ML20151S969

Forwards Proposed Revs to FSAR Section 9.1.3 Re Addl Heat Loads & Results of Analysis to Demonstrate Ability of Spent Fuel Pool Coolong Sys to Maintain Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Temp within SRP Guidelines

ML20151S969
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	04/20/1988
From:	Bailey J GEORGIA POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
GN-1441, NUDOCS 8804280535
Download: ML20151S969 (49)

Text

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Georgia Power Company g

Post Office' Box 282 Waynesboro, Georgia 3o83o T4ephone 404 554 9961 do4 724-8114 Southern Company Services, it'C Post Office Box 2625 Birmingham, Alabama 352o2 wpnene zoS 8'" "

Vogtle Project April 20, 1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk File: X7BC35 Washington, D. C.

20555 Log: GN-1441 PLANT V0GTLE - UNIT 2 NRC DOCKET NUMBER 59-425 4

CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMSER CPPR-109 SPENT FUEL RACKS Gentlemen:

In our letter of December 23, 1987, we transmitted a d' ;cription of the spent fuel storage racks to be used in the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.

That letter included a description of the racks, seismic analysis and criticality analysis.

It did not address the incressed i

heat loads on the spent fuel pool cooling system for the Unit 2 spent fuel pool.

Proposed revisions to FSAR Section 9.1.3 to describe these effects are included in Attachment A to this letter.

The increased heat loads assumed in the spent fuel pool will also affect the Component Cooling Water and Nuclear. Service Cooling

.l Water analysis.

The changes to these two systems are separate from the spent fuel rack review and will be transmitted by a separate letter.

I The spent fuel pool cooling system for Units 1 and 2 are the same, however, the design heat loads for the Unit 2 pool are being

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increased.

The Unit 2 spent fuel pool heat loads are being revised to incorporate:

1.

The capability to fill all 2098 fuel assembly locations with spent fuel, i

2.

The capability to move spent fuel from the Unit 1 pool spent fuel racks af ter a sufficient decay period and store it in the Unit 2 pool spent fuel racks, 3.

The capability to provide for a normal refueling full core unload to facilitate fuel shuffling and inspection, and 4.

The capability to 6ccommodate longer fuel cycles and the greater number of assemblies which would be discharged each cycle.

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8804280535 G80420 i

PDR ADOCK 05000425 A

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X7BC35 April 20,1988 Log: GN-1441 Page two FSAR Section 9.1. 3 i s being revised to describe the additional heat loads and the :;.'sults of the-analysis to demonstrate the ability of the spent fuel pool cooling system to maintain the Unit 2 spent fuel pool temperature within tne Standard Review Plan Guidelines.

In addition to this spent fuel pool cooling system information it is necessary to make a revision to information contained in the summary report of the criticality analysis as attsched to our-letter of December 23, 1987.

That report indicated in Sections 4.5.2.4 and 4.5.3 that the boraflex shaets are 4 inches (2.8%)

longer than used in the analysis and that this amount is available to allow for shrinkage.

The amount of extra boraflex should have been given as 3 inches, (2%).

This change does not affect the results of the analysis but does change the allowance for shrinkage.

Attachment "B" provides specific wording changes for the criticality summary report.

The revised Section 9.1.3 in conjunction with the information contained in this letter and our previous letter of December 23, 1987, completes our initial submittal in support of the new spent fuel racks.

If additional information is required to complete the review, we recommend a meeting to expedite the identification and submittal of that information, so that the scheduled use of these racks for receipt of new fuel in October 1988 will not be affected.

Sincerely,

.0 AM J. A. Bailey Project Licensing Manager JAB /PDG/wkl Attachments xc: NRC Regional Administrator NRC Resident Inspector P. D. Rice L. T. Gucwa i

R. A. Thomas B. W. Churchill, Esquire J. E. Joiner, Esquire J. B. Hopkins (2)

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G. Bockhold, Jr.

R. Goddard, Esquire R. W. McManus Vogtle Project File l

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ATTACHMENT A PROPOSED REVIIION TO VEGP FSAR SECTION 9.1.3 l

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TABLE 1.8-1 (SIfEET 4 OF 5)

SRP Where Discussed Section Specific SRP Acceptance Sriteria

$1 Lama ry Desc ript ion of Di rrerences in FSAR 6.2.1.5 81.2, Minimum Containment Pressure The VECP does not employ the heat t ra ns fe r Pa rag ra ph (Rev 2)

Analysis for Emergency Core coerricients supplied in the SRP.

6.2.1.5.9 CooIing Systen Performance Capability Studies 6.5.1 (Rev 1)

II.E, Engineered Sa fety Features ( EST)

The instrumentation provided for V[CP [Sr Pa ra g ra ph Atmosphere Cleanup Systems atmosphere cleanup does not fully conform 6.5.1.7 with the guidance of the SRP.

6.5. 2 ( Rev 1 )

II.1.A. Containment Spray as a Fission The VECP is equipped with a semiautomatic Pa rag ra ph Product Cleanup System swi tchover f rom injection to reci rcula tion 6.5.2.7 medes.

8.3.1 (Rev 2)

I I.4. F.5, ac Power Systems (Onsi te)

The diesel genera tor controls and moni toring Pa ra g raph i nst rument s a re no t mounted on a vibra tion-f ree 8.3.1.5 rioor a rea, and vibra t ion isolators have not been provided on the associated control inets.

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Un:

'o 9.1.3 (Rev 1) li.1.D.4, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and eat loads are calculated by a dirrerent Pa ra g ra ph k

Cleanup Systams method than the method stated in BT P 9-2.

9.1.3.7 m

.PW I

9.1.4 (Rev 2)

II.5, Light Load Handling System Kinetic energy or a dropped fuel handling Pa rag ra ph tool lifted to the maximum height exceeds 9.1.4.6 the kinetic energy of the tool and an assembly lifted to the normal height.

9.2.2 (Rev 1)

II.3.e, Reac to r Aux i l i a ry Coo l ing The VEGP will provide safety-grade instrumen-Pa rag raph Wa *,er System tation to detect loss of auxiliary component 9.2.8.6 cooling water to the reactor coolant pump seals, t;ut VEGP does not incorpora te an automa tic reactor coolant pump trip upon loss or auxiliary component cooling water.

'8 8 11.1, Ultimate Heat Sink Position C-1 or Regulatory Guide 1.27 Pa rag raph

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9.2.5 requires that the heat sink be capable of 9.2.5.6 providing coolleg sufficient for 30 days.

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9.4.5 (Rev 2) 18.4, ESF Ventilatior. System The VECP is not rully in conformance with Pa rag ra ph item 2 of Subsection A and item 1 or 9.4.5.8 e[

Subsection C of NUREC/CR-0660.

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i VEGP-FSAR-9 9.1.3 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM (SFPCPS)

The SFPCPS.is designed to remove the decay heat generated by stored fuel assemblies from the spent fuel pool' water.

This cooling is accomplished by taking high temperature water from the pool, pumping it through-a heat exchanger, and returning the cooled water to the pool.

A secondary function of the SFPCPS is to clarify and purify the spent fuel pool, transfer canal, and refueling water.

A portion of the hot water discharged by the pump can be diverted through a water cleanup system and returned to the pool.

P The 3FPCPS is manually controlled and is capable of maintaining the pool water at a low enough temperature to prevent excessive vapor formation or evaporation from the water surface or-to i

cause excessive discomfort to personnel during_ fuel handling operations.

The SFPCPS is shown in figure 9.1.3-1.

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9.1.3.1 Design Bases Spent fuel pool cooling system design parameters are given in table 9.1. 3-1 A

{.,. un;4 I and h bl e 1. l 3'IB fo r Un;f.1.

A.

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System (SEPCS)

L. Sp e n4 Fal fool Lo o Ung system-Unif $

The SFPCS-fee each unitfis designed to remove the decay heat generated by the spent fuel assemblies 3

removed from one-third of a reactor core 150 h after shutdown, plus one-third of a reactor core per year from the annual refueling of the previous 10 years.

When this equivalent eleven-thirds of a core is in the pool, the system will maintain the spent fuel pool q

4 water temperature below 140*F if either of the two heat exchangers per' unit is supplied with 105*F component cooling water at the design flowrate (4000 gal / min).

The design heat load was calculated following the guidance of ANS 5.1.

The design heat load for the spent fuel pool heat exchangers is the equivalent eleven-thirds of a core as described above or 17.38 x 108 Btu /h.

i Two maximum heat load cases are adso evaluated in the design of the SFPCS.

The maximumarefueling case assumes a loading of one-third core per year for 9 years, plus 40 percent of a core from the preceding year's refueling and the most recent refueling (40 percent of a core) 150 h after shutdown.

9.1.3-1 1

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i INSERT A The SFPCPS for the two units are identical, however, the expected heat removal requirements are greater for the Unit 2 pool than for the Unit 1 pool.

Spent fuel pool cooling for the Unit 2 pool was evaluated for storage of 2098 assemblies.

The Unit 1 pool spent fuel cooling system is evaluated for storage of 936 fuel assemblies.

Some fuel assemblies discharged from Unit I will eventually be stored in the Unit 2 pool.

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VEGP-FSAR-9 The maximum ^qsocycore unload case assumes a loading of one-eme third core per year for 10 years and an additional full core loaded into the pool 330 h after the most recent refueling of 40 percent core was added.

With two trains operating, the spent fuel pool temperature is maintained below 120'F and 150 F, respectively, for the maximumhrefueling and maximum /tfore unload cases. Qrjeneg hema [ Assuming a single f ailure, the spent fuel pool temper _ gatre w 11 not exceed 170* Fin $iher cose, fSs s Instr +

B.

W en N.

col Dewatering Protection e

System piping is arranged so that failure of any pipeline cannot drain the spent fuel pool bel,ow the water level required for radiation shielding.

C.

Water Purification The system's demineralizer and filters are designed to:

1.

Provide adequate purification.

2.

Permit unrestricted access for plant personnel.

3.

Minimize pool surface dose rate during fuel handling operations in the spent fuel storage area.

4.

Maintain optical clarity of the spent fuel pool water by use of the system'n skimmers, strainers, j

and skimmer filter.

i The water cleanup circuit contains a filter with 98-percent retention of suspended particulates 25 um in diameter and a mixed bed domineralizer upstream of i

the filter.

The cleanup system is designed for a flowrate of 100 gal / min and is sufficient to ensure circulation of the pool water volume and maintain the specified water chemistry, The boron concentration in the pool water is maintained at approximately the same concentration as the refueling water (approximately 2000 ppm by weight boron).

