ML20140H699

Insp Rept 50-458/86-14 on 860317-20.Violations Noted: Inadequate Corrective Action,Failure to Perform Maint Per Procedures & Inoperable Div II Diesel Generator

ML20140H699
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	03/27/1986
From:	Chamberlain D, Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140H677	List: ML20140H673 ML20140H699
References
50-458-86-14, NUDOCS 8604040170
Download: ML20140H699 (5)

See also: IR 05000458/1986014

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION IV

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sNRC Insp'ection Report: 50-458/86-14 License /CP: NPF-47

Do'cket: .;501458

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Licensee: Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)

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P. O. Box 2951

Beaumont, Texas 77704

Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)

Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana

. Inspection' Conducted: March 17-20, 1986

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Inspector: 4 . w t t 3-25 8(3

. D. Du Chamberlain, Ser.ior Resident Inspector Date

-(pars. 1, 2, and 3)

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Approved:

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hief, Pr& Ject Section A,

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ac rP ects Branch

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted March 17-20, 1986 (Report 50-458/86-14)

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Areas Inspected: This inspection was a special, unannounced inspection

. conducted to review the conditions and actions which led to a Division II

diesel generator operability failure on March 17, 1986, and to review the

planned corrective actions.

Results: Within the areas inspected, three violations were identified

-(inadequate corrective action, failure to perform maintenance in accordance

with procedures and inoperable Division !! diesel generator, paragraph 2).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employee

• R. E. Bailey, Supervisor, Quality Control (QC)

• W. H. Cahill, Jr., Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group

• E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs

• T. C. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance (QA)

• J. C. Deddens, Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group

• D. C. Davenport, Supervisor, Security

• J. W. Evans, Stenographer, GSU

• D. R. Gipson, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

• E. R. Grant, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing

• R. Helmick, Director of Projects

• R. Jackson, Shift Supervisor, Operations

• R. J. King, Licensing Er.gineer

• A. D. Kowalczuk, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance

R. Mayeux, Reactor Operator

• J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer

• W. H. Odell, Manager, Administrative

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager

• S. R. Radebaugh, Assistant Plant Manager, Services

• D. Reynerson, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering

• R. R. Smith, Licensing Engineer

• P. F. Tomlinson, Director, Quality Services

D. Williamson, Operations Supervisor

The NRC senior resident inspector (SRI) also interviewed additional

licensee personnel during the inspection period.

• Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on

March 20, 1986. NRC resident inspector (RI), W. B. Jones, also attended

the exit interview.

2. Division II Diesel Generator Operability Failure Review

This inspection was conducted by the SRI to review the conditions and

actions which led to a Division II diesel generator operability failure on

March 17, 1986, and to review the planned corrective actions. During

l performance of Surveillance Test STP-309-0202, " Division II Diesel

Operability Test," on March 17, 1986, the diesel started and came up to

speed, frequency, and voltage within the required time, but about one

minute later it began to coast down and stopped because of loss of fuel

oil flow. River Bend Technical Specifications requires the diesel to

operate loaded for at least 60 minutes for demonstration of operability

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and requires three separate and independent diesel generators (1A,1B, and

IC) to be "0PERABLE" in "0PERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3." The plant

was in operational Condition 1 on March 17, 1986. The licensee

immediately initiated a condition report (86-0311) for investigation,

analysis and corrective action on the ailed operability test.

The SRI review of the licensee's investigation of this incident revealed

the following:

a. Inadequate Corrective Action: A similar event occurred on February

14, 1986, when the Division I diesel generator (1A) failed the

surveillance operability test. The condition report (86-0179)

investigation for this failure revealed that the fuel oil strainer

valve handle was missing and that the strainer valve was misaligned

causing a loss of fuel oil flow to the diesel generator. The Nuclear

Plant Engineering (HUPE) documented corrective action on February 15,

1986, only required that the fuel oil strainer valve be realigned and

that successful operation of the diesel be demonstrated. No ger.eric

action to prevent recurrence was documented, and no remedial or

generic corrective action was specified to be implemented by any.

Other section or department. No reason was determined for the

missing handle or for the misalignment of the fuel strainer. Also,

the investigation did not determine the duration of time that the

fuel strainer had been misaligned. The analysis and understanding of

the adverse condition does not appear to have been thorough enough to

identify and correct the root cause of the problem. This is

evidenced by a reoccurrent.e of the fuel strainer misalignment problem

on the Division II diesel generator, which resulted in the Division

II diesel generator operability failure on March 17, 1986. This

inadequate corrective action for the diesel generator operability

failure on February 14, 1986, was identified by the SRI as an

apparent violation (458/8614-01).

b. Performance of Maintenance: As a result of the February 14, 1986,

Division I diesel generator operability failure, the fuel oil

strainer valve handle was removed from the Division II diesel and

installed on the Division I diesel. It was also used as a pattern

for the maintenance shop to fabricate a new handle for the Division

II diesel.

This new handle was apparently fabricated through use of a shop work

order (SWO), but the maintenance department could not locate the SWO.

The new handle was installed February 17, 1986, on the Division II

diesel generator fuel oil strainer, but no maintenance work request

(MWR) was initiated to provide documentation of work performance or

to provide for retesting as appropriate. A SWO should not be used to

work on permanent plant equipment by licensee procedure. This

failure to initiate a HWR for performance of maintenance on permanent

plant equipment was identified by the SRI as an apparent violation

(458/8614-02).

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c.- Inoperable Division II Diesel Generator: 'The Division II diesel '

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- generator was proved operable on February 15, 1986, by surveillance

e, ,test, and the new fuel oil strainer valve handle was apparently

. installed on February 17, 1986. No testing was performed af ter the

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' handle was~ installed until the March ~17, 1986, surveillance test, ,

J _ which failed because of the' improper alignment of the fuel oil

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strainer valve. On March 17, 1986, the valve handle was found to be

improperly posi_tioned on the fuel oil strainer, and the valve was

misaligned, causing a loss of fuel oil flow to the diesel. There was

no evidence found of any other maintenance work on the fuel oil

strainer between February 17, 1986, and March 17, 1986. Also, there

, was no' evidence ~ found of operational realignment of the fuel oil

strainer.

- With the_ plant in Operational Condition I on March 17, 1986, the

Division II diesel was discovered to be inoperable during

surveillance testing. .The diesel had apparently been inoperable for

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an undetermined length of time between February 15, 1986, and March

17, 1986. This failure to have three separate and independent diesel

generators "0PERABLE" in "0PERATIONAL CONDITION 1" was identified by

the SRI as-an apparent Technical Specification violation

(458/8614-03).

d. Licensee Investigation and Corrective Actions

The SRI found that the licensee was continuing his investigation of

this occurrence, and the following corrective actions were being

implemented:

. .The licensee has scribed all three diesel generator fuel oil

strainer valves so that proper valve positioning is identified

with or without the handle being installed. Diesel operabi.11ty

has been verified for three diesels.

. Maintenance personnel have been instructed on the proper

alignment of the fuel oil strainer handle and valve.

. The plant operators are verifying proper position of the fuel oil

strainers during normal rounds (at least once per shift).

. The plant manager has added a compliance inspector analyst to

his staff to assure procedure adherence for conduct of

maintenance. This person is charged with the responsibility

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for. compliance to procedures within the maintenance department.

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. The use of shop work orders has been eliminated.

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The SRI will c.ontinue to nonitor licensee actions in this area.

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3. Exit and Inspection Interviews

An exit interview was conducted on March 20, 1986, with licensee

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representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the

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SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection,

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