-1934, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1934/EPRI-1019195, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Research, Washington, D. C., November, 2012.
: 6. NUREG-1805, Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTS), Iqbal, N. and Salley, M. H.,
NUREG-1805, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., October, 2004.
: 7. NEI 00-01, Guidance for Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis
: 8. NEI 02-03, Guidance for Performing a Regulatory Review of Proposed Changes to the Approved Fire Protection Program
: 9. NEI 04-02, Guidance for Implementation of a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program under 10 CFR 50.48(c), Rev. 2, 09-2005.
[ML0608800500]
: 10. NEI 04-06, Guidance for Self-Assessment of Circuit Failures
: 11. NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition
: 12. NIST SP 1026, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Technical Reference Guide, Jones, W. W., Peacock, HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                Page 65
 
Duke Energy                                                                  6.0 References R. D., Forney, G. P., and Reneke, P. A., National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, April, 2009.
: 13. NIST SP 1041, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Users Guide, Peacock, R. D., Jones, W. W., Reneke, P. A., and Forney, G. P., National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, December, 2008.
: 14. NIST SP 1086, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Software Development and Model Evaluation Guide, Peacock, R. D., McGrattan, K., Klein, B., Jones, W. W., and Reneke, P. A.,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, December, 2008.
: 15. NRL/MR/6180-04-8746, Verification and Validation Final Report for Fire and Smoke Spread Modeling and Simulation Support of T-AKE Test and Evaluation, Tatem, P.A., Budnick, E.K., Hunt, S.P., Trelles, J., Scheffey, J.L.,
White, D.A., Bailey, J., Hoover, J., and Williams, F.W., Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, 2004.
: 16. Hughes Associates, Generic Fire Modeling Treatments, Project Number 1SPH02902.030, Revision 0, January 15, 2008.
: 17. Heskestad, G., Peak Gas Velocities and Flame Heights of Buoyancy-Controlled Turbulent Diffusion Flames, Eighteenth Symposium on Combustion, The Combustion Institute, Pittsburg, PA, pp. 951-960, 1981.
: 18. Heskestad. G., Engineering Relations for Fire Plumes, Fire Safety Journal, 7:25-32, 1984.
: 19. Yokoi, S., Study on the Prevention of Fire Spread Caused by Hot Upward Current, Report Number 34, Building Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan, 1960.
: 20. Yuan, L. and Cox, F., An Experimental Study of Some Line Fires, Fire Safety Journal, 27, 1996.
: 21. SFPE, The SFPE Engineering Guide for Assessing Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires, Society of Fire Protection Engineers, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, June, 1999.
: 22. SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Section 3-1, Heat Release Rates, Babrauskas, V., The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition, P. J. DiNenno, Editor-in-Chief, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2008.
: 23. NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition
: 24. ASME/ANS Ra-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS Ra-Sa-2008, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, American Society of Mechanical Engineers/American Nuclear Society, New York, HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page 66
 
Duke Energy                                                              6.0 References
: 25. NUREG-1824, Volume 5, Verification and Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications Volume 5: Consolidated Fire Growth and Transport Model, NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., May, 2007.
: 26. EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756, EPRI Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide Plant Specific References
: 1. AOP-014, Loss of CCW
: 2. AOP-022, Loss of Service Water
: 3. AOP-041, Response to Fire Event
: 4. CAP-NGGC-0200, Condition Identification and Screening Process
: 5. DSP-001, Alternate Shutdown Diagnostic
: 6. DSP-002, Hot Shutdown Using the Dedicated/Alternate Shutdown System
: 7. EDMG-001, Extreme Damage Event Early Actions
: 8. EDMG-002, Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
: 9. EDMG-003, Condensate Storage Tank (CST)
: 10. EDMG-005, Containment Vessel (CV)
: 11. EDMG-011, Spent Fuel Pit Casualty
: 12. EDMG-012, Core Cooling Using Alternate Water Source
: 13. EDMG-013, Airborne Release Scrubbing
: 14. EGR-NGGC-0003, Design Review Requirements
: 15. EGR-NGGC-0005, Engineering Change
: 16. EGR-NGGC-0010, System & Component Trending Program and System Notebooks
: 17. EGR-NGGC-0017, Preparation and Control of Design Analyses and Calculations
: 18. EPP-001, Loss of All AC Power
: 19. FIR-NGGC-0009, NFPA 805 Transient Combustibles and Ignition Source Controls Program
: 20. FIR-NGGC-0010, Fire Protection Program Change Process
: 21. FIR-NGGC-0101, Fire Protection Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment (NSCA)
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                Page 67
 
Duke Energy                                                              6.0 References
: 22. FPIP-0121, Radiological Release Reviews During Fire Fighting Activities
: 23. HBR2-0B060, Electrical Installation Practices, Notes and Details
: 24. RNP-M/MECH-1826, Hot Gas Layer Calculation
: 25. NED-M/MECH-1006, Generic Fire Modeling Treatments
: 26. NED-M/MECH-1007, Radiant Energy Target Damage Profile
: 27. NED-M/MECH-1008, Fire Zone of Influence Calculation
: 28. NED-M/MECH-1009, Thermal Damage Time of Cables Above a Burning Ignition Source
: 29. OMA-NGGC-0203, Shutdown Risk Management
: 30. OMM-002, Fire Protection Manual
: 31. OMM-003, Fire Protection Pre-Plan
: 32. OMM-033, Implementation of CV Closure
: 33. OMP-003, Shutdown Safety Function Guidelines
: 34. PRO-NGGC-0204, Procedure Review and Approval
: 35. RDC-NGGC-0001, NGG Standard Records Management Program
: 36. REG-NGGC-0101, Final Safety Analysis Report Revisions
: 37. Report Number 0004-0042-412-002, Evaluation of Main Control Room Abandonment Times at the H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant
: 38. Report Number 0004-0042-000-001, Evaluation of the Development and Timing of Hot Gas Layer Conditions in RNP Fire Zone 20
: 39. Report Number P2217-1021-01-01, Robinson Fire PRA Quantification Calculation
: 40. Report Number P2217-1021-01-03
: 41. RNP-E/ELEC-1216, The Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis for H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant
: 42. RNP-E/ELEC-1217, Non-Power Operations
: 43. RNP-F/PSA-0006, RNP Initiating Events Assessment
: 44. RNP-F/PSA-0014, Post Initiator Human Reliability Analysis
: 45. RNP-F/PSA-0018, PSA Model Appendix A - System Notebooks
: 46. RNP-F/PSA-0043, RNP PRA - Accident Sequence Notebook
: 47. RNP-F/PSA-0066, RNP Fire PRA Component Selection
: 48. RNP-F/PSA-0067, RPN Fire PRA Plant Partitioning and Ignition Frequency
: 49. RNP-F/PSA-0074, RNP Uncertainty Analysis
: 50. RNP-F/PSA-0077, RNP Quantification Calculation HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                Page 68
 
Duke Energy                                                          6.0 References
: 51. RNP-F/PSA-0094, RNP Fire PSA Quantification
: 52. RNP-F/PSA-0095, RNP Fire PRA - NFPA 805 Transition Support
: 53. RNP-M/MECH-1826, Hot Gas Layer Calculation
: 54. RNP-M/MECH-1884, Verfication and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Robinson Nuclear Plant (RNP) Fire PRA
: 55. SAM-1, Inject into the Steam Generator
: 56. SAM-3, Inject into the RCS
: 57. SAM-4, Inject into Containment
: 58. SAM-6, Control Containment Conditions
: 59. SAM-8, Flood Containment HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                            Page 69
 
Attachment A - NEI 04-02 Table B-1 Transition of Fundamental Duke Energy                                                                                        Fire Protection Program & Design Elements Table B-1 NFPA 805 Ch.3 Transition Details Chapter 3
 
==Reference:==
3.3.4 Insulation Materials Chapter 3 Requirement:        3.3.4 Insulation Materials.
Thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials, ventilation duct materials, and soundproofing materials shall be noncombustible or limited combustible.
Compliance Statement                              Compliance Basis License Amendment Required                        NRC approval is being requested in Attachment L.
Reference Document                                                          Doc Details UFSAR,HBR 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)                      Appendix 9.5.1.B-6 CPL-HBR2-M-025,Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC)            Section II-2.01 Main Plant Fabrication and Installation CPL-HBR2-M-028,Specification for RHR Pump Pit to HVE-5 Exhaust              Section II-2.01 Tie-In Fabrication and Installation L2-M-039,Piping and Equpment Thermal Insulation                              Section 4.4.1.4 GID/87038-0014,Fire Barrier System                                          ALL Table B-1 NFPA 805 Ch.3 Transition Details Chapter 3
 
==Reference:==
3.3.5 Electrical.
Chapter 3 Requirement:        N/A Compliance Statement                              Compliance Basis N/A                                              N/A - General statement; No technical requirements.
Table B-1 NFPA 805 Ch.3 Transition Details Chapter 3
 
==Reference:==
3.3.5.1 [Electrical Wiring Above Suspended Ceiling Limitations]
Chapter 3 Requirement:        3.3.5.1 Wiring above suspended ceiling shall be kept to a minimum. Where installed, electrical wiring shall be listed for plenum use, routed in armored cable, routed in metallic conduit, or routed in cable trays with solid metal top and bottom covers.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                                                                    Page A-14
 
Duke Energy                            Attachment I - Definition of Power Block I. Definition of Power Block 1 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                        Page I-1
 
Duke Energy                                                Attachment I - Definition of Power Block The structures in the Owner Controlled Area were evaluated to determine those structures that contain equipment that is required to meet the nuclear safety performance criteria and radioactive release performance criteria described in Section 1.5 of NFPA 805.
For the purposes of establishing the structures included in the Fire Protection program in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) and NFPA 805, plant structures listed in the following table are considered to be part of the power block.
Table I Power Block Definition Power Block                  Fire Areas                                Notes Structures A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8, Includes Waste evaporator area A9, A10, A11, A12, A13, A14, Auxiliary Building A15, A16, A17, A19, B, C, D, E, G4 Control Room            A18                            Includes Hagan Room Containment Building    F G1                              Includes the Dedicated Shutdown Transformer, Main and Auxiliary Start-Up Transformer Yard, Turbine Building Refueling Water Storage Tank, Primary Water Storage Tank, Condensate Storage Tank Diesel Fuel Oil Storage G2 Tank Intake Structure        G3 G4                              Includes the Cask Preparation Area, Hot Fuel Handling Building                                  Machine Shop and Fuel Building, Radwaste Building, Purge inlet valve room, 115kV and 230kV        G5                              Includes Unit 1 and 2 Switchyard Switchyards Dedicated Shutdown      G7 Diesel Generator Enclosure Residual Heat Removal  H Pump Room YARD                            Secondary Sampling Building, Nitrogen Storage and C Auxiliary Boiler, Condensate Polishing Building, Deepwell Pump A Area South of Unit YARD                                                    1 Service Building, Deepwell Pump C area North side of O&M Building, and the Deepwell Pump D Enclosure, Diesel Fuel Oil Unloading/Transfer Area The Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Area was considered for Radioactive Release fire fighting activities. This area is not included in the NFPA 805 definition of power block or any analysis because it is licensed under 10 CFR Part 72.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                  Page I-2
 
Duke Energy                          Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V J. Fire Modeling V&V 23 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                              Page J-1
 
Duke Energy                                                Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V INTRODUCTION This attachment documents the verification and validation (V&V) of the fire models as applied to the Robinson Fire PRA following the guidance documented in NUREG-1824, and NUREG-1934. These documents are relatively recent joint publications by the US NRC and the Electric Power Research Institute intended to provide guidance on how to conduct and document fire modeling studies, as well as develop the necessary V&V material for supporting these studies.
The analysis summarized in this appendix is based on the technical material documented in RNP-M/MECH-1884, Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Robinson Nuclear Plant (HBRSEP) Fire PRA. The summary covers all the fire models and the fire modeling applications within the Robinson Nuclear Plant Fire PRA as documented in the different calculations prepared for those purposes during the development of the Fire PRA. Each of the models used in the different calculations is identified and a V&V discussion is provided. The report also includes a summary table listing the fire models with the corresponding V&V results.
SCOPE The scope of this study includes the V&V of fire models based on the guidance available in NUREG-1824 and NUREG-1934 as applied in the HBRSEP Fire PRA. The following subsections list and describe the HBRSEP fire modeling calculations within the scope of the V&V study.
Zone Models (CFAST)
The computer model CFAST, is used in the main control room abandonment study documented in Report 0004-0042-412-002, Rev. 1, Evaluation of Control Room Abandonment Times at the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant and to document hot gas layer conditions in Fire Zone 20 in Report 0004-0042-000-001, Rev. 1, Evaluation of the Development and Timing of Hot Gas Layer Conditions in HBRSEP Fire Zone 20, respectively. The V&V for CFAST in the HBRSEP main control room abandonment study and in the Fire Zone 20 hot gas layer calculation is included in the respective report and is summarized in this document for completeness purposes.
Engineering Calculations (Hand Calculations)
The HBRSEP Fire PRA is characterized by a number of engineering (i.e., hand calculations) used throughout the analysis for various purposes. The following subsections provide a brief description of these calculations.
Hot Gas Layer Calculations The report RNP-M/MECH-1826, Rev. 1, "Hot Gas Layer Calculation", documents the approach for determining the damage time for cables immersed in a hot gas layer. The hand calculations used for this analysis are the MHQ room temperature correlation for rooms assuming an open door (NUREG-1805, Chapter 2.1) and the Beyler room temperature correlation for closed doors room (NUREG-1805, Chapter 2.3). The document also includes an analysis for screening multi compartment combinations. In general, hot gas layer temperatures are calculated for selected fire zones. If the hot gas HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                    Page J-2
 
Duke Energy                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V layer temperature is calculated to be lower than the damage thresholds for cables, the multi compartment scenario is screened.
Cable Tray Fire Propagation NED-M/MECH-1009, Rev. 0, "Thermal Damage Time of Cables Above a Burning Ignition Source". This calculation describes the approach for determining the time to damage or ignition of the closest cable tray or conduit to an ignition source and subjected to fire plume conditions. The calculation produces a look up table for damage or ignition times that are used in the quantification process for calculating non suppression probabilities. The fire model within the scope of this validation and verification study is the Heskestad Plume Temperature Correlation documented in Chapter 9 of NUREG-1805.
ZOI Calculations The ZOI calculations in the HBRSEP Fire PRA are based on hand calculations. These calculations are documented in the following reports:
* NED-M/MECH-1008, "Fire Zone of Influence Calculation". The goal of this calculation is to calculate ZOI values for various fire sizes that are conservative, encompass a broad set of fuel packages, and integrate more effectively with the scoping fire modeling process. The fire models within the scope of this V&V study are the Heskestad Plume Temperature Correlation documented in Chapter 9 of NUREG-1805 and the solid flame radiation model documented in Section 5.2 of NUREG-1805.
* NED-M/MECH-1007, "Radiant Energy Target Damage Profile": The purpose of this document is to provide a refinement of the radiant energy ZOI calculation used for identification of transients from electrical cabinet fires. The fire models within the scope of this V&V and the solid flame radiation model documented in Section 5.2 of NUREG-1805.
* NED-M/MECH-1006, "Generic Fire Modeling Treatments": The generic treatments document offers a set of pre-defined ZOI calculations. A number of fire models are subjected to V&V. These models are listed in Table J-1.
* RNP-0206, Analysis of Oil Fires for Compressors in the Lower Hallway (Fire Zone 7). This report calculates damage that may occur in the vicinity of equipment (i.e., compressors) due to radiant affects and due to plume affects after an oil spill fire scenario. The report evaluates the fire size and determines whether resulting damage to cables and components takes place. The fire ZOI is determined using methods and tools provided by NUREG-1805, Fire Dynamics Tools.
* P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3, Robinson Fire PRA Exposed Structural Steel-Fire Interaction Analysis. This report analyzes the potential risk for structural damage due to a high hazard fire affecting the integrity of exposed structural steel. If a high hazard fire source was identified, it was determined if the fire source was located within the ZOI, where exposed steel could be damaged by the plume or by flame radiation. The Heskestad Plume Temperature Correlation HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                      Page J-3
 
Duke Energy                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V documented in Chapter 9 of NUREG 1805 and the point source radiation model documented in Chapter 5 of NUREG 1805.
REFERENCES This section lists the references utilized in this report to perform the fire model V&V.
References are classified as Industry and plant specific.
Industry References
: 1. NUREG/CR-6850, EPRI/NRC-RES Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities Volume 2 Detailed Methodology, EPRI 1008239 Final Report, NUREG/CR-6850 / EPRI 1023259, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, MD, September, 2005.
: 2. NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1, Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods Enhancements, EPRI 1019259, Technical Report, NUREG/CR-6850 Supplement 1, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Rockville, MD, September, 2010.
: 3. NUREG-1824, Volume 1, V&V of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications Volume 1: Main Report, NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D.C., May, 2007.
: 4. NUREG-1824, Volume 3, Verification & Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, Volume 3: Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTS), NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P.,
NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., May, 2007.
: 5. NUREG-1934, Nuclear Power Plant Fire Modeling Application Guide, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1934/EPRI-1019195, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Research, Washington, D. C., November, 2012.
: 6. NUREG-1805, Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTS), Iqbal, N. and Salley, M. H.,
NUREG-1805, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., October, 2004.
: 7. NIST SP 1026, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Technical Reference Guide, Jones, W. W., Peacock, R. D., Forney, G. P., and Reneke, P. A., National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, April, 2009.
: 8. NIST SP 1041, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Users Guide, Peacock, R. D., Jones, W. W., Reneke, P. A., and Forney, G. P., National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, December, 2008.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                      Page J-4
 
Duke Energy                                                Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V
: 9. NIST SP 1086, CFAST - Consolidated Model of Fire Growth and Smoke Transport (Version 6) Software Development and Model Evaluation Guide, Peacock, R. D., McGrattan, K., Klein, B., Jones, W. W., and Reneke, P. A.,
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, December, 2008.
: 10. NRL/MR/6180-04-8746, Verification and Validation Final Report for Fire and Smoke Spread Modeling and Simulation Support of T-AKE Test and Evaluation, Tatem, P.A., Budnick, E.K., Hunt, S.P., Trelles, J., Scheffey, J.L.,
White, D.A., Bailey, J., Hoover, J., and Williams, F.W., Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, DC, 2004.
: 11. Hughes Associates, Generic Fire Modeling Treatments, Project Number 1SPH02902.030, Revision 0, January 15, 2008.
: 12. Heskestad, G., Peak Gas Velocities and Flame Heights of Buoyancy-Controlled Turbulent Diffusion Flames, Eighteenth Symposium on Combustion, The Combustion Institute, Pittsburg, PA, pp. 951-960, 1981.
: 13. Heskestad. G., Engineering Relations for Fire Plumes, Fire Safety Journal, 7:25-32, 1984.
: 14. Yokoi, S., Study on the Prevention of Fire Spread Caused by Hot Upward Current, Report Number 34, Building Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan, 1960.
: 15. Yuan, L. and Cox, F., An Experimental Study of Some Line Fires, Fire Safety Journal, 27, 1996.
: 16. SFPE, The SFPE Engineering Guide for Assessing Flame Radiation to External Targets from Pool Fires, Society of Fire Protection Engineers, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, June, 1999.
: 17. SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, Section 3-1, Heat Release Rates, Babrauskas, V., The SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 4th Edition, P. J. DiNenno, Editor-in-Chief, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA, 2008.
: 18. NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition
: 19. ASME/ANS Ra-Sa-2009, Addenda to ASME/ANS Ra-Sa-2008, Standard for Level 1/Large Early Release Frequency Probabilistic Risk Assessment for Nuclear Power Plant Applications, American Society of Mechanical Engineers/American Nuclear Society, New York,
: 20. NUREG-1824, Volume 5, Verification and Validation of Selected Fire Models for Nuclear Power Plant Applications Volume 5: Consolidated Fire Growth and Transport Model, NUREG-1824 / EPRI 1011999, Salley, M. H. and Kassawara, R. P., NUREG-1824, Final Report, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Washington, D. C., May, 2007.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                  Page J-5
 
Duke Energy                                                  Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Plant Specific References
: 1. RNP-M/MECH-1826, "Hot Gas Layer Calculation".
: 2. NED-M/MECH-1008, "Fire Zone of Influence Calculation".
: 3. NED-M/MECH-1009, "Thermal Damage Time of Cables Above a Burning Ignition Source".
: 4. NED-M/MECH-1006, "Generic Fire Modeling Treatments".
: 5. NED-M/MECH-1007, "Radiant Energy Target Damage Profile".
: 6. Report Number 0004-0042-412-002, Evaluation of Main Control Room Abandonment Times at the H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant.
: 7. Report Number 0004-0042-000-001, Evaluation of the Development and Timing of Hot Gas Layer Conditions in RNP Fire Zone 20.
: 8. RNP-0206, Analysis of Oil Fires for Compressors in the Lower Hallway (Fire Zone 7).
: 9. Report Number P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3, Robinson Fire PRA Exposed Structural Steel-Fire Interaction Analysis.
: 10. RNP-M/MECH-1884, Rev. 1, Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Robinson Nuclear Plant (RNP) Fire PRA VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION This section includes Table J-1 and Table J-2, which present a summary of the fire models with the corresponding V&V results. Specifically, Table J-1 summarizes the verification and validation results for the different fire modeling calculations listed earlier under the scope section. Table J-2 is specifically devoted to discussing the validation for the fire models used in the generic fire modeling treatment document. The technical material supporting the summary presented in these tables is documented in RNP-M/MECH-1884, Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Robinson Nuclear Plant (HBRSEP) Fire PRA.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                      Page J-6
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation        Section            Application      Fire Models              Verification                          Validation The ZOI calculations for the Fire Froude number present a few out of range results. All of the out of range cases are due to calculations exceeding the upper limit of the range, suggesting high intensity fires for the selected fire diameter. One reason for exceeding the upper limit is the use of the 98th percentile heat release rates for the corresponding fire diameters. Based on the guidance in Chapter 8 of NUREG, 98th percentile heat release rate values are used for screening and can be The verification of the models Heskestad                                        considered on the high end of the Use of U.S. Nuclear                      used in support of calculation Plume                                            values assigned to ignition sources. In Regulatory                              NED-M/MECH-1008, is Temperature                                      addition, setting the Froude number Commission (NRC)                        provided in NUREG-1805, Correlation                                      calculation to the upper range limit of Fire Dynamics Tools                      which contains pre-s                documented in                                    2.4 for the 98th percentile heat release (FDT ) [NUREG-                          programmed Microsoft Excel NED-M/MECH-1008,                                            Chapter 9 of                                    rate values would result in a larger 5.1            1805.0] to determine                    Spreadsheets. The Fire ZOI Calculations                                      NUREG-1805.                                      diameter. With a larger diameter, the the ZOI of a fire                        spreadsheets from NUREG Solid flame                                      flame height calculation would result in scenario in support of                  1805 are used directly in radiation model                                  shorter flame lengths, and plume scenario development                    NED-M/MECH-1008, documented in                                    temperature calculations would suggest for the HBRSEP Fire                      (Attachment 1) and therefore Section 5.2 of                                  lower temperatures. The out of range PRA                                      additional verification is not NUREG-1805.                                      results are based on conservative ZOI needed.
calculations for the Fire PRA.
Parameters are in range for the fire plume application.
Parameters are out of range for the use of the solid flame radiation model.
The reason for number of ZOI results are out of range is because the ZOI distances are close to the flames and the experiments selected for validation purposes measured radiation at longer distances from the flames. This is a limitation on the available data for validation and not necessarily a HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                Page J-7
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation    Section            Application          Fire Models              Verification                          Validation limitation on the use of the solid flame radiation model for calculating horizontal components of the ZOI for Fire PRA applications. To account for this limitation, it is noted that validation results from Figure 6-8 in Volume 3 of NUREG-1824 suggest significant heat flux over predictions over the intensity levels used for ZOI calculations (i.e.,
2 between 6 and 11 kW/m ) that would result in longer, and therefore conservative, horizontal distances.
The Fire Froude Number for all the cases in the vertical ZOI calculations are within the validation range, indicating the heat release rates relative to the fire diameters for the scenarios described by calculation RNP-0206, are Use of U.S. Nuclear                      The verification of the models within the scope of NUREG-1824. With Regulatory              Heskestad      used in support of calculation regards to the flame length ratio Commission (NRC)        Plume          NED-M/MECH-1008, is            dimensionless parameter, the majority Fire Dynamics Tools      Temperature    provided in NUREG-1805,        of the unconfined cases are above the s                  Correlation    which contains (FDT )                                                                  valid range, an indication that the flame RNP-0206, Analysis                                        documented in  pre-programmed Microsoft
[NUREG-1805.0] to                                                      height exceeds the distance of the of Oil Fires for                                          Chapter 9 of    Excel Spreadsheets. The determine a fire ZOI for                                                target above the fire for both Compressors in the 5.2                                    NUREG-1805. spreadsheets from two pieces of                                                          compressors. These are conservative Lower Hallway                                                              NUREG-1805 are used equipment, the Station  Solid flame                                    calculations for the Fire PRA given that (Fire Zone 7)                                                              directly in Air Compressor Motor,    radiation model                                the thermoplastic cables would be in and the Instrument Air  documented in  NED-M/MECH-1008,              direct contact with the flame and could Compressor B for      Section 5.2 of  (Attachment 1) and therefore  ignite. That is if even with the out of unconfined and          NUREG-1805. additional verification is not range results the cables are set to fail confined fire scenarios.                needed.                        in the fire PRA quantification The confined fire scenario calculation for both compressors results in Fire Froude number and a flame length ratio within the validation ranges included in NUREG-1824.
The Fire Froude numbers calculated for HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-8
 
Duke Energy                                                                                            Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation    Section            Application        Fire Models                Verification                      Validation both the unconfined and confined cases for the horizontal ZOI are within the validation range reported by NUREG-1824.
Most of the radial distance ratio parameters for unconfined fire scenarios are below the valid range for this parameter, indicating that the ZOI for these fire scenarios is characterized by distances close to the flames. These calculations were conducted with the solid flame radiation model described in Chapter 5.2 of NUREG-1805. A review of Figure 6-8 in Volume 3 of NUREG-1824 suggests that the majority of the validation results (with a few exceptions for Cable G in radiation ranges larger 2
than the 6 and 11 kW/m for ZOI calculations) over predict flame radiation, which result in longer horizontal distances for the ZOI. This is a limitation on the available data for validation and not necessarily a limitation on the use of the solid flame radiation model for calculating horizontal components of the ZOI for Fire PRA applications.
The confined fire scenario calculation for both compressors for fire scenarios 2 and 3 results in a Fire Froude number and a radial distance ratio parameter within the validation ranges included in the NUREG-1824 Calculation NED-      Heskestad        The Calculation              Several Fire Froude Numbers fall out NED-M/MECH-1009, M/MECH-1009,          Plume            NED-M/MECH-1009, was        of range either under or over the valid Thermal Damage  5.3            determines the time at Temperature      developed under a QA        range. All of the out of range cases Time of Cables which damage occurs    Correlation      program. During the design  exceeding the upper limit of the range, Above a Burning to cables suspended    documented in    verification review, an      suggest high intensity fires for the HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                        Page J-9
 
Duke Energy                                                                                            Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation Section            Application      Fire Models              Verification                        Validation Ignition Source              over a burning        Chapter 9 of      independent check of the      selected fire diameter. One reason for electrical cabinet. NUREG-1805        quantitative results was      exceeding the upper limit is the use of performed, therefore, results the 98th percentile heat release rates for were found to be consistent  the corresponding fire diameters.
and the calculations included Based on the guidance in Chapter 8 of th in the report have been      NUREG, 98 percentile heat release verified.                    rate values are used for screening and can be considered on the high end of the values assigned to ignition sources.
In addition, setting the Froude number calculation to the upper range limit of 2.4 for the 98th percentile heat release rate values would result in a larger diameter. With a larger diameter, the flame height calculation would result in shorter flame lengths, and plume temperature calculations would suggest lower temperatures. The out of range results are based on conservative ZOI calculations for the Fire PRA.
Cases where the Fire Froude Number results below the validation range indicate low intensity fires where the fire HRR is low compared to the pool fire area. This occurs for the lowest three HRR cases included in the calculation (i.e., 69, 143 and 211 kW) at different fire diameters. These are cases where the thermal plume that is expected from the ignition source fire could be wider than the range evaluated in NUREG-1824. A wider thermal plume will have a greater entrainment rate than one associated with a similar heat release rate fire that has a smaller diameter. This means that the conditions relative to a source fire that falls within the validation range will be less severe in terms of temperature.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                      Page J-10
 
