ML20235Z287

Investigation Rept, ASLB - Allegations Re Three NRC Employees, Initiated in Response to Jh Frye in Considering Relicensing of Nonpower Reactor at Ucla.No Evidence of Willful Misrepresentation Found

ML20235Z287
Person / Time
Site:	05000142
Issue date:	06/12/1984
From:	Bowers H, Messenger G, Rich Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Z143	List: IA-84-454, Recommends Commission Affirm SECY-83-500 to Revise 10CFR73.40(a),general Physical Protection Requirement ML20235Z140 ML20235Z266 ML20235Z287 ML20235Z305 ML20235Z328 ML20235Z366 ML20235Z369 ML20244C916
References
FOIA-84-454, FOIA-88-A-50 NUDOCS 8903150288
Download: ML20235Z287 (10)

Text

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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION TITLE: ASLB - ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING THREE NRC EMPLOYEES S

PREPARED BY: R ald M. Smith DATE: June 12, 1984 enior Investigator Office of Inspector and Auditor M

APPROVED BY: Hollis Bowers DATE: June 12, 1984 Assistant Director of Investigations Office of Inspector and Auditor l

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George Messe er I

Acting Directo Office of Inspector and Auditor OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/ PRIVACY ACT EXEMPTION..(.b),,(,5) & (7) 31 8 090303

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0FFICIAL USE ONLY PDR AFTER G 88_-A--50 _

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Suma ry This investigation was initiated based on a letter datec December 23, 1963, from John H. Frye 111, Administrative Judge for the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) :onsidering the relicensing of the nonpower reactor at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) (E eitit 1). The original l

referral mentioned " allegations of misconduct on the part of two members of the Comission's technical staff." However, review of the supporting documents provided by Judge Frye also indicated an allegation against the staff Hearing Attorney as well. The three NRC employees were detemined to be James R.

Miller, Donald M. Carlson and Colleen Woodhead. As gleaned from the materials, a separate allegation was identified for each of these individuals as follows:

1.

James R. Miller, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #3, Division of Licensing, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), was alleged to have asserted that he personally verified that UCLA's radioactive fuel met the 100 rem /hr at three feet self protection exemption (10 CFR 73.6) contrary to a submission by UCLA that it could not reach the 100 rem /hr at three feet protection level.

2.

Donald M. Carlson,' Plant Protection Analyst, Fuel Facility Safeguards Licensing Branch, Division of Safeguards, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS), was alleged to have asserted (a) that reactors like UCLA's were subject only to (10 CFR) "73.67 and 73.37" and (b) that there are no explicit NRC regulations for the protection of nonpower reactors against radiological sabotage, said statements being contrary to the provisions of (10 CFR) 73.40(a).

3.

Colleen Woodheao, Litigation Attorney, Office of the Executive Legal Director (ELD), and NRC staff counsel for the UCLA licensing hearing, was alleged to have denied before the ASLB that UCLA had more than a fomula quantity (5000 grans) of Strategic Special Nuclear Material (SSNM) shortly after the technical staff had written UC'J indicating that more than a formula cuantity was present at the UCLA #acility.

A11ecation 1: That. Janes R. Miller falsely asserteo that he personally veri-

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fied that UCLA's radioactive fuel ~ met the 100 rem /hr at inree feet exemption of 10 CFR 73.6.

Conterttion XX (Security)ge the Gap's (CBG) "CBG Menorandum as to St In the Committee to Brid" dated December 13, 1983, CBG alleged that James R.

Miller " asserted, under oath, tha~t he personally verified that UCLAr fuel met s

the 100 rem /hr exemption.." (The 100 rem /hr exemption referenced by CBG is drawn from 10 CFR 73.6(b) which provides, in part, that special nuclear material "which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems /per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding" is exempt from the requirements of section 73.20, among others.) In contrast, CBG asserted that UCLA "had subnitted to the NRC several documents indicating that they could not reach 100 rem /hr protection levels."

Miller himself was supposed to have " authorized a memorandum that said the same thing" (page 11, first enclosure to Exhibit 1).

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-..4 CbG also had questictie: t%.i r t:i.y "IhaveverifiedthattheirradiatedfuelinthEVCLA}eatorcoreenits l

raciation surb that tne 00se at three feet will bT ir e> cess of 100 rens/hr and that the desier of e rf acter makes accessibility tc that fuel very difficult. In additier., UCL(has conritted to schedule rea: tor operations tc maintain the self protec ion of the fuel in the reactor core."

hibit.2), Miller \\providedaceryofanaffidavit In his f St interview anuary 9, 198 attached to Ex5.iFit 2) whicb.wes intende in addrei:

executed questions bout his eari ez affid vit of Jril 3,1981 (Exhibit 3).

A It was clarified by Miller jin hi January 1984 iffidavit that he hat' made rning~UCLA's sertion t5iit they could maintain a 100

" calculations," con rem /nr level by following a" proposed operating schedule, using data received via telephone. He,did,not actually go to the reactor to take readings and did not confirm.that UCLAjwas actually following their intendetoperafing schedule. He was interested in what the potential licensee'(UCL ) intended to do under the license. In his view, the question of whetherpCLA is actually f

i in the intended manner was a matter for IE. (See als " Analysis of

_per otsp ng Millerfffidavits," Exhibit 4.)

WhileDavidHirsch, President,CBG,inhLsinterviewon[Fe)(Jinuary.9, ruary 6, 1984, (Exhibit 5) acknowledged that the second MillerJaffidaviT seemed to explain the first (April 8,19dT), h off red ttrat Miller had nevertheless glossed over the issue of whether UCLA really c@ld meet the 100 April 1981wasoppositetohisearlierposition,takeninvar]io rem /hr at three feet exemption. According to H7sch, Miller's position of that the reactor could not meet the exemption requirement.

{ Miller 3 countered in an interview n February 29,1984(Exhibit 61thathehad A,jcouldnotmeet-theexempt1onbecauseof made eaplier., representations that Ue made,Juch statements. He did not believe the wayl,U,CLtdoperated at the time flat coment that U,,CLA3could not meet the exemptior.

that he.had ever made a(M,, iller] referenced [,,a note by him to Victo In this same interview, wherein he said something to tTie effect that "the reactors checked will be i-trouble if the 100 rem exeroti n were lifted." A copy of the, note was obtaired and, in a subsequent interview on March 12,1984 (Exhit it 7)

Millerlagain expleined ". hat a sfatenent wit.

the note that some nerpowe-eactofs (including 1CLA'sj)"canectattainorsustain"theex tion zate had tY be read in the context of the operatiocs at the time. In LA'sjcase, the ther i

current operating schedule for IJCLA pade the statement true at that time.

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That Donald M. Carlson]falselv asserted (a) that nonpower Allegation 2:

reactors were subject only to 10 CFR 73.67 and 73.37 requirements and (b) t T.

there are no explicit NRC regulations on protection against radiological l

,sabo,t_a,._geforsuchreactors]

Inishecember 13,1983]menorandum(Enclosure 1toExhibit1),CBGalleged ateria11y false sworn statements in a 1981 affidavit that Carlson]hed made

" asserted that research reactors like UCLA's were only subject to 10 I

when ically onitting 73.40) and (that) there are 'no CFR 73.67 and 37 (spect explicit NRC regulations fqr the protection of non-power reactors against radiological.sabota.5e..."J' BG based its assertion on alleged previous Carlson "at a conference of nonpower reactor operations...that comments by such reactors must comply with 73.40 protection requirements against e'

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(Exhibit B) de quoteharlsonlas;s,ay,;ng(,"you haie,,g,;;,, ;[- [.

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i to prctect aghinst sabotage urcer the ;revisioes o' 73.40;" and later, "(s)abote;c *as always beer here.

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r 1974, your initial plans were subnitted to protect against sabotage.

...in 73.C, it says you have to protect against sabotage.'

l As in the case ofhiller] discussed above,fCarlson)also executed a second affidavit on, Janua ry 10,1984j, to explain questioned statenents in his earlier affidavitofppril 7,19813Acomparisonofthetwoa'#idavits(Exhibit 9) l revealed thatMarlson3believedthathewascorrectbothatthe" conference" and later in Ms 1981 affidavit because of changing circumstances, e.g., the pending adoption of section 73.67. More specifically, the NRC staff was at the

. time of the conference " examining the necessity to require additional physical protection measures at nonpower reactors that have the potential for exceeding Part 100 release limits as a result of sabotage." Additionally, a classified Los Alamos study entitled " Consequences f Sabotage' f Nonpower Reactors" had concluded that only one nonpower reactor (not UCLA's had a potential for release of significant amounts of radiatio.FCarlson concluded that because at

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thetimeoftheconference"areviewandana7siso the Los Alamos study had not been made yet" and a staff technical position had not been developed, he did not feel that his response was inappropriate. He did concede that a more accurate statement might have been "you may have to protect against sabotage..."

r fter ading the Carlson affidavits, Hirsch (Exhibit 5) still believed that Carlson was tellidtj the ruth at the 1979 conference and that the more recent ffort by the staff, through SECY 83-500 (Exhibit 10) to get the Comission to overrule the ASLB's opinion (LBP-83-25A) that section 73.40(a) does require protection against radiological sabotage by nonpower reactors (Exhibit 11) was i

an attempt to retroactively remove the requirement.

At this point in the investigation, the ASLB issued a Memorandum and Order dated February 24, 1984, which questionec whether " substantial misrepresent-i tationsmayhavebeenmadetoitby[U,CLApndstaffregardingsabotagematters raised by Contention XX." As indicated 171 the review of that Order (Exhibit 12), the Board (ASLE) cited several examples of misle* ding 5.$atenents by NRC staff and counsel that led the Board to believe "that UCLA'sjphysical security plar was not designed to provide protection against saDotage and that the staff did not require that such protection be provided. However, the security planandsecurityinspectionreportsfurnishedby[UCLA]indicatethatthe oppcsite is true." (See also Exhibit 1}, referencH attaphner.ts not included.)

Copiesofinspectionreportsforother[Argonautreacter,sj(likeUCLA's)were obtained and reviewed (Exhibit 14, the reports themselves are not provided because they are exempt from release under 10 CFR 2.790). It was found that both Virginia Polytechnic Institute and Iowa State University had been inspected for " Protection Against Radiological Sabotage" since 1979.

In response to the ASLB Order of Februa 24, 1 4, the staff submit;ed I

ad itional affidavits, one of them from Carlson dated March 9, 1984 (Exhibit

15) He makes the point that although a raft" hysical security pla"ii, which ad ressed " sabotage protection." was sent to "several selected licensees for review and comment" in August 1979, the NRC staff unfortunately "did not complete the development of the draft and correct it by subsequently clarifying or correcting letters to licensees since sabotage protection was

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..r craf t doCurients'"rEvEr teCan? an actual cuidance docu Ent." He su r erizec ev 3 t; ;& r,

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trehC.hecurity F.ar is i~ ater41 arc intersecuer d al f ror W f.;:

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karlsorhwes again interviewed or grch 15,1984 [ExhiMt 16) harlser.] stated

!"31 he was ur.awarc cf either er ins:Ection recuire ert or satMa;,e protection or the fact that inspections (e.g., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and lowa State Universi

) had been conducted. He again affirmed his earlier position on the matter. Carlson]was interviewed in. the presence of[R_ussell R.

Rentschlerj his section.c ief, who also stated that he was previousTy unaware of the IE Manual Chapter 2545 or the IE inspection reports (Exhibit 17).

Loren Bush, a Senior Security Specialist with IE, was interviewed on April 16, 1984, in an effort to detennine IE practice / procedures for the inspection of nonpower reactors (Exhibit 18). The salient points learned from Bush were that IE " inspects against the plan" and that inspectors mus account for heir inspection time. This means that if an inspection plan (like UCLA's included

" Protection Against Radiological Sabotage," the IE inspe tor would spect that aspect of the plan and comment on it, e.g., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and lowa State University. In order to show that all procedures had been completed, inspectors recorded their inspection time by inspection procedure number in a computer system known as the 765 System. After September 1980, inspectors were supposed to have used a draft inspection series 81N00 for Category 11 and III facilities (these with material of moderate or low strategic significance). The series 81400 was still intended for use, but in the inspection of Category I facilities (those with material of high strategic significance). It includes a special set of procedures, Bla55, for "Protectior.

Against Radiological Sabotaoe." (See a cooy of the IE Manual Chapter 25cE, AttachmentBtoExhibit18.)

Investigator Note: When all the inforr.ation gathered to that point was analyzed. the following sumary was devised to describe what apparently had happened and was presented to Bush #cr cor: rent:

In 197', WS5 promvigatec wrat ce:ere the curren sectien 73.f", wrier addressed the theft protectior reovirenerts generally raised in Section 73.40(a). NMSS viewed 73.67, with its specific requirements, as supersed-ing the the't portion of 73.40(a). Because of the results of a classi#ied (Los Alanes) study, WSS deterrirec' that with pessibly very few excep-tions, there was no radiological sabotage risk at nonoower reactors and.

therefore, believed that that pertion of 73.40(a) was no longer operative. However, NMSS did not appropriately modify o delete section 73.40(a). As nore recently pointed out by NMSS (Carlson, for example),

some licensees submitted security plans using a pre-73.

(1979) physical security plan sample. Because NMSS will accept commitments beyond that specifico in the rules, the plan was approved cer.taining the words l

" radiological sabotage" and the like. The issue was further cor.pli ted when NMSS, in connunicating approval of the plan, directed adherens. by the licensee with the plan, but with no limiting qualification on the additional issue (radiological sabotage) included in the plan.

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l-Fowever, ar.y use of 81455, whether per:er er ir: ::er under the e>istirg

r :ra stru:.ure ro tru'de ?? ' em ! ' " ' tr P \\"~5 wa! statirg cre L

r.: s ice whilt.~ was see-inci., de-- 5 r d ": ar "er via its inspecti" rt::en.

l Thus, the failure of NMSS to nodify/ delete sectice 73.40(a) and their willingness to approve securi;y plans with oc let;er needed recuirerserts wr.iis et the sert tire reaviri ; acne'e-c to tre lans, coupled witr tre IE practice / requirement to " inspect agairst the plan" and the existenct and apparent. use of Inspection Procedure 81455, " Protection Against Radiological Sabotage," resulted ultinately in the conclusion by some that part of the NRC (NMSS) is saying one thing while another part (IE) is engaged in acts (reports) which clearly illustrate the opposite position.

Bush agreed that this could explain what had happened.

I Subsequently, on April 20, 1984 NMSS issued a follow up paper, SECY 83-500A (Exhibit 19) to SECY 83-500 (Exhibit 10). Of significance is the fact that SECY 83-500A states in pertinent part that " staff has reviewed the documenta-tion relating to the implementation of its policy and has found that the following situations exist:

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Many licensee security plans contain the tenns sabotage, radiological sabotage, or industrial sabotage.

Guidance refers to industrial sabotage in introductory paragraphs and identifies for licensee use a compendium of equipment and procedures which may be used to protect against sabotage or theft, or both.

Sone safeguards inspection mocules, peccecures ar.c reports of inspectier findinas for nonpower reactors do address sabotate protection.

The introductory paragraph o# a ger.eric letter 'or transmitting reports of security inspections for all classes c' lice'rsees refers to protectic-ecair.st be? industrial sabeu ge erd r e't o' see: del nuclear naterial."

ibage 2. Eihirit W,.

The staff then identifies actions being taken to corre:t the conflicting in:ressi nonpower reactors, l

such as'.,cn beirt give* by the NP.C 35 to re:: ire ents # "

UCLA'sl,toprotectagainstradiolt;':!' sat:ta;e.

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Allecation 3: Tnat Ccileen Woodhear.denie: re#cre the ;I.E that UCLA had r:re than a formula cuantity of Stratecic Special huclear Paterial coetraFy to a written communication by staff toIUCLA lthat[UCLAlhad r:.re than a formula cuantity.

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The asis for this allegation was CBG's assertion tha: w er. it contended that UCL had more thar, a formula quantity (500: crans), that fact "was denied by UCL and (NRC) staff. However, at the ver) time they here making those initial assertions to the Licensing Board (early 1981), he RC staff had just writter.

[UCLdthatithad,basedonaninspection,foundUCLAtopossessmorethana l

fonnula quantity" (page 10. Enclosure 1 to Exhi t

. In contrast, the ASLB,

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"(w)e have reviewec tre t e. script referenced in CEG Ferruery 6,195 3 h s enrrec t v cha rr e t e r' n-m" c-.:es t ' 9 '

i and are cr* remvi"cef *"

P represer tatice to t*e 5 51 :." Et.*. the Snarc revertheirit recA s.sc "Ste d e

coursel tt accec t s t' i s F ~ ep tie r," [Crilleer Wc ccht t : o s s n "

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" Staff counsel" referee.ce:

b., CBG and the Eoard.

In his interview (Exhibit E),

iirsch nodified his allegetier ead expressed as his nair concern the \\ do trat Ps. Woccheed]did ret ap: rite tre 5 rd c' "a which showed that at that time UCLA}12,198T, from[ Miller ~to$CLA existence of a letter cated Ja ary as a Category T facD ity req iring j

sabotage protection. He furtter noted that ih)erjwhole basis for the staff posi ion that sabotage requirements did not apply was based on the assertion that UC w1s not and never had been a Category 1 facility." (According to i

him, f h~er_ arguments had been accepted by the Board, that could have been the the Beard not accepting CBG's contention concerning the matter of basis f sabotage protection for a Board hearing on the issue of the adequacy of[UCLA's]

protectionagainstsabotage.)

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In[h_er]first intervi w on February 22, 1984 Ex,hibit 21L Woodhead made the

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sarfent points that " hel did not think that s e knew at that time (1981)_ the meaning of the term ategory 2' facilities' aiid that (she] believed that[she had not made any such reference to Category 2 facilities. A review of a of the "NRC Staff Position on Unstimulated Cont tions, dated December 1, 1980, (Attachment to Exhibit 21) as provided by oodhead, supports her view of the matter. When questioneo about a contention Hirsch hat at a pre-heari a conferenceheldFebruary4and5,1981,shehadmadethea$sertionthatQJCLA I

was not and never had been a Category 1 facility,{7 hat review (also addresse Woodhead.iprovided a portio of the transcript of that meeting for review also.

i in the Attachment to Exhibit 21) indicated no direct mentier that the UCLAJ reactor "never had beer a Cateocrv 1 reactor." Finally, cr. the issue oT her knowledg,e of the January li,1981',(_ Miller] letter (Exh'ibit 2C,,(shej thouaht that{}helhadhadnoknowledc]aoftheletteratthetineandr.otedth (UCLA, reactor to[ttingQiller to send copies of correspondence had 2 problem ge h,erJ Investigator's Note:

Subsecuent to the first interview c'h:dMeQExbHt 21)} the issue reised 0 t'e IE Inspections Reports (Estib. ;4' enc tne

.J security plan which mer.ti0ned Orctection against radiological sabotage cane to

light. As mentioned previously in the discussion of[Carlsor.dthe Board then issued 1.ts Order o' Februe ry 24,1984 (attach d to ERibit.d. The Order drew Woodheadjinto the sane issue the confrontir.g Carlsen]i.e., whether the No.C taff was misleading the Board as to whether t ere was a sab:tage protectior.

requirement.

hapter2545,koodheadexcressednok When interviewed on March 16, 1984 (Exhibit 22 dated anuary 27, 1984, and ledge of the existence of IE Manual of the fact that facilities such as Virginia Polytechnic Institute and Iowa State Univ,rsi,1y hac beer inspected for " Protection Ageir.st Encioicgical HearingBranch~(supervisor,[JosephR.Gra,AssistantChiefFearingCo Sabotage."LHer IV, Hearing Trivision, ELD whc was also presert at the inter-view, supported [he.r]in that reg]ard (Exh bit 23). In response Order of February 24,1984,ghe

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" Slee tne Board (Exhibit 24).

'**1etcrel l>etters Ir. trie course of this investigation art as referencec aoove, various fiRC erployees submitted ffidav,.jts in responj,e tg. ASLB's February 24 rder (Erbibit 12), e.g., Carlsonj(Exhibit 15) andLWoodhead (Exhibit 24 An udit'crti af fidavit was that of httr6 0. Scriviter. CHe', Sec ity Licensing and Emergency Preparedness Section, Region \\.

Within that affidavit, Schuster, in pertinent part, stated "our post 1979 inspection reports did not reflect any inspection activity for sabotage protection."

However, Shuster, himself, had, in July 1980, approved a report of inspection which addressed protection against radiological sabotage at the University of Washington.

His explanation for the contradiction was essentially that he had made his statement from memory without going back to check the files.

(See-

-Report of Interview, March 6 Affidavit, and Report of Inspection at Exhibit 25.)

In his inter' view, Hirsch (Exhibit 5) stated that he would provide materials'to support his views. On April 4 and May 8, DIA received additional materials from Hirsch (Exhibits 26 and 27). The documents were reviewed and found to contain no new factual evidence. They' do clearly-state CBG's position on how the f acts of this case should be interpreted and what conclusions should be drawn as a result of those interpretations. 'Although no factual inaccuracies were detected within the documents, it is not within the province of this office to comment on the reasonableness or acceptability of CBG's argument of the facts.

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En;H :~5 l

1.

Exhibit 1 - Letter, Frye to Messenger, datec Le:er.oer 23, 1983.

2.

Exhibit 2 - ;ee-et of 1rterview, Janes C.. "'" e,. d? t e r Je r.ue rv 11, 1984..

3.

Exhibit 3 - Affidavit of James R. Miller, dated April 8,1981, l

4.

Exhibit 4 - Analysis of Miller Affidav'its, dated January 24, 1984 j

w/o attachments.

5.

Exhibit 5 - Report of Interview, Daniel Hirsch, dated February 13, 1984.

6.

Exhibit 6 - Report of Interview, James R. Miller, dated February 29, 1984.

7.

Exhibit 7 - Report of Interview, James R. Miller, dated March 13, 1984.

8.

Exhibit 8 - Extract, Transcript of meeting conducted August 27, 1979.

9.

Exhibit 9 - Comparison of Carlson Affidavits, dated January 30, 1984.

10.

Exhibit 10 - SECY-83-500, dated December 6,1953.

11

. Exhibit 11 - Atomic Safety and Licensing Board opinion LBP-83-25A, dated May 11, 1983.

12.

Ext 4 tit 12 - Review o' Docunent, dated Fet sa

29. 1954 13.

Exhibit 13 - Review of Materials, dated Febevery 23, 1984, w/o attachments.

14 Exhibit 14 - Review of Reports, dated Marce '1.19Ea, w/c attachments.

15.

Exhibit 15 - Af#idavit of Donald M. Carisc.

e ec "ar:h 9,1954, w/o l

attachments.

16.

Exhir't 16 - Re:crt of Ir.tersiew, Donald P. C3 scr. c'ated March 20, 1954 17.

Exhibit 17 - Report of Interview, Russell F. Fs tschler, dated March 20, 1984 18.

Exhibit 18 - Peport of Interview, Loren Bush, dated April 20, 1984 19.

Exhibit 19 - SECY-83-500A, dated April 20, 1954 20.

Exhibit 20 - Letter, Miller to Wegst, dated Jaruary 12, 1981.

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Ext.ibit 2~ - Report of Inters te<.,

'esepn R. G' 6, cate c Mertn 27, 1984 24 Exhibit 24 - Affidavit of Col'een P. Wor.dheat. dated March 9, 1984, 25.

Exhibit 25 - Report c.f Iritervleri, Matthew D. Sct.uster, dated May 10, 1084.

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26. Exhibit 26 - Letter, Hirsch to Smith, w/ attachment.

1 27.

Exhibit 27 - Undated document entitled, " Introduction" and undated

' document entitled "The Miller '100 Rem' Representations."

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Decet>cr 23, 1483 7

fc Mr. George Messenger, Acting Director Office of Inspector and Auditor wk)k U.S. th2 clear Regulatory Ccxrmission V

Washington, D.C.

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RE: THE REGDTIS OF TE UNIVFRSITY OF CALIFURNIA Q

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1 (UCLA Research Reactor) - Docket No. 50-142 OL (Proposed Renewal of Facility License) i

Dear Mr. Messenger:

The enrmittee to Bridge the Gap, an intervenor in proceedings on the University of California's application for a renewal of its op. rating i

license for the Argonaut reactor located on the UCLA campus, Ms made l

allegations of misconduct on the part of two members of the Camrf asion's technical staff.

These allegations appear on page 11 of the attached "CBG Memorandtru as to Status of Contention XX (Security)."

g Because of the serious nature of these allegations, the Licensing Board for this proceeding believes that they nust be brou ft to your attention for whatever action you de m necessary.

I I have also enclosed a copy of the Board's Memorandte and Order of Deceber 23, 1983, which indicates at pages 9-11 the action we are taking with regard to the implications of these allegations for our t

Proceeding.

Sincerely,

~ r~..,...

John H e III s a ve Judge

Enclosures:

2 As stated cc: w/ enclosures Chairalan Palladino Herzel H. E. Plaine w/o enclosures:

Docketing and Service Branch (for service) 4 3-12 2 ? ? 'W lf

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