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| By letters dated May 2,1983, July 9,1985, and August 13, 1985, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Coapany (CYAPC0 or the licensee) requested amendments to the technical specifications (Appendix A to Operating License No. DPR-61) for the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant. The proposed changes would add a reference to a new containment isolation valve, which has been installed at the facility; make several changes to clarify or correct administrative sections of the technical specifications, and incorporate the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. In addition, the proposed changes would clarify the definition of containment integrity, add new requirements for post-accident instrumentation and revise the schedule for removal of reactor vessel surveillance capsules. | | By letters dated May 2,1983, July 9,1985, and August 13, 1985, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Coapany (CYAPC0 or the licensee) requested amendments to the technical specifications (Appendix A to Operating License No. DPR-61) for the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant. The proposed changes would add a reference to a new containment isolation valve, which has been installed at the facility; make several changes to clarify or correct administrative sections of the technical specifications, and incorporate the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. In addition, the proposed changes would clarify the definition of containment integrity, add new requirements for post-accident instrumentation and revise the schedule for removal of reactor vessel surveillance capsules. |
| By letter dated August 15, 1985, the licensee clarified and summarized these changes in a composite submittal. This letter also withdrew the proposed change to the definition of containment integrity. The proposed changes relating to post-accident instrumentation were addressed in Amendment 66 to the License and the revised schedule for removal of the reactor vessel surveillance capsules was subsequently withdrawn by letter dated June 3, 1986. | | By {{letter dated|date=August 15, 1985|text=letter dated August 15, 1985}}, the licensee clarified and summarized these changes in a composite submittal. This letter also withdrew the proposed change to the definition of containment integrity. The proposed changes relating to post-accident instrumentation were addressed in Amendment 66 to the License and the revised schedule for removal of the reactor vessel surveillance capsules was subsequently withdrawn by {{letter dated|date=June 3, 1986|text=letter dated June 3, 1986}}. |
| This evaluation concerns the remaining items in the above submittals for the proposed administrative and clarification changes and the proposed changes for 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 reporting requirements. | | This evaluation concerns the remaining items in the above submittals for the proposed administrative and clarification changes and the proposed changes for 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 reporting requirements. |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML20058F1151993-11-23023 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 170,69,169 & 86 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20059G6411993-11-0101 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 169 to License DPR-61 ML20059G5261993-10-27027 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 168 to License DPR-61 ML20057E2011993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 167 to License DPR-61 ML20057E1921993-10-0404 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 166 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9051993-09-29029 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 165 to License DPR-61 ML20058M9291993-09-29029 September 1993 SE Re SEP Topics III-2 & III-4.A, Wind & Tornado Loadings & Tornado Missiles. Licensee Estimated Reactor Core Damage Frequency Reduced Signficantly Such That Likelihood of Core Damage Reasonably Low ML20057A3501993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 164 to License DPR-61 ML20057A3551993-09-0202 September 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 163 to License DPR-61 ML20056G2891993-08-25025 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 162 to License DPR-61 ML20056D7061993-07-26026 July 1993 Safety Evaluation on SEP VI-4 Re Containment Isolation Sys for Plant.All Penetrations Either Meet Provisions of or Intent of GDCs 54-57 Except for Penetration 39 ML20128E3291993-02-0404 February 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Util Request for Authorization to Use Portion of Section XI of 1986 Edition of ASME Code for Visual Exams VT-3 & VT-4 to Be Combined Into Single VT-3 ML20128D5231992-11-25025 November 1992 Safety Evaluation Accepting 120-day Response to Suppl 1 to Generic Ltr 87-02, Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors,Usi A-46, ML20210E1891992-06-12012 June 1992 Safety Evaluation Considers SEP Topic III-5.B to Be Complete in That If Pipe Breaks Outside Containment,Plant Can Safely Shut Down W/O Loss of Containment Integrity ML20062B7411990-10-22022 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 132 to License DPR-61 ML20059H3101990-09-0606 September 1990 Revised Safety Evaluation Clarifying Individual Rod Position Indication Testing Exception & Bases for Approving Test Exception ML20059A8021990-08-14014 August 1990 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Accepting Electrical Design of New Switchgear Room at Plant ML20056A5641990-08-0303 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Pressurizer Has Sufficient Fracture Toughness to Preclude Fracture of Head W/Flaws Remaining in Component & Pressurizer Acceptable for Continued Svc ML20055G5441990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 128 to License DPR-61 ML20055G5561990-07-19019 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 129 to License DPR-61 ML20055E2361990-07-0202 July 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 126 to License DPR-61 ML20247K2531989-09-11011 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 123 & 41 to Licenses DPR-61 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247E3761989-09-0707 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 122,34,143 & 40 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20247A4841989-09-0505 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 121 to License DPR-61 ML20245J0121989-08-14014 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Extension of Surveillance Intervals ML20247E6551989-07-20020 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 120 to License DPR-61 ML20247E6841989-07-18018 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 119 to License DPR-61 ML20246L2571989-06-26026 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118,33,142 & 36 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20246A8541989-06-23023 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Large Containment at Plant Results in Slow Hydrogen Accumulation Rate & Ensures That Sufficient Time Available to Implement Addl Hydrogen Control Features After Accident.Requirements of 10CFR50.44 Met ML20244C4451989-06-0101 June 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 117 to License DPR-61 ML20248B3001989-05-31031 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 116 to License DPR-61 ML20245J0751989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 114,30,141 & 33 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20245E8941989-04-21021 April 1989 Safeguards Evaluation Rept Supporting Amend 113 to License DPR-61 ML20235Z0881989-03-0707 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 112 to License DPR-61 ML20196D8641988-12-0606 December 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 109 to License DPR-61 ML20205M5731988-10-26026 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 108,25,134 & 26 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-49,respectively ML20204G8641988-10-18018 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Licensee Analysis of Consequences of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Accident at Facility Followed by Minimization of Water in Affected Steam Generator After Tube Rupture ML20155G4801988-09-28028 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 107,23,132 & 24 to Licenses DPR-61,DPR-21,DPR-65 & NPF-24,respectively ML20151T7641988-08-0909 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 106 to License DPR-61 ML20150A9551988-07-0101 July 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 105 to License DPR-61 ML20155F9811988-06-0101 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 104 to License DPR-13 ML20155G5031988-05-26026 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 103 to License DPR-61 ML20153G9671988-04-28028 April 1988 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 97 to License DPR-61 1999-04-28
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K3301999-10-19019 October 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License DPR-61 ML20206C8761999-04-28028 April 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License DPR-61 CY-99-047, Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use1999-03-23023 March 1999 Ro:On 981217,identified Unsuccessful Dewatering of Cnsi HIC, Model PL8-120R,containing Resins.Caused by Apparent Failure of Dewatering Tree.Other HICs Have Been Procured,Recertified & Returned to Plant for Use ML20206F1971998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 1998 for Cyap. with CY-99-027, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59, for Jan-Dec 1998.With ML20198G9101998-12-22022 December 1998 Proposed Rev 2 of Cyap QAP for Haddam Neck Plant. Marked Up Rev 1 Included ML20238F2131998-08-28028 August 1998 SER Accepting Defueled Emergency Plan for Emergency Planning for Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co CY-98-136, Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line1998-08-12012 August 1998 Ro:On 980727,flow Blockage Occurred & Caused Pressure in Sys to Increase,Resulting in Relief Valve Lifting & Pipe Vibration,Which Caused Leaks to Develop.Caused by Nearly Closed post-filter Inlet Valve.Repaired 2 Leaks in Line ML20237B7461998-07-22022 July 1998 1998 Defueled Emergency Plan Exercise Scenario Manual, Conducted on 980722 ML20202D1621998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License DPR-61 CY-98-068, Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms1998-04-15015 April 1998 Follow-up to Verbal Notification on 980413 of Film on Discharge Canal.Investigation Continuing.Samples Collected for Petroleum Analyses & Biological Characterization at Intake Structure & Discharge Canal.Replaced Sorbent Booms CY-98-045, Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing1998-04-13013 April 1998 Ro:On 980212,0219,0225 & 0312,separate Sheens of Approx One Cup of oil-like Substance Was Observed at Discharge Canal. Cause Has Not Been Clearly Identified.Called in Vendor Spill to Install Sorbent Booms to Absorb Sheen.W/One Drawing ML20217F0611998-03-31031 March 1998 Historical Review Team Rept ML20217A0001998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217K2101998-03-27027 