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{{#Wiki_filter:PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7-12 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.12     All snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from thic requirement are those installed on non-safety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.
{{#Wiki_filter:PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7-12 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.12 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY:     MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.   (MODES     5 and 6 for snubbers located on cyatems** required OPERABLE,in those MODES).
The only snubbers excluded from thic requirement are those installed on non-safety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.
(MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on cyatems** required OPERABLE,in those MODES).
ACTION:
ACTION:
With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable     snubber (s)   to OPERABLE     status   and perform an engineering cycluation   per Specification 4.7.12.c on the supported component or declare ths supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.
With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber (s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering cycluation per Specification 4.7.12.c on the supported component or declare ths supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.12     Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.12 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.
: c. Visual Inspections The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers shall be performed after four months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers. If less than two (2) snubbers are found inoperabic during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection shall be performed 12 months 1 25% from the date of the first inspection. Otherwise, subsequent visual   inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:
c.
No. Inoperable Snubbers                   Subsequent Visual per Inspection Period                   Inspection Period * #
Visual Inspections The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers shall be performed after four months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers.
0                               18 months + 25%
If less than two (2) snubbers are found inoperabic during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection shall be performed 12 months 1
1                               12 months 1 25% v,                   l 2                                 6 months + 25%
25%
3,4                             124 days   t   25%
from the date of the first inspection.
5,6,7                             62 days   1   25%
Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:
j             '8 or more                           31 days   1   25%
No. Inoperable Snubbers Subsequent Visual per Inspection Period Inspection Period * #
The snubbers may be ' categorized into two groups:         those accessible and those inaccessible during reactor operation. Each group may be inspected independently in accordance with the above schedule.
0 18 months + 25%
  "  The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step l
1 12 months 1 25% v, l
i    at a time.
2 6 months + 25%
l v The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.
3,4 124 days t
  ** These systems are defined as those portions or subsystems required to prevent releases in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits.
25%
  #c A one time extension is granted to the above 12 month 1 25% schedule which resulted from the fourth refueling inspection activities. The visual inspections required following the fourth refueling outage l
5,6,7 62 days 1
will be performed during the fifth refueling outage.         This extension cxpires upon startup from the fifth refueling outage.
25%
P601150007 860102 NDR   ADOCK 05000334 BEAVER VALLEY     - UNIT 1         3/4 7-26       p               PDR PROPOSED WORDING
j
'8 or more 31 days 1
25%
The snubbers may be ' categorized into two groups:
those accessible and those inaccessible during reactor operation.
Each group may be inspected independently in accordance with the above schedule.
l The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step i
at a time.
l v
The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.
** These systems are defined as those portions or subsystems required to prevent releases in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits.
#c A one time extension is granted to the above 12 month 1 25% schedule which resulted from the fourth refueling inspection activities.
The visual inspections required following the fourth refueling outage l
will be performed during the fifth refueling outage.
This extension cxpires upon startup from the fifth refueling outage.
P601150007 860102 NDR ADOCK 05000334 BEAVER VALLEY
- UNIT 1 3/4 7-26 p
PDR PROPOSED WORDING


ATTACHMENT B No Significant Hazard Consideration Proposed Change Request No. 121 amends the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No.       1 Technical Specifications to permit a one time extension of the next visual inspection of snubbers to the fifth refueling outage.
ATTACHMENT B No Significant Hazard Consideration Proposed Change Request No. 121 amends the Beaver Valley Power
Description of Amendment Request:             Change Request No. 121 proposes a technical specification amendment to permit a one time extension of the 12 month 1 25% snubber visual inspection period; October 4, 1985 to April 4, 1986; until the fifth refueling outage, scheduled to begin in May 1986. During the fourth refueling outage, one hydraulic snubber was found with its fluid port uncovered and therefore     was declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.7.12.b.         An evaluation determined that the cause of the failure was a leak in the fluid supply line from the remote reservoir.     The snubber passed the functional test criteria after being vented of air, therefore, the failure can be attributed to a leak in the hydraulic fluid supply line. The leak was repaired and the line was leak tested.         All other snubbers and fluid supply lines of   the same design were inspected and left in an acceptable condition.     The proposed change extends the visual inspection cf snubbers until the fifth refueling outage since the inoperable snubber condition was not caused by a snubber failure. A reservoir level   inspection of snubbers of the same design for adequate hydraulic fluid supply has been performed to provide assarance that a similar problem does not exist.
: Station, Unit No.
1 Technical Specifications to permit a one time extension of the next visual inspection of snubbers to the fifth refueling outage.
Description of Amendment Request:
Change Request No.
121 proposes a
technical specification amendment to permit a one time extension of the 12 month 1 25% snubber visual inspection period; October 4,
1985 to April 4, 1986; until the fifth refueling outage, scheduled to begin in May 1986.
During the fourth refueling outage, one hydraulic snubber was found with its fluid port uncovered and therefore was declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.7.12.b.
An evaluation determined that the cause of the failure was a
leak in the fluid supply line from the remote reservoir.
The snubber passed the functional test criteria after being vented of
: air, therefore, the failure can be attributed to a leak in the hydraulic fluid supply line.
The leak was repaired and the line was leak tested.
All other snubbers and fluid supply lines of the same design were inspected and left in an acceptable condition.
The proposed change extends the visual inspection cf snubbers until the fifth refueling outage since the inoperable snubber condition was not caused by a snubber failure.
A reservoir level inspection of snubbers of the same design for adequate hydraulic fluid supply has been performed to provide assarance that a similar problem does not exist.
Basis for no significant hazard considerations determination:
Basis for no significant hazard considerations determination:
The reservoir level inspection for adequate snubber fluid supply has been performed to verify that the snubbers are being supplied with the hydraulic fluid necessary for proper operation and that a similar failure condition does not exist.             The technical specifications visual inspections will be performed during the fifth refueling outage   which is tentatively scheduled to begin in May 1986. This results in plant operation for a short time beyond the required technical specification inspection time period.
The reservoir level inspection for adequate snubber fluid supply has been performed to verify that the snubbers are being supplied with the hydraulic fluid necessary for proper operation and that a similar failure condition does not exist.
Based   on the criteria for defining no significant hazard consideration     setforth     in   10CFR50.92(c),   plant   operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
The technical specifications visual inspections will be performed during the fifth refueling outage which is tentatively scheduled to begin in May 1986.
(1)   involve   a   significant increase in the probability of occurrence     or   the     consequences   of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated. The proposed change extends the snubber visual inspection until the fifth refueling outage. A reservoir level inspection for snubbers of the same design as the inoperable snubber has been performed.             The reservoir level inspection verified adequate hydraulic fluid supply to assure     that the snubbers are operable and that a similar     problem   has     not recurred.     Therefore, the
This results in plant operation for a
short time beyond the required technical specification inspection time period.
Based on the criteria for defining no significant hazard consideration setforth in 10CFR50.92(c),
plant operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) involve a
significant increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated.
The proposed change extends the snubber visual inspection until the fifth refueling outage.
A reservoir level inspection for snubbers of the same design as the inoperable snubber has been performed.
The reservoir level inspection verified adequate hydraulic fluid supply to assure that the snubbers are operable and that a similar problem has not recurred.
Therefore, the


Atttchment B P:ga 2 probability     of   occurrence or the consequence of an accident     will     not be significantly increased.       The extension     of     the visual inspection until the fifth refueling outage is requested to avoid a plant shutdown to perform snubber inspections when a refueling outage is tentatively scheduled to begin within a short period of time beyond the technical specification time period. A plant shutdown would be necessary to perform the visual inspections since the snubbers inside containment are considered inaccessible during power operation due to the subatmospheric containment design at BVPS Unit 1 and the need to erect scaffolding to perform the inspections. In addition,   there has not been an outage         of sufficient duration     to     date   to   perform   the required visual inspections during the technical specification time period and none are scheduled.
Atttchment B P:ga 2 probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident will not be significantly increased.
(2)   create the probability for an accident or malfunction of a different     type     than   previously evaluated since the proposed change does not modify any existing plant system.
The extension of the visual inspection until the fifth refueling outage is requested to avoid a plant shutdown to perform snubber inspections when a
refueling outage is tentatively scheduled to begin within a short period of time beyond the technical specification time period.
A plant shutdown would be necessary to perform the visual inspections since the snubbers inside containment are considered inaccessible during power operation due to the subatmospheric containment design at BVPS Unit 1 and the need to erect scaffolding to perform the inspections.
In
: addition, there has not been an outage of sufficient duration to date to perform the required visual inspections during the technical specification time period and none are scheduled.
(2) create the probability for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated since the proposed change does not modify any existing plant system.
The reservoir level inspection verified adequate hydraulic fluid supply and demonstrated that hydraulic fluid is available to the snubbers and that the snubbers can perform their intended safety function.
The reservoir level inspection verified adequate hydraulic fluid supply and demonstrated that hydraulic fluid is available to the snubbers and that the snubbers can perform their intended safety function.
(3)   involve a     significant reduction in the margin of safety since the     proposed change does not alter Bases 3/4.7.12
(3) involve a
        " Snubbers".       The reservoir level inspection verified adequate hydraulic fluid supply to those snubbers of the same design generically susceptible to the failure mode of the inoperable snubber identified and is consistent with Bases 3/4.7.12.
significant reduction in the margin of safety since the proposed change does not alter Bases 3/4.7.12
These changes do not involve any physical change to plant safety related systems, components, or structures, will not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety related equipment, increase the consequence of an accident previously analyzed, nor create the possibility of a malfunction different than previously evaluated.
" Snubbers".
Therefore, based on the above,           it is proposed to characterize the change as involving a no significant hazards consideration.}}
The reservoir level inspection verified adequate hydraulic fluid supply to those snubbers of the same design generically susceptible to the failure mode of the inoperable snubber identified and is consistent with Bases 3/4.7.12.
These changes do not involve any physical change to plant safety related systems, components, or structures, will not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety related equipment, increase the consequence of an accident previously analyzed, nor create the possibility of a
malfunction different than previously evaluated.
Therefore, based on the
: above, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving a no significant hazards consideration.}}

Latest revision as of 00:22, 12 December 2024

Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing one-time Extension of Next Visual Insp of Snubbers to Fifth Refueling Outage
ML20137A954
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley
Issue date: 01/02/1986
From:
DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20137A943 List:
References
NUDOCS 8601150007
Download: ML20137A954 (3)


Text

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7-12 SNUBBERS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.12 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE.

The only snubbers excluded from thic requirement are those installed on non-safety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed, would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

(MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on cyatems** required OPERABLE,in those MODES).

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable, within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> replace or restore the inoperable snubber (s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering cycluation per Specification 4.7.12.c on the supported component or declare ths supported system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.12 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

c.

Visual Inspections The first inservice visual inspection of snubbers shall be performed after four months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers.

If less than two (2) snubbers are found inoperabic during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection shall be performed 12 months 1

25%

from the date of the first inspection.

Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:

No. Inoperable Snubbers Subsequent Visual per Inspection Period Inspection Period * #

0 18 months + 25%

1 12 months 1 25% v, l

2 6 months + 25%

3,4 124 days t

25%

5,6,7 62 days 1

25%

j

'8 or more 31 days 1

25%

The snubbers may be ' categorized into two groups:

those accessible and those inaccessible during reactor operation.

Each group may be inspected independently in accordance with the above schedule.

l The inspection interval shall not be lengthened more than one step i

at a time.

l v

The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

    • These systems are defined as those portions or subsystems required to prevent releases in excess of 10 CFR 100 limits.
  1. c A one time extension is granted to the above 12 month 1 25% schedule which resulted from the fourth refueling inspection activities.

