ML20140H699
| ML20140H699 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | River Bend  |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1986 |
| From: | Chamberlain D, Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140H677 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-458-86-14, NUDOCS 8604040170 | |
| Download: ML20140H699 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000458/1986014
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~ APPENDIX
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION IV
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sNRC Insp'ection Report:
50-458/86-14
License /CP:
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Do'cket: .;501458
Licensee:
Gulf States Utilities Company (GSU)
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P. O. Box 2951
Beaumont, Texas
77704
Facility Name: River Bend Station (RBS)
Inspection At: River Bend Station, St. Francisville, Louisiana
. Inspection' Conducted: March 17-20, 1986
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Inspector:
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. D. Du Chamberlain, Ser.ior Resident Inspector
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-(pars. 1, 2, and 3)
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Approved:
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b
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hief, Pr& Ject Section A,
Date
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ects Branch
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted March 17-20, 1986 (Report 50-458/86-14)
Areas Inspected: This inspection was a special, unannounced inspection
. conducted to review the conditions and actions which led to a Division II
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diesel generator operability failure on March 17, 1986, and to review the
planned corrective actions.
Results: Within the areas inspected, three violations were identified
-(inadequate corrective action, failure to perform maintenance in accordance
with procedures and inoperable Division !! diesel generator, paragraph 2).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employee
- R. E. Bailey, Supervisor, Quality Control (QC)
- W. H. Cahill, Jr., Senior Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group
- E. M. Cargill, Supervisor, Radiation Programs
- T. C. Crouse, Manager, Quality Assurance (QA)
- J. C. Deddens, Vice President, River Bend Nuclear Group
- D. C. Davenport, Supervisor, Security
- J. W. Evans, Stenographer, GSU
- D. R. Gipson, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations
- E. R. Grant, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
- R. Helmick, Director of Projects
- R. Jackson, Shift Supervisor, Operations
- R. J. King, Licensing Er.gineer
- A. D. Kowalczuk, Assistant Plant Manager, Maintenance
R. Mayeux, Reactor Operator
- J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer
- W. H. Odell, Manager, Administrative
- T. F. Plunkett, Plant Manager
- S. R. Radebaugh, Assistant Plant Manager, Services
- D. Reynerson, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
- R. R. Smith, Licensing Engineer
- P. F. Tomlinson, Director, Quality Services
D. Williamson, Operations Supervisor
The NRC senior resident inspector (SRI) also interviewed additional
licensee personnel during the inspection period.
- Denotes those persons that attended the exit interview conducted on
March 20, 1986. NRC resident inspector (RI), W. B. Jones, also attended
the exit interview.
2.
Division II Diesel Generator Operability Failure Review
This inspection was conducted by the SRI to review the conditions and
actions which led to a Division II diesel generator operability failure on
March 17, 1986, and to review the planned corrective actions. During
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performance of Surveillance Test STP-309-0202, " Division II Diesel
Operability Test," on March 17, 1986, the diesel started and came up to
speed, frequency, and voltage within the required time, but about one
minute later it began to coast down and stopped because of loss of fuel
oil flow. River Bend Technical Specifications requires the diesel to
operate loaded for at least 60 minutes for demonstration of operability
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and requires three separate and independent diesel generators (1A,1B, and
IC) to be "0PERABLE" in "0PERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 3."
The plant
was in operational Condition 1 on March 17, 1986.
The licensee
immediately initiated a condition report (86-0311) for investigation,
analysis and corrective action on the ailed operability test.
The SRI review of the licensee's investigation of this incident revealed
the following:
a.
Inadequate Corrective Action: A similar event occurred on February
14, 1986, when the Division I diesel generator (1A) failed the
surveillance operability test. The condition report (86-0179)
investigation for this failure revealed that the fuel oil strainer
valve handle was missing and that the strainer valve was misaligned
causing a loss of fuel oil flow to the diesel generator. The Nuclear
Plant Engineering (HUPE) documented corrective action on February 15,
1986, only required that the fuel oil strainer valve be realigned and
that successful operation of the diesel be demonstrated. No ger.eric
action to prevent recurrence was documented, and no remedial or
generic corrective action was specified to be implemented by any.
Other section or department. No reason was determined for the
missing handle or for the misalignment of the fuel strainer. Also,
the investigation did not determine the duration of time that the
fuel strainer had been misaligned. The analysis and understanding of
the adverse condition does not appear to have been thorough enough to
identify and correct the root cause of the problem. This is
evidenced by a reoccurrent.e of the fuel strainer misalignment problem
on the Division II diesel generator, which resulted in the Division
II diesel generator operability failure on March 17, 1986. This
inadequate corrective action for the diesel generator operability
failure on February 14, 1986, was identified by the SRI as an
apparent violation (458/8614-01).
b.
Performance of Maintenance: As a result of the February 14, 1986,
Division I diesel generator operability failure, the fuel oil
strainer valve handle was removed from the Division II diesel and
installed on the Division I diesel.
It was also used as a pattern
for the maintenance shop to fabricate a new handle for the Division
II diesel.
This new handle was apparently fabricated through use of a shop work
order (SWO), but the maintenance department could not locate the SWO.
The new handle was installed February 17, 1986, on the Division II
diesel generator fuel oil strainer, but no maintenance work request
(MWR) was initiated to provide documentation of work performance or
to provide for retesting as appropriate. A SWO should not be used to
work on permanent plant equipment by licensee procedure. This
failure to initiate a HWR for performance of maintenance on permanent
plant equipment was identified by the SRI as an apparent violation
(458/8614-02).
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- generator was proved operable on February 15, 1986, by surveillance
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Inoperable Division II Diesel Generator: 'The Division II diesel
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,tes , and the new fuel oil strainer valve handle was apparently
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installed on February 17, 1986. No testing was performed af ter the
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' handle was~ installed until the March ~17, 1986, surveillance test,
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which failed because of the' improper alignment of the fuel oil
strainer valve. On March 17, 1986, the valve handle was found to be
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improperly posi_tioned on the fuel oil strainer, and the valve was
misaligned, causing a loss of fuel oil flow to the diesel. There was
no evidence found of any other maintenance work on the fuel oil
strainer between February 17, 1986, and March 17, 1986. Also, there
was no' evidence ~ found of operational realignment of the fuel oil
, strainer.
- With the_ plant in Operational Condition I on March 17, 1986, the
Division II diesel was discovered to be inoperable during
surveillance testing. .The diesel had apparently been inoperable for
an undetermined length of time between February 15, 1986, and March
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17, 1986. This failure to have three separate and independent diesel
generators "0PERABLE" in "0PERATIONAL CONDITION 1" was identified by
the SRI as-an apparent Technical Specification violation
(458/8614-03).
d.
Licensee Investigation and Corrective Actions
The SRI found that the licensee was continuing his investigation of
this occurrence, and the following corrective actions were being
implemented:
.The licensee has scribed all three diesel generator fuel oil
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strainer valves so that proper valve positioning is identified
with or without the handle being installed. Diesel operabi.11ty
has been verified for three diesels.
Maintenance personnel have been instructed on the proper
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alignment of the fuel oil strainer handle and valve.
The plant operators are verifying proper position of the fuel oil
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strainers during normal rounds (at least once per shift).
The plant manager has added a compliance inspector analyst to
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his staff to assure procedure adherence for conduct of
maintenance.
This person is charged with the responsibility
for. compliance to procedures within the maintenance department.
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The use of shop work orders has been eliminated.
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The SRI will c.ontinue to nonitor licensee actions in this area.
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3.
Exit and Inspection Interviews
An exit interview was conducted on March 20, 1986, with licensee
representatives (identified in paragraph 1). During this interview, the
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SRI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection,
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