Provisions are made to add makeup water to i

the pool, both as demineralized water to compensate for evaporation and as borated water corresponding to 1

the refueling water concentration, j

9.1.3-2

INSERT 8 2.

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System - Unit.2 The SFPCS for Unit 2 is designed to remove the decay heat generated by the spent fuel assemblies for the normal refueling, i

maximum normal refueling and maximum emergency core unloading Cases.

The. design heat load for each case was calculated following the guidance of NRC Branch Technical Position ASB 9-2, Rev. 2, dated July 1981.

A fuel burnup of 45,000 MWD /MTV is assumed.

The design heat load is based on an 18 month refueling cycle for both units, with 88 assemblies removed from the core during each refueling.

For the normal refueling case it is assumed that 88 assemblies are unloaded into the Unit 2 pool 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after shutdown of Unit 2 reactor.

At the same time it is assumed that 2,010 assemblies from previous refuelings are present in the pool.

These assemblies consist of 968 Unit 2 assemblies from previous refuelings as well as 1,042 Unit 1 assemalies transferred from the Unit 1 pool into the Unit 2 pool after they have been decayed for 15 nmnths in the Unit 1 pool.

The heat load from the 88 assemplies 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> after shutdown of the reactor is 16.66 x 10 Btu /hr.

The heat load from 2,010 assemblies from the previous refuelings is 11.63 x 106 Btu /hr.

In addition there is a heat load of 0.38 x 106 Btu /hr., from the spent fuel pool pump work.

With a design margin of 0.5 x 106 Btu /hr., the total heat input to the spent fuel pool is 29.17 x 100 Btu /hr.

This heat load is used for the spent fuel pool cooling system analysis.

During actual plant operation, Unit I fuel assemblies can be noved to the Unit 2 pool after they have decayed for 15 months in the Unit 1 pool or at any time the combined heat load of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 fuel assemblies is less than the heat load of 11.63 x 100 Btu /hr from previous refuelings described above.

For the nomal refueling case, the system will maintain the spent fuel pool water temperature below 140'F when e!ther of the two heat exchangers are in operation.

For the maximum nomal refueling case, to maximize the fuel decay heat input to the spent fuel pool, it is assumed that the entire core is unloaded into the pool 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> after the reactor shutdown.

At this time, it is also assumed that 2,010 assemblies from previous refuelings are present in the pool.

The composition of these assemblies is the same as that for the normal refueling case described above.

These assemblies consist of Unit 2 assemblies from previous refuelings as well as Unit 1 assemblies transferred from the Unit 1 pool into the Unit 2 pool after they have decayed for 15 months in the Unf t 1 pool.

The total number of fuel assemblies thus assumed in the pool at 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown is 2098 plus a 5% margin which is conservative.

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Additionally, the pool temperature is calculated assuming that these assemblies continue to remain in the pool throughout the refueling operation.

For the maximum normal refueling case, with two trains operating, the spent fuel pool temperature _ is maintained below 130'F and with one train operating, the temperature is maintained below 170*F.

For the maximum emergency core unloading case, it is assumed that the entire core is unloaded into the pool 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> after the emergency shutdown of the reactor.

At this time it is also assumed that 88 assemblies from the most recent refueling with a decay time of 36 days and 1,817 assemblies from prior refuelings are present in the pool.

These assemblies consist of 880 Unit 2 assemblies from previous refuelings as well as 937 Unit 1 assemblies transferred from the Unit 1 pool into the Unit 2 pool after they have decayed for 15 months in the Unit 1 pool.

For the maximum emergency core unloading case, with both trains operating, the spent fuel pool temperature is maintained below 135'F.

A summary of heat loads and spent fuel. pool temperatures for the above cases is presented in Table 9.1.3.4.

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VEGP-FSAR-9 00Chengd5 9.1.3.2

System Description

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The Safety Class 3, seismic Category 1 SFPCPS shown in figure 9.1.3-1 consists of two complete cooling trains.

The SFPCPS conforms to the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13, pertaining to the cooling and purification of the spant fuel storage facility.

The SFPCPS (piping, pumps, valves, and heat exchangers) is designed to remain functional' during and following a safe shutdown earthquake.

There are three sources of makeup water available.

The reactor l3 makeup water storage tank serves as the Seismic Category 1 makeup water source for the spent fuel pool; makeup water can be pumped or gravity-fed into the discharge line from spent.

fuel pool pump A.

Borated refueling water can be pumped or gravity-fed into the nonsafety-related purification loop.

Domineralized water can be pumped directly into the Safety Class 3 return lines of each spent fuel cooling loop.

The-cooling water return lhes of the cooling loops transport the

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reactor makeup water, refueling water, or demineralized water 319 into the spent fuel pool.

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During equipment maintenance, water from the transfer canal is transferred to the recycle holdup tanks for temporary holdup.

The borated water is returned to the transfer canal directly by the 3(,19 recycle evaporator feed pump.

Interconnecting piping between the

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evaporator feed pumps and the spent fuel pool is nonnuclear safety related.

Each cooling train incorporates one heat exchanger and pump.

One purification loop, with demineralizer and filter and associated piping, valving, and instrumentation, services both cooling loops.

One surface skimmer loop is also provided.

Each cooling train is designed to service the spent fuel pool with the design spent fuel assembly loading described in paragraph 9.1.3.1 and to maintain the bulk fluid temperature of the pool below 140*F.

With both trains in service with the design spent fuel assembly loading, the bulk fluid temperature of the pool is maintained below 120*F.

The SFPCPS removes decay heat from fuel stored in the spent fuel pool.

Spent fuel is placed in the pool during the refueling sequence and stored there until it is shipped offsite.

Heat is transferred from the SFPCPS through the heat exchanger to the component cooling system.

Wnen either cooling train is in operation, water flows from the spent fuel pool to the spent fuel pool pump suction, is pumped through the tube side of the heat exchanger, and is returned to the pool.

The suction line, which is protected by a strainer, is located at an elevation 4 ft below the normal spent fuel pool water level, while the return line contains an antisiphon hole near the surface of the water to prevent gravity drainage of the pool.

Amend. 3 1/84 9.1.3-3 Amend. 19 9/85

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'VE3?-FSAR-9 bb* Ob4MJe While the heat removal operation is in process, a portion of the spent fuel pool water, approximately 100 gal / min, may be diverted through a demir.eralizer and a filter to maintain spent fuel pool water clarity and purity.

Transfer canal water may also be circulated through the same demineralizer and filter by opening the gate between the canal and the spent fuel pool.

This purification loop is sufficient for removing fission products and other contaminants which may be introduced if leaking fuel assemblies are transferred to the spent fuel pool.

The deminerali=er and filter can be isolated from the heat removal portion of the SFPCPS to allow purification and cleanup of the refueling water while spent fuel pool heat removal operations proceed.

Connections are provided to the isolated loop such that the refueling water may be pumped from the refueling water system through the demineralizer and filter and discharged either to the refueling cavity, the refueling water storage tank, or the recycle holdup tanks.

To assist further in maintaining spent fuel pool water clarity, the water surface is cleaned by a skimmer loop.

Water is removed from the surface by two skimmer strainers, pumped through a filter, and returned to the pool surface at three locations remote from the skimmers.

Water clarity in the refueling canal is maintained by the use of a reactor cavity filtration unit during refueling operations.

The reactor cavity filtration unit takes suction from the refueling canal, circulates the water through a filter assembly, and discharges the water back into the canal.

The spent fuel pool is initially filled for use with water that is at the same boron concentration as that in the refueling i

water storage tank (RWST).

Demineralized water from an

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external source could be tanked to the plant and transferred te the pool by temporary connections.

Boron may be added to the fuel transfer canal from the' chemical and volume control system and then pumped to the spent fuel pool by tcmporary connections.

However, a more direct way to initially fill the spent fuel pool would be to add water from the reactor makeup storage tank or borated water from the RWST.

Demineralized water can1be added for makeup purposes, i.e.,

to replace evaporative losses, through a connection in each cooling train's purification return loop.

The pool water may be separated from the water in the transfer canal by a gate.

The gate is installed so that the transfer canal may be drained to allow maintenance of the fuel transfer F

equipment.

The water in the transfer canal may be transferred to h 19 the recycle holdup tanks in the boron recycle system.

When I

required, the water may I

9.1.3-4 Amend. 19 9/85

VEGP-FSAR-9 then be returned directly to the transfer canal by the recycle evaporator feed pumps (boron recycle system).

9.1.3.3 Component Description Codes and classifications for the SFPCPS are given in table 3.2.2-1.

Equipment design parameters are given in table 9.1.3-2.

A.

Spent Fuel Pool Pumps Two identical pumps are installed in parallel in the heat removal portion of the SFPCPS.

Each pump is sized to deliver sufficient coolant flow through its associated spent fuel pool heat exchanger to meet the system cooling requirements.

In addition to the spent fuel pool heat removal duty, the pumps may also be used in the transfer and clarification of the transfer canal water.

The pumps are horizontal, centrifugal units, with all wetted surfaces being stainless steel or an equivalent corrosion-resistant material.

The pumps are controlled manually from a local station.

B.

Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Pump i

The 100-gal / min spent fuel pool skimmer pump circulates surface water through two skimmer strainers and a filter and returns it to the pool, C.

Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers Heat exchangers are the shell and U-tube type.

Spent fuel pool water circulates through the tubes while component cooling water circulates through the shell.

The tubes and other surfaces in contact with the pool water are austenitic stainless steel; the shell is carbon steel.

The tubes are welded to the tube sheet to prevent leakage of pool water.

The heat - ex: hang eco-h:v d::ign heat 10:d ::pacity-of 17.38 x lOs Stu/h er the equiv:1:nt Of : lev:n-third: Of : ::::

( n: third ::r: 150 h after :hutd wn plu: t:n-third:

cer: frer the previeu: ::fu:lin;:).

heat exchagers b t he. uw + 1.omd un' t Z. s p e.M bel HE p o o ls o.c c.

id ent ico 1; how eve r, + h e p ec 4'or N c e. o f t h e.

l., cos r e_~. o v a \\

he.a.+. e.x cha.s g e r is co \\cwles4 ccl 4 r-A t-e. p ie<.mc.st o O l 7. 3 8 3 1o 6 GTu /k 9oe

+ h <_ 4 6; +- 1 pool o Ad 2.9.17,.io 6 ara / k For + L e. LW 4 2. p ool.

9.1.3-5

VEGP-FSAR-9 D.

Spent Fuel Pool Demineralizer The flushable, mixed bed demineralizer is designed to provide adequate fuel pool water purity for unrestricted access to the pool working area while maintaining visual clarity.

Design flow is 100 gal / min.

h': :: rt==per:tur: protectic.- L: r:quir:d for the

p;nt fu:1 p::1 d: inercliners.

Th; t;;;;::tur Of th spent fuel coeling unter fer th: minimu r:fu:lin;

= util et ex:: d the temperature at uhic? th: i:.-

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f tu: ::: ling traine ir in eper tien. See-_.. _ -_

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bss er t E.

Spent Fuel Pool Backflushable Filter The spent fuel pool filter is designed for a flow of approximately 250 gal / min.

A 5-um filter is used to improve the pool water clarity by removing insoluble particles which obscure visibility.

F.

Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Filter The spent fuel pool skimmer filter is designed for a rated flow of 100 gal / min.

A 5-um filter cartridge is used to remove insoluble particles.

G.

Spent Fuel Pool Strainers Strainers are located in each spent fuel pool pump suction line for removal of relatively large particles which might otherwise clog the spent fuel pool demineralizers or damage the spent fuel pool pumps.

H.

Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer / Strainers Two spent fuel pool skimmer / strainers are designed to remove debris and recirculate water from the surface of the spent fuel pool.

The elevation of the skimmers can be adjusted over a range of 2 ft.

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I.

Valves l

1 Manual stop valves are used to isolate equipment:

manual throttle valves provide flow control.

Valves in contact with spent fuel pool water are austenitic stainless steel or equivalent corrosion-resistant

material, i

1 9.1.3-6

g.

INSERT C c

1 Overtemperature protection is not required for the spent fuel pool demineralizers.

For the maximum normal refueling case the spent fuel pool cooling water temperature will not exceed 130'F when both cooling trains are in operation.

With failure of one train, the pool temperature may reach 170'F.

The ION removal capacity of the t

resins is significantly reduced at this tempera ture.

An alarm in the control room is provided to warn the operator of the increase in spent fuel pool temperature to take corrective action.

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VEGP-FSAR-9 Mo ( hoqj s3 l

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Piping All piping in contact with spent fuel pool water is austenitic stainless steel.

The piping is welded except where flanged connecti,ns are used to facilitate maintenance.

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K.

Reactor Cavity Filtration Unit The reactor cavity filtration unit consists of a motor, pump, and four cartridge filters.

This unit improves the refueling canal clarity by removing insoluble particles which obscure visibility.

9.1.3.4 System Ooeration A.

Startup, Normal Operation, and Cooldown The SFPCPS is not directly associated with either plant startup, normal operation, or shutdown but is operated when there is need to cool, clarify, or purify the pool water.

All situations are dependent upon the pool fuel loading and upon the elapsed time that the spent fuel has been in the pool.

One spent fuel pool pump is started manually on or before a high water temperature alarm, after assurance that cooling water is being furnished to the associated spent fuel pool heat exchanger.

The spent fuel pool water chemistry may then be checked at local sample points.

If purification is required, a portion (approximately 100 gal / min) of the system flow is diverted through the spent fuel pool demineralizer and filter and returned to the pool.

However, if only undissolved solids are to be removed, this flow may be circulated directly through the filter.

A local sample connection is provided in the purification return line so that the effectiveness of either the filter or the demineraliser may be checked as well as the boron concentration.

The spent fuel pool pump may also be used to transfer water from the fuel pool to the recycle holdup tanks.

This capabilits may be used to transfer water from the spent fuel pool for temporary holdup or to recycle and 19 reuse the water at a later time.

9.1.3-7 Amend. 19 9/85

No Chang eS 19 jn fo Only VEOP-FSAR-9 To maintain water surface clarity, a separate cleaning i

loop, the spent fuel pool skimmer / strainer loop, is i

also provided.

This subsystem, which is started manually, collects surface water from the pool, strains and filters it, and returns it to the pool at three remote locations.

By proper location of the two skimmer / strainers and the three return lines, cleaning of the complete pool surface is accomplished.

B.

Refueling

?

The SFPCPS has its maximum duty during the refueling operation when the decay heat from the spent fuel is the highest.

The system is normally placed in operation prior to the transfer of any fuel and continues in operation as long as required to maintain temperature and water purity within prescribed limits.

In addition, the reactor cavity filtration unit may be placed into service during refueling to maintain suitable water clarity for conducting fuel handling operations.

9.1.3.5 Safety Eva_luation A.

Availability and Reliability The SFPCPS has no eme'rgency function during an accident.

A cooling train may be shut down for limited periods of time for maintenance or replacement of malfunctioning components.

In the event of the failure of a spent fuel pool pump or loss of cooling 7

to a spent fuel pool heat exchanger, the second cooling train provides backup capability which ensures continued cooling of.the spent fuel pool.

A failure i

mode and effects analysis for the cooling portion of t

the SFPCS is provided in table 9.1.3-3.

The result of the unlikely failure of both spent fuel

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cooling loops would be a rise in pool water temperature followed by an increase in evaporative losses.

These losses could be made up indefinitely from the reactor makeup water system, the refueling water system, or the demineralized water system.

Each of the above sources can supply makeup water to the spent fuel pool via the cooling water return lines.

l In addition, the boron recycle evaporator feed pumps can ly9 2

pump from the recycle holdup tanks directly into the spent fuel pool l

4 9.1.3-8 Amend. 19 9/95

2n k on)/

No %nges VEGP FSAR-9 via the transfer canal when the gate between the pool-and canal is open.

B.

Spent Fuel Pool Dewatering The most serious failure of this system would be complete loss of water in the storage pool.

In accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.13, the design of the SFPCPS limits the loss of coolant that could be caused by maloperation or failure of system components such that spent fuel does not become uncovered.

The spent fuel pool cooling pump suction connections are located near the normal water level so that the pool cannot be gravity drained.

Each return line contains an antisiphon hole to prevent the possibility of gravity draining of the pool via these lines.

Finally, the lines to and from the skimmer / strainers 1

are located near the normal water level.

The accidental opening of the gate between the spent fuel pool and the transfer canal, if the canal is dry, would lower the water level approximately 6 ft, leaving about 18 ft of water over the top of the spent fuel assemblies.

Makeup water sources are provided to replace evaporative and minor leakage losses.

These sources include the refueling water storage tank, the reactor makeup water storage tank, the demineralized water storage tank, and 7

l the recycle holdup tanks.

Makeup to the spent fuel pit should be started upon a. low-level alarm signal from the spent fuel pool level instrumentation, l

i The spent fuel pool, transfer canal, and spent fuel cask loading pit have stainless steel liners welded to embedmonts in the walls and flo6rs.

At every liner weld seam continuous drains are provided for leak i

detection.

These are interconnected and drain to a collection point which is monitored to determine whether leakage is occurring.

C.

Water Quality only a very small amount of water is interchanged between the refueling canal and the spent fuel pool, as fuel assemblies are transferred in the refueling Whenever a fuel assembly with defective process.

cladding is transferred from the fuel transfer canal 1

9.1.3-9 Amend. 7 5/84

In{o OnlY No cha p VEGP-ESAR-9 to the spent fuel pool, a small quantity of fission products may enter the spent fuel cooling water.

The purification loop removes fission products and other contaminants from the water.

By maintaining radioactivity concentrations, excluding tritium, in the spent fuel pool water at or below 5 x 10 uCi/g for dominant gamma-emitting isotopes, the dose rate at the surface of the pool is 2.5 mrem /h or less.

9.1.3.6 Tests and Insoections Active components of the SFPCPS are in either continuous or intermittent use during normal system operation.

Periodic visual inspection and preventive maintenance are conducted using normal industry practice.

No special equipment tests are required, since system components are normally in operation when spent fuel is stored in the fuel pool.

Sampling of the fuel pool water for gross activity and particulate matter concentration is conducted periodically.

The layout of the components of the SFPCPS is such that periodic testing and inservice inspection of this system are possible.

Details of the inservice inspection program are outlined in section 6.6.

A.

Instrumentation Application The instrumentation provided for the SFPCPS is discussed in the following paragraphs.

Alarms and indications are provided as noted.

B.

Temperature Instrumentation is provided to measure the temperature of the water in the spent fuel pool and to give local indication as well as annunciation in the control room when normal temperatures are exceeded.

l Instrumentation is also provided to give local indication of the temperature of the spent fuel pool i

water as it leaves either heat exchanger.

C.

Pressure Instrumentation is provided to measure and give local l

indication of the pressures in the spent fuel pool pump suction and discharge lines and in the skimmer pump discharge line.

Instrumentation is also provided 9.1.3-10

~R?

i

\\

VEGP-FSAR-9 at locations upstream and downstream from the skimmer filter and the spent fuel pool filter so that pressure differential across these filters can be determined.

High aifferential pressure across the spent fuel pool filter is annunciated locally and in the control room.

D.

Flow Instrumentation is provided to measure and give local indication of the purification loop flow downstream of the spent fuel pool filter.

E.

Level Instrumentation is provided to give an alarm in the control room when the water level in the spent fuel pool reaches either the high-level or low-level setpoint.

A local alarm is also provided for low-level setpoint.

19 F.

Radiation Gamma radiation is continuously monitored in the fuel handling building.

A high-level signal is alarmed locally and annunciated in the control room.

This is described in detail in subsection 12.3.4.

9.1.3.7 Standard Review Plan Evaluation A.

Un;f I Heat loads are calculated by a different pthod than the method stated in Branch Technical Position (BTP 9-2, Revision 2, daied J+\\y 19 81.

An analysis has been performed to compare BTP-ASB-9-2 methods of decay heat calculation with standard Westinghouse methods.

The results of this analysis indicate that the application of these two methodologies do not lead to significant differences in calculated decay heat.

Calculated differences are about 1

6 percent.

For specific plants, fuel pool temperature is not parti:ularly sensitive to such differences in decay heat.

A 1-percent increase in decay heat fraction increases fuel pool temperature by less than 0.2 F, while a lO-percent increase in decay heat fraction would increase pool temperature by less than 2.0 F.

Thus the differences in the values calculated by either the Westinghouse methodology or by BTF-ASB-9-2 are slight.

B. UnlY A Heal Icods a re c.a I vla hd b y +h < m c 6 od sla+eci en NRC B ra n c h 7'e c hn ica l Po s Nion A58 9-A ) Reviskn, 2, dal<d V b

'9 TI-Amend. 1 11/83 9.1.3-11 Amend. 19 9/G5 l

l J

VEGP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1.3-1A

)

UnH A SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS Spent fuel pool storage capacity a>

14/3 cores t

Spent fuel pool water volume (gal)tb>

447,030 Nominal boron concentration of 2000 the spent fuel pool water (ppm) normaI Maximum ^ refueling case Decay heat production (Btu /h) 19.8 x 108 Spent fuel pool water temperature 118.2 with both cooling trains in operation (*F)

Spent fuel pool water heat inertia, 18.5 time to heat from 118.2'F to 212'F i

assuming no heat loss (h) em ergency Maximum ^ core unload case Decay heat production (Btu /h) 49.1 x 108 Spent fuel pool water temperature 137.5 with both cooling trains in operation (*F) j l

Spent fuel pool water heat 5.9 inertia, time to heat from i

137.S*F to 212*F assuming no heat loss (h)

Onl1 Shud.1 a.

One core equals 193 fuel assemblies.

r storage pool has a capacity of 936 fuel assemblies, b.

Volume of spent fuel pool without racks or fuel assemblies.

VEGP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1.3-16 Unil 2.

SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS Spent fuel pool storage capacity <ai 14/2 c+res 2093 f,./ ogey W;eg Spent fuel pool water volume (gal)(b>

437,890 Nominal boron concentration of 2000 the spent fuel pool water (ppm)

Maximum, refueling case Normal 5 g.L Decay heat production (Btu /h) 2Sr4 x 108 D IAo h oves d+e r.shs+down Spent fuel pool water teraperature

-110.2 130 with both cooling trains in operation (*F)

Spent fuel pool water heat inertia, Mr& 3 3 time to heat from il Q

• to 212'F assuming no heat loss (h) gg o' emerno w Maximum ^c6re / unload case 3 5.J 1 Decay heat production (Btu /h)

ASM x los

'2150 h eses qffer.shstdown I

Spent fuel pool water temperature 437.5 135 I

with both cooling trains in operation (*F)

Spent fuel pool water heat.

-5 9-5 1 inertia, time to heat froni 13 5'f -13?. 5'F to 212 *F assuming no heat loss (h) a.

One core equals 193 fuel assemblies.

Errh :t:r ;

p^-1 ha w j

1 espreiraj :f ?25 fu:1-:. : 2 11;;.

b.

Yleie r volvmc o+ ipn+ { vel (col wHh racks anci so91 4 *

• N'

In h e.s p e d (ve l

evof, 1

i INSERT D Normal refueling case Decay heat production (Stu/h) at 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> 28.29.x 106 after shutdown, i

Spent fuel pool water temperature with both 115 cooling trains in operation ('F).

Spent fuel pool water heat inertia, time to 12.7 heat from 115'F to 212'F assuming no heat

~

loss (h).

t e

?

i i

f i

l I

J l

i VEOP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1.3-2 (SHEET 1 0F 2)

SPENT FUEL POOL COOLINO AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM COMPONENT DESION PARAMETERS-Spent Etel Pool Pump Number 2

Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (*F) 200 Design flow (gal / min) 2300 Material Stainless stesel Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Pump Number 1

Design pressure (psig) 150 Design temperature (*F) 200 Design flow (gal / min) 100 Material Stainless steel Refueling Water Purification Pumps Number 1

Design pressure (psig) 120 Design temperature ( F) 140 Design flow (gal / min) 200 Material Stainless steel Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchangers(8) l Number 2

Type Shell and U tube Design heat transfer (Btu /h) 17.38 x 10' Required capacity (Btu /h/'F) 2.0 x 108 Shell Tube Design pressure (psig) 150 150 Design temperature (*F) 200 200 Design flow (lb/h) 1.98 x 108 1.14 x los Inlet temperature (*F) 105 128 outlet temperature (*F) 114 113 l

Shell Tube Fluid circulated Component Spent fuel cooling pool water water Material Carbon Stainless steel steel

1 VEOP-FSAR-9 TABLE 9.1.3-2 (SHEET 2 OF 2)

Spent Fuel Pool Domineralizer Number 1

Type Flushable Design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (*F) 250 Design flow (gal / min) 100 Resin volume (ft3) 30 Material Stainless steel Spent Fuel Pool Backflushable Filter Number 1

Design pressure (psig) 375 Design temperature (*F) 200 Design flow (gal / min) 250 Filtration requirement 98% retention of particles above 5 um Material, vessel Stainless steel Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer Filter Number 1

Internal design pressure (psig) 300 Design temperature (*F) 250 Design flow (gal / min) 100 Filtration requirement 98% retention of particles above 5 um Material, vessel Stainless steel Spent Fuel Pool Strainer Number 2

Design temperature (*F) 200 Rated flow (gal / min) 2300 Perforation (in.)

Approximately 0.2 Material stainless steel Spent Fuel Pool Skimmer / Strainer Number 2

Design temperature (*F) 200 Design flow (gal / min) 50 Perforation (in.)

1/16 Material Stainless steel (d)

See Inser+ E*

l 1

^

INSERT E (a) The heat exchanger design and sizing is based on the parameters j

as shown.

The spent fuel pool temperature analyses for Unit 2 utilize the same physical parameters for the heat exchanger.

However, the heat exchanger perfonnance is calculated based on the maximum heat load for each case and the overall perfonnance of the heat removal systems that transfer the heat - from the I

spent fuel pool to the ultimate heat sink.

l l

.I 1

1 I

d I

I l

1 4

i 1

l t

[

1 1

1

(

i I

i l

i l

)4

[

l l

TABLE 9.1.3-3A(SHEET 1 OF 10) l Un M I l

FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR COOLING PORTIOtt OF SFPCPS i

Plant Method failure [ffect AC ##""

i stem Description Sa fety Ope ra t ing failure of failure on System Safety No.

of Component function Mode Mode Detection functson capability Gene ra l Remarks l

1 Spent fuel Circulates All except Stops running Puep trip stare in None; train B available Acti tion of redundant pet pump spent fuel foss of due to elec-control room,

& t to provide 100 train

's manual. For P6-OO2 pe t water offsete trical pro-local ambe r i nd i-

s ;rcent of requi red maximum efueling case, e

( train A) through power tection cation on HS-10627, cocting capacity. In spent fuel pit tempe ra-heat ex-(see and low local pump the most limitir.g case, tore with one train changer to gene ra l discharge pressure it takes over 3 h af ter operating is 131*f and i

l maintain remarks) indication on Pe-the loss of spent fuel heatup ra t e fo r no e

062iA. I f cond i t ion pi t cool ing func t ions cooling is $.1*f/h 7

below

/40 F persists for ex-ror the water to reach f o r ma x i mumACIMM W fo r ma x i.aum M'

• -f tended time (see the boiling point; loading case, the spent t!*.** I r:r crre general remarks),

hence, there is ample fues pit tempe ra t u re ff [e/dn) ca se". [,5.oh h tempera ture a la rm to actuate tem et -

ating is 170'T and high spent fuel pit time for the operaeor wi th one t ra i n ope r-from T85H-626 in dundant pump.

heatop rate for no cool-t'2 control room.

ing is 12.7'f/h. The O

spent fuel pit pump is

'O 8

fafis to Same as above, ex-Same as above shed automatically m.na upon cept no pump trip sepon loss of offsite

]

command or a la rm and no ambe r power but can be p

spurious light in control manually loaded onto

n stop room. Pump status me emergency ac power I

Ilght on HS-10627 bus within 40 s artes i s g reen.

L3 e loss or power.

r"sa l 2

Spent fuel Circulates All except Stops running Pump trip ala rm in None; tr^" : -- f r; Activa lon of redundant pit pump spent fuel loss of due to elec-Control room, 9"t tra in A ava il-train i manual. For P6-OOS pit water offsite trical pro-loca l ambe r ind i-able to provide 100 maximum efueling case, (train B) th rough power tection cation on HS-10628, percent of requi red wp nt fuel pit tempera-hea t e x-(see and low local pump cooling capacity, in re with one train changer to gene ra l discharge pressure the most limiting case, pe ra t ing is 131*f and maintain remarks) indication on P8-it takes over 3 h af ter hea tup ra te fo r no e

062T8. If condition the loss of spent fuel oling is $.1'f/h.

below 19 F persists ror ex-pit cooling runctions eor maxim.ranscore on-for maximum tended time (see for the water to reach loading case, the spent N ON f N e rrr :

gene ra l remarks),

the boiling point; fuct pet tempe ra taere fs [ere f.=9 -"

n-high spent fuel pit hence, there is ample w i t h one t ra i n ope r-

./ case (ame[e a) tempe ra ture a la rm time for the operator ating is llO*f and f rom i l SH-626 in to actuate the re-hreatup ra te fo r rio coo 8 -

control room, dundant pu y.

ing 6s 12.7'f/h. The spent fuel pit pt emp is fails to Same as above, ex-Same as above shed automaticalBy start upon cept no pump trip tipon 8055 of offsste command or ala rm and no amber power but can be spuricass light in control manually soaded onto stop room. Pump status the emergency ac power l

l

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TABLE 9. l. 3-3A (SIIEET 3 OF 10)

Plant Method Iaelure Effect Item Description Safety Operating failure of Taalure on System Safety No.

of Component function Mode Mode Detection Function Capability Ocneral Hema rk1 fuel pit heat ex-changer room sump and/or wa ll-mounted level switches LSH-9802 and/or LSH-9198 in control room; suaIi rise in spent fuel pit temperature, pos-sible alarm IISH-626, and small rise in heat ewchanger di scha rge tempe ra-tore Tl-628A.

Tube (spent Rise in spent fuel Same as above mo fuel pit) side pit temperature

'O blockage and possible alarm 8

TISH-626 plus rise in heat exchanger

]

outlet tempe ra ture y,

11-628A.

ncrmal

o I

g as Spent fuel f ransfers All tube leakage Low spent fuel pit None; M 2 !"-

-d e

Activation or redundant C pit heat spent fuel from spent level alarm LSHL-M =a4 train A avail-train is manual. for enchange r pit beat fuel pit into 62$, high compo-able to provide 100 per-maxieum)<erueling case,16-002 load to component nent cool i ng wa te r cent or required cooling spent fuel pit tempera-(train 8) component coo l i ng wa te r surge tank level capacity.

In the most ture with one train cooling (sheII) side alare LIT-1847, limiting case, it takes ope ra t ing is 131'l and water and high component over 3 h af ter the

'c; 0;ur !. ih.

system coo l i ng wa te r re-loss of spent fuel pit cooling

.1

• T& _,,, Er gr0 1203 turn flow radia-cooling function for for man muo tore ten-tion a la r*J RE-0178 the water to reach loading ase, the spent in control room, the boiling point; fuel pit empe ra t te re in oper-f with one t.

bence, there is ample a t isul is 170 nd time for the operator to act ate the redund-heatup rate for s.

ool-ant pump.

ing is 12.l*F/h. The spent fuel pit pump is I$

Tube leakage Component cooling Same as above shed automatically f rom compo tent water surge tank upon loss of offsite coo l i ng wa te r Iw Isvel aIsra ger best can be into spent L IT-1847 and/or m nsially loaded unto fuel pit operation of make-the emergericy ac power wa te r ( see up valve LV-1851 j

bus with deO s af ter gene ra l plus grab sample the loss or power.

remarks) of spent fuel pit Also, spent feee s tari h < co $

febe $ce. g g

_.m

_m

.__s m._-.

TABLE 9.1. 3-3A (SHEET 4 OF 10)

I'l a n t Method faitore iffect stem Desc ript ion Safety Ope ra t ing failure or faisure on Systee Safety 06 0,

of CC n a nt Feene tioe.

Mode Mawle Detection inanction Capabitsty General facea rk s water to detect never be sancovered presence of sisice the stect eon line chromates; also, connect ions are to-rise in beat ex-cated 4 ft below tlws changer outlet normal wa ter level, temperature 11-56psionirig of spent fuel 6288, seaIi spent pi t wa te r i s prec Iteded feie l pit level by small holes in the rise, and pos-water return lines.

sible alare (SHL-625 pa r i as ao' = ' ope ra -

=eeee. e <s <,.0 0 4 r el tion, component cool-ruoM.

eng water pressure in futernal shest Component cooling SaeJ as above the spent f tee l pit l

(component water surge tank heat exchanger is cooling low level stare higher than that of water) side i f i-1847 and/or the spent fuel pit in s ealiage operation of enke-water.

O esp valve LV-1851

'O 8

plus flood alares i

in the control

]

room from spent y

faael pit heat ex-w changer room steep 8

and/or wall-motented level switches t.SH-9803 and/or LSH-9799 in controI

'I room; small rise in spent fuel pit tempera ture, pos-d sible alare T 8 5H-I 626, anal seeIi rise l

in heat exchanger discharge tempers-ture 10-6288.

i=sbe (spent ftise in spent fuel Same as above few p* ti side pit t empe ra tte re blockage and possible alare 185H-626 plus rise in heet exchanger outlet toeperature i1-6288.

l l

l l

l l

TABLE 9.1.3-3A(SilEET 5 OP 10)

Plant Method Iallure [ffect item Oescription Safety Operating failure a,r failure on System Safety No.

of Component function Mode

_ Mode Detection functson Capabis4ty Cereeras Remarks 5

Manual valve Isolates All Inadvertent Pump t rip s t a re in None; train B available f or valve closure U6-005, stsction or closure control room, to provide 100 percent cases, it is presumed reo rma l l y pump P6-002 local amber indi-or required cooling that poemp in same open gate fo r ma i n-cation on HS-10627, capacity. In the most train i s ope ra t imJ valve tenance and Iow local pump limiting case, it takes and will trip ir valve (train A) discharge pressure over 3 h af ter the loss is closed. Also, see indication on PI-spent ruel pit cooling general remarks or 062TA. Ir condition functions for the water item 1 persists for ex-to reach the boiling tended time, high point; hence, there is spent fuel pit ampte time for the temperattere alarm operator to actuate the from T85H-626 in reduixiant pump.

control room.

[nternal Visual inspection Same as above (9

(stem)

C lea kage T

I 6

Manual valve Isolates All Inadvertent Pump trip alarm in None; t re ml :-

for valve closure h

U6-003, suction or closure control room, local f

.--1... ; t ra i n A a va i l-cases, it it presumed y normalsy pump P6-00$

amber indication able to provide 100 that pump in same

c open gate f o r ma i n-on HS-10628, and percent or required trais is operating I

valve tenance low local pump dis-cooling capacity. In and wist trip ir (train B) charge pressure the most limiting case, valve es closed. Also, indication on PI-it takes over 3 h af ter see genera l remarks 062T8. tr condition the loss or spent ruel or item 1.

persists for ex-pit cooling runctions tended time, high for the water to reach spent ruel pit the boiling point; tempe ra ture a la rm hence, there is ample from TISH-626 in time for the operator control room.

to actuate the re-dundant pump, ruternal Visual inspection Same as above (stem) lea kage 7

Manual valve Isolates All Inadvertent Pump trip alarm in None; train B available f or va lve closure cases, U6-DOS, pump P6-002 ciisure control room, to provide 100 percent it is prestamed that locked open from heat local ambe r ind i a or required cooling pump in same traits is gate valve encha nge r cation on HS-10627, capacity. In the most operating and will trip

( train A)

E6-001 for and local pump limiting case, it takes ir valve is closed.

maintenance shutoff pressure over 3 h af ter the loss Also, see general re-Indication on PI-of spent rues pit cool-marks of item 1 062TA. If" condi-ing runctions for the

e TABLC 9.1. 3-3A(SIICCT 6 OF 10)

Plant Method failure Errect item Description Safety Ope ra t i ng failure or falture on System Safety No, or Component function Mode Mode Detection function Capability Gene ra l Remarks tion persists for water to reach the boil-extended time, ing point; hence, there high spent fuel is ample time for the pet tempe ra tu re operator to actuate the a l a rm f rom T I Sil-redundant pump.

626 in control room.

External Visual inspection Same as above (stem) leakage 8

Manual valve Isolates All Inadvertent Pump trip alarm in None;

'"I" P.;'

rc-For valve closure cases, U6-007, pump P6-005 closure control room, 9 " mt train A avail-it is presumed that locked open f rom hea t local ambe r i nd i -

able to provide 100 pump in same train is 4

gate valve exchange r cation on HS-10e,28, percent of required operating and will t rip tu

( train 8)

E6-002 for and local pump cooling capacity. In ir valve is closed.

o maintenance shutoff pressure the most limiting case, Also, see general re-T indication on PI-it takes over 3 h af ter marks or item 1.

5 06278. If condi-the loss or spent fuel 9

tion persists for pit cooling functions extended time, for the water to reach p

high spent fuel the boiling point; I

pit temperature hence, there is ample e

alarm from TISH-time for the operator 626 in control to actuate the re-room.

dundant pump.

Exte rna l Visual inspection Same as above (stem) leakage I

9 Manual valve Isolates All Inadvertent Pump trip alarm in None; train B available for valve closure cases, U6-009, heat ex-closure control room, to provide 100 percent it is presumed that locked open changer [6-local ambe r i nd i-o r requ i red coo l i ng pump in same train is gate valve 001 from cation un HS-10627, capacity. In the most opera t ing and wi l l trip

( train A) spent fuel and local pump limiting case, it takes ir valve is closed, pit for shutoff pressure over 3 h af ter the loss Also, see general re-maintenance indication on PI-of spent fuel pit cool-marks or item 1.

0627A. Or condi-ing runctions for the tion persists for water to reach the boil-extended time, ing point; hence, the re high spent fuel is ample time for the pit tempe ra tu. e operator to actuate the a la re f rom T I SH-redundant pump.

626 in control room.

~

W i

TABLE 9.1. 3-3 A(SilEET 7 OF 10)

Plant Method failure ffrect item Desc ri pt ion Safety Ope ra t ing failure of failure on System Sa fety No.

of Component Function Mode Mode Detection function Caoabilitv Ceneral Remarks External Visual inspection Same as above (stem) leakage 10 rianual valve I.olates All inadvertent Pump trip a la rm in None;. ;!. S nd r.,---

l'or va lve closure cases, U6-010, heat ex-closure control room,

+-W t ra i n A a va i l -

it is presufned that locked open changer [6-local amber indi-able to provide 100 pump,in same train is gate valve 002 from cation on HS-10628, percent of required operating and will trip.

(train B) spent fuel and local pump cooling capacity. In if valve is closed.

pit for shutoff pressure the most limiting case, Also, see general re-maintenance indication on PI-it takes over 3 h af ter marks of item 1.

06278. If condi-the loss of spent fuel tion persists for pit cooling functions extended time, for the water to reach high spent fuel the boiling point; 4

pit tempe ra tu re hence, there is ample m

a l a rm f rom T I SH-time for the operator O

626 in control to actuate the re-

'o

room, dundant pump.

I "3

fxternal Visual inspection Same as above (stem) y leakage ie il Manual valve Provides All Inadvertent Pump t rip a la rm in None; train B available f or valve closure cases.

HV-8754A, manual flow closure control room, to provide 100 percent it is presumed that normally control and local amber indi-of required cooling pump i n same t ra i n i s open butter-flow bal-cation on HS-10627, cepacity. In the most ope ra t i ng a nd wi l l trip fly valve ancing in and local pump limiting case, it takes if valve is closed.

( train A) train A shutoff pressure over 3 n af ter the loss Also, see general re-spent fuel indication on PI-of spent fuel pit cool-marks of item 1.

pit cool-0627A. If condi-ing functions for the ing loop tion persists for water to reach the boil-a extended time, ing point; hence, the re high spent fuel is ample tisse for the pit tempe ra tu re opera tor to actua te the alarm from TISH-redundant pump.

626 in controi room.

12 Manual valve Provides All

!nadvertent Pump t ri p a la rm i n None; te!

.d c:

For valve closure cases, HV-87$48, manual flow closure control room, i:nd:n;- t ra in A ava i l-it is presumed that normally control and local amber indi-able to provide 100 pump in same t ra in is open butter-flow bal-cation on HS-10628, pe rcent of required ope ra t a ng and wi l l trip fly valve ancing in and local pump cooling capacity. In if valve is closed.

( t ra in B) t ra in B shutof f pressure the m st limitinq case, Also, see genera l re-spent fuel indication on PI-it thes over 3 h af ter marks on item 1.

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TABLE 9.1. 3-3A(SilEET 9 OF 10)

Plant Method raifure Effect item Desc rip t i on Safety Ope ra t ing railure of railure on System Safety No.

of Component function Mode Mode Detection function Canabi'ity General Remarks ing is 12.7'r/h. The External Visual inspection Same as above spent fuel pit pump is (stem) shed automatical1y leakage upon loss or orrsite power but can be manually loaded onto the emergency ac power bus within 40 s af ter the loss or power.

Also, spent fuel can never be uncovered since the suction line connections are to-cated 4 ft below the normal wa ter level.

Siphoning or spent euel 'C

~

p i t wa te r i s p rec l uded by small holes,in the y

water return Isnes.

During norma l ope ra-rj tion, component cool-W ing water pressure in the spent ruel pit f

heat exchanger is e

higher than that of the spent ruei pit vner. normgl 15 Manual valve isolates All rails or left Low spent ruel pit None; U !- 9 2nd Ac t i va t on o r redunda n t U6-030, pump P6-005 open with level a la re LSHL-f -' M t ra i n A a va i l-train is manual. F o r' normally d i sc.ha rge faulted puri- 0625 in control able to provide 100 maximussrefueling case, closed dia-from non-Q rication loop room plus spent percent or requi red spent fuel pit tempe ra-phrage valve purification ruel pit tempe ra-cooling capacity. In ture wi th one tra in (train 8);

loop ture rise and pos-the most limiting case, ope ra t i ng is 131*F and valve sible high tempera-it takes over 3 h af ter heatup rate for no no rma l ly tu re a l a rm T I SH-the loss or spent ruel cooling is 5.1*r/h.

open ir 626.

pit cooling functions f or maximum core un-train A in for the water to reach loading ca the spent service.

the boiling point; fuel pit t mperature hence, there is ample with one t ain oper-time for the operator ating is 1 O'F and to actuate the re-heatup rat for no coul-dundant pump.

ing is 12, 7'r/h. The spent rue 1 pit pump is shed autosiatically upon loss or offsite powe r bu t can be l

emerpey

l l

l l

TABLE 9.1. 3-3A(SilEET 10 OF 10)

Plant Method f a i l u re E f fec t Item Description Safety Ope ra t ing failure of f ailure on System Safety i

l No.

of Component functinn Mode Mode Detection function Capabiiitv CeneraI Remarks manually loaded onto the emergency ac power bus within 8 0 s af ter 4

the loss of power.

Also, spent fuel can never be uncovered since the suction line connections are Io-cated 84 0t beiow the normal wa te r level.

Siphoning of spent fuel p i t wa te r i s precluded by small holes in the water return lines.

Du ri ng no rma l ope ra-tion, component cool-ing water pressure in t'2 the spent fuel pit O

heat exchanger is y

higher than that of n3 the spent fuel pit (n

Water.

De

o I

W

core, Dur;n g a.

maxi-vm eme<3eney un to asing rei p,j a

u,e

+1,,

.,p e n+

u fueI pool 4emp ere +vre is he lo w 140 f when -lw o frein s of. spen + net

(,oofirn

j _' N.

Gre in Of era f*'on.

A s;,.3 e fa: lure -

s's trequird l

bf f us $d lQ fetl fo r $b e'S C 9.S e.

O

TABLE 9.1.3-38(SHEET 1 OF 10)

Und E_

o FAILURE MODE AtJD EFFECTS AtJALYSIS FOR COOLItJG PORTIOt1 OF SFPCPS and #30 E **

erehlp Qo 'fts'es o

Plant Method failure Errect Item Description Safety

-. Ope ra t i ng failure or fasture on System Sarety No.

pr Cocoonent fonetIon Mode Mode Detection function capabieity,s17df Cene ra s Hema rks y

norrnal 1

Spent ruel Circulates All except Stops running Pump trip a la rm in None; train B available Activat dn or redundant pit pump spent ruel loss of due to elec-control room, i irr :; to provide 100 train is manual, for P6-002 pit water orrsite trical p ro-local amber indi-percent or required maximumfrerseeling caso,

( train A) through power tection cation on HS-10627, cooling capacity. In spent fuel pit tempe ra heat ex-(see and Iow local pump the most limiting case, t

with rain changer to gene rs t discharge pressure it ta ke s -ewee 3 h a f te r operating et '1:

au The maintain / RIM rtsarks) indication on PI-the loss of spent rase l heatup rate for no a

below *ge r 0627A. If condition pit cooling functions cooling

_'. 'u r"/h.13 9 f"k

• is,.

for maximum persists for ex-ror the water to reach tar in i.e : :eednorme/

tended time (see the boiling point; iuadi..s c si.

J.

eet r^ r ;e. e re ks f;na gene ra l rema rk s ),

hence, there is ample M'

_! L ;- ;..r we+t s-e 1

J high spent ruel pit time for the operator m ' h ' '- t'u n e case (ptof, o}

tempe ra tu re a la rm to actuate the re-

,aten; !3 : L^"

.ml from TISH-626 in dundant pump.

Se: t-r2*n rn e nn ennt. In controI room.

I r.;

,3

e, : /;+. T he O

spent rue: pit pump is

'O rails to Same as above, ex-Samo as above shed automatically 8

start upon cept no pump trip upon loss or orrsite command or a la rm a nd no ambe r power but can be p

spurious light in control manually loaded onto

o stop room. Pump status the emergency ac power i

Ilght on HS-10627 ggg bus within 8 0 s arter 4

is green.

the loss or power.

Act iva tion o[f redundant.

norma 2

Spent fuel Circulates All except Stops running Pump trip a la rm in None; tala

-^d rr-pit pump spent fuel loss of due to elec-control room,

• " ^ tra in A ava il-rain is manual. For P6-005 pit water orrsits trical pro-local amber indi-able to provide 100 x imum[ue lirerueling case

• N t

pit tempe ra-gd 00 $

(train 8) through power tection cation on HS-10628, pe rcent or required sp hea t ex-(see and low local pump cooling capacity, in tur with one t ra in ~ wdli ko changer to gene ra l discharge pressure the most limiting case, ope ra t i nga s.

g,f"3

.a.

s --

maintain 170 rema rks )

indication on PI-it takes-4hsee 3 h af ter73ehea tup ra te for no below

'r 06278. If condition the loss of spent ruel cooling o

is ' '*'/'.JJ4 ff Y M for maximum persists for ex-pit cooling runctions

'r ae.nc c^"e I

fer' Errdrorrm /

tended time (see for the water to reach ined i.m v. W ' ha P at rn e re.ce-re fs/ellaO gene ra l rema rks ),

the boiling point; fue"

,f-n a=un a r$ ' " ru

-entoodte,

high spent fuel pit hence, there is ample wi:

.x

. -...., m. c -

case ( Nofe q) tempera ture a la rm t ime fo r the ope ra to r ei..>

' ' 9 anes-from TISH-626 in to actuate the re-te 17 r2i_

e

' ~ -

r control room.

dundant pump.

n; i; ;^ "'/*. the spent fuel pit pump is fails to Same a s above, ex-Same as abcve shed automatically sta rt upon cept no pump trip upun loss or orrss te command or ala rm and no amber powe r but can be spuriotes light in control manually loaded onto stop room. Pump status t he eme r gency a c powe r

G n c/ 4'3 0 We'M TABLE 9.1.3-38(SHEET 2 OP 10) two Nrun,ns ofQr Plant Method failure rfrect Item Description Sarety Operating failure or failure on System Safety leo.

or Component fasoction Mode Mode Detection f tanct e on CapabiI s ty Guncrill Ikmaths light on 115-10628

~3 g7o p bus within 40 s af ter o

is green.

the loss or power.

qorrnal 3

Spent fuel T ransfe rs All tube leakage low spent fuel pit None; train B availabit. Activatl.on or redund.ent pet heat spent fuel from spent level alass LSHL-to provide 100 percent train it ma teua l. for enchanger pit heat ruel pit into 625, high compo-or required cooleng ximumfrerueling c.ese, l

E6-001 load to component nent cooling wa ter capacity. In the most se it fuel pit t empe ra -

(train A) component cooling water surge tank level limiting case, it takes ture with one t ra i n cooling (shell) side ' a la rm L i T-1846, 4 wee 3 h a rter the loss operating ;; ;;:c' r*_

e water and high component of spent ruel pit cool-heatsep rate for no system coo s ing wa te r re-ing functions ror the cooling i s ",. : /:.. t 3.9oF/3 1203 turn riow ra d i a-water to reach the E z r 1_:

- -^ >

tion ala re Rr-017A boiling point; hence

. a.J.

^ = "

+h

<; a in control room.

there i s ample t ime fo r

r. u. i 7;.

, ceano rm m the operator to actuate u i ' '- nc t r2 P 4

the redundant pump.

a;.;

'lG",

e4 pj Mi. ii v i ie ser = cas h c)

Tube leakage Component cooling Same as above n; i; ?.7"/h the

• o from component water surge tank spent fucI pit pump is I

"1 cooling water low level alarm shed automatically

[

into spent LI T-1846 and/or upon loss or orrsite ruel pit operation or make-power but can be g

water ( see up valve LV-1850 manually loaded onto a

ger.e ra l ple:s grab sample the emergency ac power o rema rks )

or spent ruel pit bus within 40 s af ter watcr to detect the loss or power.

presence of Also, spent fuel can chromates; also, never be uncovered rise in heat ex-since the suction line changer outlet connections are to-temperature TI-cated as rt below the 628A, small spent normal water level.

ruel pit level Siphoning of spent ruel rise, and pos-pit water is precluded sible a la re LSHL-by smalI holes in the 625 in control water return lines.

room.

During normal opera-tion, componeret cool-External shell Component cooling Same as above ing water pressure in (component water surge tank the spent ruel pit cooling low level alarm heat exchanger is water) side LST-1846 and/or higher than that or lea kage operation or make-tiie spent-f ucI pit up valve LV-1850

water, plus riood alarcs in the control room tron spent 4

~

TABLE 9.1. 3-38(SilEET 3 OP 10)

Plant Method failure Errect item Description Safety Operating Failure of failure on System Safety peo,

of Component function Mode Mode Detection function Capabitity General Hemarks_

ruel pi t hea t ex-changer room sump and/or wsII-mounted level switches LSH-9802 and/or LSH-9798 in control room; small rise in spent fuel pit tempe ra tu r e, pos-sible a la rm IISH-626, and small rise in heat exchanger discharge tempera-ture TI-628A.

Tube (spent Rise in spent fuel Same as above ond13OY d k EU fuel pit) side pit tempe ra ture C) h

• N **.450[ era fe'4

'O

• Dn bewi Op ;refe (9 blockage and possible alarm

.I TISH-626 plus rise n

in heat exchanger f s 170 [ n o coolig 3y m

t outlet tempe ra ture p

TI-628A.

norma u

I as Spent fuel T ransfe rs All Tube leakage Low spent fuel pit None; t re !. G ;;.d re-Activati n or s'edundant

• pit heat spent fuel from spent level alarm LSHL-fr"Mi tra in A ava i l-t ra in i manual, for exchange r pit heat fuel pit into 625, high compo-able to provide 100 per-( maximo refueling case, E6-OO2 load to component nent coo l i ng wa te r cent or required cooling \\ spent fuel pit temposa-cooling water surge tank level capacity.

In the most tureFPwith o g (train 8) component (shell) side a la re I I T-18a 7, limiting case, it takes ope ra t i ng g _...

..d cooling s

water and high component esse 3 h a f te r the t-L=e ~ r r 2 -- emr system coo l i ng wa te r re-loss of spent fuel pit - e.,.. ;...,, ',. : " ' / '.

1203 turn rlow radia-cooling rtenction for t ion a la re RE-0178 the water to reach bd !;g c;;c, th

--

:t in control room.

the boiling point; ruel pi t -- t ;;.,.c r;teest-hence, the re i s amp le wiph sn: t re in ce::-

time for the operator et,ng 5: ? ?sts.-and.

ant pump.

ng 31 ??.?"F/'.... CM!-

to actuate the redund-beet s,. 7000 fCr I tic spent fuel pit punip is Tube leakage Component cooling Same as above shed automatically f rom component water surge tank upon loss or orrsite 4

cooling water low level alarm powe r bis t cars be into spent L I T-18sa7 and/or manually loaded onts fuel pit ope ra t ion of ma ke-the emergency ac power water (see up valve LV-1851 bias wi th 8a0 s a f te r-gene ra l plus grab sample the loss or power.

remarks) or spent' ruel pit Also, speset ruct care c

TABLE 9.1.3-38(SilEET 4 OF 10)

Plant Method

' failure [ffect 8 tem Description Safety Operating failure of failure on System Safety leo,

of Component functions Mode Mode Detection f esoc t ion Capab i l i ty Cenceal Remarks water to detect never be uncovee cd presence of since the siection l e sse chromates; also, connect 6 eras a r e au-rise in heat ex-Cated 4 ft below the changer outlet normal water leve t,

temperattsre TI-Sipleoneng of spent fuel 6288, small spent pit water i s precluded f tee l pit level by small holes in the rise, and pos-water rettern lines.

sible alarm LSilt-645 ouring normal ope ra -

+eser. ;n sontr.1 tion, component cool-re ani,

ing wa ter pressaare in External shell Component cooling Same as above the sperit f ase l pit (component water surge tank heat exchanger is cooling low level alarm higlier than that of water) side Lli-1847 and/or the spent fuel pit rn leakage opera tion of make-water.

O up valve LV-1851

'O plus flood alarms in the control g

room from spent y

fuel pit heat ex-W changer room stamp I

and/or wa l l-motented level switches LSH-9803 and/or LSH-9799 in control room; small rise in spent fuel pit tempe ra tu re, pos-sible a la rm T ISH-626, and small rise in heat exchanger discha rge tempera-

- ture T I-6288.

Taibe (spent Rise in spent fuel Same as above fuel pit) side pit tempe ra tu ro blockage and possible t;. ira TISH-626 plus rise in heat exchanger outlet tempe ra ture Tl-6288.

s

~

TABLE 9.1.3-3B(SHEET 5 OF 10)

Plant Method failure Effect 8 tem Desc ript ion Sarccy Operating failure or f a ilure on System Safety Iso,

of Component Function Mode Mode Detection function Capability Genera s Rema rks 5

Manual valve isolates All inadvertent Pump t ri p a l a rm in None; train 8 available f or valve closure U6-001, section of closure control room, to provide 100 percent cases, it is presumed normally pump P6-002 local amber indi-or required cooling that pump in same open gate fo r ma in-cation on HS-10627, capacity. In the most train is operating valve tenance and low local piemp limiting case, it takes and will trip if valve (train A) discharge pressure ower 3 h a f te r the loss is Closed. Also, see indication on PI-spent fuel pit cooling gene ra l rema rks of 0627A. If condition functions for the water item 1.

persists for ex-to reach the boiling tended time, high point; hence, there is spent fuel pit ample time for the tempe ra tu re a la rm operator to actuate the from TISH-626 in redundant pump.

ControI room.

^

External Visual inspection Same as above q

to (stem)

C leakage

• O 8

6 Manual valva isolates A11 Inadvertent Pump t rip a la rm in None; tr:!. C nd.

f or valve closure 1

U6-003, suction of closure control room, local dwedent t ra i n A a va i l -

cases, it is presumed y j

poreally pump P6-005 amber indication able to provide 100 that pump in same

o open gate for main-on HS-10628, and percent of required t ra in i s ope ra t i ng I

valve tenance low local pump dis-cooling capacity. In and will trip if (train 8) charge pressure the most limiting case, valve is closed. Also, indication on PI-it ta kes avec 3 h a f te r see general remarks 06278. If condition the loss of spent fuel of item 1.

persists for ex-pit cooieng functions tended time, high for the water to reach spent fuel pit the boiling point; tempe ra tu re a Ia re hence, there is ampie from TISH-626 in time for the operator control room, to actuate the re-dundant pump.

External Visual inspection Same as above (stem) lea kage 7

Manual valve Isolates All anadvertent Pump t ri p a la re in None; train 8 avaitziele f or va lve closure cases, U6-DOS, pump P6-002 closure control room, to provide 100 perces.L it is presumed that locked open from heat local ambe r i nd i-of required cooling pump in same train is gate valve exchanger cation on HS-10627, capacity. In the most operating and will trip (train A)

E6-001 for and local pump limiting case, it takes ir valve is closed.

maintenance 1Ehutof f pressure dmMpe 3 h a f ter the loss Also, see general re-indication on PI-of spent fuel pit cool-ma rks or i tem 1.

062TA. I f condi-ing functions for the

TABLE 9.1.3-3F(SIIEET 6 OP 10)

Plant Method laifure Errect item Description sarety Operating Failure or raiture on System Sarety No.

or Component reenct ion Mode Mode Detection Function Capabiletv Ceneral Remarks tion persists for water to reach the boil-ewtended time, ing point; hence, there high spent ruel is ample time for the pit tempe ra ture operator to actuate the alarm from IISH-redundant pump.

626 in control room.

External Vi stea l inspection Same as above (steel leakage 8

Manual valve Isolates All Inadvertent Pump trip alarm in None; tra!- "

.'i &

f or valve closure cases, U6-007, pump P6-005 closure control room,

-S n t ra i n A a va i l-it is presumed 18sa t locked open from beat local a mbe r i nd s -

able to provide 100 pump in same train is gate valve exchanger cation on HS-10628, percent or requi red ope ra t i ng and wi l l trip 4g

( train 8)

E6-002 ror and local pump cooling capacity, in ir valve is closed.

o maintenance shutorr pressure the most limiting case, Also, see genera l re-

'u indication on PI-it takes.over 3 h a rter marks or item 1.

I 06278. Ir condi-the loss or spent ruel 9

tion persists for pit cooling runctions

[

extended time, for the water to reach p

high spent ruel the boiling point; I

pit tempe ra ture hence, there is ample e

alare from TISH-t ime fo r the 0;,ar ra to r 626 in control to actuate the re-

room, dundant pump.

External Visual inspection Same as above (stem) leakage 9

Manual valve isolatos All Inadvertent Pump t rip a la rm in None; train B available for valve closure cases, U6-009, heat ex-closure control room, to provide 100 percent it is presismed that locked open changer [6-local ae5e r i nd i-of required cooling paemp i re same t ra in is gate valve 001 from cation en HS-10627, capacity. In the most opera t a ng and will trip (train A) spent fuel and local pump limiting case, it takes ir valve is closed.

pit for shutorr pressure

-owee 3 h a f ter the loss Also, see general re-maintenance indication on PI-or spent fuel pit cool-marks or item 1.

0627A. It condi-ing functions for the tion persists for water to reach the boil-extended time, ing point; hence, there high spent ruel is ample time for the pit tempe ra ture opera tor to actua te the a la rm f rom T ISH.

redundacit pump.

626 in control room.

4 TABLE 9.1. 3-3F (SilEET 7 OF 10)

Plant Method Iallure Effect item Description Safety Operating failure of Failure on System Safety No..

of. Component funcilan Mode Mode Detection function Canabiiitv cene ra i R naa ra External Visual inspection Same as above (stem) leakage 10 Manual valve Isolates All Inadvertent Pump trip a la rm in None; tr=In sa " :

f or va lve closure cases, U6-010, heat ex-closure control room, d..d::0 train A ava i l-it is presumed that locked open changer E6-local ambe r i nd i-able to provide 100 pump, in same t ra in is gate valve 002 from cation on HS-10628, percent of required ope ra t ing and wi l l trip

( train 8) spent fuel and local pump cooling capacity. In if valve is closed, pit for shutoff pressure the most limiting case, Also, see gene ra l re-maintenance indication on PI-it takes ever 3 h a f te r marks of item 1.

06218. If condi-the loss of spent f'aie l l

tion persists for pit cooling functions extended time, for the water to reach high spent fuel time boiling point; 4

pit tempe ra ture a la rm f rom TISH- _

hence, there is ample g

time for the operator c) 626 in control to actuate the re-

• o room.

dundant pump.

?'n

[

External Visual inspection Same as above (stem) y leakage Ie 11 Manual valve Provides All Inadvertent Pump t rip a l a rm i n None; train B availaisle f or valve closure cases, HV-8751sA, manual flow closure control room, to provide 100 percent it is presumed that normally control and local embe r i nd i-of required cooling pump in same train is open butter-flow bal-cation on HE-10627, capacity. In the most opera t ing and will trip fly valve ancing in and local pump limiting case, it takes if valve is clossd.

(train A) train A shutoff" pressure ovos. 3 h af ter the loss Also, see general re-spent fuel indication on PI-of spent fuel pit cool-marks of item 1.

pit cool-0627A. If condi-ing functions for the ing loop tion persists for water to reach the boil-extended time, ing point; hence, there high spent fuel is ample time for the pit tempe ra ture operator to actuate the alarm from TISH-redundant pump.

626 in control room.

12 Manual valve Provides All Inadvertent Pump trip a la rm in None; tra h ?

.d.v f or valve closure cases, normally control and

~ closure control roose, M t ra i n A ava i l-it is presumed tisa t

^^d HV-87548, manual flow local amber indi-able to provide 100 pump in same t r in is open butter-flow bal-cation on HS-10628, percent of requi red opera t e no end wi l l trip fly valve ancing in and local pump cooling capacity. In if valve i s cinwd.

( tra in 8) t ra in 8 shutof f pressure the most limiting case, Also, see general ee-spent fuel indication on PI-it takes owne 3 h a f ter marks on ite<.

8.

-. m r

w

=..

r TABLE 9.1.3-38(SilEET 8 OF 10)

Plant Hethod f aiitsee E f fect Item Desc ript ion Safety Operating f a i liare of faelure on Syste m Sa fety Jgo of Component function Mode Mode Detectinn Itenc t ion Capahi i i ty _

Cenesat He ma e Iss pit cooling 0627D. If condi-the loss of spent foci loop tion persists for pit cooling functions entended time, for the water to reach q,g g 3 f g'gyj, high spent fine l the boiling point; g.,,rg,.,J pit temperature hence, there es ample a la re f rom 18 514-time for the operator 626 in costtrol to actuate the re.

room dondant ptemp.

15 I70 [

Dormaj 13 Check valve Prevents All fails open Loss of spent fuel None; break in non-Q Activati n of redundant U6-004 backflow or with line pit water with low piping can be isolated I train i sua nua l. for j

spent fuel break in level alarm LSHL-with valv3s U6-057, I

maximum crueling case, pit water non-Q purifi-625 in control U6-058, and U6-053.

spent fuel pit tempera-th rotagh cation ioop room.

with one train purification opera t ing A ;...

-1 loop, 4f

~f h f heatop ra te for no 4

r - - -. -. _.._ _' M / t. f 3'.1M latter faIIs cooling is 5.

g gegi.g em en eno on,.,..

'o i

g....

..M E'_ I IlliZ ' Z 'Z E

'9 "y._.~ U M A'r' ! E'.' '

M 1,:ch:k.. '.... [h. 5 t re ' -

. ihe i

spent fuel pit pump is O

shed automatically upon loss of offsite power but can be manually loaded onto the emergency ac power but within 40 s af ter Qlp loss of power.

Its 14anua l valve isolates All fails or left Low spent fuel pit None; train 15 available Activation of redundant U6-028, pump P6-002 open with level a la rm LSHL-to provide 100 percent train is manual. for no rme l ly d i scha rge faul ted puri- 0625 in control of required cooling maxemum) refueling case, open dia-from non-Q fication loop room plus spent capacety. In the most nt fuel pit tempesa-phrage valve purification fuel pit tempera-limiting case, it takes ture i th one traise

( train A);

loop t ure rise and pos-1mmoy 3 h a f te r t he loss ope ra t i ngg i ? ? ' *;.. 0%

valve sible high of spent fuel pit cool-heatup rate for io normally temperature ala rm ing functions l'or the cooling is 5 /la. 839 closed if TISH-626.

water to reach the fer r x 6 w, u

...n train B in boiling point; hence, S ed =;; n. h. it.

nt service.

there is ample time for f: e !, !: n.., -.-.. a the opera tor to w? in s..

i i i...,;--

actuate the redundant

-i....,

.5

d pump.

O mi i n,,

r e t, rn i s 170*f and nif w:n ivo +<ar,s n o e ra +:

r TABLE 9. ],3-3B (SilEET 9 OP 10)

Plant Method failure Eliect Item Description Safety Ope ra t ing failure or f ailure ovi System Safety bio,

of Conconent function Mode Mode Detecti m function Canability CC.cfat Remarg h.g 1

'?. W fh. the External Visual inspection Same as above spent ruel pit pump is (stem) shed automaticaily leakage upon loss or orrsite power but can be m.inuaeIy Ioaded onto t he emergency ac power bus within 40 s after the loss or power.

Also, spent fuel can never be uncover ed since the suction line connections are 30-cated Is It below the normal wa ter level.

SiphGning or spent ruct <

pit water is precluded ]

by smalI holes in the

'O water return lines, g

Du ri ng no s ma l ope ra-y tion, component cool-(n ing water pressure in the spent ruel pit y

heat exchanger is e

higher than that of E5.270 [

th* SP f"*' P'L wa ter ""' gl orm a j 15 Manual valve Isolates All rails or left Low spent fuel pit None; tre!9 9 -* N -

Activation ir redundant U6-030, pump P6-005 open wIth IeveI alare LSHL-1.. 1... i t ra in A ava i I-train i manua8 Ior normally discharge faulted puri- 0625 in control able to provide 100 maximum refueling case, closed dia-from non-Q rication loop room plus spent percent or requi red spent ruel pit tempe ra-phrage valve purification fuel pit tempera-cooling capacity. I ra h with one train

-. ;3;"' _.. dis c (train 8);

loop ture rise and pos-the most limiting case, ope ra t i ng valve sible high tempera-it takes euer 3 h arter hea top ra te no no rma i ly ture a1a rm T iSH-the Ioss of spent rueI cooIing is i.f':.13.1*

Open ir 626.

pit cooling functions i--

---irr-re ~ "-

train A in for the water to reach lea;.., c--..-tE 1; r ::t service.

the boiling point:

fue: git t; -e.. iu m hence, there is ampic h..u t u o i.. eys. e -

time for the operator

='3 i; '.P:

/

to actuate the re-le;;ap ;"

far. a dundant pump.

% is 12. N. Ihe

/

spent ruel pit pumse it shed automatically upon loss or offsite powe r bu t can be titad130 h,M

+svo in:n s opadf:n

l TABLE 9.1. 3-3 g(SHt'ET 10 OF 10)

Plant Method Iaifure [frect item Description Safety opera t ing failure of failure on System Safety

seo, of Component f asection Mode Mode Detection function Capability General Remarks manually loaded onto the emergeracy ac power-bus withen 8 0 s af ter 4

the loss of power.

Also, spent fuel can never be uncovered since the suction line connections are 10-ca ted as ft below the normal wa ter level.

Siphon.ng of spent fuel pi t wa ter i s precitaded by smalI holes in the water return lines.

During normal ope ra-tion, component cool-ing water pressure in D2 the spent fuel pit Oy heat exchanger is higher than that or y

the spent fuel pit to 6

wa te r.

p

o I-o core e me.ry ency ^ u n lo a d;ng c es <, +k < speas f fue i poo 1 During m a xl mum ca.

+e m p e rdire is belo w las*F when %o t,m ;,, e{ q,y gej i"

f "' '- A p e o I cool:oy s:,,g < f a ;ju,,

, n,+

.g l

u<

h>

be ju s hale feel (o r ih.s case.

i TABLE 9.1.3-4 SUp0ERY OF UNIT 2 HEAT LOADS AND PEAK TEWERATURES HEAT TIME SPENT FUEL P00L TEMPERATURE LOAD (a)

AFTER REACTOR ONE TRAIN TWO TRAINS X106 SHUTOOWN Btu /h hours

'F

• F NORMAL REFUELING 29.17 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> 140 115 CASE MAXIMUM NORMAL 52.08 120 hours0.00139 days <br />0.0333 hours <br />1.984127e-4 weeks <br />4.566e-5 months <br /> 170 130 REFUELING CASE MAXIMUM EMERGENCY 56.22 150 hcurs 180(b) 135 CORE UNLOADING CASE t

(a)

Heat load consists of decay heat from the fuel, heat load from pump work and design margin.

(b)

A single failure is not required to be postulated for this case per SRP 9.1.3.

I

-, -, - +.

S {

n.

.g

\\

Attachment B Replacement Pages for "Criticality Safety Analysis -f or Vogtle Electric Generating Plant Spent Fuel Storage Racks" that was tranreitted to NRC with letter GN-1422 of December-22, 1987.

Replace page 14 of the report with attached, revised page 14 Replace page 16 of the report with attached, revised page 16 4

1

• \\

,4 4.5.2.3 Borafier Width Tolerance Variation m

c The reference storage cell design uses a Boraflex blade width of 7.75 1 0.63 inches. A positive increment in reactivity t ccurs for a decrease in Boraflex absorber width.

For a reduction in width of the maximum tolerance, 0.063 inch, the calculated positive reactivity increment is +0.0004 Ak.

However,

'to allow for radiation-induced shrinkage in width of the Boraflex and for possible small edge affects, the width tolerance was increased to 0.25 inches corresponding to an uncertainty of

+p. 0017 a k.

4.5.2.4 Borafier Integrity The stability and integrity of the Borafier absorber saterial under irradiation has recently been investigated (

}

and further irradiation testing is currently underway. Available information confirms there is no loss of boron during irradiation although there is some radiation induced shrinkage.

Under irradiation, Boraflex beccces a hard ceramic-like material and apparently shrinks 2 to 2-1/2 percent. At a very high radiation dese, there is evidence of a small odge deterioration.

In the Vcgtle racks, the Boraflex sheets are installed in a gap of sufficient size to allow unimpeded shrinkage and thereby preclude any mechanism that might cause gaps to develop.

i To allow for shrinkage, the,,Boraflex sheets are initially 3 inches longer (approximately 2%) than would otherwise l

be necessary. Width shrinkage is accommodated by increasing the tolerance to 10.25 inches from the nominal 0.063 inches.

In both cases, shrinkage would increase the boron concsntration in the Boraflex although no credit is taken for this increased

- 14'-

o

r

.s a

s the storage rack cell (four-assembly cluste r at closest approach),

indicated a negligible change in reactivity as determined by differential PDQ-7 calculations.

4.5.3 Reactivity Effects of Boraflex Arial Length Based upon diffusion theory constants edited in the CASMO-2E output (reference design and a.special case with water replacing the Boraflex), one-dimensional axial calculations were made to evaluate the reactivity effect of reduced Boraflex axial lengths. Reduced length of the Boraflex leaves small regions of active fuel without poison at each end of the fuel assembly. The unpoisoned region at each end is referred to as "cutback".

The axial calculations used a thick (30 cm.) water reflector, neglecting the higher absorption of the stainless-steel structural material at the ends of the fuel assembly.

Results of the calculations showed that the k,fy remains less than the reference k, of the storage cells until the axial reduction in Boraflex length (cutback) exceeds feur inches top and bottom corresponding to a required overall Borafier length of 136 inches. Thus, the axial neutron leakage more than compensates for the 4-inch design cutback and the reference k, rernins a conse rvative ove r-estimate of the true k In manufacturing gf.

the racks, a 4-inch cutback ie used at the bottom of the rack.

However, an initial Boraflex length of 139 inches is used which provides an allowauce of 3 inches (approximately 2%) at the top of the racks to accommodate radiation-induced shrinkage of the Boraflex without exceeding the allowable cutback, i %