The visual inspections required following the fourth refueling outage l

will be performed during the fifth refueling outage.

This extension cxpires upon startup from the fifth refueling outage.

P601150007 860102 NDR ADOCK 05000334 BEAVER VALLEY

- UNIT 1 3/4 7-26 p

PDR PROPOSED WORDING

ATTACHMENT B No Significant Hazard Consideration Proposed Change Request No. 121 amends the Beaver Valley Power

Station, Unit No.

1 Technical Specifications to permit a one time extension of the next visual inspection of snubbers to the fifth refueling outage.

Description of Amendment Request:

Change Request No.

121 proposes a

technical specification amendment to permit a one time extension of the 12 month 1 25% snubber visual inspection period; October 4,

1985 to April 4, 1986; until the fifth refueling outage, scheduled to begin in May 1986.

During the fourth refueling outage, one hydraulic snubber was found with its fluid port uncovered and therefore was declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 4.7.12.b.

An evaluation determined that the cause of the failure was a

leak in the fluid supply line from the remote reservoir.

The snubber passed the functional test criteria after being vented of

air, therefore, the failure can be attributed to a leak in the hydraulic fluid supply line.

The leak was repaired and the line was leak tested.

All other snubbers and fluid supply lines of the same design were inspected and left in an acceptable condition.

The proposed change extends the visual inspection cf snubbers until the fifth refueling outage since the inoperable snubber condition was not caused by a snubber failure.

A reservoir level inspection of snubbers of the same design for adequate hydraulic fluid supply has been performed to provide assarance that a similar problem does not exist.

Basis for no significant hazard considerations determination:

The reservoir level inspection for adequate snubber fluid supply has been performed to verify that the snubbers are being supplied with the hydraulic fluid necessary for proper operation and that a similar failure condition does not exist.

The technical specifications visual inspections will be performed during the fifth refueling outage which is tentatively scheduled to begin in May 1986.

This results in plant operation for a

short time beyond the required technical specification inspection time period.

Based on the criteria for defining no significant hazard consideration setforth in 10CFR50.92(c),

plant operation in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:

(1) involve a

significant increase in the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated.

The proposed change extends the snubber visual inspection until the fifth refueling outage.

A reservoir level inspection for snubbers of the same design as the inoperable snubber has been performed.

The reservoir level inspection verified adequate hydraulic fluid supply to assure that the snubbers are operable and that a similar problem has not recurred.

Therefore, the

Atttchment B P:ga 2 probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident will not be significantly increased.

The extension of the visual inspection until the fifth refueling outage is requested to avoid a plant shutdown to perform snubber inspections when a

refueling outage is tentatively scheduled to begin within a short period of time beyond the technical specification time period.

A plant shutdown would be necessary to perform the visual inspections since the snubbers inside containment are considered inaccessible during power operation due to the subatmospheric containment design at BVPS Unit 1 and the need to erect scaffolding to perform the inspections.

In

addition, there has not been an outage of sufficient duration to date to perform the required visual inspections during the technical specification time period and none are scheduled.

(2) create the probability for an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated since the proposed change does not modify any existing plant system.

The reservoir level inspection verified adequate hydraulic fluid supply and demonstrated that hydraulic fluid is available to the snubbers and that the snubbers can perform their intended safety function.

(3) involve a

significant reduction in the margin of safety since the proposed change does not alter Bases 3/4.7.12

" Snubbers".

The reservoir level inspection verified adequate hydraulic fluid supply to those snubbers of the same design generically susceptible to the failure mode of the inoperable snubber identified and is consistent with Bases 3/4.7.12.

These changes do not involve any physical change to plant safety related systems, components, or structures, will not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety related equipment, increase the consequence of an accident previously analyzed, nor create the possibility of a

malfunction different than previously evaluated.

Therefore, based on the

above, it is proposed to characterize the change as involving a no significant hazards consideration.