ENS 48584: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 12/12/2012 19:14 EST | | event date = 12/12/2012 19:14 EST | ||
| last update date = 12/12/2012 | | last update date = 12/12/2012 | ||
| title = Risk | | title = Risk of Possible Flooding to Ercw Building During Design Basis Flood | ||
| event text = At 1914 EST on 12/12/12, TVA determined that Sequoyah Unit 1 and 2 were at risk of flooding into the ERCW [Emergency Raw Cooling Water] Station Building during a design basis flood due to conduit penetrations not being filled with material required to make the building water tight. The lack of a barrier would allow flood waters to enter the ERCW building at a rate greater than the sump pumps can remove creating a condition that could result in the ERCW pumps being unavailable to perform their design function during a flood event above plant grade. | | event text = At 1914 EST on 12/12/12, TVA determined that Sequoyah Unit 1 and 2 were at risk of flooding into the ERCW [Emergency Raw Cooling Water] Station Building during a design basis flood due to conduit penetrations not being filled with material required to make the building water tight. The lack of a barrier would allow flood waters to enter the ERCW building at a rate greater than the sump pumps can remove creating a condition that could result in the ERCW pumps being unavailable to perform their design function during a flood event above plant grade. | ||
This condition places both units in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety [10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B)], and could prevent the fulfillment of the safety related function of ERCW needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition [10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A)]. | This condition places both units in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety [10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B)], and could prevent the fulfillment of the safety related function of ERCW needed to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition [10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(A)]. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:02, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Sequoyah  Tennessee (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.82 h-0.0342 days <br />-0.00488 weeks <br />-0.00112 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Johnnie Edwards 23:25 Dec 12, 2012 |
| NRC Officer: | John Knoke |
| Last Updated: | Dec 12, 2012 |
| 48584 - NRC Website
| |
Sequoyah with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |