ENS 45888: Difference between revisions

v t e ENS Event
21:48 Apr 30, 2010
Title	Light Socket Short Causes Isolation Systems to Actuate
Event Description	At 1648 CDT, while the Control Bay AUO [Auxiliary Unit Operator] was attempting to change a light bulb for 1-IL-99-1AA, 1A [Reactor Protection System] RPS [Motor Generator] MG Set available light, the light socket shorted causing the loss of 1A RPS. The loss of 1A RPS resulted in Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations and initiated Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. All systems responded as designed. The Control Room operators entered the appropriate abnormal operating instruction, 1-AOI-99-1, to restore the affected systems. Operations entered TS LCO 3.3.1.1 conditions A.1 (place channel in Trip in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />) and C.1 (restore RPS trip capability in 1 hr). At 1734 CDT, Operations exited TS LCO 3.3.1.1 upon restoration of 1A RPS per 1-AOI-99-1. This event is reportable within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) [b. General Containment Isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)], except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event also requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. * * RETRACTION FROM RAY SWAFFORD TO DONG PARK AT 1522 EDT ON 6/29/10 * * * Retraction of an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> non-emergency notification for invalid Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) actuation from a loss of power to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 1A. Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) is retracting the 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) eight-hour non-emergency report made on April 30, 2010, at 2131 hours0.0247 days <br />0.592 hours <br />0.00352 weeks <br />8.108455e-4 months <br /> Central Daylight Time. BFN's initial report was categorized as a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B). The loss of power to RPS 1A resulted in PCIS Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation. However, plant conditions which require PCIS actuations and system initiations (e.g., low reactor water level, high drywell pressure, abnormal area radiation level, high area temperature) did not exist, therefore, the actuation was invalid. As a consequence, TVA has concluded that this event does not meet the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). A 60-day phone call will be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). [See EN #46054] TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the Corrective Action Program (PER 227662). TVA has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

ENS 45888 +/- *RETRACTED*
Where
Browns Ferry Alabama (NRC Region 2)
Reporting

10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.72 h0.03 days <br />0.00429 weeks <br />9.86256e-4 months <br />)
Opened:	Tim Taylor 22:31 Apr 30, 2010
NRC Officer:	Pete Snyder
Last Updated:	Jun 29, 2010
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v • d • e

v t e Emergency Notification System
Browns Ferry with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
WEEKMONTHYEAR2024-08-30T15:51:00 [Table view]
[ENS list for Browns Ferry]

@@ Line 17: / Line 17: @@
 | event date = 04/30/2010 16:48 CDT
 | last update date = 06/29/2010
-| title = Light Socket Short Causes Isolation Systems To Actuate
+| title = Light Socket Short Causes Isolation Systems to Actuate
 | event text = At 1648 CDT, while the Control Bay AUO [Auxiliary Unit Operator] was attempting to change a light bulb for 1-IL-99-1AA, 1A [Reactor Protection System] RPS [Motor Generator] MG Set available light, the light socket shorted causing the loss of 1A RPS.  The loss of 1A RPS resulted in Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 primary containment isolations and initiated Standby Gas Treatment and Control Room Emergency Ventilation.  All systems responded as designed.  The Control Room operators entered the appropriate abnormal operating instruction, 1-AOI-99-1, to restore the affected systems.  Operations entered TS LCO 3.3.1.1 conditions A.1 (place channel in Trip in 12 hours) and C.1 (restore RPS trip capability in 1 hr).  At 1734 CDT, Operations exited TS LCO 3.3.1.1 upon restoration of 1A RPS per 1-AOI-99-1.
 This event is reportable within 8 hours per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) [b. General Containment Isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs)], except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event also requires an LER within 60 days per 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).

v t e Unit 1
GE-4
Reactor critical	Critical
Scram	No
Before	Power Operation (100 %)
After	Power Operation (100 %)

ENS 45888: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 21:09, 1 March 2018

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ENS 45888: Difference between revisions

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