ML20127C997

Insp Rept 50-458/92-34 on 921108-1219.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Onsite Response to Events,Operational Safety Verification,Maintenance & Surveillance Observations,Open Item Followup & Onsite Review of LER

ML20127C997
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	01/08/1993
From:	Gagliardo J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20127C974	List: ML20127C971 ML20127C989 ML20127C997
References
50-458-92-34, NUDOCS 9301150056
Download: ML20127C997 (16)

See also: IR 05000458/1992034

Text

'

I

APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

inspection Report:

50-458/92-34

Operating License: HPF-47

Licensee:

Gulf States Utilities

P.O. Box 220

4

St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775-0220

Facility Name:

River Bend Station

-

1

Inspection At:

St. Francisville, Louisiana

l

Inspection Conducted:

November 8 through December 19, 1992

Inspectors:

W. F. Smith, Senior Resident inspector

D. P. Loveless, Resident inspector

R. H. Bernhard, Senior Resident inspector,

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Region 11

J. M. Keeton, Examiner, Operational Programs Section,

J Di ision of Reactor Safety

I

>

Approved:

gliardo, Chlef, Project Section C

Ifa

'

.

inspection Summary

Areas inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection of onsite response to

events, operational safety verification,- maintenance and surveillance-

observations, open item followup, and onsite review of a licensee event

report.

Results:

Overall, the licensee's responses to operational events during the

e

report period were very good (paragraph 2.3).

The operators' response to the motor trip on Chiller B was noteworthy.

e

They entered the shutdown evolution in an expeditious manner and used

good judgement in utilizing the available equipment to maintain the

control room atmosphere (paragraph 2.1).

e

The licensee's response to the November 24 reactor scram was very good,

including the posttrip review and the facility review committee response

(paragraph 2.2).

,

-9301150056 9301og

gDR- ADOCK 05000450

PDR

..

. .-

.

- . .

_-

- .

.- -

- -

_

_ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ . _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ ___. _ _ _ .

-2-

e

Overall, the licensee operated the facility in a satisf actory manner

(paragraph 3.6).

The performance of the operators during the November 17, 1992, reactor

e

shutdown and planned scram was very good (paragraph 3.1).

in general, plant housekeeping, including radiological housekeeping, has

e

improved over the inspection period.

However, oil leaks, oil pooling

and a Jacket water leak identified on the Division I standby diesel

generator were examples of poor housekeeping (paragraph 3.2).

One violation was identified for failure to place the reactor core

isolation cooling system in service prior to exceeding 150 psig reactor

pressure as required by Technical Specification 3.0.4 (paragraph 3.3).

,

The operators' performance during the December 6 shutdown was exemplary,

with one exception. A second violation was identified for failure to

follow the action statements of Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and

3.3.7.6 when the intermediate range monitors and the source range

,

monitors, respectively, had not been properly tested to demonstrate

operability following a plant shutdown (paragraph 3.4).

A negative trend was identified which involved operators not heeding

procedures and not complying with Technical Specification requirements

(paragraph 3.5),

Overall, the licensee's performance in maintenance activities observed

e

during this inspection period was adequate (paragraph 4.3),

e

One violation was identified for failure to establish measures to

identify that the filter elements in a safety-related unit cooler had

deteriorated and were breaking down and clogging the cooling coils

(paragraph 4.1).

The licensee's failure to promptly assess the status of five similar

safety-related unit coolers, following the identification of preventive

,

maintenance problems in Unit Cooler lHVR*UC5, was considered a weakness

l~

(paragraph 4.1).

Very good work controls were observed during the replacement of an

environmentally qualified switch (paragraph 4.2).

,

t

Overall, surveillance activities were performed in a commendable manner

e

during this inspection period (paragraph 5.2).

Operator knowledge and control of testing activities were good during

the performance of surveillance testing of the Division I standby diesel

generator (paragraph 5.1).

l

'

i

I

~-4

. - . . -

. . . . _ . , , . - - . . - . . .

. _ _ _ - , , . . . , _ , , , . . , . , - - - - , , ,

--_--,,...,,-_m.---,_,-

. - -

.-.-r

~ . . . . , , . .

. - _ . . .

.- -_ . - - . .

.--

~

_. -.

.

.. .

.

. -

'

l

.

_3

,

o

The licensee evaluation of the certification of_ a test engineer and test

practices was appropriate and reasonably supported (paragraph 6.1).

The licensee adequately evaluated potential unmonitored release paths at

e

River Bend Station (paragraph 6.2).

. censee Event Report 92-004 was a good quality report and the

i censee's corrective actions appeared to be adequate to prevent

recuitence (paragraph 7.1).

Summary of Inspection findings:

e

Violation 458/92034-1 was opened (paragraph 3.3).

V;olation 458/92034-2 was opened (paragraph 3.4).

e

Violation 458/92034-3 was opened (paragraph 4.1).

Licensee Event Report 458/92-004 was closed (paragraph 7.1).

Attachments:

• -

Attachment 1 - Persons Contacted and r

Meeting

.

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

-4-

DETAILS

.

1 PLANT STATUS

At the beginning of this inspection period, the plant was operating at

100 percent power.

On November 10, 1992, a plant shutdown was initiated as required by 72chnical

Specification 3.0.3 when the only operable control room ventilation chiller

tripped.

Howeve , the shutdown was terminated at 76 percent power when the

chiller was restarted, and full power operation was resumed on November 11.

_

On November 16, the licensee commenced a plant shutdown to Operational

Condition 3 (hot shutdown) to facilitate planned Outage 92-03. On

November 24, the plant was restarted, but the reactor scrammed from 96 percent

.

power on high neutron flux caused by a main turbine electrohydraulic control

"s

system transient.

lhe startup was resumed on November 25, and by November 27,

' 3

the pisnt was operating at 100 percent power.

'

On December 6, the plant was shut down and cooled to ambient conditions for

planned Outage 92-04 to replace a failed reactor recirculation pump seal.

The

plant was restarted on December 13 and resumed full power operation on

December 16.

At the end of this inspection period, the plant was operating at 100 percent

power.

2 ONSITE RESP 0i4SE TO EVENTS (93702)

2.1

Inoperability of Both Control Room Ventilation Systems

[

At 12:58 p.m., on November 10, 1992, the Division 11 control room ventilation

system Chiller 18 tripped on motor overload.

At the time, the Division I

system was inoperable because maintenance was being performed on the air

handling unit heaters.

In addition, Chiller D, the alternate Division 11

chiller, was inoperable because of an unresolved tripping problem that was

identified on October 18.

At 1:45 p.m.,

a plant shutdown was initiated as requir2d by Technical Specification 3.0.3.

To maintain the control room atmosphere, Chiller D was

placed in service, ever though it was technically inoperable because of

spurious trips.

The matsr on Chiller B was checked for grounds and short

circuits, but no problems were found.

bpar checking the motor control

breaker, the elech !cian found a loose pleg on the overcurrent trip device.

When the plug wa: properly installed, the breaker performed as designed.

At 3:32 p.m., Chiller B was restored to service and the plant shutdown was

terminated at about 76 percent power.

By 2:27 a.m.,

on November 11, full

power operation was resumed. The licensee reported the event at 2:02 p.m., on

'

'

.

.

9

-5-

November 10, as required by 10 CFR Part 50.72.

They also initiated Condition

Report 92-0898 to document the trip of Chiller B and the shutdown event.

The inspector examined a sin;ilar breaker and noted that the overcurrent ! ip

device plug, when-properly irstalled, snapped and locked in place. The

inspector questioned how the plug could come loose, and the licensee's

representative stated that the positive locking feature of the plug would

prevent the plug from coming loose and that there was an independent

verification signed off whenever the plug was installed.

In this case, the

installer apparently failed to snap the plug in place, and the independe'nt

verifier did not notice the error. The licen ce informed the inspectnr that

44 similar safety-related breaker'overcurrent trip device plugs were chec hd

and they were all aroperly installed.

Because this'was the only time that

this type of plug mad come loose, and no others were found, the licensee

considered this to be an isolated incident. The electricians that had

previously installed the plug in the Chiller 8 controller were counselled on

this event.

No further corrective action was taken.

2.2 Reactor Scram

On November 24, 1992, the reactor scrammed on high neutron flux as indicated

by the average power range monitors. A power ascension was in progress when

the electrohydraulic control system pressure regulator automatically shifted

from the manually selected Channel B to Channel A.

A large deviation existed

between the channels prior to the automatic transfer.

Therefore, the transfer

I

caused the main turbine control-valves to change position from'approximately

35 percent open to 23 percent open.

The resulting pressure surge in the

reactor vessel caused a momentary collapse of voids in the reactor, causing an

indicated power increase to greater than the 118 percent high neutron flux

scram setpoint. The inspector was notified and reported to the control room

where he determined that the operators had brought the plant to a stable

l

condition.

The licensee reviewed the event and determined that the pressure regulator

circuit was designed to automatically transfer from one channel to the other

in the event of a rapid failure of one channel. This function was not

intended to provide a smooth automatic transfer when the channels were slowly

drifting apart, as occurred during this event.

The licensee found that the

Channel A pressure amplifier card had been slowly drifting out' of calibration.

This card was replaced.

The inspector reviewed the posttrip review data package. All other plant

systems were determined to have functioned properly.

Several _ items were

reviewed in depth by licensee personnel to verify their accuracy. The

inspector observed the facility review committee meetings held to discuss the

event and_the readiness to restart the plant.

The questions raised by the

committee members-were of.high quality and were responded to prior to.an

authorization to restart. The overall licensee response to the scram was

considered very good.

L

.

..

.

.

i

_

_ _

-6-

During the subsequent startup, the licensee monitored the channel outputs on

the emergency response information system to observe any drift. The channels

continued to drift apart during pressure increases.

Each time the licensee

adjusted the gain to bring the channels back together.

During planned

Outage 92-04, the licensee performed additional troubleshooting of the

pressure regulator circuits.

The technicians found that the Channel B

pressure transmitter was not repeatable during calibration.

This transmitter

was replaced.

The River Bend Station Updated Safety Analysis Report, Chapter 15.2, " Increase

n, Acactor Pressure,

ps.iui tca a failure of the pressure regulator.

This

,

event is referred to as an "ar.ticipated operatio.nal transient." Therefore,

_

the safety significance of thia failure was low.

The licensee was continuing

to investigate the problem and work with the vendor at the end of this

inspection period.

ihe corrective actions will be reviewed further with the

issuance of the licensee event report.

2.3 Conclusions

Overall, the licensee's response to operational events during the report

e

period was very good.

The operators' response to the motor trip on Chiller B was noteworthy.

They entered the shutdown evolution in an expeditious manner and used

good judgement in utilizing the available equipment to maintain the

control room atmosphere.

The licensee's response to the November 24 reactor scram was very good,

e

including the posttrip review and the facility review committee's

evaluation.

_

3 OPERATIONAL SAFETY VERIFICATION (71707)

The objectives of this inspection were to ensure that this facility was being

operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and to ensure

that the licensee's management controls were effectively discharging the

licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation.

3.1 Control Room Observations

On November 17, the inspectors monitored portions of control room operations

during the shutdown of the plant for planned Outage 92-03.

The primary

purpose of the outage was to repair the drywell pedestal sump pumps.

The

licensee discovered both pumps were not functional when unidentified leakage

began to fill the sump. Details on the issue were documented in paragraph 2.4

of NRC Inspection Report 50-458/92-32.

The reactor was manually scrammed from '9.5 percent power, as delineated in

the normal shutdown procedure. The opt

es executed the appropriate actions

,

. . .

- . .

.

_

_

_ _ __ -

__

____

. - -

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

-7-

in response to the scram.

The applicable emergency operating procedure was

entered when reactor vessel water level shrank to Level 3, but in recovering

level, manipulation of the feedwater controls resulted in slightly overfeeding

the reactor, which caused a high level trip of the operating feedwater pump.

The feedwater pump was promptly restored to service, and the shutdown was

completed without incident.

The licensee explained that, although the reactor vessel level was optimized

just prior to the scram, compensation for normal shrink and preventing the

feedwater system from overfeeding has been difficult for some of the less

experienced operators. The licensee had just issued a change to System

Opar e ing Procedure SOP-0009, " Reactor Feedwater System," on November 11,

providing specific guidance for the operators during this type of feedwater

transient and has been in the process of training the operators on feedwater

transient response during routine requalification training.

Overall, operator performance during the shutdown was very good.

3.2 Plant Tours

On December 1, 1992, the inspector toured the diesel generator building. The

inspector noted that the Division I diesel had a lubricating oil leak on the

strainer. Although this leak had been previously identified by the licensee,

oil had flowed through the absorbent cloths that had been laid down and was

flowing across the frame and over other equipment.

This appeared to be a fire

hazard and could have affected the long-term operability of other equipment if

left uncorrected.

The licensee was informed and this situation was corrected.

On December 2, the inspector observed a small jacket water leak coming from

the turbocharger.

The leak had accumulated into a white buildup.

The

_

licensee wrote a maintenance work order to repair the leak and the buildup was

removed to prevent any corrosion problems.

Throughout this inspection period the housekeeping in the plant continued to

improve. The above examples were indicative of weaknesses in isolated areas.

3.3 Reactor Startup with Safety System inoperable

On November 25, 1992, the licensee exceeded 150 psig reactor pressure with the

reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system out of service. Technical Specification 3.7.3 states that the RCIC system shall be operable with an

operable flow path capable of automatically taking suction from the

suppression pool and transferring the water to the reactor pressure vessel.

This specification is applicable in Operational Conditions 1, 2, and 3, with

reactor steam dome pressure greater than 150 psig.

The associated action

statement requires that the operator restore the system to operable status

within 14 days or be in at least hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Technical Specification 3.0.4 states that entry into an operational condition

or other specified condition shall not be made when the conditions for the

__

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ____ ___________________ - __ - __ __ -

_ ____ _ _ _._._ _ _ _ _ ___..__ _ _ _ _ _ . _

_.

4

-8-

timiting Condition for Operation are not met and the associated action

-

requires a shutdown if they are not met within a specified time _ interval.

On November 25, the_ operators were in the process of starting up the reactor.

Earlier in the day, the RCIC system had been isolated because of low reactor

pressure.

Following criticality, the reactor operators began to Warm up the

RCIC system steam lines prior to placing the system in standby lineup.

At

8:59 p.m., the reactor steam dome pressure was taken above 150 psig, entering

the specified condition for Technical Specification 3.7.3.

The RCIC steam

lines remained isolated because they were not_ completely warmed.

Therefore,

the shift supervisor advised the control operating foreman to log the'RCIC

system as inoperable and enter the associated Technical Specification action

statement.

This action was in violation of Technical Specification 3.0,4

(Violation 458/92034-01).

The licensee reviewed this event and determined that the Shift Supervisor had

incorrectly interpreted the Technical Specifications.

Technical Specification 3.7.3 notes that the provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.4

are not applicable provided the surveillance is performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

after the reactor steam pressure is adequate to perform the test. The

licensee stated that the operators involved in this event were aware that this

exception had been utilized during previous startups and did not fully explore

,

'

the differences between an allowed surveillance testing exception and the

system not being operable.

The inspector noted that General Operating Procedure G0P-0001, " Plant

Startup," requires the operator to place the RCIC system in the standby mode

prior to exceeding 150 psig.

The licensee stated that the control operating

foreman did not challenge the Shift Supervisor on having the system in standby

alignment, even though he read it in G0P-0001.

3.4 Review of Reactor Shutdown Activities

On December 6, the inspector observed portions of the control room operations

during the shutdown of the plant for planned Outage 92-04. The first stage of

the Reactor Recirculation Pump B shaft seal was failing as indicated by

abnormal staging pressures.

The second stage seal was preventing reactor

coolant system leakage, but the licensee decided to obtain the required parts,

,

I

shutdown and replace the seal .

The inspector observed the briefing held by

the Shif t Supervisor just prior to the planned scram.

This Shift Supervisor

made specific assignments for each _ operator, stressed clear communications,

and covered areas requiring special attention, including feedwater. controls,

Subsequently, the scram was executed from 25 percent power.

The operators

responded in a deliberate and orderly manner.

The operators' actions to

control feedwater were excellent.

The operators responded to the level shrink

.

and stabilized the level at about 30 incnes without receiving a high level

feedwater pump trip. Overall, the operators' performance was exemplary, with

one exception as discussed below.

I

,

<

, ,

-

, - .

.m.

, , -

r

m,,,m

.

