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| {{Adams
| | #REDIRECT [[IR 05000413/1986024]] |
| | number = ML20204J495
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| | issue date = 07/24/1986
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| | title = Insp Repts 50-413/86-24 & 50-414/86-26 on 860526-0625. Violation Noted:Failure to Follow Performance Test & Instrumentation Procedures
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| | author name = Lesser M, Peebles T, Skinner P, Van Doorn P
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| | author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
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| | addressee name =
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| | addressee affiliation =
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| | docket = 05000413, 05000414
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| | license number =
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| | contact person =
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| | document report number = 50-413-86-24, 50-414-86-26, IEIN-85-033, IEIN-85-059, IEIN-85-33, IEIN-85-59, NUDOCS 8608110112
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| | package number = ML20204J483
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| | document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
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| | page count = 11
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| }}
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| See also: [[see also::IR 05000413/1986024]]
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| | |
| =Text=
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| {{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -
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| k
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| i- %-
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| . UNITED STATES
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| , [p "Guq'o '
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| NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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| REGloN 11
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| [ n
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| 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.
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| g j
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| *I * ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323
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| \ * a..+ /
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| Report Nos. 50-413/86-24 and 50-414/86-26
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| Licensee: Duke Power Company
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| 422 South Church Street
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| Charlotte, N.C. 28242
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| , Docket Nos.: 50-413 and 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35 and NPF-52
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| Facility Name: Catawba 1 and 2
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| Inspection Conducted: May 26 - June 25, 1986
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| Inspectors: , , /ArfLM /w f /h
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| P. K. Van Door'n~ g& 6 Wdaaw/ [' 7/ ate 'Kgn~edMfx
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| ' ~~
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| PT . SKinne /// Aate'pigTied~
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| M. S.'
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| r i 14d/h . fhY
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| '/ Dale'ylgned
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| Lesser ' -~ [ ///
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| Approved by: *
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| [o__. AY h
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| T. Peeble's, Section Chief 'Dats Sir,aed
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| Projects Branch 3
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| Division of Reactor Projects
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| &
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| -
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| SUMMARY
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| Scope: This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted on site inspecting in
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| the areas of, review of plant operations (Units 1 & 2); surveillance observation
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| (Units 1 & 2); maintenance observation (Units 1 & 2); review of licensee
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| nonroutine event reports (Units 1 & 2); procedures (Units 1 & 2); survey of
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| Licensee Response to Safety Issues (Units 1 & 2), Followup of Information Notices
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| (Units 1 & 2); and preparations for refueling (Unit 1). s
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| Results: Of the eight (8) areas inspected, two (2) apparent violations were
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| identified, (Failure to follow procedures, paragraphs 6.b and 11.d; and Failure
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| to provide adequate procedures, paragraph 11.b). 1
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| ,
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| 8608110112 860725
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| PDR ADOCK C5000413
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| G PDR
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| _. _ _ _
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| REPORT DETAILS
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| 1. Persons Contacted
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| Licensee Employees
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| J. W. Hampton, Station Manager
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| E. M. Couch, Construction Maintenance Central Manager
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| H. B. Barron, Operations Superintendent
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| *M. J. Brady, Asst. Operating Engineer
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| A. S. Bhatnager, Performance Engineer
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| T. B. Bright, Construction Engineer Manager
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| S. Brown, Reactor Engineer
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| B. F. Caldwell, Station Services Superintendent
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| *J. W. Cox, Superintendent, Technical Services
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| T. E. Crawford, Operations Engineer
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| L. R. Davidson, QA Manager Technical Support
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| B. East, I. & E. Engineer
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| *C. S. Gregory, I. & E. Support Engineer
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| C. L. Hartzell, Licensing and Projects Engineer
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| *J. A. Kammer, Performance Test Engineer
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| *J. Knuti, Operating Engineer
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| P. G. LeRoy, Licensing Engineer
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| W. W. McCollough, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
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| *W. R. McCullum, Superintendent, Integrated Scheduling
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| C. E. Muse, Operating Engineer
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| K. W. Reynolds, Construction Maintenance
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| *F. P. Schiffley, II, Licensing Engineer
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| G. T. Smith, Maintenance Superintendant
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| J. Stackley, I. & E. Engineer
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| D. Tower, Operating Engineer
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| Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators,
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| mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.
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| * Attended exit interview. _
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| 2. Exit Interview
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| The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 25, 1986, with
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| those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector described the
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| areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings. No
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| dissenting comments were received from the licensee. The licensee did not
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| identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the
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| inspectors during this inspection.
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| . - - -
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| . . ._ _ . _ _ _ _ _ __-. _ _ _ _ _ . . - . -_ . . .- ..
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| $
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| 2
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| '
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| 3. Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Hotters (Units 1 & 2)
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| (92702)
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| a. (OPEN) Unresolved Item 413/84-87-03- Review of operations corrective
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| action program. The inspectors reviewed the employee training
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| presentation for the Pro'olem Investigation Report program being
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| developed to answer this item. This presentation appears acceptable.
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| This item remains open pending full implementation of the new program.
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| b. (OPEN) Unresolved Item No. 414/85-56-03: Evaluation of Human
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| Engineering Discrepancies in Control Room. The discrepancies identi-
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| fied by this item have been corrected except for numbers on I/R Amps
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| meter and the legends not removed for valves 2RC3, 2RC4, 2ND26 and
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| 2ND60. Further review will be conducted regarding the remaining two
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| items.
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| c. (CLOSED) Unresolved Item 414/86-22-01 : Review of Licensee Actions
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| i Concerning Control of Welding Inserts. The licensee had completed the
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| review of this issue. The inspector held discussions with licensee
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| personnel to review the findings. It appears that reuse of the inserts
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| -
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| was being considered only if they could be fully justified by reestab-
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| '
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| lishing traceability plus providing further technical justification.
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| It is clear that new inserts were used and there is no evidence that a
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| coverup was attempted. Quality Assurance personnel were cognizant of
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| i the problem during its initial stages. The inspector considers
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| licensee actions regarding this item to be acceptable.
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| 4 No violations or deviations were identified.
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| 4. Unresolved Items *
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| A new unresolved item is identified in paragraph 11.c. * An Unresolved
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| ,
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| Item is a matter about which more information is required to determine
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| -
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| whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation.
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| 5. Plant Operations Review (Units 1 & 2) (71707 and 71710)
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| I
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| a. The inspectors reviewed plant operations throughout the reporting
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| period to verify conformance with regulatory requirements. Technical
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| ; Specifications (TS), and administrative controls. Control room logs,
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| danger tag logs, Technical Specification Action Item Log, and the
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| l- removal and restoration log were routinely reviewed. Shift turnovers
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| were observed to verify that they were conducted in accordance with
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| approved procedures.
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| The inspectors verified by observation and interviews, the measures
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| taken to assure physical protection of the facility met current
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| '
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| requirements. Areas inspected included the security organization, the
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| establishment and maintenance of gates, doors, and isolation zones in
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| the proper condition, that access control and badging were proper and
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| i procedures followed.
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| i
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| I
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| 4
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| _ . - , . , , , - , - , , , . - , , ,,,,,..----.-_,._,._______.---y- , ,..- - , .- - -...--... ,,,__..
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| . . . _ _ - - . . - - _
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| 3 1
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| In addition to the areas discussed above, the areas toured were
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| observed for fire prevention and protection activities. These included
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| such things as combustible material control, fire protection systems
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| and materials, and fire protection associated with maintenance ,
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| activities.
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| ,
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| '
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| b. On June 5, 1986, the licensee requested a seventy-two (72) hour
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| extension to the time allowed under the Action statement of Technical
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| Specification (TS) 3/4.4.6.2 " Operational Leakage". This request was
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| made due to an unidentified leakage of 1.9 gpm. The request was to
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| allow the unit to remain in Hot Standby to identify the leak. Relief
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| was granted based on discussions between NRR, Region II, the Resident
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| '
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| Inspector and the licensee. The licensee has addressed this issue in a
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| letter to Region II dated June 10, 1986,
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| c. At approximately 11:00am on June 13, 1986, the computer program for
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| calculating unidentified leakage was showing 1.79 pm unidentified
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| leakage. An Unusual Event was declared at 3:00pm. At 3:42pm, a ,
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| breaker shorted in a turbine building non-safety related power panel
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| (IMXD) causing smoke and damage to the panel along with a loss of power
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| to all loads served by that panel. One of these loads was the Hydrogen
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| cooling pump, the loss of which caused main generator temperatures to
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| start increasing. The operator began unloading the generator due to
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| temperature increases. A second load was power to the control circuit
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| of the variable letdown orifice control valve (INV 849). The loss of
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| this control circuit caused this valve to fail full open giving a
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| letdown flowrate of about 110gpm. The operator shifted the letdown
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| orifice to a 45gpm orifice and immediately noted a high charging rate
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| and a very low letdown rate indicating a primary system leak. Due to '.
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| , cooldown caused by unloading the generator and the leak, leakage rate
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| at first appeared to be about 150gpm. After about forty-five (45)
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| minutes the operators shut the letdown isolation valves (INV-1 and
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| 1NV-2) which stopped the leak. A controlled shutdown of the reactor
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| was continued and the generator taken off the line. The Unit was in
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| Mode 3 at 5:00pm. Subsequent leakage calculation (prior to shutting
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| INV-1 & INV-2) identified a leak of about 25gpm. A containment entry
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| , was made and identified a 360 degree crack in a one (1) inch socket
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| '
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| weld to the flange for the <ariable orifice control valve (INV 849)
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| outlet side. Cooldown and d. pressurization was continued and the plant
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| was placed in Mode 5 at a15am on June 15, 1986. The resident
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| inspectors were on site and closely monitored this event. The cause of
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| the failure of IMXD had been identified to be a vendor installed
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| nameplate (size 1" x 2.5"), which had caused a short circuit.
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| "
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| Preliminary evaluation by licensee design personnel indicates probable
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| cause of the socket weld failure to be vibration induced fatigue. The
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| '.
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| weld was sent to the Westinghouse hot laboratory in Pittsburg, Penn.
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| for analysis. Further licensee actions have included radiography of
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| welds, vibration tests on both units, procedural changes limiting use
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| of valve 1NV 849, removal of label plates from transformers in both
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| 4
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| -. . . _ _ . - . - . . - . . - - . ,-.---__ - .- -- ,_
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| ,y2 . ._m . , _ _ _ - , , - _
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| .
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| 4
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| units and rewelding to reinstall INV 849. The inspectors verified
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| licensee actions. Long term corrections are being reviewed. The
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| residents will continue followup of this problem which will be reported
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| in detail to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report.
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| No violations or deviations were identified.
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| 6. Surveillance Observation (Units 1 & 2) (61726)
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| a. During the inspection period, the inspector verified plant operations
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| were in compliance with various TS requirements. Typical of these
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| requirements were confirmation of compliance with the TS for reactor
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| coolant chemistry, refueling water tank, emergency power systems,
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| safety injection, emergency safeguards systems, control room ventila-
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| tion, and direct current electrical power sources. The inspector
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| verified that surveillance testing was performed in accordance with the
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| approved written procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated,
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| ,
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| limiting conditions for operation were met, appropriate removal and
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| restoration of the affected equipment was accomplished, test results
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| met requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the
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| individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified
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| during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate
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| management personnel,
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| b. On June 11, 1986, a reactor trip from 85% power occurred on Unit 1.
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| Investigation into this by the licensee will be documented in a
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| Licensee Event Report. The inspector reviewed this event and identi-
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| fied the following sequence. The instrumentation technicians (IAE)
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| were performing IP 0/A/3?40/11, Excore Nuclear Instrumentation System,
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| dated 7/16/85. In accordance with step 10.1.6, IAE had requested the
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| reactor operator (RO) to turn the Steam Generator Program Level
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| Setpoint Indicator to a channel other than the one being tested. The
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| IAE performed the required adjustments on the specific channel he was
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| working. He then proceeded to the next channel without notification to
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| the R0 as required by a repeat of doing step 10.1.6. This failure
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| resulted in the I/E performing action on the channel selected to
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| provide input to the steam generator level circuit. The input caused a
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| '
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| decrease of feed water to the steam generators and a resultant low-low
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| level steam generator B reactor trip before actions could be taken to
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| correct the situation. The actions by the IAE personnel in not
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| ,
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| performing step 10.1.6 of IP 0/A/3240/11, is a violation of TS 6.8.1
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| { which requires procedures to be implemented as they are approved. This
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| '
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| example is being combined with other examples discussed in paragraph
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| 11.d to constitute one violation 413/86-24-01,414/86-26-01, Failure to
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| follow procedures associated with IP 0/A/3240/11, Station Directive
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| 3.2.2, Operations Management Procedure 2-29 and Maintenance Management
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| Procedure 1.0.
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| One violation was identified as described in paragraph 6.b. above. No
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| ! deviations were identified.
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| l-
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| _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .
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| 5
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| 7. Maintenance Observations (Units 1& 2) (62703) ;
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| Station maintenance activities of selected systems and components were
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| observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with
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| requirements. The inspector verified licensee conformance to the require-
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| ments in the following areas of inspection: the activities were accomp-
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| lished using approved' procedures, and functional testing and/or calibrations
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| were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
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| control records were maintained; activities performed were accomplished by
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| qualified personnel; and materials used were properly certified. Work
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| requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure
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| .
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| that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance which may
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| effect system performance.
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| No violations or deviations were identified.
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| 8. Review of Licensee Nonroutine Event Reports (Units 1 & 2) (92700)
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| a. The below listed Licensee Event Reports (LER) were reviewed to
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| determine if the information provided met NRC requirements. The
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| determination included: adequacy of description, verification of
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| compliance with Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements,
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| corrective action taken, existence of potential generic problems,
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| reporting requirements satisfied, and the relative safety significance
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| of each event. Additional inplant reviews and discussion with plant
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| personnel, as appropriate, were conducted for those reports indicated
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| by an (*). The following LERs are closed:
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| *LER 413/85-53 Diesel Generator 1A Battery Charger
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| Inoperable Due to Blown Fuses
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| LER 413/85-67 Rev.1 Reactor Trip on Loss of Main Feedwater
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| Pump Due to Design Deficiency
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| *LER 413/86-01 Procedural Deficiency Caused Missed
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| Surveillance of Control Room Carbon
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| Filters
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| LER 413/86-06 Reactor Trip Due to Trip of the 1C2
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| l
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| Heater Drain Tank Pump
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| *LER 413/86-07 Auxiliary Feedwater Start on Loss of Main
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| Feedwater Pump Turbine Condenser Vacuum
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| *LER 413/86-10 Alternate Power Sources Not Verified
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| Operable While Diesel Generator 1B
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| Inoperable
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| *LER 413/86-11 Both Trains of Annulus Ventilation System
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| Inoperable Due to Personnel Error
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| 6
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| *LER 413/86-12 Rev.1 Both trains of Containment Valve
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| Injection Water System Inoperable Due to
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| Defective Procedure
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| LER 413/86-13 Termination of Containment Release Due to
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| 4
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| Spurious Radiation Alarm
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| LER 413/86-14 Control Rod Surveillance Not Performed
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| Due to Defective Procedure
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| LER 413/86-16 Penetration Surveillance Interval
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| -
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| Exceeded Due to Personnel Error and
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| Defective Procedure
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| *LER 413/86-17 Axial Flux Difference Requirements Not
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| Met Due to Computer Malfunctions
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| *LER 413/86-23 Reactor Trip Due to Failure to Block
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| Source Range High Flux Trip Setpoint
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| >
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| LER 414/86-03 ESF Actuation - High/High Steam Generator
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| Level Caused By Main Feedwater Isolation
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| LER 414/86-09 Failure to Place Inoperable Steam
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| Generator In A Tripped Condition Within
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| One Hour
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| LER 414/86-10 ESF Actuation - Auxiliary Feedwater Auto
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| -
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| Start Due to High/High Steam Generator
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| Level
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| LER 414/86-12 ESF Actuation - Main Feedwater Isolation
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| , on Steam Generator 2A Due to High/High
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| i Steam Generator Level
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| i b. (CLOSED) CDR 413/84-16, 414/84-16: Unconsidered effects of superheated
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| i steam on safety-related components. The inspectors observed safety
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| related equipment in the Unit 2 exterior doghouse to verify that the
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| licensee responses appropriately identified equipment possibly affected
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| by superheated steam. Final NRC approval of the licensee analysis is
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| complete.
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| '
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| No violations or deviations were identified.
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| 9. Survey of Licensee's Response to Safety Issues (Units 1 & 2) (92701)
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| The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to the issue of biofouling of
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| cooling water heat exchangers as addressed in Inspection and Enforcement
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| -
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| Manual TI 2515/77.
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| l
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| .. -. - - _ -
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| . . . ,
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| 1 .
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| 7
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| ,
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| The licensee has developed several procedures that are used to monitor flow
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| through service water heat exchangers. These procedures are conducted on a
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| quarterly basis by the performance engineering personnel. Installed
| |
| instrumentation is not used to monitor degradation but more precision test
| |
| equipment is installed. Trends are maintained by these engineers. Heat
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| exchangers that are not feasible to measure various parameters, have been
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| scheduled for routine periodic cleaning. Fire protection systems are
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| periodically flushed and, in addition, are being modified to include a
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| chlorination system for chemical treatment. Based on this review, the
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| , actions taken and scheduled by the licensee appear to be acceptable.
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| No violations or deviations were identified.
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| i ?
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| 10. Preparations for Refueling (Unit 1) (60705)
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| ,
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| The inspector reviewed preparations for refueling of Unit 1 presently
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| scheduled to commence August 15, 1986 and complete on October 23, 1986. The
| |
| inspector reviewed procedures for fuel handling, transfers, and core
| |
| verification; inspection of fuel to be reused; and various other procedures
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| that will be required during refueling. The inspector reviewed the
| |
| following specific procedures:
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| IP 1/A/3230/06 Procedure for Disconnecting and Connection of
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| Incore T/C Cables, dated 6/2/86
| |
| .
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| MP 0/A/7150/43 Reactor Vessel Internals Removal and Replacement,
| |
| dated 4/25/86
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| MP 0/A/7150/50 UHI Piping Removal and Replacement, dated 9/30/85
| |
| MP 0/A/7150/76 Rod Drive Assembly Installation and Removal, dated
| |
| 11/21/85
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| MP 1/A/7150/42 Reactor Vessel Head Removal and Replacement, dated
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| 2/4/86
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| ; OP 0/A/6550/04 Transferring New Fuel to the Elevator, dated
| |
| l 6/19/84
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| l
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| OP 0/A/6550/05 Primary Neutron Source Handling, dated 6/27/84
| |
| OP 0/A/6S50/07 Reactor Building Manipulator Crane Operation, dated
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| 2/20/86
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| !
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| ! OP 0/A/6550/08 Fuel Transfer System Operation, dated 6/27/84
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| l OP 0/A/6550/09 RCCA Change Fixture Operation, dated 6/21/84
| |
| OP 0/A/6550/14 Draining and Filling Spent Fuel Pool Transfer Canal
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| and Cask Area, dated 6/26/84
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| I
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| t
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| o
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| *
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| e
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| 8
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| OP 1/A/6200/13 Filling, Draining, and Purification of Refueling
| |
| Cavity, dated 6/29/84
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| OP 1/A/6550/06- Transferring Fuel With the Spent Fuel Manipulator
| |
| Crane, dated 6/21/84
| |
| In addition, although' procedure identification numbers have been assigned
| |
| for areas such as Vessel Irradiation Sample Removal, Refueling Procedure,
| |
| Total Core Unloading, Total' Core Reloading and Spent Fuel Pool Shuffle of
| |
| Core Components, these procedures have not been issued at this time. The
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| inspector identified to the licensee his concern over issuance of these
| |
| procedures and minor errors in the procedures listed above including that a
| |
| two year review had not been performed to date.
| |
| The inspector also reviewed a proposed schedule for the refueling that
| |
| identifies major work to be accomplished during the outage. This schedule
| |
| also shows the Nuclear Station Modifications that are scheduled to be
| |
| performed.
| |
| No violations or deviations were identified.
| |
| 11. Plant Procedures (Units 1 & 2) (42700)
| |
| a. The inspector reviewed various plant procedures to determine whether
| |
| overali plant procedures are in accordance with regulatory require-
| |
| ments, procedure changes were made in accordance with TS requirements,
| |
| the technical adequacy of the reviewed procedures is consistent with
| |
| desired actions and modes of operation, and procedures, when used, are
| |
| being followed as required. In addition to the procedures identified
| |
| in paragraph 10 above the below listed procedures were also reviewed:
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| PT 1/A/4200/02A Monthly Outside Containment Integrity
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| .
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| Verification
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| PT 2/A/4200/02A Monthly Outside Containment Integrity
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| Verification
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| PT 1/A/4200/02B Cold Shutdown Inside Containment
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| 1
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| Integrity Verification
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| PT 2/A/4200/02B Cold Shutdown Inside Containment
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| Integrity Verification
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| IP 0/A/3240/11 Excore Nuclear Instrumentation System
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| IP 1/A/3101/02 Refueling Water System Instrumentation
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| Calibration
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| SD 3.1.17 Fuel Handling Interlocks
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| !
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| -_. - _ __ _ - . . _ _
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| | |
| ~ . _ .
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| s
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| e
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| 9
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| ,
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| TP 1/A/1450/18 Spent Fuel Pool Filter Train Functional
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| Test
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| 'As a result of this review one violation and one unresolved item was
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| identified as discussed below.
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| '
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| b. The review discussed above identified several examples of inadequate
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| '
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| .
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| procedures. The first example is contained in PT 2/A/4200/02A, Monthly
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| Outside Containment Integrity Verification for Unit 2. The purpose of
| |
| this PT is to insure that containmeat penetration integrity is being
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| maintained by verifying conditions of the penetration isolations
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| located outside of the containment. A' review by the licensee of this
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| PT identified approximately twenty-five (25) valves located on various
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| penetrations that were not included in this procedure. These are
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| identified in the licensee's non-routine event report C86-77-2 dated
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| 6/5/86. The omission of these valves resulted in a violation of TS
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| 4.6.1.1.a , which requires the penetrations to be checked every thirty
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| one (31) days. A subsequent check of these valves found them all in
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| their required positions. Adequate corrective actions would have
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| included the prompt identification and correction of the following
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| examples and therefore this licensee identified example is a violation.
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| A second example was associated with . PT 2/A/4200/02B, Cold Shutdown
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| Inside Containment Integrity Verification. The purpose of this PT is
| |
| to insure that containment penetration integrity is being maintained by
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| verifying conditions of penetrations inside the containment. A review
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| of this procedure identified twelve (12) valves that are a part of
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| these penetrations that were not included in this procedure. As a
| |
| result of this the licensee violated T.S. 4.6.1.1.a. A subsequent
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| check of these valves found them all in their required position.
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| The third example of inadequate procedures is associated with PT
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| 1/A/4200/02A, Monthly Outside Containment Integrity Verification for
| |
| Unit 1. A review of this procedure by the inspector identified one
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| valve that should be included in the procedure. The omission of this
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| valve also resulted in a violation of TS 4.6.1.1.a. This valve was
| |
| ;
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| also found in its required position.
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| These three examples are combined to constitute one Violation,
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| 413/86-24-02 414/86-26-02, Failure to provide adequate procedures
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| t
| |
| resulting in a violation of TS 4.6.1.1.a.
| |
| c. During the inspectors review of PT 2/A/4200/02A several additional
| |
| questions were identified. A comparison of this PT to the Unit 1
| |
| procedure identified approximately twenty (20) valves that were on the
| |
| '
| |
| Unit 1 procedure that were identified by the licensee, but similar Unit
| |
| ! 2 valves were not identified. Positions for Numerous valves on the
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| Unit 2 procedure were identified as " CLOSED" whereas the Unit 1
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| procedure and the system flow diagrams identify these same valves as
| |
| " LOCKED CLOSED". These questions are being identified as an Unresolved
| |
| Item 413/86-24-03, 414/86-26-03: Procedural discrepancies associated
| |
| with similar procedures between Units 1 & 2 pending review by the
| |
| _ - . ._- _ - - _ _ _ --__ _ _ - . _
| |
| | |
| s
| |
| .
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| 10
| |
| licensee and additional review by the inspector to determine the extent
| |
| and significance of the discrepancies.
| |
| d. The inspector also reviewed several administrative procedures that are
| |
| used to control work and testing associated with work. The specific
| |
| procedures reviewed were Station Directive (SD) 3.2.2, Development and
| |
| Conduct of the Periodic Testing Program, Operations Management
| |
| Procedure (OMP) 2-29, Technical Specifications Logbook, and Maintenance
| |
| Management Procedure (MMP) 1.0, Work Request Preparation. In addition
| |
| to this review, the inspector reviewed various work items to insure
| |
| they were conducted in accordance with these administrative procedures.
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| SD 3.2.2, Section 8.0 requires after a valve has undergone maintenance
| |
| and prior to its return to service, it shall be tested as necessary to
| |
| demonstrate that the parameters affected by the maintenance are within
| |
| acceptable limits. On May 17,1986, 2CF-87, 2CF-33, and 2CF-60 were
| |
| repaired and returned to service on May 19, 1986, without being tested
| |
| to demonstrate that the parameters affected were within acceptable
| |
| limits. OMP 2-29, Section 3.3.8 requires inoperable equipment that
| |
| causes operation in an ACTION statement of TS for the existing mode be ,
| |
| -
| |
| logged in the TS Action Item Log (TSAIL). Work request 31838 OPS,
| |
| l 31841 OPS, 32033 OPS and 32046 OPS were all processed to be performed
| |
| on May 14, 1986, and were not logged in the TSAIL. The results of this
| |
| failure allowed work to be performed without performance of the
| |
| required functional testing. MMP 1.0, paragraph 4.3.10 states that the
| |
| ! section of the Work Request entitled " Procedure Numbers" shall reflect
| |
| a complete listing of procedures to perform work, A review of the work
| |
| requests identified above identified that the procedures that were
| |
| required to be used to perform the required retesting was omitted
| |
| contributing to the failure to retest the work activity. The above
| |
| examples are combined with the example discussed in paragraph 6.b to be
| |
| identified as one Violation : 413/86-24-01, 414/86-26-01; Failure to
| |
| follow procedures associated with IP 0/A/3240/11, Station Directive
| |
| 3.2.2, Operations Management Procedure 2-29 and Maintenance Management
| |
| Procedure 1.0.
| |
| Two violations were identified as described in paragraphs 11.b. and d. .
| |
| above. No deviations were identified.
| |
| 12. Followup of IE Notices and IE Bulletins Sent For Information (Units 1 & 2)
| |
| (92701)
| |
| The inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee upon receipt of an
| |
| IE Notice (IEN) sent for information purposes only. The Compliance
| |
| Engineer, at present, controls receipt and distribution of these documents
| |
| to assure appropriate personnel review the contents and determine actions
| |
| that may be required as a result. The following notices were reviewed to
| |
| assure receipt, review by appropriate personnel, and any resulting action
| |
| identified, documented and followed to completion:
| |
| IE Notices 85-33
| |
| 85-59
| |
| ,
| |
| No violations or deviations were identified.
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| !
| |
| i
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| , , _ _ _ , _ _ -- _ .-. _ , .
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| }}
| |