Duke Energy                                                                                            Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation  Section            Application        Fire Models              Verification                        Validation These are cases where damage to the target occurs most likely due to direct flame impingement before damage time to the target occurs.
Several flame length ratio calculations resulted out of range. All of these results are above the high end of the validation range, meaning that the length of the flame was always greater than the height of the target above the fire source causing direct flame impingement on the target. For these cases, given the diameter and HRR of the fire, direct flame impingement occurred to the target cable. Thus, a larger fire diameter would result in flame length ratios within the validation range but lower Fire Froude Numbers. Thus, the values of flame length ratio that are not within the validation range are based on conservative calculations for the Fire PRA.
To ensure the equations were The comparison of dimensionless coded correctly in the      parameters with the validation range Calculation NED-                                                      suggest a number of out of range spreadsheets used in the M/MECH-1007, utilizes                                                results, which are expected for both the calculation, the spreadsheet the U.S. Nuclear                                                      Fire Froude Number and the radial results were checked against Regulatory                                                            distance ratio dimensionless parameter.
Solid flame    the results of the NED-M/MECH-1007,                Commission (NRC)                                                      For the radial distance ratio radiation model NUREG-1805 FDTs Solid Radiant Energy                  Fire Dynamics Tools                                                  dimensionless parameter, all the 5.4                                    documented in  Flame Model 2 spreadsheet Target Damage                  (FDTs) [NUREG-                                                        calculations that are out of range are Section 5.2 of  for identical inputs. Both Profile                        1805.0] to determine a                                                on the low side of the range. This NUREG-1805. spreadsheet models were radiative ZOI from                                                    happens because the target is close to found to produce the same electrical cabinet fires                                              the flames and the experiments results (NED-M/MECH-1007),
to qualified and                                                      selected for validation purposes therefore the spreadsheets unqualified cables.                                                  measured radiation at longer distances used in the calculations are considered verified.        of the target from the flames. This is a limitation on the available data for HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                      Page J-11
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation    Section            Application        Fire Models              Verification                          Validation validation and not necessarily a limitation on the use of the solid flame radiation model for calculating horizontal components of the ZOI for Fire PRA applications. To account for this limitation, it is noted that validation results, from Figure 6-8 in Volume 3 of NUREG-1824, suggest significant heat flux over predictions over the intensity levels used for ZOI calculations (i.e.,
2 between 6 and 11 kW/m ) that would result in longer, and therefore conservative, horizontal distances.
The Beyler room temperature Calculation correlation was developed using data RNP-M/MECH-1826, with a maximum temperature rise of determines the fire heat The hand 150&deg;C. Extrapolation of this correlation release rate necessary  calculations to higher temperatures (330&deg;C) is to generate a damaging  used for this justified by using the Beyler correlation hot gas layer within a  analysis are the only when it is the most conservative compartment or          MHQ room The fire modeling documented    result (i.e., lower estimate of HRR for multicompartment for a  temperature in this calculation is a        room-wide damage to cables),
given floor area.        correlation for Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet    compared to the MQH correlation, Furthermore, this        rooms supplemented with VBA          which is validated at higher calculation describes    assuming an RNP-M/MECH-1826,                                                          Macros. The spreadsheet is a    temperatures the process for          open door Hot Gas Layer    5.5                                                      custom built fire modeling tool The results show that the majority of the crediting the heat      (NUREG-1805, Calculation                                                              that uses the same closed-      compartment ratio parameters are soak time. The heat    Chapter 2.1) form room temperature          within the valid range, suggesting that soak time refers to the and the Beyler correlations (Sections 5.1 and  the room size of these fire scenarios lag time between the    room 5.3 of NUREG-1805) that are    was included in the V&V study temperature              temperature provided in NUREG-1824          described in NUREG-1824. Those surrounding the cable    correlation for targets and the          closed doors                                    compartment aspect ratios that fall temperatures inside the  room                                            outside the application range do so on cable targets            (NUREG-1805,                                    both ends of the range. This can be generating the          Chapter 2.3).                                    explained by the limited experiments electrical damage                                                        selected for the validation study. As and/or ignition.                                                          indicated in NUREG-1934, the selected experiments are representative of HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-12
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation        Section            Application        Fire Models            Verification                          Validation various types of spaces in commercial NPPs, but do not encompass all possible geometries or applications.
This is a limitation on the available data for validation and not necessarily a limitation on the use of the model for calculating HGL scenarios applicable to the Fire PRA. To address this limitation, it is noted that both the MQH and Beyler room temperature models are reported to overpredict room temperatures for most configurations in Table 3-1 of NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (which lists a yellow-plus) and Table 4-1 in NUREG-1934 (which suggests an average bias of 1.44). This over prediction throughout the evaluated scenarios suggest that the configurations that are outside the validation range in this application will also result in temperature over predictions.
The Generic Fire Modeling Treatments,                    The calculation development Revision 0 document is                  and review process in place at used to establish ZOI                    the time the Generic Fire NED-M/MECH-1006,                    for specific classes of  Listed in Table Modeling Treatments Generic Fire          5.6            ignition sources and    2 later in this document was prepared          Listed in Table 2 later in this section.
Modeling Treatments                  primarily serves as a    section        included contributions from a screening calculation in                calculation preparer, a the Fire PRA under                      calculation reviewer, and a NUREG/CR-6850                            calculation approver.
Sections 8 and 11.
Report No.                          Calculation of main                      Attachment 4 of Report        A full validation study for the analysis is 0004-0042-412-002,                  control room            CFAST,          0004-0042-412-002, includes    described in Section A4.5.1 of Report Evaluation of Control 5.7            abandonment times.                      a software description and    0004-0042-412-002. The Version 6.1.1 Room Abandonment                    The abandonment                          benchmark V&V. The            non-dimensional parameters that affect Times at the H. B.                  times are then used as                  attachment provides a          the model results as documented in HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                Page J-13
 
Duke Energy                                                                                              Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation Section            Application        Fire Models              Verification                            Validation Robinson Nuclear            inputs to the risk                      description of the verification  NUREG-1824, Volumes 1 and 5 and Plant                        quantification of main                  documentation for CFAST.        NUREG-1934, include the model control room fire                        The primary documents            geometry, the equivalence ratio, the fire scenarios. The report                    applicable to this effort are    Froude Number, and the flame length provides operator                        NIST SP 1086 (Ref. 9),          ratio.
abandonment times in                    NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref.      All non-dimensional geometry the HBRSEP MCR due                      3), and NUREG-1824, Volume      parameters fall within the to visibility reduction                  5 (Ref. 20). A benchmark        NUREG-1824, Vol. 1 validation range of and/or temperature                      installation and verification    0.6 - 5.7.
increase for fire                        procedure is provided by NIST scenarios in the                        (Ref. 8) to ensure correct      Table A4-5 of Report 0004-0042-412-HBRSEP MCR. Fire                        installation and proper function 002, shows the approximate Fire sizes are postulated                    of the CFAST model              Froude Number for NUREG/CR-6850, using the discretized                    components. This procedure      Appendix E Case 8 (Transient Fires).
distributions for specific              was performed as part of the    The table indicates that the Fire Froude types of electronic                      verification process.            Number falls below the NUREG-1824 equipment fires and                                                      validation range of 0.4 - 2.4 in nearly transient combustible                                                    all cases, which means that the thermal fires as described in                                                    plume that is expected from the ignition NUREG/CR-6850.                                                            source fire could be wider than the range evaluated in NUREG-1824. A wider thermal plume will have a greater entrainment rate than one associated with a similar heat release rate fire that has a smaller diameter. This means that the conditions relative to a source fire that falls within the validation range will be less severe both in terms of the concentration of combustion products and the temperature. In the case of the Main Control Room the results are conservative when applied to low Fire Froude Number fire scenarios.
Regarding the equivalence ratio calculation, Report 0004-0042-412-002, demonstrates that all cases fall within the NUREG-1824 validation range (i.e.,
0.04-0.6). The global equivalence ratio for normal air supply to the MCR is HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                          Page J-14
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation      Section            Application        Fire Models              Verification                          Validation assessed using the ratio of the maximum supported fire size to the fire size postulated. The report indicates that the fresh air supply and the initial oxygen concentration within the HBRSEP MCR is capable of supporting a fire on the order of 1,990 kW (1890 Btu/s) for twenty-five minutes when the HVAC system is providing outside air and 1,440 kW (1,360 kW) when the HVAC system is not providing outside air. At an equivalence ratio of 0.6, the maximum fire size would be about 1,194 kW (1,132 Btu/s). This is larger than the transient, single bundle electrical panel, and multiple bundle electrical panel fire scenarios.
However, the workstation and the propagating MCB panel fire scenarios (Bin 7 and above) have fire sizes that are greater than 1,194 kW (1,132 Btu/s) at least for a portion of the scenario.
When the time at which the abandonment is predicted is factored into the equivalence ratio calculation, it is shown that all cases have equivalence ratios less than 0.6 up to the time that abandonment is predicted.
Analysis of the hot gas                  Attachment B of Report          Tables A2-7 through A2-10 of Report Report No.                          layer temperature and                    0004-0042-000-001, describes    0004-0042-000-001, summarize the 0004-0042-000-001,                  soot concentration                      the Verification for the CFAST  non-dimensional parameters for a Evaluation of the                  conditions in the                        model Version 6.1.1.54. The    transient fuel package fire and the Development and                    Robinson Nuclear Plant  CFAST Version    attachment provides a          electrical panel fires as located in the 5.8 Timing of the Hot                  (HBRSEP) fire          6.1.1.54        description of the verification E1/E2 Switchgear Room and the Gas Layer Conditions                compartments for                        documentation for CFAST.        Safeguards Room for the initial ignition in HBRSEP Fire                      transient ignition                      The primary documents          source. The tables indicate that the Zone 20                            sources and electronic                  applicable to this effort are  transient fire scenario parameters and panel ignition sources                  NIST SP 1086 (Ref. 9),          most of the panel fire scenario HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-15
 
Duke Energy                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation  Section            Application      Fire Models              Verification                        Validation that involve secondary                  NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. parameters fall within the combustibles (cable                      3), and NUREG-1824, Volume  NUREG-1824, Volume 1 parameter trays). Fire scenarios                  5 (Ref. 20).                space range. Several of the panel fires are evaluated in the                                                  have fire Froude Numbers that are E1/E2 Switchgear                                                      somewhat below or above the Room and the                                                          NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. 3) range.
Safeguards Room, in                                                  In addition, the flame height to the Reactor Auxiliary                                                enclosure ratio is greater than the Building (RAB).                                                      NUREG, Vol. 1 (Ref. 3) range for the smallest diameter panel (MCCs) in the Safeguards Room.
The large flame length predicted for the Safeguards Room panel fire scenario is not expected to adversely affect the calculation results. In the case of the Halon actuation, the fire size at the time the smoke detectors actuate is much smaller than the peak fire size upon which the values in Table A2-8 are derived. In this case, the flame length will be shorter than the ceiling and the application will be within the NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. 3) range.
Although this line of reasoning does not apply to the hot gas layer temperature calculation, it may be inferred that the overall treatment of the electronic panel fire, especially in the MCCs, is not representative of the way in which they will actually behave if ignited. The MCCs are relatively well sealed and external combustion may occur at gaps or seams in the MCC enclosure. The CFAST model conservatively removes the metal enclosure and places the fire 0.3 m (1 ft) below the panel top.
The actual flame length will be shorter and within the NUREG-1824, Vol. 1 HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                    Page J-16
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                    Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation          Section            Application      Fire Models              Verification                          Validation (Ref. 3) test basis.
The fire Froude Numbers for several panels are shown in Tables A2-7 and A2-8 of Report 0004-0042-000-001 to be either lower or higher than the range evaluated in NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. 3). A similar argument that was developed for the flame length applies to the fire Froude Number. The characteristic length is somewhat arbitrarily established using the panel plan dimensions. The actual characteristic length is difficult to assess since the panel is not a simple two-dimensional fuel package. Burning will occur at the vents, if present, and gaps and seams, all of which are smaller than the characteristic dimension. From a macroscopic perspective, the 464 kW (440 Btu/s) electronic panel fire is a common plant ignition source and is not significantly different from the types of source fires considered in the NUREG-1824, Volume 1 (Ref. 3) test series.
The verification of the models The vertical ZOI calculations for the Fire Heskestad used in support of calculation Froude number present several out of Use of U.S. Nuclear    Plume P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3, is    range results. Most of the out of Regulatory            Temperature provided in NUREG-1805,        range cases are due to calculations Commission (NRC)      Correlation P2217-2300-01-03,                                                              which contains pre-            exceeding the upper limit of the range, Fire Dynamics Tools    documented in Rev 3, Structural                                                              programmed Microsoft Excel    suggesting high intensity fires for the (FDTs) [NUREG-        Chapter 9 of Steel-Fire Interaction 5.9                                                    Spreadsheets. The              selected fire diameter. One reason for 1805.0] to determine  NUREG 1805.
Analysis Fire ZOI                                                              spreadsheets from NUREG        exceeding the upper limit is the use of the ZOI of a fire      Point source Calculations                                                                  1805 are used directly in      the 98th percentile heat release rates scenario in support of radiation model P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3,      for the corresponding fire diameters.
scenario development  documented in (Attachment B) and therefore  Based on the guidance in Chapter 8 of for the RNP Fire PRA  Section 5.3.1 of additional verification is not NUREG, 98th percentile heat release NUREG 1805.
needed.                        rate values are used for screening and HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                Page J-17
 
Duke Energy                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation  Section        Application          Fire Models              Verification                        Validation can be considered on the high end of the values assigned to ignition sources.
In addition, setting the Froude number calculation to the upper range limit of 2.4 for the 98th percentile heat release rate values would result in a larger diameter. With a larger diameter, the flame height calculation would result in shorter flame lengths, and plume temperature calculations would suggest lower temperatures. The out of range results are based on conservative ZOI calculations for the Fire PRA.
In the transient case, with the fire in the center of the room, the Fire Froude number is out of range on the lower limit. The other two transient cases, with a fire on the wall and in the corner, have higher HRR values and are within the validation range of the Fire Froude number. Both of these scenarios (wall and corner) are more conservative than the transient fire in the center of the room. Since all three of the transient scenarios were screened out in the structural steel-impact analysis (P2217-2300-01-03, Rev 3), including the more conservative wall and corner scenarios, the use of the model for the transient scenarios is justified.
Flame length ratio is within the validation range for all scenarios.
Parameters are out of range for the use of the point source radiation model.
The reason for number of ZOI results are out of range is because the ZOI distances are close to the flames and the experiments selected for validation purposes measured radiation at longer HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                    Page J-18
 
Duke Energy                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-1: Summary of V & V Results for Fire Models in Specific HBRSEP Fire PRA Applications Report Calculation  Section        Application          Fire Models              Verification                        Validation distances from the flames. This is a limitation on the available data for validation and not necessarily a limitation on the use of the point source radiation model for calculating horizontal components of the ZOI for Fire PRA applications. The model limitations presented in Chapter 5.5 of NUREG 1805, indicate that the point source radiation model overestimates the intensity of thermal radiation at target locations close to the fire.
Therefore, the results are conservative and no further justification for the use of the point source radiation model is required.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                    Page J-19
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                      Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                                Subsequent    Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation    Modeling                        Application          Original Correlation Range        Validation and  Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                  Verification*          (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Flame Height  Page 18            Heskestad      Provides a limit                                          Directly (Ref. 19);    on the use of the                                        NUREG-1824, Heskestad      ZOI                5  log 5  Volume 3 (Ref.
(Ref. 20)                                                                23)               
                                                                                                                                < 3000 Indirectly In practice, wood and hydrocarbon      NUREG-1824, fuels, momentum or buoyancy            Volume 5 (Ref.
dominated, with diameters between      42) 0.05 - 10 m (0.16 - 33 ft).
(Correlation used in CFAST)
Point Source  Page 19            Modak (Ref. Lateral extent of  Isotropic flame radiation. Compared    NUREG-1824,    Predicted heat flux at Model                            45)            ZOI -              with data for 0.37 m (1.2 ft) diameter Volume 3 (Ref. target is less than 5 comparison to      PMMA pool fire and a target located    23);            kW/m&#xb2; (0.4 4 Btu/s-ft&#xb2;)
other methods      at a ratio of 10.                      SFPE (Ref. 24)  per SFPE.
Method of    Page 19            Shokri et al. Lateral extent of  Pool aspect ratio less than 2.5.      SFPE (Ref. 24)  Ground based vertical Shokri and                      (Ref. 46)      ZOI -              Hydrocarbon fuel in pools with a      NUREG-1824,    target.
Beyler                                          comparison to      diameter between 1 - 30 m (3.3 -      Volume 3 (Ref.
other methods      98 ft).                                23)
Vertical target, ground level.
Method of    Page 20            Mudan (Ref. Lateral extent of  Round pools;                          SFPE (Ref. 24)  Total energy emitted by Mudan (and                      47)            ZOI -              Hydrocarbon fuel in pools with a                      thermal radiation less Croce)                                          comparison to      diameter between 0.5 - 80 m (1.64 -                    than total heat released.
other methods      262 ft).
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                            Page J-20
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                      Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                                Subsequent    Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation    Modeling                        Application          Original Correlation Range        Validation and    Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                  Verification*          (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Method of    Page 20            Shokri et al. Lateral extent of  Round pools;                          SFPE (Ref. 24)  Predicted heat flux at Shokri and                      (Ref. 46)      ZOI                Hydrocarbon fuel in pools with a                      target is greater than 5 Beyler                                                            diameter between 1 - 50 m (3.3 -                      kW/m&#xb2; (0.44 Btu/s-ft&#xb2;)
NUREG-1824,      per SFPE (Ref. 24).
164 ft).                              Volume 3 (Ref. 23)        Shown to produce most conservative heat flux over range of scenarios considered among all methods considered.
Plume heat    Page 22            Wakamatsu      Vertical extent of Fires with an aspect ratio of about 1 Wakamatsu et    Area source fires with fluxes                          et al. (Ref. ZOI                and having a plan area less than 1    al. (Ref. 48)    aspect ratio ~ 1. Used
: 48)                              m&#xb2; (0.09 ft&#xb2;).                        (larger fires)  with plume centerline SFPE Handbook    temperature correlation; of Fire          most severe of the two is Protection      used as basis for the ZOI Engineering,    dimension. This is not a Section 2-14    constraint in the fire (Ref. 49)        model analysis for the cases evaluated.
Plume        Page 23            Yokoi (Ref. Vertical extent of Alcohol lamp assumed to effectively  NUREG-1824,      Area source fires with centerline                      21);          ZOI                be a fire with a diameter ~0.1 m      Volume 3        aspect ratio ~ 1. Used temperature                      Beyler (Ref.                      (0.33 ft).                            (Ref. 23);      with plume flux
: 50)                                                                    SFPE Handbook    correlation; most severe of Fire          of the two is used as Protection      basis for the ZOI Engineering,    dimension.
Section 2-1 (Ref. 51)
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                          Page J-21
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                      Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                              Subsequent      Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation      Modeling                          Application          Original Correlation Range      Validation and    Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                Verification*            (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Hydrocarbon    Page 51            SFPE          Determine heat    Hydrocarbon spill fires on concrete None. Based on    None. Transition from spill fire size                    Handbook of    release rate for  surfaces ranging from ~1 to ~10 m  limited number    unconfined spill fire to Fire          unconfined        (3.3 - 33 ft) in diameter.          of observations. deep pool burning Protection    hydrocarbon                                                              assumed to be abrupt.
Engineering,  spill fires.
Section 2-15 (Ref. 52)
Flame          Page 100          SFPE          Determine the      Corner fires ranging from ~10 to    None. Based on    None. Offset is assumed extension                          Handbook of    fire offset for    ~1,000 kW (9.5 - 948 Btu/s). Fires  limited number    equal to the depth of the Fire          open panel fires. included gas burners and            of observations. ceiling jet from the Protection                        hydrocarbon pans.                                      experiments.
Engineering, Section 2-14 (Ref. 53)
Line source    Page 101          Delichatsios  Determine the      Theoretical development.            SFPE Handbook      None. Transition to area flame height                      (Ref. 54)      vertical extent of                                    of Fire            source assumed for the ZOI                                                Protection        aspect plan ratios less Engineering,      than four. Maximum of Section 2-14      area and line source (Ref. 49)          predictions used in this region.
Corner flame    Page 108          SFPE          Determine the      Corner fires ranging from ~10 to    None.              None.
height                            Handbook of    vertical extent of ~1,000 kW (9.5 - 948 Btu/s). Fires  Correlation form Fire          the ZOI            included gas burners and            is consistent with Protection                        hydrocarbon pans.                  other methods; Engineering,                                                          comparison to Section 2-14                                                          dataset from (Ref. 53)                                                            SFPE Handbook, Section 2-14 (Ref. 53) provides basis.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-22
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                                Subsequent        Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation      Modeling                          Application          Original Correlation Range        Validation and      Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                  Verification*            (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Air mass flow  Page 140          Kawagoe        Compare            Small scale,  scale, and full scale  Drysdale          None. SFPE (Ref. 57) through                            (Ref. 55)      mechanical        single rooms with concrete and steel  (Ref. 56);        spaces with a wide range opening                                          ventilation and    boundaries. Vent sizes and thus      SFPE (Ref. 57)    of opening factors.
natural            opening factor varied. Wood crib ventilation        fuels.
Line fire flame Page 210          Yuan et al. Provides a limit                                        None.              None.
height                            (Ref. 22)      on the use of the                                        Correlation form ZOI (ZOI);                  0.002 <        < 0.6        is consistent with other methods; Extent of ZOI for In practice, from the base to several comparison to cable tray fires.
times the flame height based on      dataset from 0.015 - 0.05 m (0.05 - 0.16 ft) wide  Yuan et al.
gas burners.                          (Ref. 22) provides basis.
Cable heat      Page 210          NBSIR 85-      Provides          Cables with heat release rates per    None.              Correlation predicts a release rate                      3196 (Ref. assurance that    unit area ranging from about 100 -                      lower heat release rate per unit area                      58)            the method used    1,000 kW/m&#xb2; (8.8 - 88 Btu/s-ft&#xb2;).                        than assumed in the is bounding                                                                Treatments and is based on test data.
Line fire plume Page 212          Yuan et al. Provides a limit                                        None.              None.
centerline                        (Ref. 22)      on the use of the                                        Correlation form temperature                                      ZOI (ZOI);                  0.002 <        < 0.6        is consistent with other methods; Extent of ZOI for In practice, from the base to several comparison to cable tray fires.
times the flame height based on      dataset from 0.015 - 0.05 m (0.05 - 0.16 ft) wide  Yuan et al.
gas burners.                          (Ref. 22) provides basis.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                              Page J-23
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                        Attachment J - Fire Modeling V&V Table J-2: V & V Basis for Fire Models / Model Correlations Used: Generic Fire Modeling Treatments Correlations.
Reference Location in in Generic Generic Fire                                                                              Subsequent    Limits in Generic Fire Fire Correlation        Modeling                          Application        Original Correlation Range        Validation and  Modeling Treatments Modeling Treatments                                                                                Verification*          (Ref. 11)
Treatments (Ref. 11)
Document*
Ventilation      Page 283          Babrauskas    Assessing the      Ventilation factors between 0.06 -    SFPE (Ref. 57)  None. Provides depth in limited fire size                    (Ref. 59)      significance of    7.51.                                                the analysis of the vent position on  Fire sizes between 11 - 2,800 kW                      selected vent positions.
the hot gas layer  (10 - 2,654 Btu/s)                                    The global equivalence temperature                                                              ratio provides an Wood, plastic, and natural gas fuels.                alternate measure of the applicability of the analysis and for reported output is within the validation range of CFAST.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                Page J-24
 
Duke Energy              Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval L. NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii) 15 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                            Page L-1
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 1 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.1 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.1 states:
Wiring above suspended ceiling shall be kept to a minimum. Where installed, electrical wiring shall be listed for plenum use, routed in armored cable, routed in metallic conduit, or routed in cable trays with solid metal top and bottom covers.
HBRSEP has wiring above suspended ceilings that may not comply with the requirements of this code section.
Suspended ceilings are noncombustible and exist only in the Control Room (FZ 23),
Inside AO Office and old Turbine Building RCA Entrance (FZ 25A). Combustibles in concealed spaces are minimal.
The three areas currently with suspended ceilings inside the NFPA 805 defined power block are in the Control Room (FZ 23), Inside AO Office and old Turbine Building RCA Entrance (FZ 25A). The Inside AO Office and old Turbine Building RCA Entrance (FZ 25A) are not risk significant. Neither of the rooms nor the cables are safety-related.
Most electrical wiring above the Control Room partial suspended ceiling is in conduit except for short flexible connectors to lighting fixtures. There is one eight-foot length of eight-inch diameter UL approved flexible air duct with flame spread rating of 25 or less.
The quantity of cabling above the suspended ceilings in the Control Rooms is very low and results in limited combustible loading. The existing fire detection capability and/or the Control Room Operators who are continuously present in the area would identify the presence of smoke. In addition, no equipment important to nuclear safety is located in the vicinity of these cables.
Video/communication/data cables that have been field routed above suspended ceilings are low voltage. Existing cables for video, communication, and networking may not be plenum rated, but are not generally susceptible to shorts that would result in a fire.
Basis for Request:
The basis for the approval request of this deviation is:
* All electrical wiring above the control room partial suspended ceiling is in conduit except for short flexible connectors to lighting fixtures. According to FAQ 06-0021, cable air drops of limited length (~3 feet) are considered acceptable.
* No equipment important to nuclear safety is located in the vicinity of these cables.
* Minimum amount of cables exist above the Control Room ceiling, which results in limited combustible loading.
* Smoke Detectors are installed both above and below the partial suspended ceiling in the Control Room.
* The Inside AO Office and old Turbine Building RCA Entrance (FZ 25A) are not risk significant. Neither of the rooms nor the cables are safety related.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-2
 
Duke Energy                    Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval
* Existing fleet procedures will be used to ensure that changes moving forward are considered for NFPA 805 impacts. (FIR-NGGC-0010)
Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
The location of wiring above suspended ceilings does not affect nuclear safety. No equipment important to nuclear safety is located in the vicinity of these cables.
Therefore, there is no impact on the nuclear safety performance criteria.
The location of cables above suspended ceilings has no impact on the radiological release performance criteria. The radiological release review was performed based on the manual fire suppression activities in areas containing or potentially containing radioactive materials and is not dependent on the type of cables or locations of suspended ceilings. The location of cables does not change the radiological release evaluation performed that potentially contaminated water is contained and smoke monitored. The cables do not add additional radiological materials to the area or challenge system boundaries that contain such.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page L-3
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
The use of these materials has been defined by the limitations of the analytical methods used in the development of the FPRA. Therefore, the inherent safety margin and conservatisms in these methods remain unchanged.
The three echelons of defense-in-depth are 1) to prevent fires from starting (combustible/hot work controls), 2) rapidly detect, control and extinguish fires that do occur thereby limiting damage (fire detection systems, automatic fire suppression, manual fire suppression, pre-fire plans), and 3) provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed (fire barriers, fire rated cable, success path remains free of fire damage, recovery actions). The prior introduction of non-listed video/communication/data cables routed above suspended ceilings does not impact fire protection defense-in-depth. Echelon 1 is maintained by the current cable installation procedures documenting the requirements of NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.1. The control room is a continuously manned area of the plant. The introduction of cables above suspended ceilings does not affect echelons 2 and 3. The video/communication/data cables routed above suspended ceilings does not result in compromising automatic fire suppression functions, manual fire suppression functions, fire protection for systems and structures, or post-fire safe shutdown capability.
 
==
Conclusion:==
 
HBRSEP determined that the performance based approach satisfies the following criteria:
* Satisfies the performance goals performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release
* Defense in Depth
* Safety Margin HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-4
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 2 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.2 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.5.2 states:
Only metal tray and metal conduits shall be used for electrical raceways. Thin wall metallic tubing shall not be used for power, instrumentation, or control cables. Flexible metallic conduits shall only be used in short lengths to connect components.
The use of PVC piping for underground embedded conduit is permitted by HBRSEP per HBR2-0B060 Sht D6 for electrical raceway installations. Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) or High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) type ducts (conduits) are permitted when embedded in compacted sand or reinforced concrete. In addition, some PVC conduit was found in reinforced concrete wall. The PVC/HDPE conduit is embedded within a noncombustible enclosure which provides protection from mechanical damage and from damage resulting from either an exposure fire or from a fire within the conduit impacting other targets.
Basis for Request:
* The PVC/HDPE conduit, while a combustible material, is not subject to flame/heat impingement from an external source which would result in structural failure, contribution to fire load, and damage to the circuits contained within where the conduit is embedded in concrete or compacted sand.
* Failure of circuits within the conduit resulting in a fire would not result in damage to external targets.
Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
The use of PVC/HDPE conduit in embedded locations does not affect nuclear safety as the material in which conduits are run within an embedded location is not subject to the failure mechanisms potentially resultant in circuit damage or resultant damage to external targets. Therefore there is no impact on the nuclear safety performance criteria.
The use of PVC/HDPE conduits in embedded installations has no impact on the radiological release performance criteria. The radiological release review was performed based on the manual fire suppression activities in areas containing or potentially containing radioactive materials and is not dependent on the type of conduit material. The conduit material does not change the radiological release evaluation performed that concluded that potentially contaminated water is contained and smoke is monitored. The conduits do not add additional radiological materials to the area or challenge systems boundaries that contain such as the PVC/HDPE conduits are embedded.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page L-5
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
The PVC/HDPE conduit material is embedded in a non-combustible configuration. The material is protected when embedded from mechanical damage and from damage resulting from either an exposure fire or from a fire within the conduit impacting other targets. The areas with PVC/HDPE conduit have been analyzed in their current configuration. The precautions and limitations on the use of these materials do not impact the analysis of the fire event. Therefore, the inherent safety margin and conservatisms in these analysis methods remain unchanged.
The three echelons of defense-in-depth are 1) to prevent fires from starting (combustible/hot work controls), 2) rapidly detect, control and extinguish fires that do occur thereby limiting damage (fire detection systems, automatic fire suppression, manual fire suppression, pre-fire plans), and 3) provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed (fire barriers, fire rated cable, success path remains free of fire damage, recovery actions). The use of PVC/HDPE conduits in embedded installations does not impact fire protection defense-in-depth. The PVC/HDPE conduit in embedded installations does not affect echelons 1, 2, and 3. The PVC/HDPE conduits do not directly result in compromising automatic fire suppression functions, manual fire suppression functions, or post-fire safe shutdown capability.
 
==
Conclusion:==
 
HBRSEP determined that the performance based approach satisfies the following criteria
* Satisfies the performance goals performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release
* Defense in Depth
* Safety Margin HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-6
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 3 NFPA 805 Section 3.5.16 NFPA 805 Section 3.5.16 states:
The fire protection water supply system shall be dedicated for fire protection use only.
Exception No. 1: Fire protection water supply systems shall be permitted to be used to provide backup to nuclear safety systems, provided the fire protection water supply systems are designed and maintained to deliver the combined fire and nuclear safety flow demands for the duration specified by the applicable analysis.
Exception No. 2: Fire protection water storage can be provided by plant systems serving other functions, provided the storage has a dedicated capacity capable of providing the maximum fire protection demand for the specified duration as determined in this section.
The review of plant flow diagrams show no hard connections to other plant systems, besides those for fire protection use. It should be noted that although there are no hard pipe connections to other plant systems, there are procedures that utilize the fire protection water supply. They are as follows:
* AOP-014 - Loss of CCW
* AOP-022 - Loss of Service Water
* EDMG-001 - Extreme Damage Event Early Actions
* EDMG-002 - Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)
* EDMG-003 - Condensate Storage Tank (CST)
* EDMG-005 - Containment Vessel (CV)
* EDMG-011 - Spent Fuel Pit Casualty
* EDMG-012 - Core Cooling Using Alternate Water Source
* EDMG-013 - Airborne Release Scrubbing
* SAM Inject into the Steam Generator
* SAM Inject into the RCS
* SAM Inject into Containment
* SAM Control Containment Conditions
* SAM Flood Containment The use of the fire protection water for these non-fire protection system water demands would have no adverse impact on the ability of the fire protection system to provide required flow and pressure. OMM-002, Section 8.15, details restrictions and allowances for use of the fire protection water supply system at HBRSEP.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-7
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Basis for Request:
The use of the fire protection water for these non-fire protection system water demands would have no adverse impact on the ability of the fire protection system to provide required flow and pressure. This is based on how fire water usage is restricted (CR 99-01247), in the following ways:
: 1. Fire service related activities (emergency, testing and training).
: 2. When the use of fire water is specifically called out in approved plant procedures (i.e., AOPs).
: 3. During plant emergencies when fire water is needed to protect safety related equipment.
: 4. When usage is deemed necessary AND sufficient justification is provided to show that the use of the fire water system for the proposed activity does not cause the fire water system to be in a condition outside of its design basis (i.e., the quantity of water needed for the proposed activity does not drop supply and pressure below that required/defined in UFSAR Section 9.5.1).
Permission shall have the approval of the Shift Manager (CR 96-00729 and CR 96-00730).
The water supply system is capable of maintaining the pressure in the main plant loop at 70 psi or higher with the largest deluge system in operation and with the system supplying an additional 1000 gpm to hoses.
Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
The use of fire protection water for non-fire protection plant evolutions is an occurrence that requires Shift Manager review and concurrence. The flow limitations to those non-fire protection functions ensure that there is no impact in the ability of the automatic suppression systems to perform Therefore, there is no impact on the nuclear safety performance criteria.
The use of fire protection water for plant evolutions other than fire protection has no impact on the radiological release performance criteria. The radiological release performance criteria is satisfied based on the determination of limiting radioactive release (Attachment E), which is not affected by impacts on the fire protection system due its use for non-fire protection purposes.
Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
The use of the fire water system, including the use of hydrants and hose, for non-fire protection uses does not impact fire protection defense-in-depth. The fire pumps have the excess capacity to supply the demands of the fire protection system as well as the non-fire protection uses identified above. This does not compromise automatic or manual fire suppression functions, fire suppression for systems and structures, or the nuclear safety capability assessment. Since both the automatic and manual fire suppression functions are maintained, defense-in-depth is maintained.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-8
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval The methods, input parameters, and acceptance criteria used in this analysis were reviewed and found to be in accordance with NFPA 805 Chapter 3. The methods, input parameters, and acceptance criteria used to calculate flow requirements for the automatic and manual suppression systems were not altered. Therefore, the safety margin inherent in the analysis for the fire event has been preserved.
 
==
Conclusion:==
 
HBRSEP determined that the performance based approach satisfies the following criteria:
* Satisfies the performance goals performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release
* Defense in Depth
* Safety Margin HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-9
 
Duke Energy                          Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 4 NFPA 805 Section 3.2.3(1)
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii), Performance-based methods, the fire protection program elements and minimum design requirements of Chapter 3 may be subject to the performance-based methods permitted elsewhere in the standard.
In accordance with NFPA 805 Section 2.2.8, the performance-based approach to satisfy the nuclear safety, radiation release, life safety, and property damage/business interruption performance criteria requires engineering analyses to evaluate whether the performance criteria are satisfied.
In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c)(2)(vii), the engineering analysis performed shall determine that the performance-based approach utilized to evaluate a variance from the requirements of NFPA 805 Chapter 3:
A. Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; B. Maintains safety margins; and C. Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire nuclear safety capability).
Duke Energy, HBRSEP requests formal approval of performance-based exception to the requirements in Chapter 3 of NFPA 805 as follows:
NFPA 805, Section 3.2.3(1)
    "Procedures shall be established for implementation of the fire protection program.
In addition to procedures that could be required by other sections of the standard, the procedures to accomplish the following shall be established:
Inspection, testing, and maintenance for fire protection systems and features credited by the fire protection program."
Duke Energy, HBRSEP requests the ability to utilize performance-based methods to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features required by NFPA 805. Performance-based inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies will be established as described in Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Technical Report TR-1006756, "Fire Protection Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide for Fire Protection", Final Report, July 2003.
Basis for Request:
NFPA 805 Section 2.6, "Monitoring," requires that "A monitoring program shall be established to ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained and to assess the performance of the fire protection program in meeting the performance criteria.
Monitoring shall ensure that the assumptions in the engineering analysis remain valid."
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-10
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval NFPA 805 Section 2.6.1, "Availability, Reliability, and Performance Levels," requires that "Acceptable levels of availability, reliability, and performance shall be established."
NFPA 805 Section 2.6.2, "Monitoring Availability, Reliability, and Performance,"
requires that "Methods to monitor availability, reliability, and performance shall be established. The methods shall consider the plant operating experience and industry operating experience."
The scope and frequency of the inspection, testing, and maintenance activities for fire protection systems and features required in the fire protection program have been established based on the previously approved Technical Specifications / License Controlled Documents and appropriate NFPA codes and standard. This request does not involve the use of the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 to establish the scope of those activities as that is determined by the required systems review identified in Attachment C This request is specific to the use of EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features credited by the fire protection program. As stated in EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 Section 10.1, "The goal of a performance-based surveillance program is to adjust test and inspection frequencies commensurate with equipment performance and desired reliability." This goal is consistent with the stated requirements of NFPA 805 Section 2.6. The EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 provides an accepted method to establish appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies which ensure the required NFPA 805 availability, reliability, and performance goals are maintained.
The target tests, inspections, and maintenance will be those activities for the NFPA 805 required fire protection systems and features. The reliability and frequency goals will be established to ensure the assumptions in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis remain valid. The failure criterion will be established based on the required fire protection systems and features credited functions and will ensure those functions are maintained.
Data collection and analysis will follow the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 document guidance. The failure probability will be determined based on EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 guidance and a 95% confidence level will be utilized. The performance monitoring will be performed in conjunction with the Monitoring Program required by NFPA 805 Section 2.6 and it will ensure site specific operating experience is considered in the monitoring process. The following is a flow chart that identifies the basic process that will be utilized.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page L-11
 
Duke Energy                  Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval EPRI TR-1006756 - Figure 10-1 Flowchart for Performance-Based Surveillance Program HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                              Page L-12
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Duke Energy, HBRSEP does not intend to revise any fire protection surveillance, test or inspection frequencies until after transitioning to NFPA 805. Existing fire protection surveillance, test and inspection will remain consistent with applicable station, Insurer, and NFPA Code requirements. HBRSEP's intent is to obtain approval via the NFPA 805 Safety Evaluation to use EPRI Technical Report TR1006756 guideline in the future as opportunities arise. Duke Energy, HBRSEP reserves the ability to evaluate fire protection features with the intent of using the EPRI performance-based methods to provide evidence of equipment performance beyond that achievable under traditional prescriptive maintenance practices to ensure optimal use of resources while maintaining reliability.
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
Use of performance-based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, Monitoring Program, will ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis. Therefore, there is no adverse impact to Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria by the use of the performance-based methods in EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756.
The radiological release performance criteria are satisfied based on the determination of limiting radioactive release. Fire Protection Systems and Features may be credited as part of that evaluation. Use of performance-based test frequencies established per the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, Monitoring Program, will ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis which includes those assumptions credited to meet the Radioactive Release performance criteria. Therefore, there is no adverse impact to Radioactive Release performance criteria.
Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
Use of performance-based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods combined with NFPA 805, Section 2.6, Monitoring Program, will ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis which includes those assumptions credited in the Fire Risk Evaluation safety margin discussions. In addition, the use of these methods in no way invalidates the inherent safety margins contained in the codes and standards used for design and maintenance of fire protection systems and features. Therefore, the safety margin inherent and credited in the analysis has been preserved.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-13
 
Duke Energy                        Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval The three echelons of defense-in-depth described in NFPA 805 Section 1.2 are
: 1) to prevent fires from starting (combustible/hot work controls),
: 2) rapidly detect, control and extinguish fires that do occur thereby limiting damage (fire detection systems, automatic fire suppression, manual fire suppression, pre-fire plans), and
: 3) provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed (fire barriers, fire rated cable, success path remains free of fire damage, recovery actions).
Echelon 1 is not affected by the use of the EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods. Use of performance-based test frequencies established per EPRI Technical Report TR-1006756 methods combined with NFPA 805 Section 2.6, Monitoring Program, will ensure that the availability and reliability of the fire protection systems and features credited for defense-in-depth are maintained to the levels assumed in the NFPA 805 engineering analysis. Therefore, there is no adverse impact to echelons 2 and 3 for defense-in-depth.
 
==
Conclusion:==
 
NRC approval is requested for use of the performance-based methods contained in the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Technical Report TR-1006756, "Fire Protection Equipment Surveillance Optimization and Maintenance Guide", Final Report, July 2003 to establish the appropriate inspection, testing, and maintenance frequencies for fire protection systems and features required by NFPA 805. As described above, this approach is considered acceptable because it:
A. Satisfies the performance goals, performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release; B. Maintains safety margins; and C. Maintains fire protection defense-in-depth (fire prevention, fire detection, fire suppression, mitigation, and post-fire safe shutdown capability).
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                      Page L-14
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Approval Request 5 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.4 NFPA 805 Section 3.3.4 states:
Thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials, ventilation duct materials, and soundproofing materials shall be noncombustible or limited combustible.
Insulation materials such as Armaflex , Neoprene, Styrofoam and other foam based insulating materials are used at HBRSEP. These insulation materials meet flame spread and smoke developed criteria, but do not meet the NFPA 805 definition of non or limited combustible regarding heat value content.
Duke Energy, HBRSEP requests the ability to use thermal insulation materials that meet the flame spread and smoke developed criteria, but do not meet the heat value content criteria of NFPA 805.
Basis for Request:
Armaflex insulation meets the Branch Technical Position BTP APCSB 9.5.1/ Appendix R requirements for limited combustibles by meeting the flame spread rating of 25 or less as measured using the test method of ASTM E-84, but does not meet the current heat value content requirement based on an initial review of the definition of a limited combustible due to the heat value exceeding 3500 Btu/Lb.
NFPA 805 Section 3.3.4 requires: Thermal insulation materials, radiation shielding materials, ventilation duct materials, and soundproofing materials shall be noncombustible or limited combustible. The definition of a limited combustible for NFPA 805 uses the definition from NFPA 220 which states:
1.6.36 Limited Combustible. Material that, in the form in which it is used, has a potential heat value not exceeding 3500 Btu/lb (8141 kJ/kg) and either has a structural base of noncombustible material with a surfacing not exceeding a thickness of 1/8 in. (3.2 mm) that has a flame spread rating not greater than 50, or has another material having neither a flame spread rating greater than 25 nor evidence of continued progressive combustion, even on surfaces exposed by cutting through the material on any plane. (See NFPA 220, Standard on Types of Building Construction).
The insulation materials used in the plant have flame spread and smoke developed ratings of 50 or less. Interior walls and structural components, radiation shielding, soundproofing, and interior finishes are non- combustible or are listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factor Mutual (FM) or UL, or have flame-spread, smoke and fuel contribution of 25 or less and are considered acceptable per the original BTP/Appendix R requirements. The materials do not contribute appreciably to the spread of fire.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                    Page L-15
 
Duke Energy                      Attachment L - NFPA 805 Chapter 3 Requirements for Approval Acceptance Criteria Evaluation:
Nuclear Safety and Radiological Release Performance Criteria:
The use of insulation material other than non-combustible and more than limited combustible in the plant does not affect nuclear safety. The Fire PRA development requires the inclusion of the effect of intervening combustibles to be documented and included in the analysis where determined to have fire effects as part of the performance-based approach. General area walkdowns and personnel interviews found that there were no large concentration installations of this insulation in the plant.
The use of insulation material other than non-combustible and more than limited combustible has no impact on the radiological release performance criteria. The radiological release review was performed based on the manual fire suppression activities in areas containing or potentially containing radioactive materials and is not dependent on the type of insulation material. The insulation material does not change the radiological release evaluation performed that concluded that potentially contaminated water is contained and smoke is monitored. The insulation materials do not add additional radiological materials to the area or challenge systems boundaries.
Safety Margin and Defense-in-Depth:
The insulation materials in their current configuration are considered as non-cable intervening combustibles. The precautions and limitations on the use of these materials do not impact the fire safety analysis of the fire event. Therefore, the inherent safety margin and conservatisms in these analysis methods remain unchanged.
The three echelons of defense-in-depth are 1) to prevent fires from starting (combustible/hot work controls), 2) rapidly detect, control and extinguish fires that do occur thereby limiting damage (fire detection systems, automatic fire suppression, manual fire suppression, pre-fire plans), and 3) provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed (fire barriers, fire rated cable, success path remains free of fire damage, recovery actions). The use of insulation material which is non-combustible or more than limited combustible does not impact fire protection defense-in-depth. The insulation material does not affect echelons 1, 2, and 3. The insulation material does not directly result in compromising automatic fire suppression functions, manual fire suppression functions, or post-fire safe shutdown capability.
 
==
Conclusion:==
 
NRC approval is requested for use of thermal insulation materials that meet the flame spread criteria, but do not meet the heat value content criteria of NFPA 805 based on these materials meeting BTP APCSB 9.5.1/Appendix R requirements. HBRSEP has determined that the approach satisfies the following criteria:
* Satisfies the performance goals performance objectives, and performance criteria specified in NFPA 805 related to nuclear safety and radiological release
* Defense in Depth
* Safety Margin HBRSEP LAR Rev 2                                                                    Page L-16
 
Duke Energy                          Attachment M - License Condition Changes M. License Condition Changes 3 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                      Page M-1
 
Duke Energy                                              Attachment M - License Condition Changes Replace the current HBRSEP fire protection license condition 3.E with the standard license condition from Regulatory Guide 1.205, modified as shown below. No other license conditions need to be superseded or revised.
HBRSEP implemented the following process for determining that these are the only license conditions required to be either revised or superseded to implement the new fire protection program which meets the requirements in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 50.48(c):
A review was conducted of the HBRSEP Operating License DPR-23, by HBRSEP licensing staff and Duke Energy fire protection staff. The review was performed by reading the Operating License and performing electronic searches. Outstanding License Amendment Requests that have been submitted to the NRC were also reviewed for potential impact on the license conditions.
Supersede the existing license condition 3.E, in its entirety, as shown below:
E. Fire Protection Program Carolina Power & Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report dated February 28, 1978, and supplements thereto.
Carolina Power & Light Company may make changes to the approved Fire Protection Program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.
It is HBRSEPs understanding that implicit in the superseding of this license condition, all prior fire protection program SEs and commitments have been superseded in their entirety by the revised license condition.
The proposed license condition follows:
===============================================================
Duke Energy shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program that comply with 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified in the license amendment request dated September 16, 2012, and as approved in the safety evaluation report dated _________. Except where NRC approval for changes or deviations is required by 10 CFR 50.48(c), and provided no other regulation, Technical Specification, license condition or requirement would require prior NRC approval, the licensee may make changes to the fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission if those changes satisfy the provisions set forth in 10 CFR 50.48(a) and 10 CFR 50.48(c), the change does not require a change to a Technical Specification or a license condition, and the criteria below are satisfied.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                        Page M-2
 
Duke Energy                                        Attachment M - License Condition Changes Risk-Informed Changes that May Be Made Without Prior NRC Approval A risk assessment of the change must demonstrate that the acceptance criteria below are met. The risk assessment approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC and shall be appropriate for the nature and scope of the change being evaluated, be based on the as-built, as-operated, and maintained plant, and reflect the operating experience at the plant. Acceptable methods to assess the risk of the change may include methods that have been used in the peer-reviewed fire PRA model, methods that have been approved by NRC through a plant-specific license amendment or NRC approval of generic methods specifically for use in NFPA 805 risk assessments, or methods that have been demonstrated to bound the risk impact.
(a)    Prior NRC review and approval is not required for changes that clearly result in a decrease in risk. The proposed change must also be consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy and must maintain sufficient safety margins. The change may be implemented following completion of the change evaluation.
(b)    Prior NRC review and approval is not required for individual changes that result in a risk increase less than 1E-7/yr for CDF and less than 1E-8/yr for LERF. The proposed change must also be consistent with the defense-in-depth philosophy and must maintain sufficient safety margins. The change may be implemented following completion of the change evaluation.
Other Changes that May Be Made Without Prior NRC Approval (1) Changes to NFPA 805, Chapter 3, Fundamental Fire Protection Program.
Prior NRC review and approval are not required for changes to the NFPA 805, Chapter 3, fundamental fire protection program elements and design requirements for which an engineering evaluation demonstrates that the alternative to the Chapter 3 element is functionally equivalent or adequate for the hazard. The licensee may use an engineering evaluation to demonstrate that a change to NFPA 805, Chapter 3 element is functionally equivalent to the corresponding technical requirement. A qualified fire protection engineer shall perform the engineering evaluation and conclude that the change has not affected the functionality of the component, system, procedure, or physical arrangement, using a relevant technical requirement or standard.
The licensee may use an engineering evaluation to demonstrate that changes to certain NFPA 805, Chapter 3 elements are acceptable because the alternative is adequate for the hazard. Prior NRC review and approval would not be required for alternatives to four specific sections of NFPA 805, Chapter 3, for which an engineering evaluation demonstrates that the alternative to the Chapter 3 element is adequate for the hazard.
A qualified fire protection engineer shall perform the engineering evaluation and HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page M-3
 
Duke Energy                                      Attachment M - License Condition Changes conclude that the change has not affected the functionality of the component, system, procedure, or physical arrangement, using a relevant technical requirement or standard.
The four specific sections of NFPA 805, Chapter 3, are as follows:
* Fire Alarm and Detection Systems (Section 3.8);
* Automatic and Manual Water-Based Fire Suppression Systems (Section 3.9);
* Gaseous Fire Suppression Systems (Section 3.10); and
* Passive Fire Protection Features (Section 3.11).
This License Condition does not apply to any demonstration of equivalency under Section 1.7 of NFPA 805.
(2) Fire Protection Program Changes that Have No More than Minimal Risk Impact Prior NRC review and approval are not required for changes to the licensees fire protection program that have been demonstrated to have no more than a minimal risk impact. The licensee may use its screening process as approved in the NRC safety evaluation dated ___________ to determine that certain fire protection program changes meet the minimal criterion. The licensee shall ensure that fire protection defense-in-depth and safety margins are maintained when changes are made to the fire protection program.
Transition License Conditions (1) Before achieving full compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c), as specified by (2) below, risk-informed changes to the licensees fire protection program may not be made without prior NRC review and approval unless the change has been demonstrated to have no more than a minimal risk impact, as described in (2) above.
(2) The licensee shall implement the modifications described in Attachment S, Table S-2, Plant Modifications Committed, by the end of the unit refueling outage currently scheduled for September/October 2020 (R232). The licensee shall maintain appropriate compensatory measures in place until completion of the modifications delineated above.
(3) The licensee shall implement the items as listed in Attachment S, Table S-3, Implementation Items, within 365 days after receipt of the safety evaluation/license amendment with the exception of implementation items S-3.11, 12, and 14, which are associated with modifications and will be completed after all procedure updates, modifications and training are complete.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                  Page M-4
 
Duke Energy                          Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality V. Fire PRA Quality 26 Pages Attached HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                            Page V-1
 
Duke Energy                                                  Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality In accordance with RG 1.205 position 4.3:
The licensee should submit the documentation described in Section 4.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.200 to address the baseline PRA and application-specific analyses. For PRA Standard supporting requirements important to the NFPA 805 risk assessments, the NRC position is that Capability Category II is generally acceptable. Licensees should justify use of Capability Category I for specific supporting requirements in their NFPA 805 risk assessments, if they contend that it is adequate for the application. Licensees should also evaluate whether portions of the PRA need to meet Capability Category III, as described in the PRA Standard.
The HBRSEP Combined Internal Events and Fire PRA was peer reviewed March 2013.
The peer review was conducted by a team of industry personnel (utility and vendor).
The Westinghouse Owners Group performed the review and have documented the outcome via LTR-RAM-13-06 Fire PRA Peer Review of the H. B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Against the Fire PRA Standard Supporting Requirements from Section 4 of the ASME/ANS Standard. As noted in LTR-RAM 06, the HBRSEP Fire PRA was found to be consistent with the ASME/ANS Standard and is suitable for supporting risk-informed applications.
The peer review team noted a number of Facts and Observations (F&Os). As documented in LTR-RAM-13-06, 85% of the Supporting Requirements (SRs) were assessed at Capability Category II or higher. Approximately eighteen Finding level and nine Suggestion level F&Os were identified during the peer review conducted in March 2013. Duke Energy recognized that the Core Damage and Large Early Release Frequencies were relatively high, as noted in LTR-RAM-13-06. Based on the CDF and LERF values at the time of the initial peer review, coupled with the number of findings associated with the Fire Scenario Selection (FSS) Technical Element (18), Duke Energy decided to have a focused peer review.
The focused peer review was conducted July 2013 and evaluated the FSS Technical Element based on refinements to approved methodologies and updated documentation.
The focused peer review was conducted by Frederick Mowrer (C P Fire, LLC) and Bijan Najafi (Hughes Associates) and is documented via Hughes Calculation No. 0004-0042-415-RPT-001, Robinson Nuclear Plant Fire PRA Focused Peer Review, Revision 2. As noted in LTR-RAM-13-06 and Hughes Calculation No. 0004-0042-415-RPT-001, the Fire PRA does apply the methodologies outlined in NUREG/CR-6850 correctly, is consistent with the ASME/ANS Standard and is applicable for supporting risk-informed applications. Although several of the initial F&Os were resolved, six new findings and four new suggestions were identified during the focused-scope peer review.
Both of these peer reviews were performed to RG 1.200 Revision 2 and account for the clarifications defined there.
Table V-1 documents the Finding level F&Os associated with both the initial and focused peer reviews.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                    Page V-2
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                              Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition CF-A1              REVIEW the conditional failure    Dispositioned RNP-0153 is Attachment 9 of RNP-F/PRA-0094        RNP-0153 (Attachment 7 of P2217-1021-01-03)
(CAT III)          probabilities for fire-induced                  and describes cable failure analyzed for the      has been updated to reflect all HBRSEP circuit failures                                HBRSEP Fire PRA, RNP-0153. The third bullet      information. Additionally, Reference 5.1 has been and                                              of RNP-0153, Section 3.0 states, "All cables are  updated to RNP Fire Safe Shutdown Program CF-B1              ASSIGN        the    appropriate                assumed to be Thermoset. This is consistent      Database, Rev 19.
(CAT I/II/III)      industry-wide generic values                    with the cable specifications for safety related for risk-significant contributors                cable at BNP and there are no substantive based on the specific circuit                    differences in failure probabilities for the two configuration              under                cable types for the purposes of this analysis."
consideration                                    Reference 5.1 of RNP-0153 is "BNP Fire Safe Shutdown Program Database, Rev. 26." In response to a Peer Review question, it was advised that BNP should be RNP, that cable should be Thermo-plastic rather than Thermo-set and the HBRSEP FSSPMD should be referenced instead.
The determination of meeting the requirements of CF-A1 depends on the information in RNP-0153. As presently written, RNP-0153 leads to questions of whether it is really applicable to HBRSEP.
Revise and update RNP-0153. Perform a confirmation that the balance of information in RNP-0153 is valid for H.B. Robinson.
CF-A2              CHARACTERIZE                  the Dispositioned No characterization of the uncertainty associated The basic events associated with hot short uncertainty associated with the                  with the applied conditional circuit failure      probabilities have been assigned an error factor (NOT MET)          applied      conditional  failure              probabilities was documented in EPM Report        when the combined cutset is created using the P2217-1021-01-01,      Robinson    Fire    PRA  UNCERT        code. Although  important    for probability assigned per CF-Quantification Calculation, as captured in EC    determining the statistical uncertainty of the PRA A1.                                              90905.                                            cutsets, the criteria needed for the LAR are based on the mean values which are not significantly impacted by the uncertainty analysis.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Based on the above disposition, SR CF-A2 is considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                      Page V-3
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                          Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                      Disposition CS-A1              IDENTIFY cables whose fire-      Dispositioned Attachment 7 of RNP-F/PSA-0066 (Equipment        All cables identified in Attachment 7 of induced failure could adversely                Selection) contains a list of equipment which is RNP-F/PSA-0066 have been routed and added (CAT I/II/III)      affect  selected    equipment                to be credited in the Fire PRA, but which does  to FSSPMD with the exception of components and/or credited functions in the              not have cables identified and routed. A spot    that were not installed prior to RNP-F/PSA-0066 CS-A2              Fire PRA plant response                        check review of the cable database (RNP          being completed.
(CAT III) model.                                        FSSPMD R21_Read Only QA Record.mdb)
CS-A10                                                            reveals that several of the components listed in (CAT III)                                                          Attachment 7 are not included in the cable database. For example, Attachment 7 includes "Fire      Tag"      CHG-C-INDICATING-LIGHT corresponding to PRA BE JILCHGPCTF; however, CHG-C-INDICATINGLIGHT is not in the cable database, hence BE JILCHGPCTF will never be affected by fires. Others identified by spot check include 480V-52/11A, 480V-52/13B, EDGA-AMMETER, etc. Thus, there are some PRA components which are being credited in the PRA which do not have cable routing incorporated into the cable database; hence, they will never fail.
Review Attachment 7 of RNP-F/PSA-0066, identify components which are not in the cable database, and update the cable database to include all credited PRA components.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-4
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                            Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                Status                            Finding                                          Disposition CS-A11              If assumed cable routing used                The scope and extent of assumed cable routing      As noted in HBRSEP Change Package (CAT I/II/III)      in the Fire PRA, IDENTIFY the                for non-credited components (i.e., components      RNP-0152          (Attachment        19        of scope    and    extent,  and  Open          assumed to fail for all fires) is documented in    P2217-1021-01-03), cable toning was used to PROVIDE a basis for the                      Table 4 of RNP-F/PSA-0066. Although a basis is    confirm cable routes. There were some instances assumed cable routing.                        not provided for the assumed routing, it is a      where cable toning was not possible within a CS-C3                                                            generally accepted practice to omit certain        specific compartment (embedded cable, etc.). In systems which do not perform a safety function    these instances, the cable was assumed to be (NOT MET)
(but may back up a safety system) and would        failed throughout the entire compartment that it require immense amount of work to manually        was known to traverse through.
trace the cables. The credited components with assumed routing are contained in the FSSPMD,      As noted in HBRSEP change package however, there is no documented basis for the      RNP-0205,          (Attachment        19      of routing, and it is unclear if the scope and extent P2217-1021-01-03), the assumed cable route is understood. The basis for assumed routing is    data determines the cable-to-fire zone correlation not documented. Furthermore, to understand,        (which is sufficient for NSCA), but does not and to be able to evaluate the uncertainty        determine the cable-to-raceway-to-fire zone associated with assumed routing some form of      correlation (which is needed for PRA). Based on documentation should be assembled describing      this assumption, any ignition source within a the scope and extent of the assumed routing.      given fire zone will impact all cables with For example, are there fire compartments with a    assumed cable routes in the ignition sources fire significant amount of assumed routing, are there  zone.
high significance fire compartments, systems, trains or components dominated by cable failure    RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY of cables which have an assumed routing, etc.      CLASSIFICATION:
As part of an overall Task 3 documentation        As the Fire PRA documentation has not been package, describe the scope and extent of          updated to further describe the scope and extent assumed routing used in the HBRSEP Fire PRA.      of the assumed routing, no improvement has been made to the capability category assessment for SR CS-C3. However, RNP considers the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable for the NFPA 805 application because documentation of the scope and extent of the assumed routing will not change the quantified risk metrics.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                  Page V-5
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                      Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                      Topic                Status                          Finding                                        Disposition CS-C1          DOCUMENT        the      cable Dispositioned There is no notebook encompassing Task 3          In the process at HBRSEP, Fire Protection/NSCA (NOT MET)      selection    and      location              (Cable Selection) making review and update        develops and maintains the cable selection and methodology applied in the Fire              difficult. There are numerous change packages,    circuit analysis data. This data is then referenced PRA in a manner that                          and a database (FSSPMD) which is a repository    as inputs to the Component Selection and facilitates    Fire        PRA                for the cable routing information; however, there Quantification FPRA calculations. This process applications, upgrades, and                  is no document explaining what tasks were        and associated results are easily reviewable, has peer review.                                  performed, which procedures or guidelines were    been peer reviewed multiple times for our other employed, and in which document the analysis is  sites and found to be acceptable. There is no contained.                                        requirement to have a separate PRA notebook.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
With no change being made, HBRSEP considers the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable for the NFPA 805 application and this finding to be sufficiently resolved for SR CS-C1 to be assessed as CAT I/II/III.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-6
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                Status                          Finding                                            Disposition ES-A2              REVIEW          power  supply,  Dispositioned Power supplies, support systems, interlock          A detailed review of the modeling of associated (NOT MET)          interlock              circuits,              circuits and instrumentation are included in the    circuits for all components functional states in the instrumentation, and support                    internal events PRA model. For fire PRA specific    fire PRA CAFTA model was performed. The ES-B4                                                                                                                  details of the review are provided in Attachment 2 system dependencies and                        logic, examples indicate that not all support (NOT MET)                                                                                                              of        Hughes      Associates    Inc.      (HAI)
IDENTIFY              additional                system      dependencies        were    completely 1RCS04042.414.031-002, and revisions to the equipment whose fire-induced                    considered. The area of concern is the lack of      fire PRA CAFTA model, the RR file table BE, and CS-A3              failure,    including  spurious                modeling of instrumentation power dependency        Component Selection Database (CSDB) table (CATI/II/III)      actuation, could adversely                      (self-identified by the utility). For example, see  PRA_SSEL as a result of this detailed review are affect any of the equipment                    gate HRAPORV-455C "PORV FAILS TO                    listed in 1RCS04042.414.031-001, Attachments identified per SR ES-A1.                        CLOSE DUE TO HRA", one of its inputs is an          3, 4, and 5, respectively. Revision 4 of the HBRSEP fire PRA calculation for component AND gate for "INDICATIONS THAT PORV IS selection (RNP-F/PSA-0066) incorporates all of OPEN FAIL." For the indicators modeled here, if    the changes required to the fire PRA CAFTA there is a loss of power, the indicators will scale model as a result of the detailed review of the low, potentially preventing the operators from      associated circuits.
taking necessary actions. For the indication discussed in the example above, a loss of power    Review credited components to ensure that will cause the indicators to scale low, potentially power supplies, support systems, interlock circuits, and instrumentation dependencies are preventing the operators from taking necessary adequately captured.
actions, and thus could adversely impact fire risk.                                              RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
With the above described changes incorporated, these SRs are considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                      Page V-7
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                    Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                    Status                          Finding                                            Disposition ES-A3              INCLUDE equipment whose              Dispositioned The "RCP Seal No. 1 Leak-Off" and "SI test line"      RNP-0148, Multiple Spurious Operation Expert (NOT MET)          fire-induced      failure,      not              are both ISLOCA paths that were screened from        Panel Report, did consider spurious isolation of including spurious operation,                      the Internal Events analysis; however these          the RCP Seal No. 1 leakoff valves. As noted in contributes to or causes                            screened paths are not explicitly dispositioned in the report, 125V DC power will be removed within (a) fire-induced          initiating              the fire PRA component selection calculation.
events treated in the Fire Safe                    These items were discussed with the host utility      ten minutes as noted in HBRSEP Dedicated Shutdown / Appendix R                              that provided the following input on the two          Shutdown Procedure (DSP-002).
analysis                                            ISLOCA paths mentioned above: The seal leak-(b) Internal Events PRA                                                                                  As noted in Attachment 3 of the HBRSEP off is normally open and seal leak-off is part of initiators as identified using the                                                                        Component Selection Calculation, RCP Seal No.
IE requirements in Part 2                          the normal cooling path. Failure in either 1 Leak-Off is not consequential. Leakoff is not (including      any    gradations                  direction is non-consequential" and "The test line required to maintain adequate seal cooling in the across capability categories in                    has 3+ locked closed manual valves." Based on PRA model. Furthermore, seal leakoff is not that standard) as modified per                      this feedback, it is judged that this is a 4-2.5, or                                                                                                modeled in the Fire PRA.
documentation issue with no impact on the (c) unique fire-induced initiating                  analysis. This finding is related to the events not addressed or                            consideration of previously screened ISLOCA          RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY otherwise screened from the                        pathways from the Internal Events PRA for            CLASSIFICATION:
above two analyses if SR                            inclusion in the Fire PRA. Include, in the IE-C4 in Part 2 cannot be met.                      component selection calculation, a discussion of      Based on the above disposition, this SR is screened paths and why or why not they contain        considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
components that warrant inclusion in the fire PRA.
FQ-B1              PERFORM the quantification in        Dispositioned In review of the fire PRA documentation there no      RNP-F/PSA-0077        documented      proof    of (CAT I/II/III)      accordance with HLR-QU-B                            convergence study was performed in support of        convergence for CDF and LERF for the internal and its SRs in Part 2                              the selection of truncation level for quantification. events PRA. As the fire PRA model is largely and                                                                                                      dependent on the internal events PRA, it can be DEVELOP a defined basis to                                                                                concluded that there is convergence for CDF and support the claim of non-                                                                                LERF in the fire PRA applicability of any of the requirements under HLR-QU-B                                                                              The model was quantified based on a CDF in Part 2.                                                                                                quantification of 1E-12. This is about seven orders of magnitude below the final CDF. This is generally accepted as a good bounding truncation level HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                          Page V-8
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                Status                        Finding                                      Disposition FQ-F1              DOCUMENT the CDF and              Dispositioned The contents of the elements of applicable SRs The HBRSEP Fire PRA was developed using the (CAT I/II/III)      LERF analyses in accordance                    of Part 2 were addressed in the FQ and        Internal Events PRA. The Internal Events PRA is with HLR-QU-F and HLR-LE-G                      associated documents; however, no explicit    aligned with RG 1.200 and was peer reviewed.
and their SRs in Part 2 with the                connections were established in the documents  Therefore, the back-references associated with following clarifications:                      to associate with the "back-references"        requirements LE-G2, LE-G4 and LE-G5 are (a) SRs QU-F2 and QU-F3 of                      requirements LE-G2, LE-G4 and LE-G5.          considered to be met.
Part 2 are to be met including identification of which fire scenarios and which physical analysis units (consistent with the level of resolution of the Fire PRA such as fire area or fire      compartment)        are significant contributors (as defined in Part 1);
(b) SR QU-F4 of Part 2 is to be met consistent with 4-2.13 (c)    SRs LE-G2 (uncertainty discussion) and LE-G4 of Part 2 are to be met consistent with 4-2.13, and DEVELOP a defined basis to support      the    claim    of non-applicability of any of the requirements      under    these sections in Part 2.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-9
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                          Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                        Disposition FSS-B1              DEFINE and JUSTIFY the          Dispositioned The conditions and timing that lead to Main      Section 5.9.2 of P2217-1021-01-03 provides a (CAT I/II/III)      conditions that are assumed to                Control Room (MCR) abandonment due to            discussion of Main Control Room abandonment cause MCR abandonment                          environmental conditions and reliance on ex-      due to environment conditions.
FSS-A6              and/or reliance on ex-control                  control room actions are described in main (CAT III)          room operator actions including                control    room    analysis  report    (Report The probability associated with main control room remote      and/or    alternate              0004-0042-412-002).                              abandonment due to a loss of habitability has FSS-B2              shutdown actions.                                                                                been incorporated into the quantification of the (CAT III)                                                          Abandonment due to equipment damage and to        Fire PRA.
loss of habitability is based on the guidelines provided      in    Section    11.5.2.11    of NUREG/CR-6850.        The    analysis    method described in NUREG/CR-6850 Appendix L is used to assess scenarios in the MCB.
This SR is considered met. A new Finding (FSS-B1-01) has been assigned to this SR because all conditions requiring reliance on remote/alternate shutdown are not identified.
Fires in the MCR or other location in the plant that may lead to loss of control room functions such that use of remote/alternate shutdown capability is required are not characterized and evaluated. Such scenarios for MCR habitability are identified and analyzed.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                Page V-10
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                            Disposition FSS-C2              CHARACTERIZE            ignition Dispositioned Section 5.6.2 of the Quantification Calculation        Section 5.6.2 of the Fire PRA Quantification (CAT II/III)        source intensity using a                        (EPM Report No. P2217-1021-01-01, Rev. 1,              Calculation discusses the growth profile used.
realistic time-dependent fire                  dated February 2013 included in EC 90905) and          This can also be seen in the RNP_EVAL_Rev2 growth profile (i.e., a time-                  in particular the third bullet under Figure 7 on      spreadsheet used during the quantification dependent heat release rate)                    Page 51 of 113 indicates that "The HGL                process. This spreadsheet includes a cable tray for significant contributors as                threshold assumes a constant HRR up to HGL            propagation model (HGL_Time worksheet).
appropriate to the ignition                    formation." The basis for using the time versus source.                                        HGL based on a constant HRR and then                  Furthermore, Calculation NED-M/MECH-1009 compare it to a curve based on a variable HRR          also provides a time to damage based on fire has not been provided. At the top of Page 52 of        growth.
113 in the Quantification Calculation it states that, "The net effect of these uncertainties is generally a conservative time to HGL. For ignition sources that are high risk, more detailed fire modeling may be pursued on a case by case basis."
The intent of the Standard is that conservative =
Category I, and that realistic = Category II/III, therefore this SR is evaluated at Category I. An example of a more realistic analysis is Hughes Report Number: 0004-0042-000-001 for Fire Compartment 20.
Finding FSS-C2-01 has not been resolved.
For each scenario, the ignition source intensity is characterized using a time-dependent heat release rate, consistent with the Category II/III requirement for this SR; however, the total heat release required to cause hot gas layer formation is based on a fire that is initiated at full peak intensity, consistent with the Category I requirement for this SR. Suggestion FSS-C2-02 has been prepared to suggest further justification and validation of the methodology used to determine the total heat release required to cause hot gas layer formation.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-11
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                            Disposition FSS-C4          If a severity factor is credited in Dispositioned The severity factors, as described in Section          Section 5.5.4.5 of the Quantification Calculation (CAT II)        the analysis, ENSURE that                        5.5.4.5 of the Quantification Calculation (EPM        (EPM Report No. P2217-1021-01-03) has been Report      No. P2217-1021-01-01,          dated  updated to provide more detail as to why specific
: a. the severity factor remains                February 2013 included in EC 90905) are                severity factors are applied in the MakeSScen independent      of    other              apparently evaluated using the calculation logic      module.
quantification factors                      in Attachment 20 of the Quantification Calculation. This is not explained in a clear and
: b. the severity factor reflects                concise way in Section 5.5.4.5, nor is any the fire event set used to                  reference to Attachment 20 found in that section.
estimate fire frequency                    The general reference to module "MakeSScen" and the fact that its contents are listed in
: c. the severity factor reflects Attachment 20 in the introductory paragraph of the      conditions      and Section 5.5.4 is not considered to be sufficient.
assumptions        of    the Further, the descriptions in Section 5.5.4.5 specific fire scenarios (pages 41-42 of 113) of how the Severity Factor under analysis, and determination is done do not appear to exactly
: d. a      technical      basis                match with the programming logic found on supporting the severity                    pages 7-12 of Attachment 20. This needs to be factors determination is                  clarified and clearly documented to support provided.                                  future use, update, and peer review of the Severity Factor calculations.
In addition, the use of generic fire modeling data and severity factors for different ignition source Bins      from    NUREG/CR-6850            without considering mode of exposure and position (i.e.,
not just distance) of the targets relative to the fire source may not fully constitute "explicit consideration" in quantifying the severity factor such that it reflects the conditions and assumptions of the specific fire scenario under analysis.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-12
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                              Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                Status                          Finding                                              Disposition FSS-C7              If multiple suppression paths    Dispositioned Credit is given for both automatic sprinkler        No credit has been applied for manual actuation (NOT MET)          are credited, EVALUATE and                    suppression and manual firefighting, but mutual      or recovery of fixed suppression systems. The PROPERLY                MODEL                  dependency on the common water supply                common water supply at HBRSEP is sufficient to dependencies        among    the              system has not been evaluated or properly            provide water to both the automatic suppression credited      paths  including              modeled.                                            system as well as the manual firefighting. The dependencies associated with                                                                        reliability/unavailability of the fire pump and recovery of a failed fire                                                                          associated sprinkler has already been accounted suppression system, if such                                                                        for in the non-suppression probability.
recovery is credited.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-C7 is considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
FSS-D2              USE fire models that have        Dispositioned This finding recommends that the HGL                Attachment J of the LAR provides a discussion (CAT I/II/III)      sufficient capability to model                calculation (RNP-M/MECH-1826) be subjected          on the software used during the development of the conditions of interest and                to validation and verification in order to establish the          HBRSEP          HGL        Calculation FSS-D6              only within known limits of                    its technical basis and known limits of              (RNP-M/MECH-1826).
(CAT I/II/III)      applicability.                                applicability.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-13
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                            Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition FSS-D7            In crediting fire detection and  Dispositioned There is a failure to meet the Category I          Currently, system performance is monitored and (NOT MET)        suppression systems, USE                        requirement of having systems installed and        maintained at a high level as part of the System generic estimates of total                      maintained in accordance with applicable codes      Health Reporting and System Notebook FSS-F1            system unavailability provided                  and standards. The Main Turbine Lube Oil            processes. Outlier behavior with respect to (CAT III)        that                                            Deluge system must be replaced to account for      system availability would be evident to the (a) the credited system is                      system deficiencies identified in NCR-425437        system engineer and plant management through installed and maintained in                    where a simultaneous actuation of the Turbine      the health data (available for the previous accordance with applicable                      Lube Oil suppression system, along with the        12 months), which indicates overall Excellent codes and standards                            mezzanine and ground level sprinkler systems,      (Green) performance.
(b) the credited system is in a                could place a higher system demand on the fully operable state during plant              water supply than can be provided by a single      Furthermore, during the periods when key fire operation, and                                  fire pump.                                          protection systems are unavailable due to testing (c) the system has not                                                                              and maintenance, compensatory actions are experienced outlier behavior                    This was not identified, nor is a comparison        taken such that the risk associated with the relative        to        system                provided in the Fire PRA of all installed detection system being unavailable does not increase.
unavailability.                                and suppression systems vs. the corresponding Code Compliance calculation.                        RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Finding FSS-D7-01 has not been resolved.
Because evidence is not provided to support that    Using plant-specific information to quantify total credited detection/suppressions systems are        unavailability factors is a CAT III requirement and installed and maintained in accordance with        was not done.
applicable codes and standards. System health report for period Q2-2013 for systems              With no change being made, HBRSEP considers 6185/6181/6175/6195/6205/6180 notes that age,      the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable obsolescence        and      replacement      part for the NFPA 805 application and this finding to procurement is an issue. This system health        be sufficiently resolved for SR FSS-D7 to be report also notes that "There are LTAMs            assessed as CAT II is MET.
budgeted for 2014 and 2015 which study and replace the detection, CO2, and Halon Systems." This report suggests that some of the fire protection systems at HBRSEP may be experiencing outlier behavior relative to system unavailability and may not be in a fully operable state during plant operation. Consequently, this SR is still considered to be not met.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-14
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                      Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition FSS-D7          In crediting fire detection and  Dispositioned Evidence needs to be provided to support that    Currently, system performance is monitored and (NOT MET)      suppression systems, USE                        credited detection/suppressions systems are      maintained at a high level as part of the System generic estimates of total                      installed and maintained in accordance with      Health Reporting and System Notebook system unavailability provided                                                                    processes. Outlier behavior with respect to applicable codes and standards. System health that (a) the credited system is                                                                  system availability would be evident to the installed and maintained in                    report for period Q2-2013 for systems            system engineer and plant management through accordance with applicable                      6185/6181/6175/6195/6205/6180 notes that age,    the health data (available for the previous 12 codes and standards, and (b)                    obsolescence      and      replacement      part months), which indicates overall Excellent the credited system is in a fully              procurement is an issue for multiple fire        (Green) performance.
operable state during plant                    protection systems. This system health report operation.                                      also notes that "There are LTAMs budgeted for    Furthermore, during the periods when key fire protection systems are unavailable due to testing 2014 and 2015 which study and replace the and maintenance, compensatory actions are detection, CO2, and Halon Systems." This report  taken such that the risk associated with the suggests that some of the fire protection        system being unavailable does not increase.
systems at HBRSEP may be experiencing outlier behavior relative to system unavailability and    RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY may not be in a fully operable state during plant CLASSIFICATION:
operation.
Using plant-specific information to quantify total unavailability factors is a CAT III requirement and was not done.
With no change being made, HBRSEP considers the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable for the NFPA 805 application and this finding to be sufficiently resolved for SR FSS-D7 to be assessed as CAT II is MET.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                Page V-15
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                        Finding                                      Disposition FSS-E1              For      any    fire  modeling  Open      Section 4.3 of Calculation No. P2217-2100-00,    Section 4.3 of Calculation P2217-2100-01-01 will (CAT I/II/II)      parameters not covered by the                Fire Scenario Data, RNP-F/PSA-0079, dated        be updated appropriately at a later date. This is a requirements of HLR-FSS-C or                  January 2013 contains information about fire    documentation issue that will not impact fire FSS-H4              HLR-FSS-D,          USE    plant-modeling parameters that were used. However,    scenario development or quantification.
(CAT II)            specific parameter estimates for fire modeling if available, or            Section 4.4 through 4.7 should be completed because they are missing information about      As stated in the response to FPRA RAI 1A, use      generic    information modified as discussed in SR                  other relevant fire modeling parameters.        parametric uncertainty for fire ignition frequency, FSS-E2;        USE        generic                                                              non-suppression probability, and hot short information for the remaining                Add relevant information to the report.          probability have been assessed for their impact parameter estimates.                                                                          to CDF and LERF in the integrated analysis Finding FSS-E1-01 has not been resolved.        performed in response to FPRA RAI 3.
Sections 4.3 through 4.7 still make reference to databases for the parameters used in the fire modeling. These parameters should be added to the report.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                Page V-16
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                      Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                      Topic                Status                            Finding                                        Disposition FSS-E3          PROVIDE a mean value of,          Open      No statistical representation of uncertainty    HBRSEP used the HRRs and applied them using (CAT I)          and statistical representation                intervals (e.g., NUREG/CR-6850 Table E-1 or      the guidance found in NUREG/CR-6850. As of, the uncertainty intervals for            G-1 for HRR, Tables E-2 through E-9 for severity NUREG/CR-6850 is the consensus methodology, the parameters used for factor) is documented for the mean values of    a detailed uncertainty analysis on these modeling the significant fire scenarios.                                    parameter estimates used for fire modeling the  parameters is not needed and does not add to significant fire scenarios.                      the credibility of the results. The majority of applied values are based on the 98th and 75th percentile fires from NUREG/CR-6850, and the ZOIs are applied conservatively. It is not believed that reducing these values would allow the use of reduced impacts for the applications being pursued.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Although no change has yet been made that would improve the Capability Category assessments, HBRSEP considers the risk results from the Fire PRA to be creditable for the NFPA 805 application because documenting the statistical representation of uncertainty intervals will not change the quantified risk metrics.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-17
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                              Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                        Finding                                            Disposition FSS-E4              PROVIDE a characterization of    Dispositioned There is some assumed cable routing applied        As noted in HBRSEP Change Package (NOT MET)          the uncertainties associated                    directly in FSSPMD. These routings are            RNP-0152          (Attachment        19        of with cases where cable routing                  identified in RNP-0152. Components with            P2217-1021-01-03), cable toning was used to FSS-A1              has been assumed based on                                                                          confirm cable routes. There were some instances unknown routing are otherwise assumed to fail in (CAT I/II/III)      SRs CS-A10 and/or CS-A11.                                                                          where cable toning was not possible within a the PRA model. However, there is no discussion    specific compartment (embedded cable, etc.). In that characterizes the uncertainties associated    these instances, the cable was assumed to be with cases where cable routing has been            failed throughout the entire compartment that it assumed. A more detailed characterization of      was known to traverse through.
the uncertainties associated with cases where cable routing has been assumed is needed for      As noted in HBRSEP change package RNP-0205 (Attachment 19 of P2217-1021-01-03), the SR FSS-E4 to be met.
assumed cable route data determines the cable-to-fire zone correlation (which is sufficient Provide a detailed uncertainty characterization    for NSCA), but does not determine the discussion in appropriate reports related to      cable-to_raceway-to-fire zone correlation (which circuits with assumed routing.                    is needed for PRA). Based on this assumption, any ignition source within a given fire zone will impact all cables with assumed cable routes in the ignition sources fire zone.
RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION:
Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-E is considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
FSS-F3              In crediting fire detection and  Dispositioned Section 2.4 of the Structural Steel report        The unavailability of the Turbine Lube Oil Deluge (CAT I/II/III)      suppression systems, USE                        (P2217-2300-01-03) states that "It is assumed      system has been updated to 0.05 in Rev. 3 of generic estimates of total                      that an unavailability value of 0.01 will be      P2217-1021-01-03 (Fire PRA Quantification FSS-D7              system unavailability provided                                                                    Calculation). This change was made based on bounding and conservative for the deluge (NOT MET)          that (a) the credited system is                                                                    engineering judgment.
installed and maintained in                    sprinkler system." What is the basis for this? Has accordance with applicable                      this value been confirmed against the plant-      RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY codes and standards, and (b)                    specific experience for availability of the        CLASSIFICATION:
the credited system is in a fully              detection/suppression systems?
operable state during plant                                                                        Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-D7 is operation.                                                                                        considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                  Page V-18
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                  Status                            Finding                                          Disposition FSS-G2              APPLY all the supporting          Dispositioned Fire modeling performed in support of the Multi-      A detailed multi-compartment analysis was (CAT I/II/III)      requirements listed in SRs                      Compartment Analysis (MCA) failed to consider        performed      and      is    documented    in FSS-C1 through FSS-C8 for                      the acute effect of hot gas flow through openings    RNP-F/PSA-0089. The Fire PRA Quantification FSS-G3 fire modeling of single physical                and ducts on local potential targets. In addition,    Calculation only updated results based on new (CAT II) analysis units to the modeling                  the consideration and evaluation of additional        CCDPs and a new HGL Calculation. The open of    multi-compartment      fire              aspects of multi-compartment fire scenarios was      Turbine Building was discussed in the HGL scenarios.                                      not documented and/or done, i.e., the fact that      Calculation (RNP-M/MECH-1826). The detailed the Turbine Building has no exterior walls was        review of hot gas flow through openings has not not identified and the impact of this evaluated.      been performed. The impact of hot gas flow Treatment of MCA in only 7 pages of the              through openings and ducts on local targets is Quantification Calculation does not appear to be      expected to be minimal.
adequate. Furthermore, in their evaluation of compartments subject to a hot gas layer,              RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY HBRSEP used a criterion of 1E-07 for total            CLASSIFICATION:
ignition frequency. Based on this, HBRSEP Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-G2 is excluded all but two compartments. A review of considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
the table that was subject to the review showed there were two additional compartments that met the criterion for inclusion. This is an error rate of 100%.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-19
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                          Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                    Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition FSS-G6          QUANTIFY          the    risk  Dispositioned Table B-5 of this report defines lists fourteen (14) Section 5.10 of P2217-1021-01-03 provides a (CAT I)          contribution of any selected                  unscreened multi-compartment fire scenarios.        discussion of the multi-compartment scenarios multi-compartment          fire              Attachment E of the same report offers risk          quantified in the Fire PRA. There are five scenarios    in    a    manner associated      with    these    scenario. The  scenarios that do not screen currently based on consistent    with    the  FQ requirements.                                Quantification    Report    (P2217-1021-01-02)    an        updated        HGL        Calculation Section 5.10 states that "Based on updated Hot      (RNP-M/MECH-1826, Rev. 0). These scenarios Gas Layer frequencies, all of the fire              have been quantified in a manner consistent with compartments previously analyzed in the Multi-      the FQ requirements.
Compartment Analysis (Reference 3.14), have now      screen."    Reference        3.14    is RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY RNP-F/PSA-0089 Rev 0 and it does not support        CLASSIFICATION:
the statement that all MC fire is screened.
Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-G6 is considered to be Met at CAT II/III.
Finding FSS-G6-01 has been resolved. Hughes Calculation No. 1RCS04042.414.031, Revision 0 (Multi-Compartment Analysis for the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment at Robinson Nuclear Plant), provides a detailed multi-compartment analysis. This analysis has been included in Section 5.10 of the HBRSEP Fire PRA Quantification Calculation. Based on updated Hot Gas Layer data, the scenarios identified in the Hughes calculation screen from further analysis.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-20
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                      Topic                  Status                          Finding                                        Disposition FSS-H2          DOCUMENT a basis for target      Dispositioned The fire modeling in Hughes Report No.            Plant modifications in addition to intumastic cable (CAT I)          damage      mechanisms      and                0004-0042-000-001 for Fire Compartment 20        coating are incorporated into the Fire PRA thresholds used in the analysis,                credits fire coating. Category II of this SR      Calculation        (EPM          Report        No.
including references for any                                                                      P2217-1021-01-03). These plant modifications requires documentation of the references for any plant-specific or target-specific                                                                are discussed in Attachment S of the LAR. The performance criteria applied in                plant-specific or target-specific performance    ten minute time until cable damage (per the analysis.                                  criteria applied in the analysis, and a basis for NUREG/CR-6850) is achieved via plant target damage mechanisms and thresholds used      modifications discussed in Attachment S.
in the analysis, which has not been provided.
Finding FSS-H2-01 has not been resolved.          RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY Plant-specific documentation should be provided  CLASSIFICATION:
for the performance criteria used to evaluate Based on the above disposition, SR FSS-H2 is damage to coated cables and cable trays with      considered to be Met at CAT II/III.
solid bottoms.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                Page V-21
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                          Finding                                        Disposition HRA-C1              For each selected fire scenario,    Dispositioned The fire-specific operator actions are evaluated  All fire response actions have been updated such (CAT II)            QUANTIFY the HEPs for all                        using only the Cause-Based Decision Tree          that they are quantified using the CBDTM and HFEs and ACOUNT FOR                              method (CBDTM). The HRAs from the Internal        HCR/ORE combination method similar to Internal FQ-C1              relevant fire-related effects                    Events methods used both CBDTM and                Events operator actions. P2217-1022-01-03 (CAT I/II/III)      using detailed analyses for                      HCR/ORE to address the cognitive risk of the      documents the Fire HRA.
significant        HFEs        and                operator actions. The HCR/ORE method is conservative estimates (e.g.,                    generally the dominant risk value for actions with screening values) for non-                        short system time windows or very long median significant        HFEs,        in              response times. Events 0FIREOMA01 and accordance with the SRs for                      0FIREOMA02 are events with short time HLR-HR-G in Part 2 set forth                      windows where the HCR/ORE method would be under at least Capability                        the dominant cognitive risk. The cognitive risk is Category II, with the following                  underestimated by an order of magnitude.
clarification:
The HRA needs to be revised to better address
: a. Attention is to be given to                the cognitive risk portion for each HEP.
how the fire situation alters any previous assessments in non-fire analyses as to the influencing factors and the timing considerations covered in SRs HR-G3, HR-G4, and HR-G5 in Part 2 and
: b. Develop a defined basis to support the claim of non-applicability of any of the requirements          under HLR-HR-G in Part 2.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-22
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                            Finding                                        Disposition IGN-A7              USE a plant-wide consistent        Dispositioned In general the SR was met. There are areas          Transient fire scenarios have been postulated in methodology        based      on                such as the transient ignition sources related      each fire compartment as noted in Hughes (CAT I/II/III)      parameters that are expected                    identification are still required, some of these is  Calculation No. 1RCS04042.414.031-002.
to influence the likelihood of                  already self-identified as part of the "lead review" ignition to apportion high-level                activities as indicated in the -0067 notebook. For ignition frequencies (e.g., plant-              instance, fire zone 22 and others are identified in wide values) to estimate                        the "lead reviews" as additional effort is needed.
physical analysis unit or ignition      source        level              Address the transient ignition sources for frequencies.                                    application fire zones. Providing a complete and through ignition sources identification is important.
IGN-A9              POSTULATE the possibility of      Dispositioned HBRSEP did postulate transient combustibles          Transient fire ignition frequency has been transient combustible fires for                  for all physical analysis units except for one,      assigned to FC490. Transient Influence Factors (CAT I/II/III)      all physical analysis units                      FC490.      This physical analysis unit is the      of Low(1), Low(1), and Low(1) replaced factors regardless of the administrative                deepwell pump D enclosure. HBRSEP needs to          No(0), No(0), and No(0) for maintenance, restrictions.                                    provide      justification  for    why    transient occupancy, and storage, since entry to FC490, combustibles are not postulated for FC490.          which requires using a crane to remove the concrete enclosure, is not precluded.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-23
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                              Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                          Finding                                          Disposition PP-B6              ENSURE                            Dispositioned Underground cabling was not addressed in          The cable routing database system FSSPMD RNP-F/PSA-0067. The HBRSEP project team          was reviewed determining which manholes had (CAT I/II/III)      a. that    collectively,    the                noted a comment was included in this calculation  cables within the scope of the Fire PRA defined physical analysis                  that a Yard fire zone should be included in the associated with them. The manholes where units    encompass      all              next revision of the report.                      cables were identified have been included as locations within the global                                                                  plant partitioning elements (i.e., Physical Analysis analysis boundary                                                                            Units) in the Fire PRAs. The following manholes and                                                                                                have been included as plant partitioning elements: MH M-34, MH M-35, MH-1, and
: b. that    defined    physical                                                                  MH-34. The cables that were identified as routed analysis units      do not                                                                    through MH-35, MH-36 and MH have been overlap                                                                                      included      in  the    Intake    Structure    Fire Compartment, FC290. The cable loading for the manholes have been assessed following the same approach documented in the HBRSEP combustible loading calc. The approach consists of multiplying the factor of 5,515 BTU/ln-ft to each linear ft of cable. Under this approach, a total of 496350 BTUs have been estimated for each manhole. This assumes nine 10 long exposed cables per manhole. Nine cables is the average number of cables identified in the manholes.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-24
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                        Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                        Topic                Status                          Finding                                        Disposition PRM-B11            MODEL all operator actions      Dispositioned Main control room abandonment is discussed in    Fire response and Main Control Room (NOT MET)          and operator influences in                    Section 7.1.4 of Calculation P2217-1022-01-01,  Abandonment HFEs have not been incorporated accordance with the HRA                      "Fire Human Reliability Analysis" and Table 7.1  in the combined Internal Events/Fire PRA. The PRM-B2              element of this Standard.
lists the human failure events (HFEs) associated Main Control Room Abandonment HFEs from (CAT I/II/III)                                                    with main control room abandonment. However,    Hughes              Calculation            No.
these HFEs have not yet been incorporated into  RSC-CALKNX-2013-0301 has been incorporated HRA-B2                                                            the HBRSEP fire PRA model. Without the HFEs      into the recovery rule files used during the (NOT MET)                                                        for main control room abandonment, the          quantification process as appropriate based on HBRSEP fire PRA is incomplete.                  the fire compartment being quantified.
Incorporate the main control room abandonment    RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY HFEs into the fire PRA model.                    CLASSIFICATION:
Based on the abovementioned details, these SRs are considered to be MET at CAT I/II/III.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                              Page V-25
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                    Status                          Finding                                          Disposition PRM-B15            MODEL any new accident                Dispositioned Quantification of the HBRSEP fire PRA model        Following additional refinements to the model, progressions beyond the onset                      indicates that the fire-related LERF is about      LERF is more in line with typical results.
(CAT I/II/III)      of core damage identified per                      90 percent of the fire-related CDF. This result is PRM-B13 to determine the                            exceptionally high and has been self-identified fire-induced        LERF          in              by the utility. The result is produced by MSO accordance with HLR-LE-A,                          events in the switchgear and cable spreading HLR-LE-B, HLR-LE-C, and                            rooms that cause a core damaging accident HLR-LE-D and their SRs in                          sequence and also result in the spurious Part 2 with the following                          opening of several containment isolation valves.
clarifications:                                    Fire-related LERF for HBRSEP is an unusually (a) All the SRs under                              high proportion of the fire-related CDF. Typically, HLR-LE-A,              HLR-LE-B,                  fire-related LERF is 10 - 25 percent of the HLR-LE-C, and HLR-LE-D in                          fire-related CDF. At HBRSEP, fire-related LERF Part 2 are to be addressed in                      is about 90 percent of the fire-related CDF.
the context of fire scenarios including effects on system                        Investigate ways to remove conservatisms from operability    /    functionality,                the HBRSEP fire PRA model, particularly for the operator      actions,    accident                MSOs in the switchgear and cable spreading progression,      and      possible                rooms.
containment                failures accounting for fire damage to equipment and associated cabling.
(b) LE-C2 and LE-C6 in Part 2 are to be met in a manner consistent with 4-2.10.
(c) LE-C6 in Part 2 is to be met in a manner consistent with PRM-B9 above.
(d) LE-C8 in Part 2 is to be met in a manner consistent with PRM-B6 above.
and DEVELOP a defined basis to support      the      claim      of nonapplicability of any of these requirements in Part 2.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                        Page V-26
 
