05000335/FIN-2012002-01: Difference between revisions

Finding

Title

Failure to Follow Reactor Protection System Surveillance Procedure Resulting in Reactor Plant Trip

Description

A Green, self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 was identified which requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities referenced in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, dated February 1978, including safety related activities carried out during operation of the reactor plant. Licensee surveillance test procedure 2-OSP- 63.01, Unit 2 RPS Logic Matrix Test, was not complied with as written when a Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic matrix switch was inadvertently placed out of position resulting in an unplanned reactor trip. The licensee entered this violation in their corrective action program as condition report 1657802. The licensees failure to fully implement RPS testing procedure 2-OSP-63.01, Unit 2 RPS Logic Matrix Test, as written is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be of more than minor significance because it resulted in a reactor trip and is similar to NRC Manual Chapter 0612 Appendix E, example 4.b. The inspectors evaluated the risk of this finding using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The finding involved the cross-cutting area of human performance, in the component of work practices and the aspect of procedural compliance (H.4.b), in that the licensee failed to ensure that personnel followed procedure requirements to prevent unexpected results.

01
Site:	Saint Lucie
Report	IR 05000335/2012002 Section 4OA2
Date counted	Mar 31, 2012 (2012Q1)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Initiating Events
Identified by:	Self-revealing
Inspection Procedure:	IP 71152
Inspectors (proximate)	R Reyes D Jones G Ottenberg J Laughlin T Hoeg D Rich J Hamman R Williams A Butcavage T Su
CCA	H.8, Procedure Adherence
INPO aspect	WP.4
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v • d • e

Finding - Saint Lucie - IR 05000335/2012002

1(0)2(1)3(2)4(3)5(3)7(6)8(1)9(1)301(0)403(0)404(0)405(2)502(0)

IR 05000335/2012002: 1

Finding List (Saint Lucie) @ 2012Q1

CCA Matrix: 2012Q1

	Q	CCA	Title
05000335/FIN-2011202-01	2011Q3	H.7	Security
05000335/FIN-2011202-02	2011Q3	H.10	Security
05000335/FIN-2011005-02	2011Q4	P.2	Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure for Evaluation of Past Operability
05000335/FIN-2011403-01	2011Q4		Security
05000335/FIN-2011005-01	2011Q4		Reactor Pressure Vessel supports not included in the St. Lucie ISI Program
05000335/FIN-2012002-01	2012Q1	H.8	Failure to Follow Reactor Protection System Surveillance Procedure Resulting in Reactor Plant Trip

Self-Identified List (Saint Lucie)

	Q	Title
05000335/FIN-2011004-01	2011Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000335/FIN-2011004-02	2011Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000335/FIN-2011005-03	2011Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Saint Lucie Findings full list]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{finding
-| title = Failure To Follow Reactor Protection System Surveillance Procedure Resulting In Reactor Plant Trip
+| title = Failure to Follow Reactor Protection System Surveillance Procedure Resulting in Reactor Plant Trip
 | docket = 05000335, 05000389
 | inspection report = IR 05000335/2012002

05000335/FIN-2012002-01: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 20:44, 20 February 2018

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05000335/FIN-2012002-01: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 20:44, 20 February 2018

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