March 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 192 to License DPR-61 CY-98-046, Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal1998-03-12012 March 1998 Follow-up to 980311 Verbal Notification of Film on Discharge Canal.Cause Not Yet Determined.Film Is Contained & Will Be Absorbed by Containment & Sorbent Booms That Were in Place in Discharge Canal ML20216D6531998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1998 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217D7381998-02-28028 February 1998 Revised MOR for Feb 1998 Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-012, Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant1998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1998 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck Plant CY-98-010, Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,19971997-12-31031 December 1997 Annual Rept for 10CFR50.59,Jan-Dec,1997 ML20198N6681997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20217P4861997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual Financial Rept, for Cyap ML20199L5891997-12-24024 December 1997 Independent Analysis & Evaluation of AM-241 & Transuranics & Subsequent Dose to Two Male Workers at Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Plant ML20203K4271997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20199B1141997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20198M8101997-10-14014 October 1997 SER Accepting Proposed Revs to Util Quality Assurance Program at Facility ML20198J8811997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20210P8721997-08-31031 August 1997 Post Decommissioning Activities Rept, for Aug 1997 ML20217Q3171997-08-31031 August 1997 Addl Changes to Proposed Rev 1 to QA Program ML20210U9301997-08-31031 August 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant CY-97-082, Special Rept:On 970708,routine Surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Sys Instrumentation Revealed,Data Was Not Being Reproduced by Portion of Playback Sys.Station Presently Pursuing Replacement of Seismic Monitoring Sys1997-08-14014 August 1997 Special Rept:On 970708,routine Surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Sys Instrumentation Revealed,Data Was Not Being Reproduced by Portion of Playback Sys.Station Presently Pursuing Replacement of Seismic Monitoring Sys ML20210L0521997-07-31031 July 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1997 for HNP ML20149E4451997-06-30030 June 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20141A0041997-05-31031 May 1997 Independent Assessment of Radiological Controls Program at Cyap Haddam Neck Plant Final Rept May 1997 ML20140H5241997-05-31031 May 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20141K4201997-05-22022 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 191 to License DPR-61 ML20141D4141997-04-30030 April 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1997 for Connecticut Yankee Haddam Neck ML20138G5901997-04-25025 April 1997 Proposed Rev 1 to Cyap QA Program for Haddam Neck Plant ML20137W8051997-03-31031 March 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20137H3031997-03-31031 March 1997 Rev 2 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20137C6281997-03-14014 March 1997 Redacted Version of Rev 1 to Nuclear Training Loit/Lout Audit Reviews ML20137A0801997-02-28028 February 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant ML20135C5101997-02-26026 February 1997 1996 Refuel Outage ISI Summary Rept for CT Yankee Atomic Power Co B16268, Special Rept:On 970205,declared Main Stack-Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Calibr Methods. Will Revise Calibr Procedure to Technique to Demonstrate Accuracy & Linearity Over Intended Range of Monitor1997-02-19019 February 1997 Special Rept:On 970205,declared Main Stack-Wide Range Noble Gas Monitor Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Calibr Methods. Will Revise Calibr Procedure to Technique to Demonstrate Accuracy & Linearity Over Intended Range of Monitor ML20135E3221997-02-13013 February 1997 Independent Review Team Rept 1996 MP -1 Lout NRC Exam Failures ML20134L2751997-02-0303 February 1997 Draft Rev to GPRI-30, Spent Fuel Storage Facility Licensing Basis/Design Basis ML20138K5721997-01-31031 January 1997 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1997 for Haddam Neck Plant.W/ ML20134L2791997-01-10010 January 1997 Rev 0 to QA Program Grpi ML20134L2911997-01-0808 January 1997 Rev 0 to UFSAR Rev Grpi ML20134L2721996-12-31031 December 1996 Commitment Mgt Grpi 1999-04-28
[Table view] |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N0. 79 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-61 CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY H,ADDAM NECK PLANT
^
DOCKET NO. 50-213,
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters dated May 2,1983, July 9,1985, and August 13, 1985, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Coapany (CYAPC0 or the licensee) requested amendments to the technical specifications (Appendix A to Operating License No. DPR-61) for the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant. The proposed changes would add a reference to a new containment isolation valve, which has been installed at the facility; make several changes to clarify or correct administrative sections of the technical specifications, and incorporate the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. In addition, the proposed changes would clarify the definition of containment integrity, add new requirements for post-accident instrumentation and revise the schedule for removal of reactor vessel surveillance capsules.
By letter dated August 15, 1985, the licensee clarified and summarized these changes in a composite submittal. This letter also withdrew the proposed change to the definition of containment integrity. The proposed changes relating to post-accident instrumentation were addressed in Amendment 66 to the License and the revised schedule for removal of the reactor vessel surveillance capsules was subsequently withdrawn by letter dated June 3, 1986.
This evaluation concerns the remaining items in the above submittals for the proposed administrative and clarification changes and the proposed changes for 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 reporting requirements.
P
Notices of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination and Opportunity for Hearing related to the requested actions were published in the Federal Register on October 26, 1983 (48 FR 49581), August 14,1985(50FR32791),
and July 2,1986(51FR24252). No comments or requests for hearing were received.
2.0 EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION The licensee proposed to add a recently installed containment boundary valve to.the list of containment isolation valves contained in Table 3.11-1 of Specification 3.11. Since this change provides operability and surveillance requirements for the new valve which are equivalent to those specified for boundary valves currently covered by this specification, this change is acceptable.
The licensee proposed to revise Figure 6.2-1 to reflect current offsite organization titles and structure. The utility positions of Chairman and Executive Vice President were added to the organizational chart to correctly reflect the current utility organization. The organization, including Senior Vice President Nuclear Engineering and Operation, and subordinates who are responsible for management of the nuclear facilities, remains unchanged. Therefore, this change is acceptable.
The licensee proposed several changes to Specification 6.5 to consolidate and clarify Nuclear Review B'oard (NRB) requirements. The required NRB composition was simplified by specification of a minimum and maximum board membership and deletion of a provision for alternate members.
The areas of nondestructive testing and administration were added to the i scope of NRB review to conform with the guidance of ANSI N18.7-1976.
NRB review and audit requirements were also revised to conform more closely to NRC Standard Technical Specification (STS) and to clarify licensee implementation of these requirements. With regard to training I
9
1 and qualification audit requirements, it was recognized that a sampling technique, which reviews the entire facility staff over the course of several audits is acceptable for meeting these requirements. Since the proposed changes are consistent with the requirements of ANSI N18.7-1976 and NRC STS, these changes are acceptable. The licensee further proposed editorial changes to the addressees for the required reports listed in Specification 6.9. These changes reflect the current titles of NRC recipients and are, therefore, acceptable.
The licensee also proposed changes to be consistent with the revised reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The proposed revisions include changing the definition of " reportable occurrence" to that of " reportable event," deleting unnecessary and conflicting references to reporting requirements in the limiting conditions for operations and surveillance requirements section, revising the administrative controls section to reference 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73 and deleting the previous reporting requirements. The licensee's proposed changes included several revisions to reporting requirements in Specification 3.22, Fire Protection Systems. The staff concluded that these changes did not confonn properly with changes to the administrative controls section or to the revised reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The staff concluded in lieu of the licensee's proposed changes, that Specification 3.22 reporting requirements should l be revised to conform to Specification 6.9.2, Special Reports. These proposed changes were discussed during a meeting between F. Akstulewicz, NRC, and licensee representatives on May 19, 1986. The licensee's representatives agreed to the staff's editorial changes as documented in a meeting sunenary dated June 10, 1986, and, therefore, we find the proposed revisions acceptable.
a
4 We have evaluated the proposed changes to the technical specifications and have concluded that these changes are administrative and do not involve any physical change to the plant's safety-related structures, systems, or components. Further, these changes do not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety-related equipment, or increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed or create the possibility of a malfunction different from those previously evaluated.
Therefore, as stated above, we find the licensee's requested changes to be acceptable.
3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, and changes to the surveillance requirements. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly,
- this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion j
setforthin10CFR51.22(c)(9). Pursuantto10CFR51.22(b)no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1)thereisreasonableassurancethatthehealthandsafetyof the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner,
! and(2)suchactivitieswillbeconductedincompliancewiththe i
l
5-Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
5.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This Safety Evaluation has been prepared by P. Swetland, D. Johnson, and M. Kray.
Dated: August 6,1986 O
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