Duke Energy                                                                                                                                Attachment V - Fire PRA Quality Table V-1 Fire PRA Peer Review - Facts and Observations (with RESOLUTION OF CAPABILITY CATEGORY CLASSIFICATION For Non-CAT II)
SR                          Topic                  Status                            Finding                                        Disposition PRM-C1              DOCUMENT the Fire PRA              Dispositioned Documentation of development of the plant          The development of the plant response model is (CAT I/II/III)      plant response model in a                        response model is spread over several              documented in Attachment 9 of RNP-/PSA-0066 manner        consistent      with              calculations and documents. The primary            via a model change log. RNP-F/PSA-0066 also HLR-IE-D,              HLRAS-C,                  documents are RNP-F/PSA-0066 (component discusses assumptions made during the HLR-SC-C, HLR-SY-C, and                          selection)          and        P2217-1021-01-01 HLR-DA-E and their SRs in                        (quantification). Thus, key elements of the PRM    development of the model.
Part 2 as well as 4-2.10 with                    development (e.g., assumptions that are made the following clarifications:                    while developing the model) being dispersed and (a) HLR-IE-D in Part 2 is to be                  difficult to assimilate and comprehend. The met in a manner consistent                      dispersion of pertinent information about with that required under                        development of the PRM makes understanding HLR-IGN-B of this Standard.                      of the development difficult for reviewers and for (b) Document any defined                        utility staff who will make future modifications to bases to support the claim of                    the      HBRSEP        fire  PRA    model    and nonapplicability of any of the                  documentation.
referenced requirements in Part 2 beyond that already                      Develop a PRM-specific calculation or notebook covered by the clarifications in                which combines the pertinent portions of PRM this section.                                    documentation from existing documents or calculations.
UNC-A2              INCLUDE the treatment of          Dispositioned To comply with Section 2 applicable SRs intent      Section 7.0 of the HBRSEP Fire PRA (CAT I/II/III)      uncertainties, including their                  for UNC, a final documentation of importance        Quantification Calculation, provides an analysis documentation, as called out in                  rankings considering various sensitivity studies    of uncertainty regarding the quantification of the IGN-B5              SRs        PRM-A4,        FQ-F1,                along with applicable sequences is suggested to    HBRSEP Fire PRA. Importance rankings are also (CAT I/II/III)      IGN-A10, IGN-B5, FSS-E3,                        be included in the UNC discussion in an            discussed    in  this  section. Additionally, FSS-E4, FSS-H5, FSS-H9, and                      independent document.                              Section 9.0 provides a discussion of sensitivities CF-A2 and that required by                                                                          that were evaluated.
performing Part 2 referenced requirements throughout this Standard.
HBRSEP LAR Rev 1                                                                                                                                                    Page V-27}}

Latest revision as of 22:40, 9 January 2025

Transition Report, Revision 1, Transition to National Fire Protection Association Standard 805, with Attachments a, I, J, L, M, and V. Pages22-174
ML16158A267
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