,

. - ,

--

-

-

-

- - -

- - - -

- . .

. . . .

.

.

. . . . .

...

.

..

.

.

.

. . . .

.

'

-

,

-9-

p

On December 7, with the plant in cold shutdown, the Shift Supervisor realized

that the functional test surveillances for all channels of the intermediate

range and source range monitors were not current at the time the plant was

placed in hot shutdown at 5:29 p.m., on December 6.

With these monitors being

inoperable, Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.7.6 required the reactor

mode switch to be locked in the shutdown position and all insertable control

rods verified inserted into the core within I hour of the scram. While the

reactor operator did immediately verify that all rods had been inserted into

j

the core after the scram, as witnessed by the inspector, the mode switch,

{

t

'

which was in the shutdown position, was not locked until the Shift Supervisor

I

noticed the error at approximately 6:30 a.m., on December 7.

The licensee

!

identified the error on Condition Report 92-0937.

Immediate corrective

l

actions were to verify all rods in, lock the mode switch in shutdown, and

'

implement the required surveillance tests.

Failure to comply with the action requirements of Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.7.6 is a violation (Violation 458/92034-2).

l

The surveillance tests for the intermediate range monitors were' completed at

2 p.m., on' December 7, and then the source range monitors were tested at

9:12 p.m.

The inspector questioned why the source range monitors were tested

last because, at the time the error was discovered, the reactor was in the

'

source range. Although the actions were in compliance with Technical

Specifications, the reactivity in the reactor core could have been better

monitored with the source range instruments. The licensee agreed to consider

this as a safer practice in the future.

3.5 Negative Trend in Operator Performance

in vie,: of the two violations addressed in paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4 of this

report, and considering two additional Technical Specification violations

cited in NRC Inspection Report 50-458/92-32, the inspectors expressed concern

that an unacceptable trend was developing.

The licensee had recognized the

negative trend, and initiated corrective actions, including the following:

On December 15, plant management held a meeting with all shift

e

supervisors to discuss the unsatisfactory performance trend, emphasizing

professionalism in operations, good communications between watch-

standers, self-checking, and the oversight roles of the shif t

supervisors and shift technical. advisors.

The licensee implemented a case study on the RCIC issue, discussed in

e

paragraph 3.3, to present to all operators.

The licensee committed to discuss all of- the recent procedure / Technical

Specification violations with all operations watch sections.

_

_ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ .

'

-10-

Where appropriate, operating procedure revisions were initiated to

e

clarify the specific requirements and prompt the operators as an

enhancement.

The inspectors will continue to monitor these corrective actions and will

document the findings during the closure review of the associated licensee

event raports.

3.6 Conclusions

Overall, the licensee operated the facility in a satisfactory manner,

e

The performance of the operators during the November 17, 1992, reactor

o

shutdown and planned scram was very good,

Overall, plant housekeeping, including radiological housekeeping, has

e

improved over the inspection period. However, oil leaks, oil pooling

and a jacket water leak identified on the Division I standby diesel

generator were examples of poor housekeeping.

One violation was identified for failure to place the RCIC system in

e

service prior to exceeding 150 psig reactor pressure as required by

Technical Specification 3.0.4.

A second violation was identified for failure to follow the action

e

statements of Technical Specifications 3.3.1 and 3.3.7.6, when the

intermediate range monitors and the source range monitors, respectively,

had not been properly tested following a plant shutdown.

Overall, the operators' performance during the December 6 shutdown was

[

e

exemplary,

A negative trend was identified which involved operators not heeding

o

procedures and not complying with Technical Specification requirements.

4 M0KTHLY MAINTENANCE OBSERVATIONS (62703)

The station maintenance activities addressed below were observed and

documentation reviewed to ascertain that the activities were conducted in

accordance with the licensee's approved maintenance programs, the Technical

Specifications, and NRC Regulations.

4.1

Lack of Maintenance on High Pressure Core Spras Pump Room Cooler Filter

On December 2, 1992, during an NRC management tour, the inspector noted a

buildup of foreign material on the discharge screen from Auxiliary Building

Unit Cooler lHVR*UC5.

This unit cooler provides cooling air to the high

pressure core spray pump room.

Approximately one-third of the discharge

1

{

,

. - - - - _ - . _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _________

_ ____ __

. _

_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _

__ _

. _ _ - _ - - ._

.

.

'

-11-

,

screen was blocked.

This condition was reported to the main control room,

lhe Shift Supervisor issued Condition Report 92-0930 to document the problem.

The licensee initiated Preventive Maintenance Work Order p562428 to evaluate

and clean the unit cooler,

The technicians inspected the internal filters and

,

found that they had collapsed onto the cooling coils and that the filter media

,

had disintegrated and had been drawn into the coils.

The filters and filter

media were removed.

The coils were cleaned, and a determination was made that

further cleaning was not necessary. New filters were installed, The filter

media was bagged and transferred to radioactive waste storage in accordance

'

with the instructions of-the radiation protection technicians.

The licensee reviewed the maintenance history of Unit Cooler lHVR*UC5.

Initially, preventive maintenance on all plant unit coolers provided for the

replacement of filters on a routine basis.

During Refueling Outage 2, the

licensee determined that this was excessive.

Therefore, the preventive

maintenance tasks were scheduled to be performed only when the operators

requested them.

This was an acceptable solution for most of the unit coolers,

because they had external filters that could be readily observed and evaluated

to determine when they required changing.

However, Unit Cooler 1HVR*UC5 had

i

filters internal to the unit cooler casing.

Therefore, the operators could

not routinely observe the filters and did not request preventive maintenance

to be performed.

The inspector noted that the filters were last changed on April 15, 1991. As

, _

of the end of this inspection period, the licensee was reviewing maintenance

l

records to better understand the basis for changing the filters on April 15

and why the inaccessibility of the filters had not been identified at that

'

time,

filters collapsing and clogging the flowpath in safety-related unit

coolers is a condition adverse to quality.

The licensee's failure to provide

measures to identify and correct this condition adverse to quality in Unit

i

I

Cooler lHVR*UC5 is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI

(Violation 458/92034-3).

The licensee developed a list of five other safety-related unit coolers which

had internal filters.

Although the problem with preventive maintenance

,

1-

scheduling was identified on December 3, no action was taken to assess the

extent of the degradation on the other unit coolers until after a plant

shutdown on December 6.

The licensee continued to run the plant in

Operational Condition 1 from December 3 through 6 without evaluating the

operability of the other unit coolers with internal filters.

The inspector questioned the licensee on the potential impact of the-other

unit coolers,

lhe licensee inspected and replaced each of the filters prior

to restarting from planned Outage 92-04 conducted from December 6-11, 1992.

However, the failure to assess the generic aspects of the other unit coolers

in a timely manner was considered a weakness.

.

- - -

- - -

-

. .

..,.w

~,,,_m.

y

_

,.7,

,

_

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_

~12-

At the end of this inspection period, the licensee was in the process of

reviewing the preventive maintenance tasks which were scheduled only as needed

to determine if they were being properly monitored and performed.

4.2 Preventive Maintenance on Environmentally Qualified (E0) Components

On December 18, 1992, the inspector observed the replacement of one of several

EQ pressure switches in accordance with Maintenance Work Order E558245.

This

work was scheduled based on the expiration of the EQ service life of

Switch llSV*PS49B.

The inspector reviewed the work documentation package and

found it to be in order and well written.

The technicians were qualified to

perform the work. The equipment clearance was properly implemented.

The

_

lif ting and reconnection of leads were properly verified and documented to

prevent wiring errors.

A quality control inspector was present and observed

the work.

The overcil performance of this maintenance item was very good.

4.3 Conclusions

e

Overall, the licensee's performance in maintenance activities observed

during this inspection period was adequate.

e

One violation was identified for failure to identify that the filter

elements in a safety-related unit cooler had collapsed onto the cooling

coils, clogging the air flow channels.

The licensee's f ailure to promptly assess the status of five similar

e

safety-related unit coolers, following the identification of preventive

maintenance problems in Unit Cooler lHVR*UC5, was considered a weakness.

Work controls observed were very good during the replacement of an

_

environmentally qualified switch.

The individuals performing the task

were properly qualified.

5 BIMONTHLY SURVEILLANCE OBSERVATIONS (61726)

The inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related systems and

components addressed below to verify that the activities were being performed

in accordance with the licensee's approved programs and the Technical

Specifications.

5.1 Diesel-Generator Operability Tes;

On December 4, 1992, the inspector observed portions of the performance of

Surveillance Test Procedure STP-309-0201, " Diesel Generator Division I

Operability Test."

The inspector reviewed the procedure and determined that

it implemented the requirements of Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.2.a.1

through 4.8.1.1.2.a.7, and that it had been performed within its required time

frame.

The test was properly signed out for performance in the Surveillance

Test Procedure Progress Log and was approved by the control operating foreman.

.

-13-

The inspector observed the control room operator and determined that he was

aware of the procedural requirements.

Continuous communications had been

established, as required, between the control room and the diesel generator

building.

As the generator was unloaded, the operator insured that the

reactive load was maintained within the acceptable region.

Good attention was

paid to all adjustments and the operator was observed following the operations

self-checking policy.

The inspector observed operators in the diesel generator building performing

operator rounds in support of the surveillance test.

The operators were

f amiliar with the parameters being observed and what the expected values were.

_

All required data taken was compared with the published a :eptance criteria.

The inspector independently verified the fuel oil levels and pressures,

starting air pressures, and the material condition of the diesel engine.

5.2 Conclusions

Overall, surveillance activities were performed in a commendable manner

e

during this inspection period.

Operator knowledge and control of testing activities were very good

during the performance of surveillance testing of the Division I standby

diesel generator.

6 OPEN ITEM FOLLOWUP (92701)

6.1 lest Engineer Certification and Test Practices

The inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation of an evaluation completed

on October 23, 1992, addressing the adequacy of the certification of a

_

pipefitter to a test engineer and addressing the possibility that workers were

being directed to beat on valves to make sure that they had seated to pass the

test.

The licensee concluded that there were no safety issues and that no

immediate corrective actions were warranted.

On December 7-8, the inspector reviewed the licensee's documentation.

The

documents showed that the pipefitter in question was qualified and certified

as a test engineer in accordance with Procedure TSP-0001, Revision 7, " System

Engineering Personnel Training and Qualifications." The inspector also

reviewed the individual's resume and the completed personnel qualification

matrix.

The information met or exceeded the qualification criteria delineated

in Procedure TSP-0001.

The individual's background, experience, and education

appeared to be adequate for t.im to perform the function of a Level Il test

engineer.

The inspector noted that, during previous outages, the individual

was certified and performed the duties of a level I test engineer and

subsequently met the requirements of ANSI /ASME-N45.2.6 - 1978, " Qualification

of Nuclear Power Plant Inspection, Examination and Testing Personnel," for

Level II.

'

Y

l

-14-

With regard to the second concern, the licensee's quality assurance staf f

informed the inspector that they had discussed the issue with a few workers,

the licensee's Mechanical Process System Supervisor, and the contractor's lead

test engineer.

The consensus was that, once a test was deemed unacceptable,

valves have been perturbod during the course of troubleshooting, but never

with the objective of obtaining satisfactory test results.

The licensee did

not identify any evidence that indicated the test engineer had directed anyone

to strike a valve to seat with the objective of obtaining satisfactory test

results.

The inspector concluded that the licensee's review was reasonable.

6.2 Potential Unmonitored Release Paths

The inspector reviewed an engineering evaluation performed by the licensee

addressing:

(1) potential unmonitored radiological releases from the turbine

building via the lubricating oil reservoir, and (2) the potential of the

instrument air system being contaminated and distributing contamination to the

control room, technical support center, and operations support center during

an accident.

The licensee explained that radioactive steam leakage into the turbine bearing

lubricating oil would be precluded by the design of the turbine seals,

bearings, and gland sealing system.

In order for the lubricating oil

reservoir to become contaminated, four barriers would have to fail and the

steam leakage rate would have to be significant.

This would attract the

attention of the operators, who coul<i take action such as shutting down the

turbine.

In addition, there was not a pathway by which the air in the

,

i

reservoir could be discharged into the turbine building, based on Flow

Diagram 12210-FSK-16-38.

The engineering evaluation approached the instrument air issues from a normal

operation and an accident perspective.

During normal operation, contamination

was not a problem because of the delay time involved in any radionuclides

,

traveling from the air compressor intakes to the points of release.

'

During design basis accident conditions, the worst case being a main steamline

break in the steam tunnel and assuming that the instrument air compressors

picked up all of the activity, the highest exposure would be 6 Rem for the

i

30-day thyroid iodine dose.

The evaluation concluded that if 100 percent of

the radioactive material followed the rupture disk pathway to the control room

l

intakes, the 30-day thyroid iodine dose would be 15.3 Rem to the operators,

with 23 Rem to the technical support center personnel.

The operations support

!

center could be evacuated, as delineated in the emergency implementation

procedures.

These values were within the 30 Rem allowable dose stated in

l

10 CFR Part 100.

The inspector concluded that the licensee's evaluation adequately addressed

the potential release paths.

'

..

-15-

6.3 Conclusions

e

The licensee evaluation of the certification of a test engineer and test

I

practices was appropriate and reasonably supported,

l

The licensee adequately evaluated potential unmonitored release paths at

e

River Bend Station.

7 ONSITE REVIEW 0F A LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (92700)

7.1

(Closed) Licensee Event Report 458/92-004:

Increased Surveillance (Per

Technical Specification 4.0.5) Missed for Standb_y Service Water Pumps due

to Procedural Deficiency

This licensee event report involved five instances where the licensee failed

to test one control building chilled water pump and three standby service

!

I

water pumps at an increased frequency as required by Technical

l

Specification 4.0.5, and ASME Code,Section XI, IWP-3230(a).

Each pump was

j

determined to be in the alert range as defined in the ASME Code.

The licensee

demonstrated that each of the pumps were capable of performing their intended

safety functions.

Therefore, there was minimal safety significance to this

issue.

The root cause was determined to be an ambiguity which existed on the

licensee's Surveiliaiice Test Scheduling Completion / Exception Form.

When a

I

pump was tested and found to be in the alert range, and it was already on an

increased frequency schedule, the form required the user to indicate that no

frequency change was required.

This was misconstrued by the scheduling

personnel to mean the normal frequency and, as a result, the next test was

l

scheduled at the normal frequency instead of at an increased frequency.

,

l

The licensee changed the above referenced form to explicitly state whether or

I

not the components were in the alert range, leaving no doubt what the next

text frequency should be.

The inspectors reviewed the change to the form,

which was Enclosure 3 to Administrative Procedure ADM-0015, Revision 13,

" Station Surveillance Test Program." The change appeared adequate to prevent

l

future problems of this nature.

7.2 Conclusions

e

Licensee Event Report 92-004 was a good quality report and the

licensee's corrective actions appeared to be adequate to prevent

,

l

recurrence.

l

I

l

l

l

l

,

-

.

_ . __ _ _

_

. . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _.

. . ._ _ _

_ . __ _ __

-

.

-

ATTACHMENT 1

1

PERSONS CONTACTED

1.1

Licensee Personnel

0. L. Andrews, Director, Quality Assurance

R. E. Barnes, Supervisor, Maintenance Engineering

P.. E. Cole, Supervisor, Control Process Systems

J. W. Cook, Senior Technical Specialist

T. C. Crouse, Manager, Administration

W. L. Curran, Cajun Site Representative

P. E. Freehill, Assistant Plant Manager - Outage Management

E. L. Glass,' Supervisor, Instrument & Control

W. C. Hardy, Radiation Protection, Supervisor

V. F. Klco, Principal Engineer - NSAG

I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Operations Quality Assurance

C. R. Maxson, Senior Compliance Analyst

.

C. L. Miller, Supervisor, Maintenance Support

W. H. Odell, Manager, Oversight

S. R. Radebaugh, APM - Maintenance

B. R. Smith, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

M. A. Stein, Director, Design Engineering

W. J. Trudell, Assistant Operations Supervisor

1.2 Other Personnel Contacted

The personnel listed above attended the exit meeting.

In addition to the

personnel listed above, the inspectors contacted other personnel during this

inspection period.

2 EXIT MEETING

An exit meeting was conducted on December 22, 1992.

During this. meeting, the

inspectors reviewed the scope and findings of the report. The licensee did

not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the

inspectors.

I

1

-

e

e-

r

-

y

,_--.r

,,, .

y

y

,

, , -~

,4.-