ENS 41496: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 03/15/2005 16:30 CST | | event date = 03/15/2005 16:30 CST | ||
| last update date = 03/15/2005 | | last update date = 03/15/2005 | ||
| title = Kewaunee Plant Design | | title = Kewaunee Plant Design for Flooding Events May Not Mitigate the Consequences of Piping System Failures | ||
| event text = The following was provided by the licensee: | | event text = The following was provided by the licensee: | ||
While reviewing Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) memorandum regarding Task Interface Agreement (TIA), TIA 2001-02,'Design Basis Assumptions For Non-Seismic Piping Failures at Prairie Island Plant,' Kewaunee staff determined that the Kewaunee plant design for flooding events may not mitigate the consequences of piping system failures. As a minimum, and as a consequence of assuming failure of non-seismically qualified piping systems as prescribed in the TIA, water has been assumed to collect in the turbine building from a circulating water system piping failure that would result in substantial damage to Engineered Safeguards (ESF) and Safe Shutdown (SS) plant equipment, most notably electrical equipment. As a consequence of high water level in the turbine building, water could flow into the ESF equipment rooms that contain the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps, Emergency Diesel Generators and both the 480 volt and 4160 volt electrical switchgear. Water is assumed to flow into the equipment rooms by way of leakage past non-water-tight doors and the plant's unchecked floor-drain system. The expected water levels In the safeguards and electrical equipment rooms are assumed to increase to the point of causing multiple trains of both ESF and SS equipment to be unavailable to safely shutdown the plant. | While reviewing Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) memorandum regarding Task Interface Agreement (TIA), TIA 2001-02,'Design Basis Assumptions For Non-Seismic Piping Failures at Prairie Island Plant,' Kewaunee staff determined that the Kewaunee plant design for flooding events may not mitigate the consequences of piping system failures. As a minimum, and as a consequence of assuming failure of non-seismically qualified piping systems as prescribed in the TIA, water has been assumed to collect in the turbine building from a circulating water system piping failure that would result in substantial damage to Engineered Safeguards (ESF) and Safe Shutdown (SS) plant equipment, most notably electrical equipment. As a consequence of high water level in the turbine building, water could flow into the ESF equipment rooms that contain the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps, Emergency Diesel Generators and both the 480 volt and 4160 volt electrical switchgear. Water is assumed to flow into the equipment rooms by way of leakage past non-water-tight doors and the plant's unchecked floor-drain system. The expected water levels In the safeguards and electrical equipment rooms are assumed to increase to the point of causing multiple trains of both ESF and SS equipment to be unavailable to safely shutdown the plant. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:21, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Kewaunee  Wisconsin (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | |
| LER: | 05000305/LER-2005-004 Regarding Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged by Unanalyzed Internal Flooding Events and Inadequate Design |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.3 h0.0125 days <br />0.00179 weeks <br />4.1094e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Harold Prokash 22:48 Mar 15, 2005 |
| NRC Officer: | Chauncey Gould |
| Last Updated: | Mar 15, 2005 |
| 41496 - NRC Website
| |
Kewaunee with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |