ML20199C818

Transcript of 960918 Interview of J Weaver in Crystal River, Florida Re OI Rept 2-96-033.Pp 1-31.W/Certificate of Svc. Date of College Graduation Deleted

ML20199C818
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Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	09/18/1996
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:
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ML20199C716	List: IA-97-313, Transcript of 951130 Interview of P Hinman in Crystal River, Florida Re OI Rept 2-94-036.Pp 1-146.W/Certificate of Svc. Title Page Encl.Birth Date & Social Security Number Deleted ML20199C710 ML20199C735 ML20199C747 ML20199C779 ML20199C803 ML20199C818 ML20199C827 ML20199C852 ML20199C889 ML20199C912 ML20199C929 ML20199C942 ML20199C961 ML20199C966 ML20199C981 ML20199C989 ML20248J609
References
FOIA-97-313 2-96-033, 2-96-33, NUDOCS 9711200154
Download: ML20199C818 (31)

Text

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2

NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION 3

++ +++

1 4

OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS 5

INTERVIEW 6

---

x 7.

IN THE MATTER OF 8

INTERVIEW OF Docket No.

9 JOHN RICHARD WEAVER 2-96 033 10 11

---

~~~---

~-----x 12 13 Wednesday, Leptember 18, 1996 14 15 Conference Room - Second Floor 16 Crystal River Plant 17 15760 West Powerline Street 16 Crystal River, Florida 19 20 The above-entitled interview was conducted at

.21 2:12 p.m.

EXHIBIT 22 PAGE I.0F.22PAGE(S).

23 BEFORE:

b 24 JIM VORSE Senior Investigator N )

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2-96-033 S*hJ kA It///9't

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A 1-APPEARANCES:

l 2

On Behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Consnission l,

3 JAMES VORSE, Senior. Investigator

• i 4

Region II NRC Office of Investigations

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-401 Marietta Street 6

Atlanta, Georgia 30323 7

On Behalf of the Interviewee, John Richard Weaver l

8 ROBERT ALEXANDER GLENN/-ESQUIRE 9

MAC-ASA 10 Post Office Box 14042 11 St. Petsrrburg, Florida 33733 t

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MR. VORSE:

For the record today's date is 3

September 18th, 1996.

The time is 2:12 p.m.

I'm Special 4

Agent Jim Vorse of the NRC's Office of Investigations and I 5

will be conducting this interview.

6 During this proceeding, which is being recorded 7

for transcription, the NRC's Office of Investigations will 8

conduct an interview of John Richard Weaver.

This 9

interview pertains to 01 investigation number 2-96-033.

10 The location of this interview is the Administration 11 Building, Crystal' River Nuclear Plant, Crystal River, 12 Florida.

13 And others in attendance at this interview are --

14 and would you please identify yourselves.

15 MR. GLENN:

Alex Glenn, G-L-E-N-N.

Corporate I

16 Counsel, Florida Power Corporation.

17 MR. VORSE:

Mr. Weaver, would you introduce 18 yourself, and your 3ob title, please.

19 MR. WEAVER:

John Richard Weaver.

I'm a Puels 20 Engineer for Florida Power Corporation.

21 MR.-VORSE:

Okay.

Would you swear him in, 22

please, 23 -Whereupon,

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t 24 JOHN RICHARD WEAVER, 4

25 being first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined

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l and testified as follows:

2 EXAMINATION 3

MR. VORSE:

Mr. Weaver, would you please tell me 4

about your educational background?

5 THE WITNESS:

I have a B.S. ii. Nuclear 6

Engineering from the Univarsity of Florida.

And I've taken 7

a few basic courses at the University of Tennessee and 8

Georgia Tech, s.

9 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

Would you give me your 10 experience, please?

11 THE WITNESS:

I've been a -- well, I graduated

!} D 12 in nd I worited at TVA f or about six yea? s, most of 13 that time as a instrument nuclear control engineer and I 14 came to Florida Power as an instrument control engineer for 5

15 about two years and transferred into the STA program.

And 5

I 16 from there, without completing that program, I transferred 17 into the reactor engineering group.

And I worked as a ij 18 reactor engineer up to last year.

And then I transferred a

h 19 into the fuels group a year ago.

Er 20 MR. VORSE:

And would you explain your duties in a

21 your present job?

22 THE WITNESS:

Okay.

My present job we buy the 23 uranium and contract to have it-made into fuel, usually 24 through FRAMATOME, and do analysis on -- along the core, 25 we'll burn, and the peak power, and other parameters of the

. _._ _ _ __.~. _ _...

1

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1 core.

In addition to that we do some safety' analysis for 2

the -- for transients and things like that.

3 MR. VORSE:

On the 26th of March 1996 you were 4

in the control room with Mr. Atkinson.

5 THE WITNNSS:

Right.

6 MR. VORSH:

Mr. Atkinson was operating the tag 7

board?

8 THE WITNESS:

Right.

9 MR. VORSE:

You were with him, physically, you 10 were sitting next to him?

11 THE WITNESS:

Right.

12 MR. VORSE:

You had earphones?

13 THE WITNESS:

Right.

14 MR. VORSE:

You could communicate with everyone 15 that was involved in this?

16 THE WITNESS:

Yes.

17 MR. VORSE:

Would you explain what your 18 responsibilities were that night -- or that day?

I kind of 19 THE WITNESS:

Okay.

Normally I 20 cbserve the total fuel taovement and I'm there to change movesifIfeelsomebodydoesn'tgoin},but, cts %L P M m HY AH you know, when 21 22 things are going well it's an observation task.

23 he were getting right near the end of refueling 24_ and we were putting fuel near one of the two NI's and t.he 25 counts were going up so I got sort of away from the 1.

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observing mode and was doing one over M plotW*because it-v 2

goes up by this criteria you have to continue to predict if 3

it will go critical.

And it's a pretty time consuming 4

calculation.

But I was still on the headphones and trying 5

to hear what was going on.

4 6

MR. VORSE:

Okay.

So-you weren't-watching the 7

-- we've got this move sheet.

8 170s WITNESS:

Right.

9 MR. VORSE:

Did you look at the move sheet?

10 THE WITNESS:

It's over by Jim.

I --

At'the nw P#

11 time I was doingv ov'er M plots, I was not looking at the 12 move sheets.

13 MR. VORSE:

Nhut were you doing, aDain?

14 THE WITNESS:

One over M, we call them.

It's a 15 nuclear calculation for criticality.

16 MR. VORSE:

You were doing calculations and you 17 weren't very involved in the tag board and the move sheet?

18 THE WITNESS:

Right.

19 MR. VORSE:

Are you supposed to be involved with 20 the tag board and-most sheet or you just had a -- to answer 21 a' question?

22 THE WITNESS:

I'd say my prime responsibility is

- 23 doing-these1one over M plots when they're needed.

But L

24 that's-only -- usually it's right in the beginning of 25 refueling because you start loading by the NI's.

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.i lt. we-usually load from ene NI to the-other and Yhat's all 2E taken care of.

3-MR. VORSE -

What does NY mean?

4 THE WITNESS:

Nuclear instrumentation.- They'll 5

give you-the counts of how much radiation's being absorbed.1 l

6 But this= time'instead of going from-one-NI to the next we n

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.7 H0kmeted'the core from one side to the other, so wnen we 8

were finishing'*0a core we were-approaching the other NI,

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9 which causes your counts to-increase..

10-MR; VORSE:

Okay.

Were you aware that one fuel 11 assembly was lowered onto another because of.a 12 misinterpretation?

13-

.THE WITNESS:

My first knowledge was;an " Oops",

i I

a 14 and at that time I thought'that the operator had just gone 15 down in that direction and caught herself.

And I didn't

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4 16 know until-a couple of moves later when we were removing 4

17 the one that was sat down on, Jim informed me no, we did 18 sit down on it.

19 MR VORSE:

This was during that same shift?

20 THE WITNESS:

Right.

It was maybe 30 minutes

'21 later, a couple vf moves later, looking at the move sheet.

v 23 MR. 10RSE:

Did you make a log book entry?

23

'TER WITNESS:

No.

First of all, you know, the-24 -discubaion with Jim and I ensued and I said, you know, did 25 she say the.pclition should have went to was. Oscar ten?

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-l' And just in the _ background it seemed like, yo'u know, I was 2

kind of hearing -- trying to keep a little attention to 3

what was going on, and the normal place would be Oscar ten 4

and it sounded' normal to me.

And I didr't think she had 5

said Romeo ten.

In fact, and the way es do this is that 6

Jim would be the first one to say it, hn would saf -- you 7

know, up at that position you're going t':) _ Oscar ten or 8

Romeo ten.

And I don't think Jim said he was going to ss 9

Oscar ten -- I mean Romeo ten.

I think he said, you know, 10 going to Oscar ten.

11 Well then when she got to Oscar ten she was 12 supposed to say, I'm over Oscar ten going down.

And I 13 don'.-remember another transmission at that time.

It was 14 like, you know, there's some silence and all of a sudden, 15

" oops".

So I don't remember a transmission when she was 16 over wherever she was over.

So I.think that he said Romeo

7 ten and she got half-way there; I saw the map of what the

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)S.54eee looks like.

19 MR. GLENN:

I think that's what I showed you 20 earlier.

21 MR. VORSE:

For the record, Mr. Weaver is 22 showing me a map of the reactor core --

23 THE WITNESS:

As it was at that time.

24 MR. VORSE:

-- as it was at that time.

125 THE WITNESS:

And one logical way to go from

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'l Romeo eight to Oscar ten would be to go f rom Romeo eight to

'2: Romeo _ ten,Jand'from Romeo.. ten to' Oscar ten, because you l

3~ folly operate the bridge in one direction atJa time, 4- ~normally..

So -- especially-when you're ever the core.

5 So had she gone from Romeo oight to Romeo ten and 6

had a mental lapse.or-whatever and went down instead of I

7..over, you have levers that'll put you down or put-you over.

8 I mean, many times they go the other way, you know, we 90-9 backwards instead of frontwards.

That's very common.

And 10 ~ so -- but it is a different lever _that would put you going 11-down.

That could have been what. happened.

12 But, anyway, i don't remember her saying that she

- 13 was over Romeo ten and going down.

14 MR. VORSE:

Where did you think she wast

- 15 THE WITNESS:

I don't know where she was but I 16 don't remember saying anything after Jim said go to Oscar 17 ten.

She didn't reply back, because you wait till the personisoverwherethey'resupposedtobeandthenre$ lay 18 g

n m.u ce-19 back over this position, posi ion to go down.

20 MR. VORSE:

Well, what went through your mind 21 when you heard " oops"?

22 THE. WITNESS:

That she had, you know,. started 23 down in the wrong position-and stopped.

24

MR. VORSE:

Okay.

So at the time of the " cops" 25 you did not know-that the contact had been made?

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Right.

2 MR. VORSE:

As I. recall earlier.you said about i

3 30 minutes'later?

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THE WITNESS:

Well, we can look in_the move 5

sheets.

You know, the one that was being moved next -- or 6

not next but after that, it was the one that wati sat on.

7 (Examining documents.)

I have the move sheets don't I?

I 8

don't know'if I have the move sheets or not.

m 9-MR. GLENN:-

I mhy have it.

10' THE WITNESS:

Here they are.

Here they are.

11 Okay.

12 Okay.

The one that was being sat upon_vas right 13 there.

It's 89A.

It's 89A, it's right here.

And that was 14 the 1739.

See -- wait a ndnute.

Let's see where -- I'm 15 sorry, that's not.

That's right, we've moved into the 16 start right here 17 MR. GLENN:

1327, 18 THE WITNESS:

Right, okay.

Yeah, this was --

19 the incident is right here.

And then 89A is the next move.

20 So, 1852.

So, 30 minutes.

21 MR. VokSE:

Okay.

Let the record reflect he's 22 showing me the time that he made a notation, I guess, on 23_ the sheet that -- and what is'that telling me, the time?

24 THE WITNESS:

Well, the time that this was moved 25 was-1852, the time that the assembly in question was moved.

1 11 s-1.

-MR._VORSE:

Okay.

So what you're.saying is --

2 THE WITNESS:

Was 1821.

3 MR. VORSE:

1821 is the-time that'one fuel 4

assembly was lowered.onto another --

S THE WITHESS:

Right.

6 MR. VORSE:

-- and R ten.

7 THE WITNESS:

Right.

8 MR VORSE:

And 1852 is when it was lowered 9

into --

10 THE WITNESS:

Was when the assembly that was 11 lowered upon was moved to a new location.

12 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

13 MR. GLENN:

But those are not your notations, 14 are they, and the time?

15 THE WITNESS:

No, that's Jim Atkinton's 16 notation.

But this is my notation, I moved it to eleven 17 instead of ten -- I mean ten instead of eleven.

It was 18-intended for a box move and I didn't need the box move so I 19 moved it to where it was going to be eventually.

20 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

Why didn't you log the issue?

21 THE WITNESS:

Because of this disagreement of 22 whether we said Oscar ten or Romeo ten.

And logging the 23 log was not a big thing to me, it was the fact that once I 24 logged the log I needed to write a precursor card and I-25 needed to proceed.

And I knew that the right person to

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.1 write that-card was-the shifter in the contro'-- I mean-the 2

RB because he's, you know, responsible for these' people and 3

he's an eye witness-to it.

So I wanted to get with Dave, 4

but_I wanted to get with Mike Collins -- I mean Mike 5

Culver, I'm sorry, you know,.because I figured he was 6

coming in.

And talk to him and have him talk to Dave.

7 Kind of go up the chain of command.

8 MR VORSE:'

Okay.

When did you first learn that t

9 one fuel assembly had been lowered on another?

10 THE WITNESS:

Right here at 1S52, il MR. VORSE:

Okay.

And what did --

12 THE WITNESS:

And I knew that because -- well, I 13.mean, it-was when we were going to pick it up, it might 14 have been a few minutes before that.

And Jim actually, you 15 know, asked me is it okay to pick this one up.

And then I 16 replied, why?

And he said, secause the fuel assembly sat 17 on it.

18 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

19 THE WITNESS:

I mean, I was busy doing-other 20 things.

21 MR. VORSE:

And what did that alert you i

22 to maybe therc's a problem here with the damage or 23 something --

No,'hacause I'm -- I'm intimately,fd" L

24 G';THEWITNESS:

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. aware of this fuel's" build.gt.?I was in charge.of a sacaeden ).

25

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process.

We take all the fuel apart, rebuild it into 2

another assembly, five different ones.

And so I know this 3

fuel assembly.

4 MR. VORSE:

Talk to me and tell me why you think 5

that.

6 THE WITNESS:

And I didn't bring in my other 7

upper end fitting.

I have an upper end fitting that 8

we bent one of these ears on --

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9 MR. VORSE:

Can you speak up a little bit?

10 THE WITNESS:

Okay.

I have one in the car that 11 I have an upper end fitting that we bent one of these 12 fingers and it took 2500 pounds to ber.d it.

And the reason 13 we bent it is because we were trying to Set a plug out of 14 it and to, you know, we had to bend it back to ase it.

It 15 took 2500 pounds to bend it back.

So these things are 16 extremely strong.

17 The limits that we have to prevent any damage to the fuel is realty for these$Vr'd jn s~'

-gisth toetstraps.

And that 18 19 limit is abut 500 pounds, but we set our bridge to about 20 350 pounds so we won't meet that limit.

21 So the -- and here's where we sat, we sat right 22 on top of this, which pushes down on this spring.

So, you 23 know, ti.is is a very strons spring.

You know, it's 24 cushioned even more.than if it was sitting on the fuel 25 assembly because when it contacts this, due to the momentum t

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14 1-'it might engage that spring.

This spring is' compressed-2' when-you put it in-the core and it0 takes-800_ pounds to 3 ' cowpress it.

So-it's, you know, this fuel seats 800 pounds 4

for. two years,1 because the plenum is _ sitting on these ears:

5-right here and exerting that force on them.

6 And so we sat on'that, which would normally cause 7_

that to compress that spring but I don't think the 350 8

pounds would do it.

But maybe just the -- and the ' rate in 9

which we go down I have a little objection to the report 10 that the NRC-put out and said that we collided with the-11 fuel assembly.

We're' going down at five feet per minute, 12 which is an inch per second.

And we do that even when we grapple the 4e44,f11*'

4 ea L that these fingers that go down, and when 13 14 they contact right here they're contacting at. that same 15 speed.

So it's like a normal operation instead of 16 contacting at that speed.

17 And as far as the other assembly, it hit right 18 here,-which, you know, is equally as massive of a -- let's 19 see --

20 MR. GLENN:

Don't kill your back.

21 PGR. VORSE:

Yeah, geez.

22 THE WITNESS:

This is equally as massive -- of a 23 piece of casting (phonetic) --

24-(Parties talking simultaneously.)

25 THE WITNESS:

So I had no qualms about it.

J

15

-1 ' damaging the fuel.- And ny only recourse would be, if I

+

2 had, was to do a video verification, which was coming up in 3

the next few hours.

And we did that.

4-MR. VORSE:

Did anyone'ask if all of tt,e little 5

safety engineer -- safety features for underloading the 6

work, all the things on the bridge that were supposed to 7

prevent -- did anyone ask if everything worked?

8 THE WITNESS:

Well,-because I didn't capture s

9 that one, it happened, you know, I thought she just went 10 down a little bit and didn't touch it.

The only way you 11 could tell that is right when you went down you did a 12-digital reading.

And if you didn't catch-it then you 13 wouldn't catch it.

14 MR VORSE:

Would Christine Smith catch it?

15 THE WITNESS:

Would that stay in or not?

When You'd get an underload, and yes, she could possibly 16 17 have caught it -- if she had stayed down when she said 18

" cops" it would have been there.

If she went up 19 immediately, then it wouldn't have been there.

20 MR. VORSE:

What wouldn't have been there?

21-THE WITNESS:

The digital _ reading reads the 22 weight'that's.on the mast.

23 MR. GLENN:

But the underloader automa --

24 doesn't it automatically cut off --

25 THE WITNESS:

It -- well, it --

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26

1

.MR. GLENN:

-So I don't know -

_I guess I wasn't 2

understanding what you meant by --

3 MR. VORSE:

Well, yeah, they've got auto -- like us you say, auto cutoffs,-you know, to prevent this thing 5

from, you know, going to fast or to put too much pressure 6

on it.

7 THE WITNESS:

Right.

This thing has to work 8

every time you pick a fuel' assembly up.

So it worked, you

=s.

9 know, just a few minutes before when you picked the fuel 10' assembly up.

So, you know, it was probably expected that 11 it'd work the_next time it was -- usually -- I mean, that 12 - could have-been the very time that it didn't work, but 13 MR. VORSE:

But Christine would know that 14 probably.

15 THE WITNESS:

If it was captured.

She might 16 have just turned around real quick too, and then, you know.

17 it wouldn't have been.

And if it hadn't worked, then the 18 full weight of the fuel assembly would have been on it.

19 And I've been talking to B&W and, you know, they 20 have a lot of analyses that are much greater than what 21 we've set it to and they feel like it would have carried 22

-it, but they haven't -- weren't able to pull the right 23 documents that would-have been there today.

I'm pretty 24 sure that we can ascertain that it could-carry the whole 25 weight of a fuel assembly.

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MR. VORSE:

Did --

'2 MR'.;GLENN:

I'm sorry, can_I interrupt,'just ask-

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.a question? :I'm sorry.

-4

-Was your earlier question in'asking whether or 5

not the underloader activated?2 6

MR. VORSE:

I-just wanted to make sure that 7 'everything -

in an underload condition everything worked 8

okay.

Oc 9

!GR. GLENN:

Okay.

All-right.

10 MR. VORSE:

And-I don't know if John can answer 11 that.

12 MR. GLENN:

' Yeah.-I don't think he can.

I think 13 ' Christine is:the one who -- or Dave Jones, I think also 14 since he was there.

I believe.

I'm sorry.

15 MR. VORSE:

That's_al right.

16 Do you remember Atkinson saying something to you 17 about'do-you think we should tell somebody about this or - -

1B

- THE= WITNESS:

No.

19 MR. VORSE:

- 'make a---

20-Did;you feel that management'should know about 21-it?

-22 THE WITNESS:

'Yes.

I wanted.to go through my 23 chain of command.though.

Because, there was a_ couple of

-24 things.

One is thatLwas this'a. precursor card or-was it a 125- ~ problem report?

I felt it was a precursor card but,-you

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1 know, Mike Culver is the-interpretation conta'ct of the-2 procedure.

3 Number two, I didn't want"to write this precursor 4

card before Dave Jones had a chance to because that's 5

exactly what we're here for right now, it would have been a 6

little lesser situation but it would have been the same 7 -thing.

You know, he's the supervisor,- he was a eye 8

witness, and there was another, you know, you have to work 9

with these operators and we're not their supervisors.

It 10 goes a lot easier when a supervisor reprimands them or 11 writes them up than if somebody from outside operation 12 writes them up.

And it really, I felt, was his I

13 responsibility anyway.

14 MR. VORSE:

Do you know who wrote the anonymous 15 precursor?

16 THE WITNESS:

No, I haven't the slightest.

17 MR. VORSE:

Why would you think someone vould do

- 18 that?

19-THE WITNESS:

Well, maybe to spread the 20 punishment a little bit.

There were several other things 21 that happened this outage and, you know, it could have been 22 somebody other than it happened to but, you know, if somebody else gets in trouble maybe you don't look as bad 23 24 -when you get in trouble.

I don't know.

'So.

25 MR. VORSE:

Did you have any discussion with Mr.

19

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1 JonesLabout a precursor?

2 THE WITNESS:

I never got in contact with him.

3 ' Our next job was to do the core verification-And I'd just 4

worked en eight hour shift, so-I went out in the car and 5

slept about three er four hours because it was going to 6

take that long for Mike to get in there.

I came in he had 7

gone'right in the control RB, so I didn't get hold of him.

8 And he was, you know, examining this fuel-and I was 9

watching on the video camera what he was examining.

10 MR. VORSE:

Would you -- would you -- would it 11 be a fair assessment to say that this~ refueling outage and 12 probably every refueling outage is a very busy time and 13 just a lot of things going on?

14 THE WITNESS:

It's our busiest time.

15 MR. VORSE:

And so this thing was just one of 16 many things that was going on?

I mean, did it -- did it 17 just seem this was just a small thing in relation to all 18 the other things that were going on?

19 THE WITNESS:

As far as an incident, you know, I 20 couldn't decide whether'it fit between a precursor card and 21 a problem report.

And I'll give you an example of what is 22 not any problem at'all is when we pick up a fuel assembly 23 and it won't go in, we'get-underloads.

And then because it 24-won't go.in we put it somewhere.

So we put it in a 25 location other than where'it should go, usually to box in

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li;some other; fuel temporarily.

3 1

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'.Well, essentially that's whatLhappened here.

But 3

obviously;the intent was different, you know, the fact 1that 4

she intended to go to the right place and-went to the wrong 5 -place.

I consider that a personnel problem, you know, not-l 6- 'a' physical problem, because we've done exactly the' physical' 7

Ching that happened here.

8 And then the other -- that's:on the lesser, you 9

know, side of-this incident.

On the more severe side of 10- this incident-is if.we would have picked it up and put it 11 somewhere where it didn't belong and ungrapple it.

We 12: -consider a fuel-move to be consummated when you let go of 13 it.

So had we let go of the assembly, then we would have 14 stoppedLall work, we would have met in the office, we

-15 would, you know, done a KT or whatever and tried to 16 determine, you know, what happened, and wouldn't proceed 17 until we had management, you know, tell us okay, you got s

18 your minds free, let's go back to work.

'19 MR. VORSE:

Is there.anything that you want to 20 tell me that I haven't asked?

21" THE WITNESS:-

You know, the time frame is hard 22 to remember, especially that far back.

And I think I got a 23 hold of Mike right after he came-out, and talked to him 24 about it. -But by that time he had been contacted by the 25 control room and the shifter because that' problem report 4

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1 had gone to the shifter.- And:he said, well,.~if'you didn't-

2. put, you know, if you:didn't log the log when'it happened, 3

then.you can't logfit.non.

And so that's why I didn't log 41 - anything in the log.

5 I wanted Dave to have time to submit his 6

precursor card and then I was going to log in the log.

But 7: - I talked to Mike and he says, well, you know, not after 8-this precursor card hits the control room.

So, you know, 9

it's like, you know, do things after the fact.

After the 10 f act when somecody else had turned it in.-

11 MR. VORSE:

I don't understand why you wouldn't 12 have just logged it in then.

13' THE WITNESS:

Well, he's essentially my 14. supervisor.

I mean, he was my supervisor for four years --

15 MR. GLENN:

What do you mean then?

At that 16 3/26, March 26.

17 MR. VORSE:

As soon as you learned of the 18-contact 19 THE WITNESS:

Oh, as-soon as -- immedictely.

20 Well,-I thought I explained that.

But first of all you - have'an operator sitting right next to you and we don't 22 - just log that the incident happened, you know, the log is 23 there for instructional means to improve next time.

And.I 24 was going to get into this thing about whether we said 0 or 25-we said R.

And, you-know, that was different -- in my

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opinion that was different than the operator'at the table 2

with me.

And I didn't want to do that in front of him.

3 And then the other stigma that's attached, we 4

had, you know, two guys that got fired about a year ago 5

and, you know, the idea of other people out to get 6

operators suddenly is -- is very apparent around here.

And 7

I felt it was much more prudent to let his supervisor 8

reprimand him than me put in a precursor card.

9 I mean, if we make that, you know, a management 10 requirement that, you know, whoever you are immediately you 11 do it, well then, you know, I don't have that luxury.

But 12 the eye witness, number one, should have been the primary 13 person to write it.

14 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

I don't have anything else.

15 Do you have anything you want to ask?

16 MR. GLENN:

Not at this time.

17 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

We'll go ahead and conclude 18 the interview.

The time is --

19 THE WITNESS:

I have a few things that I want to 20 go through.

I've written a lot and I usually don't get to 21 say hardly anything.

22 MR. VORSE:

Oh, okay.

Fine.

23-THE WITNESS:

Okay.

First of all, I didn't know 24 about this report that the NRC had written until yesterday.

25 I felt this outage went extreuely well, other than this

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-23 1

incident.- To give an example:

We put the la'st 19 fuel 2

assemblies in the core in_six hours,-and the last time we 3

spent eight hours putting the last four in.

So I, you 4

know, things were going real well.

5 The -- you have these four bullets in your 6

report.

And the first one is why I didn't record the 7

potential mis -- the mislocation of the fuel log -- in the 8

fuel. log.

And like I said,_it was a personnel issue and 9

for it to st",f in the wrong position there would have to be 10 five more barriers broken.

We tell them when they're up, 11 we tell them when we're going down, we tell them when 12 they're down, they get permission to release it, and 13 usually it's both from me and from the board operator 14 because there's a ZZ reading that I'm in charge of.

15 And then the --

16 MR, VORSE:

Can I ask ye; Mat the ZZ stands 17 for?

18 THE WITNESS:

That's the elevation that you're 19 at.

If you're sitting on the fuel -- either sitting on --

20 there's a little frame that holds the fuel, that little 21 bottom piece, if you're sitting in the frame you'll be at 22 one elevation, if you're sitting on the frame you'll be at 23-another.

And the fuel, then it grows was at -- it's burnt, 24 so it does vary some but Af it's within a half an inch we 25 give them the okay to set ;t down.

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1 24 l

1 MR. VORSE:

Okay.

2 THE WITNESS:

So that's the -- a required thing 3

that they have to get our permission for.

4 I wanted to talk to Mi'e Culver about the r

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5 interpretation of 503.

And I felt what would happen is 6

Dave Jones, Mike Culver, and myself and all the operators 7

would have gone in the room together and took our best 8

opinion of who heard what, because there were eight people 9

that could have heard it.

And, you know, I think this who 10

-- right now the supposition is that the operator said 11 Romeo eight, but, you know, she could have said Oscar 12 eight.

And that eliminates, you know, half of our 13 precautions when that happens.

And just three barriers 14 left when -- if she said Oscar eight.

So.

15 And we didn't have a video camera.

Often these t+ QP" as r 16 video cameras wUre,in the minority, the plants that don't 17 have video cameras to see the thing go down.

We tried to 18 buy one last time and our management got to see this laser 19 light thing, it's a remote, a real high powered light, and 20 they bought it, or they rented it; they used our money that 21 we would have bought the camera and some lights with.

So 22 we essentially, you know, didn't buy the camera this time 23 because we didn't have the funds to do it.

We have another 24 task now to move the fuel with another tool, and we bought 25 it for that reason.

Or buying it -- will buy it for that e

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11 - reason.

2 Okay.

The second onefis more of the -

the second-bullet you have.has mora to do with the operators in

-3: :

4 the-building.

I'm sorryi this is a:CCRO.

And,_you know,-I 5

thought.-- he' thought it was she-said Romeo ~ ten.

I thought 6

she said Oscar ten.

So that's essentially what that one

-7

' is.

I 8

The third one has-to do - -

sv 9

MR. VORSE:

I'm sorry. - Can you run thkt one by L

10' me again.

You thought she said Oscar --

- 11 THE WITNESS:

Jim Atkinson tht'ght that she said 12-that she wab' going to Romeo ten -- Romeo ten, and.1 thought 13 that she said she was going to Oscar ten, which would have 4

2 14 : been the correct move.

15-MR. VORSE:

Okay.

16 THE WITNESS:

And Jim would have had to say the 17 first thing, he would have had to tell her where to 90.

So 18 I don't know what happened in the interview, whether he.

19 told her to go to Romeo eight or he told her to go to Oscar 20 eight.

I think he told her to go to Oscar eight.

Okay.

21 Ths third-thing has to do with in the RB, the 22 shift supervisor.

It's very hard for him to see where it's 23-going because he's' lined up with it in one direction.

But 24..in the-other direction he's 65 feet-away and.only his depth 25 - of field will tell him whether he's coing to hit it or not.

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.So, you know, without:the camera that is acve'ry hard thing-2 - to determinec

3; And it'says in your' write-up_that,.you know,Eyou 4; violated procedure.

The procedure said that he.should L$

verify it, not that he must.- You know, it's usually amust"

'6. is n' requirement; procedure violation "should" is a 7

recormnendation.

Okay.

8.-

And the last bullet in your item,_you talk about.

~

9 N8C6 as somebody I'should have. checked that certainly 10- wouldn't-have been'because that's the one that was in the 11; mast and, you know, it normally sees its own weight when it sets down, it set down on something else.

That should be 12 :

13z no different than the weight it would see-if it sat on it.

14'?In the core we never -- it often doesn't hit'the spot the 15 first time, so it's going to be. sitting on one point as it 16 would be if it sat on that control rod post there, So that 17 wasn't a concern.

- 18 But, you know, the one that was more of a concern-19 was the N89A,1which it was going to be video verified, and so I -- and certainly in my mind and my knowledge of the-21 fuel there was no trouble picking it up.

I mean, that 22 isn't the top of the fuel--- of the upper and fitting that

- 23 you-hook into, and there would be no trouble grappling it.

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- 24:

MR. VORSE:

For the record,.when Mr. Weaver wss-25 discussing these numbers like N89A, he's referring to the

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1 move. sheet:that was used on the 26th of March't

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-2L THE WITNESSi And then another item-I haven't 3; said yet is that, okay,-the force that'we'normally set on 4 --the fuel end to grapple it is greater than the underload.

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.5 It's.a little load and it's about 500 pounds.

Okay.

Tht:

6 force-that these springs see when they're in use is 800 7-pounds.

8 And another item -I didn't bring up is that during -

9 a normal refueling my estimate is that you get an underload

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~10' times on different assemblies.

Okay.

11 The rate of aescent is.five feet per minute, one 4

12 inch per second.

13 Okay.

And the last item is, you know,-this issue l

- 14 of a conspiracy might have some warrant if we had waited 15 three days to a week and not have issued any precursor 16 cards and somebody had issued an anonymous precursor card 17 in chat length of time.

We were very busy and we're talking about hours here-for us to have the opportunity to 19 get together, figure out what happened, and issue a

. 20 prucursor card.

'21 That's all I have to say.

22 MR. GLENN:

And did that, in fact happen?- I

- 23 mean, in your opinion, you were there.

Was there any type 24 of conspiracy that people got together and said,' boy, we

• shouldn't report this ---

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-28 1

THE WITNESS:

.Jutt the opposite.

'I mean, Mike

^

2 Culver told me not to make entry in the log.

I mean, I,

3 you know -- I mean, I don't think in my mind it would be a 4 - conspiracy for me to make an entry in the-log that morning, 5-but,.you know, he was being extra sync to sync _by saying, i

6 well, you know, they've already issued a precursor card, 7

don't put an entry-in the log now.

I mean, in which he was 8

right.

But, you know, it wasn't, you know, we were being 9

extra non that way, I guess, than even thinking about it.

10-MR. VORSE:

Okay.

So there was never a meeting 11 or there was r.ever a group discussion about any of this?

12 You know, we're already under the gun and we may not want 13 to tell anybody about this, 14 THE WITNESS:

Once that anonymous precursor card 15 was issued we got into this mode, don't talk to anybody, 16 you're, you know, in this mode we're in now.

I mean, it 17 was like, well, you know -- it was out of our hands, it uas 18 in Mike and Tom Metcalf's hand.

We were interviewed by him 19 and had to write up things for him.

It was nothing that we 20 did amcngst ourselves.

I have yet -- I haven't talked to 21 Jim Atkinson.since we were on shift.

I haven't talked to 22 Christine at all.

I talked to Mike Culver but I was trying 23 to talk to Mike Culver.

I '.aven't talked to Dave Jones.

24 MR. VORSE:

That's all I have.

25 MR. GLENN:

I don't have anything.

29

-1 r-1:

MR. VORSE -

Okay.

We'll go ahead hnd conclude 2 -- this: interview.- The-time is 2:47, still on the 18th of 3

September,_-1996 -

-4 (Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 5

2:47 o' clock p.m.)

6 7

8 9

-10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17-18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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00 t'-

1-CERTIFICATE 2

This is to certify that the attached proceedings 3

before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Conunission in 4 -the matter of:

5 Name_of Proceeding: Interview of John P. Weaver 6

Docket Number (s):

2-96-033 7

Place of Proceeding:

Crystal River Nuclear Plant 8

Crystal River, Florida

~-

9 10 were held as herein appears, and that this is the origina.1 11 transcript thereof for the file of the United States 12 Nuclear Regulatory Coanission taken by me and, thereafter l

13 reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the 14 court reporting company, and that the tranucript is a true 15 and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

16-T 17

/

18 JA&/?

\\ n <-

e resf--G}. May~

f' 19

-20 Official Reporter 21 Neal R. Gross and Co.,

Inc.

22 23 24 25

. -. - _. =

s-t s3 l 1

CERTIFICATE 2

This is to certify that the attached proceedings

.3 before the United States Nuclear Regulatory. Commission in 4

the matter of:

5 Name of Proceeding: Interview of David Paul Jones 6

Docket Number (s):

.2-96-033 7

Place of Proceeding:

Crystal River Nuclear-Plant 8

Crystal River, Florida 9

10 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 11-transcript thereofforthefileoftheUndtedStaters 12 Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and T.hereafter 13 reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the 14 court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true 15 and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.

16

/

1 b ill/ L i

A,* 4 19 Dy S. May 20 Official Reporter 21 Neal R. Gross and Co.,

Inc.

' 22 23 24 25 S

my m

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