ENS 52597: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 03/07/2017 08:30 EST | | event date = 03/07/2017 08:30 EST | ||
| last update date = 03/07/2017 | | last update date = 03/07/2017 | ||
| title = Breach | | title = Breach in Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment | ||
| event text = At 0830 [EST] on March 7, 2017, operators discovered that on March 3, 2017 at 2046 a door was blocked open creating a breach of the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE) boundary that exceeded the allowed ABSCE breach margin. As a result, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Condition B for two trains of Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) inoperable due to an inoperable ABSCE boundary in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. The condition has been corrected and ABGTS was restored to operable as of 0949 March 7, 2017. | | event text = At 0830 [EST] on March 7, 2017, operators discovered that on March 3, 2017 at 2046 a door was blocked open creating a breach of the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE) boundary that exceeded the allowed ABSCE breach margin. As a result, both Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.7.12 Condition B for two trains of Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) inoperable due to an inoperable ABSCE boundary in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. The condition has been corrected and ABGTS was restored to operable as of 0949 March 7, 2017. | ||
In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the analysis of the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) assumes that radioactive materials leaked from the Emergency Core Cooling System are filtered and adsorbed by the ABGTS. For the fuel handling accident, the analysis assumes that the ABSCE boundary is capable of being established to ensure releases from the auxiliary and containment buildings are consistent with the dose consequence analysis. | In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the analysis of the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) assumes that radioactive materials leaked from the Emergency Core Cooling System are filtered and adsorbed by the ABGTS. For the fuel handling accident, the analysis assumes that the ABSCE boundary is capable of being established to ensure releases from the auxiliary and containment buildings are consistent with the dose consequence analysis. | ||
Latest revision as of 20:43, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Sequoyah  Tennessee (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| LER: | 05000327/LER-2017-001 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.15 h0.0479 days <br />0.00685 weeks <br />0.00158 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Jonathan Redner 14:39 Mar 7, 2017 |
| NRC Officer: | Jeff Rotton |
| Last Updated: | Mar 7, 2017 |
| 52597 - NRC Website
| |
Sequoyah with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | |