ENS 43421: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 06/14/2007 08:10 CDT | | event date = 06/14/2007 08:10 CDT | ||
| last update date = 06/14/2007 | | last update date = 06/14/2007 | ||
| title = Unable | | title = Unable to Perform Safe Shutdown as a Result of Appendix R Fire Affecting Hpci | ||
| event text = During verification of plant procedures associated with achieving safe shutdown during and after an Appendix R fire, it was determined that there was no readily available success path to secure HPCI when required. The scenario in question involves a fire-induced spurious HPCI initiation that must be terminated within 10 minutes to prevent flooding main steam lines and disabling both available methods of hot shutdown. For this event, RCIC is one defined method of temperature and pressure control to achieve hot shutdown. The other defined method requires ADS valves to lower pressure to allow CS to provide makeup water. As written, the procedure steps provided to Operations personnel would not have been sufficient to isolate steam to the HPCI turbine. All other methods to secure HPCI that would have been reasonably available required operation of components that could have been affected by the same fire that caused the spurious initiation of HPCI. | | event text = During verification of plant procedures associated with achieving safe shutdown during and after an Appendix R fire, it was determined that there was no readily available success path to secure HPCI when required. The scenario in question involves a fire-induced spurious HPCI initiation that must be terminated within 10 minutes to prevent flooding main steam lines and disabling both available methods of hot shutdown. For this event, RCIC is one defined method of temperature and pressure control to achieve hot shutdown. The other defined method requires ADS valves to lower pressure to allow CS to provide makeup water. As written, the procedure steps provided to Operations personnel would not have been sufficient to isolate steam to the HPCI turbine. All other methods to secure HPCI that would have been reasonably available required operation of components that could have been affected by the same fire that caused the spurious initiation of HPCI. | ||
The procedures have been changed to provide Operations personnel adequate and effective instructions to isolate HPCI when required after a spurious initiation during an Appendix R fire. | The procedures have been changed to provide Operations personnel adequate and effective instructions to isolate HPCI when required after a spurious initiation during an Appendix R fire. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:16, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Cooper  Nebraska (NRC Region 4) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.17 h0.0488 days <br />0.00696 weeks <br />0.0016 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Roy Giles 14:20 Jun 14, 2007 |
| NRC Officer: | Joe O'Hara |
| Last Updated: | Jun 14, 2007 |
| 43421 - NRC Website
| |