05000254/FIN-2013003-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.07 | ||
| Inspector = B Cushman, C Lipa, C Mathews, D Szwarc, G O, | | Inspector = B Cushman, C Lipa, C Mathews, D Szwarc, G O'Dwyer, J Bozga, J Mcghee, L Jones, R Langstaff, S Bell | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-citied violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to translate design requirements into procedures to ensure availability of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) in a loss of lock event. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate the need to minimize diesel generator cooling water (DGCW) flow as assumed in the design calculation into station operating procedures. In response to the inspectors concerns, the licensee initiated actions to verify the required flow of the DGCW system and assessed operability. Because the existing river temperature was significantly lower than 95F (the assumed initial temperature), the licensee concluded the UHS was capable of performing its function. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as issue report 1416634. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because operating procedures did not require throttling of the DGCW flow or guidance if an emergency diesel generator was operating following a lock failure resulting from a barge colliding into the lock structure. The lack of guidance resulted in an increased heat load and resulted in reasonable doubt the UHS would remain below 108F. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Exhibit 4, External Events Screening Questions, and answered no to all of the applicable questions. Subsequent calculations by the licensee indicated the maximum flow would not challenge the maximum design temperature limits for the UHS. Therefore, the finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined the cause of this finding did not represent current licensee performance and, thus, no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-citied violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to translate design requirements into procedures to ensure availability of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) in a loss of lock event. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate the need to minimize diesel generator cooling water (DGCW) flow as assumed in the design calculation into station operating procedures. In response to the inspectors concerns, the licensee initiated actions to verify the required flow of the DGCW system and assessed operability. Because the existing river temperature was significantly lower than 95F (the assumed initial temperature), the licensee concluded the UHS was capable of performing its function. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as issue report 1416634. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because operating procedures did not require throttling of the DGCW flow or guidance if an emergency diesel generator was operating following a lock failure resulting from a barge colliding into the lock structure. The lack of guidance resulted in an increased heat load and resulted in reasonable doubt the UHS would remain below 108F. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Exhibit 4, External Events Screening Questions, and answered no to all of the applicable questions. Subsequent calculations by the licensee indicated the maximum flow would not challenge the maximum design temperature limits for the UHS. Therefore, the finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined the cause of this finding did not represent current licensee performance and, thus, no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. | ||
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Latest revision as of 23:19, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000254/2013003 Section 1R07 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.07 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Cushman C Lipa C Mathews D Szwarc G O'Dwyer J Bozga J Mcghee L Jones R Langstaff S Bell |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |