ML20245G528

Forwards Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant Exercise on 880609, by Fema.No Deficiencies Noted.Five Areas Requiring Corrective Action & Addl 34 Areas Recommended for Improvement Identified

ML20245G528
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	06/12/1989
From:	Dan Collins NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Wilgus W FLORIDA POWER CORP.
References
NUDOCS 8906290169
Download: ML20245G528 (1)

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y.gw JUN 121989 Florida Power Corporation-Mr..W. S.. Wilgus

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Vice. President, Nuclear Operations

- ATTN:. Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing

'P. 0.-Box 219-NA-21 Crystal: River, FL' 32629-Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

' FEMA. FINAL REPORT ON THE CRYSTAL' RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ON JUNE 9, 1988 Enclosed is a. copy (of the exercise evaluation report by the Federal Eme Management Agency FEMA) on the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant exercise -

. conducted on June 9,1988.

As indicated in:the report. FEMA identified no deficiencies.

However, a total.of five areas requiring corrective action were identified during - the exercise.

An additional. 341 areas recommended for~.

improvement were identified.

We' encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA.

Resolution-of these items should be completed

. prior to the next full-scale' emergency preparedness exercise.

We also. encourage you to work closely with the State of Florida and the risk counties of Citrus and Levy in' the development of a scenario for the next

. full-scale exercise that' will effectively test the areas.in which the above

. items were identified.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely, stigtnalSigrN Q D.M.Co!!!ss tp Douglas M. Collins, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards cc:

P. F. McKee, Director, Nuclear

' Plant Operations

. R. C. Widell, Director, Nuclear Site Support State of Florida bec:'NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk RI RII R

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Federal Emergency Management. Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 i

M 23 Mr. Frank J. Congel Director j

Division of Radiation Protection i

and Emergency Preparedness

fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

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Dear Mr. Congel:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the June 9,1988, partial. participation joint exercise of the offsite radiological emer-gency preparedness plans site-specific to the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant. Citrus and Levy Counties, both located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone, fully participated in the exercise.

The State of Florida participated partially.

The exercise report was prepared by Region IV staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). There'were no deficiencies iden-tified during this exercise. There were, however, areas requiring corrective action and areas recommended for improvement.

Based on the results of this exercise, the State of Florida and Citrus and Levy Counties demonstrated the capabil!ty to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on February 15, 1984, will remain in effect.

FEMA Region IV staff will furnish a copy of this exercise-report to the State of Florida and will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-3026.

Sincerely, f.

u Dennis H. Kwiat wski Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Enclosure 0Nb0bhS v t wvw r

I CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE

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O CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PIANT EXERCISE Conducted on Ju'ne 9, 1988 Exercise Report August 18, 1988 Utility:

Florida Power Corporation Plant Location:

Crystal River, Citrus County, Florida Participating State and Local Governments:

State of Florida Citrus County Levy County i

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l: 7p TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace I..

EXERCISE

SUMMARY

1 II.

DETAILED DISCUSSION 2

State of Florida 2

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 2 Doce Assessment 2

Emergency News Center (ENC) 4-Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) 5 Field Monitoring Teams 1 and 3

-6 Field Monitoring Team 2 7

Medical Services 8

Citrus County 11 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 11 Outside Activities 12 Levy County 15 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 15 Outside Activities 17 III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 19 IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 20 V.

APPENDICES 25 A.

Evaluator List and Assignments B.

Exercise Objectives and Scenario

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EXERCISEL

SUMMARY

f t1 The Crystal River partial participation exercise was conducted.cr June'9, 1988, and was observed by ei

' representing five Federal agencies. ghteen' Federal evaluators The evaluation was based on

.NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1,.Rev.

1, " Criteria for Preparation and-Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of

. Nuclear Power Plants".

The Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant is-owned and operated by the Florida Power Corporation.

It is located in Citrus County approximately seven and one-half miles northwest of the. town of Crystal River.

Parts of Citruy and Levy Counties lie within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

During this exercise, Citrus and Levy Counties fully participated and implemented their emergency response plans.

The State of Florida partially. participated and staffed the Emergency

' Operations Facility, the Emergency News Center, the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory, and deployed three field monitoring teams.

This. exercise' included the following major participants:

Florida Power Corporation.

-Florida-Division of Emergency Management Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Citrus' County Emergency Management Levy County Emergency Management-Agency All.but.one'of the exercise objectives were demonstrated, and no NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 deficiencies were' identified.

There were,'however, five areas requiring corrective actions identified and several areas recommended for improvement which are listed in Sections III and IV of this report.

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DETAILED DISCUSSION 1

State of Florida Emercency Operations Facility (EOF)

Staffing of the Emergency Operations Facility by the State emergency response team was rapid, adequate, and appropriate.

Staff members were knowledgeable and proficient in the performance of their assigned duties.

Adequate space and equipment were available for State personnel.

The Governor's Authorized Representative demonstrated excellent command and control.

Notifications to local agencies were made within the required 15-minute time period.

State and Florida Power Corporation' representatives jointly and promptly developed appropriate protective action recommendations.

Overall, the State staff in the EOF executed their responsibilities in a professional and well-organized manner, i

thereby meeting all applicable exercise objectives.

Suoerior Items:

1.

Command and control by the Governor's Authorized Representative.

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2.

Proficiency of the Op< rations Officer.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

None.

Dose Assessment The State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) demonstrated the ability to perform radiological dose projections and recommend protective actions for the plume exposure pathway.

The State radiological assessment team made a smooth transition from the early waste gas tank releases and resulting dose projections to the later LOCA conditions.

Both releases led to protective action decisions based on projected airborne plume pathway exposures.

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< The protective actions for sheltering and evacuation.were based-on current PAG recommendations and-models for the expected duration of release.

The protective action recommendations were made.after consideration of-plant status =information, weather

conditions, and field monitoring data.

The State field communications' capability was greatly improved, most' notably the radio: links to the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory.

(MERL). and the field teams.

The field monitoring results are extremely important in dose projection and validation of the plume modeling' estimation performed at the. EOF..

The'dosa assessment room was a vital center of activity.for the

-Florida' Power Corporation and the State of Florida.

There was an orderly flow of information on the release. parameters and the meteorological factors from the utility to the State.

This arrangement has'many advantages, outweighing the few disadvantages of crowding ~and noise level.

The DHRS dose assessment team is perfecting an additional capability via a radiological dose assessment computer model.

The model calculates-whole body gamma and thyroid doses, as well as deposition rates and~cummulative deposition, at predefined.

locations and meets the. qualifications for dose assessment specified in NUREG-0654.. The atmospheric dispersion routines used;in the model allow for the thermal inversion boundary layer (sea breeze) effects.

The State (DHRS) retainsLits present and back-up capability via hand-programmable computers.

The State uses a conservative 2000 ft. ceiling for-stability Classes 0 and F.

.All ten of the objectives for radiological dose projection and protective action decision-making were achieved.

l Sunerior Ita==:

1.-

Communications equipment and personnel.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

None.

j Arena Recommended for Incrovement:

None.

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Emercancy' News Center (ENC)

.The Emergency News Center is located in-the utility's Nuclear Operations Training Facility on West 7 Rivers Drive in Crystal River.

The plant' EOF is located in the'same building.

Co-location of State, county, and utility Pios at the ENC-

-facilitated'the' coordination of news releases as well.as the media briefings. 'During the 1986 exercise, the location of PIO staffs in separate rooms prompted a recommendation that they be co-located.

Adequate space and equipment, including telephones, were available for both news center staff and media representatives.

" Insufficient telephones" was identified as an. inadequacy-during the 1986 exercise.

The State, county, and utility staffs present in the ENC were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and coordinated their activities well, i

There'were six news media briefings conducted during the three-hour period of exercise activity at the Media center.

Before each briefing,: State,-county, and utility spokespersons coordinated what was to be presented.

Both' actual and mock media were present at each briefing and asked appropriate and aggressive questions.

The ENC spokespersons responded sincerely and skillfully to the media queries.

Media kits, adequate working space, telephones, and all news releases were available to the media representatives.

The spokespersons present at the briefings utilized several displays and diagrams in their. presentations and,-generally, avoided the use of technical jargon.

However, 10-mile EPZ sectors were generally referred to by_their alphabetical designation; only in a few instances were geographical descriptions utilized by the spokespersons.

When information was not available to the spokespersons, or when they did not have the answers to media questions, they simply said they did not know but would have the proper response by the next briefing.

In every instance the response was, indeed, provided at the following briefing.

Although the PIO personnel from Citrus and Levy Counties were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and industrious, they were exceedingly busy attending briefings, coordinating, and answering telephone calls.

It is doubtful that this would be an adequate number of personnel during an actual emergency.

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' Copies of EBS messages were not available at the ENC.-

The prompt transmission of-EBS messages from the counties to the ENC is E

necessary to ensure that all information given the public is coordinated and accurate.-

The exercise activities at the Emergency News Center _were a marked improvement over the 1986 exercise.

Most of the

-recommendations of the previous exercise were_ implemented, and all objectives were accomplished.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Provide an additional PIO for each county at the ENC.

2.

Utilize, as much as possible, geographical features to describe the sectors of the 10-mile EPZ.

3.

Request that counties provide copies of all EBS messages to' ENC staff.

Mobile Emercancy Radiological Laboratory (MERL1 The MERL was repositioned.

Activities and staffing at this location were limited because of the length and orientation of the scenario.

The survey teams were briefed and dispatched from the MERL.

The MERL assisted the " Rad Control" station by.

relaying information when necessary, and served well as a communication back-up.

Several samples (soil and vegetation) were delivered to the MERL, processed through a hot line, and properly handled during preparation.

Although sample preparation was adequate, suggestions were discussed that would make preparation less cumbersome and faster.

Counting procedures and data reporting were in accordance with accepted practices.

Equipment was properly maintained and operational.

General information concerning the emergency was not displayed for MERL personnel.

The overall operation of the MERL was adequate and appropriate to the level of activity projected by the scenario.

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-6 deficiencies:. None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

.l.

Reexamine sample preparation area and support.

equipment..

Consider the use of wide-mouthed containers.

as recepticals for waste. material and. Rad wash procedures.

2'.

Develop method for displaying pertinent emergency information.

Field Monitorina Teams 1 and 3 Field' team members and other radiological health personnel were

'largely propositioned with equipment and supplies at the MERL location in Crystal River prior to the Alert notification.

Three two-person radiological monitoring teams were promptly deployed following an equipment check-outland briefings.

Each vehicle had two radios (primary and back-up) and communications were very good throughout the exercise; however, the vehicle-to-vehicle communication was not continuous.

Field monitoring team maps were excellent, enabling teams to find-assigned locations.

Ambient radiation measurements were

- conducted satisfactorily.

Air sampling.for radioiodines and particulate was demonstrated.

In view of the relative importance of radioiodines in the dose projections, more air sampling-should have.been conducted.

A higher? priority should have been assigned to the return of air samples to the MERL.

' The teams.had suitable equipment and ample supplies in general.

However, one of the single-channel analysers in use for radiciodine monitoring did not check out properly before the teams were dispatched, and no spare was available.

Field teams did not have silver zeolite cartridges in their possession and only two charcoal cartridges appeared to be in the possession of the team observed demonstrating air sampling.

While a limited stock of silver zeolite cartridges were stored at the MERL, these were dated five years earlier, and visual inspection prompted some concern that State personnel should be cognizant of the possibility of the deterioration of their silver zeolite cartridges.

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l Personnel exposure control was generally good.

However, two of the four 0-20R range dosimeters had not been zerced properly or were defective.

Superior Items:

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Organization of radiological activities.

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Field monitoring maps.

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Communications.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirine Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

I 1.

Quantity and quality of radioiodine cartridge supply should be reexamined.

2.

Critical equipment spares should be available.

3.

Improve team designation to avoid potentially confusing similarities of radio call numbers and team identification numbers.

Field Monitorina Team 2 Communications capability among the field teams, the field team coordinator, and the MERL was fully demonstrated.

The radio communications system was excellent.

Transmissions were clear with no dead spots, and no failures were observed.

However, the radio / car designation (e.g., RAD 3) was not the same as the Team's designation (e.g., Team #2).

This dual designation lead to some confusion early in the exercise.

Communication protocol l

could be simplified if the team number were the same as the car / radio number.

Members of the field team were supplied with the required self-reading and permanent-record dosimeters.

The players read the dosimeters every 30 minutes and recorded the values on record cards.

The teams were well trained in exposure control I

procedures.

Turn-back values were printed on the EPZ maps.

l Ambient radiation monitoring was demonstrated by the field teams in accordance with established procedures.

Equipment was correctly calibrated and operational.

The significance of the various measurements was understood by the team.

They were able to interpret their measurements and accurately track the path and edge of the plume.

Readings were transmitted promptly to the L

. EOF.

Proper radio protocol was used.

However, the time that measurements were obtained was not always transmitted to the EOF.

The sample time was assumed to be the same as the transmission time.

Time is a critical component of any sample.

Along with the location and measured values, the sample time must be included.

Airborne radiciodine sampling was conducted in accordance with established procedures.

Team members followed written procedures step-by-step.

External electrical connectors were built into the field vehicles to facilitate safe and rapid operations.

The single-channel analyzer failed to operate reliably during the exerciso.

one particulate sample was collected.

Superior Items:

1.

Dosimetry.

2.

Communications.

3.

EPZ map with checklists, procedures and turn-back values.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

l 1.

Repair single-channel P.nalyzer; obtain back-up in case of failure.

2.

Include sample time with sample values.

3.

Assign the same number to the team and team car / radio.

Medical Services The accident was reported to the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) dispatcher at 8:39 a.m.

All of the regular EMS crews that would normally respond were occupied with real emergencies or back-up duties.

Therefore, this part of the scenario objective was not demonstrated.

The patient was transported to the hospital in an EM1 vehicle not normally used for patient transport.

The hospital Emergency Room (ER) received the call of a contaminated patient at 9:05 a.m. and immediately began preparing the patient receiving and treatment area.

The h.;-spital staff had adequately prepared the area and dressed out the personnel by 9:30 a.m.

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The staff acted promptly and appropriately to contain contamination and treat the simulated injury.

The staff l

demonstrated careful and deliberate action in the treatment and assessment of the patient.

I A full demonstration of the adequacy of the hospital staff and facilities was achieved during this drill.

However, demonstration of the adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals was incomplete due to actual emergencies.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

During future exercises, patienes should be prepared with realistic injuries an,d spocific areas of contamination to more thoroughly test the ability of the medical personnel to control contamination.

The use of an on-site controller with pre-established conditions (i.e., medical symptoms, how accident occurred) would greatly improve the realism of the exercise.

2.

Rather than have a county health department trained monitor repositioned at the accident site, have the sector on-call monitor respond to the same call that activates the EMS system.

This would realistically test the ability of the county to locate and dispatch a trained monitor.

3.

The hospital Emergency Room Lead Nurse has instructions to always call the power plant for either confirmation or information and assistance when the ER is notified of a contaminated patient.

Attempts by the nurse to accomplish this were unsuccessful.

Since this was an off-site patient, the plant had no information about the situation and, in fact, attempted to convince the nurse that this was a hoax.

After several calls the nurse was still unable to clarify this issue.

In future exercises the plant should provide the agreed upon assistance.

It was understood that a plant HP would not respond on this exercise in order to give the county monitor a chance to take the lead.

However, the nurse was trying to obtain.information about what type of contamination could be expected on the incoming patient.

I i j 4.

-Annissue related to the above incident' concerns updated telephone numbers.

One of the two power plant numbers that the nurse called was no longer correct.

She was informed that the unit she was.trying to contact had moved.

Telephone number changes for emergency workers should be immediately transmitted to all appropriate parties.

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The hospital treatment room has no provision for isolating the' ventilation return port.

Therefore, it is recommended the access port be covered with a suitable material (such as a piece of pre-cut yellow herculite) and taped.

This would prevent airborne contamination from entering the main hospital ventilation system.

6.

Because of the size of the room, the portable x-ray unit cannot.be brought into the room.

Therefore, if it is necessary to x-ray the patient before being declared free from contamination, the decontamination table must be moved to the door or just outside of the room.

When moving the table it is recommended that the table be disconnected from the drain and receptacle and be capped off to prevent potential spillage and for ease of movement.

7.

A step-off area sign (for contamination control) should be used in futura exercises.

8.

Nine of the hospital staff have completed the ORAU REACTS course.

This was evident by the skills and proficiency demonstrated by these individuals.

When possible, it is recommended that the ER physicians be given the opportunity to attend this training.

9.

When performing radiation surveys of the patient, the hospital etaff should check the patient's back if the extent of contamination is not known.

This oversight on this exercise could have been due to the limited information provided by the ambulance crew.

All of the regular EMS crews that would normally respond were tied up with real emergencies at the time of the exercise.

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l< Citrus County Emercency Ooerations Center (EOC)

Citrus County operated from a new Emergency Operations Center, completed within the past 90 days.

The EOC was activated and fully staffed.within about.30 minutes.

Proper call-up procedures were followed.

Security was provided by the Citrus County Sheriff's Office.

Fifty-one individuals-representing elements of Citrus County government having emergency responsibilities participated in the exercise at the EOC.

The County Administrator and his assistant, as well as the Chairman of the-County Commission, participated at the EOC.

Excellent leadership was displayed by county officials,-including the County Commission Chairman, Emergency Management-Director, and Chief of Operations, Citrus County Sheriff's Office.

The1 new EOC has a superior communications capabilf sv. 'The new building also is the location of the "911" emergency services and is operated on a 24-hour basis.

RACES operators participated but were not required to provide back-up communications since systems operated properly.

Sufficient EOC briefings were conducted by the Emergency Management Director.

Information exchange could be better effected if organizations present in the EOC were called

.upon at each briefing for a current status report of activities.

Siren activation was simulated at both Site Area Emergency and General Emergency.

However, the activation and EBS message, not actually broadcast, met the 15-minute criterion and were closely coordinated with State of Florida and Levy County officials.

It is suggested that a copy of the ELS message be provided to the Emergency News Center; however, in an actual emergency, the ENC would monitor the broadcast and know the content of the message.

The Rumor Control staff in the EOC performed in a superior manner.

This activity was staffed with six well-qualified individuals.

EOC equipment, including maps, displays, status boards, and furniture, was excellent.

Posting of wind direction, sectors where protective actions had been taken, and displaying the population of each sector on the operations map would enhance the EOC operations.

Also demonstrated by the Sheriff's Office was a helicopter with a recently installed siren and public address system.

This could be utilized to warn boaters, fishermen, and transients.

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' Sunerior Items:

1.

Rumor Control' operations..

2..

Communications capability.

3.

Support.provided by the Citrus. county Sheriff's office.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Indicate on the operations map the wind direction and which sectors have been evacuated or sheltered.

2.

Post population of each sector on operations map.

3.

Transmit copies of EBS messages to Emergency News-Center.

4.

Determine the local landmarks to describe each sector or any combinations of sectors in advance of actual need for information.

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Outside Activities Recention Center / Shelter - The reception center / shelter operation was-located at the Withlacoochee Vocational. Technical Center in Inverness, Florida.

The overall management and staff participation was excellent.

Staff members representing Red Cross, the Citrus County Emergency Management, and RACES were enthusiastic and knowledgeable of their assigned duties.

This center had adequate shower and kitchen facilities as well as areas to: accommodate approximately 2300 handicapped individuals and their families.

This facility was last used during Hurricane Elena in 1986.

Adequate communication systems exist to j

communicate with the Citrus County EOC and all field personnel.

j Approximately 60 handicapped individuals from Key Pine Village j

i were monitored and registered.

Two individuals were decontaminated in an area clearly marked and well prepared.

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l Adequate equipment and supplies were available and used during the simulated decontamination procedures.

Individuals were I

. monitored prior to, and after, showering.

Disposable clothing was issued to the two individuals after the scrub-down had been completed.

All individuals participating in the decontamination area were well trained and very knowledgeable of their~ assigned duties.

All areas requiring corrective actions in the 1986 exercise report were successfully implemented.

Suoerior Items:

1.

Reception center / shelter management.

2.

Committment and enthusiasm of participants.

Deficiencies:

None.

l Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

None.

Traffic Control Points (TCP's)/ Boat Ramos - Thr. Citrus County Sheriff's Department adequately demonstrated the capability to control vehicular evacuation of, and access to, a contaminated Dosimetry for emergency workers was adequate.

Written area.

procedures were utilized by the three Deputies assigned' traffic and access control duties.

Areas requiring corrective actions have been corrected since the June 1986 exercise.

Continued radiological training for emergency workers is recommended now that adequate dosimetry equipment has been

acquired, i

Four public boat ramps in Citrus County were visited.

None of these ramps has signs advising boaters of the procedures to follow in the event of an accident at Crystal River.

(G.2.)

i Deficiencies:

None.

Argas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

1.

G.2. - Post information/ warning signs adjacent to public boat ramps.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

i 1.

Provide additional emergency worker training for all personnel assigned to traffic and access control duties.

'l g Decontamination

.The Citrus County Fire Department established'a

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vehicle decontamination station on US-19/98 at the' Cross State-

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-Canal.. This-location'is approximately 4.5 miles from the facility and would be a main evacuation route in'an emergency..

Water from the canal would'be used for wash-down,.and-used. water o

would flow back~into the canal.'

During the demonstration two vehicles were adequately Decontaminated.- The driver of one vehicle was found to be i

contaminated.

She was sent to the reception center:in Inverness for decontamination.

When questioned as to how~this person.would get.to Inverness, the evaluator was told that she could drive l

South on 19/98.and then via State roadsLto Inverness.-

This would require going closer to the power plant'and against the flow of evacuating traffic on US-19/98.

This is the established procedure.in' order to keep the contaminated person in Citrus County for control purposes.

(J.10.j.)

-Deficiencies:

None.

L Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

1.

-J.10.j. - Procedures require maintaining control of contaminated people.in Citrus County even though this may require going against the evacuation flow.

I Reevaluate this procedure to seeLif contaminated persons could~be decontaminated in Levy' County, outside the 10-mile EPZ.

i Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Citrus County fire personnel performing decontamination duties have had little " hands-on" experience.

Provide additional training.

School Evacuation - A discussion took place at the Citrus County EOC with-the Citrus County School District Administrative Assistant in charge of school evacuation.

The discussion included a review of school evacuation procedures.

An actual school. evacuation did not take place since it was not an objective ~of this exercise.

The official notification of an emergency would be accomplished via a telephone call from the Citrus County Emergency Management

. Director to the School District, although it is likely that sirens would be heard at some schools.

The telephone list was up-to-date and included alternates.

The School District would, in turn, notify the individual school principals.

There are three schools in Citrus County within the 10-mile EPZ.

The three schools are extremely close geographically.

Each principal has a copy of the school EOP.

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., The bus drivers are adults, and.the vehicles.are parked at centrally located areas in the county during.off-duty hours, and the drivers-are either at the bus centers or located nearby.

Eighty percent of the buses are equipped with two-way radios.

Deficiencies:

None.

' Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:. None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Provide additional training in evacuation procedures for administrators and teachers.

2.

Provide relocation shelter information to the parents of all school children to avoid panic in the event of an emergency.

At this time only families living inside the 10-mile EPZ are issued information, yet many live outside this area but have children attending those schools.

Mobility-Imoaired - No actual demonstration of ability to deal with the mobility-impaired took place since it was not an objective of the exercise.

A member of the Citrus County Emergency Management responsible for the mobility-impaired citizens discussed procedures and plans for the mobility-impaired with the evaluator.

The list of "special-needs" people is currently categorized by.

township in Citrus County and is being computerized to include:

a) township; b) evacuation sector; c) mode / method of transportation vehicle needed; and d) type of impairment.

The data, lists and plans are kept current because of the' annual threat of hurricane activity in the area.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

None.

Levy County Emercancy Onorations Center (EOC)

The EOC, located in the basement of the Levy County Courthouse in Bronson, has sufficient space to support emergency operations.

Maps and displays were adequate, but better arrangement of the status boards would enhance their usage.

9

. The State, Citrus and Levy Counties, and the utility used a dedicated telephone to exchange information and to coordinate decisions.

The EOC had local government radio as a back-up.

Each EOC staff position in the operations room did not have a telephone.

In the event of an actual emergency, a considerable wait to use the telephone could develop.

The EOC also did not have the Sheriff's Department and Highway Department radios, which would allow direct communication with emergency workers in the field.

(F.1.)

The EOC was effectively managed by the Director of the Departnent of Emergency Management.

Protective action decisions were made in consultation with the County Commissioner present and were further coordinated with the State and citrus County.

The EOC staff members were knowledgeable and carried out their duties efficiently.

The DEM Director also acted as the Rumor Control contact.

This function should, however, be delegated to other EOC staff to enable the DEM Director to more fully concentrate on EOC management.

(G.4.c.)

Public Alert and Notification was coordinated with Citrus County.

The simulated activation of the Public Alert and Notification System met the requirements of NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1.

Since there are no available broadcast stations in Levy County, Citrus County broadcasts all EBS messages.

The counties used prescripted EBS messages and coordinated their uso.

The first message indicated that, should a radioactive release occur, its effects would be confined within the plant boundary and pose no threat to the public.

When the decision was made to evacuate at 8:54 a.m.,

Levy County decided to evacuate out to ten miles because the majority of the population in Levy County lives within seven miles of the plant.

The area from seven to ten miles is mostly swamp or woodland and has no permanent residents.

A minor release occurred at 9:15 a.m.

The EBS message concerning evacuation did not provide a description of the boundary in terms of recognizable geographic landmarks.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

1.

F.1. - Provide sufficient telephones for the EOC staff and a means to integrate the county emergency radio capability from the EOC.

2.

G.4.c.

- Train personnel to staff the Rumor Control function to relieve the DEM Director of those duties.

'6 : Areas Recommended for Imorov3 ment:

1.

Define sectors by using geographic landmarks.

2._

Modify the status boards so that~they.can be hung on the wall and better utilized.

3..

Request.a utility representative at the EOC to provide

. technical information to the EOC staff.

Outside Activities Reception Center / Shelter - The relocation center at Bronson High School was an adequate shelter facility.

Five persons were repositioned:

the Shelter Manager, the school custodian, two registrars, and a Deputy Sheriff.

An adequate radiological monitoring. demonstration was provided at the entrance to the shelter by two Civil Air Patrol personnel.

However, plastic gloves were not used and the survey meter was not protected from potential contamination. -Although no evacuees were present, an adequate demonstration of sheltering, monitoring and decontamination capability was accomplished,.as well as the full activation of trained shelter staff.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Provide plastic gloves for radiological monitors and

. protection for the survey meter.

2.

Provide additional training for radiological monitoring personnel.

l Traffic Control Point's (TCP's)/ Boat Ramos - The capability of Levy County traffic and access control, which was an objective and an area requiring corrective action from the previous j

exercise, was not demonstrated.

j l

The intent was to have a traffic control point northbound on U.S.

19 and CR 121 just before the Lebanon Station vehicle decontamination facility.

However, the Deputy Sheriff assigned to the site received an emergency call to report to a fire before

-the traffic control point was set up.

(J.10.j.)

. one public boat ramp in Levy County was visited.

Information/

warning signs concerning the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant are installed in the area but not adjacent to the boat ramp.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirine Corrective Actions:

1.

J.10.j. - The capability of Levy County traffic and access control was not demonstrated during this exercise.

The next exercise.should require that traffic and access control measures be demonstrated.

breas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Post information/ warning signs adjacent to public boat ramps.

Decontamination - A vehicle decontamination facility was set up and demonstrated by the Inglis Volunteer Fire Department at Lebanon Station in Levy County.

An area was roped off for monitoring and wasn-down.

During the monito: ing procedure, the probes were protected by surgical gloves to preclude contamination.

All procedures were generally performed in an effective manner.- A barrel was used for disposal of contaminated equipment.

The firefighters were very thorough and conscientious.

They were all equipped with self-reading dosimeters and were familiar with the procedures for the checking and recording of readings.

Effective radio communications with the Levy County EOC were possible from the decontamination center.

Sumerior Items:

1.

Vahicle decontamination procedures demonstrated by the Inglis Volunteer Fire Department.

Deficiencies:

None.

Arena Recuirine Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

None.

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III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES.

i-Facility or EUEEG Corrective Scheduled Activity Item Action Date of Concletion l

Deficiencies None Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions Citrus G.2.

Post information/ warning County signs adjacent to public boat ramps.

J.10.j.

Procedures require maintain-ing control of. contaminated people in Citrus County even though this may require going against the evacuation flow.

Reevaluate this procedure to see if contaminated persons could be decontaminated in Levy County, outside the 10-mile EPZ.

Levy

.F.1.

Provide sufficient telephones County for the EOC staff and a means to integrate the county emergency radio capability from the EOC.

G.4.c.

Train personnel to staff the Rumor Control function to relieve the DEM Director of those duties.

J.10.j.

The capability of Levy County traffic and access control was not demonstrated during this exercise.

The next exercise should require that traffic and access control measures be demonstrated.

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S-2 IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS' RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT p

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. Facility or Activity.

Areas' Recommended for Improvement

- ENC 1.

Provide an additional PIO for each county at'the ENC.

2.

Utilize, as-much:as possible, geographical features to describe the sectors of the 10-mile EPZ.

3.

'5 quest that counties provide copies of all EBS mes' sages to ENC staff.

MERL.

1.

Reexamine' sample preparation area and support equipment.

Consider.the use of wide-mouthed containers as recepticals for waste material and Rad wash procedures.

2.

Develop method for displaying pertinent emergency information.

Field Monitoring 1.

Quantity and quality of radioiodine Teams'1 and 3 cartridge supply should be reexamined.

2.

Critical equipment spares should be available.

3.

Improve team designation to avoid potentially confusing similarities of radio call numbers and team identification numbers.

Field Monitoring 1.

Repair single-channel analyzer; obtain Team 2 back-up in case of failure.

2.

Include sample time with sample values.

3.

Assign the same number to the team and team car / radio.

______.m----------m-----

i

+

1 i

Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement Medical Services 1.

During future exercises, patients should be prepared with realistic injuries and j

specific areas of contamination to more thoroughly test the ability of the medical personnel to control contamination.

The use of an on-site controller with pre-established conditions (i.e., medical symptoms, how accident occurred) would greatly improve the realism of the exercise.

1 2.

Rather than have a county health department trained monitor repositioned at the accident site, have the sector on-call monitor respond to the same call

{

that activates the EMS system.

This would realistically test the ability of the county to locate and dispatch a trained monitor.

3.

The hospital Emergency Room Lead Nurse has instructions to always call the power plant for either confirmation or information and assistance when the ER is notified of a contaminated patient.

Attempts by the nurse to accomplish this were unsuccessful.

Since this was an off-site patient, the plant had no information about the situation and, in fact, attempted to convince the nurse that this was a hoax.

After several calls the nurse was still unable to clarify this issue.

In future exercises the plant should provide the agreed upon assistance.

It was understood that a plant HP would not respond on this exercise in order to give the county monitor a chance to take the lead.

However, the nurse was trying to obtain information about what type of contamination could be expected on the incoming patient.

e 1

7<

. ' Facility or-Activity Areas' Recommended for Improvement

' Medical" Services.

4.

An issue related to'the above incident (Continued) concerns updated telephone 1 numbers.

One of the two power plant' numbers that the nurse called was no longer correct.. She was informed that the unit she was trying to contact had moved.- Telephone number changes-for emergency workers should be.immediately transmitted to all appropriate parties.

5.

The hospital treatment. room has no provision for isolating the ventilation return port.

Therefore,'it is recomasnded.the access port.be covered with a yellow suitable material (such as.

a piece.of' pre-cut yellow herculite)~and taped.

This would prevent airborne contamination'from entering the main hospital ventilation system.

6.

Because of the size of the room, the portable:x-ray unit cannot be brought 1

into the room.

Therefore, if it'is necessary'to x-ray the patient before being declared free'from contamination,.

the decontamination table must be moved to the door or just outside of the room.

When moving the table it is recommended that the table be disconnected from the drain and receptacle and be capped off ato prevent potential spillage and for ease of movement.

7.

A step-off-area' sign (for contamination control) should be used in future exercises.

8.

Nine of the hospital staff have completed the ORAU REACTS course.

This was evident by the skills and proficiency demonstrated by these individuals.

When possible, it is recommended that the ER physicians be given the opportunity to attend this training.

_ i m.___.___

fq 4

1

+

' Facility'or

' Activity-Areas Recommended for Improvement Medical Services 9.

When performing radiation surveys of.the (Continued) patient, the: hospital staff should.checW the patient's back if the extent of E

. contamination is not known.

This oversight on this exercise could have been:due to the limited information provided by the ambulance crew.

All of the regular EMS crews that would normally respond were tied up,with real emergencies at the time of the exercise.

Citrus County 1.

Indicate on the operations map the wind direction and which sectors have been evacuated or sheltered.

2.

Post' population of each sector on operations map.-

3.

Transmit copies of EBS messages to

' Emergency News Center.

4.

Determine the local landmarks to describe each sector or any. combinations of sectors in advance of actual need for information.

5.

Provide additional emergency worker training for all personnel assigned to traffic and access control duties.

6.

Citrus County fire personnel performing decontamination duties have had little

" hands-on" experience.

Provide additional training.

7.

Provide additional training in evacuation procedures for administrators and teachers.

8.

Provide relocation shelter information to the parents of all school children to avoid panic in the event of an emergency.

At this time only families living inside the 10-mile EPZ are issued information, yet many live outside this area but have children attending those schools.

]

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Facility or-Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement

-Levy County

1..

Define sectors by using' geographic landmarks.

2.

Modify the status boards so that they can be hung on the wall and better utilized.

3.

Request a utility representative at the EOC to provide technical information to the EOC staff.

4.

Provide plastic gloves'for radiological monitors and protection for the survey meter.

5.

Provide additional training for..

radiological monitoring personnel.

6.

Post information/ warning signs adjacent to public boat ramps.

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. APPENDICES A.

. Evaluator-List and_ Assignments B.

Exercise' Objectives:and Scenario g

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t' FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER' PLANT EXERCISE.

4 June 9, 1988 CHIEF OF EVALUATORS AND RAC CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard (FEMA)

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)

. David Richards (DOE)

Chuck Wakamo'.(EPA).

HEpIA CENTER Tom Hawkins (FEMA)

Denise Hunt,(FEMA)

MOBILE' EMERGENCY RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY (MERL)

Brad Eichorst (DHHS/FDA)

Malcolm Frazier (DHHS/FDA)'-

MEDICAL ACTIVITIES Gary Sirmons (DHHS/HRSA)

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING FIELD TEAMS Caroline Herzenberg (FEMA)

Jim Levenson (FEMA)

CITRUS COUEIX John Heard (FEMA)

Bill McSwain (FEMA)

Tim Dowd (FEMA)

LEVY COUNTY Larry Robertson (FEMA)

Don Hammonds (FEMA)

Angelo Spano (FEMA)

MOBILE EVALUATORS Lamar Arrendale (DOT)

Walt Lucas (DOT)

Al Hall (FEMA)

_.m. _ _ _. _ _ _. _

m___._._._m___= _ _.

____.______m

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S T A T E O F F t. O R I D A D E P A R T M E N T O F C O M M U N I T.Y A F F A I R S 2371 E X E C U TIV E C E N T E R C I R C L E, EAST

• T A L L A H A S S E E, F L O R I D A 32399 i

BOB MARTINEZ THOMAS G. PELH AM

~

March 25, 1988 Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency 1371 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30309

Dear Mr. Woodard:

Enclosed for your review and approval are goals and objectives for the June 9, 1988 partial participation exercise at the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant.

The goals and objectives were developed with input from state agencies, Citrus and Levy counties and Florida Power Corporation.

The first scenario development group meeting is scheduled for April 6,1988 at 1:00 p.m.

in the Citrus County EOC located in Lecanto, Florida.

Other meetings are tentatively scheduled every two weeks thereafter.

You or your representative are invited to participate in any of these meetings and in the development of the scenario.

If.you have any questions or comments, please contact me at the Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management, 2740 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904/487-4918).

Sincerely,

/

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Gordon L. Guthrie Director GLG :s h Enclosure I

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

• HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

• RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

A i-h GOALS AND OBJECTIVES CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT'

['

PARTIAL' PARTICIPATION STATE / LOCAL EXERCISE June 9, 1988 1

The following goals and objectives reflect appropriate staffing by the State of Flo rida. - The licensee's Emergency.

Operations Facility will be staffed by the Governor's Authorized.

Repr esen ta tive, the Public' Information Of ficer located at the Emergency News Center, and liaison personnel assigned to local.

government emergency operations centers.-

The exercise will eval-i uate emergency response and communications capabilities among state and local governments, and the licensee.

Goals I.

To evaluate portions of the Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan f or Nuclear Power Plants and confirm its adequacy for response to an emergency situation at the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant.

Specific portions of the plan to be addressed are:

A.

Annex P - Crystal River Site Plan B.

Annex B - Emergency Response Organizations and Responsibilities C.-

Annex C - Direction and Control D.

Annex D - Emergency Classification System E.

Annex E - Notification and Activation F.

Annex F - Emergency Communications G.

Annex G - Public Inf ormation H.

Annex H - Emergency Facilities Revised:

4/5/88 j

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Annex I - Accident Assessment I.

J.

Annex J - Radiological _ Exposure' Control

_K..' Annex K - Protective-Response i

L.

Annex L - Medical and Public Health _ Support Objectives The following' objectives will be demonstrated by ' indicated agencies-during the exercise.

Division of Emergency ' Management 1.

Ability toLmobilize and activate facilities promptly.

2.

Ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing f

.around the clock. (SEOC will not be fully' activated. )

'3.

Ability to made decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

5.

' Ability to communicate with all appropriate locations,

. organizations and field personnel.

21.

Ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

'24.

Ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

25.

Ability to provide advance coordination of inf ormation released.

32.

Ability to iaontif y need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.

1

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p Department' of Health and Rehabilitative Services / Office of

' Radiation Control' 5.

Ability.to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

6.

Ability to ' mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams in a timely. fashion.

7.

Appropriate equipment and procedures f or determining i

ambient radiation levels.

8.

Appropriate equipment and procedures for the measurement of airborne radiciodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCi/cc in the presence of noble gas.

10.

Ability to project dosage to the public via plume expo-

.sure,. based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.

20.. Ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

21.

Ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

22.

Ability to supply KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

Citrus and Levy Counties:

1.

Ability to mobilize and activate facilities promptly.

2.

Ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

l

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' 3.1 Ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

Adequacy of facilities and displays to support ' emergency

-4.

operations.

p 5.

Ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

]

13.

Ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and I

disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 L

minutes.

14.

Ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instruc-L tions to the public in a timely fashion.

15. -

The organizational ability and resources necessary to p

manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

Ll 6. -

The organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as. inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

17.

The organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

I 18.

The organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility - impaired individuals within the plume EPZ.

19.

Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools i

within the plume EPZ.

(Citrus County only.)

20.

Ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

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21; Ability [to ;make ;the ' decision, based on predetermined

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,~ criteria,nwhether'to irrae KI to emergency workers and/or the -;..eral population.

122.i Ability; to supply and administer KI, once the' decision has'been made to:do so.

~ 4bility :- to ' brief-- the media in a ' clear,: accurate and 24.

1.:

timely manner.

' 25.. Ability to : provide advance, coordination of 'in'f ormation released.

26.. Ability to; establish and operate rumor control in a.

coordinated fashion.

127.

. Adequacy of procedures for the registration.and radiolo-gica1' monitoring of evacuees.

y L2 8. l Adequacy!of' facilities for mass care of evacuees.

2 9.. - Equipment and procedures f or decontamination ' of

' emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

30.. Adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures-for handling contaminated individuals.-

(Citrus County only.)

31..

Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and.proce-

\\.

dures for handling contaminated individuals.

(Citrus l

County only.)

32.

Ability to identify need for, request, and obtain 1

L Federal assistance.

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ST ATE OF FLORID A D EP A RTMENT OF COMMU NITY A FF AIRS i

i 2571 EXECUTIVECENTER C I R C L E, EAST

• T A L L A H A S S E E, F L O R I D A 32399 BOB MARTINEZ THOMAS G. PELH AM

' * " ~

l April 25, 1988 l

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural 'and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency 1371 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 3030 9

Dear Mr. Woodard:

Enclosed is the scenario f or the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant partial participation plume exposure pathway exercise.

The exercise time window will be on June 9, 1988 from 4:00 a.m. to 2:00 p m.

- The scenario was developed by representatives of Florida Power Corporation; the Florida Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management; the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DBRS); Citrus County Division of Emergency Management; and Levy County Department of Emergency Managemen t.

The scenario is adequate to test and demonstrate capabilities as required by the exercise objectives.

Control messages are being developed to assure full demonstration of emergency response activities.

I have also enclosed a schedule of meetings and personnel assigned for the exercise.

The Controller /ENaluator briefing will initially include the Citrus and Levy County Directors to discuss the timing and locations of all outside activities.

The following will be fully activated and exercised:

- Citrus and Levy County EOCs;

- Emergency Operations Facility;

- Emergency News Center;

- DHRS Radiation Control personnel with the Mobile Emergency Radiation Laboratory; and

- DERS Field Teams.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

• HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT e RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

I';'y

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Mr. Glenn Woodard April ' 25, 1988 s

Pag e : Two The ' State. Emergency Operations Center. will be partially activated : for the exercise, but not for evaluation purposes.

If you have any questions, please contact me at the i

Department of Community Aff airs, Division of Emergency

~ Management, 2740 Centerview Drive,. Tallahassee, Florida 32399.

Sincerely, f

o; Gordon L. Guthrie Director.

o GLG:sh Enclosures

_.L.___l_________....__

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-CRYSTAL = RIVER NUCLEAR' POWER PLANT C

- EXERCISE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

June 9,1988 Time Acti'v ity/ Even t 4:401AM Initial conditions distributed to control' room operators.-

Con' rol room receives a report of: a ; fire in ' the Health 4:50 AM-t Physics Calibration ' Lab (95' elevation Control

~ Complex).

The fire alarm is sounded and the Fire Brigade is' dispatched.

5:001AM, The' Fire' Brigade arrives at~the scene to discover smoke

~

and flames in the area.. oAn; individual nearby reports

'seeingE2-3 people in the vicinity before the fire' broke

-out.

The Medical Emergency Team is notified.

5:05 AM~

The fire,is still in progress, the Shift Supervisor declares an UNUSUAL' EVENT based on"a~ fire >10 minutes duration.

State'and local authorities as well as the

.NRC are-notified.

'5:10-AM

' Fire' Team Leader reports that one person has been rescued and is 'being attended to by the MET but does not appear to be seriously. injured.

The fire is still burning and the Fire Brigade is uncertain as to how many more people are trapped..

5:20 AM State' Warning Point notified of UNUSUAL EVENT.

5:25 Jut The Fire Team Leader reports that the fire has been extinguished.

A second person has been rescued.

The

- extent of the injuries appear to be' first and second degree burns on chest and legs and smoke inhalation.

The first. person rescued suffered minor smoke inhala-tion only.

An ambulance is requested and dispatched.

Seven Rivers hospital is notified.

5:27.AM A work crew that evacuated the Auxiliary Building due to the fire lef t an improperly installed hoist in place e

in the waste gas valve alley on 95' elevation.

The hoist causes a failure of a waste gas header line resulting in a small crack and a release of activity into the Auxiliary Building.

The source of the leak is the Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) and cannot be isolated.

]

5:30 AM The control room receives an alarm (RM-A3 WARNING) indicating increased activity in the Auxiliary Building.

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i 5:33 AM The control room receives an alarm (RM-A2 ~ WARNING)-

indicating low level release'to the environmentrbelow Technical Specifications.

5:35 AM

-State Warning Point' completes initial notification.

- 5:45 AM The ambulance arrives onsite and transports both.vic-tims to Seven Rivers Hospital.

5:55 701 The waste gas ~line fails completely causing a large increase in release rate.

'The' control room receives RM-A2 and RM-A3 HIGH alarms.

5 : 5 9 ' AM/

RM-A2 reaches T,echnical Specification. levels.

6:05 AM RM-A2. reaches 10 times Technical Specification. limits,

and based on this the Emergency Coordinatorfdeclares an ALERT. ; State, local and NRC authorities are notified.

TSC activation begins and the Environmental Survey Team and Dose Assessment Team prepare L to activatee 6:20 AM State Warning Point notified of ALERT.

Citrus and Levy counties begin. activation procedures.

6:25 AM The TSC ir staffed and operational and the release con-tinues from the WGDT.

6:30;AM The Emergency Coordinator ~ receives f ollow-up inf or-mation.concerning the accident; victims.

The first victim is in good condition but is being held. f or observation (mild smoke inhalation), the second victim 1,

in critical condition and is being airlifted to s

Tampa Burn Center.

6:35 AM A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared based on a dose rate of >50 mr/hr for greater than 30 minutes at the Site Boundary.

State, local and NRC authorities are notified and the EOF is activated.

6:45 AM WGDT pressure continues to decrease due to the leak thus decreasing radioactive release rate through the plant vent (RM-A2) to the environment.

6:50 AM State Warning Point notified of SITE AREA EMERGENCY and EOF activation.

State personnel report to BOF/ ENC.

6:54 JJi A heater drain limit switch shorts causing a reactor trip.

The turbine f ails to trip and is tripped locally.

6:57 AM The transient (reactor trip) causes a small break reac-l tor coolant system leak of 30 gpm in the Reactor Building.

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=7:06-?AM The control room receives-a Reactor Building Sump alarm.:

L 7:15 AM.

RM-A2.is at normal' levels (< Tech., Spec.) and WGDT.

pressures is O psi thus terminating the release to the en viro nmen t.

The RCS' leak in the Reactor-Building is now at 4 8 g pm.

7:20 AM The control room receives an RM-A6 WARNING ala rm indi-c' ting' increased activity'in'the Reactor Building-a

. atmosphere.

The decision is.made to initiate plant cooldown procedures.. Preliminary steps are started to prepa re. f or ' cooldown (OP-20 9).

7:33~AM Control Rod Group 1.(safeties)' withdrawn, plant cooldown is started per (OP-103B).

hhe Control Room ' receives an RM-A6 HIGH. alarm, activity.

7:36 AM in the Reactor Building continues to increase.~

7:37 AM" The RCS leak continues;in the Reactor Building.

RB pressure is at 1.psig, the Reactor Building sump is

. full, and plant cooldown rate is 74 degrees per hour.

8:01-AM The crack-in,the cold leg of the RCS inside the " Reactor Building.significantly degrades causing a large leak into the Reactor Building.

The Engineered Safeguards System is: actuated.

8:03 AM

.RB pressure is.at 28 psig,.RB temperature is at 237 degrees, and'the: Containment High Range Monitor (RM-G29) reads 40'R/hr.

Building spray is initiated and one pump. fails due to a failed Building. Spray Valve (BSV-3).

The Emergency Repair Team is dispatched to the Auxiliary Building to investigate.

High~RB pressure and operati'on of the Building Spray System causes a failure of the penetration seal f or the-supply line for-RB Spray Ring No. 2 (located in quadrant 3, 106'. elevation, 8" pipe).

This causes the elevated RB activity to be released into the Auxiliary Building.

8:06 AM Control Room receives an RM-A2 HIGH' alarm due to penetration f ailure.

Activity is again released to the en vironmen t.

8:14 AM Reactor Building pressure is at 43 psig, RB tem-perature is at. 317 degrees, and the Containment High Radiation Monitor reads 20,000 R/hr and increasing.

8:20 AM The Containment High Radiation Monitor peaks at 40,000 R/hr.

The release into the Auxiliary Building and the

)

environment also peaks at this time.

_ = _ - - _

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8: 2 9 AM A GENERAL: EMERGENCY is declared based on the 'RB con-i ditions. listed >above.

The following-Protective Action S

Recommendations are.given to offsite authorities:

• EVACUATE 0-5 MILES, 360 DEGREES.

• EVACUATE 5-10 MILES, S ECTO RS B, C, & D

• SHELTER 5-10. MILES, ALL REMAINING SECTORS -

8:45: AM The Emergency Coordinator receives an update on.the:

q injyry, victim. lie is in' stable but guarded condition 1

at the Tampa Burn-Center.

The wind begins~ shifting from out'of the WSW (230 degrees) to out of the west (260-270 degrees) prompting-a change in Protective Action Recommendations.

b

• EVACUATE 0-5 MILES,. 360 DEGREES R

• EVACU ATE 5-10 MILES,. SECTORS B,, C, D, E ' & F

• ' SHELTER 5 MILES, ALL REMAINING' SECTORS i

9 : 00 ' M( '

The Environmental Survey Team / Dose Assessment reports

>2 R/hr child thyroid at 3 miles.

9:15 AM The Emergency Repair Team completes' repairs on BSV-3 allowing. operation of the second - Building. Spray f Pump,

~

Reactor Building pressure. decreases at a faster rate.

As itB pressure decreases, theirelease rate; decreases.

'I 9:30 AM A boat arrives at Pete's Pier in Crystal River with one injured person whose arm is: cut and bleeding.

They were fishing. in the nuclear power plant discharge canal-when the sirens went off.

In ' their hast to depart,.one person fell in the boat ' receiving the injury.

10:00 AM RM-A2.begins trending downward at a faster rate reducing the environmental release.

10:20 AM RD pressure is at 7 psi.

The penetration seal holds at this reduced pressure thus terminating the radioactive release through the Auxiliary Building.

10:30 AM RM-A2 is at normal levels

(< Tech. Spec.) indicating the release to the environment is terminated.

11:30 AM The plant is stable and recovery ef forts begin.

12:30 PM The Exercise is terminated.

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JUN 121969 Florida Power Corporation Mr. W. S. Wilgus Vice President, Nuclear Operations ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing

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1 P. O. Box 219-NA-21 i

Crystal River.. FL 32629 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA' FINAL REPORT ON _THE CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ON JUNE 9, 1988 Enclosed is 'a copy (of the exercise evaluation report by the Federal Emerc Management Agency FEMA) on the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant exercise conducted on June 9,1988.

As indicated in the report, FEMA identified no deficiencies.

However, a total of five areas requiring corrective action were identified during the exercise.

An additional 34 areas recommended for improvement were. identified.

We encourage you-to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA.

Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full-scale emergency-preparedness exercise.

We also encourage _you -to work closely with the State of Florida and the risk counties of Citrus and Levy in the development of a scenario for the next full-scale exercise that will sifectively test the areas in which-the above items were identified.

Your' cooperation in_this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely, triginalSigrA Q D.M. Collins Douglas M. Collins, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards cc:

P. F. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations R. C. Widell, Director, Nuclear Site Support State of Florida bec: NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk R

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I JUN 121989

- Florida Power Corporation Mr. W. S. Wilgus Vice President, Nuclear Operations ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing P. O. Box 219-NA-21 Crystal River,.FL 32629 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

FEMA FINAL REPORT ON THE CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ON JUNE 9, 1988 i

t by the Federal Emergency Enclosed is a copy (of the exercise evaluat on repor Management Agency FEMA) on the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant' exercise conducted on June 9,1988.

As indicated in the report, FEMA identified no deficiencies.

However, a total of five areas requiring corrective action were identified during the exercise.

An additional 34 areas recommended for improvement were identified.

We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA.

Resolution of these items.should be completed prior to the next full-scale emergency preparedness exercise.

I We also encourage you to work closely with the State of Florida and the risk counties of Citrus and Levy in the development of a scenario for the next full-scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were identified.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely, CiiginalSialbl4 D.M. Collins >-

Douglas M. Collins, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards cc:

P. F. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations R. C. Widell, Director, Nuclear Site Support State of Florida bec: NRC Resident Inspector Document Control Desk RI RII R

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UNITED STATES AEffob NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

REGION ll g

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,luNi21989 Florida Power Corporation Mr. W. S. Wilgus Vice President, Nuclear Operations ATTN: Manager, Nuclear Operations Licensing P. O. Box 219-nae 21 Crystal River, FL 32629 Gentlemen:

SUBJECT:

' FEMA FINAL REPORT ON THE CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ON JUNE 9, 1988 Enclosed is a _ copy of the exercise evaluation report by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant exercise conducted on June 9, 1988.

As indicated in' the report, FEMA identified no deficiencies.

However, a total of five areas requiring corrective action were identified during the exercise.

An' additional 34 areas recommended for improvement were identified.

We encourage you to assist the appropriate organizations in resolving the weaknesses identified by FEMA.

Resolution of these items should be completed prior to the next full-scale emergency preparedness exercise.

We also encourage you to work closely with the State of Florida and the risk counties of Citrus and Levy in the development of a scenario for the next full-scale exercise that will effectively test the areas in which the above items were identified.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely,

• 0 Douglas M. Collins, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards cc:

P. F. McKee, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations R. C. Widell, Director, Nuclear Site Support i

State of Florida-

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Federal Emergency Management Agency Washing +on, D.C. 20472 0

'My j 3 Mr. Frank J. Congel Director

'Jivision of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

Washington, D.C. -20Sb5

Dear Mr. Congel:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the June 9,1988, partial participation joint exercise of the offsite radiological emer-gency preparedness plans site-specific to.the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant. Citrus and Levy Counties. both located in the 10-mile plume emergency planning ' zone, fully participated in the exercise.

The State of Florida participated partially.

The exercise' report was prepared by Region IV staff of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

There were no deficiencies iden-tified during this exercise. There were, however, areas requiring corrective action and areas recommended for improvement.

Based on the results of this exercise, the State of Florida and Citrus and Levy Counties demonstrated the capability to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of. a radiological emergency at the site.

Therefore, the 44 CFR 350 approval granted on February 15, 1984, will remain in effect.

FEMA Region IV staff will furnish a copy of this exercise report to the State of Florida and will assure completion by the State of the necessary corrective actions.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Craig S. Wingo, Chief, Technological Hazards Division, at 646-3026.

Sincerely, 4

d-Dennis H. Kwiat wski Assistant Associate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Enclosure c> n a O

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CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR W R PLANT EXERCISE A

O FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY l

REGION IV 4 75641<bri 7

p-i Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 1371 Peachtree Street, NE Atlanta, Georgia 30309 CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE Conducted on June G, 1988 i

Exercise Report August 18, 1988 Utility:

Florida Power Corporation Plant Location:

Crystal River, Citrus County, Florida Participating State and Local Governments:

State of Florida Citrus County Levy County

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

'Paae I.

EXERCISE

SUMMARY

1 II.

DETAILED DISCUSSION.

2 State of Florida 2

Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) 2 Dose Assecsment 2

Emergency News Center (ENC) 4 Mobile Emergen > Radiological Laboratory (MERL) 5 Field Monitoring Teams 1 and 3 6

Field Monitoring Team 2 7

Medical Services 8

Citrus County 11 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 11 Outside Activities 12 Levy County 15 Emergency Operations center (EOC) 15 Outside Activities 17 III.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES 19 IV.

SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPROVEMENT 20 V.

APPENDICES 25 A.

Evaluator List and Assignments B.

Exercise objectives and Scenario i

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EXERCISE

SUMMARY

j The Crystal River partial participation exercise was conducted on June 9, 1988, and was observed by eighteen Federal evaluators representing five Federal agencies.

The evaluation was based on NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1,

" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Supportoof Nuclear Power Plants".

The Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant is owned and operated by the Florida Power Corporation.

It is located in Citrus County approximately seven and one-half miles northwest of the town of Crystal River.

Parts of Citrus and Levy Counties lie within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.

During this exercise, Citrus and Levy Counties fully participated and implemented their. emergency response plans.

The State of Florida partially participated and staffed the Emergency Operations Facility,-the Emergency News Center, the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory, and deployed three field monitoring teams.

This exercise included the following major participants:

Florida Power Corporation Florida Division of Emergency Management Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Citrus County Emergency Management Levy County Emergency Management Agency All but one of the exercise objectives were demonstrated, and no NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 deficiencies were identified.

There were, however, five areas requiring corrective actions identified and several areas recommended for improvement which are listed in Sections III and IV of this report.

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DETAILED DISCUSSION i

i State of Florida.

/

Emercency Ocerations Facility (EOF) i Staffing of the' Emergency Operations Facility by the State j

emergency. response team was rapid, adequate, and appropriate.

4 Staff. members-were knowledgeable'and proficient in the.

1 performance of their assigned duties.

Adequate space and, k

equipment were,available for State-personnel.

The Governor's Authorized ~ Representative demonstrated excellent command and control.

Notifications to local agencies were made within the required 15-minute time period.

.l State and Florida Power. Corporation' representatives jointly and promptly. developed appropriate protective action recommendations.

Overall,'the State staff in the' EOF executed'their responsibilities in.a professional and well-organized manner, thereby' meeting'all applicable exercise objectives, sumerior Itense 1.

Command and control by the Governor's Authorized" Representative.

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2.

Proficiency of the Operations Officer.

deficiencies:

None.

Areas Reauirina corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Rece===nded for Incrovement:

None.

i L

Dose Assessment The State of Florida. Department of Health and Rehabilitative i

Services (DHRS) demonstrated the ability to perform radiological dose projections and recommend protective actions for the plume exposure pathway.

The State radiological assessment team made a smooth transition from the sarly waste gas tank releases and resulting dose projections to the later LOCA conditions.

Both releases led to protective action decisions based on projected airborne plume pathway exposures.

--_u--______-______-_-_-____----_____

~

The protective actions for sheltering and evacuation were based on current PAG ~ recommendations and models for the expected duration of release.

The protective action recommendations were made after consideration of plant status information, weather conditions, and field monitoring data.

The State field communications capability was greatly improved, most notably _the radio links to the Mobile Emergency Radiological Laboratory (MERL) and the field teams.

The field monitoring results are extremely important in dose projection and validation of the plume modeling estimation performed at the EOF.

The dose assessment room was a vital center of activity for the Florida Power Corporation and the State of Florida.

There was an orderly flow of information on the release parameters and the meteorological factors from the utility to the State.

This arrangement has many advantages, outweighing.the few disadvantages of crowding and noice level.

The DHRS dose assessment team is perfecting an additional capability via a radiological dose assessment computer model.

The model calculates whole body gamma and thyroid doses, as well as deposition rates and cummulative deposition, at predefined locations and meets the qualifications for dose assessment specified in NUREG-0654.

The atmospheric dispersion routines used in the model allow for the thermal inversion boundary layer (sea breeze) affects.

The State (DHRS) retains its present and back-up capability via hand-programmable computers.

The State uses a conservative 2000 ft. ceiling for stability classes o and F

All ten of the objectives for radiological dose projection and protective action decision-making were achieved.

Superior Items:

1.

Communications equipment and personnel.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for InDrovement:

None.

c Emeroency News' Center (ENC)

The Emergency' News Center is located in the utility's Nuclear, Operations Training Facility on West 7 Rivers Drive'in Crystal River.

.The plant EOF is located in the'same building.

Co-location of' State, county, and utility Pios at the ENC facilitated the coordination of news releases as well as the media' briefings..During the 1986 exercise, the location of PIO staffs in separate rooms prompted a recommendation that.they be co-located.

Adequate space and equipment, including telephones, were L

available for both news center staff and media representatives.-

L

" Insufficient 1 telephones" was identified as an inadequacy during the 1986 exercise.. The State, county, and utility staffs present in the ENC were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and coordinated'their activities well.

There were six news media briefings conducted during the three-hour period of exercise activity at the Media Center.

Before each briefing, State, county, and utility spokespersons coordinated what was to be presented.

Both actual and rock media were present at each briefing and asked appropriate and aggressive-questions.

The ENC spokespersons responded sincerely and skillfully to the media queries.

Media kits, adequate working space, telephones, and all news releases were available to the media representatives.

The spokespersons present at the briefings utilized several displays and diagrams in their presentations and, generally, avoided the use of technical jargon.

However, 10-mile EPZ sectors were generally referred to by their alphabetical designation; only in a few instances were geographical descriptions utilized by the spokespersons.

When information was not available to the spokespersons, or when

.they did not have the answers to media questions, they simply said they did not know but would have the proper response by the next briefing.

In every instance the response was, indeed, provided at the following briefing.

Although the PIO personnel from Citrus and Levy Counties were knowledgeable of their responsibilities and industrious, they were exceedingly busy attending briefings, coordinating, and answering telephone calls.

It is doubtful that this would be an adequate number of personnel during an actual emergency.

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.. Copies of EBS messages were not available at the ENC.

The prompt transmission of EBS messages from the counties to the ENC is necessary to ensure that all information given the public is coordinated and accurate.

The exercise actiNities at the Emergency News Center were a marked improvement over the 1986 exercise.

Most of the recommendations of the previous exercise were implemented, and all objectives were accomplished.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Provide an additional PIO for each county at the ENC.

2.

Utilize, as much as possible, geographical features to describe the sectors of the 10-mile EPZ.

3.

Request that counties provide copies of all EBS messages to' ENC staff.

Mobile Emercancy Radiclocical Laboratory (MERL)

The MERL was propositioned.

Activities and staffing at this location were limited because of the length and orientation of the scenario.

The survey teams were briefed and dispatched from the MERL.

The MERL assisted the " Rad Control" station by relaying information when necessary, and served well as a communication back-up.

Several samples (soil and vegetation) were delivered to ths MERL, processed through a hot line, and properly handled during preparation.

Although sample preparation was adequate, suggestions were disdussed that would make preparation less cumbersome and faster.

Counting procedures and data reporting were in accordance with accepted practices.

Equipment was properly maintained and operational.

General information concerning the emergency was not displayed for MERL personnel.

The overall operation of the MERL was adequate and appropriate to the level of activity projected by the scenario.

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Deficiencies:..None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

' Reexamine sample preparation area and support equipment.. Consider the use of. wide-mouthed containers as;recepticals for waste material and Rad wash procedures.

2.

Develop method for displaying pertinent emergency information.

Field Monitorina Teams 1 and 3 Field team members and other radiological' health personnel were largely repositioned with equipment and supplies at the MERL location in Crystal River prior to the Alert notification.

Three two-person radiological monitoring teams were promptly deployed following an equipment' check-out and briefings.

'Each vehicle had two radios-(primary and back-up) and communications were very good throughout the exercise; however, the vehicle-to-vehicle communication was not continuous.

Field monitoring team maps were excellent, enabling teams to find assigned. locations.

. Ambient radiation measurements were conducted. satisfactorily.

Air ~ sampling for.radioiodines and particulate was demonstrated.

In view of the relative importance of'radiciodines in the dose projections, more air sampling should have been conducted.

A

. higher. priority chould have been assigned to the return of air samples to the MERL.

The-teams had suitable equipment and ample supplies in general.

However, one of tts single-channel analysers in use for radioiodine. monitoring'did not check out properly before the teams were dispatched, and no spare was available.

Field teams did not have silver zeolite cartridges in their possession and only two charcoal cartridges appeared to be in the possession of the team observed demonstrating air sampling.

l While a limited stock of silver zeolite cartridges were stored at the MERL, these were dated five years earlier, and visual inspection prompted some concern that State personnel should be cognizant of the possibility of the deterioration of their silver g

I zeolite cartridges.

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i Personnel exposure control was generally good.

However, two of the four 0-20R range dosimeters had not been zeroed properly or I

were defective.

I SuDerior Items:

1.

organization of radiological activities.

2.

Field monitoring maps.

{

i 3.

Communications.

j Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirine Corrective Actions:

None.

l l

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Quantity'and quality of radioiodine cartridge supply should be reexamined.

2.

Critical equipment spares should be available.

3.

Improve team designation to avoid potentially confusing similarities of radio call numbers and team identification numbers.

Field Monitoring. Team _2 Communications espebility among the field teams, the field-team coordinator, and the MERL was fully demonstrated.

The radio communications system was excellent.

Transmissions. ware clear with no dead spots, and no failures were observed.

However, the radio / car designation (e.g., RAD 3) was not the same as the Team's designation (e.g., Team #2).

This dual designation lead to some confusion early in the exarcise.

Communication protocol could be simplified if the team number were the same as the car / radio number.

Members of the field team were supplied with the required self-reading and permanent-record dosimeters.

The players read the dosimeters every 30 minutes and recorded the values on record cards.

The teams were well trained in exposure control procedures.

Turn-back values were printed on the EPZ maps.

Ambient radiation monitoring was demonstrated by the field teams in accordance with established procedures.

Equipment was correctly calibrated and operational.

The significance of the

-various measurements was understoed by the team.

They were able to interpret their measurements and accurately track the path and j

edge of the plume.

Readings were transmitted promptly to the

a;

' r EOF.

Proper radio protocol was used.

However, the time that measurements were obtained was not always transmitted to the EOF.

The. sample time was assumed'to be the same as the transmission time.. Time'is a critical component of any sample.

Along with the: location and measured values, the sample time must be included.

Airborne radioiodine sampling was-conducted in accordance with-established procedures.

Team members followed written procedures L

step-by-step.- External electrical connectors were built into the field vehicles to-facilitate safe and rapid' operations.

The single-channel analyzer failed to operate reliably during the-exercise.

One. particulate sample was collected.

Sumerior Items:

1.

Dosimetry.

2.

Communications.-

3.

EPZ map with checklists, procedures and turn-back

-values.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Repair single-channel analyzert obtain back-up in case of failure.

2.

Include sample time with sample values.

3.

Assign.the same number to the team and team car / radio.

Medical Services The accident was reported to the Emergency Medical Services'(EMS) dispatcher at 8:39 a.m.

All of the regular EMS crews that would normally respond were occupied with real emergencies or back-up duties.

Therefore, this part of the scenario objective was not dear.nstrated.

The patient was transported to the' hospital in an EMF vehicle not normally used for patient transport.

The hospital Emergency Room (ER) received the call of a contaminated patient at 9:05 a.m. and immediately began preparing the patient receiving and treatment area.

The hospital staff had adequately prepared the area and dressed out the personnel by 9:30 a.m.

4 1

_9 j

1 The staff acted promptly and appropriately to contain.

contamination and treat the simulated injury.

The staff 1

demonstrated careful and deliberate action in the treatment and I

assessment of the patient..

l A' full demonstration'of the adequacy of the hospital staff and facilities was achieved during this drill.

However, demonstration of the.mdequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals was incomplete due to actual emergencies.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for' Improvement:

1.

During future exercises, patients should be prepared with realistic injuries an.d specific areas of contamination to more thoroughly test the ability of the medical personnel to control contamination.

The i

use of an on-site controller with pre-established f

conditions (i.e., medical symptoms, how accident occurred) would greatly improve the realism of the exercise.

2.

Rather than have a county health department trained monitor propositioned at the accident site, have the i

sector on-call monitor respond to the same call that activates the EMS system.

This would realistically test the ability of the county to locate and dispatch a trained monitor.

i 3.

The hospital Emergency Roon Lead Nurse has instructions

]

to always call the power plant for either confirmation

{

or information and assistance when the'ER is notified of a contaminated patient.

Attempts by the nurse to accomplish this were unsuccessful.

Since this was an off-site patient, the plant had no information about the situation and, in fact, attempted to convince the

]

nurse that this was a hoax.

After several calls the 4

nurse was still unable to clarify this issue.

In future exercises the plant should provide the agreed upon assistance.

It was understood that a plant HP l'

would not respond on this exercise in order to give the l

county monitor a chance to take the lead.

However, the l

nurse was trying to obtain information about what type of contamination could be expected on the incoming patient.

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An' issue related to'the above incident concerns updated telephone numbers.

One cf the two power plant numbers.

that the nurse called.was no longer-correct.

She was informed that the~ unit she was trying;to contact had.

-moved.. Telephona. number changes for emergencyJworkers should be-immediately transmitted to all a;tropriate parties.

4 5.

The hospital treatment room has no~ provision for

-isolating the ventilation return port.

Therefore, it is recommended the access port be covered with a

. suitable material (such as a piece.of pre-cut. yellow

.herculite) and taped.

This.would prevent airborne l

4 contamination-from entering the main hospital' ventilation system.

6.

Because of the size of.the room, the portable x-ray

. unit cannot be brought into the room.

Therefore,. i f i t' is necessary to x-ray'the patient before being declared free fron contamination, the decontamination table must be moved to'the door or just outside of the room.

When.

moving the table it is recommended that the. table be disconnected from the drain and receptacle and he capped off to prevent potential: spillage and for ease-of. movement.

7.

A step-off area sign (for contamination control) should be.used in future exercises.

8.

Nine of the hospital staff have completed the ORAU REACTS course.

This was evident by the skills and proficiency demonstrated-by these individuals. LWhen possible, it.is recommended that the ER physicians be given the opportunity to attend this training.

9.

When performing radiation surveys of.the patient, the hospital' staff should check the patient's back if the extent of contamination'is not known.

This oversight on this exercise eculd have been dbe to the limited information provided by the ambulance crew.

All of the regular EMS crews that would normally respond were tied up with real emergencies at the time of the exercise.

cf

-11.

l Citrus County

~

' Emercencv Ooerations Center (EOC)

Citrus" County operated from a new Emergency Operations Center, completed within:the past 90 days.

The EOC was activated and-fully staffed.within about 30 minutes.. Proper. call-up procedures were followed.

Security was provided by the Citrus County

, Sheriff's Office.

Fifty-one individuals representing elements of-

' Citrus' County government having emergency responsibilities participated.in the exercise at the EOC.

The-County Administrator and his assistant, as well as'the Chairman of the

-County Commission, participated at the EOC.

Excellent leadership.was displayed by county officials, including the County. commission Chairman, Emergency. Management Director, and. Chief of Operations, Citrus County Sheriff's Office.

t The new-EOC has a superior communications capability.- The new building also is-the. location of the "911" emergency services and is operated on n 24-hour basis.

RACES operators-participated ~but were not required to provide back-up communications'since systems operated properly.

Sufficient EOC briefings were conducted by the Emergency Management Director.

Information exchange could be betteri ffected if organizations present in the EOC were called e

upon'at each briefing for a current status report of activities.

Siren activation was simulated at'both Site Area Emergency and.

General Emergency.

However, the activation and EBS message, not actually broadcast, met the 15-minute-criterion and were closelyL coordinated with State of Florida and Levy County officials. 'It l

13 suggested that a copy of.the EBS massage be provided to the Emergency' News Center; however, in an~ actual emergency, the' ENC would monitor tha broadcast and know the content of the message.

The Rumor Control staff in the EOC performed in a superior 3

. This activity was staffed with six well-qualified manner.

individuals.

EOC equipment, including maps, displays, status boards, and furniture, was excellent.

Posting of wind direction, sectors where protective actions had been taken, and displaying the population of each sector on the operations map would enhance the EOC operations.

Also demonstrated by the Sheriff's Office was a helicopter with a recently installed siren and public address system.

This could be utilized to warn beaters, fishermen, and tisnsients.

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Sunerior Ita==:'

~1.

Rumor Control operations.

2.

Communications capability.

.a 3.

Support provided.by the Citrus County Sheriff.'s office.

I

Deficiencies:. None.

~ Areas Reauirina' Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

_ Indicate lon the operations map the wind direction and which sectors have been evacuated or sheltered.

. 2.

Post: population of.each sector on-operations map.

.3..

. Transmit copies of EBS messages to Emergency News Center.

4.

Determine the local landmarks to describe each sector or any combinations of sectors in advance of actual need'for information.

Outside Activitigg Recention Center / Shelter'- The reception center / shelter operation.

was located at the Withlacoochee Vocational Technical Center in Invarness, Florida.

The overall management and staff participation was exctllent.

Etaff members representing Red-j i

'Crost., the Citrus County Emergency Management, and RACES were

(

enthusiastic and knowledgeable of their assigned duties.

This: center had adequata shower and kitchen facilities,.as well as areas to' accommodate approximately 2300 handicapped individuals and their families.

This facility was last used during Hurricana Elenalin 1986. ' Adequate communication systems exist to 1

communicate with the Citrus County EOC and all field personnel.

j J

Approximately 60 handicapped individuals from Key Pine Village were monitored and registered.

Two' individuals were decontaminated in an area clearly marked and well prepared.

Adequate equipment and supplies were available and used during the simulated-decontamination procedures.

Individuals were

-4

• monitored prior to, and after, showering.. Disposable' clothing was issued to the two individuals after the scrub-down had been completed.

All individuals participating in the decontamination area were well trained and very knowledgeable of their assigned duties.

All areas requiring corrective actions in the 1986 exercise report were successfully implemented.

Superior Items:

1.

Reception center / shelter management.

2.

Committment and enthusiasm of participants.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

None.

Traffic Control Points (TCP's)/ Boat Ramos - The Citrus County Sheriff's Department adequately demonstrated the capability to control vehicular evacuation of, and access to, a contaminated Dosimetry for emergency workers was adequate.

Written area.

procedures were utilized by the three Deputies assigned traffic and access control duties.

Areas requiring-corrective actions have been corrected since the June 1986 exercise.

Continued radiological training for emergency workers is recommended now that adequate dosimetry equipment has been acquired.

Four public boat ramps in Ciurus County were visited.

None of these rexps han signs advising boaters of the procedures to follow in the event of an accident at Crystal River.

(G.2.)

QRficiencies:

None.

i Areti Recuirina Corrective Jctions:

1.

G.2. - Post information/ warning signs adjacent to public boat ramps.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Provide additional emergency worker training for all personnel assigned to traffic and access control duties.

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Decontamination - The Citrus County Fire Department' established a.

vehicle' decontamination station on US-19/98 at the Cross State Canal.

This location is approximately 4.5 miles from the

~

3 facility and would be a main evacuation route in an. emergency.

I Water from the carial would be used for wash-down, and used water would flow back into the canal.

1 During.the demonstration two vehicles were adequately.

j decontaminated.

The driver of one vehicle was found to be contaminated.

She was sent to.the. reception center.in Inverness for. decontamination.

When questioned as to how this person would get to Inverness, the evaluator was told that she could drive South on 19/98 and then via State roads to Inverness.

This would L

require. going closer to the power plant and against the flow of L

evacuating traffic on US-19/98.

Thistis the established procedure in order to keep the contaminated person in Citrus

{

County for-control purposes.

(J.10.j.)

j i

Deficiencies:

None.

Argas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

1.

J.10.j. - Procedures require maintaining control of contaminated people in Citrus County even though this may require going against the evacuation flow.

Reevaluate this procedure to see if contaminated persons could be decontaminated'in Levy County, outside the 10-mile EPZ.

Areas. Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Citrus County fire personnel performing decontamination duties have had little " hands-on" experience.

Provide additional training.

Echool EERGMAfd9.D - A discussion took place at the Citrus County EOC wita che Citrus County School District Administrative Assistant in charge of echool evacuaticn.

The discussion included a review of school evacuation procedures.

An actnal school evacuation did not take place since it was not an objective of this exercise.

The official notification of an emergency would be accomplished via a telephone call from the Citrus County Emergency Management Director to the School District, although it is likely that sirens would be heard at some schools.

The telephone list was up-to-date and included alternates.

The School District would, in turn, notify the individual school principals.

There are three schools in Citrus County within the 10-mile EPZ.

The three schools are extremely close geographically.

Each principal has a copy of the school EOP.

____.mm.

'. -.The bus-drivers are adults, and the vehicles'are parked.at L

centrally located areas.in'the county during off-duty hours, and s

the drivers are either at~the-bus centers or located nearby.

Eighty percent of the buses are equipped with'two-way radios.

Deficiencies:

None.-

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Areas-Recommended for Improvement:

1.-

Provide' additional training in evacuation procedures for administrators and teachers.

i 2.

Provide relocation' shelter information to the parents of all school. children to avoid panic in the event of

~

an emergency.

At this time only families living inside the'10-mile EPZ are issued information, yet many live 4

outside this area but have children attending those schools.

Mobility-Innaired - No actual demonstration of ability to deal with the mobility-impaired took place since it was not an objective of1the exercise.

A member of the Citrus County Emergency Management responsible for the mobility-impaired citizens discussed procedures and plans for the mobility-impaired with the evaluator.

The list of "special-needs" people is currently categorized by township in Citrus County and is being computerized to include:

a) township; b) evacuation sector; c) mode / method of transportation vehicle.needed; and d) type of impairment.

The data, lists and plans are kept current because of the annual threat of hurricane activity in the area.

Deficiencies:

None.

1 Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions:

None.

Arman Recommended for Improvement:

None.

{

Levy County Emercancy Onerations Center (EOC)

The EOC, located in the basement of the Levy County Courthouse in Bronson, has sufficient space to support emergency operations.

Maps and displays were adequate, but better arrangement of the status boards would enhance their usage.

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4 F The State, Citrus and Levy counties, and the utility used a

~

dedicated telephone to exchange information and to coordinate decisions.-

The EOC had local government. radio as a back-up.

Each EOC staff position in'the operations room did not'have a telephone.-

In;the event of an actual; emergency, a considerable wait to use.the' telephone could develop.

The EOC also did not have the Sheriff's Department and. Highway Department radios, which wouldfallow direct communication with emergency workers.in the field.

.(F.1.)

The EOC was effectively managed by the Director of the Department of Emergency Management.

Protective action decisions were made in consultation with.the County Commissioner present and were further coordinated with the State and~C.itrus County.

The EOC taff members were knowledgeable and carried out their duties s

efficiently.

The DEM. Director also' acted as the Rumor Control contact.

This function should, however, be delegated to other EOC staff'to enable the.DEM Director to more fully concentrate on EOC management.

(G.4.c.)

Public Alert and Notification was' coordinated with Citrus County.

The simulated activation of the Public Alert and Notification System met the-requirements of NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1.

.Since there are no.available broadcast stations in Levy County, Citrus County broadcasts all EBS' massages.

The counties used prescripted EBS messages and coordinated'their use.

The first message indicated that, should a radioactive release occur, its effects would be confined within the plant' boundary and pose no threat to the public. -When the decision was made to evacuate at l

8:54 a.m.,

Levy County decided to evacuate out to ten miles because the' majority of the population in Levy County lives I

within seveu milen of the plant..The area from seven to ten miles is mostly swamp or woodland and has no permanent residents.

A minor release occurred at S:15 a.m.

The EBS messaga concerning evacuation did not provide a description of the boundary in terms

(

of recognizable geographic landmarks.

i D.aficiencies:

None.

Areas Reauirina Corrective Aptions:

1.

F.1. - Provids sufficient telephones for the EOC staff and a means to integrate the county emergency radio capability from the EOC.

2.

G.4.c.

- Train personnel to staff the Rumor Control function to relieve the DEM Director of those duties.

c

-17.

Areas Recommended for Incrovement:

1..

Define' sectors by using geographic landmarks.

2.-

Modify the status boards.so that they can.be: hung on

~

the. wall ~and better utilized.-

3..

Roquest a utility representative at the EOC to provideL

technical :information to-the Eoc staff.

1 Outside Activities Recention Center / Shelter The relocation center at Bronson High School was an. adequate shelter: facility.

Five. persons.were repositioned:

the Shelter Manager, the school custodian, two-

. registrars, and.a Deputy Sheriff.

An, adequate radiological monitoring. demonstration was.provided at

.the entrance to.the shelter by two Civil Air ~ Patrol personnel.

However, plastic gloves were not used and-the survey meter was not protected from potential contamination.

Although no evacuees were present,.an adequate. demonstration of sheltering,; monitoring _

and decontamination capability was accomplished, as well as the' full' activation of trained shelter staff.

Deficiencing:

None'.

Areas Reauirina Corrective' Actions:

None.

Areas Recommended'for Improvement:-

1.

Provide plastic gloves for radiological monitors and

~

protectionLfor'the survey meter.

2.

-Provido additional training for radiological monitoring personnel.

Traffic Control Point's (TCP's)/ Boat Ramna - The capability of Levy County traffic and access control, which-was an objective and an arma requiring corrective action from the previous l

exercise, was not demonstrated.

.The intent was to have a traffic control point northbound on U.S.

19 and CR 121 just before the Lebanon Station vehicle decontamination facility.

However, the Deputy Sheriff assigned to the site received an emergency call to' report to a fire before the traffic control point was set up.

(J.10.j.)

~

'q. one public boat ramp in Levy County was visited.

Information/

warning signs concerning the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant are installed in the area but not adjacent to the boat ramp.

Deficiencies:

None.

Areas Recuirina Corrective Actions:

{

1.

J.10.j. - The capability of Levy County traffic and access control was not demonstrated during this exercise.

The next exercise should require that i

traffic and access control measures be demonstrated.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

1.

Post information/ warning signs adjacent to public boat ramps.

Decontamination - A vehicle decontamination facility was set up.

and demonstrated by the Inglis Volunteer Fire Department at Lebanon Station in Levy County.

An area was roped off for monitoring and wash-down.

During the monitoring procedure, the.

i probes were protected by surgical-gloves to preclude contamination.

All procedures were generally performed in an effective manner.

A barrel was used for disposal of contaminated equipment.

The.firefighters were very thorough and conscientious.

They were all equipped with self-reading dosimeters and wara familiar with the procedures for the checking and recording of readings.

Effective radio communications with the Levy County EOC were possible from the decontamination center.

Suoerior Itgag:

1.

Vehicle decontamination procedures demonstrated by the l

Inglis Volunteer Fire Department.

q Deficiencies:

None.

I Arene kacuirina Corrective Actions:

Nona.

Areas Recommended for Improvement:

None.

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF INADEQUACIES l

' Facility or NUREG Corrective Scheduled Activity Item Action Date of Completion Deficiencies None Areas Reauirina Corrective Actions Citrus G.2.

Post information/ warning County signs adjacent to public boat ramps.

J.10.j.

Procedures require maintain-ing control of contaminated people in Citrus County even though this may require going against the evacuation flow.

Reevaluate this procedure to see if contaminated persons could be decontaminated in Levy County, outside the 10-mile EPZ.

Levy F.1.

Provide sufficient telephones County for the EOC staff and a means to integrate the county emergency radio capability from the EOC.

G.4.c.

Train personnel to staff the Rumor Control function to relieve the DEM Director of those duties.

J.10.j.

The capability of Levy County traffic and access control was not demonstrated during this exercise.

The next exercise should require that traffic and access control measures be demonstrated.

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SUMMARY

LISTING OF AREAS RECOMMENDED l

FOR IMPROVEMENT Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement ENC 1.

Provide an additional PIO for each county at the ENC.

2.

Utilize, as much as possible, geographical features to describe the sectors of the lO-mile EPZ.

3.

Request that counties provide copies of all EBS mes' sages to ENC staff.

MERL 1.

Reexamine sample preparation area and

)

support equipment.

Consider the use of wide-mouthed containers as recepticals

~

for waste material and Rad wash procedures.

2.

Develop method for displaying pertinent emergency information.

Field Monitoring 1.

Quantity and quality of radioiodine Teams 1 and 3 cartridge supply should be reexamined.

2.

Critical equipment spares should be 1

available, 3.

Improve team designation to avoid potentially confusing similarities of radio call numbers and team identification numbers.

Field Monitoring 1.

Repair single-channel analyzer; obtain Team 2 back-up in case of failure.

l 2.

Include sample time with sample values.

3.

Assign the same number to the team and team car / radio.

.. Facility or Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement Medical Services 1.

During future exercises, patients should be prepared with realistic injuries and specific areas of contamination to more thoroughly test the ability of the medical personnel to control contamination.

The use of an on-site controller with pre-established conditions (i.e., medical synptoms, how accident occurred) would greatly improve the realism of the exercise.

2.

Rather than have a county health department trained monitor repositioned at the accident site, have the sector on-call monitor respond to the same call that activates the EMS system.

This would realistically test the ability of the county to locate and dispatch a trained monitor.

3.

The hospital Emergency Room Lead Nurse has instructions to always call the power plant for either confirmation or information and assistance when the ER is notified of a contaminated patient.

Attempts by the nurse to accomplish this were unsuccessful.

Since this was an off-site patient, the plant had no information about the situation and, in fact, attempted to convince the nurse that this was a hoax.

After several calls the nurse was still unable to clarify this issue.

In future exercises the plant should provide the agreed upon assistance.

It was understood that a plant HP would not respond on this exercise in order to give the county monitor a chance to take the lead.

However, the nurse was trying to obtain information about what type of contamination could be expected on the incoming patient.

l

) Facility or.

Activity Areas Recommended for Improvement i

)

Medical Services 4.

An issue related to the above incident (Continued) concerns updated telephone numbers.

One-of the two power plant numbers that the nurse called was no longer correct.

She was informed that the unit she was trying to contact had moved.

Telephone number changes for emergency workers should be immediately transmitted to all appropriate parties.

5.

The hospital treatment room has no.

provision for isolating the ventilation return port.

Therefore, it is recommended the access port be covered with a yellow suitable material (such as a piece of' pre-cut yellow herculite) and taped.

This would prevent airborne contamination from entering the main hospital ventilation system.

6.

Because of the size of.the room, the portable x-rsy unit cannot be brought into the room.

Therefore, if it is necessary to x-ray the patient before being declared free from contamination, the decontamination table must be moved to the door or just outside of the room.

When moving the table it is recommended that the table be disconnected from the drain and receptacle and be capped off to prevent potential spillage and for ease of movement.

7.

A step-off area sign (for contamination control) should be used in future exercises.

8.

Nine of the hospital staff have completed the ORAU REACTS course.

This was evident by the skills and proficiency demonstrated by these individuals.

When possible, it is recommended that the ER physicians be given the opportunity to attend this training.

-m-___.__._

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.,o.

Facility or

Activity-Areas Recommended for Improvement Medical Services 9.

When' performing radiation. surveys of the

-(Continued) patient, the hospital staff should check the patient's back if the extent-of contamination =is not known..This oversight:on this exercise could have-been.due to the limited information provided by the ambulance crew.

All of-the regular-EMS crews that would-normally respond were tied up'with real'

' emergencies at the time of the exercise.

Citrus County 1.

Indicate on the operations map the: Wind direction and which sectors have been evacuated or sheltered.

2.

Post population of each sector.on operations map.

3.

Transmit copies'of EBS messages to-Emergency News Center.

4.

Determine the local landmarks to describe each sector or any combinations of sectors in advance of actual need for information.

5.

Provide additional emergency worker training'for all personnel assigned tc traffic and access control duties.

6.

Citrus County fire personnel performing decontamination duties have had little i

" hands-on" experience.

Provide additional training.

7.

Provide additional training in evacuation procedures for administrators and teachers.

8.

Provide relocation shelter information to the parents of all school children to avoid panic in the event of an emergency.

At this time only families living inside the 10-mile EPZ are issued information, yet many live outside this area but have children attending those schools.

o

.. a o-

,j l ' Facility or-Activity

~ Areas Recommended'for Improvement 1 '-

l Levy County 1.

DefineLsectors by using geographic f

landmarks.

-2..

Modify the status boards: so that they can be hung-on.the wall and. batter-utilized.

3.-

. Request a utility representative:at the EOC to provide technical information to the EOC' staff.

'4.

Provida plastic gloves for radiological monitors and protection for the~ survey meter.

5.

Provide additional training.for radiological monitoring personnel.

6.

Post.information/ warning signs adjacent to'public boat ramps.

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M

. V.

APPENDICES A.

Evaluator List and Assignments B.

Exercise Objectives and Scenario Y

FEDERAL EVALUATOR ASSIGNMENTS CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXERCISE June 9, 1988 CHIEF OF EVALUATORS AND RAC CHAIRMAN Glenn Woodard (FEMA)

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF)

David Richards (DOE)

Chuck Wakamo (EPA)

MEDIA CENTER Tom Hawkins (FEMA)

Denise Hunt,(FEMA)

MOBILE EMERGENCY RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORY (MERL)

Brad Eichorst (CHHS/FDA)

Malcolm Frazier (DHHS/FDA)

MEDICAL ACTIVITIES Gary Sirmons (DHHS/HRSA)

RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING FIELD TEAMS Caroline Herzenberg (FEMA)

Jim Levenson (FEMA)

CITRUS COUNTY John Heard (FEMA)

Bill McSwain (FEMA)

Tim Dowd (FEMA)

LEVY COUNTY Larry Robertson (FEMA)

Don Hammonds (FEMA)

Angelo Spano (FEMA)

MOBILE EVALUATQES, Lamar Arrendale (DOT)

Walt Lucas (DOT)

Al Hall (FEMA)

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ST ATE OF FLORID A D EP A R TM ENT~ OF COMM U NITY AFF AIRS 2371 E X E C U TIV E CE N T E R C I R C L E, E A S T

• T A L L A H A S S E E, F L O R I D A 32399 808 MARitNEZ THOMAS G. PELH AM

~

March 25, 1988 Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency j

1371 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30309

Dear Mr. Woodard:

Enclosed for your review and approval are goals and objectives for.the June 9, 1988 partial participation exercise at the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant.

The goals and objectives were developed with input from state agencies, Citrus and Levy counties and Florida Power Corporation.

The first scenario development group meeting is scheduled for April 6, 1988 at 1:00 p.m.

in the Citrus County EOC located in Lecanto, Florida.

Other meetings are tentatively scheduled every twO weeks thereafter.

You or your representative are invited to participate in any of these meetings and in the navelopment of the scenario.

If.you have any questions or comments, please contact me at the Department of Community Af fairs, Division of Emergency M anagement, 2740 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904/487-4918).

Sincerely, s

Gordon L. Guthrie Director GLG:sh Enclosure EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT e HOU$ LNG AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT e RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT i

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-GOALS AND OBJECTIVES j

CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER. PLANT

]

PARTIAL PARTICIPATION STATE / LOCAL EXERCISE i

June 9,.1988 a

The following goals and objectives reflect appropriate staffing by the State of Florida.

The licensee's Emergency j

Operations ' Facility will be sta f fed by the Governor's Authorized

{

Representative,;the Public_Information Officer located at the Emergency News Center, and liaison personnel assigned to local 4

government-emergency operations centers.

The exercise will eval-uate emergency response and communications capabilities among state and local governments, and the licensee.

Goals I.-

To evaluate portions of the Florida Radiological Emergency Management Plan for Nuclear Power Plants and confirm its adequacy f or response to an emergency situation at the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant.

Specific portions of the plan to be addressed are:

A.

Annex P - Crystal River Site Plan B.

Annex B - Emergency Response Organizations and Responsibilities C.

Annex C - Direction and Control D.

Annex D - Emergency Classification System l

E.

Annex E - Notification and Activation F.

Annex F - Emergency Communications G.

Annex G - Public Information H.

Annex H - Emergency Facilities Revised:

4/5/88

c, 2

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I.

Annex I - Accident Assessment J.:

Annex J - Radiological Exposure. Control K.

Annex K - Protective Response L.

Annex L - Medical and Public ' Health. Support Objectives The following objectives will be demonstrated by indicated agencies during the exercise.

Division of Emergency Management 1.

Ability to mobilize and activate facilities promptly.

2.

Ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock. (SEOC will not be fully ' activated. )

3.

Ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency.

activities.

5.

Ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

21.

Ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

24.

Ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner.

25.

Ability to provide advance coordination of inf ormation

~

released.

32.

Ability to identif y need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance.

-;.Q;*

p i

r Departr ent' of - Health and Rehabilitative Services / Office of Radiation' Control

'5.

Ability'to' communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and fi~ eld personnel.

6.

Ability to mobilize and deploy field monitoring teams 'in-a; timely fashion.

i 3

7.

Appropriate equipment and procedures for determining ambient ~ radiation levels.

8.

Appropriate equipment and procedures for'the measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10-7 uCi/cc.in the presence of noble gas.

t 11 0.

AbilityL to project dosage-to the public-via plume expo-sure, based on plant and field data, and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on' PAG's, available shelter, evacuation time estimates, and all other appropriate factors.

20.

Ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure.

21.

Ability to make the decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency ; workers and/or the general population.

22.

Ability to supply KI, once the decision has been made to-do so.

k Citrus and Levy Counties:

l.

Ability to mobilize and activate facilities promptly.

2.

Ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock.

i 3.

Ability to make decisions and to coordinate emergency activities.

4.

Adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations.

5.

Ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations and field personnel.

13.

Ability to alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes.

14.

Ability to formulate and distribute appropriate instruc-tions to the public in a timely fashion.

15.

The organizational ability and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the plume EPZ.

16.

The organizational ability and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, as inclement weather or traffic obstructions.

17.

The organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to an evacuated area.

18.

The organizational ability and resources necessary to ef fect an orderly evacuation of mobility - impaired i

individuals within the plume EPZ.

19.

Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to ef f ect an orderly evacuation of schools

]

within the plume EPZ.

(Citrus County only.)

i 20.

Ability to continuously monitor and control emergency 1

worker exposure.

m 4

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21.

Ability to make the decision, based on predetermined L

criteria,.whether to issue KI to emergency workers and/or the general population.

22.

Ability to supply and administer KI, once the decision has been made to do so.

24.

Ability to brief the media in a clear, accurate and timely manner..

25.

Ability to provide advance coordination of inf ormation -

released.

26.

Ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

27.

Adequacy of procedures for the registration'and radiolo-gical monitoring of evacuees.

28.

Adequacy of facilities for mass-care of evacuees.

29.

Equipment and procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

30.

Adequacy of ambulance facilities and procedures for handling contaminated individuals.

(Citrus County only.)

31.

Demonstrate adequacy of hospital facilities and proce-dures for handling contaminated individuals.

(Citrus

/

County.only.)

32.

Abt; ty to identify need for, request, and obtain Federal assistance, i

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ST ATE OF FLORID A D EP A RTM ENT OF COMMU NITY A FF AIRS 2371 EXECUTIVE CENTER C I R C L E, E A S T

• T A L L A H A S S E E, F L O R I D A 32399 BOB MARTINEZ THOMAS G. PtLH AM April 25, 1988 i

Mr. Glenn C. Woodard, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency 1371 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 3030 9

Dear Mr. Woodard:

Enclosed is the scenario f or the Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant partial participation plume exposure pathway exercise.

The exercise time window will be on June 9, 1988 from 4:00 a.m.

to 2:00 p.m.

The scenario was developed by representatives of Florida Power Corporation; the Florida Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management; the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS); Citrus County Division of Emergency Management; and Levy County Department of Bnergency Management.

The scenario is adequate to test and demonstrate capabilities as required by the exercise objectives.

Control messages are being developed to assure full demonstration of emergency response activities.

I have also enclosed a schedule of meetings and personnel assigned for the exercise.

The Controller / Evaluator briefing will initially include the Citrus and Levy County Directors to discuss the timing and locations of all outside activities.

The following will be fully activated and exercised:

- Citrus and Levy County EOCs;

- Emergency Operations Facility;

- Emergency News Center;

- DHRS Radiation Control personnel with the Mobile Emergency Radiation Laboratory; and

- DERS Field Teams.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

• HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT e RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

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Mr. Glenn Woodard.

April 25, 1988 Page : Two The State Emergency operations Center will be. partially

. activated.for the. exercise,.but:not for evaluation purposes.

.If.you have.any. questions, please contact me at the Department of Community Aff airs, Division of Emergency.

Management, 2740 Centerview Drive, Tallahassee,- Florida 323 99.

Sincerely, Gordon L. 'Guthrie Director GLG:sh Enclosures l

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CRYSTAL RIVER NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l

EXERCISE SCENARIO

SUMMARY

June 9,1988 Time Activ ity/ Even t i

4:40 AM.

Initial conditions distributed to control room J

operators.

1 4:50 AM Control room receives a report' of a fire in the Health Physics Calibration Lab (95' elevation Control Complex).

The fire alarm is sounded and the Fire Brigade is dispatched.

5:00'AM The Fire Brigade arrives at the scene to discover smoke and flames in the area.

An individual nearby reports seeing 2-3 people in the vicinity before the fire broke out.

The Medical Emergency Team-is notified.

i 05 AM The fire is still in progress, the Shift' Supervisor declares an UNUSUAL EVENT based on a fire >10 minutes duration.

State and local authorities as well as the NRC are notified.

5:10 AM Fire Team Leader reports that one person has been rescued and is being attended to by the MET but does not appear to be seriously injured.

The fire is still burning and the Fire Brigade is uncertain as to how many more people are trapped.

5:20 AM State Warning Point notified of UNUSUAL EVENT.

5:25 AM The Fire Team Leader reports that the fire has been extinguished.

A second person has been~ rescued.

The extent of the injuries appear to be first and second degree burns on chest and legs and smoke inhalation.

The first person rescued suf fered minor smoke inhala-tion only.

An ambulance is requested and dispatched.

Seven Rivers hospital is notified.

5:27 AM A work crew that evacuated the Auxiliary Building due to the fire left an improperly installed hoist in place in the waste gas valve alley on 95' elevation.

The hoist causes a failure of a waste gas header line resulting in a small crack and a release of activity into the Auxiliary Building.

The source of the leak is the Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) and cannot be isolated.

5:30 AM The control room receives an alarm (RM-A3 WARNING) indicating increased activity in the Auxiliary Building.

L s

5:33 AM

.The control room receives an alarm (RM-A2 WARNING) indicating low level release to the environment below Technical Specifications.

5:35 AM State Warning Point completes initial notification.

5:45 AM The ambulance arrives onsite and transports both vic-tims to Seven Rivers Hospital.

5:55 AM The waste gas line f alls completely causing a large

. increase in' release rate.

The control room receives RM-A2 and RM-A3 HIGH alarms.

5 : 5 9 AM RM-A2 reaches Technical Specification levels.

6:05 AM RM-A2 reaches 10 times Technical Specification limits, and based on this the Emergency coordinator declares an ALERT.

State, local and NRC authorities are not!.fied.

TSC activation begins and the Environmental Survey Team' and Dose Assessment Team prepare to activate.

6:20 AM' State Warning Point notified of ALERT.

Citrus and Levy counties begin activation procedures.

6:25 AM The TSC ir staffed and operational and the release con-tinues f rom the WGDT.

6:30 AM

.The. Emergency Coordinator receives f ollow-up inf or-mation concerning the accident victims.

The first victim is in good condition but is being held for observation (mild smoke inhalation), the-second victim is. in critical condition and is being airlif ted to Tampa Burn Center.

6:35 AM A SITE AREA EMERGENCY is declared based on a dose rate of >50 mr/hr for greater than 30 minutes at the Site Boundary.

State, local and NRC authorities are notified and the EOF is activated.

6:45 AM WGDT pressure continues to decrease due to the leak thus decreasing radioactive release rate through the plant vent (RM-A2) to the environment.

6:50 AM State Warning Point notified of SITE AREA EMERGENCY and EOF activation.

State personnel report to DOF71NC.

6:54 AM A heater drain limit switch shorts causing a reactor trip.

The turbine f ails to trip and is tripped locally.

6:57 AM The transient (reactor trip) causes a small break reac-tor coolant system leak of 30 gpm in the Reactor Building.

7:06 AM The control room receives a Reactor Building Sump alarm.

7:15 AM RM-A2 is at normal levels

(< Tech. Spec. ) and WGDT pressures is O psi thus terminating the release to the en viro nmen t.

The RCS leak in the Reactor Building is now at 4 8 g pm.

7:20 AM The control room receives an RM-A6 WARNING alarm indi-cating increased activity in the Reactor Building atmosphere.

The decision is made to initiate plant cooldown procedures.

Preliminary steps are started to prepare for cooldown ( OP-20 9 ).

.7:33 AM Control Rod Group 1 (safeties) withdrawn, plant cooldown is started per (OP-103B).

7:36 AM The Control Room receives an RM-A6 HIGH alarm, activity in the Reactor' Building continues to increase.

7:37 AM The RCS leak ~ continues in the Reactor. Building.

RB pressure is at 1 psig, the Reactor Building sump is full, and plant cooldown rate is 74 degrees per hour.

8:01 AM The. crack in the cold leg of the RCS inside the Reactor Building significantly degrades causing a large leak into the Reactor Building.

The Engineered Safeguards System is actuated.

8:03 AM RB pressure is at 28 psig, RB temperature is at 237 degrees, and the Containment High Range Monitor (RM-G29) reads 40 R/hr.

Building spray is initiated and one pump fails due to a failed Building Spray Valve (BSV-3).

The Bmergency Repair. Team is dispatched to the Auxiliary Building to investigate.

High RB pressure and operati'on of the Building Spray System.

causes a failure of the penetration seal f or the supply line f or RB Spray Ring No. 2 (located in quadrant 3, 106' elevation, 8 " pipe).

This causes the elevated RB activity to be released into the Auxiliary Building.

8:06 AM Control Room receives an RM-A2 HIGH alarm due to penetration failure-.

Activity is again released to the en vironmen t.

8:14 AM Reactor Building pressure is at 43 psig, RB tem-perature is at 317 degrees, and the Containment High Radiation Monitor reads 20,000 R/hr and increasing.

8:20 AM The Containment High Radiation Monitor peaks at 40,000 R/hr.

The release into the Auxiliary Building and the environment also peaks at this time.

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. 8: 2 9 AM A GENERAL EMERGENCY is declared based on the RB con-ditions listed above.

The following Protective Action

)

' Recommendations are given to offsite authorities:

j

.* EVACUATE 0-5 MILES, 360'DBGREES

• EVACUATE 5-10 MILES, S ECTO RS B, C,

& D

• SHELTER 5-10 MILES, ALL REMAINING SECTORS 8:45 AM' The Emergency Coordinator receives an update on the l

injqry. Victim.

He is in stable but. guarded condition j

at the Tampa Burn Center.

The. wind begins shifting from out of the WSW (230 degrees) to out of the west (260-270- degrees) prompting a change in Protective Action Recommendations.

• EVACUATE 0-5 MILES, 350 DEGREES

• EVACUATE 5-10 MILES, SECTORS B, C,-D, E& F

• SH ELT ER 5-10 MILES, ALL REMAINING SECTORS 9:00 AM The Environmental. Survey Team / Dose Assessment reports

>2:R/hr child thyroid at 3 miles.

f 9:15 AM The Emergency Repair Team completes repairs on BSV-3 allowing operation of: the second Building Spray Pump, Reactor Building pressure decreases at a faster rate.

As RB pressure decreases, the release rate decreases.

9:30 AM A boat arrives at Pete's Pier in Crystal River with one injured person whose arm is cut and bleeding.

They were fishing in the nuclear power plant discharge canal when the sirens went off.

In their hast to depart, one person fell in the boat receiving the injury.

10:00 AM RM-A2 begins trending downward at a faster rate reducing the environmental release.

10:20 AM' RB pressure is at 7 psi.

The penetration seal holds at this reduced pressure thus terminating the radioactive release through the Auxiliary Building.

10:30 AM RM-A2 is at normal levels

(< Tech. Spec.) indicating the release to the environment is terminated.

11:30 AM The plant is stable and recovery ef forts begin.

12:30 PM The Exercise is terminated.