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Forwards Safety Reviews of Plant Sys Re Fuel Loading & Precriticality post-core Load Hot Functional Testing, Criticality,Low Power Testing & full-power Operation Per Application for OL
	ML20107B662
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	10/31/1984
From:	Cain J; LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Eisenhut D; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	W3P84-3086, NUDOCS 8411020284
	Download: ML20107B662 (100)
	v • d • e

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October 31, 1984 J.M. CAIN Preside'nt W3P84-3086 3-A1.01.04 A4.05 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN:

Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT:

WATERI'ORD 3 SES REQUEST FOR OPERATING LICENSE REFERENCES 1) Letter W3A84-0133, J.M. Cain to D.G. Eisenhut, dated October 5, 1984

2) Letter, D.G. Eisenhut to J.M. Cain, dated June 13, 1984,

3) Letter W3B84-0807, J.M. Cain to D.G. Eisenhut, dated October 31, 1984 On October 5, 1984, I submitted a request for authorization to load fuel and perform pre-criticality hot functional testing, subject to our completion cf the pertinent elements of the Licensing Program Plan and other identified activities. This is to inform you that Waterford-3 is physically complete and ready for fuel loading.

Responses to all of the 23 issues identified by the NRC in Reference 2 have now been submitted. While the responses to Issues 1, 6 and 10 will be supple-mented in November (see Reference 3), the current status of our resolution of the issues fully supports issuance of an operating license conditioned to preclude initial criticality until the NRC has fully resolved the 23 issues.

This position represents our desire to confirm LP&L's confidence in the hardware acceptability to the NRC and the public served by LP&L prior to going critical and proceeding with the low power testing and power ascension program. The lack of fission products and decay heat, prior to initial criticality, assure that no significant hazard exists for fuel loading and subsequent pre-criticality testing.

The safety reviews of plant systems against each of the 23 NRC issues described in Reference 1 have bcen completed for the systems required by Technical Specifications for Modes 6 through Mode 3 (Fuel Load and Post-core Hot Functional Testing). As presented _in Attachment A, only three instances were determined to require a limited safety review. A limited safety review is defined as a 8411020284 841031 PDR ADOCK 05000382 i

PDR A

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'W3P84-3086"

Page 2; x

. safety review in which.the basis for the1 evaluation. requires that credit must

-be taken.for-lack of fission products and' decay heat. An additional safety

< review would be performed prior.to initial criticality. In these instances the

.re' solution of theLissues were evaluated 'to be sufficient to proceed with operation

, cinLModes.6cthrough 3.,:Further resolution would be a prerequisite to removing the' limitation'ont nitial criticality. Attachment B provides a summary of the i

safety. reviews performed for~the systems required by the Technical Specifications Jfor_ operation in Mode 2-and Mode' 1 (initial criticality to full power operation).

' Attachment {D of Reference l' included a listing of licensing commitments, significant

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. construction _ deficiencies,_ inspection report open items and fuel load prerequisite fsystem completion. work items. ;These items, with.the exception of-items listed fin Attachment C, have been-completed by LP&L or have been judged not to be truly jprerequisite to fuel load and post-core hot functional testing.- These judgements, which are few in number;-have been reviewed with the Resident NRC Inspectors.

nan. additional' area which must=be addressed relative to actual fuel-load is completion of' the surveillances required by Technical Specifications prior:to

' entering Mode 6 -(Fuel Load). _ : These surveillances are basically complete, as presented.in' Attachment C.. Completion of prerequisite surveillances for Modes 5 4 and 3 are'not expected to impact the performance of post-core hot functional

,' testing.

Your'timelysaction on'this matter is requested. With,both the plant and its

' staff'in their current' state of readiness, our ability to begin fuel loading and-pre-criticality testing in the near term will avoid unnecessary delays in the 2

schedule for achievement =of commercial' operation.

1

- Sincerely,

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J.M.-Cain JMC:KWC:sms.

+

-Attachments

~ cc (with Enclosure): LR.S. Leddick, D.E. Dobson, K.W. Cook, lJ.T. Collins (NRC)

D. Crutchfield (NRC),

N

.G. Knighton (NRC), G. Charnoff, L.L. Humphreys, R.L. Ferguson, J. Wilson (NRC), L. Constable-(NRC),

Project Files

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t ATTACHMENT A h:

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-SAFETY.. REVIEWS OF PLANT s

-SYSTEMS REQUIRED'BY-TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR FUEL LOADING'AND PRECRITICALITY

/

'a POST-CORE LOAD HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING

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LICENSING PLAN FOR FUEL LOADING AND PRECRITICALITY POST CORE LOAD HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING A Licensing Program Plan has been structured to institute safety reviews of those plant systems required for fuel load and post fuel load testing, criticality and low power testing (to 5% power) and full power operation.

j A detailed review of the technical specifications was performed to determine the listing of plant systems required for fuel loading and post-core hot functional testing under the limited license (Table A-1).

Forty-nine plant systems have been identified as being required to be operable by Waterford SES #3 technical specifications in modes 6, 5, 4, 3 (refueling through hot standby) and these systems are the subject of this Attachment (Attachment A).

These are the modes involved with fuel load and pre-criticality, post fuel load hot functional testing. This is a conservative approach because many of these requirements assume the presence of irradiated fuel and therefore are not of significance to the initial core loading and testing processes. This progrcm will assure LP&L management that the impact of any concern raised is properly assessed and resolved in the context of safe plant operations and protection of the public health and safety as will be specified in our operating license / standard technical specifications and FSAR.

Safety reviews were performed on each of the plant systems in Table A-1, against each of the 23 issues (Table A-2).

Table A-3 provides a complete matrix indicating those safety reviews which have been successfully completed. Table A-4 provides the footnotes associated with the Table A-3 matrix indicating outstanding actions required to complete the matrix.

Where successful completion of the safety review is indicated in Table A-3, the safety review assures completion of those actions necessary to insure the system is constructed and functions according to the requirements of the FSAR in light of the 23 issues, without consideration of the lack of fission products (due to not having gone critical).

In three instances it was judged to be necessary to perform limited safety reviews (credit must be taken for lack of fission products in order to justify safety significance). The matrix references a footnote describing the circumstances and basis for the limited review for each of the instances.

7 A-1

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During the: safety evaluation of these 49 fuel load systems they were

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categorized into_ subgroups that. logically represent the potential issue by.

issue safety impact.-The subgroups are defined in Table A-6 as:

A.; The issue does.not have a-safety related effect on the system because

a) Ethe contractor in question did n'or do work on the system under

evaluation,: or b) :-the procedure o'r process in question 'did not apply to the system

. under evalu'ation.

s' B.

The-issueldoes not have a:~afety related effect on the system because:

bM "a) the contractor'in question,did not do'any safety related work on the system under evaluation, or the procedure or process.in

. question did not apply to any: safety related portions of the system y

under~ evaluation.and

-b) ;any non-safety related activities performed on the system of concern does not have any significant effect on the safety related function of the system under evaluation.

E C.

The. issue does have-a potential. safety.related effect on the system-because:

a): 'tLe contractor in question,did' work of safety significance on the

~

system under evaluation, or

-b) the procedureLor process in' question did apply-to safety significant' activities of-the system under evaluation.

Safety, evaluations were performed'and verified.(as necessary)~to assure LP&L management that Waterford SES'f3 can be safely operated.without

-compromising the health and safety of'the public.. The subgroup for each 1

-system, as it relates to each of the' twenty-three issues, is presented in Table A-6.-In performing the:e' valuations, it was determined that it would be more effective to' subdivide the first issue '(Inspection Personnel -

Issues) into three subissues' covering-1A - Mercury, IB - Thompkins-Beckwith-and 1C

Other Contractors. ~This resulted in effectively 25 issues being evaluated for each'of:the149 plant' systems. Since this results in a total of 1225 safety reviews -(each~ co'nsisting of several pages) it is not

-feasible to present all of the documentation in this transmittal. The full-documentation.of the' safety reviews is'on file at the Waterford SES #3 J0n-site. Licensing Unit offices forJinspection and review by the NRC' staff.

1The_ individual' safety reviews were reviewed and summaries prepared, for those. falling within Subgroup-C. The summaries are included in'this

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= ttachment - (Table A-5) for each issue and subissue.

a A-2 4

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TABLE A-1 1 PLANT SYSTEMS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DURING

FUEL LOADING AND PRE-CRITICAL POST-CORE LOAD HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING MODE OPERABILITY 1 ACRONYM

,SYS. NO.

-DESCRIPTION IS REQUIRED LDC-02A 125v D'C SAFETY MODE 1-6 MT

- 03 SWITCHING STATION MODE 1-6

~ ST 04' STARTUP TRANSFORMERS MODE 1-6

~1 4kv -

06A1 4.16kv ELEC. DISTRIBUTION MODE 1-6

-SAFETY

'SSD-

-07A 480v ELEC. DISTRIBUTION SAFETY-MODE 1-6 l

LVD.-

~08A 208/120v ELEC. DISTRIBUTION MODE 1-6 SAFETY

ID 09A INVERTERS & DISTRIBUTION' MODE 1-6 SAFETY-10 COMMUNICATIONS MODE 1-6 HT'

~13A-1 HEAT TRACE SAFETY MODE 1-6

-EM ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING ~

ALL MODES

- SM -

.17 SEISMIC MONITORING ALL MODES a:

-ARM /RMC/.'

18-1.

RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM ALL MODES

-PRM

.18 18-3 18-4 l

18. SS:

20' SECURITY SYSTEM ALL MODES-FPD 21-FIRE DETECTION

-ALL MODES-FP.

'22 FIRE PROTECTION ALL MODES CC 36-1 COMPONENT COOLING WATER MODE 1-6 36-2

'ACC-36-3 AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING MODE 1. ATER W

'EG 39-EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR MODE 1 I RN -

140-2 CRANE & HOIST FHB MODE 6-ONLY C

R 1 CCS.'

4?A RCB CONTAINMENT ~ COOLING MODE 1-4 s'

JSBV

-43B SHIELD BLDG VENTILATION MODE 1-4 4

A-3 E

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PLANT. SYSTEMS REQUI' RED BY-TECHNICAL-SPECIFICATIONS DURING-

FUEL LOADING AND' PRE-CRITICAL POST-CORE' LOAD HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING' q

3

- MODE OPERABILITY

ACRONYM-!

SYS. NO.

DESCRIPTION IS REQUIRED

.CVR:

43E:

CONTAINMENT VACUUM RELIEF.

MODE 1-4

.HVC'

'46B

. CONTROL ROOM HVAC ALL MODES.

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46D RAB HVAC-MODE l-6

.CHWi 46E RAB~ CHILLED WATER MODE 1-6 FP L46K FIRE' DAMPERS ALL MODES CB' 48.

LRT CONTAINMENT VESSEL MODE l-6

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PAC-

49

. PROCESS ANALOG CONTROL MODE 1-6

-IC 50B MISC. PANELS MODE l-6' y

-RCS-52A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM MODE 1-6 52B-52C e

~CVC 53A

CHARGING & LETDOWN MODE l-6 BAM,,

.53B BORIC ACID MAKEUP MODE l,

-PSLE

' 54--9 PRIMARY SAMPLING MODE 1-5 GWM SSA

-GASEOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT ALL MODES

?LWM 55B LIQUID & LAUNDRY WASTE ALL MODES 55E MANAGEMENT

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58 SAFETY INJECTION-MODE 1-6

'i 60A~

60B 60C

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. CONTAINMENT SPRAY MODE l-4~

FHS

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" FUEL HANDLING & STORAGE MODE 6 ONLY

PPS 66 PLANT PROTECTION SYSTEM ALL-MODES 63 hA ENI 65A EXCORE NUCLEAR INST.

MODE 1-6

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7IB CONDENSATE MAKEUP MODE 1-3 EFW-73 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER MODE l-3 1

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,-v, yve-,-m,e,-nw-m m w p m e w, w r e r-r w-r-

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TABLE A-1 PLANT SYSTEMS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DURING FUEL LOADING AND PRE-CRITICAL POST-CORE LOAD HOT FUNCTIONAL TESTING MODE OPERABILITY LACRONYM SYS, NO.

DESCRIPTION IS REQUIRED

.SSL 75 SECONDARY-SAMPLING MODE 1-4 SG.'

76 STEAM GENERATORS & MSIV MODE 1-4 TUR 88 TURBINE & TURBINE' CONTROLS MODE 1-3 91 SEISMIC SUPPORTS.

ALL MODES 19-16 WHIP RESTRAINTS ALL MODES 19-17 SYSTEM SUPPORTS'(HANGERS)

ALL MODES SEISMIC STRUCTURES ALL' MODES A-5 i

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L TABLE A-2 SAFETY-REVIEW ISSUES ISSUEi NO.

-(A). Inspection Personnel Issues - Mercury:

11

'(B) Inspection Personnel Issues - T&B

' (C) Inspection Personnel' Issues - Other Contractors 2

' Missing NI Instrument Line Documentation

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-Instrumentation Expansion Loop Separation 4

. Lower Tier Corrective Actions are not being Upgraded to NCRs 5

Ven' dor Documentation - Conditional Releases

'6 Dispositioning of Nonconformance and Discrepancy Reports

.7' Backfill Soil Densities "8

' Visual ~ Examination of Shop Welds During Hyrdrostatic Testing

,9,

--Welder Certification 110:

. Inspector Qualifications (J.

A.. Jones & Fegles) 11' Cadwelding

- l'2

. Main Steanline Framing Restraints 13' Missing'NCRs 14 J..A. Jones Speed Letters and EIRs

'15 Welding of "D" Level Material Inside Containment

-16

. Surveys and Exit Interviews' of QA Personnel 17.

[QC Verification of Expension Anchor Characteristics

-18

' Documentation of Walkdowns on Non-Safety Related Equipment 19 Water in Basemat Instruments 20 Construction Materials Testing (CMT) Personnel Qualification

-Records 21 LP&L QA Construction System Status and Transfer Reviews 22' Welder Qualifications (Mercury) and Filler Material Control (Site Weld) 23.

.QA Program Breakdown Between Ebasco and Mercury A-6

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TALLE A-3 SYSTENS / ISSUE SAFEIY RESOIITTICH HATRIX Indicates that Tean:, I3EC, P0Z and Plant P.anager review comoleted.

SysIYM 1

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4 5-6 7'

8 9

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I X

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'X X

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X X

X X.

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08A 208/120V Electric X

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E E

E N

M N

.O O

O O

O N

N N

a.

O I O O

. N N

N N

N n.

N LT N

0 1

2 3

4 5

6 7

8 9

1 1

1 5

E.

E E

U U

S S

S S.

S S

I I

I

.I.

I I

ET

)

O 2

N

(

lllll

q

,1 L ! ! ;"

b

+i

[

t q

. 1 3

4 X

I RTAM N

b IT R

U O

L I

O S

R S

N P

E O

R I

W T

E' 4'

W S C

I E E A

V' A

I T

E 3

V O G

R 1

E E

N N

L

'R T I

W~

A B

O D

E A

Y O N

N T

T F A

E T

S F

S E

A T

R k

U I

O U

S Q '

E E'

U R

SS I

/

W S

E M

I.

E V2 T

E S

RE Y

D S

YO TM EFG AN SI R

'D E ET TN E

IE E

E E

N M

N N

N O

IO O

O O

N LT N

N N

2, 3

9 0

1 1

2 2

~

E E

E U

U U

S S

T I

I I

I

)

E 3

T

(

ON Ii j ;

Q 4

1

)

Ii!!;l iiI h

?E

TABLE A-5 SAFETY REVIEW SUMMARIES A-14

.,1 A

'h

' Issue #1 - ' Inspection-Personnel -Issues LThis: issue was. evaluated on a. contractor basis.:.

LIssue'#1'A - Mercury, Subgroup C - Mercury'did perform safety related work on the system and safety evaluations were ' performed to as'sure LP&L management that Waterford Steam

~

Electric Station f3 ean be safely: operated without compromising the health L

7.,,

'{

" and safety!'of.the public.-

_ Issue #1 does have a potential effect on:

s System #

System Description

Evaluation 218-3' Radiation Monitoring System Installation of safety related-instrumenta-L22x

. Fire Protection tion was inspected by potentially unqualified c36-1

. Component Cooling Water inspectors._ The quality of safety related instru-36-2 Component Cooling Water.

mentation associated with

.this system was verified.

-36-3 L Aux. Component Cooling

-Verification was accom-

. Water plished by reinspection

.of N1 instrument loops.

39

. Emergency Diesel Generator Satisfactory completion

'of this program involving

'43AL RCB Containment Cooling-Mercury installations verifies acceptance cf the.

-43Bl Shield Bldg. Ventilation-installations..Accordingly,-

this issue does not-serve 43E.

Containment Vacuum Relief as a constraint to the safe operation of these systems, 46B-Control Room HVAC and has been resolved and 46D'

. closed out by LP&L.

RAB HVAC

.46E3

-RAB Chilled Water

.52A,

Reactor Coolant System

.G

52B-Reactor Coolant System-

52C.

Reactor Coolant System 53A Charging & Letdown

~

53B.

Borie Acid Makeup

- A-15 3.

we ew w **r

System #

System Description

55A Gaseous Waste Management 55B Liquid Wasta Management 58 Safety Injection 60A Safety Injection 60B Safety Injection 60C Safety Injection 59 Containment Spray 66 Plant Protection System 63 Plant Protection System 71B Condensate Make-up 73 Emergency Feedwater 76 Steam Generator and MSIVs l

A-16

m T

~

.[

tf' - _ _

M i-. Tissue 1#1B - Tompkins-Beckwith' n.

(Subaroup C TompkinanBeckwith did perform safety'related work on the system, iand safety ' evaluations were performed co; assure LP&L management that

.Waterford SES;f3 can'be safely. operated without compromising the health and

~

' safety.of the public.

r:

Issue #1.does have'a potential.effect ont' 1 System #

System Description

Evaluation

[

18-3

' Radiation Monitoring Work performed on this system was inspected by.

'22-Fire Protection potentially unqualified egg.

a6' inspectors. To close out

,36-l'

. Component Cooling Water' the concern LP&L verified the qualifications of the

~ 6 ~ Component, Cooling Water initial' inspectors. LP&L 3

also verified qualifica-

e

..:.36-3 Aux. Component Cooling tions of the inspectors LWater.

performing any'over-inspec-tion.' - Over-inspection

~

39.

. Emergency Diesel Generator provided to meet the ASME Code requirements for third 43B

Shield Bldg.. Ventilation party Authorized Nuclear Inspection' services and-

~

43E~

Containment Vacuum Relief independent Preservice

^

Inspection in conjunction 4651 Control Room HVAC with other inspection programs, hydrostatic

+

146D RAB HVAC

-testing, and Pre-Core Hot.

13 '

=FLactional Testing' confirm

'46E.

RAB Chilled Water-the acceptability of hard-

.were installed by Tompkins.

, 48 LRT Containment Vessel Beckwith.

^

52A-Reactor. Coolant System t

52B

' Reactor Coolant System 152C -

Reactor' Coolant System 53A Charging and Letdown i

3535 Boric Acid Makeup T54 Primary Sampling

.55A:

- Gaseous Waste Management j

55B Liquid and Laundry Waste Management i

b A-17 c

6 i

3, s g

~,,

i t.

A-

'\\[

4

,N,-

1

}N

'p_

t; System #'

System Description

,ai (55Ei Liquid and Laundry Waste-

=

Management

?

- 58 J.

Safety Injection O

'. '60A -

~ SafetyIn[ection

- i60B-

' Safety Injection.

60C'

'. Safety Injection 259

. Containment. Spray 1

-- 61) '

Fuel Handling and' Storage

'(65A-1

'Excore Nuclear Instrument

-71B Condensate Make-up-

[73l Emergency Feedwater-76.

- Steam Generatoriand.MSIV 88-

~ Turbine.and Turbine Controls 19-16

-' Whip' Restraints

' System Suppor's L 19-t y

fr 2

6 s

A,.

i i

W

?g.

T-

,,1

.I, J

Issue-f1C - Other Contractors Subgroup C --Other Contractors (other;than Mercury and Tompkins-Beckwith) did

. perform safety related work on a. number'of systems and. safety evaluations are

,being performed to assure LP&L management'that Waterford SES #3 can be safely

. operated without.iompromising the health and safety of the public.

.. Issue #1C does have a potential effect on:

L -

System'#

System Description Evaluations

~

All Table A-1 See Table A-1 A' limited safety review

-Systems" was performed based upon the results of inspector qualification validation to date and the lack of fission products and decay heat prior to initial criticality.

4 J

LA-18a

i

~

A I

[ Issue #2_-MissingN1'InstrumentLineDocumentation l

Subgroup'C - Instrumentation installations that were identified to have

,1 Jadequate documentation 7to support the ' quality' of the - installations but a

~

Ldecision was made -to rework the installations to-comply with ASME III documentation requirements.are contained <in'this system and a safety evaluation was5 performed to assure.LP&L management that'Waterford SES #3 can tw safely operated without compromising ~the health _and safety of_the pubite.

JI'ssue #2'does have"an'effect:on-

~

w Systemsf-

' System Description Evaluation

'36-1[

Component Cooling Water eg 36-2'

, Component Cooling Watert

^

136-3

- Aux._ Component Cooling These systems were_ reworked Wate r..

to correct documentation to demonstrate system

39?

Emergency Diesel Generator operability and remove

. tube class breaks from 43B.

- Shield Building Ventila-ASME III to ANSI B31.1.

. tion -.

All work is complete.

166L

' Plant Protection System.

s.

63 Plant Protection System-

)73 Emergency Feedwater

76'-

Steam Generator and MSIV

.i.

,C E

h 1

-A-19

.n ne,,--,,,,,n.

I a

~

Issue #3 - Instrumentation Expansion Loop Separation

. Subgroup C - It has'been determined that there is identified installation j

deficiency regarding tubing separation criteria in the system and a safety evaluation was~ performed to' assure LP&L management that Waterford SES #3 can be safely operated without compromising ~the health and safety of the public.

Issue #3 does have.a potential effect on:

- System #-

System Description

Evaluation

'661 Plant Protection System New tube tracks and supports were installed to 63 Plant Protection System correct the deficiencies.

Accordingly, this issue does not serve as a constraint to the safe operation of these systems, and has been resolved and closed out by LP&L.

A-20

Issue #4 - Lower Tier Corrective Actions Are Not Being Upgraded to NCR's

. Subgroup C - DCN's, FCR's, EDN's and T-B DN's.have been reviewed and it was determined that some documents should have been upgraded to NCR's.

A safety evaluation was performed to assure LP&L management that Waterford SES #3 can be safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public.

Issue #4 does have a potential effect on all systems in Table A-6.

The Evaluation reveals that a statistically acceptable number of lower tier documents were reviewed showing no significant quality impact (no cases were detected which were safety significant and would be reportable under 10CER50.55e). 'Therefore it is possible to conclude with a 95% confidence level that 95% of the.unsampled documents contain no significant deficiencies. Accordingly, this issue does not serve as a constraint to safe operation of the systems.

A-21

4 4

Issue:f5 - Vendor' Documentation - Conditional Releases

' Subgroup C'- With a review of QA/QC records it is concluded that there-are no

~

unresolved items which affect the systems, however Issue #5 does have a potential effect on all systems in Table A-6.

- The Evaluation reveals that during the review of QA/QC records conditional

~

releare items which affected systems were evaluated and closed out by LP&L

~

with -receipt of the " unconditional" paperwork. No items exist to affect the safety _ function of'the systems.

A-22

N-t- ).

(Issue'#6 - Dispositioning of Non-Conformance and Discrepancy Reports

Subgroup C - It was noted during a review.of NCR's that some of the reports had questionable.dispositioning potentially rendering the quality of installation indeterminate.

Issue #6 does'have a potential effect on all systems in Table A-6.

The Evaluation included a combination screening and sampling method to review ERASCO NCR's including NCR's identified by the NRC and no items were identified which had significant safety impact on the systems. Mercury NCR's

.were reviewed for upgrade and sampled to determine reportability to support the conclusion that the safety review is not effected.

(

A-23

T:, r r

, a.c w

1 h-

-. Issue #7 - Backfill Soil Densities 1 Subgroup C, Data from the in-place density tests on the class A fill was potentially;not : traceable _ relative to the technical adequacy of the

placements, therefore the impact on the the quality of the. system may have

>been indeterminate.' 'A safetyLevaluation was performed to assure LP&L i

management that Waterford SES'f3 can.be safely-operated without compromising

.the' health 1and safety of the public.

. Issue #7 does have,a potential effect on all systems in Table A-6.

~

The Evaluation reveals that'the data for the in-place density tests performed

'on;the class A fill has'been located and has been transmitted to the QA records vault. ' Review and analysis of the records indicates'that the Class A backfill-soil densities are in accordance with specifications and FSAR requirements except for analytically non-significant. deficiencies'and does provide the required design structural capacity for the plant under seismic loadings.- Accordingly, this. issue does not. serve.as a constraint to safe operation of the system,'and has been resolved and closed out by LP&L.

h, 6

6 7

A-24

7;C

/

Issue #8 - Visual Examination of Shop Welds During Hydrostatic Testing TSubgroup C The system does include ASME Class 1 & 2 welds (shop and field) that'were. inspected during total system hydro in the field. A safety evaluation was performed to assure LP&L management that Waterford SES #3 can

. be' safely operated without compromising tha health and safety of the public.

' Issue'#8'does have a potential effect on:

System #

System Description

Evaluation 18-1 Radiation Monitoring System ASME Class 1 & 2 welds

-(shop and field) were 18-2 Radiation Monitoring inspected and documented on ASME N-5 code data reports L18-3 Radiation Monitoring during total system hydro in the field. The ASME 18-4 :

Radiation Monitoring Class 1 & 2 welds (shop and field) were tested and

18-5 Radiation Monitoring inspected in accordance with ASME code, in the 36-1

. Component Cooling Water-field. There is no devia-tion from FSAR require-36-2 Component Cooling Water ments. -Accordingly, this issue does not serve'as a 36-3

. Aux. Component Cooling restraint to safe operation Water of these systems, and has been resolved and closed

' 52A' -

Reactor' Coolant System.

out by LP&L.

52B Reactor Coolant System 52C

. Reactor Coolant System 53A Charging And Letdown 53B Boric Acid Makeup 54-9

. Primary Sampling 55A Gaseous Waste Management S5B Liquid and Laundry Waste Management

'55E Liquid and Laundry Waste Management 58-Safety Injection A-25

.C e

s cSystem #

System Description-60A-Safety Injection

' 60B -

Safety Injection

60C Safety Injection 59 I Containment Spray.

-71B-Condensate Makeup 73.

Emergency Feedwater

~L76 Steam Generator and MSIV A-26

)

7l L

+

,.y

t

' Issue #9' -Welder Certification lSubtroup'C'- During theLNRC Staff review of the records for the installation of the supports for certain instrumentation cabinets in the RCB, it was

-determined the same documentation.was apparently missing. This apparent missing documentation pertained to support. welds and certification of some

welders. A safety evaluation was performed to assure LP&L management that 3-Waterford SES'#3'can be safely operated without compromising the health and

' safety of the.public:

Issue' #9'does -have a potential effect on':

-System #=

System Description

Evaluation; 48

' Containment Vessel The review and evaluation of s

the welding for the RCB 52AL Reactor Coolant System instrument cabinets in question is complete with 52B Reactor Coolant System confirmation of its capability to adequately 52C Reactor Coolant System perform its safety function under design conditions.

55B Liquid and Laundry The welding on.instrumenta-Waste Management tion cabinets supports that affect these systems has 55E Liquid and Laundry been reinspected and verified-Waste Management as acceptable with no rework required. No further correc--

58'

. Safety Injection.

tive action is required.

60A Safety Injection 60B.

Safety Injection

'60C Safety Injection 66.

Plant. Protection System 63 Plant Protection System 76 Steam Generators.and MSIV Seismic Structures 4

I '

A-26a

Issue #10 -~Tnspector Qualifications 1--(J.A. Jones and Fegles)

Subgroup C'- J.A._-Jones and Fegles were responsible for the construction of

~

.the basemat and all structural concrete on,the basemat. A safety evaluation

was. performed to assure LP&L' management that Waterford SES #3 can be safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public.

-Issue #10 does'have-a potential effect on:

System #-

System Description' Evaluation

' Seismic Structures A limited safety review was performed based upon the results of inspector qualification verification to-date, lack of fission products and decay heat prior to initial criticality and low probability of a seismic event during the time period from Fuel Load to initial criticality.

A-27

_____________J

,m

LIssue'#11 - Cadwelding

' Subgroup C - Data from the cadweld testing program was potentially not traceable relacive.to the technical adequacy; therefore the impact on the system could have been indeterminate. A safety evaluation was performed to fassure LP&L management the Waterford SES No. 3 can be safely operated without compromising the health-and safety of the public~.

Issue #11.does have a potential effect on all systems in Table A-6.

The Evaluation of cadweld records concluded that discrepancies noted were not

- significant tof safety and would not have had any effect on the structural-

. capability of:the NPIS during operation and safe shutdown. The probability

- of an accident previously evaluated in the FSAR is not increased.

Accordingly, this issue does not serve as a constraint to the safe operation of the systems, and has been resolved and closed out by LP&L.

A-28

y -

Issue #12 - Main Streamline Framing Restraints

' Subgroup C -' Apparent failure to inspect the installation of the main streamline. framing restraints may' rendered the quality of the system indeterminate. _A safety evaluation was performed to assure LP&L management that' Waterford SES #3 can be safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public.-

Issue #12 does have a potential effect on:

System #

. System Description

Evaluation 76 Steam Generators and The deficiencies noted MSIV during the reinspection have been corrected and 19 1 Seismic Supports all hardware corrective actions have been completed

'19-16 Whip Restraints and verified by LP&L.

Accordingly, this issue 19-17' System Supports does not serve as a (Hangers) constraint to safe operation of these systems.

Seismic Structures and has been resolved and closed out by LP&L.

A-29

fa Issue #13:- Missing NCRs Subaroup C -;It was.noted that there were missing reports in the

! consecutively numbered EBASCO and Mercury NCRs implying missing NCRs that may n

have' rendered' system quality indeterminate. A safety evaluation was performed.to assure LP&L management that Waterford SES #3 can be' safely

~

operated without-compromising the heath and safety of the public.

. Issue #13 does have 'a potential effect on all systems in Table 'A-6.

The Evaluation includes reviews of EBASCO and Mercury'NCR documentation completed by LP&L QA. EBASCO and Mercury missing / voided NCRs and Mercury NCRs closed administratively have been determined to be properly dispositioned and closed. -There are no unreviewed safety questions for this system pertinent to

=this issue.

w N

A-30

~

.i

-. LIssueLf14'- J.A. Jones Speed Lett'ers and EIRs-h

~

Subtroup C - Contractors' performing safety related work generated EIRs and

~

Speedy Menos'which transmitted design information that could potentially

.. affect system quality. A safety review was performed to assure LP&L'

~

management that.the system can be safely operated without compromising the

haalth and safety;of the public.

Issue #14~does have a potential effect on all systems in Table A-6.

The Evaluation included a sampling program to evaluate informal documents o-requesting engineering information from safety related contractors. Of all

- the samples reviewed those that resulted in design change deficiency had no safety significance. The program provides reasonable assurance that informal i

documents were not-used to transmit design changes which have safety i

-' significance.

l t

M P

A-31 2--w

.--.- x.--a

W 7

s

.i

,..r ! -

~

. Issue'#15'- Weldins'of'"D" Level Material Inside Containment f Subaroup'C - Class "D" material installation inside containment does have a

. potential effeat on:

System'#

System Description

Evaluation 108A" 208/120v Elec. Distribution.During the evaluation of Safety-Class "D" material installation inside

'17 Seismic Monitoring containment the work and material under review was 18-1 Radiation Monitoring verified by LP&L.

' System Contractor QA is of satisfactory quality, and 18-2 Radiation Monitoring' this issue does not have

' System an adverse effect en the safety analysis, system 18-3:

Radiation Monitoring operability or margin to System safety on these systems.

~18-4~

Radiation Monitoring System 5, Radiation Monitoring System 21 Fire Detection

' 22 Fire Protection 36-1 Component Cooling Water 36-2 Component Cooling Water 40-2 Crane & Hoist FHB 43A RCB Containment Cooling 43E.

Containment Vacuum Relief-

48 LRT Containment Vessel 52A Reactor Coolant System 525 Reactor Coolant System

-52C Reactor Coolant System 53A' Charging & Letdown 54-9 Primary Sampling A-32

t'

' System-#

System Descripti<in t

[58-Safety' Injection =

60A' Safety Injection -

~

.608

Safety Injection-60C Safety Injection

~ 59-Containment Spary 61 ^

Fuel Handling & Storage i

65A-1

-Excore Nuclear Inst.

65A-2' Excore' Nuclear > Inst.

'71B Condensate Makeup

' 76 -

Steam Generators & MSIV 91 Seismic Supports 19-16

.Wip Restraints 19 17

' System Supports (Hangers)

Seismic Structures t

1, ;

A-33

_i r

i

-Issue #16 - Surveys and Exit Interviews of QA Personnel 4

Subaroup'C - An interview program was instituted by~LP&L to provide an

. additional avenue of communication to elicit information on quality concerns

. from personne1' prior to leaving the Waterford SES No.~3 project. The concern was that:the LP&L program may not.have promptly or' thoroughly er.amined the

+

specific = areas of concern and the programmatic implications of these systems.

Issue #16 does have a potential effect on a!1 systems in Table A-6.

l The Evaluation reveals that' all concerns are being reviewed under an improved quality concern program. Where there are issues not previously identified with potential safety related consequences, these issues are promptly reported.to LP&L management..These concerns are properly addressed under LP&L required and approved management. programs in a timely fashion. The

- program does not involve unreviewed safety issues.

f e

I t

1 a

t E

4

'h a

A-34

n-4

-Issue #17 -'QC Verification of Expansion Anchor Characteristics Subtroup C'- Mercury. the subject of this concern, did install safety related instrumentation expansion anchors in these systems. A safety evaluation was

,~~

performed to assure LP&L management that the system can be safely operated

,q-

~ without compromising the health and safety of the public.

-- Issue #17 does have a potential effect on:

System,#(

System Description

Evaluation 18-1 Radiation Monitoring Inspection forms were used 18-2:

System-that do not explicitly.

18 cover all inspection 18-4 attributes. The rainspec-18-5 tion of all Mercury installed N1 instrumentation 36-1 Component cooling Water and subsr.quent engineering evaluations indicates that 36-2 Component Cooling Water the issue of expansion anchor characteristic

~36-3 Aux.' Component Cooling Water inspection forms have no safety significance for 39 Emergency Diesel Generator these systems.

43A RCB Containment Cooling l

43B Shield Bldg. Ventilation I

43E Containment Vacuum Relief 46B Control Room HVAC 46D RAB HVAC 46E RAB Chilled Water SOB Misc Panels-

$2A Reactor Coolant System 528 Reactor. Coolant System 52C Reactor Coolant System L

'53A Charging and Letdown 53B Boric Acid Makeup 55A Gaseous Waste Management A-35 l

V.-

^

Issue #18'- Documentation of Walkdowns on Non-Safety Related Equipment L

Subgroup C - Documentation of walkdown on non-safety related equipment does have a potential effect on:

System #'

System Description

Evaluation p

02A

'125v DC Safety Area inspections where the system is present indicate l'

06A 4.16ky Elec.

no interactions of safety Distribution Safety significance. Accordingly, this issue does not serve 07A 480v Elec.

as a restraint to safe Distribution Safety operation of these systems, and has been resolved and

~08A 208/120v Elec.

closed out by LP&L.

Distribution Safety

'09A Inverters &

l Distribution Safety 10 Communications

~13A-1 Heat Trace Safety

-16 Environmental Monitoring 17 Seismic Monitoring 18-1 Radiation Monitoring System 18-2 Radiation Monitoring System 18-3 Radiation Monitoring System 18-4 Radiation Monitoring System 18-5 Radiation Monitoring System 20 Security System 21 Fire Detection 22, Fire Protection A-36

C V

System # '

System Description

36-1; Component Cooling Water 36-2 Component Cooling Water 36-3

-Aux Component Cooling Water-39' Emergency Diesel Generator 40-2 Crane & Hoist FHB

'43A RCB Containment Cooling 43B Shield Bldg. Ventilation

>)

43E

. Containment Vacuum Relief 46B

' Control-Room HVAC

_46D RAB HVAC 46E-RAB Chilled Water

~46K-Fire Dampers 48 LRT Containment Vessel u49 -

Process Analog Control

50B Misc. Panels-

-52A Reactor Coolant System 52B Reactor Coolant System 52C Reactor Coolant System 53A Charging & Letdown 53B Boric Acid Makeup 54-9 Primary Sampling

'55A-Gaseous Waste Management s

A-37

T

1. System #

System Description

55B Liquid & Laundry Waste

Management SSE Liquid &^ Laundry Waste Management' 5 8 '.

. Safety Injection 60A Safety Injection 60B Safety Injection

~ 60C:

Safety Injection 59 Containment Spray 61.

Fuel Handling & Storage 66 Plant Protection System 63 Plant Protection System 65A-1 Excore Nuclear Inst.

65A Excore Nuclear Inst.

-71B Condensate Makeup 73 Emergency Feedwater 75-Secondary Sampling 76 Steam Generators & MSIV

=91 Seismic Supports 19-16' Whip Restraints 19-17 System Supports (Hangers)

Seismic Structures A-38

D'

l s

2 m

Issue #19 - Water in Basemat' Instruments-x-

1

- Subgroup C - Water in basemate instruments does have a potential effect on:

System #-

System Description.

Evaluation-

'08A-208/120 v Elec. Distribution The present' analysis for Safety

. moderate energy pipe rupture flooding per the 10 "

Communications FSAR envelopes the concern for water seepage since 13A-1; Heat Trace' Safety this flow rate would be minimal. Accordingly,

~

L17 Seismic Monitoring this issue does not serve i

as a restraint to safe 18-1

-Radiation Monitoring

-operation of these System systems, and has been resolved and closed out 18-2 Radiation Monitoring by LP&L.

System-3-Radiation Monitoring' System

'18-4

> Radiation' Monitoring:

System 18-5 Radiation Monitoring

' System.

20 Security System 36-1 Component Cooling Water F

36-2 Component Cooling Water

~'

36-3 Aux Component Cooling Water.

43A RCB Containment Cooling

'46D RAB HVAC 46E RAB Chilled Water 53A Charging & Letdown

'53BL Boric Acid Makeup A-39

~. -. _ _ -. _ -. -,. _ _ _ _

L System #'

System Description

}.

55A.

Gaseous Waste Management

-55B Liquid & Laundry Waste

' Management 55E -'

' Liquid & Laundry Waste Management 58

. Safety 'Inj ection 60A Shfety Injection 60B Safety Injection 60C Safety Injection 59 Containment' Spray

71B Condensate Makeup 17 3 Emergency Feedwater Seismic Structures A-40

Issue #20 - Construction Materials Testing (CMT) Personnel Qualifications Records Subgroup-C - Construction Material Testing (CMT) personnel did do work on the system and a safety evaluation was performed to assure-LP&L management that

- Waterford SES #3 can be safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public.

Issue #20 does have a potential effect on:

System #

System Description

Evaluation Seismic Structures An Engineering Evaluation of CMT for backfill soils indicates no defective work of safety significance was accepted as a result of testing personnel actions.

A limited safety review was performed based upon the results of inspector qualification verification to date, lack of fission products and decay heat prior to initial criticality ana low probability of a seismic event during the time period from Fuel Load to initial criticality.

t s

I A-41

p 1.=

Issue #21 -- LP&L -QI. Construction System Status and Transfer Reviews Subaroup C - Open walkdown. comments did have a potential impact on the system even though startup and system engineering evaluated the walkdown concerns and determined tbst there is no adverse impact on system / testing or opacability.

. Issue #21 does have a potential effect on:

System f.

System Description

Evaluation 71 Condensate Makeup All open walkdown comments have been resolved / closed.

91 Seismic Supports All significant construction QA findings have been identified and properly dispositioned.

Accordingly, this review does not serve as a constraint to safe operation of these systems, and has been resolved and closed out by LP&L.

A-42

b 4

i i,

k Issue #22 - Welder Qualifications (Mercury) and Filler Materials Control b

(Site Wide)

E....

Subaroup C -~The LP&L review of qualifications status documentation for all L

Mercury welders has been completed and the program does have a potential impact on'the system. The weldsent filler material controls did apparently

'l f

- deviate from code requirements.

. Issue #22 'does' have a potential effect on all systems in. Table A-6.

~

The Evaluation contains a. clarification of the review finding on welder qualifications, and there are no potential unreviewed safety questions pertinent to this issue.

"Rebaking" of low hydrogen electrodes was not practiced on the site and engineering justification demonstrates that while there were limited deviations from code specifications however this did not cause degradation of quality of weldsent filler material.

t.

L f

1 I

I 1

I, I

I r

4 A-43

F. ".

+

b

. Issue #23' _QA Program Breakdown Between EBASCO And Mercury The concern-is.not directly related to the systems under'. review and is considered 'to be progra==ntic'in nature.

' There are no Subgroup C' systems.

'N

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b i$

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A-43a

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. ISSUES-

.No.'1

. No. 2 ;

No. 3_

No. 4 -

No. 5 No. 6

- No. 7 No. 8..

+

inspection - Missing NI - - instrumen- ' Lower Tier -Vendor Docu-Disposition-Backfill' Visual Exam-

- Personnel 7 Instrument, tation Ex 2; Corrective mentation.- ing of Non. Soil.,

ination of

. Issues.

. Line Docu, ~ pension Loop Actions'are. Conditional conformance. Densities.. Shop Welds.

mentation Separation not being. - Releases-and Discrep -

During.

.SYSTEN

.(A)(B)(C)

NCRs.

. Testing s

Upgraded to;

,ancy Reports.

.'Rydrostatic 02A - 125v DC Safety A'B C.

A'

-- A C-C

'C.

C.

'A' 03

- Switching Starten;

'A B.C A

A

-C C

C C

A-OS

- Startup Transformers

.A BfC ~

A' A.

-C

'C C

C A.

06A - 4.16kw Elec.

A.B-C' A

A C

C.

C-C-

-A.

1 Distribution Safety ;

07A - 480v Elec.

A B C-

.A A

. C ;-

C ~

' C _'

C A

.j Distribution Safety 08A - 200/120r Elec.

A BC A

A C

C C

C A-i Distribution Safety j

09A - inverter.

A B C A.

. A-C' C-C C

A Distribue1*3 2'afety.

9 1

10

- Coutumvr.z" me A B C A

. A

'C" C

C C

A 1

. B C A.

A C.

C.

C-C.

A 13A Heat Trace Safety

,A i

16

- Environmental A B C A

A C

C

.C C

A.

Monitoring 17

- Seismic Monitoring A.B C A_

A

.C C

'C C

A 2

i Ii 1

A-44 1

il' 4

1 -

R. I

~ ~

r - :

~

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.+

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=

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4

.~ ~ TABLE A-6 '

-iSsurs

~

No. 8i,

iNo. ' 1..,

no. 2 No.13 -

No. 4.

No. 5-f No., 6

- No. 7 :

-- Inspection;' Missing N1-instrumen-' ; Lower Tier : Vendor Docu-Disposition-Backf til Visual Esam-J.

.Peroommel.

Instrument,tation Ex-

-Correcttve ' mentatton.- ing of Non-Soti.

.inatton of '

' Issues 1.ine Docu-pension Loop Actions are ' Conditional. conformance ; Densities '. Shop Welds

, mentation.. Separation ' not being

- Releases

- and Discrep '

'During,

Upgradsd to'-

SYSTEM

'(A)(B)(C)

NCRs:

'ancy Reports.

Hydrostatic Testing.

I 18-1 Radiation Monitoring.

B.B C

'A A

C

-C C-C.

-C System.

4 18 'BB'C.

A-A ~-

C C'

C-C

'C 18-3~

C-C C

A A

C-C

C.

C-C' 18-4

A B'C.-

'A A

C C

C' C

C i

18-5 A 'B C

A, A.

C

.C C

C

-C 20

- Security System A

B'C' A

A C

C C

'C A

21

- Fire Detection ABC

'A B

C C

C-C A

22

- Fire Protecties C C 'C -

A B

C.

C C

C B.

36 Component Cooling Water

'CC C-C.

B.

C C

C 36-2 C C C'

C.

B-CL C

C C:

C 36 Aux Component Cooling

.C.C C-C B.

'C C

C C

C.

Water

!^

39

- Emergency Diesel Generator C'C C C

B C

C C

C B'

40 Crane & Hotst FK3 AE,C

'A A-C C

C C

'A 43A - RCB Containment Cooling C B C A

B' C

C C

C A

A-45

{.,.:. ~ ~ ' -

~

'~

~

, 9its

..,4 e-J:4(-

s

? P. %.. y~

3 5

,TP

/

^

. 9.

1

+

v

..g.

~

.J TABLE A-6.

a

+

p ISSUES j

~

1

. No.J3

. No. ~ 4 No. 5-

. No. 6 No. 7'

.No. 8 No. 1-

.No. 2.

t inspection. Missing N1 Instrumen-Lower Tier Vendor Docu-Disposition-Backfill..

Visual Exam-Personnel fastrument.-tation Ex-1 Corrective. mentation - ing of Non-Soil ination of:

1ssues Line Docu-pension Loop Actions are Conditional conformance Densitiesi Shop Welds-sentation ' Separation. not being Releases and Discrep.

.During SYSTEMS' (A)(B)(C).

. Upgraded to.

~ ancy Reports Hydrostatic' NCRs-Testing' 435 - Shield B1dg.. Ventilation.

-C C.' C C-B C

C-C C

A 43E- - Containment Vacuum Relief C. C C'

A B

C.

C --

C-C-

A 468 - Control Room HVAC' CC C A'

B C

C C

C A.

.)

06D - RAB HVAC

.C C C A

B.

C C-C C'

A

- 46E - RAB Chilled Water C C C'

A B

-C C

C C

B

.46K: - Fire Dampers A B C A

A C

C C

C A

48

- LRT Containment Vessel'

'A C C A

B C

C C

C A

49

- Process Analog Control A~S C A

B C

C C

C A

SOB - Misc. Panels A-B C A

B.

C C

A 52A - Reactor Coolant System C-C'C A

B C

C C

52B C C C A

B, C

C C

52C C C C A

B C

C C

C-C A-46 I

~l i

e w

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g:-

e

!?

r

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r t

- TABLE A-6

'TSSUES

. No. 1.

.No. 2

, No. 3 No.: 4

. No. 5

'No. 6

~No. 7 No. 8 Inspection-Missing N1 Instrumen-Lower Tier-Vendor Docu-Disposition-Backfill'

Visual Exam '

Personnel.

Instrument, tation Ex-. Corrective.- ~~ ment.e ton -- ing of Non-Soil.

Shop Welds ination of-Issues

. Line Docu. pansion Loop Actions are-Conditional 'conformance Denstetes mentation Separation not being -

Releases.

and Discrep- '

'During-Upgraded to SYSTEMS-(A)(B)(C)

NCBs ancy Reports.

Hydrostatic

' Testing.

53A - Charging & Letdown' C C'C A-B Cs C

C C

C-

~

f

$3B - Boric Acid Makeup;

,' C C.- C A'

.B.

'C.

.C C'

C C-56-9. - Primary Sampling B C-C A?

B C-C

.C C

-C 55A - Caseous Waste Management C C C A

B

'C C

C C

C~

SSB - Liquid & Laundry Waste' C C C A

B C

C C

.C C.

Management 55E B C C A

B' C-C C

C C-58

- Safety injection C C C

-A B

C C

'C 60A CC C

'Al B

C C

C-

~

60B C~C C A'-

B C

C C

C C'

60C C C C'

A

.B C'

C-C C

C-1

,I '

59

- Containment Spray C C C:

A B

C C-C C

C 61

- Fuel Handling & Storage

.A.C C-A.

B

~C C

C C

B t

A-47 qe 9

35 7-4 1

7 A

s

~

~.,

8 4

-A

-m

'c af s i

xod t

E l

a ne t g l oWgsn 8 ai noi

'A A A A C

C B

C A

A A A

A ut pi r t

. saord s oinhuye NViSDHT

. s' l

.e l

i i! r 7f t -

C C

C

.klcim' s

oaoe NBSD s

~

, n ept

. oncer i onro tNacp

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C C

6 oooD p

f y

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-ul c

a

. onn D o o 's -

i ie

. rtt s 5oaia C

C C

.dtd e nnnl oeeoe' NVmCR' e

o

. rer

.t '

evag ii nd '

6

. Tt sie S

cned A

E 4 reob a C

C C

U eri rs E

S

. wrt r gB L

S o o o c e pC B

T NLCAnU3 AT

' o -

p on nxLo eE i-m nt unoa 3roir C

C A A B

B B

A A

ti sa st np onaee NI rpS~

.1 t - ~

Nnun eco-

. gmoi nuDt 2i r a-C C

A A A

C A

C A A A

A A

.st et ssnn-oinie NMILm

. n

)

ol C

C C

C

- i e

(.

t n

)

cns B

3 B

C B

C C

B C

C B

C C

B

'l eoe

. (

psu

.)

.srs A

C C

A A C

C B

C.

B A

A A

A 3

. (

ones NIPi s

l

)

o s

m V

r r

N e

T t

e t

S n

g s

M o

n y

t r

c a

S s

e g

H s

h.

n p

t n

e

(

e n

I u

a i s

n s

r o

e v

l r

i t

s s

u i

r k

d p

o b

r t

t t

t a

a e

m t

r o

n r

c c

e h

e a

a u

p i

o u

e l

F S

r T

p a

p r

t c

e e

u r

p t

o u

t y

y n

S t

u S

r N

a c

r e

s S

.S P

s n

a C

e c

M e

n e

d n i R

m i E

t r

2 e

g n m i m e

m T

n o

d r

o a

b s

p t

s

. S a

c A

n e

c e

r i i s

i Y

l 3

x 5

o m

e t

u e

h y

e 6

E 6

C E

S S

T S

W S

S S

P..

1 6

7 1

1 A

8 6

5 1

3 5

6 8

1 9

9 6

6 7

7 7

7 8

9 1

1 l

I

W

-r,-

4-..

t<

J

.,y' T_t, v

s.

.+.

/8 _.

.},

TABl.E A-6.

.p ISSUES

' No. 9 No. 10

'No. II.

No. 12

-No.'13 No. 14 No. 15 No.-' 16 '

' Welder Cer-Inspector Cadwelding ' Main Steam-Missing NCRs J. A. Jones ' Welding of. Surveys and

' tification Qualifica 3 line Tramingl

. Speed

,"D" Level Exit Interviews-tions (J.A..

Restraints, Letters Jones &'

'and EIRs.,

Material'

.of QA Personnel Inside.

SYSTEM "Fegles)

Containment' 02A - 125v CD Safety

'A' A

C

.A C-C A-C

~ 03

- Switching Station

'. A A

C

'A C'

C A

C k

04

.- Startup Transformers A

A

' C A.

C C

A C

.j 06A - 4.16kv Elec.

A

.A C

A-

,C C

"A' C-Distribution Safety-07A - 480v 'Ilec.

.A'

.A C'

A C

~ C A

C Dist',ibution fafety.

08A - 208/120v Elec.

A A-C

-A C

C C

C Distribution Safety 09A - Inverters &

A-A C

A C-C-

A C

Distribution Safety 10

- Communications A

A C

A~

C C

A C

13A Beat Trace Safety A

A C

A.

C C

A.

C 16

- Environmental

'A A

C A

C C

A C"

Monitoring 17

- Seismic Monitoring A

A C.

A C

C C.

C A-49

~.

,_,3

. 4< '

i.

i l

1

.i

-}.

TABLE A-6

,~

-ISSUES ~

No. 11 No'. 12 "

'.No.

13 No.'14 No. 15 No.'16-No.-9 No. 10.

Welder Cer-Inspector ~ - Cadwalding-Main Steam-J- Missing 3CRs J. A. Jones ' Welding of - Surveys and-tification,Qualifica.

'.line Framing Speed "D" Level Exit Interviews-tions (J.A.

Restraints, latters

, Material'.

of QA Personnel

' Jones &

and EIts '

Inside LContainment SYSTEM-Fegles) 18 Radiation Monitoring A

.A C

A C

C

.. C C

System 18-2 A

A C

A.

'C C-C.

C 18-3 A

A C

A C '-

'C C

C 18-4 A'

A

'C.

A C

C

-C C

18-5 A

A C

.A C

C C

C 20

- Security System A

A C

A.

C C

A C

31

- Fire Detection A'

A C

C C

C 22

- Fire Protection A'

A' C

A C

C C

C 36 Component Cooling Water-A A-C A-C-

C C

C 36-2 A'

A

'C.

.A C.

C, C

'C 36 Aux Component Cooling A

A C

A C-C A

C Water i

39

- Emergency Diesel Cenerator A

.A C

A-C.

C A

C i

-C

.A C

C-C C

40 Crane & Hoist THB B

A a

63A - RCB Containment Cooling A

.A' C

A C

C C

C t

4 l

}.

I i

A-50 1

1 4

9

--r

w s

^

TABLE A-6' ISSUES -

No. 9'

. No. 10' No."11 No. 12

No. 13

- No. 14:

No. 15,

No. 16 '

'idelder Car Inspector Cadwelding~ Main Steam-~ Missing NCRs J.A. Jones Welding of~.

Surveys and tification Qualifica-

' line Framing.

~

Speed "D" Level.

. Exit Interviews-tions (J A.

Restraints

. Letters-Material-of QA Personnel Jones &

and EIRs-Inside SYSTEM 5 Fegles)

Containment 43B~

Shield 81ds. Ventilation A'

A

'C

'A' C

C A

C 43E - Contafmeant Tacuus Relief A

A C

.C C

C-Control Room 'HVAC A

A C

C

'A C

468

- 66D - RAB HYAC B

-A C

A C

C A

C 46E - RAB Chilled Water A

A C

C A

C.

66K - Fire Dampers A

A C-A C

C-A C

68

- LRT Came=f% t Vessel C

A

-C

'A:

C C

C

.C 49

- Process A==Yag Control A

A C

C A

C 508 - Misc. h elm B

A C

A

.C C

A C-

$2A - Reactor Coolmat System C

A C

A.

C C

C.

C 523 C

A C

'A C

C C

C.

52C

.C A

C A

C C

A-51 i

I~

0 0

k

. rf r-r w:

w,

h

G[

. _j -

TABLE A.-

- ISSUES

~!

No. 9

' No. 10 No. 11.

No. 12

No.'13-No. 14' No.15 No.16 -

Welder Cer-Inspector.

Cadwelding.' Main Steam - Missing NCRs J.A. Jones-W lding of-Surveys and' Speed

."D" Level.

Exit Interviews tification Qualifica--

. line Framing'

~Lettern Material

_of QA Personnel.

' j' tions (J.A.

Restraints Jones &

and EIRs Isaide SYSTEMS

.Tegles)

. Containment 53A - Charging & Letdown A

A C

-A

.C C

.C C-

'53B

- Boric Acid Makeup-

-A

. A' C

A C

C

'A

-C-56-9 --- Primary Sampling.

A.

A; C

A C

^C C

C

'55A

- Caseous Waste Management A

A C

A C.

C A

C 558 - Liquid & Laundry Waste C

A' C

A-C C:

-A C-Management S5E C.

.A.

C A

C C.

A C

-}

1 58

- Safety. Injection C

A

'C' A

C C

-C C

l 60A' C

.. A C

A

.C C

C C

60B C-A C'

A'

'C C

C C

l 60C

'C A

C A

C

~C C

C.

. 59

- Containment Spray A

A C

A-C C

C C

61

- Fuel Handling & Storage B

A C --

A C

C C

C A-52

5,

-w 1

' ;F 2

e73 z

iC;;

3

...: r ; :

9.-

[

'.,'s

.e p:,

3 r

m.,

.s

.y

.e s.

.l 'l'..

.u

' TABLE A-6.

~

P

'TSSUES.

t-

' No. 101 Mo.'11' No,'12

.' No. 13..

4 No. 14 ::

'No."15*-_

..No'. 16.

No ~9~

3

.x

-Welder Cer.' inspector' Cadwelding - Main S tean-Missing NCRs.J. A. Jones ' Welding of... Surveys and ' '.>

tification_-Qualiftea--.

line Framing.

- Speed-

.."D" 1. eve 11 ' Exit Intetviews tions (J.A.

' Restraints.

Letters JMaterial.

1of QA Personnel Jones &'

and ETRs J inside -

' E

' SYSTEMS.

Fegles)

Containment; 66. - Plant Protection System C'

.A'

.' C A

C' C-

-A C.

63 lC A

C..

A C.

C A

.C' 65A Excore Nuclear inst.

A-A C

A, C'

C C: -

C-65A-2 A

'A C

A C

C

'C-

.C.

- 715.- Condensate Makeup A

-A

.C A

C C

C C-73

- Emergency Feedvater A

A

- C

.A

'C C

A'.

C, 73 =- Secon:lary Sampling -

A' A.

C'

.A C

C A'

C-

- 76 ' - Steam Generators & MSif

.C A

C-C C

C~

C C.

88

- Turbine & Turbine Control.s A1 A

C A

C-C

'A' C.

91

- Seizaic Supports 5

A.

-C.

C-C

~C

.C C-19 Whip Restraints 3

A C'

C I' C

C C

C 10 System Supports (Hangers) 5 A

'C*

'C C}

C C

C

- Seismic Structures C

C C -.

C

~C:

C-C-

C

.j A-53 Y

r

rn '.

s

~

-T - -

'^-

-_4.-

~ ;

J

. #.{'-

TAB 1.E A ISSUES -.

No. 17:

No.'18' No. 19 i

.No. 20 -

No. 21 No.'22:

No. 23-QC Verifi-

'Documen--

Water in

- Construction LP&L QA-

. Welder _

QA Program cation of' tation of-Basemat.. Materials-Construc.- -Qualifica-. Breakdown -

Expansion

Walkdowns on. Instruments Testing tion System tions Between Ebasco -

Anchor Char-'.Non-Safety (CMT)

Status and, (Mercury)_

and Mercury acteristics Related

- Personnel Transfer and Filler Equipment Qualifica- ' Reviews -

'hacerial tion Records-

. Control-SYSTEM (Site Wide) 02A - 125v DC Safety A

C' A

A-A C

A-

'03

- Switching Station A

A

.A A

A C

A 04'

- S'tartup Transformers.

A A..

A A

A C

A 06A' - 4.16kv Elec.

A C

A' A

A C'

A Distribution Safety

~07A

- 480v Elec.

A C

A.

A A-C A

Distribution Safety 08A - 208/120v Elec.

A.

C C2 A

A C,

A Distribution Safety..

{

l 09A - Inverters &

A

-C'

'A A.

A C

A-Distribution Safety 10

- Communications A

C C

A A'

C A.

13A Heat Trace Safety A

C C

A' A

C A

h 16

- Environmental A

C A

A.

A C

A i

Monitoring 17

- Seismic Monitoring A

C.

C A'

A C

A A-54 A

~

7 y

s 14; 4

a TABLE A-6'

}

' ISSUES '

No. 17' No. 18 No. 19 No220

- No. ' 21 No '22 No.'23L QC Verifi -

Documen-Water.in Construction LP&L QA Walder

'QA Program '

cation of tation of Baseast.

Materials Construc-Qualifica-Breakdown Expansion Walkdowns on Instruments Testing

' tion System tions Between Ebasco

' Anchor Char-Non-Safety (CNT)

Status and. (Mercury) and Mercury -

acteristics ' Related Personnel Transfer and Filler.

-Equipment Qualifica ' Reviews Material' tion Records, Control SYSTEM

,(Site Wide)-

18 Radiation Monitoring C

C C-

.A B

C-A-

System 18-2 C

C-C-

A B

C A

18-3 C

C-C A

B C

A 18-4 C

C C'

A-B.

C A

18-5 C

-C.

C A

B C,

A 20

- Security System A

C C

A A

C A

21

- Fire Detection A

C A

A-A C

A 23

- Fire Protection A

C A

A A'

C A

36 Component Cooling Water C

C-

-C A-B C

A 36-2 C

C

'C A-B C

A 36 Aux Componenc Coolieg C

C C

A B

C A

Water 39

- Emergency Diesel Generator C

C

.A A

A C

A 40 Crane a Holst THB A

C A

A A

C A

43A - RCB Containment Cooling C

C C

A A

C A

A-55 s

~

af"'"7' rl!

TABLE A-6

ISSUES, t

No. 17..

No. 18 No. 19

'so. 20 '

No.'21 No. 22 No. ~ 23 -

'i

_QC Verifi-Documen-Water in Construction LP&L QA.

Welder QA Program

'i~

cation of.

tation of Basemat Materials Construc-Qualifica-Breakdown Expansion Walkdown on. Instruments Testint tion System tions Between Ebasco Anchor Char-Non-Safety (CMT)

Stztus and (Mercury) and Mercury acteristics' Related

?arsonnel Transfer and Filler-Equipment-

. Onalifica- ' Reviews.

- Material tion Records Control SYSTEMS

_ (Site Wide) 43B ~- Shield Bldg. Ventilation-C C

'A A

.B C-A

.i I

43E - Containment Vacuum Relief C

C A.

A~

A C

A 465 - Control Room HVAC C

C A-A B**

C A

46D - RAB HVAC C

C C

A C

A 46E - RAB Chilled Water C

C C

B C

A 46K - Fire Dampers A

C A

A A

.C A

48

- LRT Containment Vessel A'

C A

A

.A.

C A

49

- Process Analog Control A

C A

A A

C A

50B - Misc. Panels C

.C A

A A

C A

52A' - Reactor Coolant System C

C-A.

'A-A C

A 52B C

C

'A-A A

C-A 52C C

C A

A A

C A

i f

- - This system was incorrectly identified as 43B9 in this issue.

A-56 O

E

_-j'

.+:

,' c %

s 4

/

TABLE A-6 ISSITS

^

No. 17-No. 18 No. 19 -.

'No. 20.

No. 21'.

'No..No. 23-

-QC Verifi-Documen-

. Water in

. Construction LP&L'QA Walder..

QA Program cation of-tation of Basemat.

Materials Construc..Qualifica-Breakdown-Expansion Walkdowns on Instruments Testing tion System tions Between Ebasco' Anchor Char-Non-Safety (CMT);

Status and -(Mercury) and Mercury acteristics Related Personnel Transfer' and Filler Equipment Qualifica- ' Reviews Material tion Records.

.Centrol SYSTEMS (Site Wide) 53A - Charging & Letdown C

C C'

A A

C A

535 - Boric Acid Makeup.

C C

C A.

A C

A 54 Primary Sampling A-

'C A

A A

C A

55A - Caseous Umste Management C

C C

A B

C A

553 - Liquid 4 Laundry Waste A

C C

A' A

C A

Managemmet 55E A

C C

A A

C A

58

- Safety Injection C

C C

A B

C A

6&L C

C C

A B.

C A

605 C

C C

A-B C

A.

60C C

C C

A B

C A

$9

- Containment Spray C

C C

A B

C A

61

- Fuel Handling & Storage C

C A

A A

C A

L A-57 4

O O

g

-m

.m n.

,-4g

,-s

-Q e

^

~. g 3 a

b A

h v'

I s

- TABl.E A-6 ISSUES'.

~

' No.' 17-No. 18 No. 19:

' No. No. 21 No. 22 No. 23-

.QC Verift-.Documen..

Water in-

. Construction I.P&l,QA

.. Walder.

QA Program"

~

cation of.:

..tation of Basemat Materials-aConstruc. :Qualifica ' Breikdown Expansion' -Walkdowns on instruments Testing.

tion Systsu tions

-Between Ebasco.

1 acteristles telated--

Status and. '(Mercury) and Mercury

- Anchor Char-Non-Safety '

Personnel- ~ Transfer -

and Filler (CMT)

Equipment.

Qualifica-Reviews.

Material

-tion Records.

Control SYSTEMS (Site Wide) 66

- Plant Protection System C-C'

.A A

C A

63 C-C A

A A-C A

65A Excore Nuclear inst.

A C

A

~A lA C

A 65A-2

.A C

A A

A C

A 71B - Condensate Makeup C

C C-

'A' C

C A.

73

- Emergency Feedvater C

~C.

C A

A C

A iS

- Secondary Sampli,g A

C A

A-

'A C

'A

'76

- Steam Generators & MSIV C

C A

A A

C A-88

- Turbine & Turbine Controls A

A A

C_-

A 91

- Seismic Supports A

C A

A C

C A

19 Whip Restraints A

C A

A A

C A

19 System Supports (Hangers)

C C

'A A

A C

A t

- - Seismic Structures C

C-C C

A C

A-A-58 w

e

.a

?*

t-g

+-

i k-ATTACHMENT B

-:n SAFETY REVIEWS FOR PLANT SYSTEMS REQUIRED BY l

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR

' ~

CRITICALITY, LOW. POWER I.

TESTING AND FULL POWER OPERATION i

4

.~

t

.r--

T

!~

V

^

G L1' CENSING PLAN FOR.

. CRITICALITY, LOW POWER TESTING AND FULL POWER OPERATION i

The program discussed in Attachment C and applied to Fuel load and LPrecriticality; Post. Core-Load Hot Functional. Testing in Attachment A is being-applied to those systems required for Criticality, Low Power Testing and Full Power Operation...These systems-are listed in Table B-1. -This l process:has:been completed to the extent. feasible pending final resolution of Issue:#1C.

Summaries have been' prepared -(as described in Attachment A. Table A-4) and

- full documentation will be filed in-the Waterford 3 On-Site Licensing Unit offices'for inspection and review by the NRC staff.

k 6

B-1

7, TABLE B-1 PLANT SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR CRITICALITY AND LOW POWER TESTING TO FIVE PERCENT, AND FULL POWER OPERATION OPERABILITY ACRONYM SYS.~ NO DESCRIPTION REQUIRED PMC-15 PLANT MONITORING COMPUTER MODE I ( 20%)

FP 22-3 FIRE PROTECTION - HALON MODE 1 ( 20%)

HRA.

43H

-RCB HYDROGEN'RECOMBINERS/

MODE 1-2 ANALYZER

. CEC 64 CONTROL ELEMENT ASSY.

MODE 1-2 CALCULATOR-INI

'65B

-INCORE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATTON MODE 1 ( 20%)

MNI 65C l MOVABLE INCORE NUCLEAR INSTR.

MODE 1 ( 20%)

'VLP 69

. VIBRATION & LOOSE PARTS MODE 1-2 MONITOR B-2

l 4

.I f i.

!{

CXCP 3

Gw 2

X X

. s.

X X

Ce SiI. ve 2

nr 2

X X

X aer Te 1

g 2

X X

X t a an h a 0

X X

X tM.

2 s td ene t at ale 9

X X

X 1

cpl i

n ddn nno 8

X X

I 1

I ac

/f

/

7 X

X X

1 6

1 X

X X

5 1

X X

X 4

X X

X 1

3 X

X X

1 X

I X

2 X

X X

1 T

M 1

N X

X X

1 O

I TU 0

X X

X L

1 O

S EX 9

X X

X YTE 8

X X

X FA S

5 7

X X

X r.

X X

X U

3 S

S 6

X X

X L

I

/

S 5

X T

X X

X I

C TS X

X X

Y 4

S 3

X X

X 2

X X

X w

D m

C) f

(

I B

X X

g I

I X

y, A

X X

X g

X X

X il

/

2 E

S T

N R

S B

U O

E R

T P

L N

A R

e M

A I

Y E

A l

O H

B S

L P

b C

M S

C a

O A

U E

T G

C N

S N

N E

T N

N O

I O

R N

n O EO O

R I

E a

I RT L

M O

T N

M r T OT E

T C

E E

f A

CA T

I E

C LR rT Nr Em" S

N T

O EO UN I

N e

Y O

O RR T

NE O

S M

R DE LA M

IR P

YZ OL EL Li TO T

HY RU RR BR AT N

E L

TC OT AT RI A

R BA NL CS VS BN L

I CN OA NN ON ID P

F RA CC II MI V*!

It i

l

R 3

EE d

8 C

TB 5

2 T

4 5

5 9

SM 1

2 4

6 6

YU SK m

TABLE B-4 SAFETY REVIEW SUMMARIES a

l B-7 i

I y2 4

L. Issue #1:- Inspection Personnel Issues 2

~

^

This' issue was evaluated on c. contractor basis.

Issue #IA.Mercurl

. Subgroup C - Mercury'did perform' safety.related work on.the system and safety.

evaluations'were performed ~to. assure LP&L management that Waterford Steam

~ Electric Station.f3 can be~ safely;cperated without compromising the-health

and safety offthe public.

Issue il'does have's potential effect on:

- System #-

System Description

Evaluation 43-H-RCB Hydrogen Recombiners/

Installation of safety Analyzers

-related instrumenta-tion was inspected by 164;

- Control Element-Assy.

potentially unqualified

-Calculator inspectors. The quality.

L of safety.related instru-mentation associated with this system was verified.

Verification was accom-plished by reinspection of N1 instrument loops.

Satisfactory completion of this program involving Mercury installations verifies acceptance of the installations. Accordingly, this issue does not serve as a constraint to the safe

' operation of these systems, and has been resolved and closed out~by LP&L.

F c

~

(

B-8

. ~ -

s Issue.#1B - Tompkins-Beckwith

- Subaroup C Tompkins-Beckwith did-perform safety related. work on the system, Land safety evaluations were performed to assure LP&L management that Waterford e

i SES _f3 Lean be safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public..

Issueifi.does have a-potential effect on:

- Sy' stem #-

System Description Evaluation

'43-H RCB Hydrogen Recombiners/

Work performed on this Analyzers

~ system was inspected by potentially unqualified inspectors. To close out the concern.LP&L verified the qualifications of the initial inspectors. LP&L also verified qualifications-of the inspectors-performing any over-inspection. Over-inspection provided to meet p

the ASME Code requirements

[P l~

for third party Authorized Nuclear Inspection services and independent Preservice Inspection.in conjunction with other_ inspection programs, hydrostatic testing.and Pre-Core Hot

' Functional Testing confirm the acceptability of hardware installed by Tompkins-Beckwith.

1 A

4

- B-9

-m_

Tssue #1C - Other Contractors Subgroup C - Other Contractors (other than Mercury and Tomkins-Beckwith) did perform safety related work on a number of systems and safety evaluations are being performed to assure LP&L management that Waterford SES #3 can be safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public.

Issue #1C impact beyond initial criticality remains to be evaluated.

B-10

Issue;#2 --Missing N1 Instrument ~Line Documentation

[.

.None of the instrument installations to be reworked to comply fully with ASME

.III requirements are contained in the systems.

t.

There are no! Subgroup C systems.

~B........

m Issue'f3 - Instrumentation Expansion Loop Separation There are no instrument expansion loop separation violations of safety

- ' significance in these systems There are no Subgroup C' systems.

m

)

B-12

7 1

v l'

? Issue #4 l-Lower: Tier Corrective Acticas Are Not Being ' Upgraded to NCR's he

' Subaroup C '- DCN's,.FCR's, EDN's and T-B DN's have been reviewed and it was determined.that some. documents shou M have been upgraded to NCR's.- A safety evaluation was. performed to. assure LP&L management that Waterford SES #3 can be-safely; operated-without compromising the health and safety of the public.

Issue #4 does have a potential effect on all systems in Table B-5.

The Evaluation reveals that a statistically acceptable number of lower tier

documents were. reviewed. showing no significant quality impact (no cases were

-detected which.were safety significant and would be. reportable under

10CFR50.55e). Therefore it is possible to conclude with a 95% confidence level that'.95% of the unsampled documents contain no significant deficiencies. Accordingly, this issue does not serve as a constraint to safe l operation of~the systems.

-g B-13

^

-n~

T.

r

+

- Issue #5 - Vendor Documentation - Conditional Releases

- Subaroup C - With'a review of QA/QC records-it is concluded that there are~no

' unresolved items.which affect the systems, however Issue #5 does have a

. potential effect on all systems in Table B-5 The Evaluation reveals that during.the review of'QA/QC records conditional release items which affected systems were evaluated and closed out.by LP&L with receiot of the." unconditional" paperwork.~ No' items exist to affect the

- safety function of the systems.

m_

L i-y-.

l.

B-14

v.

l

Issue #6 - Dispositioning of Non-Conformance and Discrepancy Reports Subgroup C - It_was noted during a review of NCR's that some of the reports had questionable dispositioning potentially rendering the quality of

-installation indeterminate.

Issue'#6 does have a potential effect on all systems in Table B-5.

l

'The Evaluation included a combination screening and sampling method to review EBASCO NCR's including NCR's identified by the NRC and no items were

identified which had significant safety impact on the systems. Mercury NCR's were reviewed'for upgrade and sampled to determine reportability to support the conclusion that the safety review is not effected.

B-15 s

s

1

$9 se.

~

c-

~

Issue.f7 - Backfill Shil Densities f

Subaroup C Data'from the in-place density tests'on the class A fill was epotentially not. traceable relativeLto the' technical' adequacy of the

- placements,; therefore.the impact on' the the quality of the ' system may have beenLindeterminate. A safety evaluation was performed to assure LP&L management that Waterford SES #3 can'be safely operated without compromising g

the health and safety of the public.

^

Issue #7fdoes have a potential effect on all. systems in Table B-5.

l O

LThe'Evaluat' ion reveals that theLdata for the in-place. density tests performed on the class A fill has been located and has been transmitted to the'QA records-vault.. Review and analysis of the records indicates that the Class A i

-backfill' soil densities are in accordance with specifications and FSAR-1 requirements except for analytically non-significant deficiencies and does

provide the-required design structural capacity for the plant under seismic

' loadings. Accordingly,~this' issue,does not serve as'a constraint to safe

operation of the system, and;has been resolved and closed out by LP&L.

w l

1 4

1

.b 4

B-16 4

A e

m,h s, o

e-m

,.w.,--

e.w,e-

-,g-

,m,,,-re-

,,r-*=

.y--w---

g-re,*----w3--y w m r

fT 4

s.

Issue-#8 - Visual Examination of Shop Welds During Hydrostatic Testing

' Subgroup C - The system does include ASME Class 1 & 2 welds (shop and field) that were inspected during total system hydro in the field. A safety-evaluation was performed to assure LP&L management that Waterford SES #3 can be' safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public.

. Issue'#8 does have a potential.effect on:

System #

System Description

Evaluation 43-H RCB Hydrogen Recombiner/

ASME Class 1 & 2 welds Analyzer (shop and field) were inspected and documented on ASME N-5 code data reports

'during total system hydro in the field. The ASME Class 1 & 2 welds (shop and field) were tested and inspected in accordance with ASME code, in the-field. There is no devia-tion from FSAR require-ments. Accordingly, this issue does not serve as a-restraint to safe operation of these systems, and has been resolved and closed out by LP&L.

i I

J' s

B-17'

_ _ _ ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, _. _ _. _ _. _ _ -. _..

+

~

. Issue #9 -~ Welder Certification.

Subgroup A' - The instrumentation cabinet support welding ~ performed by J. A.

c' Jones.does not have an.effect en the systems in Table B-5.

.)There are~no Sub' group C systems.-

Y w

h B :.

1 1

Issue #10 lInspector Qualifications - (J.A. Jones and Fegles)

No work.~as' performed on these systems by J.A. Jones and Fegles.

w There~are no Subgroup _C-systems.

h v

u 9

B-19 L

t 2

+

r

-,w-e..

,.,<=

---vr-rw.~.m

,,rr-,vm,+,r-

-se--

m.2 rw+--*-p r=+=e-v--+w*

4

e--~~~

- + -+ =

-Her

~

Issue:#11;- Cadwelding

. Subgroup C - Data from the cadweld testing program was potentially not

' traceable relative to the' technical adequacy; therefore the impact on the

-systewjcould-have been-indeterminate. A safety evaluation was performed to assure LP&L management the Waterford SES No. 3 can be safely operated without

-compromising the health and safety of the public.

Issue #11 does -have a potential effect on all systems in Table B-5.

The Evaluation of cadweld records concluded that discrepancies noted were not significant.to safety and would not have had any effect on the structural

. capability of.the NPIS during operation and safe shutdown..The probability cof an accident previously evaluated inithe FSAR is not increased.

Accordingly, this issue does not serve as a constraint tx) the safe operation of the systems, and has been resolved and closed out by'LP&L.

~

l 1

F B-20 m

m.'

s

' > Issue-#12. Main Streamline Framing Restraints

-The' main streamline framing' restraints do not impact these systems.

b There are no Su group C. systems.

t l'

e i

s

?

d s

k

-1 o

s Y

+

B-21

Issue #13 -' Missing NCRs

-Subgroup'C It'was noted that there were. missing reports in the consecutively numbered EBASCO and Mercury NCRs implying missing NCRs that may have rendered system quality indeterminate. A safety evaluation was performed to assure

~

LP&L management that Waterford SES #3 can be safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public.

cIssueL #13Ldoes have a potential effect on all systems in Table B-5.

The Evaluation. includes reviews of EBASCO and Mercury NCR documentation completed by LP&L QA. EEASCO and Mercury missing / voided NCRs and Mercury NCRs closed administratively have been determined to be properly dispositioned and closed. There are no unreviewed safety questions for this system pertinent to this issue.-

B-22 e-

Issue #14 -. J. A. Jones' Speed Letters and EIRs

~

' Subgroup C - Contractors performing safety related' work generated EIRs and

. Speedy Menos which transmitted design information that could potencially.

affect system quality. A safety review was performed to assure LP&L

~

management that.the system-can be' safely. operated without compromising the

' health and' safety of.the public.

Issue.#14 does have'a potential effect on all systems in Table B-5.

. The Evaluation' included a sampling program to evaluate informal documents

. requesting engineering _information from safety related contractors. Of all the samples reviewed those that resulted in design change deficiency had no safety significance._ The program provides reasonable assurance that informal documents.were not used to transmit design changes which have safety significance.

4 s

B-23

. ~

L

. Issue lf15 - Welding of "D" Level Material Inside Containment

~

Subgroup C'- Class "D". material installation inside containment does have a potential effect on:

System #

System Description ~

Evaluation 43H RCB1 Hydrogen Recombiners/

During the evaluation of Analyzer Class "D" material installation inside

'64 Control Element Assy.

containment the work and

- Calculator material under review was verified by LP&L.

. 65B' Incore Nuclear Contractor QA is of Instrumentation satisfactory quality, and this issue does not have 65C Movable Incore Nuclear an adverse effect on the Instrumentation safety analysis, system operability or margin to 69l Vibration & Loole Parts safety on these systems.

Monitor 4

3 B-24

)

T

Issue #16 - Surveys and Exit Interviews of QA Personnel Subgroup C - An interview program was instituted by LP&L to provide an additional avenue of communication to elicit information on quality concerns from personnel prior to leaving the Waterford SES No. 3 project. The concern was that the-LP&L program may not have promptly or thoroughly examined the specific areas'of concern and the programmatic implications of these systems.

-Issue #16 does have a potential effect on all~ systems in Table B-5.

The Evaluation reveals that all concerns are being reviewed under an improved quality concern program. Where there are issues not previoasly identified with potential safety related consequences, these issues are promptly reported to LP&L management. These concerns are properly addressed under LP&L required and approved management programs in a timely fashion. The program does not involve unreviewed safety issues.

B-25

e-Issue #17

-QC Verification of Expansion Anchor Characteristics Subgroup C - Mercury.. the subject of this concern, did install safety related instrumentation expansion anchors in these systems. A safety evaluation was performed to assure LP&L management that the system can be safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public.

Issue #17 does have a potential effect on:

System #

System Description

Evaluation 43H RCB Hydrogen Recombiner/

Inspection forms were used Analyzer.

that do not explicitly cover all inspection 64

. Control Element Assy.

attributes. The reinspec-tion _of all Mercury installed NI instrumenta-tion and subsequent engineering evaluations indicates that the issue of expansion anchor characteristic inspection forms have no safety significance for these systems.

B-26

p.

j

~

Issue #18 Documentation ofL Walkdowns on Non-Safety Related Equipment Subgroup C - Documentation of walkdown on non-safety related equipment does have a potential.effect. A safety review was performed to assure LP&L Management that the System can be safely operated without compromising the health and safety of the public.

s Issue #18 does have a potential effect on all systems in Table B-5.

~The' Evaluation included' area inspections where the system is present and indicate no interactions of safety significance. Accordingly, this issue

.doec not serve as a restraint to safe operation of these systems, and has been resolved and' closed out by LP&L.

B-27

i

~

Issue fl9 - Water in Basemat' Instruments Subgroup C - Water in basemat instruments does have a potential effect on:

System #

System Description

Evaluation

~15' Plant Monitoring Computer The present analysis for moderate energy pipe rupture flooding per the FSAR envelopes'the concern for water seepage since this flow rate would be minimal. Accordingly, this issue does not serve as a. restraint to safe operation of these systems, and has been resolved and closed out by LP&L.

B-28

.n.

Issue #20'- Construction Materials Testing (CMT) Personnel Qualifications Records

. The contractor in question did not do work on these systems.

~ There.are no Subgroup C systems.

1 h.

l B-29 n

-rs+.

rm'

- Issue #21'- LP&L QA Construction System Status and Transfer Reviews All signfia. cant _ documentation and hardware dispositions were identified at the time status and transfer letters were transmitted for these systems.

There are no unreviewed safety questions pertinent.

There are no Subgroup'C systems.

B-30

Issue #22'- Welder Qualifications (Mercury) and Filler Materials Control (Site Wide)

Subgroup C - The LP&L review of qualifications status documentation for all Mercury welders has been completed and the program does have a potential impact on the system. The weldment filler material controls did apparently

. deviate from code requirements.

-Issue #22 does have a potential effect on all systems in Table B-5.

The Evaluation contains a clarification of the review finding on welder qualifications, and there are no potential unreviewed stfety questions pertinent to this issue. "Rebaking" of low hydrogen electrodes was not practiced on the site and engineering justification demonstrates that while there were limited deviations from code specifications however this did not cause degradation of quality of weldment filler material.

B-31

1.

- Issue 'f23 - QA Program Breakdown Between EBASCO And Mercury U

The concern is not' directly related to the systems under review and is considered to be programmatic in nature.

. There are no Subgroup C systems.

e l

B-32

[; -

5 '

g-T! ; W

~

~ '

4 t

.-?

9 9

J s

1,

+

' TABLE B-5 c

155UES

.k Be. I Bo. 2 '

5o. - 3.

No. 4

.Eo. 5

. No. 6

' No. ' 7 1.

'No. 8 laspection. Missing N1 lastrumen- ~ Laser Tier. Vendor Docu-Disposition-Backfills Viemal Emme-Foresseel lastrument.tation Ex-Corrective usatation. tag of Non Sail,

-inacion of.

. 3 lasses

.Line Docu-passion Isop Actions are. Cenditional. comformance Densities

$ hop Welds

'. {

5YSTDI

. not being Releases

and Discrep-~

During.

- 5

.anstation

. Separation (A)(B)(C)

~. Upgraded to ancy Reports'-

Hydrostatic

..NCRs Testing 15.. - Flaat Monitoring d'

-A 5~

A B'.

C C

C.

C A'

22 Fire Protectism - Emlen

'A 5-A 3

-C C

C

'C A'

DCS Bydrogen h imer/'

C C A

3 C

C C

C-C 41E Analyser 64 Centrol h Assy.

yC 3'

A

.B C

C C

C

.A Calculater.

Incore Emelser A 5 A

B C

C-C C

A 655 2

lastr - =ria=

65C - Novable lasere smalaer

'A:5 A

'B

'C-C C

C A

lastrummatar*m=

Tibration & Looes Parts A B A

B C'

C-C C

A, 69 s

nonitos 3-33 5

s G

6

5-

' l s

- ~

r i4 4-

4 TABLE 5-5

" 'J,

?-

ISSUES No. 9

.No. 10

.. No. 11 No.' 12 -.

No. 13

- No. 14 -

' No. ' 15 No.~16 Walder Cer-Inspector

.Cadwelding Main Steam-Missing NCRs J.A. Jones hiding of. Surveys and,

tification Qualifica-line Framing Speed

. D" Level Exit Interviews

.tions (J.A.

Restraints Latters,.

. Material of QA Personnel:

(;

Jones &

and EIts Inside Contmia===t -

SYSTEM -

Fegles) 15

- Plant Monitoring Computer

A

-A C

A-C C

A C

Fire Protection - Halon A

A C

C~

~A

'C 32-3 00 - acs Hydrosen Recombiner/

A A

C A.

C C

Analyzer 64

- Control Element Assy.

A

.A

.C A

C C

'C' C

Calculator I

653 - Incore Nuclear

,A A

C A

C C

C

._ C Instrumentation Movable Incore Nuclear

.A A

C.

A C

C C

C 05C Instrumentation 09

- Vibration & Loose Parts A

A C

C C

C Monitor B-34

i. '

Y

=

e

TABLE B-5 ISSUES I

No. 17 No. 18 No. 19 No. 20 No. 21 No. 22 No. 23 QC Verifi-Documen -

Water in Construction LP&L QA Welder QA Program cation of tation of Basemat Materials Construc-Qualifica-Breakdown Expansion Walkdowns ao Instruments Testing tion System tions Between Ebasco j

Anchor Char-hon-3afety (CMT)

Status and (Mercury) and Mercury aeteristics Balated Personnel Transfer and Filler Equipment Qualifica-Reviews Material

-tion Records Control SYSTEM (Site Wide) 15

- Plant Monitoring Computer A

C C

A A

C A

22 Pire Protection - Halon A

-C A

A A

C A

6 311 - RC3 Hydrogen Recombiner/

C C

A A

A C

A Analyzer l 64

- Control Element Assy.

C C

A A

A C

A l

Calculator 655 - Incore Nuclear A

C A

A A

C A

Instrumentation 65C - Movable Incore Nuclear A

C A

A A

C A

Instrumentation 69

- Vibration & Loose Parts A

C A

A A

C A

Monitor i

B-35

(:

.p ATTACHMENT C STATUS OF COMPLETION OF FUEL LOAD ITEMS i

2

---,--,--r,e,

---,,-----m,

, +.

1 T

^

,'N

. STATUS OF COMPLETION OF FUEL LOAD ITEMS g

. LICENSING COMilTMENTS '

.All" licensing commitment action required.by LP&L are completed.

-SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCIES Final-reports or I nterim reports with justifications for ~ interim operation will

~

i

. be complete and submitted to Region IV by COB this date.

4 INSPECTION REPCRT ITEMS-lCompletion of:LP&L required actions for inspection report items is complete with the exception of. five (5) items from a recent inspection report (84-31) which are-expected to be complete by 11/5/84.

FUEL LOAD'(MDDE 6) PREREQUISITE. WORK ITEMS Work items required'for Mode 6 will be complete by COB this date.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SURVEILLANCES Surveillances required by technical epecifications prior-to. entering into Mode 6

'will be complete by COB this date with the' exception that specific items which are related-to being performed within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months prior;to fuel load and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months prior to. fuel-load. These' exceptions will be completed on the' required schedule

, - 7

- following a' licensing' decision and establishment of a fuel load date.

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W3P84-3086, Forwards Safety Reviews of Plant Sys Re Fuel Loading & Precriticality post-core Load Hot Functional Testing, Criticality,Low Power Testing & full-power Operation Per Application for OL: Difference between revisions

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W3P84-3086, Forwards Safety Reviews of Plant Sys Re Fuel Loading & Precriticality post-core Load Hot Functional Testing, Criticality,Low Power Testing & full-power Operation Per Application for OL: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 02:29, 13 December 2024

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SUBJECT:

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