NSD-NRC-97-5347, Submits Response to NRC Re AP600 Fire Protection Configuration Modeled in Probabilistic Risk Assessement,Per Section 9.5 & App 9A of Ssar,Rev 1

Submits Response to NRC Re AP600 Fire Protection Configuration Modeled in Probabilistic Risk Assessement,Per Section 9.5 & App 9A of Ssar,Rev 1

ML20211G000
Person / Time
Site:	05200003
Issue date:	09/29/1997
From:	Mcintyre B WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP.
To:	Quay T NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NSD-NRC-97-5347, NUDOCS 9710010355
Download: ML20211G000 (30)

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Westinghouse Energy Systems h 355 Electric Corporation P'"***N' "355 DCP/NRC1056 NSD-NRC 97 5347 Docket No.: 52 003 September 29,1M7 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 A'ITliNTION: T.R. QUAY SUlljliCT:

RiiSPONSE TO NRC's JUNE 27,1997 LislTER CONCl!RNING Till! AP600 FIRE l'ROTECTION CONFIGURATION MODELED IN Tile PRA

Dear Mr. Quay:

The Al'600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) internal fire analysis is documented in Chapter 57 of the AP600 PRA report. The internal Gre analysis was performed based on information provided in Section 9.5 and Appendix 9A of AP600 SSAR Resision 1. The SSAR chapter and appendix relating to Gre areas and Orc protection were revised in June,1996 and again in 1997. The informatioo that changed within these sections included renumbering Ore areas, combining or redefining selected Orc areas, changing the combustible loadings (btu) within some fire areas, and removing automatic Gre suppression capability from some Ore areas.

The NRC issued a letter to Westinghouse on June 27,1997, indicating that based on their ongoing seview of the AP600 PRA and SSAR, discrepancies exist between the AP600 Gre protection con 0guration described in SSAR Appendix 9A and the fire protection con 0guration assessed in the PRA (Rev,10). The letter identined a few of the discrepancies. 'these discrepancies identified Gre areas which appeared to be renumbered, and a few areas where a sprinkler was no longer located in the Ore area. The letter also states that Westinghouse should revise the PRA internal fire analysis and the SSAR, as appropriate, to reflect the actual Gre protection design of the AP600.

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The PRA internal Ore analysis performed for the AP600 produces a conservative estimate of the plant core damage frequency because of the bounding nature of the analysis. It is important to recognize f/

the bounding nature of this analysis when determining if a revision is required for the PRA. What needs to be considered is, do the design changes make the PRA internal fire analysis results and conclusions change. if the results change, is it a minor change or significant change 7 Is this change

[jh an increase or decrease in core damage frequency? It is Westinghouse's position that the changes

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made beNen SSAR Rev.1 and SSAR Rev.14 are minor changes in the overall fire analysis. The conclusions and insights do not change. A complete reanalysis of the PRA internal Gre analysis is not necessary. An assessment of the effect of the design changes on the PRA internal fire analysis was performed to support this position.

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DCP/NI(C1056 NSI).NitC 97 5347 September 29,1997 linclosure i provides a paper that summarizes the assessment and the results and conclusions of the assessment.

linclosure 2 is a draft of Attachment $7A which will be placed at the end of AP600 PRA Chapter $7 in the ne.st revision to the PRA report. Attachment 57A provides a detailed discussion of the assessment of the effect of the Orc protection con 0guration changes on the PRA internal Dre analysis.

The OITS number associated with this Orc protection con 0guration issue is 5900.

The enclosures of this letter close, from the Westinghouse perspective, this Dre protection conuguration issue. The Westinghouse status column in the OITS will be changed to " Action N."

The NRC should review the enclosures and inform Westinghouse of the status to be designated in the "NRC Status" column of the OITS.

Please contact Cynthia l.. llaag on (412) 374 4277 if you have any questions concerning this transmittal.

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Brian A. McIntyre, Manager Advanced Plant Safety and Licensing Jml III1 Closures cc:

J. M. Sebrosky, NRC (I!nclosures)

D. C. Scalletti, NRC (linclosures)

N. J.1.iparuto. Westinghouse (w/o !!nclosures) m4 wn

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Enclosure i to Westinghouse Letter DCP/NRC1056 September 29,1997 9

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s ASSESSMENT OF FIRE PROTECTION CONFIGURATION CliANGES ON AP600 PRA INTERNAL FIRE ANALYSIS 1.0 11ACKGROUND 1

The AP600 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) internal fire analysis is documented in Chapter $7 of the AP600 PRA report.

1 A PRA it.ternal fire analysis was performed based on information provided in Section 9.5 and Appendit 9A of AP600 SSAR Revision 1. De SSAR chapter and appendix relating to fire areas and fire protection were revised in June 1996 and again in 1997. De information that changed within these sections included renumbering fire areas, combining or redefining selected fire areas, changing the combustible loadings (btu) within some Ore areas, and removing automatic fire suppression capability from some fire areas.

De NRC issued a letter to Westinghouse on June 27.1997 indicating that based on their ongoing review of the AP600 PRA and SSAR, discrepancies exist between the AP600 fire protection configuration desenbed in SSAR Appendix 9A and the fire protection configuration assessed in the PRA (Rev.10). De letter identified a few of the discrepancies. These discrepancies identified fire areas which appeared to be renumbered, and a few areas where a sprinkler was no longer located in the fire area. De letter also states that Westinghouse should revise the PRA internal fire analysis and the SSAR, as appropriate, to reflect the actual fire protection design of 'he AP600.

The PRA internal fire analysis performed for the AP600 produces a conservative estimate of the plant core damage frequency because of the bounding nature of the analysis. It is important to recognize the bounding nature of this analysis when determining if the PRA needs to be revised. What needs to be considered is, would the design changes make the PRA internal fire analysis results and conclusions change, if the results would change, is it a minor change or significant change? Is this change an increase or decrease in core damage frequency? It is Westinghouse *s position that the changes m.ide between SSAR Rev. I and SSAR Rev.14 are minor changes in that the overall fire atalysis conclusions do not change, and that a complete reanalysis of the PRA internal fire analysis is not warranted. An assessment of the effect of the changes was performed to support this position. A summary of the assessment is presented in the following sections.

2.0 ASSESSMENT

OF FIRE PRO'ECTION CONFIGURATION DISCREPANCIES An assessment was performed of the fire protection configuravon discrepancies'effect on the PRA results and conclusions of the differences between the PRA and SSAR fire protection con 0guration. Tasks involved in the assessment included:

Determine which fire areas have been renumbered, split, or combined. Identify if new fire' areas exist.

Identify those areas where automatic fire suppression equipment was considered in the PRA fire analysis, but no longer exists.

Assess the effect, if any, of changes in combustible loadings and overall Door areas.

Assess the changes effect, if any, to the fire ignition frequencies used in the PRA fire analysis.

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Recalculate the at power and shutdown operations quantitative analysis for those fire areas that no longer contain automatic fire suppression capability, and any new fire areas identified from the precceding tasks.

Assess the effect on the PRA internal fire analysis results, conclusions, and insights.

2.1 Fire Areas A summary of the SSAR Rey. I fire area number (and what was used in the PRA) versus the SSAR Rev.14 fire aren number is provided in Table 1. Table 2 provideJ A summary of those fire areas reported in SSAR Rev. I that were cot.,bined into fire areas reported in SSAR Rev.14. Only those fire areas not screened in the PRA i

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evaluation are being compared in Tables I and 2. As can te seen by these tables. many areas were renumbered, and a few areas combined equipment into one area.

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The task of comparing fire areas confirmed that several of the fire areas were changed or renumbered between SSAR Rev. I and Rev 14. Several fire areas have been combined. The combined areas, as illustrated in Table 2 are primarily electrical and I&C equipment rooms within the same division. As an esample, the division C batteries (was area 1202 AF 05) are now combined into the same fire area as the division C electrical equipment (was area 1202 AF 03), and the "new" fire area is numbered 1202 AF 03, Only the electrical and 1&C equipment of the same division were combined (i.e.. division A & B or A & C equipment were not combined).

Dere is one new rone identified in SSAR Rev.14 that was not assessed in the PRA internal fire analysis. Bis new tone, VES air storage / operating deck staging area, is within the containment fire area 1000 AF 01 and is zone 1250 AF 12555. His new fire tone was further assessed.

A qualitative assessment of those fire areas that were screened out was also performed to support the assumption that the changes do not cause the screening to be incorrect. The areas that were screened are ide.itifed within PRA Table $7 4. and the reason for an area being screened out are noted on the table (as notes Bl and B2 on Table $7-4) and discussed on PRA page 5717. Those fire areas screened out in the PRA fire analysis were compared to the corresponding fire area identified in SSAR Rev.14. No new mformation was identified during the comparison that would change a screened fire area to one that is not screened.

2.2 Automatic Fire Suppression Equipment Consideration In the PRA internal fire analysis, automatic fire suppression equipment was considered to help mitigate the propagation of fires from one area to another. The areas where automatic fire suppression is credited are listed below.

Fire Area Capability still exist in PE *' " I' **

^

(per PRA)

(per SSAR Rev.14) 1240 AF 01 1200 AF 04 Preaction sprinkler No 2033 AF 01 2003 AF 01 Wet pipe sprinkler Yes 2033 AF 02 2033 AF 03 Wet pipe sprinkler Yes 2043 AF 01 2043 AF 01 Wet pipe sprinkler Yes 2050 AF 01 2050 AF 01 Water spray Yes 4031 AF 02 4032 AF 02 Wet pipe sprinkler No 4032 AF 01 4031 AF 02 Preaction sprinkler No 4032 AF 02 4031 AF 01 Preaction sprinkler No 404i AF 01 4042 AF 02 Preacuun sprinkler No 4N2 AF 01

• 4N2 AF 01 Preaction sprinkler No a note there is a t)po m PRA TaNe 57 3 Thu a typed as doel Af ol in the taNc, t>ut should tw doel AF 01.

The capability of automatic fire suppression should no longer be credited for six of the fires areas. An assessment of the effect on the PRA fire analysis results was performed.

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e-2.3 Fire ignition Frequencies De nest task was to assess if there were changes to the fire ignition fregunenes because nre areas hre been combined. De information used to assess fire ignition frequencies includes the room Door area, cable insulation heat valae for the room, the number of pieces of equipment m each area (i.e., transformers, batteries, etc) and the transient combustible material.

Dose items of most interest for the assessment were the floor area and cable blu (heat loads) changes, as these are the items that could most innuence the fire ignition fiequencies because they are area specific, are based on the fire protection summary table of the SSAR,.md are used in the calculation of weighting factors that are used in the frequency calculations.

De assessment concluded that it was not necessary to further re evaluute the fire ignition frequencies for the PRA internal fire analysis based on fire area information provided in SSAR Rev,14.

2.4 Potential for Fire Propagation Per PRA Chap'er 57 (Step 8 of section 57.2), fire propagation from fire areas with less than 20,000 Btu /sq. ft.

I combustible loadings was ncs considered credible on the basis that a significant fire can not develop in the area.

A review of the combustible loadings between SSAR Rev. I and Rev.14 for those fire areas that were not screened out indicate there are t few areas that had less than 20.000 Btu /sq. ft. combustible loadmgs identified in SSAR Rev.1, but now have loadings greater than 20,000. Dese areas include:

SSAR Rev. I SSAR Rev.14 1200 AF 12341 Widdle Annu us 9,677 Btu /sq. ft.

30.000 Stu/sq. ft.

I100 AF i1300A/B Maint. Floor 12.518 28,000 1250 AF 12555 VES air storese 61,000 (new area) 1230 AF 01 Div. A/C Corridor 344 33,000 Dese arSas were further assessed for potential fire propagation.

2.5 Results of the Assessment he effect of the differences identified between the PRA model and the current SSAR fire protection configuration are discussed below, At. Power Evaluatloat Per Chapter 57 of AP600 PRA Rev.10, the total at power fire induced core damage frequency (including containment and control room) is 6.5E-07 per year. Following the assessment o'f the changes, the at. power fire induced core damage frequency is calculated to remain at 6.5E-07 per year.

Safe Shutdown Evaluation:

Per Chapter 57 of AP600 PRA Rey,10, the total fire induced core damage frequency (including

.ontainment and control room) occurring during safe shutdown is 2.6E 08 per year. Following the assessment of the changes, the sr.fe shutdown conditions fire induced core damage frequency is calculated to ren.ain at 2.6E-08 per year.

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Mid Loop Evaluation:

Per Chapter 57 of AP600 PRA Rev.10, the total fire induced core damage frequency (including containment and control room) occurring during mid loop operation is 3 lE 07 per year. Following the assessment of the changes, the mid loop operation fire induced core damage frequency is calculated to be 3.8E-07 per year. His represents approximately a 23 percent increase in the fire-induced core damage frequency for mid loop conditions from that reported in the AP600 PRA, Rev.10. The primary contributors to this increase are:

SSAR Rev.14 Reason for PRA Fire Area Fire Area CDF per PRA Reassessed CDF increase in CDF 4041 AF 01 4N2 AF G2 SE 10 IE-08 Remosal of auto fire suppression 4N2 AF 01 4042 AF 01 1.6E-09 3.2E-08 sprinklers N/A 1250 AF 12555 0.0 2.5E-08 new area analyred Although there is an increase in the mid loop conditions fire induced core damage frequency, the conclusions and insights that are reported in Chapters 57 and 59 of the PRA remain unchanged.

3.0

SUMMARY

ne fire induced core damage frequency remains unchanged for the at power and safe shutdown evaluations.

The fire induced core damage frequency during mid-loop operations may increase approximately 23 percent, from 3.lE 7 to 3.8E 7 per year, which is still orders of magnatude lower than the safety goal of IE 4 per year.

As the overalt bounding assumptions made in performing the PRA internal fire analysis have not changed (i.e.,

assume that a fire in a nocsafety related equipment room causes all nonsafety related equipment to be damaged, rather than just the truely affected equipment), the PRA fire analysis performed for AP600 still produces a conservative estimate of the plant core damage frequency.

The conclusions and insights from the PRA internal fire analysis, as stated in PRA Chapter $7 and Chapter 59 (Table 59 29), do not change as a consequence of the fire protection area design changes that occurred between SSAR Rev. I and SSAR Rev.14. Therefore,it does not warrant a complete reanalysis of the PRA internal fire analysis to make the PRA and SSAR fire protection consistent.

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Table 1

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Comeparison of Fire Areas that were Not Screened from the PRA analpis PRA Fire Area Corresponding SSAR '"

General j

(SSAR Rev.1 Area)

Rev.14 Fire Area (Zone)

Descript6on 1200 AF 01 1200 AF 01 RCA of the Aux. Bldg i

1 1201 AF 02 1201 AF 02 Div. B batteries 1201 AF 03 1201 AF 03 Div. D de equipA&C room 1201 AF 04-1201 AF 04 Div. B/D VBS equip.

1201 AF 05 1201 AF 05 MSIV compartment A 1201 AF 06 1201 AF 06 MSIV compartment B 1202 AF 02 1202 AF 02 Northeast elevator shaft j

1202 AF 03 1202 AF 03 Div. C batteries 1202 AF 04 1202 AF 04 Div. A electrical equip.

3 1202 AF 05 1202 AF 03 Div. C electrical equip. (equip now included with Div. C batteries) t 1205 AF 02

'1205 AF 02 Southeast elevator shaft i

1211 AF 01 1201 AF 03 (1211 AF 12105)

Div. D batteries (equip. with l

1201 AF 03) 1212 AF 01 1202 AF 04 Div. A electrical rooms (with 1202 AF 04) j 1220 AF 01 1220 AF 01 Div. B/D corridor 82* 6" 1222 AF 01 1201 AF 02 Div. B electrical equip. (equip, with 1201 AF 02) 1222 AF 02 1220 AF 01 (1222 AF 12212)

Div. B RCP trip swgr. (equip.

wit).1220 AF 01) 1230 AF 01 1230 AF 01 Div. A/C corridor 100' 1230 AF 03 1200 AF 04 (1230 AF 12321)

Nonclass IE electrical 1231 AF 01 1201 AF 02 (1231 AF 12304)

Div. B I&C equip. (equip, with-1201 AF 02) 1232 AF 01 1232 AF 01 Remote shutdown workstation 1240 AF 01 1200 AF 04 (1240 AF 12421)

Nonesass IE electrical 1242 AF 01 1242 AF 01 Main control room 1242 AF 02 1242 AF 02 Div. A penetration area 1243 AF 01 1243 AF 01 Reactor trip swgr i S

e Table 1 Comparison of Fire Areas that were Not Screened from the PRA analysis

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PRA Fire Area Corresponding SSAR '"

General (SSAR Rev. I Area)

Rev.14 D.re Area (Zone)

Description 1243 AF 02 1243 AF 02 Reactor trip swgr 2 1244 AF 01 1204 AF 01 VFS penetration room 1252 AF 01 1250 AF 01 Non radioactive ventilation 2000 AF 01 2000 AF 01 Turbine building floor 2009 AF 01 2009 AF 01 Stairwell #1 southwest 2033 AF 01

'8' 2003 AF 01 Aus. boiler equip. toom 2033 AF 02

'8' 2033 AF 03 Diesel driven fire pump room 2033 AF 03

• 2033 AF 02 Motor driven fire pump room 2043 AF 01 2043 AF 01 Laboratory 2050 AF 01 2050 AF 01 Lube oil room 2052 AF 01 2052 AF 01 Southwest 4kv swgr room 2053 AF 01 2053 AF 01 Generator panel room 2053 AF 02 2053 AF 02 Northwest 4ky swgr room 4031 AF 02

• 4032 AF 02 Containment access corridor 4031 AF 03 4032 AF 01 HF offices and access portal 4031 AF 04 4003 AF 01 Demin. water degassifier 4031 AF 05 4032 AF 01 Electrical equipment 4032 AF 01 4031 AF 02 Nonclass IE battery charger #2 4032 AF 02 4031 AF of Nonclass IE battery charger #1 4032 AF 03 4031 AF 02 Nonclass IE batteries #2 4032 AF 04 4031 AF 01 Nonclass IE batteries #1 4033 AF 01 4034 AF 01 General offices 4041 AF 01

• 4042 AF 02 Nonclass IE swgr #2 4N2 AF 01 4N2 AF 01 Nonclass IE swgr #1 4N2 AF 03 4041 AF 01 Conference / turnover room 4051 AF 02 4052 AF 01 Containment purge / exhaust room 5000 AF 00 *

$031AF01 Radwaste building 6030 AF 01 6030 AF 01 DG room A 6030 AF 02 6030 AF 02 DG toom B 6

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Table 1 Cornparison of Fire Areas that were Not Screened from the FRA analysis PRA Fire Area Corresponding SSAR '"

General (SSAR Rev.1 Area)

Rev.14 Fire Area (Zone)

Description 6030 AF 03 6030 AF 03 Fuel oil day tank room A 6030 AF N 6030 AF 04 Fuct oil day tank room A Containment 1000 AF 01 zones:

Containment 1000 AF 01 tones:

1100 AF 11105 1100 AF 11105 Reactor cavity 1100 AF 11206 1100 AF 11206 FXS valve / accumulator room A 1100 AF 11207 1100 AF 11207 FXS valve / accumulator room B l

1100 AF ll300A 1100 AF ll300A hiaintenance floor l

1100 AF 11300B 1100 AF 11300B hiaintenance door 1100 AF ll300C 1100 AF 11300C hiainteaance floor 1100 AF 11301 1100 AF 11301 50 compartment i 1100 AF iI302 1100 AF i1302 SO compartment 2 1100 AF 11303 1100 AF 11303 Pzt compartment 1100 AF ll303A d'

1100 AF 11303B ADS upper valve area 1100 AF 113038 d'

1100 AF ll303A ADS lower valve area 1100 AF i1500 l100 AF l1500 Operating deck 1100 AF 11590 1100 AF 11500 RHR valve area 1200 AF 12356 d'

1100 AF 12341 hiiddle annulus not specific area in SSAR Rev. I 1250 AF 12555 VES air storage / Staging Area i1) Those areas listed in bold typeface in this column have been renumbered since 55AR Rev, I.

(2) Indicates the fire area was renumbered. and that the new number either did not exist before or was also renumbered (e.g.. old fire areas not combined with other areas).

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I Table 2 Summary of Combined Fire Areas that were Not Screened from the PRA Analysis "Old" fire area "New" fire eres General l

(SSAR Rev.1)

(SSAR Rev.14)

Description 1

1202 AF 03 1202 AF 03 Div. C electrical and I&C 1202 AF 05 equipment 1201 AF 03 1201 AF 03 Div. D clectical and 1&C 1211 AF 01 equipmcnt 1202 AF 04 1202 AF 04 Div A electrical and l&C 1212 AF 01 -

equipment i

1201 AF 02 1201 AF 02 Div. B electrical and l&C 1222 AF 01 equipment 1231 AF 01 1220 AF 01 1220 AF 01 Div. B RCP trip swgr.

1222 AF 02 1230 AF 03 1200 AF 04 Nonclass lE electrical 1240 AF 01 4032 AF 01 4031 AF 02 :

Nonclass IE battery #2 and 4032 AF 03 battery charger #2 4032 AF 02 4031 AF 01 Nonclass IE battery #1 and 4032 AF 04 battery char;er #1 1244 AF 01 1204 AF 01 VFS penetration room (note -

lots of other equipirones now appear in "new" 1204 AF 01 that was not explicitly listed in SSAR Table 9A.6, Rev.1) 4031 AF 03 4032 AF 01 HP offices 4031 AF 05 1100 AF 11500 1100 AF 11$00 Operating deck i100 AF l1590 8

g to Westinghouse i.etter DCP/NRC1056 September 29,1997 1

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574, pesign change Effect on Internal Fire Analpls A'ITACIIMENT 57A DESIGN CitANGE EFFECT ON INTERNAL FIRE ANALYSIS This attachment to Chapter 57 documents the effects of changes in the Gre protection configuration on the PRA internal fire analysis.

57A.1

Background

The PRA internal fire analysis, as documented in Chapter 57 of the AP600 PRA, was performed based on th' N protection configuration provided Revision 1 of the AP600 SSAR.

SSAR section 9.5 i

/pendix 9A, which relates to fire areas and fire protection, were revised in June 1996 and again in 1997. The information that changed within these sections included renumbering fire areas, combining or redefining selected fire areas, changing the c,ombustible loadings (btu) within some fire areas, and removing automatic fire suppression capability from some fire areas. An assessment is performed and reported in this attachment that determines the effect of these changes on the intemal fire analysis conclusions and

insights, it is imponant to recognize that the PRA internal fire analysis performed for the AP600 produces a conservative estimate of the plant core damage frequency because of the bounding nature of the analysis. What needs to be assessed is, would the design changes make the PRA internal fire analysis results and conclusions change. If the results do change, is it a minor change or significant change? Is this change an increase or decrease in core damage frequency? Based on the assessment provided in this Attachment 57A, the changes in fire protection configuration made between SSAR Rev. I and SSAR Rev.14 are minor changes in that the overall fire analysis conclusions and insights do not change. An assessment of the effect of the changes was performed to support this position. The assessment is presented in the following sections.

57A,2 Assessment of Fire Protection Configuration Changes An assessment was performed of the fire protection configuration divrepancies'effect on the PRA results and conclusions of the differences between the PRA r.d SSAR fire protection configuration. Tasks involved in the assessment included:

Determine which fire areas have been renumbered, split, or combined. Identify if new fire areas exist.

Identify those areas where automatic fire suppression equipment was considered in the PRA fire analysis, but no longer exists.

Assess the effect, if any, of changes in combxtible loadings and overall floor areas.

Assess the changes effect, if any, to the fire ignition frequencies used in th,e PRA fire analysis.

ENE Ruision: DRAFT 3 W85tlfigh0US8 uh September 1997 57A l

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57A. D(sign Change Effect ca litirnal Fire Analysts l

Recalculate the at. power and shutdown operations quantitative analysis for those fire areas that no longer contain automatic fire suppression capability, and any new fire areas identified from the preceding tasks.

Assess the effect on the PRA internal Ore analysis results. conclusions, and insights.

07A.2.1 fire Areas A summary of the SSAR Rev. I fire area number (and + ' was used in the PRA) versus the SSAR Rev. I1 fire area number is provided in Tabe 37A 1.

Table 57A 2 provides a summary of tnose fire areas reported in SSAR Rev. I that were combined into fire areas reported in SSAR Rev.14 Only those fire areas not screened in the PRA evaluation are being compared in Tables 57A 1 and 57A 2. As can be seen by these tables, many areas were renumbered, and a few areas combined equipment into one area.

y The task of compaing fire areas confirmed that several of the fire areas were changed or renumbered between SSAR Rev. I and Rev 14. Several fire areas have been combined. The

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combined areas, as illustrated in Table 57A-2 are pnmarily electrical and I&C equipment rooms within the same division. As ha example. the division 'l batteries (was area 1202 AF

05) are now combined into the same fire area as the division C electrical equipment (was area 1202 AF 03), and the "new" fin, area is numbered 1202 AF 03. Only the electrical and I&C equi, ment of the same division were combined (i.e.. division A & B or A & C equipment t

were not combined).

Here is one new zone identihed in SSAR Rev.14 that was not assessed in the PRA internal fire analysis. His new zone, VriS air storage / operating deck staging area, is within the containment fire area 1000 AF 01 and is zone 1250 AF 12555. Thh new fire zone was farther assessed.

A qualitative assessment of those fire areas that were screencd out was also performed to support the assumption that the changes do not cause the screening to be incorrect. He areas i

that were screened are identified within PRA Table 57-4, and the reason for an area being screened out are noted on the table (as notes Bl and B2 on Table 57-4) and discussed on page 57 17. Rose fire areas screened out in the PRA fire analysis were compared to the corresponding fire area identified in SSAR Rev.14. No new information was identified during the comparison that would change a screened fire a ea to one that is not screened.

57A.2.2 Automabc Fire Suppression Equipment Consideration In the PRA internal fire an6rsis, automatic fire suppression equipment was considered to help mitigate the propagation of fires from one area to another. De areas where automatic fire suppression is credited are listed below.

Revision: DRAFT EML Septembee 1997 WJ.h W85tifigh00$8 ch5hril 57A 2

57A. Desiga Change Effect on Intern:1 Fire Analysis l

Fire Area Capability still exist "EE " "

(per PRA)

(per SSAR Rev.14) l 1240 AF 01 1200 AF 04 Preaction sprinkler No l

2033 AF 01 2003 AF 01 Wet pipe sprinkler Yes l

2033 AF 02 2033 AF 03 Wet pipe sprinkler Yes l

2N3 AF 01 2043 AF 01 Wet pipe sprinkler Yes l

,+y 2050 AF 01 2050 AF 01 Water spray Yes l

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4031 AF 02 4032 AF 02 Wet pipe sprinkler No l

4032 AF 01 4031 AF C2 Preaction sprinkler No l

4032 AF 02 4031 AF 01 Preaction sprinkler No l

4M1 AF 01 4042 AF 02 Preaction sprinkler No l

4042 AF 01

• 4042 AF 01 Preaction sprinkler No I

' = note there is a typo in PRA Table 57 2b. The is typed as dell AF 01 in the sabic, tut should be 4G62 AF 04.

The capability of automatic fire suppression should no longer be credited for six of the fires areas. An assessment of the effect on the PRA fire analysis results was performed.

57A.2.3 Fire Ignition Frequencies The next task was to auess if there were changes to the fire ignition frequencies because fire areas have been combined. De information used to assess fire ignition frequencies includes the room Goor area, cable insulation heat value for the room, the number of pieces of equipment in each area (i.e., transformers, batteries, etc) and the transient combustible material.

Those items of most interest for the assessment were the floor area and cable btu (heat loads) changes, as these are the items that could most influence the fire ignition frequencies because they are area-specific, are based on the fire protection summary table of the SSAR, and are used in the calculation of weighing factors tht. are used in the frequency calculations.

The assessment concluded that it was not necessary to further re-evaluate the fire ignition frequencies for the PRA internal fire analysis based on fire area information provided in SSAR Rev.14.

T Westinghouse ENEL Revision: DRAFT ex= w September 1997 57A 3 d57a rH

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$7A. Design Change Effect ca kternal Fire Analysis 57A.2.4 Potential for Fire Propagation Per PRA C'espter 57 (Step 8 of sect;an 57.2), fire propagation from Dre areas with less than 20,000 Lu/sq. ft. combustible loadings was not considered credible on the basis that a si;.. cant Ore can not develop in the area. A review of the combustible loadings between SuR Rev. I and Rev,14 for those fire amas that were not screened out indicate there are a few areas that had lesi, than 20,000 Btu /sq. ft. combustible loadings identified in SS AR Rev, 1, but now have loadings greater than 20,000. These areas include:

SSAR Rev. ISSAR Rev.14 1200 AF 12341 Middle Annulus 9,677 Btu /sq. ft.30.000 btu /sq. ft.

I100 AF 11300A/BMaint. Floorl2,51828,000 1250 AF 12555VES air storage---- 61,000 1230 AF OlDiv. A/C Corridor 34433,000 l

These areas were further assessed for potential fire propagation.

57A.3 Results of the Assessment The fire-induced core damage frequency for the fire areas and zones identified in Table 57A 3 was reassesed from that calculated in Chapter 57. The effect of the fire protection configuration changes on the PRA internal fire analysis results is calculateo as follows:

At Power Evaluation:

He total at power fire-induced core damage frequency (including containment and control room) recorded in Chapter 57 is 6.5E-07 per year. (see page 57-4? of PRA Rev.10).

The sum of the CDF contribution of the affected fire areas per PRA Table 5717 a:

1240 AF 01 4.08E 10 4031 AF 02 3.30E lI 4032 AF 01 1.10E 10 4032 AF 02 1.97E 10 4041 AF 01 3.70E 10 4042 AF 01 1,16E-09 1230 AF 01 2.47E-09 Total 4.75E-09 Per Table 57A-4, the revised sum of the CDF contribution of the affected fire areas is 6.29E-09.

Hus, the revised total at power fire induced core damage frequency !v l

6.fE 4.75E-09 + 6.29E-09 = 6.52E-07 per year.

Revision: DRAFT ENEL N MDW September 1997 t;nial %

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$7A-4

9 57A. Desiga Change Effect on liternal 1 Ire Analysis herefore, the core damage frequency is 6.5E-07 per year, w hich is unchanged from that reported in the AP600 PRA Chapter 57.

1 Safe Shutdown Evaluation:

The total fire induced core damage frequency (including containment and control raom) occurring during safe shutdown is reported in Chapter 57 as 2.6E-08 per year. (see page 57-45 of PRA Rev.

10).

De sum of the CDF contribution of the affected fire areas per PRA Table 57 24 is:

1240 AF 01 N/A 4031 AF 02 1.02E 14 4032 AF 01 7.43E 14 1

4032 AF 02 1.31E 13 4041 AF 01 1.57E 12 4042 AF 01 4.92E 12 1250 AF 12555 N/A 1230 AF 01 1.74E-10 Total 1.81E 10 Per Table 57A 5, tne revised sum of the CDF contribution of the affected fire areas is 3.17E 10.

Thus, the revised total at power fire-induced core damage frequency is:

2.6E 1.81E 10 + 3.17E-10 = 2.61E-08 per year.

Therefore, the core damage frequency is 2.6E-08 per year, which is unchanged from that reported in th AP600 PRA Chapter 57.

Mid L >op Eva8uation:

The tr.tal fire induced core damage frequency (including containment and con *rol room) occurring during mid-loop operation is reported in Chal ter 57 as 3.lE-07 per year. (see page 57 45 of PRA i

Rev.10).

T Mingh00$8 ENE RnWon: DRAFT

=_

September 1997 57A 5 ch57a.r t l

57A. Desisi Chaige Effect c2 liternal Fira Analysis De sum of the CDF contribution of the affected fire areas per PRA Table 57-27 is:

1240 AF 01 N/A 4031 AF 02 2.49E 11 4032 AF 01 2.36E 10 4032 AF 02 4.23E 10 4041 AF 01 5.01 E-10 4042 AF 01 1.58E-09 1250 AF 12555 N/A 1230 AF 01 N/A Total 2.76E-09 Per Table $7A 6, the levised sum of the CDF contribution of the affected fire areas is 7.37E-08.

Rus, the ' revised total at-power fire induced core damage frequency is:

3.lE 2.76E-09 + 7.37E-08 = 3.81E-07 per year.

Herefore, the core damage frequency is 3.8E-07 per year, which is approximately a 23 percent increase in the core damage frequency for mid-loop conditions from that reported in the AP600 PRA Chapter 57.

57A,4 Summary The effect of the differences identified between the PRA model and the current SSAR fire protection configuration are discussed below.

At Power Evaluation:

Per Chapter 57 of AP600 PRA Rev.10, the total at-power fire-induced core damage frequency (including containment and control room) is 6.5E-07 per year. Following the assessment of the changes, the at-power fire-induced core damage frequency is calcu!ated to remain at 6.5E-07 per year.

Safe Shutdown Evaluation:

Per Chapter 57 of AP600 PRA Rev.10, the total fire-induced core damage frequency (including containment and control room) occurring during safe shutdown is 2.6E-08 per year. Following the assessment of the changes, the safe shutdown conditions fire induced core damage frequency is calculated to remain at 2.6E-08 per year.

Revision: DRAFT ENEL W MIIM September 1997 ch57aril 57A-6

- 3 n

57A. Design Change Effect on I:ternal Fire Analysis

• d Mid Loop Evaluation:

Per Chapter 57 of AP600 PRA Rev.10, the total fire-induced core damage frequency (including containment and control room) occurring during mid loop operation is 3.lE-F,;er year.

Following the assessment of the changes, the mid loop operation Gre-induceo 3e damage frequency is calculated to be 3.8E-07 per year. Tais represents approximate 23-percent increase in the fire-induced core damage frequency f >r mid-loop conditions from that reported in the AP600 PRA, Rev,10. The primary contributors to this increase are:

SSAR Rev.14 Reason for PRA Fire Area Fire Area CDF per PRA Reassessed CDF increase in CDF 4041 AF 01 4042 AF 02 SE 10 lE-08 Removal of auto fire suppression 4N2 AF 01 4042 AF 01 1.6E-09 3.2E-08 sprinklers N/A 1250 AF 12555 0.0 2.5E-08 new area analyzed Although there is an increase in the mid-loop conditions fire induced core damage frequency, the conclusions and insights that are reported in Chapters 57 and 59 of the PRA remain unchanged.

57A.5 Conclusions

'Ihe fire-induced core damage frequency remains unchanged for the at-power and safe shutdown evaluations. The fire-induced core damage frequency during mid loop operations may increase approximately 23-percent, from 3.lD7 to 3.8E-7 per year, which is still orders of magnitude lower than the safety goal of IE 4 per year.

As the overall bounding assumptions made in performing the PRA intemal fire analysis have not

, changed (i.e., assume that a fire in a nonsafety related equipment room causes all nonsafety-related equipment to be damaged, rather than just the truly affected equipment), the PRA. fire analysis performed for AP600 still produces a conservative estimate of the plant core damage frequency.

The conclusions and insights from the PRA internal fire analysis, as stated in PRA Chapter 57 and Chapter 59 (Table 59-29), do not change as a consequence of the fire protection area design changes that occurred between SSAR Rev. I and SSAR Rev.14.

Revision: DRAFT ENEL MI@S8

' yw-September 1997 a

57A-7 ch57arti

tj 1;

y 57A. Design Change Effect on irternal Fire Analysis I

Table 57A.1 Comparison of Fire Areas that were Not Screened from the PRA analysis PRA Fire Area Corresponding SSAR "

General (SSAlt Rev,1 ima)

Rev.14 Fire Area (Zone)

Description l

1200 AF 01 1200 AF 01 RCA of the Aux. Bldg l

1201 AF 02 1201 AF 02 I'iv. B batteries l

1201 AF 03 1201 AF 03 Div. D de equip /l&C toom l

1201 AF 04 1201 AF 04 Div. B/D VBS equip.

l 1201 AF 05 1201 AF 05 MSIV compartment A l

1201 AF 06 1201 AF 06 MSIV compartment B l

1202 AF 02 1202 AF 02 Northeast elevator shaft l

1202 AF 03 1202 AF 03 Div. C batteries l

1202 AF M 1202 AF M Div. A clectrical equip.

1202 AF 05 1202 AF 03 Div. C electrical equip. (equip now included with Div. C batteries) l 1205 AF 02 1205 AF 02 Southeast elevator shaft 1211 AF 01 1201 AF 03 (1211 AF 12105)

Div. D batteries (equip. with 1201 AF 03) 1212 AF 01 1202 AF 04 Div. A electrical rooms (with 1202 AF N) l 1220 AF 01 1220 AF 01 Div. B/D corridor 82'-6" 1222 AF 01 1201 AF 02 Div. B electrical equip. (equip.

with 1201 AF 02) 1222 AF 02 1220 AF 01 (1222 AF 12212)

Div. B RCP trip swgr (equip.

with 1220 AF 01) l 1230 AF 01 1230 AF 01 Div. A/C corridor 100' l

1230 AF 03 1200 AF 04 (1230 AF 12321)

Nonclass IE electrical 1231 AF 01 1201 AF 02 (1231 AF 12304)

Div. B I&C equip. (equip. with 1201 AF 02) l 1232 AF 01 1232 AF 01 Remote shutdown workstation 1240 AF 01 1240 AF 01 Nonclass IE electrical compartment 117' Revision: DRAN gyg September 1997 MDM

'a - '

ch5hril 57A 8

iiir "i:

57A. Desiga Change Effect ca Imrnal Fire Analysis Table 57A 1 Comparison of Fire Areas that were Not Screened from the PRA analysis PRA Fire Area Corresponding SSAR '"

General (SSAR Rev.1 Area)

Rev 14 Fire Area (Zone!

Description 1242 AF 01 1242 AF 01 Main control room l

1242 AF 02 1242 AF 02 Div. A penetration area l

1243 AF 01 1243 AF 01 Reactor trip swgr I l

1243 AF 02 1243 AF 02 Reactor trip swgr 2 l

1244 AF 01 1204 AF 01 VFS penetration room l

1252 AF 01 1250 AF 01 NonJradioactive ventilation l

2000 AF 01 2000 AF 01 Turbine building floor l

2009 AF 01 2009 AF 01 Stairwell #1 southwest l

2033 AF 01

'2' 2003 AF 01 Aux. boiler equip toom l

2033 AF 02 52' 2033 AF 03 Diesel-driven fire pump room l

2033 AF 03

'2' 2033 AF G2 Motor-driven fire pump room l

2N3 AF 01 2N3 AF 01 Laboratory l

I 2050 AF 01 2050 AF 01 Lube oil room l

2052 AF 01 2052 AF 01 Southwest 4kv swgr room l

'053 AF 01 2053 AF 01 Generator panel room l

2053 AF 02 2053 AF 02 Northwest 4kv swp room l

403) AF 02 '2' 4032 AF 02 Containment access corridor l

4031 AF 03 4032 AF 01 HP offices and access portal l

4031 AF 04 4003 AF 01 Demir.. water degassifier l

4031 AF 05 4032 AF 01 Electrical equipment l

4032 AF 01 4031 AF 02 Nonclass IE battery charger #2 l

4032 AF 02 4031 AF 01 Nonclass IE battery charger #1 l

4032 AF 03 4031 AF 02 Nonclass IE batteries #2 l

4032 AF 04 4031 AF 01 Nonclass IE batteries #1 l

4033 AF 01 4034 AF 01 General offices l

T Westinghouse ENE Roision: DRAR gr.= u,,

september 1997 57A.9 ch57a rt i

57A. Desigli Change Effect ca liternal Fire Analysis mw Table 57A 1 Comparison of Fire Areas that were Not Screened from the PRA analysis PRA Fire Area Corresponding SSAR '"

General (SSAR Rey,1 Area)

Rev.14 Fire Area (Zone)

Description l

4NI AF 01 "'

4042 AF 02 Nonclass 1C swgr #2 l

4042 AF 01 4N2 AF 01 Nonclass IE swgr #1 l

4N2 AF 03 4041 AF 01 Conference / turnover room l

4051 AF 02 4052 AF 01 Coginment purge / exhaust room l

5000 AF 00 "'

5031 AF 01 Radwaste building l

6030 AF 01 6030 AF 01 DG room A l

6030 AF 02 6030 AF 02 DG room B l

6030 AF 03 6030 AF 03 Fuel oil day tank room A l

6030 AF 04 6030 AF 04 Fuel oil day tank room A l

Containment 1000 AF 01 zones:

Containment 1000 AF 01 zones:

l 1100 AF 11105 1100 AF 11105 Reactor cavity f

l 1100 AF 11206 1100 AF 112%

PXS valve / accumulator room A l

1100 AF l1207 1100 AF 11207 PXS vahe/ accumulator room B l

1100 AF ll300A 1100 AF ll300A Maintenance floor l

l100 AF i1300B 1100 AF i1300B Maintenance floor l

1100 AF ll300C 1100 AF ll300C Maintenance floor l

1100 AF i1301 1100 AF i1301 SG compartment I l

1100 AF 11302 1100 AF 11302 SG compartment 2 l

1100 AF 11303 1100 AF 11303 Pzt compartment l

1100 AF ll303A "'

1100 AF 11303B ADS upper valve area l

1100 AF ll303B "'

1100 AF ll303A ADS lower valve area j

1100 AF 11500 1100 AF 11500 Operating deck l

1100 AF 11590 1100 AF 11500 RHR valve area l

1200 AF 12356 "'

1100 AF 12341 Middle annulus l

not spnific area in SSAR Rev. I 1250 AF 12555 VES air storage / Staging Area l

Revision: DRAFT September 1997 W Westinghouse ch57tril 57A-10

+4..

57A. Desiga Change Effect ca 1;ternal Fire Analysis I

(1) Those areas listed in bold typeface in this column have been renumbered since SSAR Rev.1.

(2) Indicates the fire area was renumbered, and that the new number either did not exist before or was also renumbered (e g.,

old fire areas not combined with other areas).

e n: DM W Westirighouse fgff September 1997

• a~ ~

57A-ll ch57arii j

e a

jib. 10!

57A. Design Cha;ge Effect c2 I;ternal Fire Analysis 1

i Table 57A 2 Summary of Combined Fire Areas that were Not Screened sa>m the PRA Analysis n

"Old" fire area "New" fire aren G-neral (SSAR Rev.1)

(SSAR Rev.14)

Description 1202 AF 03 1202 AF 03 Div. C electrical and !&C 1202 AF 05 equipment 1201 AF 03 1201 AF 03 Div. D electical and !&C 1211AF 01 equipment 1202 AF 04 1202 AF 04 Div. A electrical and !&C 1212 AF 01 equipment 1201 AF 02 1201 AF 02 Div. B electrical and I&C 1222 AF 01 equipment 1231 AF 01 1220 AF O'.

1220 AF 01 Div. B RCP trip swgr.

1222 AF 02 4032 AF 01 4031 AF 02 Nonclass lE battery #2 and 4032 AF 03 battery charger #2 4032 AF 02 4031 AF 01 Nonclass IE battery #1 and 4032 AF G4 battery charger #1 1244 AF 01 1204 AF 01 VFS penetration room (note -

lots of other equiplzones now appear in "new" 1204 AF 01 that i

was not explicitly listed in SSAR Table 9A.6, Rev.1) 4031 AF 03 4032 AF 01 HP offices 4031 AF 05 1100- AF i1500 1100 AF i1500 Operating deck i100 AF i1590 Revision: DRAFT ENEL UDE September 1997

""'~

ch57a.rl i 57A-12

4 57A. Desig Change Effect on J;ternal Fire Analysis

{

}

.... e Table 57A 3 FIRE AREAS REASSESSED Fire Area (PRA)

Descrirtion Reason for Resssessment l

4 1240 AF 01 NonClass IE electrical Sprinkler removed from this fire area. Remove credit rocm taken for the sprinkler from the fire propagation estimates.

4031 AF 02 Containment access Sprinkler removed from this fire area. Remove credit corridor taken for the sprinkler from the fire propagation estimates.

4032 AF 01 Non-Class IE battery Sprinkler removed from this fire area. Remove credit charger #2 taken for the sprinkler from the fire propagation estimates.

4032 AF 02 Non-Class IE battery Sprinkler removed from this fire area. Remove credit charger #1 taken for the sprinkler from the fire propagation estimates.

4N1 AF 01 Electrical switchgear Sprinkler removed from this fire area. Remove credit room #2 taken for the sprinkler from the fire propagation estimates.

4N2 AF 01 Electrical switchgear Sprinkler removed from this f.re area. Remove credit room #1 taken for the sprinkler from the fire propagation estimates.

1200 AF 12341 "'

Middle annulus Combustible load changed from -9,700 btidsq. ft. to

-30,000 btu /sq. ft. Rus, the potential for fire propagation from this zone is assessed.

1100 AF 11300 A&B "'

Maintenance floor Combustible load changed from -12,500 bru/sq. ft. to

~28,000 btu /sq. ft. Thus, the potential for fire propagation from this zone is assessed.

1250 AF 12555 "'

VES air storage /

This fire zone was not specifically identified ia SSAR operating deck staging Rev.1. Need to assess this zone.

area 1230 AF 01 Division A/C corridor Con bustible load changed from -300 btu /sq. ft. to

-33.000 bru/sq. ft. Thus, the poter.tial for fire propagation from this area is assessed.

I ENE Revision: DRAFT M @ S8

';7mh September 1997 57A 13 M7a ril 1

57A. Desigi Charge Effect o2 liternal Fire Analysis Notes to Table 57A 3:

(1)

Fire zone 1200 AF 12341 is within containment fire area 1000 AF 01. This zone is physically sepa ated from other fire zones by the steel wall of containment and by the steel and concrete vessei stiffeners and flexible ventilation seal above, and it is separatcd from adjacent fire areas by the walls and floor of the shield building, which have concrete thickness of more than I foot. In addition, the combustible material for this zone consists primarily of cable insulation in the non-Class IE electrical penetration assemblies, located in the northeast quadrant of the fire zone. The Class IE electrical penetration assemblies also pass through this fire zone, but are enclosed by 3-hr fire barriers per division. Because this fire zone is separated from the other zones by concrete and steel walls, with no openings, fire propagation from this area is not realistic.

(2)

Fire zones 1100 AF 11300 A&B are located withiri containment fire area 1000 AF 01. De quantity and arrangement of the combustible material in these fire zones, and the characteristics of the barriers that separate cach zone from other fire zones are such that a fire which damages safe shutdown components in the zone does not propagate to the extent that it damages redundant safe shutdown componchts in another fire zone. The combustibles are concentrated and separated such that a fire w(,uld not be expected to spread throughout the area. Thus fire propagation from each of these areas is not considered to be credible, and is not further assessed.

(3)

Fire zone 1250 AF 12555 is part of the containment fire area 1000 AF 01. His fire zone was not specifically identified in SSAR Rev.1. and thus not evaluated in the PRA internal fire analysis. This fire zone is separated from adjacent fire areas by 3-hr fire barriers, and it is separated from adjacent containment fire zones by the main equipment hatch and its enclosure and the shield building wall, which has a concrete thickness of more than one foot.

No significant potential exists for propagation during power operation because closure of the equipment hatch is required per Technical Specification 3.6.1, thus there is no pathway into containment for the fire to spread. However, the operating deck equipment hatch could be open during safe shutdown and mid-loop conditions. Thus, the potential for fire propagation from this zone s containment fire zone 1100 AF 11500 (operating deck) is further assessed.

Revision: DRAFT ENEL September 1997

!#a:&,.

MDM ch5hril 57A 14

= tm; 57A. Design Change Effect on Internal Fire Analysis

l

^

Tshie 57A-4

SUMMARY

OF REVISIONS TO QUAN'llTATIVE ANALYSIS REFULTS - AT POWER Conditional Total Total Fire Core Damage Core Danage Contribution l

Ignition Fire Damage Sc nario Damage Probability Frequency of Fire Area l

Fire Area Frequency State Frequency Category (CCDP)

(CDF) to CDF 1240 AF oi 1.55E-03 FDS l AB41 1.55E-03 TRI 5.78E4)8 8.96E-I l 4.53E-10 l

FDS I AB42 1.46E-05 TDI I.19E-07 1.74E-12 l

FDS I AB43 5.58E-08 LAl 7.86E-M 4.39E-I l l

l 8.74E-07 MAI 3 M E-04 3.18E-10 l

4031 AF 02 4.38E-M FDS l ANI 4.34E-M NPI 8.75E-08 3.79E-I l 3.83E-I I l

FDSIAN2 4.38E-06 NPI 8.75E4)8 3.83E-13 l

4032 AF 01 1.26E-03 FDSIAN8 1.26E-03 ivri 8.75E-08 1.10E-10 1.IIE-10 l

FDSlAN9 1.26E4)5 NPI 8.75E-08 1.10E-12 l

4032 AF 02 2.25E-03 FDS I AN10 2.25E-03 NPl 8.75E-08 I.97E-10 I.99E-10 l

FDSlANII 2.25E-05 NPI 8.75E-08 f.47E-12 l

4MIAF01 2.66E-03 FDS l AN15 2.63E-03 NPI 8.75E-08 2.30E-10 6.64E-10 l

FDS I AN16 2.'0E-05 NPI 8.75E-08 2.19E-12 l

FDS I AN17 9.58E-08 NL1 5.51 E-M 5.28E-I l l

1.60E-06 NMI 2.37E4M 3.79E-10 l

Revision: DRAIT M EL DN

'=='-

September 1997 57A-15 ch57usi

!f!

57A. Design Change ENect on Internal Fire Analysis O

3 Table 57A-4

SUMMARY

OF REVISIONS TO QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS RESULTS - AT POWER Conditional Total Total Fire Core Damage Core Damage Contribution Ignition Fire Damage Scenario Damage Probability Frequency of Fire Area Fire Area Frequency State Frequency Category (CCDP) -

(CDF) to CDF l

4N2 AF 01 2.66E-03 FDS i AN18 8.26E-03 NPI 8.75E4)d 7.23E-10 2.00E-09 l

FDS I AN19 7.84E-05 NPI 8.75E-08 6.86E-12 l

FDSIAN20 3.00E-07 NLI 5.51E4M 1.65E-10 l

4.70E-06 NMi 2 37E-M I. I IE-09 l

1230 AF 01 l

1.71 E-M FDS I AB35 6.16E-07 LLI 5.51E-M 3.39E-10 2.82E-09 l

1.03E-05 MLI 2.37E-M 2.44E-09 l

FDS I AB6 1.61E-06 TDI 1.19E-07 I.92E-13 E

l FDS I AB7 9.64E-08 MDI 3.64E-M 3.51 E-I I j

6.16E-09 LDI 7.86E4M 4.84E-12 Total 6.29E-09 l

l Revision: DRAFT EAfEL w

"" ~

September 1997 57A-l's cia.,i s

SiF $5 57A. Design Change ENect on Internal Fire Analysts t

l Table 57A-5

SUMMARY

OF REVISIONS TO QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS RESULTS - SAFE SHU1DOWN Conditional Total l

Total Fire Core Daninge Core Damage Centribution Ignition Fire Damage Scenario Daninge Probability Frequency of Fire Area Fire Area Frequency State Frequency Category (CCDP)

(CDF) to CDF 4031 AF 02 3.08E-05 SFDSI 3.05E-05 RNS I.ME-08 5.00E-13 5.05E-13 l

SFDS 5 3.08E-07 NRN I.64E-08 5.05E-15 l

4032 AF 01 8.98E-05 SFDS5 8.98E-05 NPI 1.64E-08 1.47E-12 1.48E-12 l

SFDS 8 8.98E-07 NPI 1.M E-08 1.47E-14 l

4032 AF 02 1.60E48 SFDS 8 1.60E41 NPI 1.ME-08 2.62E-12 2.62E-12 l

4G4I AF 01 1.90E41 SFDS 6 1.88E41 NP1 1.64E-08 3.08E-12 3.14E-I I l

SFDS 10 1.14 E-07 V24N 2.48E-04 2.83E-I l l

4042 AF 01 5.96E-04 SFDS 6 5.90E-04 NPI 1.ME-08 9.68E-12 9.85E-I I l

SFDS 10 3.58E-07 V24N 2.48E-GS 8.88E-l I l

1230 AF 01 1.17E-05 SFDS 9 7.02E-07 V24N 2.48E-04 I.74E-10 1.77E-10 l

SFDS12 7.02E-09 V24A 3.94E-OS 2.77E-12 l

1250 AF 12555 2.06E44 SFDS 16 2.06E-G8 g

LP2 2.60E-08 5.36E-12 5.36E-12 l

Total 3.17E-10 l

I Revision: DRAIT W85tingh00S8 g

September 1997 57A-17 ch57arn

...:.s 57A. Design Change ENect on Internal Fire Analysis o

i e

Table 57A-6

SUMMARY

OF REVISIONS TO QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS RESULTS - MID-LOOP OPERATION I

Conditional Total l

Total Fire Core Damage Core Damage Contribution I

Ignition Fire Damage Scenario Damage Probability Frequency of Fire Area Fire Area Frequency State Frequency Category (CCDP)

(CDF) to CDF l

l 4031 AF 02 7.63E-06 MFDSI 7.55E-06 RNS-D 1.62E W I.22E-09 1.23E-09 l

MFDS 5 7.63E-08 NRN-D I.62E-M 1.24E-1 I l

4032 AF 01 2.22E-05 MFDS5 2.22E-05 NPI-D 2.13E-m 4.72E-09 4.78E-09 l

MFDS 8 2.22E-07 NPI-D 2.13E-M 4.73E-11 l

4032 AF 02 3.97E-05 MFDS 5 3.97E-05 NPI-D 2.13E-M 8.46E-10 8.46E-10 l

4NIAFUI 4.70E-05 MFDS 6 4.65E-05 NPI-D 2.13E-M 9.90E-09 1.00E-08 l

MFDS 8 4.70E-07 NPI-D 2.13E-M l.00E-10 l

4N2 AF 01 1.48E-M MFDS 6 1.47EW NPI-D 2.13E-04 3.13E-08 316E-08 l

MFDS 8 1.48E-06 NPI-D 2.13E-04 3.15E-10 l

1230 AF 01 2.90E-06 N/A 2.90E-06 N/A N/A N/A 1.43E-1 I l

MFDS 7 2.90E-08 LP5-D 4.94E@

I.43E-I I l

1250 AF 12555 5.10E-05 MFDS 16 5.10E-05 LP2-D 4.95E-M 2.52E-08 2.52E-08 Total 7.37E-08 l

Revision: DRAFT ENEl.

September 1997 cus7.,n 57A-18

[

_-