ML17348B474

Discusses 920112 Audit of Structures & Civil Engineering Features at Facility & Forwards Trip Rept

ML17348B474
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	04/13/1992
From:	Raghavan L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Goldberg J FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
TAC-M81313, TAC-M81314, NUDOCS 9204280379
Download: ML17348B474 (178)

Text

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~O April 13, 1992 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251 Mr. J. H. Goldberg President Nuclear Division Florida Power and Light Company P. 0. Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420

SUBJECT:

TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4 - AUDIT OF STRUCTURES AND CIVIL ENGINEERING FEATURES (TAC NOS.$ 181313 ANDj!P1314)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff performed a structural audit at Turkey Point during the week of January 13, 1992. The objectives of the audit were to obtain information about the performance of structures at Turkey Point and to draw some generic conclusions based on the information obtained from this audit and audits at other plants.

During the audit, you presented a concise summary of past experiences related to Category 1 structures and other civil engineering features, including a discussion of events such as delamination of the Unit 3 containment dome during construction, dropping of a spent fuel assembly in the spent fuel storage pool, and intake structure degradation. As part of the audit, we performed a walkdown of the plant and examined the containment exterior surfaces, auxiliary, control, old and new diesel buildings, spent fuel storage areas, safety-related tanks, intake structures and cooling canal areas. Since both Units 3 and 4 were operating at the time of the audit, a walkdown of the inside of the containment could not be performed. Based on your presentation and our walkdown, several questions and concerns were raised for which you provided written responses and furnished other pertinent documents. We reviewed and discussed your responses and presented our final observations in an exit meeting on January 17, 1992. We also made recommendations for improvement but did not identify any specific action items. The enclosure provides a detailed report of the audit.

We observed that, in general, the civil/structural plant features are performing well. However, some structures/components do show signs of degradation, such as degradation of concrete beams and walls of the intake structure, water accumulation in the vertical surveillance tendons and water infiltration into the tendon gallery. However, we recognize that you are already aware of some of these degradations and are in the process of monitoring and addressing them. This is evident by the ongoing repairs to the i:~ QP 9204280379 920413 PDR ADOGK 05000250 p PDR

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Mr. J. H. Goldberg April 13, 1992 intake structure and the bent plates on the anchor bolt chairs of some exterior tanks. During the 1993 refueling outage, you plan to perform an analysis for liner bulging and repair the liner coatings, seam welds and penetration canisters. In addition, as stated in the exit meeting, you have formed a team to develop a short-term as well as a long-term inspection and repair plan to address civil/structural areas that are not currently included in a specific maintenance program. We believe that this is an important program and, upon implementation, should ensure the continued "good condition" of the structure and civil engineering features at the plant.

If you have any questions, please call me at (301) 504-2019.

Sincerely, (Original Signed By)

L. Raghavan, Acting Project Manager Project Directorate II-2 Division of Reactor Projects --I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

Audit Results

'cc w/enclosure:

See next page DISTRIBUTION

<Docket File .=

NRC & Local PDRs PDII-2 RF G. Lainas S. Varga H. Berkow, w/o enclosure D. Miller, w/o enclosure L. Raghavan G. Bagchi, w/o enclosure H. Ashar, w/o enclosure OGC ACRS (10)

M. Sinkule, RII OFC L P II-2 PM: PDI I-2 D:P 2 L. Ra hava .Ba chi H Be DATE Qs~ 0 as~ lD 92 L y92 OFFICIAL RE D COPY Document Name: AUDIT.TP

Hr. J. H. Goldberg Florida Power and Light Company Turkey Point Plant CC:

Harold F. Reis, Esquire Administrator Newman and Holtzinger, P.C. Department of Environmental 1615 L Street, N.W. Regulation Washington, DC 20036 Power Plant Siting Section State of Florida Jack Shreve, Public Counsel 2600 Blair Stone Road Office of the Public Counsel Tallahassee, Florida 32301 c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Regional Administrator, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400 Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John T. Butler, Esquire 101 Marietta Street, N.W. Suite 2900 Steel, Hector and Dayis Atlanta, Georgia 30323 4000 Southeast Financial Center Hi ami, Florida 33131-2398 Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Hr. Thomas F. Plunkett, Site The Capitol Vice President Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Florida Power and Light Company Plant Manager P.O. Box 029100 Turkey Point Nuclear Plant Miami,.Florida 33102 Florida Power and Light Company P.O. Box 029100 Joaquin Avino Miami, Florida 33102 County Manager of Metropolitan Dade County 111 NW 1st Street, 29th Floor Hr. R. E. Grazio Miami, Florida 33128 Director, Nuclear Licensing Florida Power and Light Company Senior Resident Inspector P.O. Box 14000 Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420 Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 1448 Homestead, Florida 33090 Mr. Jacob Daniel Nash Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Blvd.

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Mr. Robert G. Nave, Director Emergency Management Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100

ENCLOSURE 1 TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TRIP REPORT Purpose: Audit of Structures and Civil Engineering Features Location: Turkey Point Nuclear Plant - Units 3 & 4 Florida City, Florida Dates: January 13-17, 1992 Personnel: R. Rothman (NRC), H. Ashar (NRC),

J. Lenahan (NRC), R. Morante (BNL),

J. Braverman (BNL)

Back round:

The objective of the plant visit was to obtain information about the- performance of structures at operating plants and to draw some generic conclusions based on the information obtained from this and other plant visits. To'achieve this objective, an assessment of the existing condition and past performance of structures and civil engineering features at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant was performed. Any failures, degradations, maintenance, surveillance, modifications/repairs of safety related structures were of interest. Structures reviewed include buildings, tanks, cable tray and conduit supports, anchorages, underground structures, and the water intake structure.

ns ection Summar January 13, 1992:

The afternoon of January 13 was devoted to health physics training, whole body counting, dosimetry/badging, and introduction to several Florida Power & Light (FPL) personnel.

Discussions were held regarding the agenda, available documents, facilities for the formal presentation, and schedules.

FPL prbvided a computerized list of all plant changes and modifications and a separate list of changes for which the civil engi'neering discipline was the lead group. From this list the audit team selected a representative sample of structural plant changes for which 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were performed; These were identified to FPL the following morning to enable them to retrieve the document files from their Juno Beach office.

January 14, 1992:

An entrance meeting was held with FPL personnel and the NRC/BNL representatives. A list of the attendees at the entrance meeting is contained in Attachment 1. R. Auluck (NRC Pro)ect Manager for Turkey Point) and R. Rothman described the purpose and scope of the visit.

A formal presentation was then made by FPL personnel. A copy of the agenda and viewgraphs used in the presentation is included in Attachment 2. The ma)or'opics covered include design criteria, containment structures, support anchorages, spent fuel pool and racks, intake structure, masonry walls, structural boundaries, geology/foundation conditions, maintenance of structures, seismic instrumentation, civil/structural LERs, past structural issues, civil/structural 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations, and emergency plans for natural emergencies.

January 15, 1992:

The audit team stayed together during the entire walkdown except as noted later on January 16, 1992. Since both nuclear units were operating, no walkdowns could be made inside containment. The audit team began the walkdown in the tendon gallery beneath the Unit 3 containment. .The entire tendon gallery was examined (all 360') and included the concrete walls, floor, ceiling (bottom of mat), tendon bearing piates, and tendon grease caps. The review of the outside containment encompassed the containment dome, ring girder, wall, tendon buttresses, tendon bearing plates and tendon grease caps.

The containment dome was closely examined for any signs of delamination, domes'n which occurred following original construction of the containment. At that time, the exterior concrete layer of the dome separated from the tendon layer. FPL described the repair made to correct this problem in their formal presentation.

It consisted of removing the delaminated layer, placing radial reinforcement, and pouring a new concrete layer to repair the the afternoon, the audit team examined areas in the Unit 3 spent fuel pool building, accessible portion of the containment mat, auxiliary building, control building, and Unit 4 switchgear building. These walkdowns included the cable spreading room, battery room, control room, roofs of the spent fuel and auxiliary building,"'4160 Volt switchgear room, 480 Volt load center area, air handling equipment room, computer room, seismograph pit, cathodic protection system terminal panel area, CCW heat exchanger room, RHR heat exchanger room, and the RHR pump room.

Structural components reviewed in these areas include concrete floors, walls, and ceiling; building structural steel; conduit/supports; cable tray/supports; piping support anchorages; seismic gaps between buildings; equipment supports; tanks'nd masonry walls.

January 16, 1992:

In the morning, the audit team examined the Unit 3 and 4 emergency diesel generator buildings, diesel oil tank for Unit 3, condensate storage tank, and Unit 3 and 4 intake structure. In the emergency diesel generator building the structural components reviewed include the concrete floor, walls, and ceiling; diesel support frame/anchorage; day tank anchorage; and electrical equipment support/anchorage. In the intake structure, the structural components reviewed include the concrete floor; partially accessible portions of the CW pump concrete support beams and wallsg and concrete walls at the East side of the intake structure and the screen washout area. Since both units were operating, it was not possible to view the concrete walls and slab below grade from inside the intake structure. However, photographs taken by FPL inside the intake structure below grade were made available and were reviewed by the audit team later in the day.

The above describes the structures and scope of the walkdown review effort for aging related degradation effects. During all of the walkdowns, a walkdown log was maintained as shown in in which the team recorded for each observation the building/area, elevation, location, component/item, aspect reviewed, photograph number, and any. comments. Data were recorded for structural components when aging degradation effects were present as well as when they were not. Photographs were taken for selected items to enhance the documentation and these were noted in the log. In addition, measurements were taken when appropriate (such as crack width), to determine the severity of the degradation.

In the afternoon, the audit. team split into two groups. The first group consisting of H. Ashar and R. Morante covered the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation review. The second group consisting of the remaining members of the audit team examined the cooling canals.

A FPL representative made a short presentation to the first group describing the 10 CFR 50.59 Program and Initiatives. A copy of the viewgraphs is presented in Attachment 4. The presentation covered the procedures and guidelines, review and approval process, training, and recent initiatives to improve the program.

j The. second group was driven by a FPL representative around the perimeter of the cooling canals. Several stops were made to more closely examine the canals. FPL originally released the cooling water discharge directly to the ocean. However, due to environmental concerns a cooling canal system was constructed to service both nuclear units and the fossil units at Turkey Point.

It is an extensive canal system consisting of 200 feet wide canals spanning 168 miles in total length. FPL literature

containing further details and a map of the canal system is presented in Attachment 5.

Upon completion of the canal system examination, the audit team reassembled to review representative 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation packages related to the civil discipline. A limited review was made on PCM 79-015, 82-148,83-050, and 90-472.

At this time, FPL provided written responses and documents to address and resolve questions and concerns raised by the audit team during the formal presentation session and during the walkdowns. The audit team reviewed and discussed the FPL responses. A list of the more meaningful observations was then compiled. This list was conveyed verbally to FPL at the exit meeting held on January 17, 1992.

Results Observations During the exit meeting held on January 17, 1992, R. Rothman reiterated the purpose of the NRC staff visit and the observations noted as a result of the formal presentation given by FPL and the walkdowns performed by the audit team. It was explained that the observations were being presented to FPL for their information and do not represent requirements by the NRC.

Any action the licensee might take as a result of these observations is considered voluntary. A list of the attendees at the exit meeting is contained in Attachment 1.

While most of the civil/structural plant features examined at Turkey Point Nuclear Plant were in good condition after 19 years of operation, there were some components which did show varying degrees of aging degradation. The key observations are discussed below, with a more complete list and detailed description presented in Attachment 6. '8 Observations noted in the Unit 3 tendon gallery include some signs of corrosion in the tendon bearing plates, cracks and voids in the concrete adjacent to a few bearing plates, and a gap of about 2" between the tendon gallery wall and the ceiling which permits water infiltration. It appears that the large gap developed due to deterioration of the joint filler material.

In FPL's presentation of the tendon surveillance program at Turkey Point, it was noted that water had accumulated at the bottom of the vertical surveillance tendons in Unit 3. This condition was not observed in Unit 4 during its tendon surveillance. Expanded surveillance of vertical tendons in Unit 3 for the presence of water would identify the extent of this condition as a first step toward resolution.

Examination of the condensate storage tank revealed bent plates on the .anchor bolt chairs, deterioration of the water seal at the base of the tank coupled with corrosion of the tank bottom plate, and signs of corrosion/scratches/gouges on the tank wall.

Significant deterioration in the concrete beams supporting the ICW pumps and CW pumps in the intake structure had occurred.

This consisted of delamination of concrete cover over the reinforcement and corrosion of the steel reinforcement. FPL was aware of these problems and is in the process of repairing the beams. Repairs began in 1985 and completion is planned by the end of 1996. The audit team reviewed a report on the intake structure prepared by a consultant to FPL., The report indicates that the bay walls are also degrading and experiencing active corrosion of the reinforcing bars. Therefore, the audit team recommended that the licensee also give close attention to other parts of the intake structure such as the intermediate and exterior walls..

For unreinforced masonry walls, the seismic qualification relies on the assumption that there are no cracks in the wall.

However, there appears to be no formal monitoring program to confirm that no cracks develop.

Turkey Point has only one three-component accelograph that records photographically. This provides only limited information which will require time to evaluate.

it If improved seismic instrumentation were available may be possible to avoid unnecessarily shutting the plant down in the event of a nondamaging earthquake.

An examination of the Unit 3 containment dome showed no signs of concrete degradation or delamination, which was a problem after original construction. However, the overlay/coating on the dome was peeling. This may also be the cause for some of the clogged drains that have occurred at the base of the dome.

Photographs for some of the key observations noted above are presented in Attachment 7.

Although it was not possible to examine the inside of the containments, FPL in its formal presentation on January 14, 1992 and in their viewgraphs (Attachment 2), did present the results of the Unit 4 containment building ILRT structural inspection report. Some of the items identified in the ILRT report are peeled, delaminated, and disbonded topcoat in some areas of the containment liner; surface corrosion of some of the liner seam welds and penetration canisters; leaching of joint filler material between the liner and adjacent concrete structuresg radially inward bulging of the liner; and two 1/16 inch cracks in the 4B steam generator cubicle wall.

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The 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation procedure seems to have been significantly improved in the past few years. A limited review of the individual engineering packages revealed that up to 1983 there was very little documentation relating to safety evaluations. On a Change Request Notice, the engineer would only be required to identify whether "this change affects nuclear safety or design criteria." A review of a more recent engineering package (PC/M No.90-472) did, however, reflect a substantial safety evaluation as required by the current FPL procedures regarding 10 CFR 50.59.

Conclusio Considering that the two units have been operating for approximately 19 years, most civil/structural plant features have performed well. Some structures/components, however, do show signs of varying levels of aging degradation. The most severe cases relate to degradation of concrete beams and walls in the intake structure, water accumulation in the vertical surveillance tendons and water infiltration into the tendon gallery.

FPL was aware of some of the observations identified by the audit team and was in the process of monitoring or addressing some of the concerns. Examples of this include repairs being performed to the intake structure; enhanced protective coatings program; repairs to be made for the bent plates on the anchor bolt chairs of some exterior tanks; repairs to the liner-coating, seam welds and penetration canisters planned for the 1993 refueling outage; and a FPL analysis to address liner bulging.

In addition to the ongoing repairs and enhanced protective coatings program, FPL stated that a team has been formed to develop a strategic plan for addressing plant material condition.

This team will consider short term and long term repairs and inspections for civil/structural areas that do not currently have a specific maintenance program. The audit team believes that this is an important program, which if properly implemented will prevent the development of any significant degradation of structures and civil engineering features.

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ATTACHtlENT 2 TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 &4 NRC REVIEW OP SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES JANUARY 13-17 1992 SCHEDULE JANUARY 13'992 NRC STAFF ARRIVES AT PTN (2:00 PM) TO COMPLETE NECESSARY HP TRAINING JANUARY 14 g 1992 FPL PRESENTATIONS ON SELECTED NRC TOPICS 08:00 11'30 PRESENTATIONS 11:30 01 00 LUNCH & NRC STAFF CAUCUS 01:00 04:00 PRESENTATIONS 04:00 - 04:30 NRC STAFF CAUCUS 04:30 - 05:00 REVIEW OF ACTION/FOLLOW-UP ITEMS SEE PAGE 2 FOR DETAILED SCHEDULE JANUARY 15'992 08:00 11:30 FIELD WALKDOWNS (See page 3 for detailed schedule) 11:30 01:00 LUNCH & NRC STAFF CAUCUS 01:00 04:00 FIELD WALKDOWNS 04'00 04:30 NRC STAFF CAUCUS 04:30 - 05:00 FPL/NRC STAFF MEETING JANUARY 16'992 08:00 12:00 FIELD 'ALKDOWNS AND REVIEW OF SELECTED 50.59 EVALUATIONS ( SPLIT NRC TEAM )

12:00 03:00 LUNCH & NRC STAFF CAUCUS 03:00 05:00 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS IDENTIFICATION OF FPL AND NRC FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS JANUARY 17 1992 08'00 -10:00 EXIT MEETING

0, NRC REVIEW OP SAPETY RELATED STRUCTURES PPL PRESENTATION SCHEDULE JANUARY 14 1.992 TOPIC SCHEDULE INTRODUCTION 08:00 08:05 1.0 DESIGN CRITERIA 08:05 08:40 2.0 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES 08:40 09:50 3.0 SUPPORT ANCHORAGES 09:50 10:10 4.0 SPENT FUEL POOL AND RACKS 10:10 10:30 5.0 INTAKE STRUCTURE 10:30 11:10 6.0 MASONRY WALLS 11:10 - 11:30 t

LUNCH & NRC STAFF CAUCUS 11:30 01:00 7.0 STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES 01:00 01:20 8.0 GEOLOGY/FOUNDATION CONDITIONS 01:20 01:40 9.0 MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURES 01:40 - 02:20 10.0 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION 02 20 - 02 35 11.0 CIVIL STRUCTURAL LER'S 02:35 02:55 12.0 PREVIOUS NRC STAFF REPORTS 02:55 03:15 13.0 10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS 03:15 - 03:25 14.0 EMERGENCY PLANS 03:25 - 03:40 ADDITIONAL ITEMS 03:40 04:00 NRC STAFF CAUCUS 04:00 - 04:30 REVIEW OF ACTION/FOLLOW-UP ITEMS 04:30 05:00

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NRC REVIEW Op SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES WALKDOWN SCHEDULE JANUARY 15-1 6 I.9 9 2 LOCATION SCHEDULE JANUARY 15'992

~ UNIT 4 TENDON GALLERY 08:00 8:45 I

~ UNIT 3 TENDON GALLERY 08:45 9:30

~ UNIT 3 SPENT FUEL POOL 09:30 09:45

~ AUX. BLDG ROOF AREA 09:45 - 10:15

~ UNIT 4 SPENT FUEL POOL 10:15 - 10:30

~ UNIT 4 CONTAINMENT ROOF 10:30 - 11:15

~ YARD TANKS ZN RCA 11:15 11:30 LUNCH AND NRC STAFF CAUCUS 11:30 - 01:00

~ AUX. BLDG INTERIOR 01:00 01:45

~ SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION 01:45 - 02:OO

~ TURBINE BLDG 18 FT., COMPUTER RM 02:00 02:45

~ TURBINE BLDG 30 FT., CABLE SPREAD ROOM 02:45 - 03:30 AREA & NEW ELECT. EQUIP. RM

~ TURBINE BLDG 42 FT., CONTROL RM AREA 03: 30 04: 00 NRC STAFF CAUCUS 04:00 04:30 FPL/NRC STAFF MEETING 04:30 - 05:00 JANUARY I.6 p 1992

~ UNIT 3 EDG BLDG 08:00 08:30

~ UNIT 4 ED/ BLDG 08:30 - 09:00

~ INTAKE STRUCTURE 09:00 09:30

~ SITE PERIMETER 09:30 10:30

~ OTHER AREAS OF INTEREST 10:30 - 12:00

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TURKEY'POINT UNITS 3&4 NRC REVIEW OF SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES JANUARY 13-17,1992 TLIN F PRE ENT Tl N 1.0 DESIGN CRITERIA (R. GIL)

- SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA

- WIND DESIGN CRITERIA

- TORNADO MISSII.E PROTECTION

- FLOOD PROTECTION

- SAFETY RELATED STORAGE TANKS

- UNIT 4 EDG BUILDING 2.0 CONTAINMENTSTRUCTURES (K. GREENE)

- TENDON SURVEII LANCES

- CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM

- PRE-ILRT INSPECTION 3.0 SUPPORT ANCHORAGES (R. GIL) 4.0 SPENT FUEL POOL AND RACKS (R. GIL) 5.0 INTAKE STRUCTURE (T. CARTER) 6.0 MASONRY WALLS (R. GIL) 7.0 STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES (R. GIL)

OUT IN PRESENTATI N ONTINUED 8.0 GEOLOGY/FOUNDATION CONDITIONS (R. GIL)

- GROUNDWATER EFFECTS

- SETTLEMENT 9.0 MAiNTENANCEOF STRUCTURES

- OVERVIEW (R. GIL)

- PROTECTIVE COATINGS (G. DOLDERER)

- ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION (T. LUKE)

'1 0.0 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION(R. GOULDY) 11.0 CIVIL STRUCTURAL LER'S (J. KNORR) 12.0 STRUCTURAL ISSUES - PREVIOUS NRC STAFF REPORTS (H. GAVANKAR) 13.0 CIVIL/STRUCTURAL10CFR60.69 EVALUATIONS(H.

GAVANKAR) 14.0 EMERGENCY PLAN fOR NATURALEMERGENCIES

( J.,KIRKPATRICK)

1,0 DESIGN RITERIA

~ GENERAL CRITERIA

~ SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA

+ WIND DESIGN CRITERIA

~ TORNADO MISSILE PROTECTION

~ FLOOD PROTECTION

~ SAFETY RELATED STORAGE TANKS

~ UNIT 4 EDG BUILDING

1.0 DESIGN CRITERIA (CONTINUED)

N RA RITERIA

~ NORMAL LOADS (AISC, ACI, LOCAL CODES)

~ ACCIDENT 5. NATURAL EVENT LOADS-Y= 1/4 (1.26D + 1.25E)

Y= 1/cf) (1.26D + 1.0R)

Y= 1/cf) ('1.26D + 1.26H + 1.26E)

Y= 1/4 (1.0D + 1.0E')

WIND LOADS ARE SUBSTITUTED FOR "E"

~ SPECIFIC CONTAINMENTCRITERIA IS CONTAINED IN SECTION 5.1 OF UFSAR

~ ADDITIONALDETAILS AVAILABLEIN CHAPTER 6 OF UFSAR AND DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT/SELECT LICENSING ISSUES

1.0 DESI N CR TER)A C NTIN ED SEl lVll DESI N RITE IA

~ LOCATED IN VERY LOW SEISMIC HAZARD ZONE

~ HOUSNER RESPONSE SPECTRA- 0.05 OBE, 0.15 SSE

~ VERTICAL SPECTRA TAKEN AS 2/3 OF HORIZONTAL SEISMIC FORCES APPLIED SIMULTANEOUSLYIN VERTICAL AND WORST CASE HORIZONTAI.

~ SPECTRA FOR CONTROL BUILDING AND CONTAINMENT GENERATED USING TIME HISTORY TECHNIQUE (SAMPLE EARTHQUAKE- 1940 EL CENTRO, CALIFORNIA)

~ AUXILIARYBUILDING USES GROUND SPECTRA - STRUCTURE IS BROAD WITH RESPECT TO ITS HEIGHT AND HAS NATURAL FREQUENCIES OUTSIDE AMPLIFIED PORTIONS OF DESIGN SPECTRA

~ DAMPING VALUES CONSERVATIVE IN COMPARISON WITH REG. GUIDE 1.60

~ AEC PUBLICATION TID-7024 USED AS BASIC GUIDE

1 DE I N RITERIA NTINUED WIND DE I N RITERIA

~ HURRICANE WIND LOAD OF 146mph (REPLACES "E" IN LOAD COMB(NATIONS)

~ TORNADO WIND LOAD OF 226mph

~ DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE OF 1.6 psi

~ TORNADO MISSILES (DESCRIBED BELOW)

~ TORNADO WIND, PRESSURE, MISSILE AND DEAD LOADS ARE APPLIED SIMULTANEOUSLY

~ WIND FORCES CALCULATED PER ASCE PAPER 3269

~ FOR TORNADO LOADS, STRESSES ARE LIMITEDTO YIELD AND LOCAL CRUSHING IS ALLOWED AT THE MISSILE IMPACT ZONE

~ BUILDING STRUCTURES ALSO REVIEWED FOR NO LOSS OF FUNCTION FOR TORNADO WINDS OF 337mph WITH 2.26 psi PRESSURE LOAD

1 DESl N RITERIA NTINUED T RNAD IVII I PR 7 Tl N

~ lVIISSILE SPECTRUM:

- CORRUGATED SHEET SIDING 6 225mph

- BOLTED WOOD DECKING e 200mph

- PASSENGER CAR 6 50mph

~ PROTECTION PROVIDED BY:

- CLASS I ENCLOSURE

- REDUNDANCY AND SPACING

~ DESIGN METHODOLOGY

- ENERGY BALANCE EQUATIONS ARE USED TO DETERMINE THICKNESS OF CONCRETE OR STEEL

- CONTAINMENTPENETRATION ANALYSIS BASED ON NAVDOCKS P-61

- LOCALCRUSHING PERMITTED AT lVIISSILEIMPACTZONE

1. DE IGN RITERIA NTIN ED FL OD PR TE Tl N

~ LOCATION: COASTAL WITH BARRIER ISLANDS LOCATED 6-8 MILES OFFSHORE

~ PLANT GRADE AT EL. 18ft IVlLW

~ DESIGN BASIS FOR MAXIIVIUMFLOOD STAGES AND WAVE HEIGHT BASED ON TESTING

~ MODEL USED PROBABLE IVlAXIMUMHURRICANE, ASSUIVIED STATIONARY TO ESTABLISH STEADY STATE CONDITIONS

~ PREDICTED MAXIMUlVIFLOOD EL. OF 18.3ft MLW

~ PREDICTED WAVE RUN-UP OF 8.7ft

~ FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES INTAKE:

- 4ft HIGH WALL ON EAST SIDE (EL. 20ft)

- 4ft HIGH OPENING ON EAST WALL (11-13ft ELEV.)

- ICW PUMPS SET AT EL. 22.6ft

- DECK DESIGNED FOR SURGE UPLIFT FORCES

~ FLOOD PROTECTION FEATURES POWER BLOCK:

. - BARRIERS TO EL. 20ft TO NORTH, SOUTH 5, WEST

- BARRIERS TO EL. 22ft TO EAST (DUE TO WAVE RUN-UP

- BARRIERS ARE CONTINUOUS WITH STOP LOGS AT OPENINGS

~ 1988 LER'ARfOUS CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IMPLEIVlENTED, INCLUDING RE-EVALUATIONOF DESIGN BASIS PARAMETERS

1.0 DE I N RITERIA NTIN ED AF R T T

~ TANK FUNCTIONS:

- UNIT 3 8c UNIT 4 CONDENSATE STORAGE (CST)

- UNIT 3 8c UNIT 4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE {RWST)

- UN)T 3 DIESEL OIL STORAGE (DOST)

(UNIT 4 DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK IS WITHIN NEW UNIT 4 DIESEL BUILDING)

~ ORIGINAL DESIGN CRITERIA

- SEISMIC DESIGN WAS TO A GROUND ACCELERATIONOF 0.06g, UStNG TID-7024 METHODOLOGY

- WIND LOADS USED WERE 194mph FOR FULL TANKS AND 140mph FOR EMPTY TANKS.

- MISSILE PROTECTION FOR THE CST'S AND RWST'S IS PROVIDED BY REDUNDANCY AND SPACING

- NO MISSILE PROTECTION WAS PROVIDED FOR THE DOST (SUFFICIENT TIME WOULD BE AVAILABLEDUE TO DAY TANKS AND BATTERIES TO OBTAIN OIL FROM OTHER SOURCES)

N RIT IA NTIN ED 0 TYR T TAN I 0

~ SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITIES

- CLASS I TANKS IDENTIFIED UNDER A-46 WALKDOWN/REVIEWEFFORT

- BASED ON SEISMIC TEAM REVIEW AND CALCULATIONS, TANKS ARE ADEQUATE FOR 0.16g SEISMIC INPUT (BASED ON ASCE STD. 4-86 WHICH CONSIDERS AMPLIFIEDFREQUENCY RESPONSE OF IMPULSIVE FLUID MASS)

- SEISMIC I OADS CALCULATEDBY A&6 TEAM ENVELOP PTN DESIGN BASIS TORNADO WIND LOADS

- NEW UNIT 4 DIESEL OIL TANKS ARE MISSILE PROTECTED AND CROSS-TIED INTO UNIT 3 TANK

~ MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCEACTIVITY

- CST REPAIRS COMPLETED IN 1983 - NITROGEN BLANKETINGAND TANK SEAL ADDED TO PROTECTION CST COATING REPAIRS RE-PERFORMED IN 1991-COATINGS APPLIED IN 1983 WERE DEFICiENT

AFETY R T RA TAN

- THE EMERGENCY DIESEL OIL STORAGE TANK lS INSPECTED EVERY TEN YEARS, BY PROCEDURE

- DURlNG EDG OIL TANK INSPECTION IN 1987, MINOR PAINT DAMAGEWAS FOUND DUE TO METHOD USED FOR SAMPLING ACTIVITIES - THIS PLROBLEM WAS CORRECTED

- INPO SER 2-84 AND IEN 86-08 IDENTIFIED POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH EPOXY COATINGS IN OIL STORAGE TANKS - ISSUE NOT APPUCABLE TO PTN, A DIFFERENT COATING SYSTEM WAS USED, WHICH IS COMPATIBLE WITH OIL STORAGE TANKS

- NO OTHER INTERNAL COATING PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED

- TANK EXTERIORS RECENTLY INSPECTED AS PART OF A-46 WALKDOWNS, NO CORROSION OR FOUNDATION CRACKING WAS IDENTIFIED - DAMAGED/BENTANCHOR BOLT CHAIR PLATES WERE IDENTIFIED AND MODIFICATIONIS PRESENTLY BEING DEVELOPED

- IDENTlFICATIONAND IMPLEMENTATIONOF REQUIRED INSPECTIONS FOR TANKS WILLBE CONSIDERED BY THE RECENTLY FORMED PLANT MATERIALCONDITION TEAM

1. DE IGN CRITERIA ONTINUED UNIT 4 ED BUILDIN

~ COMPLETED IN 1991 AS PART OF EMERGENCY POWER UPGRADE 1

~ STRUCTURE HOUSES THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS FOR UNIT 4,WITH ITS AUXILIARIES,AND TWO DIESEL OIL COMPARTMENTS

~ LOAD COMB!NATIONS AND STRUCTURAL ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH NUREG 0800 (STANDARD REVIEW PLAN).

~ SEISMIC DESIGN h

- 0.16 g SSE AND 0.06 g OBE

- VERTICAL ACCELERATION TAKEN AS 2/3 OF HORIZONTAL

- RESPONSE SPECTRA DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDE 1.60 'EG.

- DAMPING VALUES USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 1.61

- MODES AND.ORTHOGONAL EARTHQUAKECOMPONENTS-COMBINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 1.92

- FLOOR RESPONSE SPECTRA DB/ELOPED FROM SYNTHETIC TlPIE-HISTORIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 1.122

- MATHMODEL CONSISTS OF LUMPED MASS CANTILEVERAND WITH SOIL SPRINGS

1. DE IGN CRITERIA ONTIN ED N T4 D B I DIN NTIN ED 4

~ HURRICANE WIND DESIGN

- VELOCITY PRESSURES CALCULATEDIN ACCORDANCE WITH ANSI 58.1 OR ASCE PAPER 3269, FOR CASES NOT COVERED BY ANSI

- SOUTH FLORIDA BUILDING CODE ALSO REVIEWED

~ TORNADO LOADS

- WIND VELOCITIES AND DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURES IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 'I.76 AND SRP

- WIND VELOCITY PRESSURE CALCULATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANSI 58.1 WITH NO VARIATIONTAKEN FOR HEIGHT OF STRUCTURE, AND A GUST FACTOR OF UNITY

- WIND AND PRESSURE LOADS ARE COMBINEDWITH TORNADO MISSILE IMPACT FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH SRP

- TORNADO MISSILE SPECTRUM IN ACCORDANCE WITH SRP

+ FLOOD PROTECTION

- M'AXIMUMFLOOD AND WAVE RUN-UP ELEVATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH FSAR

- BARRIERS DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REG. GUIDE 1.102

2.0 NTAINMENTSTR CTUR NTAINMENTTEND N SURVEILLAN E

.

DES RIPTl PRESCON CORPORATlON (BBRV SYSTEM)

NINETY 0/4-INCH WIRES WITH BUTfONHEADED ANCHORAGES, STRESSING WASHERS, SHIMS 165 DOME TENDONS, 180 VERTICALTENDONS, 489 HOOP (HORl2ONTAL) TENDONS HCTRA TENDONS PROVIDED FOR SURVEILLANCE PURPOSES ANY THREE ADJACENT TENDONS IN ANY OF THE THREE GROUPS CAN BE LOST (LOAD REDISTRIBUTION CAPABILITlES OF CONTAlNMENTSHELL)

~ I 0'4 p 0 0 q Oqp 0000 0 Oq qg"00 0 O 0'q 0~ 000 p 0 0ppop 0

--'O 0 0 0 00 00 Opp pp 00 0 0 0 Qlf p pp 0 00 0

&0 (0 0 0 0 0 0 0 so ~ DNQ?

COHThlNHEHT STRDCTURE PRESTRESS TENDON HhRDWhRE hSSEHSLT

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NTAINMENTT ND N RV IL N NT'D FFE TIV 8 TR IN ND N PRESTRESS LOSSES ELASTIC SHORTENING OF CONCRETE CREEP OF CONCRETE SHRINKAGE OF CONCRETE RELAXATIONOF PRESTRESSING STEEL FRICTlONAL LOSSES VALUES OF PRESTRESS LOSSES DETERMINED BY CALCULATIONS, INFORMATION PROVIDED BY PRESCON, OR FULLNCALETEST DATA PRESTRESS LOSSES APPLIED TO JACKING STRESSES TO DETERMINE FINAL EFFECTIVE PRESTRESS AT THE END OF 40 MARS FOR TENDONS lN EACH GROUP'THESE VALUES ARE DOCUMENTED lN FSAR.

2. A C NTAINMENTTENDON SURVEILLANCES CONT'D ORIGINA PLANT TE HNI AL SPECIFICATION RE IREMENT ORIGINAL PLANT TECHN!CAL SPECIFICATIONS IN EFFECT THROUGH 15TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE NINE TENDONS WERE ORIGINALLYSELECTED FOR SURVEILLANCE; THESE TENDONS WERE To BE EXAMINED As PART OF EVERY SURVEILLANCE DURING CONSTRUCTION, CONCRETE DELAMINATIONS OCCURRED IN UNIT 3 CONTAINMENT DOME; CONDITION WAS CORRECTED DURING CONSTRUCTlON. INSPECTION OF ADDITIONALUNIT 3 DOME TENDONS WAS REQUIRED THROUGH FIRST THREE YEARS OF PLANT LIFE SOME SURVEILLANCE TENDONS WERE OBSERVED TO BE TOO CI.OSE TO MAIN STEAM VALVES FOR PERSONNEL SAFETY; THEREFORF DIFFERENT TENDONS FOR SURVEILLANCEWERE SELECTED.

REQUIRED TESTS UFTAFF MEASUREMENTS {EACH TENDON)

SHEATH FILLER INSPECTION - VISUAI CHEMICALTEST (EACH TENDON)

FOR ONE TENDON FROlN EACH GROUP, TENDON WAS DETENSIONED; WIRE WAS REMOVED, VISUALLY INSPECTED, TENSILE TESTS PERFORMED

TURKEY POINT UNIT 3 xzzzmu. mazru lax~ 2'~ eau.m K~ Mama, uz~

1D15 X X+ X 1D18 X 1D27 1D36 X X 2D11 X X X 2D21 X+

2D24 X X+

2D28 X X+ X+

3D21 X+ X X 3D24 X X+ X 3D28 X X X X X 1D53 X X+ X 62H18 X 64H50 X X 42H70 X 64H51 X 13H47 23vi X+ X+ X X 45V7 X+ X X 61V1 X X 12V3 61V2

- TENDONS DETENSIONED FOR WIRE INSPECTION

TURKEY POINT UNIT 4 1D28 X X X 2D28 X+

3D28 X+ X X X 2D14 2D3 X X+

13H15 X+

35H70 X+

51H50 13H38 42H57 ~

64H70 X X 42H80 X+ X X 62H38 X+

13H51 X 12V29 X X 34V29 X+ X X 56V29 X X X

+ - TENDON DETENSIONED FOR MIRE INSPECTION

't1

2. A ONTAtNMENTTEND N SURVElLLAN ES CONT'D NEW T HNI A P IFI ATI N RE IREMENT IN EFFECT BEGINN!NG WITH 20TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE {1 992)

REQUIRES THAT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF TENDONS BE DEMONSTRATED EVERY FIFTH YEAR FROM DATE OF INITIAL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY TEST REQUIRES SURVEILLANCE OF A RANDOM BUT REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF AT LEAST 12 TENDONS {3 DOME, 4 VERTICAI 8 HORIZONTAL)

FOR EACH SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION, ONE TENDON FROM EACH GROUP MAY BE KEPT UNCHANGED TO DEVELOP A HISTORY PROVISIONS EXIST FOR SELECTING SUBSTITUTE TENDONS TO REPLACE SELECTED TENDONS THAT ARE INACCESSIBLE OR UNSAFE FOR INSPECTION-PRESCRIBED BY ASME IWL-2521.1 (a)

REQUIRED TESTS UFTNFF MEASUREMENTS (ALLTENDONS)

SHEATH FILLER INSPECTION (ALLTENDONS)

VISUAL INSPECTION CHEMICALTESTS NO CHANGE IN PRESENCE VERIFICATION OF MINIMUMGREASE COVERAGE NO UNACCEPTABLE CORROSION IN END ANCHORAGES NO UNACCEPTABLE CRACKING IN CONCRETE ADJACENT TO END ANCHORAGES WIRE INSPECTION (FOR ONE TENDON FROM EACH GROUP)

VISUAL INSPECTION TENSILE TESTS PLANT IS SUBJECT TO LlMITINGCONDITIONS FOR OPERATION (LCO) IN THE EVENT OF UNACCEPTABLE TEST RESULTS; LCO ls DESCRIBED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

NTAIN T 0 N F R S TS HR H ALL IJFTWFF VALUES EXCEEDED THE MINIMUM EFFECTIVE DESIGN PRESTRESS TYPICALLYFOUND MILLSCALE, MINOR CORROSION ON SHlMS AND BEARING PLATES, SOME SLIGHT SPOTTY, DISCOLORATION DURING UNIT 3 1ST YEAR SURVEILLANCE, FOUND CORROSION VflTH PITTING ON SEVERAl. ANCHORAGES AND WIRES FOR VERTICALTENDONS; THIS WAS CAUSED BY A DELAY tN INSTAIJJNG THE SHEATH RLLER DURING CONSTRUCTION (WIRES AND ANCHORAGES EXPOSED MOISTURE PAt08 TO TENS!ONtNG . THt8 WAS NOT A PROGRESSIVE CONDITION, HO ER.

BEGINNING IN THIRD YEAR, SOME CORROSION OF GREASE CAPS AND BEARING PLATES FOR UNIT 3 TENDONS WAS NOTED.

SUGHT INCREASE OF CORROSION LEVELS OF SHIMS, BEARING PLATES, STRESS NASHERS NOTED DURING IOTH YEAR SURYEIUANCE NO SERIOUS PROGRESSIVE CORROSION OBSERVED MORE CORROSION OBSERVED ON UNIT 3 THAN ON VNIT 4

2.O A CONTAINMENTTEND N URVEILLAN E

SUMMARY

AND TREND F RE ULT THR SURVEIL NIR IN P N I A MINOR SCRATCHES, NICKS, DIE MARKS, HEAT TREAT)NG DISCOLORATION, LOCALIZED CORROSlON DURING UN!T 3 1ST YEAR SURVEILLANCE, SOME CORROSION PflTlNG OBSERVED ON VERTICALTENDONS (EXPOSED'TO MOISTURE PRIOR TO TENSIONING).

SOME OXIDATIONAND PITnNG NOTED IN UNIT 3 5TH AND 10TH YEAR SVRVEILLANCES (NOT PROGRESSIVE)

MORE CORROSION OBSERVED ON UNIT 3 THAN ON UNIT 4

2.P A CONTAINMENTTENDON SURyEI LLAN E CONT'0

SUMMARY

AND TREND F RES T THR GH TENTH YEAR S RVEI WIR N TIN FOR UNIT 3, TWO SPECIMENS {ONE IN 1 ST YEAR, ONE IN 5TH YEAR) HAD YIELD STRENGTHS '!-2.3% BELOW REQUIRED VALUE; WIRES FROM SIX TENDONS (FIVE IN UNIT 3, ONE IN UNIT 4) HAD ULTIMATESTRENGTHS 1%

BEI.OW REQUIRED VALUE FOR EACH SITUATION WHERE YIELD STRENGTH WAS BELOW REQUIRED VALUE, AVERAGE YIELD STRENGTH OF ALL SPECIMENS TAKEN.FROM WIRE IN QUESTION WAS ABOVE REQUIRED VALUE.

FOR EACH SITUATION WHERE ULTIMATESTRENGTH WAS BELOW REQUIRED VALUE, AVERAGE YIELD STRENGTH OF WIRE WAS ABOVE REQUIRED VALUE (YIELD STRENGTH IS MORE INDICATIVEOF THE BEHAVIOR AND ACCEPTABILITY OF TENDON WIRES AT NORMALAND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS THAN IS THE'LTIMATESTRENGTH).

FOR REASONS LISTED ABOVE, CONDmON OF WIRES WA CONSIDERED TO BE ACCEPTABLE

2.0 A CONTAINMENTTEND N SURVEILLANCES CONT'D

SUMMARY

AND TRENDS F RESULT THROUGH TENTH YEAR S RVEILLAN NT'0 SHEATH FILL R INSPE TI N CHEMICAL CONTENT, NEUTRALIZATIONNUMBERS WERE ACCEPTABLE OBSERVED FREE WATER AND DISCOLORATION IN SEVERAL UNIT 3 TENDONS. THIS WAS APPARENTLY DUE TO USE OF REMOVABLE TENDON PIT COVERS FOR SURVEILLANCE TENDONS (ALL OTHER VERTICAL TENDON TOP. CAPS WERE COVERED WITH CONCRETE);

INADEQUATESEALS ALLOWED WATER TO ACCUMULATE IN PITS, SEEP INTO TENDON SHEATHS.

CHEMICALTESTS SHOWED PERCENTAGE OF FREE WATER TO BE WITHIN ACCEPTANCE UMITS DESIGN OF SEALS HAS BEEN MODIFIED IN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE THE COVERS WATERTIGHT;.

FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS TO SEALS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED DURING 20TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE SPECIAL SURVEILLANCEOF VERTICALTENDONS WAS PERFORMED FOLLOWING 10TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE TO ADDRESS ISSUE OF WATER'IN TENDONS. FREE lgATER WAS FOUND IN SEVERAL TENDONS, BUT PERCENTAGE WAS ALWAYS WITHIN ACCEPTANCE UMITS.

NO UNACCEPTABLE PROGRESSIVE CORROSION WAS NOTED ON VERTICALTENDON WIRES.

SOME LEAKAGE OF SHEATH FILLER FRONI VERTICAL TENDON CAPS NOTED (CRACKED GASKETS, CORRODED CAPS). PLANT IS CURRENTLY WORKING TO REMOVE CORROSION, RfCOAT CAPS AS NECESSARY.

2.0 A ONTAINM NT TENDON S RYE}LLANCE CONT'D

SUMMARY

F FIFTE NT YEAR RVBLLAN MOST RECENT TENDON SURVEILLANCE - PERFORMED IN 1988 12 TENDONS lNSPECTED FOR UNIT 3, 10 FOR UNIT 4 FOR EACH UNIT, ONE ADDITtONALHORIZONTAL TENDON INSPECTED TO MEET!NTENT OF TECHNICAL.

SPECIFICATION IMPLEMENTATIONPROCEDURE 0-AOMRR 021 (REFLECTING NEW TECH SPECS, WHICH WERE IN REVIEW PROCESS AT THE TIME)

TWO ADDITIONALUNIT 3 VERT1CAL TENDONS INSPECTED TO $ ATISFY RECOMMENDATIONS MADE AFTER 10TH YEAR AND SPEClAL VERTICALTENDON SURVEILLANCES AMOUNT OF CHEMICAL IMPURITIES WAS WITHIN ACCEPTANCE LIMITS IN THREE TENDONS IN UNIT 3, SMALLAMOUNT OF FRE WATER WAS OBSERVED; NONE OBSERVED IN UNIT 4.

TESTS SHOWED PERCENTAGE OF FREE WATER TO BE WITHIN ACCEPTANCE LIMIS.

FOR SEVERAL UNIT 4 HORIZONTAlTENDONS, NKIITRAAHATIRHNNNNKR IHNINATKRYKRY SURHT1.Y ACIDIC NATURE, WHICH WAS OUTSIDE SPECIFlED LlMITS.

VALUES WERE WITHIN UMITS RECOMMENDED BY MANUFACTURER, HOWEVER, AND WERE THEREFORE CONSIDERED ACCEPTABLE.

MODIFIED FORMULATIONS OF VISCONORUST SHEATH FiLLER WHICH HAVE HIGHER BASE NUMBER HAVE BEEN USED AS REPLACEMENT GREASE 1N LATER SURVEIllANCES.

4 CONTAINMENTTEND N SURVEILLANCES C NT'D S MMARY F FIFTEENTH YEAR URVEILLAN E NT'0 N AN H RA A MB IE NO EXCESSIVE CRACKING OR CORROSION. SOME SURFACE OXIDATION OBSERVED AT OUTER EDGE QF BEARING PLATES AT TOP ENDS OF SOME VERTICAL TENDONS FOR BOTH UNITS. OVERALL CONDITION WAS CONSISTENT WITH THAT REPORTED IN EARLIER SURVEILLANCES.

THE 15TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE REPORT RECOMMENDED THAT THECORRODED AREAS OF THE BEAR!NG PLATES BE CLEANED AND COATED

2. A NTAINM NT TENDON URVEILLAN ES NT'D

SUMMARY

F FIFTEENTH YEAR URVEIL N LlFT- F F R PREVIOUS SURVEILLANCES COMPARED MEASURED FORCES TO CALCULATED MINIMUM40-YEAR DESIGN STRENGTHS. THIS SURVEILLANCE UTILlZED METHOD DESCRIBED IN REG. GUIDE 1.38.1 TO DETERMINE UPPER AND LOWER BOUND LIFTOFF VALUES FOR EACH lNDIVIDUALTENDON AT ANY POINT DURING ITS UFE.

FOR UNIT 3; LIFTOFF VALUES FOR EACH TENDON EXCEEDED PREDICTED LOWER BOUND VALUES.

FOR UNIT 4, LIFTOFF VALUE FOR ONE TENDON WAS 0.3/o BELOW PREDICTED LOWER BOUND VALUE. PER PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS, FOUR ADDITIONAL ADJACENT TENDONS WERE TESTED; TWO OF THE UFT-OFF VALUES WERE SLIGHTLY BELOW PREDICTED LOWER BOUND VALUES.

'IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANT PROCEDURE, 'AN EVALUATION.WASPERFORMED, AND A SPECIAL REPORT WAS SUBMf1TED TO NRC. THIS REPORT CONCLUDED THAT. THE PRESTRESSING SYSTEM WOULD MAINTAINITS INTEGRITY; THIS WAS BASED ON MEASURED STRESS LEVELS AND THE DESIGN MARGINS IN THE SYSTEM.

IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT LlFTNFF VALUES FOR FOUR OF THE TENDONS IN THIS AREA BE OBTAINED DURING THE NEXT SURVEILLANCE,

~ I. IF'IOFF TURKEY POINT ijNIT 4 TENDON I BHSI RESEAT PREDICTED I.IFTOFF FIERCE AT IS/g YEARS 5S5.1 NIPS 150 C50 550 5 IO 20 M 40 Tlirt AFTER INITIAL TENSIONING I YEARS)

F)GUAE I I

.0 A NTAINMENTTEND N RVEl LAN E UMMARY F I NTH R RV ILLAN NT'D LlFT NT'OR SEVERAL TENDONS ON BOTH UNITS, MEASURED LIFT-OFF FORCE EXCEEDED PREDICTED UPPER BOUND VALUE.

IN ALL CASES EXCEPT ONE, THE TENDONS HAD UNDERGONE PREVIOUS SURVEILLANCES; HIGH LIFT-OFF VALUES WERE A CONSEQUENCE OF HAVING ADDITIONAL FORCE APPLIED TO TENDONS DURING THE PREVIOUS DETENSIONING/RETENSIONING PROCESSES.

THE EXCEEDING OF THE UPPER BOUND VALUE DOES

'OT AFFECT SAFETY OR STRUCTURAL CAPACITY.

WHEN THE EXCESS RETENSIONING LOADS ARE CONSIDERED, THE GENERAL PATTERN OF

. PRESTRESS LOSS IN THE TENDONS FOLLOWS THE PREDICTED BEHAVIOR.

ISSUE WILLCEASE TO BE A-FACTOR IN FUTURE

'HIS SURVEILLANCES, AS INSPECTION WILL INVOLVE RANDOMLYSELECTED TENDONS INSTEAD OF TH PREVIOUSLY DESIGNATED TENDONS. ALSO, THE 16TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE REPORT HAS RECOIIJIltrIENDED THAT RETENSIONING LOADS BE AS, CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO THE IJFTWFF LOADS TO PREVENT THE INTRODUCTION OF ADDITIONAL PRESTRESS INTO THE TENDONS.-

~ L lF TOFF TURKEY POlNT'NlT 3 TENOON 45V7 RESEAT PREDlCTED LlFTOFF FORCE AT 'le/g YEARS 576.3 KlPS Ul A

750 K

Ll A'a.

C)

Cl K

Cll I-650 550 4 . 5 10 20 30 40 Tll4E AFTER INl TlAL TENSlONlNG (YEARS )

FIGURE G

2. A NTAINMENTTENDON RVEILLAN F NT'D

SUMMARY

F FIFTEENTH YEAR URYEILLANC NT'0 WIR N P TI N I AL LOCAL AREAS OF LEVEL 3 CORROSION {NOT PROGRESSIVE)

UNIT 3. VERTICALTENDON WIRE SHOWED PATCHES OF SURFACE ROUGHNESS WIR N ALL UNIT 3 SAMPLES MET REQUIRED VALUES IN UNIT 4, 2 SPECIMENS FROM ONE VERTICAL TENDON SHOWED ULTIMATESTRENGTH LESS THAN 4.% BELOW REQUIRED VALUE. PER PLANT PROCEDURE, AN EVALUATIONOF THIS CONDITION WAS PERFORMED, AND A SPECIAL REPORT WAS'SUBMmED TO NRC. THIS

. REPORT CONCI.UDED THAT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE CONTAINMENTSTRUCTURE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

DESIGN OF CONTAINMENTALLOWS ANY THREE ADJACENT VERTICALTENDONS TO BE LOST THE WIRE IN QUESTION MET THE FOR YIELD STRENGTH SPECIFIED'EQUIREMENTS IT WAS RECOMMENDED THAT'ADDITIONALWIRES FROM THE SAME HEAT AS THE WIRE IN QUESTION BE INSPECTED DURING THE NEXT SURVEILLANCE.

2. A NTAINMENTTEND N URVEILMN ES Nl"D POSSIBL LEAKAG F HEATH FI LE RECENTLY RAISED CONCERN RELATED TO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMOUNT OF SHEATH FILLER REMOVED FROM CONTAINMENTAND AMOUNT OF SHEATH FILLER REPLACED PREVIOUS TURKEY POINT SURVEILLANCE REPORTS HAVE NOT TABULATEDTHIS DATA. RESEARCHED PERFORMED ON ORIGINAL DATA RECORD SHEETS FILLED OUT BY.

SURVEILLANCE PERSONNEL; DATA NOT AVAILABLEFOR ALL SURVEILLANCES, HOWEVER.

VOLUMES WERE NOT RECORDED PRECISELY ESTIMATES BASED ON LEVELS OF SHEATH FILLER IN BARRELS EXACT AMOUNTS OF OVERFLOW NOT MEASURED IN MAJORITY OF CASES; VOLUME REMOVED AND VOLUME REPLACED WERE OF SIMILAR MAGNITUDES.

IN APPRONMATELY30% OF CASKS, THERE WAS AT LEAST A 10 GALLON DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VOLUME REMOVED AND VOLUME REPLACED.

POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR DIFFERENCES:

VOIDS IN ORIGINAL INSTALLATION LEAKAGE FROM TENDON CAPS THERMAL SHRINKAGE OF GREASE {UP TO 8%)

PENETRATION OF GREASE INTO SPACES WITHIN WIRE BUNDLE (OCCURRING OVER TIME LEAKAGE INTO CONTAINMENTCONCRETE

'BECAUSE OF THERMAL GRADIENT, LESS COMPRESSION OCCURS ON OUTSIDE SURFACE OF CONTAINMENT. GREASE LEAKING FROM SHEATHS WOULD BK MORE UKELYTO MIGRATE TO OUTSIDE SURFACES. THERE HAS BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF GREASE LEAIQLGE FROM CONCRETE CRACKS OBSERVED ON EITHER CONTAINMENT.

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NTAlNM T T NO N RV LAN P SIBL KA F HEATH Fi R NT'D EVALUATIONOF POSSiBLE EFFECTS OF SHEATH FiLLER LEAKAGE INTO CONTAINMENTCONCRETE FOR PRESTRESSED SHELI .NO REUANCE IS MADE ON MECHANICALINTERLOCKING FOR RESISTANCE OF APPLIED LOADS. THEREFORF GREASE CANNOT DEGRADE SHEAR CAPACITY OF SECTlON.

~

ACI 615.1R-79 INDICATES THAT PETROLEUM PRODUCTS ARE NORMALLYHARMLESS TO MATURE CONCRETE ALTHOUGH LIMITE, RESEARCH INDICATES THAT COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH OF MOIST CURED CONCRETE IS RELATIVELYUNAFFECTED BY IMPREGNATION.OF OII ABSORPTION OF OIL CAUSES DECREASE IN COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH lMMEDIATELYFOLLOWING EXPOSURE TO OIL, AND FOR A SHORT TIME THEREAFTER.

WITHIN SEVERAL MONTHS, OIL IMPREGNATED SPECIMENS EXHIBITCOMPRESSIVE STRENGTHS EQUAlJJNG OR.

EXCEEDING THE CONTROL SPECIMENS.

TESTS SUGGEST THAT RELATIVELYLARGE HYDROCARBON MOLECULES ARE UNABLE TO PENETlRATK THE PARTS OF THE MACROSTRUCTtjRK OF THE CONCRETE PASTE REACHED BY WATER, AND THEREFORE CAUSE NO DETRIMENTALEXPANSION. NO SWELLING HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN OVEN DRIED SPECIMENS EXPOSED TO KEROSENE OR LUBRICATlNG OIL

2.0 A ONTAtNMENTTEND N SURVEILLANCES CONT'D FAILURE F AN H R H D THREAD b RIN RV I LAN iNSPE Tl NRC INFORMATION NOTICE (IN) 910 ISSUED IN DECEMBER 199'I DOCUMENTED FAILURE OF THE INTERNALTHREADS OF AN ANCHOR HEAD WHILE THE TENDON WAS BEING STRESSED WITH THE HYDRAULICSTRESSING RAN (OCQNEE).

SITUATION CAUSED BY STRESSES Il4 THREADS EXCEEDED MATERIALYIELD STRENGTH THIS IS A PERSONNEL SAFE7Y ISSUE; NO EFFECT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY OR STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF PRESTRESSING SYSTEM CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO THIS SITUATION PRIOR TO THE 21TH YEAR SURVEILLANCE.

2. NTAINMENTSTRUCTURE B. ATH Dl PR TE TI N CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTALLED DURING ORIGINAL CONSTRUCTION TO CONTROL GALVANICCORROSION ON METALLIC SURFACES OF THE CONTAINMENT FOUNDATIONS SYSTEM DESIGNED TO PROTECT EXTERNAL SURFACES OF THE LINER PLATE, REINFORCING STEEL, TENDON ASSE MBLIES THESE SURFACES ARE CONNECTED TO CATHODIC PROTECTION RECTIFIERS PRO/UNIT). POSITIVE SIDE OF CURRENT SUPPLY CONNECTED TO ANODES IN FOUR DEEP WELLS AROUND EACH CONTAINMENT.

REFERENCE ELECTRODES WIRED TO CONTROL CABINET TO TREND THE EFFECTS OF THE SYSTEM.

CATHODIC PROTECTlON SYSTEM IS CONSIDERED TO BE A 8 N ICIA ENHAN EM RATHER THAN AN INTEGRAL PARTOF THE CONTAINMENT DESIGN.

HISTORlCALLY,THE CATHODIC PROTECTION SYSTEM HAS PROVIDED CONSISTENT CORROSION CONTROL PERIODIC MAINTENANCEHAS, UNTIL RECENTLY, EFFECTIVELY MAlNTAINEDTHE OUTPUT OF THE SYSTEM'.

THE SYSTEM IS PRESENTLY EXHIBITING REDUCED OUTPUT.,

RECTIFIERS PROVIDING CURRENT TO THE BASE OF CONTAINMENTVESSELS HAVE BEEN FOUND TO BE IN PROPER OPERATING CONDITION.

SEVERAL ANODES ARE INDICATINGVERY LOW CURRENT READINGS REPLACEMENT EVALUATIONSARE PRESENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION.

TURXEY POINT UNIT 4 COHTAIHMEMT BUILDZNO ZLRT STRUCTUEULL INSPECTIONS I ~ ZNSPECTZOM REQUIREMENTS o NHX TEE INBPECTZON NAS CONDUCTED o NEAT NERE THE REQUIREMENTS ZZo SCOPE o NEAT STRUCTURAZ ELmlEHTS NERE REVZENED o TO mAT DEGREE %ERE THBX REVZENED ZZI ~ ZNSPECTZOM ATTRIBUTES AND CRXTERZA o NEAT ATTRXBUTES NERE INSPECTED o NSLT CRITERIA %AS USED TO DETERMINE SXOXXFZCAHT DEQQADATXOM RESOXs TSg SVLTsUATZOMp AMD CORRECTZVE ACTION o NHAT NAS POUND DURIMO TSE INSPECTION o EVaXUATZOX OV SiaSXVXCAMT imuaS mUHD o CORRECTIVE ACTiONS ZMPTEMEHTED OR PIAHHED CONCLUSIONS o NITS RESPECT TO ZHLT-o NXTS REKQLD TO IA)MQ TERX PER?ORMAMCE VZ ~ ~ <r'gTURQ ~g o UNIT 3 IIEET INSPECTION o UHXT 4 ZLRT INSPECTION

I ~ INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS A. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4 ~ 5SORY

~ 1 ~ 5 ~ 3 fc 10 CFR 50 APPENDIX J IM ACCORDANCE NITH 10 CFR APPEHDIZ J g SECTXOM Vg A VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ACCESSIBLE IHTERIOR AHD EXTERIOR SURFACES OF THE COHTAI?QtEHT, IMCLUDIHQ LINER PLATE, SHALZs BE PERl'ORATED DURXHQ TEE SHUTDOWN FOR (BUT PRIOR TO) EACH TYPE iAi COHTAIMÃEHT LEAXAQE RATE TEST T1Gt PURPOSE OF THIS ZMSPECTXOM SHALL BE TO IDEHTXFY EVZDEHCE OF DEGRADATION %RICH MAY AFFECT COHTAXMHEHT STRUCTURAL XHTEQRZTY OR LEAKTXQETMESS TEE VISUAL INSPECTION SHALL BE QEMERAL IM MATUREg XTS ZHTEHT SHALL BE TO DETECTS 1~ QROSd AREAS Ol'IDESPREAD CELhCXXHQ 2~ SPALLZMQ OF CONCRETE 3~ QOUQZHQ OF STEEL ELEHEHTS 4~ RUST 5~ NEXiD DEQRADATZON B TO ESTABLISH A BASELXHE FOR FUTURE XLRT SURVEZLLAHCES 1e DETAILED ZMSPECTXON AMD NOTES 2~ PE 3~ REPORT ADDRESSZMQ FZMDZHQSg EVALUATZOMSi CONCLUSIONS AHD CORRECTIVE ACTXOMS Ce POST ZLRT ZMSPECTXON TO IDENTIFY AMY STRUCTURAL CHAMQES RESULTZMQ FROM ZLRT

ZZ. SCOPE ACCESSIBLE COMPOHKHTS OF POST TENSXOHZHO TEHDOHS TO DETECT SRBASB LZJQULOB 1~ ALL HORIZONTAL (HOOP) TEHDOHS EXCEPT FOR A SMALL NUMBER ZH ARRAS WHICH NKRB INACCESSIBLE DUB TO ZNTERFERENCES 2~ ALL DOME TENDONS 3~ AIsL VERTICAL TENDON LONER ENDS ~ UPPER ENDS ARB ENCASED IM CONCRETE Bo EXTERIOR CONCRETE SURFACES TO DETECT S TRUCTtMQ DEFZCZENCXES le EXTERIOR l6QsX>> AHD TENDON BUTTRESSES 2~ DOME AHD RXHO OZRDER

3. ACCESSIBLE PORTZOM OF FOUOATZOM mTHZM THE TENDON OALLERY I

Ce INTERIOR LINER AND PENETRATZONS TO DETECT AREAS %KZCH AFFECT LEAXTZOHTNESS 1e CYIsZHDER XsZMER %AS OBSERVED FROM THE THREE, MAIM ELEVATZOMS 14 FT BASEMENT XsEVEXsg 30 FT 4 ZM MEN%ANISE LEVELS AND 5$ FT OPERATXMO DECK 2~ DOM3 LINER INSPECTED USZMO BINOCULARS 3~ ALX>> PENET$ %TIOM CAMXSTERS 4~ SPECIAX>> ATTEMTZOM PIsACED OM INTERFACE AT FOUNDATZOM BASEMAT mERE mTER ACCUMULATXOM POTENTIAL ZS HXOH Do. OTHER INTERNAL STRUCTURES THAT RECEIVED A OENERAXs VXSUAIs XNSPECTXON

1. CONCRETE CUBICLE MALLS. REACTOR CAVITY, STEAM OEHERATORt REACTOR COOLANT, PUMP g PRESSURZ3ER g ACCUMULATOR WALLS 2~ PRIMARY AND SECONDARY BXOSHXEXsD WALLS 3o FX>>OORS OF THE THREE MAIM DECKS io STRUCTURAL STEEIs SUPPORTXMO THE THREE MAXM DECKS

IXZ~ IMSPECTZOM ATTRIBUTES AHD CRITERZA CRZTERXA ISSUED UHDER FPL EMQZMEERZMQ EVALUATIONZN PTM SECS~91~087 EHTZTLED ssQUIDELZHE FOR VISUAL IHSPECTZOH Ot POST-TEHSXOHXHQ TEHDON COHPOHEHTS 1~ CORROSION OF CAPS AMD ATTACHIMQ STUDS ~ AREAS COMSZDERED DEQRADED VERS THOSE EXHZBZTZMQ PZTTZMQ AMD/OR DELAMZMATXOM RESULTZMQ IM SXQMZFZCAMT LOSS OF CROSS SECTION 2~ QREASE LEJQGLQE %HICK %OULD BE EVZDEHCE OF SUBSTAHTZAL REDUCTION OF ISV22iTORY'XAMPLES QIVEM

%5RS POOLZMQ OM HORZSOHAL SURFACES'UBSTAMTIAL STAIHIMQ OF CONCRETE mes, mZOR LZaXS AROUHD QASXETSg %ETTZHQ OF SEVEEULZs AMACEHT CAPS BY SIMQLE TEHDOMe Be EXTERIOR CONCRETE SURFACES 1~ EZPOSED REXHFORCZMQ BARS 2~ SZQNZFICAMT CONCRETE SPALLS 3~ CRACK PAMlERMS 4~ 'RACKS SXEZEXTZMQ RUSTBLEEDXMQ 5~ RUSTBLEOXMQ OR STAZHZMQ 6~ SXMQLE CRACXS 1/14 INCR OR (GtEATERg OR AHY CRACK ADJACENT FRACTURE SURFACESe Ce ZHTERZOR LZHER AND PEHETRATZOMS 1e DEQRADED COATXHQS ~ PEELED'ELAKCMATEDg DXSBOHDED VERS LOQQED TO DETERMINE I? AMT DEQRADATZOM OCCURRED DURZMQ DEPRESS URINATION 2e CORROSZONe PZTTZHQg DELAÃZHATZONg EXTENSIVE SGR?ACE CORROSION 3~ DZSTORTXONe BULQES AMD CRACKS

Do OTHER ZMTKQGLL STRUCTURES 1 COMCRETE DEQRADATZOM AS P~OUSLX DEPIMED 2~ STRUCTURAL STEEL DEQRADATZOM o DEQRADED COATIMQS o CORROSZOM o DXSTORTXOMi EZCESSXVS D PLZCTXOM< %ARPXMQ i CRACKS+

o CRACKED'OOSE@

DEQRADED COMMECTIOMS o CORRODED g

ZV RESULTS AHD EVALUATION STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS INSPECTED %ERE POUND TO BE ZH QESQSLLLLY QOOD COHDXTZON Ae POST TEHSXOHZHQ TENDONS 1~ CAPS AHD STUDS RESULTS>

DOMES'HD MINOR SURFACE CORROSION OF CAPS AND STUDS %AS NOTED OM HORZEOHTAIsg VERTZCAIs TEmON CAPS ON UNIT 4 ~ UHXT 3 TEMDON QAIsLERY %AS INSPECTED FOR COXPARZSOM OF THE VERTICAL TENDON CONDITION, AHD HORE SZQHZFZCAHT CORROSION ZNCLUDZHQ PZTTXNQ AHD DEHQlZHATZOM NOTED ON VERTICAL TENDON LONER CAPS EVALUATION!

BASED ON THE LEVEL OF CORROSION NOTED ON THE UNIT CAPS'HE CONDITXON mlS HOT COHSIDERED SZQHZFZCAHT i

m:TH RESPECT TO XLRTg AHD IT %AS CONCLUDED THAT HO XmaOZATE ACTION mS NECESSARY. XT mS CONCLUDED THAT THE UNIT 3 VERTZCAIs TEOON LCNER CAPS REQUIRED REPAIRS ON a TxmaY SCHGULX.

CORRECTIVE ACTION!

o MEND TENDON INSPECTION PROCOURE 0 BMX 051 1 TO MONITOR RATE OF CORROSION OF CAPS AT 6 MONTH INTERVAIaSe REPAIR AS HECESSARYe 0 REPAIRZHO UNIT 3 VERTZCAIs TENDON LOSER CAPS BY CLEANIHQ AHD RECOATZHQe 2~ QREASE LEAXAQS THROUQH CAPS RESULTS<

QREASR MRS NOTED ON SEVERAL CAPS'RZMARZIsY ON THE LCNER END OF THE VERTXCAL CAPS AHD SOME HORIZONTAL l

ts CAPS. THE QREASr LEAXAQE OCCURS THROUQH THE VILL ON THE HORIZONTAL CAPS'HE QREASE ZS CAKED NZTH DEBRIS AHD MOTHERED e SEVESUlL VERTICAIs CAPS HAD DROPLETS OF QREASE OM THE ATTACHMENT STUDS~ AND T%0 VERTICAL TENDON CAPS %ERS NOTED TO HAVE ACCUMmaTZONS OF APPROXunTELY 4-e OUNCES DIRECTLY BENEATH TREK OH THE QALLERY FLOOR~

EVALUATION:

IT  %&3 CONCLUDED THAT THE AMOUNT OP QREASS LEAXAQE

%AS HOT Or AH IMMEDIATE CONCERN BASED ON THE QUANTITY Or QREASS ?OUHD NZTH RESPECT To THE TOTAL VOLUME Ol'REASS %ZTHIM THE SHEATHS ~ IH ADDITION~

THE RATE or LEAEAQS Is Los, BASED oN THE maTHERIHQ OBSERVED AHD THS MINOR QUANTITY Or PRESE MATERIAL

?OUHDe coaREcTzvE AcTxoNc o AMEND TENDON INSPECTION PROCEDURE 0-BMM 051 ~ 1 To MONITOR RATS Or QREASS LEAEAQE AT 5 MONTE ZNTERVALSe -REPAIR COMPONENTS AS HECESSARYe 3 ~ 'TEHDON QALLERY RESULTS!

TENDON QALLERY SUMP PUMP %AS ?OUMD To BS OUT Or sERVzcS RESULTZMQ zM AccUMULATZON or mTER ON THE t

?Looae R3&HIATER IS EHTERZHQ THS QALLERY PRIMARILY THROUQH THS EHTRANcS MANHOLE, AND UPPER max eoIHT.

soME CRAcxs DUE To aEzNtoacEMEMT coaaoszoN mam NOTED OM THS QALLERY NALLSe SVALUATXOM!

SINCE THE TENDON %!LLSRY ZS NOT A SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURE e VARIOUS CORRECTZVS ACTXONS %ZIsI>> BE IMPLEMENTED TO REPAIR AND MAINTAIN THS SUMP PUMPS REPAZR NAlsZs DEFZCZENCXESg AHD IMPROVE THS coNrzQURATZOM or THS MANHOLE. THzs mLL IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE INSPECTIONS AHD MZNZMZIS THE posszszxzTY or CORROSION To THE TENDON cAps AND QAXsIsERY RSZNFORCEMEHT e ACTION!

REPAIR AHD MAINTAIN SUMP PUMP e INCLUDE SUMP PUMP SURVEZLLANCS AS PART Or TENDON ZNSPECTXON PROCEDURE O SMM 051e1e ADD COIsx>>AR AT MAHHOLS To PRECLUDE RUMO?l'ROM EHTERZMO QALLERYe

B EXTERIOR CONCRETE 801UPACES CYLINDER lGLLZs AHD TENDON BUTTRESSES RESULTS t CYLINDER %ALL mLS ?OUHD TO BE XM QOOD CONDITION+ T%0 REPAIRED AREAS %KXCH %ERE ASSOCIATED %ZTH THS ORZQZHAL COHTAZHMEHT STRUCTUEULL ZHTEORZTY TEST (SZT) WERE OBSERVED TO HAVE MO OTHER EVIDENCE OF GREASE LEAKLOE ?ROM QREASE'TAINS o

THS SHEATHS %AS ?OUHDo MINOR SPALXsZMO %AS NOTED AT THS CORNER 0? SONS TEHDOH BUTTRESSES 1%AY PROM THE SEATZMO BASEPLATES. MOST OF THS SPALLZD AREAS HAVE BEEN REPAIRED o HO EXPOSED REZH?ORCEKEHT OR

. SIQHZ?ZCAHT RUSTSTAIMIMO %AS ?OUHDi EVALUATXOHs THS QREASE STAINS '%ERE DETERMINED TO BE ZNSXONZ?ZCAHT SXMCS MO ?RESH MATERIAL MRS OBSERVED AHD THE STAINS ARS %EATHImED AHD DISCRETE e THE SPALLS VERS MOT CONSIDERED STRU&lURALLYSZOHX?ZCANT BASED ON THEXR SXSS AHD LOCATXONe THEY %ERS ATTRIBUTED TO THE ORXOXHAL CONCRETE PLACEMEHTp POST TENS XOHIHQ OP ERATZON AMD INCIDENTAL CONTACT NZTK EQUZPMEMT DURXHO THS TENDON SURVEILLAMCES~

CORRECTIVE ACTION!

o REPAIR SPALLED AREAS DURZNO THS 1.993 TNEHTZETH TERR TENDON SURVEILLANCE THS DOME 8%8 ?OUHD TO BS ZN QOOD CONDITION OVERALLe NO mTER POHDZHO mS NOTED. a HORZSOMTAL CRACX mS NOTED ON THS RXMO OIRDER HEAR BUTTRESS HUMBER 5 AHD OTHER CRACKS BETWEEN DOME TENDON INSETS %AS OBSERVED. SONS MINOR CORROSION O? THS TENDON SURVEILLANCE SKYCLZMBER RAILS MRS HOTEDe THE SKID RESISTANT MATERIAL APPLIED TO THS DOME %AS NOTED TO BS PEELXHOo SOME SECTIONS OF THE HASDRAZLS %ERE FOUND TO BS CORRODED AHD ZM HEED O? REPAIR+

THE HORZSOHTAL CRACXS ARE TYPICAL OF THOSE DOCUMENTED NXTHZM THS ORXQXMAL SXT REPORT AMD RESULTED PROX TEE POS'T TENSZOHXMO OPERATION AND PRESSURE TEsT. HO SPALIXMO, RUST-BLEEDXMO oa OTHER SZQNS OF ADVANCED DEQRADATIOM %ZRS HOTEDe A CLOSE XMSPECTZOM %ILL BE PERFORMED DURXMQ THE 20TH YEAR TENDON SURVEZLLtLHCEe THS OTHER ITEMS 'WERE NOT REPAIRED UHDER PLANT voax ORDERS.

CORRECTIVE ACTION<

o PERFORM A DETAILED INSPECTION OF RZMO OIRDER CRACXS DURZHO THS 20TH YKhR TENDON SURVEILLANCE XN T993, o REPAIR DOME CPO9kLAYg SXYCLIMBER RAILSg AHD HAMDRAXLS.UNDER PLANT coax oanERS 3~ FOUMDATXOM RESULTS!

THE FOUMDATXON IAS FOUI TO BE ZN EXCELL coHDZTzoM IZTE Ho svznEHcs oF STRUcmnuLL DEQRADATZOM FOUND e SURVEILLANCE OF THS FOUHDATION NZTEXM THS OALLERY

%ILL BS INCLUDED IXTEZM THS TENDON INSPECTION PROCEDURE 0 8N 051ele o MNXD PROCEDM 0 NX 054e i TO IHCLUDS I&RIM THS QALLERY AT 4 MOST'MTERVALSe

C>> ZMTERZOR LZMER AHD PEHETRATZOM RESULTS'OME AREAS OF PEEZsEDp DELAXZMATKDg AHD DZSBOHDED TOPCOAT VERS OBSERVED>> ZH THESE AREAS'HE PRIME COAT ZS ZHTACT AHD AFFORDZHO CORROSION PROTECTZOM TO THE LZMER>> SURFACE CORROSION OF SOME OF THE LZHER SZAX mass AS maZ AS A Fgg PEHETRATZOH CAMZSTERS %AS OBSERVED>> JOZHT FILLER MATERIAL BETWEEN THE LZMER AHD ADJACEHT COHCRETE STRUCTURES %AS MOTED TO BS LEACHZMO ZM SONS AR?RS>>

INWARD BQLOZMO OF THS LZHER 5%8 OBSERVED AT THS OPERATZHO DECK ZsEVEL AHD ABOVE TO THE POLAR C$ Q!85 OZRDER L1s>>>>s ~

NELS ZT OCCURS'HS BQLOZMO RUNS THS EHTZRE HEZOHT OF THE 1D FOOT LZHER PAHEL AHD THEY ARS APPROXZMMELY 15 ZMCHES %ZDS AN) 1/2 ZMCH OUT OF ROUHD %XTH THS ADJACEHT SECTZOMS %RICH ARS MOT INWARDLY BQLOZMO>> THS BQLOZMO ZS RAHDOX BUT %IDES PREAD AROUHD THS PERIMETER OF THE BQZZsDZMO>>

EVRLQATIONe THS COATZMO DZSCREPAHCZES VERS LOOOED TO DETECT AHY ADDZTZOMAL COATZMO FAILURES RESULTZHO FROX THS ZLRT DEPRESSURXSMXOM>> HO ADDITZOHAL COATZMO FAILURES NRKS MOTED FOLLOmSO THS ZLRT. THS COMDITIOM OF THS COATZHOS

%AS COMCLQDED TO BS ACCSPTABZsS FOR UNIT OPERATZOM>>

THS CORROSION OBSERVED %LS SUPERFICIAL AHD HOT OF COHCERM RELATIV3 TO THS ZMTSORZTY OF TH@ AFFECTED COMPOMEHTS.

THS JOINT FILLER MATERIAL CONDITION %AS LOOOSD FOR FUTURE FUNCTION OF THS JOINT FZLZsER ZS TO PRECLUDE DEBRIS FROX OETTZMO LODOSD BETNSEN THS COMCRETS FLOORS AHD NALZsg AHD THS LZMSR>>

ZMDUSTRY RESEARCH IMDZCATED THAT THE ZsIMER BULOZMO ZS MOT ORIOZMAZs DSSXOM CALCQZsATXOMS ZMDZCATED THAT THE WM INDEPENDENT KiZs CALCULATION %AS PERFORMED TO COHFZRX THE ADEQUACY OF THS LZHER ZM THE AS FOUHD COMDZTZOM>>

o REPAIR DEORADED COATZMOS UHDER THE MATERXEL UPORADE PROORAX o REPAIR CORRODED LIHER AHD PEMETRATIOM CAHISTERS DURIMO THS 1993 REFUEZsIMO OUTAOS

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FURTHER STUDY RESULTS AHD EVALUATXON (CQHTISUED)

Do OTHER STRUCTURES RESULTS<

'EMERAL ZMSPECTXON OT OTHER STRUCTUREB NAB CONDUCTED AHD MO SZQHZTZCAHT DEmADATZOM %AS PQUMD

%NO I /16 ISCH CRACKS ORIQXSATXSQ AT THE LOSER CQRHERS OT A DUCT PEHETRATZOS THROUQH THE iB STEAM QEHERATOR CUBICLE %AZsL VERS POUHDo

%%LUATZONc THE CRACKS %ZRS HQT CONSIDERED BIQSIl'ZCAHT BASED QS THEIR SXSEg ASD THE PACT THAT SO ADDITZOHAL SZQHB OT DZSTRESS %ERE PQUHDe

~

DRANZNQS ISDZCATED THAT SO SZQHXPXCAST LOADS ARE PRESEHT XM THE AREAR'HD ZT CQMCIUDED THAT RESULTED DUE TO SHRZHXAQE AHD ASSOCIATED STRESS CONCEHTRATIOMB AT THE WALL DISCQHTXMUZTYo

~

A REVZZN QT THE DESZQH o REPAIR THE CSLRCXS MND COAT %Ref DURZMO THE SEXT RETUELZM4 OUTAQE ZN 1903 CONCLUSIONS Ao PROCEED %XTH ILRT BASED ON FAVORABLE RESULTS POUHD DURIN4 TH3 INSPECTION A TIMELY SCHEDULE C~ SO ADVmSE EFFECTS POUHD DUE TO THE ILRT

ÃPLURE PINESS As UMZT 3 ZLRT ZMPECTIOMS SCHEDULED FOR L992 REFOELZHO OUTAOE %ILL BE PERFORMED IS 1 SZMILAR MANER AND NZLL BE DOCUMENTED %ZTEIM 1 REPORT Bo USE BASELZSI5 ZSPORHATZON 'ECORDED FOR THE UNIT 4 ZLRT PRESZSmr Y SCEEDULZD VOR TEE X9OS REPUZLIza OUTAOEo UPDATE REPORT. AS NECESSARY>>

PPORT AN HORAGE

~ DESIGN CRITERIA 5 PRACTICE

~ 79-02 RESOLUTION

~ OTHER PAST PROBLEM AREAS

SUPPORT ANCH RAGES ONTINUED

~ DESIGN CRITERIA 5. PRACTICE

- APPROVED ANCHORS FOR DESIGN ARE HILTI KBII 8c DRILLCO MAXIBOLT

- ANCHORS HAVE SITE SPEClFIC TESTING FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CAPACITIES AND INSTALLATIONTORQUE VALUES

- S.F. OF 4 IS USED FOR DESIGN, S.F. OF 2 IS USED FOR FUNCTIONALITYREVIEWS

- S.F. Of 3 IS ALLOWEDTO LIMITEDEXTENT FOR EVALUATION OF INSTALLED RACEWAY SUPPORTS

- STRAIGHT LINE SHEAR-TENSION INTERACTION FORMULA NORMALLYUSED FOR DESIGN, SQUARED INTERACTIONUSED FOR FUNCTIONALITYREVIEWS

- PRYING ACTION IS ACCOUNTED FOR BY EITHER CONSIDERING BASEPLATE FLEXIBILITYIN THE CALCULATIONOR BY ASSUMING A RIGID BASEPLATE AND APPLYING A S.F. OF 1.5

- FPL SPEC COVERS INSTALLATIONAND INSPECTION GUIDELINES FOR EXPANSION ANCHORS

- DESIGN INFORMATION INCORPORATES LESSONS LEARNED FROM PAST PART 21 NOTIFICATIONS ISSUED BY HILTI, INCLUDING EDGE DISTANCE ISSUE OF 1988

- EXPANSION ANCHORS NOT ALLOWED FOR ANCHORAGE OF VIBRATING/ROTATINGEQUIPMENT OR ATTACHMENTS TO MASONRY WALLS

- DESIGN OF OTHER ANCHORS FOLLOW ACI-349 CRITERIA

SVPP RT AN HORAGE C NT)N ED

~ 79-02 RESOLUTION EFFORT

- 1PP% INSPECTION PERFORMED FOR ANCHORS ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEMS IN 79-02 SCOPE' MOST DEFICIENCIES FOUND IN SHELL-TYPE ANCHORS

- DEFICIENT ANCHORS REPLACED WITH WEDGE-TYPE ANCHORS WHICH WERE SITE SPECIFIC TESTED

- S.f. OF 5 WAS USED FOR SHELL TYPE ANCHORS, OTHER CRITERIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT DISCUSSED ABOVE

- AFTER SEVERAL INSPECTIONS, FINAL 79-02 REPORT WAS ISSUED ON OCTOBER 22, 1987

~ OTHER PAST PROBLEM AREAS

- IEN 80-21 IS BEING ADDRESSED UNDER THE A-46 PROGRAM

- JAN,91 HILTI PART 21 ON CAPACITIES FOR 1" AND 3/4" ANCHORS

'OT A PROBLEM AT PTN DUE TO SITE SPECiFIC TESTS NEW TESTS AND SPEC REVISION REQUIRED DUE TO MODIFICATIONOF AFFECTED ANCHOR SIZES BY HILTI

-'lE NOTICE 86-94, HILTI PART 21 ON 1/2" ANCHOR CAPACITIES

'APACITIES REDUCED BY MAX. OF 11%

'PL REVIEWED 50% OF 79-02 SUPPORTS, AND STANDARD DETAILS FOR SMALL BORE PIPING AND RACEWAY SUPPORTS ALL SUPPORTS REVIEWED FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE REVISED DOCUMENTS AFFECTED BY NEW ALLOWABLES

3. SUPPORT ANCHORA E NTIN ED

- REDUCED CAPACITIES FOR WEJ-IT ANCHORS

~

FOLLOW UP ON PROBLEM IDENTIFIED AT CRYSTAL RIVER

. FOUND TO ALSO BE APPLICABLE AT PTN

'EDUCTIONS IN ANCHOR CAPACITIES OF 50-60%

'

NO FUNCTIONALITYPROBLEMS FOUND (S.F. 0 2.0)

SEVERAL SUPPORTS REQUIRED MODIFICATIONTOMEET FSAR REQUIREMENTS

4.0 PENT FUEL P OL AND RACK

~ ANALYSIS OF POOL STRUCTURES

~ CONDITION OF POOL

~ LINER PLATES

~ SPENT FUEL RACKS

~ HEAVY I OADS HANDLING

4 SPENT FUEL POOL AND RA K NTINUED

~ NEW HIGH DENSITY STORAGE RACKS INSTALLED IN BOTH UNITS

~ ANALYSIS OF POOL STRUCTURES

- ANSYS FINITE ELEMENT 3-D MODEL

- SOIL REPRESENTED BY SYSTEM OF SPRING ELEMENTS

- LINER NOT INCLUDED AS STRUCTURAL ELEMENT

- LOADS 5, LOAD COMBINATIONS PER FSAR

- ANALYSIS INCLUDED BOILING CONDITION (212 ),

CONSERVATIVELYIGNORED COOLING SYSTEM

- ALL'CONCRETE STRESSES WITHIN ALLOWABLES

- MINOR LOCALIZEDREBAR OVERSTRESS IN 212~ THERMAL +

SEISMIC LOAD CASE AT THE BOTTOM CENTER AREA OF FOUNDATION MAT - CREATES NO LOSS OF FUNCTION

- ANALYSIS REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND APPROVED BY NRR DURING RERACK LICENSING - SER WAS ISSUED

~ CONDITION OF POOL STRUCTURE

- STRUCTURE IN GOOD CONDITION OVERALL

- CRACKING IDENTIFIED AT JOINTS BETWEEN MAIN POOL STRUCTURE AND ADJACENT NEW FUEL STORAGE AREA-CONDITION REPAIRED IN 1986 (PC/M'5-71 8c 72)

4 PENT F POOL AND RA K NTlN D

~ LINER PLATES

- LlNER IN MAlN POOL AREA REPLACED lN LATE 70'S TO 1/4" PLATE

- LINER WAS ANALYZEDAS PART OF RERACK EFFORT AND FOUND TO REMAIN FUNCTIONAL

- NO LEAKAGE HAS BEEN IDENTlFIED IN MAIN POOL AREA

- TRANSFER CANAL LINER

'OT REPLACED ALONG WITH MAIN AREA LINER

'EAKAGEHAS BEEN DETECTED IN UNIT 3- WELL WITHIN MAKE-UP CAPABIL'ITY

'ITUATIONHAS BEEN REVIEWED AND REPAIRS IMPLEMENTED NO STRUCTURAL DEGRADATION Of CONCRETE OR REBAR IS EVIDENT - CONSERVATIVE ESTIMATES OF POTENTIAL DEGRADATIONARE ENVELOPED BY DESIGN MARGIN IN THE STRUCTURE (NCR N-91-0330)

SPENT FUEL POOL PLAN AT ELEVATION 63'W'

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4. SPENT F EL POOL AND RA K NTINUED SPENT" FUEL RACKS

- HIGH DENSITY RACKS INSTALLED WITH CAPACITY OF APPROXIMATELY1400 STORAGE LOCATIONS t

- RACKS DESIGN AND BUILT BY WESTINGHOUSE IN ACCORDANCE WITH FSAR REQUIREMENTS AND APPLICABLE NRC SRP AND OT POSITION PAPER

- RACKS ARE FREE STANDING AND MEET ALL REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTED IN SER ISSUED BY NRC IN 1984'

REGlON I FUEL, STORAGE RACK MOOULE

I 0.60" SIDE PLATE ADJACENT CELL 8.75 SQUARE ASSEMBLY UPPER GRIO

'ELL ASSEMBLY 075" POISON MATERIAL l65.6 I ASSEMBLY OWER GRID SIDE ASSEMBLY F LAT E~g BASE PLATE SUPPORT PLATE LEVELING SCREW POOL LINER CONCRETE PLATF EMBE;DMENT REGION l MOOULE CROSS. SECTION

REGION ll FUEL, STORAGE RACK MOOULE

CELL ASSEhlSLY P0150N MATEP. IAL Icc .ci" WR>PPER BASK PLATE SUPPORT PLATE LEVELING SCP E'hl POOL LINER CONCRETE PLATE EMBEDMENT REGION ll MOOUI.E CROSS. SECTION

4.0 PENT FU f POOL AND RA KS CONTINUED

~ HEAVY LOADS HANDLING

- LIMITSWITCHES ON CASK CRANE PREVENT MOVEMENT OF BEYOND CASK LAYDOWNAREA AND ALSO RESTRICT VERTICAL LIFT

- TECHNICALSPECIFICATIONS AND PLANT PROCEDURES LIMIT ANY LOADS THAT CAN BE TRANSPORTED OVER SPENT FUEL TO 2000lbs

- NEW SPENT- FUEL CRANE INSTALLED IN 1990

. DESIGNED FOR 4000lb CAPACITY - LOAD LIMITSET TO 2075lbs TO PRECLUDE UPLIFT'FORCES ON THE RACKS

'. DUAL CABLE DESIGN HOISTS EQUIPPED WITH EDERER X-SAM JR SYSTEM FOR PROTECTION AGAINST LOSS OF LOAD, LOAD SWAY, TWO-BLOCKING AND LOAD HANG-UP PROVIDES BETTER LOAD CONTROL FOR THE OPERATOR CRANE PROVIDES BOTH ELECTRONIC AND VISUAL STORAGE LOCATION INDEXING

- PLANT PROCEDURES REQUIRE EVALUATIONSFOR ANY HEAVY LOAD LIFTS IN THE VICINITYOF SPENT FUEL-EVALUATIONSHAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR CASES SUCH AS REPAIRS TO THE POOL KEYWAY GATE

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~ 0l IlAlALCAINOAOI'NtACIAAC UNIT 3 AS SHOWN UNIT 4 OPPOSITE HAND ALI.DIMENSIONS IN INGHES SPENT FUEL POOL ARRANGEMENT

U ts 3 an t ke st ct e Orientation: The geometry and primary components of the PTN Units 3 and 4 Intake Structure Overviews Documented history of the structure Zn depth revt.ev of "Selected Topics~'.

1. Circulating Water (CW) Pump Thrust Beams

2. Law Engineering and Testing Corporation Report

3. Modifications to Intake Cooling Water (ICW) Support Beams Standard Repair External Reinforcement "Beam" Fix

4. Mitigation Modifications

5. Assessment and Planning Activities Independent Review by APTECH Engineering Structural Assessment by FPL Selection of a "Long Term" Repair Approach Development of a Long Term Action Plan, FPL Specification CN 2.28 Proposed Implementation Schedule 8ummary: Documentation Available

plan v9.ew!

Location of major ecpxipment:

1. Traveling Screens

2. ZCW Pumps

3. Screenwash Pumps

4. Circulating Water Pumps Bay designations: ZCW and CW Location of major structural components:

1. bay walls

2. ZCW suyport beams

3. traveling screen suyport beams Prof ile Vins'!

Location of major .structural components:

1. ZCW support beams

2. traveling screen support beams

3. CW thrust beams

4. strut beams

5. turning vein structure Reference water levels:

1. normal operating / mean sea level

2. level to which bays were dewatered to perform the Law Engineering testing and sampling.

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SCREENS l~SCREEN STOP LOO CUOE

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PROTE CINCH WAlL EL O'-F (m)

EL F ~ PVC (-)4'-5'MQUQ FFE DPERAINO SLEEVE WATER LEVEL EL - '-F EL WATER LEVEL AT EL (-)12'-C  %%CH LETCO DATA DBThNED.

I I I I EL - 2b'<<F APPROX. 52 FT.

H S OR Zn-service Dates Unit 3: 1972 Unit 4: 1973 1985 / 1986'WP thrust beams found to be seriously degraded. All beams were replaced.

Strut beams in the wet/dry zone (El 1' 9") were found to be degraded. Strut beams were repaired.

Walkway support beams (El 1' 6") were found to be degraded and were replaced.

1987 (Unit 3 g Cycle 11) ~

In-depth testing by Law Engineering of pump support beams and bay walls.

Inspection and repair of deteriorated structural components to include; 1) removal of unsound concrete,

.removal of corrosion from rebar, scotchcoating of rebar, and replacement of concrete, and 2) replacement of IC pump anchor bolts.

Recommendation to perform a visual condition survey of the intake structure, structural elements every 12 to 18 months.

1988 (Unit 4, Cycle 12):

Inspection and repair of deteriorated structural components to include; 1) removal of unsound concrete, removal of corrosion from rebar, scotchcoating of rebar, and replacement of concrete, and 2) replacement of ICW pump anchor bolts.

. External "Beam Fix" to the 4B ICW Pump support beam.

Half-cell potential testing of the operating deck by FPL personnelo

1989 (Unit 3 Short Notice inspection of all Unit 3 bays.

Outage)'etailed Total chloride content determination for selected sites on the operating deck.

1990 (Unit 3, Cycle 12):

In-depth testing and evaluation to include; 1) concrete sampling of the selected ICW support beams to determine total chloride content, 2) half cell potential testing by FPL personnel, 3) independent review by Aptech Engineering, and 4) formal structural assessment by FPL.

Formal inspection, documentation and assessment of all Unit .3 bays. General inspection of bay walls above waterline.

Development and issuance of FPL Specification CN 2.28 detailing inspection requirements and a six year implementation plan for installation of permanent modifications.

1991 (Unit 3 EN - Unit'4g EN/Cycle 13):

Detailed and confirmatory inspections of all bays with repairs as required.

Installation of permanent "external beam" modification to the 3C ZCW pump support .beam. Completed as a proactive, plant management initiative.

Installation of "mitigative" modifications consisting of;

1. grout reprofiling of the operating deck,

2. grout sealing of all recesses in the operating deck,

3. modification to the CW pump drain lines,

4. sealing of concrete surfaces (deck and selected ICW pump support beam surfaces), and

5. installation of drip flashing on the lower east face of the ZCW pump support beam.

Identification of stress induced cracking and delamination of the CW pump thrust beams.

General inspection of bay walls above water line.

Preparation and issuance of PCM 91-198 for repairs and modifications (3B ICW external beam modification) during the Unit 3, Cycle 13 outage.

Inspection and implementation of permanent modifications.

circulating Rater Pump Thrust Beams Found to be seriously degraded in 1985. Concrete cover was essentially nonexistent due to corrosion induced spalling.

To resolve the deficiency;

1. all concrete was removed

2. all rebar was removed and Gr. 60 epoxy coated rebar was installed

3. concrete was repoured to the original dimensions

4. beams were coated with coal tar epoxy to inhibit chlorides from intruding into the concrete.

Stress cracks and an areas of delamination were documented in inspections conducted in 1990. No rust bleeding or evidence of corrosion were noted. Based on the function of the pump and the support beam (Not Nuclear Safety Related) the condition was determined not to be a potential operability concern and is being prioritized for repair.

The root cause of the initial failure appears to be that

'stress cracks formed as a result of a downward Load created during pump start-up which tends to impose, rotation on the beam via the through-bolts attaching th pump to the beam. The cracks provided a direct path for the intrusion of moisture, rich in chlorides, which resulted in rapid degradation due to corrosion. Although the current condition is similar, the rate of corrosion of the rebar is far less due to the epoxy coating on the rebar. No evidence of corrosion induced degradation was noted.

'(gjjjgjggg+~wyC~g~uiiif+".W~~~i!m+3 A method of repair has been determined which will eliminate the mechanism for stress cracking. Xnstallation of this repair with repair of the cracked and delaminated sections will be specified and installed in accordance with applicable

,.: outage schedules.

Schematic Representation CW Pump Thrust Beam

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raw Engineering Report (March 9, 1987)

Scope of Nozk:

1. Visual condition survey.

2. Depth of cover confirmation by drilled probe measurements.

3. Sampling for chloride concentration and pH determination.

4. Copper/copper sulfate half cell potential survey.

Sampling area consisted of beams, struts, and walls above normal waterline (exposed surfaces) as well as walls and struts which are submerged under normal operating conditions.

Results:

1. Visual condition survey identified only two areas where there was evidence of corrosion induced cracking or.spalling:

Struts at El 1'-9" showed some minor rust staining with no evidence of cracking or spalling.

Underside of operating deck beams showed evidence of significant rust staining and crack developmen due to rebar corrosion.

2. Depth of cover averaged 3" on beams and struts and 6" on bay walls which was in agreement with design drawings.

3. Overall conclusion:

active corrosion activity can be expected in exposed portions of the structure where 3" of cover is present.

active corrosion was not expected in areas where 6" of cover is present but is postulated to be in the early stages of development in atmospherically exposed areas.

in the areas of the bay walls which are normally submerged but exposed by dewatering for sampling and testing:

there is a distinct change in chloride levels between the normally exposed and normally submerged areas (ie. chloride levels are much greater in the normally exposed areas).

~IBeam bL'odification' (1988)

Background:

In response to the observations and testing conducted during previous outages, inspections and repairs were planned to be performed on the Unit 4 ICW support beams during the Unit 4, Cycle 12 Refueling Outage. Based on observed conditions, 3 out of four bays were repaired utilizing standard repair procedures and one bay (4B ICH) received a newly designed external reinforcement system.

Stand424 Rlpsir Standard repairs are utilized when the observed condition, subject to detailed analysis, is determined to be within the existing design criteria. These repairs consist of:

removal of unsound concrete.

cleaning of corrosion from exposed rebar surfaces.

documentation of as>>found reinforcement geometry.

coating the exposed rebar with a rust inhibiting coating (Scotchcoat).

repouring the concrete to original geometry.

Extenul Reinforcement - "Beaa method of'epair was first established as a specific PM'his modification for deficiencies identified in the 4B ICW support beam (general corrosion of reinforcement, significant cracks forming within the pump barrel, loss of reinforcement due to misplaced conduit). It would later be established as the design standard for permanent modification to all bays to ensure that the design basis of the structure is maintained beyond the expected end of plant life. This repair consists of:

removal of'nsound concrete.

cleaning of corrosion from exposed rebar surfaces.

documentation of as-found reinforcement geometry.

coating the exposed rebar with a rust inhibiting coating (Scotchcoat) .

grouting "shear lugs into the bay walls.

attaching epoxy coated structural plate to the bottom face of the beam surfaces via. expansion and welded headed anchors.

repouring the concrete to original configuration.

welding of a structural "T-beam" to the cover plates and the grouted-in shear lugs.

coating of all exposed surfaces with Coal Tar Epoxy.

Schematic Representation "Beam Eix" - External Reinforcement 0

0 0 ~

~ 4 ~ 4 0 0

~ ~ ~

0 ~~ ~

0 040 0.0

~ ~ 40

~ 0 4 ~ 40

~ 4 ~ ~

~ ~ 0 0

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Section A - A

Mitigation Modifications In order to provide adequate assurance that permanent, repairs can be effected on the ICW pump support beams within scheduled outage windows over a six year period, specific modifications were required to "mitigate" the effects of on-going corrosion activity. These modifications consist of:

reprofiling the deck surface to promote drainage and prevent standing water which promotes the migration of chloride ions.

sealing of conduit access recesses in the deck surface to prevent the collection of water which in-turn promotes the migration of chloride ions and saturates the concrete elements.

addition of a "drip" flashing to the lower east face of the beams to prevent water from adhering to this beam surface.

extension of'W pump drain lines beyond the lower east face of the beam to prevent the constant wet/dry cycles previously imposed on the beam.

application of a clear sealer to the top and migration east face of the of the beam to inhibit the further of chloride ions.

Assessment and Planning Activities

Background:

prom 1985 to 1990, a considerable number of inspections, repairs, and testing procedures. were employed to assess and demonstrate the acceptability of the structure. Xn

,~ p'ail,lPdK'(i...i!!J',,I'p, I, h -:,,Ni ~ ~4h -.i'-:,'V':"tl"i CC~+~ijoNCraaCe4"'.4<5ac&E?tjjkaeerQijj'dditionally, FPL with the A/E o f record (Bechtel) and the independent review of Aptech, established the basis. for the long term treatment of the structure. To consolidate the data and establish a firm operating basis,' formal "Structural Assessment" was prepared by FPL. Following the assessment, a long term plan for the inspection and repair of the structure was issued.

Independent Review:

Scope of Work:

1. Visual condition survey.

2. Review of previous inspections and test data.

3. Analysis of data to estimate the remaining life of the structure.

4. Provide recommendations on how to improve the existing condition and ensure that the structure remains within it's design criteria beyond the expected end of plant life.

Results

1. The current condition, with the repairs completed to date, is not likely to become an immediate concern.

2. Scheduling of permanent repairs should be able to be accomplished within projected outage schedules, over a six (6) year period, assuming specific mitigative actions are implemented and regular inspections, are made to confirm the structural condition.

Structural Assessment:

In August 1990, a structural assessment was prepared by the FPL Site Civil Engineering Discipline. This document consolidated the results of inspections, testing, independent assessments, and design basis calculations.

In reviewing the available data, the following conclusions were reached:

1. The current condition of the intake structure was not, expected to degrade rapidly and continued to meet all design basis requirements.

2. Mitigating measures are required to be implemented to allow time to install permanent modifications within pro)ected outage schedules.

3. Inspections are required during each outage to ensure that installed repairs continue to perform as designed and to monitor the progress of remaining degraded components.

10

Long Term Repairs:

Several approaches to the long term repair of the intake structure were considered. Since the most critical members, the beams supporting the Saf ety Related ICN pumps, were also the members in the most critical need of repair, efforts were concentrated on permanent fixes to these beams. The approaches considered were:

continue to repair as corrosion becomes visible This repair, adequate in the short term, arrests the degradation in an intermediate state. Implementation of this repair would continue through the life of the structure or until such time as the limiting quantity of reinforcement remains.

Remove all concrete past the rebar, replace rebar and concrete This method restores the original design margin of the structural members by; 1) replacing the existing chloride ion laden concrete with .new concrete, and 2) replacing the existing degraded rebar with corrosion resistant materxal.

Installation of "external" reinforcement systems t replace degraded reinforcement This method of repair, already employed in the 4B ICW bay, restores the original design margins and can be implemented one bay at a time within the plant outage duration criteria. This repair was evaluated and selected as the preferred method of permanent repair.

11

Establishing a Plan of Action:

With evaluations complete and the method of permanent repair selected, a plan for the remaining scope of work was developed. FPL Specification CN 2.28 was prepared and issued as a scheduling and planning guideline to complete the balance of inspection and repair activities. All permanent modifications are specified and implemented under separate Plant Change/Modif ication (PC/M) documents.

This specification delineates:

Installation of mitigative repairs.

Uniform techniques for the formal documentation and reporting of crack geometry and propagation in structural elements.

Guidelines for the conduct of inspections.

Recommended implementation schedule for completion of permanent repairs over a six (6) year implementation period.

12

Xmplementation Schedule:

See: Specification Cn 2 28, Attachment 2 Summary:

1. Timeline summary

2. Graphic representation showing the location and method of repair for identified deficiencies

3. All evaluations and test reports

4. Volumes of photographs taken to document the condition of the structure during inspection and repair periods.

~,

13

SPECIF iCATION Spec No. CN-2.28 Revlalon 1 Nuclear Etlglneerlhg Data intake Structure, Attachment 2 lnapectfon and Repair Page 1 ot1 Recommended Implementation Schedule ModNcatlons and inspections cÃ%:48M>..u HA&A6%4e@~d%+e<..N.4tlfpx

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6.0 MASONRY WALLS

~ INITIALRESOLUTION OF IEB 80-11

~ RESOLUTION OF LER 250-83-06

~ POST IEB 80-11 ACTIVITY

6. MASONRY WALLS CONTINUED

~ lNITIALRESOLUTION OF IEB 80-11

- 97 WALLS IDENTIFIED AS EITHER SUPPORTING SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS OR OF II/I CONCERN

- WALLS WERE WALKED DOWN TO VERIFY CONFiGURATION AND IDENTIFY ALL ATTACHMENTS AND PENETRATIONS

- ALLWAI LS WERE ANALYZEDFOR APPROPRIATE LOADS AND LOAD COMBINAT)ONS BASED ON CONFIGURATION SHOWN ON RECORD DRAWINGS

- REPORT WAS SUBMITTED TO NRC IN APRIL, 1981

- RESPONSE TO FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS WAS SUBMITTED IN MA'Y, 1982

~

6. MA NRY WALLS NTIN D

+ RESOLUTION OF LER 250-83-06

- DURING MASONRY WALL MODIFICATIONS IN APRIL, 1983, MASONRY WALLS IN CONTROL ROOM FOUND TO DEV'IATE FROM DRAWING DETAILS USED TO RESOLVE IEB 80-11

( MISSING GROUT AND REBAR IN CELLS )

- INSPECTIONS WERE INITIATEDTO ASSESS EXTENT OF PROBLEM - DISCREPANCIES WERE FOUND TO AFFECT ALL AREAS OF THE PLANT AND THE NEED FOR RE-ANALYSIS WAS IDENTIFIED

- ALL WALLS WERE RE-ANALYZEDUSING NRC APPROVED ELASTIC METHODS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF STEAM GENERATOR FEEDPUMP ROOM WAI LS WHICH WERE ANALYZEDUSING ARCHING ACTION METHODOLOGY FOR INTERNAL PRESSURE, ONE-DIRECTIONALLOADS ONLY

- UNINSPECTED ALLOWABLESWERE USED FOR THE RE-ANALYSIS AND SAMPLES OF THE IN-PLACE MATERIALS WERE TESTED TO VERIFY THAT THEY MET DESIGN SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

- CRACKS IDENTIFIED DURING THE WALKDOWNS WERE EVALUATEDAND REPAIRED - NO NEW CRACKS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN SUBSEQUENT INFORMALWALKDOWNS

- INTERFACES WITH MAIN STRUCTURE WERE CONSIDERED IN Tfg EVALUATIONEFFORT

- APPROXIMATELY34 WALLS WERE MODIFIED AND 25 WALLS WERE REMOVED

6,0 MA ONRY WALL ONTIN ED

- MODIFICATIONS CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWINQ; ADDITION OF WALL BRACING ADDITION OF TOP SUPPORT

'ILLINGOF EMPTY CELLS WITH GROUT

'DDITION OF GROUT AND REBAR

- A THREE DAY AUDIT OF THE MASONRY WALL RE-ANALYSIS EFFORT WAS CONDUCTED BY THE NRC AND ITS CONSULTANTS IN AUGUST, 'I 983 - AUDIT INCLUDED A SITE VISIT

- CLOSURE OF THE IEB-80-11 EFFORT FOR PTN IS DOCUMENTED IN NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 88-17

• 6.0 MASONRY WALL ONTINUED

~ POST IEB 80-11 ACTIVITY

- MODIFICATIONS TO MASONRY WALLS ARE STRICTLY CONTROLLED BY PLANT CHANGE PROCEDURES AND SPECIFICATIONS - MODIFICATIONS ARE AVOIDED WHENEVER FEASIBLE

- DRAWINGS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO IDENTIFY THE LOCATION AND SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF ALL MASONRY WALLS IN THE POWER BLOCK

- WHEN THE ADDITION OF LOADS TO EXISTING WALLS IS NECESSARY, CALCULATIONS ARE REVISED TO TRACK THE NEW LOADS AND ENSURE THAT THE WALL REMAINS STRUCTURALLY ADEQUATE

- ONLY THROUGH BOLTING IS ALLOWED FOR ATTACHMENTS TO MASONRY WALLS - ANCHORS ARE TRACKED IN CALCULATIONS

- MODIFICATIONS/EVALUATIONS EXISTING WALLS FOR DC ENCLOSURE ROOII/I.QUALIFIED TO IEB 80-11 REQUIREMENTS "

'EW MASONRY WALLS ADDED IN AUXILIARYBUILDING AS PART OF UNIT 4 EDG ADDITION

'IMITEDNUMBER OF MINOR LOADS ADDED TO SOME OF THE EXISTING WALLS

~ NRC fE NOTICE 87-67 WAS ISSUED IN DECEMBER, 1987 TO ADDRESS FOLLOW-UP PROBI.EMS AT SOME UTILITIES - FPL HAS A PROGRAM AND PROCEDURAL CONTROLS IN PLACE TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH LED TO IEB 80-11

7.0 STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES

~ BACKGROUND

~ DESIGN FEATURES

7. TR TVRAL BOUNDARIES CONTINUED BACKGRO ND

~ LONG TERNI AND SEISMIC DISPLACEMENTS EXPECTED TO BE RELATIVELYINSIGNIFICANT

- COMPETENT ROCK FOUNDATION (WITH LIMITEDROCK FILL)

DIFFERENTIAL SETTLEMENT EXPECTED TO BE INSIGNIFICANT {EXPECTED TO BE ELASTIC, DUE TO INITIALLOADINGj NO DIFFERENTIAL SEMLEMENT IS EVIDENT IN ANY STRUCTURES, BASED ON INFORMAL OBSERVATIONS POTENTIAL FOR SEISMIC DEFLECTIOMS ARE REDUCED

- LOW SEISMICITY NO KNOWN FAULTS - FAR FIELD EARTHQUAKES ONLY, WITH NO SEVERE DISPLACEMENTS

'ECENT SEISMOLOGY. EVALUATIONSCONFIRM LOW SEISMIC HAZARD FOR SITE AREA

- MAXIMUMHEIGHT FOR SPACIAL INTERACTIONS IS LESS THAN 40ft ABOVE GRADE

- STRUCTURES IN CLOSE PROXIMITYTO EACH OTHER HAVE RELATIVELYHIGH NATURALFREQUE NCIES

- RELATIVE SEISMIC DEFLECTIONS BETWEEN ADJACENT STRUCTURES ARE EXPECTED TO BE LESS THAN 1/4 INCH

'XISTING CALCULATIONS SHOW SEISMIC DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN CONTROL AND AUXILIARY BUILDING TO BE SIGNIFICANTLYLESS

7.0 STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIE ONTIN ED DESI NF A R NT F R DIFFERENTIA TT M T

~ BUILDINGS IN CLOSE PROXIlVllTYTO EACH OTHER WERE PROVIDED WITH SUFFICIENT SEPARATION IN DESIGN

- MINIMUM1/2 INCH SEPARATION BETWEEN AUXILIARY AND CONTROL BUILDINGS,

- 3/4 INCHES BETWEEN AUXILIARYBUILDING AND CONTAINMENT

- GAPS FILLED WITH COMPRESSIBLE MATERIAL

< WELL DESIGNED COMMODITIES (PIPING, RACEWAYS)

RUNNING BETWEEN BUILDINGS CAN ACCEPT SEISMIC DISPLACEMENTS OF THE MAGNITUDEEXPECTED AT PTN

~ CURRENT DESIGN PRACTICE ACCOMMODATES THE POTENTIAL FOR DIFFERENTIAL MOYEMENTS BETWEEN STRUCTURES

8.0 GE LO Y FOUNDATION ONDITION

~ SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS

~ FOUNDATION CONDITIONS

~ EXPECTED SETTLEMENT

~ GROUNDWATER CONDITIONS

t

8. EOLOGY FOUNDATION CONDITI NS CONTINUED

~ SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS

- SITE LIES WITHIN COASTAL LOWLAND ON SOUTH FLORIDA SHELF

- SITE ORIGINALLYCOVERED BY MANGROVE SWAMP

- UNDERLYINGTHE ORGANIC SOIL IS PLElSTOCE NE LIMESTONE TO A DEPTH OF APPROXIMATELY1,00 FEET

- THIS IN TURN IS UNDERLAIN BY LIMESTONE OF MIOCENE AGE

~ FOUNDATION CONDITIONS

- ALL PLANT STRUCTURES BEAR ON THE LIIVIESTONE, WHICH IS LOCATED NEAR THE ORIGINAL GROUND SURFACE, OR ON COMPACTED LIMEROCK FILL WHICH BEARS ON THE LIIVIESTONE

- THE ROCK IS COMPETENT WITH RESPECT TO THE FOUNDATION LOADING

-'OIVIE SOFT ROCK AND POTHOLES FOUND DURING FOUNDATION EXCAVATIONWERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH COMPACTED FILL

-'AL'L IVIAJOR FOUNDATIONS ARE FOOTINGS AND MATS

- ALLOWABLEBEARING PRESSURES ARE:

LIMEROCK FILL- '10 KSF

. FOUNDATION ROCK- 7.5 KSF

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COltALLINC LIMESTONE SILTY Oft CLAYCY SANO SILTSTONC ON CLATSTO NtOILLACKOL4 LIaCSTONC Hl

8.0 EOLO Y FQ NDATION CONDITIONS CONTINUED

~ FOUNDATION SETTLEMENT

- MAJOR STRUCTURES ARE BEARING ON ROCK OR ON COMPACTED FILL, THEREFORE SETTLEMENT WAS NOT A CONCERN

- EXPECTED SETTLEMENT IS ELASTIC AND WILL OCCUR AS LOAD IS APPLIED

- NO LONG TERIVI SETTLEMENT WILL OCCUR

- SETTLEIVIENTESTIMATES WERE BASED ON ELASTIC THEORY-EXPECTED TOTAL AND DIFFERENTIAL SETTLEMENTS ARE LESS THAN 1/2 INCH

- SINCE COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION, NO VISIBLE SIGNS OF DISTRESS DUE TO SETTLEMENT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED

8. E LO Y FOUNDATI N CONDITI N NTIN ED

~ GROUND WATER CONDITIONS

- SHALLOW GROUND WATER CONDITIONS PREVAIL AT THE SITE

- GROUND WATER LEVELS FLUCTUATE WITH THE LEVEL OF BISCAYNE BAY

- RECENT MEASUREMENTS SHOW GROUND WATER LEVELS TO BE ABOUT EL. 0 FEET

- THE GROUND WATER LEVEL HAS NO EFFECT ON THE STABILITYOF THE STRUCTURES

- NO SEEPAGE OF GROUND WATER HAS BEEN REPORTED OR IDENTIFIED IN ANY OF THE BELOW-GROUND STRUCTURES

- MAJOR FOUNDATION ELEVATIONS:

CONTAINMENTSTRUCTURE BUILDING FLOOR EL. '14 FT REACTOR WELL (TOS) EL. - 16.5 FT REACTOR WELI (BOS) EL. -23.7 FT

'UXILIARYBUILDING MAIN LEVEL (TOS) EL. 18 FT LOWER LEVEL (TOS) EL. 10 FT RHR EQUIPMENT ROOM EL. %.5 FT

'ONTROL BUILDING LOWER LEVEL (TOS) EL. 18 FT

9.0 MAINTENAN E OF STR TURES

~ OVERVIEW

~ PROTECTIVE COATINGS ICW PIPING

9.0 MAINTENAN E F STR CTURE ONTINUED

~ IMPORTANT ISSUE DUE TO SALT AIR ENVIRONMENT

~ VARIOUS NCR'S ISSUED AND RESOLVED IN THE AREA OF CORROSION (REVIEWED BY ENGINEERING AND REPAIRS IMPLEMENTED AS APPROPRIATE)

~ SPECIFIC PROGRAMS AND/OR MODIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN IMPI EMENTED FOR AREAS OF SPECIAL CONCERN:

- INTAKE STRUCTURE

- ICW BURIED PIPING

- PROTECTIVE COATINGS

- TPCW HX Pf DESTALS

- AUX. BUILDING BASEMENT WALL

~ A TEAM HAS BEEN FORMED AT PTN TO DEVELOP A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ADDRESSING PLANT MATERIALCONDITION-THIS TEAM WILL CONSIDER BOTH SHORT TERM AND LONG TERM REPAIRS AND INSPECT1ONS FOR CIVIL/STRUCTURALAREAS THAT DO NOT CURRENTLY HAVE A SPECIFIC MAINTENANCEPROGRAM

~ 1 992 (CIVIL/STRUCTURALMAINTENANCEAND REPAIR PROJECT AUTHORIZED AND UNDERWAY

9. MAINTENAN E F TR T RE NTlN ED PR T IV OAT)N

~ MATERIALCONDITION UPGRADE PRO'GRAM

-REPLACEMENT/REPAIRS OF COATING SYSTEMS TO IMPROVE CORROSION PROTECTION, DECONTAMINATIONAND PERSONNEL SAFETY

-PLANT !S SPLIT INTO PROJECT AREAS WITH TARGET COMPLETION DATES

-STRATEG!C PLANNING TEAM PRIORITIES ARE FACTORED INTO SCHEDULES

- LEVEL 2 AND BOP AREAS COMPLETED IN 1991:

UNIT 3 RHR PUMP AND HX ROOM UNIT 3 SPENT FUEL PUMP AND HX ROOM

'OST ACCIDENT SAMPLING ROOM UNIT 4 EDG BUILDING

- AREAS WITH COATING WORK IN PROGRESS:

'NIT 3/4 INTAKE

. UNIT 4 CHARGING PUMP ROOM

AINTENANCE OF TRUCTURES CONTINUED

- 1991 DUAL UNIT OUTAGE CONTAINMENTCOATING PROJECT TEAM FORMED CONSISTING OF FPL COATING SPECIALIST, SITE COATING SUPERVISOR, APPLICATION CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR. AND INSPECTION CONTRACTOR SUPERVISOR TEAMACTIVELYPARTICIPATED IN PLANNING,TRAINING AND DAILY SUPERVISION FPL COATING SPECIALIST SUPPLIED TECHNICAL SUPPORT, TRAINING, PLANNING, CONTRACTOR SUPERVISION AND FIELD AUDITS WORK FORCE CONSISTED OF, APPROXIMATELY150 PAINTERS AND INSPECTORS, PLUS ADDITIONAL

. SUPPORT

'PPROXIMATELY62,000 SQ FT REMOVED AND RECOATED

'PERATING DfCK (EL. 58 FT) AREA PROJECT ELEMENTS:

LINERP LATE CCW LINES MANIPULATORCRANE EMERGENCY COOLERS EMERGENCY FILTERS NORMAL COOLERS CONCRETE SURFACES

'ONCRETE WALLS AND CEILINGS WERE COATED INSIDE THE SHIELD WALLS AT EL. 14 FT

- 1992 OUTAGE CONTAINMENTCOATING PLAN IS NOW BEING DEVELOPED

.0 IVIAINTENANCEOF STRUCTURES CONTINUED

~ PROTECTIVE COATINGS SPECIFICATIONS

- CONTAINIVIENT-LEVEL 1

. COATING SYSTEMS REDESIGNED TO IMPROVE CORROSION PROTECTION, DECONTAMINATION,EASE OF APPLICATION AND IVIAINTENANCE,USING ADVANCED IVIATERIALSAND INDUSTRY STANDARDS

. COATING SYSTEMS WERE IRRADIATEDAND DBA TESTED TO DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

( ANSi 6.9 8c 101.2 )

COATINGS WERE FIELD TESTED FOR EASE OF APPLICATION,TO REDUCE TIME AND IMPROVE QUAUTY

'OTHER DESIGN FACTORS=WERE V.O.C'S, HARDNESS, RECOAT TIMES, AND CURE TIMES

. PAINTERS RECEIVED TRAINING ON SITE PROCEDURES AND SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TO APPLYING COATINGS QC HOLDS ARE SPECIFIED FOR CRITICAL ACTIVITIES (SURFACE PREPARATION, AMBIENTCONDITIONS, MIXING, FILIVI THICKNESS, ETC.)

THE SPECIFICATION REQUIRES ENGINEERING REVIEW OF ANY DEGRADED CONDITIONS FOUND {CONCRETE CRACKS, STEEL CORROSION) PRIOR TO PROCEEDING WITH COATING ACTIVITIES

. THE SPECIFICATION WAS RECENTLY REVISED TO INCORPORATE LESSONS LEARNED DURING THE DUAL UNIT OUTAGE EFFORT

9. IVlAINTENACEOF TRU T RES CONTIN ED

- BALANCE OF PLANT AND LEVEL 2

. SPECIFICATION REVISED SIGNIFICANTLYTO ENHANCE THE REQUIREMENTS OF COATING SYSTEMS, SURFACE PREPARATION, APPLICATION, TRAINING AND PROTECTION OF PLANT EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL SPECIFICATION UPGRADES ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND WILL REDUCE CORROSION, CONTAMINATIONAND LENGTHEN THE MAINTENANCEPAINTING CYCLE TURKEY POINT AND ST.,LUCIE (FPL'S OTHER NUCLEAR SITE) HAVE COMMON LEVEL 2 BALANCE OF PLANT COATING SPECIFICATIONS, INCORPORATING TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNED AT BOTH SITES A COATING MAINTENANCEPROCEDURE IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT AT PTN TO MAINTAINTHE NEWLY INSTALLED COATING SYSTEMS

PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION E I

~ CEMENT-MORTAR LINED CAST IRON PIPE PIPE SIZES 30" & 36" WALLTHICKNESS .79 & 1.0

~ BELL & SPIGOT TYPE JOINTS

~ INSTALLED UNDERGROUND

~ SALT WATER SYSTEM WITH COOLING CANALS

PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION RE P TI

~ INTERNAL PIPE CRAWL-THROUGH INSPECTIONS

~ LOCALIZED FAILURE OF LINING

~ LOCALIZED PITS AND CORROSION CELLS

~ REPAIRED INDICATED AREAS WITH AN EPOXY COATING

~ EPOXY REPAIR HAS PROVEN SUCCESSFUL

PTN 38@ .

ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION

~ OVERALL WALLTHICKNESS

~ CONDITION OF PIPE WALL

~ EXTERNAL CORROSION RATE

PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION

~ DURING DUAL UNIT OUTAGE

~ COMPREHENSIVE INTERNAL INSPECTION

~ UT MEASUREMENT OF WALLTHICKNESS

~ REPAIRED LOCALIZED LINING FAILURES

~ CLEANED AND COATED OF ALL INTERNAL PIPE JOINTS WITH EPOXY COATING

PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION R LT

~ CEMENT-MORTAR LINING IS IN GOOD CONDITION

~ WALL THICKNESS MEASUREMENT RESULTS 3lI II ~II RANGE .74-.86 ..92-1.08 AVERAGE . 81 1.0 NOMINAL .79-. 85 1.0-1.06 MIN WALLREQ..268 .291

~ EXTERNAL CORROSION RATE = 2 MILS/YEAR

~ RATE CONSISTENT WITH C.I. PIPE HANDBOOK

PTN 3&4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION

~ EXTERNAL CORROSION RATE IS LOW

~ STING ICW PIPING SHOULD LAST THE LIFE OF T PLANT WITH MARGIN

PTN 38c4 ICW PIPING SYSTEM STRUCTURAL CONDITION

~ CONTINUE TO MONITOR CONDITION OF LINING

~ CONTINUE TO REPAIR LOCALIZED LINING FAILURES AND CORROSION CELLS

10. SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

~ KINEMETRICS STRONG MOTION ACCELEROGRAPH (1VIODELSIVIA-1)

INSTALLED AT UNIT 3

~ ADDITIONALSEISMIC STATIONS ADDED BY FPL TO MONITOR STATE ACTIVITIES-SYSTEM MAINTAINEDBY UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

~ TWO ADDITIONALSTATIONS ARE IN THE FUNDING PROCESS.

THESE WILL BE ADDED IN GEORGIA TO CONNECT THE FLORIDA AND USGS SYSTEMS AND ALLOW SEISMIC ATTENUATION FACTORS TO BE DETERMINED TO DATE THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY RECORDED SEISMIC 0

~

ACTIVITYBY THESE UNITS.

~ FLORIDA HAS HAD FIVE PREVIOUS SEISMIC EVENTS WITH THE STRONGEST ESTIMATED AT 2.6 MM

~ THREE PROCEDURES ARE USED TO IVIAINTAINTHE SEISMIC INSTRUMENT INSTALLED AT TURKEY POINT

- O-PMI-103.1, SEISMOGRAPH QTR. FUNCTIONALCHECK AND SEMI-ANNUALBATTERY REPLACEMENT

- O-PMI-103.2, SEISMOGRAPH ANNUALFILM REPLACEMENT PMI'I 03.3, SEISMOGRAPH 18 MO. REPLACEMENT FOR CALIBRATIONRECERTIFICATION

SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION 4m~+ 1 1

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CLAPS'aS~m Osmaua FPL DIGlTAL SEISMIC IHONITORING STATlONS MAINTAINEDBY U of F GEOLOGY DEPARTMENT

CIVIL/STRUCTURAL LERS SINCE 198 DESCRIPTION 80-021 Discharged battery in a seismograph 81-013 Void in concrete below Unit 3 cont. equipment hatch 82%10 PIpe support no longer contacting the ground due to cracking grout 82%11 Surveillance test, of seisrr;ograph not compfe<ed on schedule 83-006 Masonry walls not ln complIance with desi

{no Internal reinforoIng steel 88-026 Flood protection deficiencies for diesel oil transfer pumps and North/West/South sides of, auxiliary buildIngs Unit 4 81%14 Defective area in concrete containment 83-001 InstallatIon deficiencies of framing steel and supports inside containment 83-002 Fuel assembly drop Into spent fuel rack

NRC STRUCTURAL INSPECTIONS 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 19&5 1984 1983 1982 1981 %80 1979

AS C NSPEC 0 SSUES ZNSPECTION AREA REPORT NO. RESULTS (COPIES OF INSPECTION REPORTS ARE HADE AVAILABLE HERE)

1. ERECTION OF STRUCTURAL STEEL k 91-10 NO DEVIATIONS CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS IN THE NEW DG BLDG

2. ERECTIOH OF NEW SECURITY BARRIERS 91-10

3. INTAKE STRUCTURE REPAIR 91-10 88-17

4. DESIGN VALIDATION INSPECTION 91-201 IF I 89-203-12 CCW HT. DCHAN GER 89-203 SUPPORT PEDESTAL STIFFNESS ASSUHPTIOH.

IF I 89-203-16 CCW SURGE TANK SUPPORT PLATFORN ANCHORAGES.

(Both of these deficiencies were corrected before the 1991 restart of the units)

5. WELDING PROGRAN l PIPE SUPPORTS 91-17 90-42 NO 'DEVIATIONS 90-32

6. EVALUATION OF DESIGN CAPACITIES 90-32 IFI 89-29-02 OH WEJ-ITS WAS CLOSED..

OF INSTALLED WEJ-IT ANCHORS 89-47 IFI 89-29-02 REPLACED IFI 86-13-01.

89-01 ALL WEJ-ITS NET FUNCTIONALITY CRITERIA.

88-24 ITEN 86-13-01 RENAINED OPEN.

86-13 IF I 86-13-91 INITIATED.

PAST HRC IHSPEC ION SSUES INSPECTION AREA REPORT NO ~ RESULTS

7. HEM EDG CONCRETE PLACEHENT 90-29 HO DEVIATIONS 90-10 89-04 19

8. SOIL li FOUNDATION PREPARATION 89-19 HO DEVIATIONS a

FOR THE NEM EDG BLDG. 89-04

9. CONTAINNENT TENDON SURVEILLANCE 88-17 NO DEVIATIONS 80-29 r

10. HASONRY MALL DESIGN 88-17 IE BULLETIN 80-11 MAS CLOSED.

80-29 I). SPENT FUEL RERACK 85-11 HO DEVIATIONS 85-05 85-04 84-12

12. CABLE TRAY LOADIHGS 91-10 NO DEVIATIONS 83-14 IFI 83-14-02, HOV 83-14-03 (NRC LETTER 10-24-83 ACKHOMLEDGED FPL CORRECTIVE ACTION).

13. PIPE SUPPORTS (IEB 79-02) 88-24 IEB 79-02 MAS CLOSED.

87-52 , 87-01 , 86-48) 86 13'5 28 ~ 85-120 85-09 , 82-23 , 81-27,

• HOV 86-13-02 (HRC LETTER 6-30-86 ACKNOWLEDGED 80-27 , 80-18+, 80-09, FPL CORRECTIVE ACTION).

80-05 , 79-38 , 79-32, +IR 80-18 IDENTIFIED A VIOLATION. NRC LETR 89-01 e 89-47 o 91-17 9-29-80 ACKHOMLEDGED FPL CORRECTIVE ACTION.

)0 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS

1. PROCEDURE: QUALITYINSTRUCTIONS NO. JPN-Ql 3.9

2. JPN STANDARD AND TRAINING PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO NSAC-125 AND INDUSTRY INITIATIVES

3. ALL ENGINEERING OUTPUT PRODUCTS CONSIDER AND DOCUMENT APPLICABILITYOF 50.59

4. REPORT ON CURRENT STATUS OF PC/M's IS AVAILABLEFOR PC/M SELECTION

10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS EVALUATION NO. SUBJECT

1. PC/H 90-472-00 CCN SURGE TANK RIGIDITY; UPGRADE, UNIT 4 PC/H 90-471-00 N UNIT 3

2. PC/H 90-460-00 REPAIR 5 HODIFICATION OF UNIT 4 INTAKE STRUCTURE PC/H 89-549-01 REPAIR OF CONCRETE AT THE UNIT 3 INTAKE STRUCTURE

3. PC/H 89-159-01 FLOOD PROTECTION OF EDG FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUHPS, UNITS 3 L 4

4. PC/H 88-319-01 HODIFICATIONS TO SUPPORT SPENT FUEL POOL RERACKING, UNITS 3C4 PC/H 87-405-02 INSTALLATION OF HIGH DENSITY FUEL STORAGE RACKS, UNIT 4

5. PC/H 88-170-01 REPLACEHENT OF SPENT FUEL POOL CRANE, UNIT 3 PC/H 88-171-00 UNIT 4

6. PC/H 87-259-07 EDG ENHANCEHENT - EDG BUILDING ADDITION, UNITS 3 5 4 PC/H 87-212-05 EDG ENHANCEHENT - SITE PREPARAT10N

7. PC/H 86-099-01 ADDITION OF SECURITY GRATING AT INTAKE STRUCTURE

8. PC/H 85-147-02 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEH - SEISHIC QUALIFICATION PC/H 85-148-04 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING SYSTEH - SEISHIC UPGRADE

9. PC/H 85-066-01 REHOVAL, REPLACEHENT a HOD IF ICATION OF CONTROL ROON DOOR, UNITS 3 a 4

10 CFR 50.59 EVALUATIONS EVALUATION NO SUBJECT

'-

10. PC/H 84-004-02 CABLE TRAY HODIFICATIONS UNIT 3.

PC.H 84-005-01 UNIT 4.

11. PC/H 83-050-04 HASONRY WALI. HODIFICATIONS; UNITS 3 I4

12. PC/H 82-219-00 REACTOR CAVITY L TRANSFER CANAL LINER REPAIR, UNIT 4 C

13. PC/H 77-54A-01 CONTAINHEHT HODIFICATIOH FOR STEAH GENERATOR REPAIR, UNIT 3.

14. PC/H 76-006 Cl{ANGE OF THE SPENT FUEL PIT ROOH DOOR FROH CONCRETE SLAB DOOR TO PUSH-BUTTON ELECTRICALLY OPERATED SLIDING DOOR, UNITS 3 L 4

15. JPN-PTN-SEHJ-89-111, Rev. 1, 1/31/90 ICW PlPING INSPECTION, UNIT 3

16. JPN-PTN-SEC-90-018, Rev. 0, 1/25/90 REPLACEHENT OF INFLATABLE BOOT SEAL OF SPENT FUEL POOL KEYWAY GATE, UNIT 3

17. JPN-PTN-SECJ-89-072, Rev. I, 11/3/89 FIRST LOADING OF THE OVERHANG ROWS IN THE SPENT FUEL STORAGE RACKS, UHITS 3 l 4 NOTE: During the past few years, FPL Nuclear Engineering Discipline has. been providing training on l0 CFR 50.59 evaluations to FPL and A/E engineers, based on the guidelines of NSAC-125 document prepared by Nuclear Hanagement and Resources Council (NUHARC) and Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) as well as JPN-()I 3'.9, "IOCFR50.59 EVALUATIONS". A separate presentation on the procedural aspects and training provided, can be arranged during this week, if desired.

14. EVER N Y PLAN FOR NATURAL EMERGENCIE

~ EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

- EPIP 20101, DUTIES OF THE EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

- EPIP 20106, NATURAL EMERGENCIES

- EPIP 20107, FIRE/EXPLOSION EMERGENCIES

~ DUTIES OF EMERGENCY COORDINATOR

- DECLARATION

- NOTIFICAT)ONS/COMMUNICATIONS

- ACTIVATION

~ PREPAR'ATION ACTIVITIES FOR NATURALEMERGENCIES

- PERFORM WALKDOWNS

- SUPPLY CHECKS

- SECURE DOORS AND ROOF HATCHES

- INSTALLATIONOF STOPLOGS

- CLOSE VENT OPENINGS

- STAGE SANDBAGS

- STAGE DEWATERING PUMPS

- OPERABILITY CHECKS (EDG'S, BATTERY CHARGERS)

~ IN THE EVENT OF FIRE OR EXPLOS!ON, EMERGENCY TEAM IS ACTIVATED-TEAII WILL TAKE ACTION TO PROTECT PLANT PERSONNEL AND MINIMIZEDAMAGETO EQUIPMENT

r 0

>I

URKEY PO N P EAMa ~~ C4v~ / ~

%DO'ER

/ /~ 2. Page /

oi'LDG/AREA ELEV LOC o COMPONENT/ZTEM PIC COMMENTS QNI T' QGQSoA ~~~ ~ @IV ZO g~ E.~R g P

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J} ~ ~R 7~~ W~P J r~4 Q qs.v3

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ATTACHl'1ENT 4 FPL NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 1 OC FR50.59 PROGRAM AND INITIATIVES PROCEDURES AND GUIDANCE o Ql SUPPLEMENT 3.1-3 "ENGINEERING PACKAGE"

-PROVIDED STANDARD FORMAT AND CONTENT FOR DESIGN MODIFICATION. SECTION 3 IS THE 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATION, o Ql 3.9 "10CFR50.59 EVALUATIONS"

-PROVIDES REQUIREMENTS FOR COMPLIANCE TO 50.59.

o OTHER ENGINEERING PROCEDURES WHICH REQUIRE THE ENGINEER TO CONSIDER 10CFR50.59

-Ql 3.10 "DRAWING CHANGE REQUESTS (DCR'S)"

-Ql 3.14 "MINOR ENGINEERING PACKAGES (MEP'S)"

-Ql 8.3 "ITEM EQUIVALENCY EVALUATIONS (IEE)"

o NED GUIDANCE FOR PERFORMING 10CFR50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS

-BASED ON NSAC 125

-PROVIDES. DETAILED GUIDANCE

=DEFINITIONS

= FORMAT

FPL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 1 OCF R50. 59 PROGRAM AND INITIATIVES REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS o FULL INTER-DISCIPLINE REVIEW REQUIRED FOR 50.59 SE'S o NUCLEAR DISCIPLINE REQUIRED TO REVIEW AND APPROVE ALL 50.59 SE'S

-PROVIDES A)N PROCESS REVIEW WITH FOCUS ON THE SE NUCLEAR DISCIPLINE MAINTAINS 50.59 PROGRAM

-NUCLEAR DISCIPLINE MAINTAINSTHE FSAR

-NUCI.EAR DISCIPLINE CONDUCTS 50.59 TRAINING o FSAR AND DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT CHANGE PACKAGES REQUIRED AS PART OF PLANT CHANGE PACKAGES o PLANT SAFETY COMMITTEE APPROVES ALL 50.59 SE'S FOR PLANT CHANGES o CORPORATE NUCLEAR REVIEW BOARD REVIEW'S 50.59 SE'S

FPL NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 1 OCF R50. 59 PROGRAM AND lNITIATIVES TRAINING o 50.59 INTRODUCTION ADDED TO NED QA ORIENTATION TRAINING o EPRI/NUMARC 60.69 COMMITTEE. CHAIRMAN PROVIDED INITIAL NED TRAINING AFTER NSAC-125 ISSUED o NED HAS DEVELOPED A "CORE" TRAINING COURSE

-PROVIDED SEMI-ANNUALLYFOR NEW EMPLOYEES

-COURSE MAINTAINEDAND INSTRUCTED BY FPL NUCLEAR DISCIPLINE STAFF

FPL NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 10CFRC 3.69 PROGRAM AND INITIATIVES 1992 INITIATIVES o REVISE THE NED 60.69 GUIDANCE DOCUMENT TO INCORPORATE SCREENING GUIDANCESELF ASSESSMENT FEEDBACK o STREAMLINE ENGINEERING PACKAGE TO IMPROVE SE METHODS WHILE ELIMINATINGREDUNDANT OR NEGATIVE DECLARATIONS IN THE TEXT SELF ASSESSMENT FEEDBACK o UPGRADE TRAINING MANUAL

FPL NUCLEAR ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT 10CFR50.59 PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES 50.59 PCM SE FORMAT

-DESCRIPTION AND PURPOSE

--ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS ON SAFETY

-FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

-EFFECTS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION DETERMINATION

-PLANT RESTRICTIONS

-CONCLUSIONS

~ )

ATTACHNENT 5 TURKEY POINT LAND UTILIZATIONSITE

'ITE DESCRIPTION INCLUDES APPROXIMATELY25,000 ACRES CONTAINS A COOLING CANALSYSTEM FOR 2000 MW OF GENERATION CANALSYSTEM CONSISTS OF 168 MILES OF 200 FOOT WIDE CANALS INCLUDES A LARGE PUBLIC RECREATION AREA INCLUDES FACILITIES FOR BOY/GIRL SCOUT CAMPING INCUDES AN AIR FORCE SEA SURVIVALSCHOOL HAS FACILITIES FOR FUEL OIL DELIVERIES VIA BARGES INCLUDES A FPL BOAT RAMP RESPONSIBLITIES OF LAND UTILIZATION .

MAINTENANCEAND OPERATION OF CANALSYSTEM '

A 5 YEAR DREDGING PROGRAM IS IN PROCESS

- AMPHIBIOUS BACKHOES ARE USED FOR CLEARING, STRAIGHTENING AND CONSTRUCTION OF SPOIL DISPOSAL AREAS FOR DREDGES MAINTENANCEOF ENTRANCE AND RECREATION AREAS OPERATION OF METEOROLOGICALTOWERS MAINTAINROADWAYS MAINTAINAND OPERATE ALL EQUIPMENT TO SUPPORT THE ABOVE ACTIVITIES UPHOLD REGULATORY COMMITMENTS (ENVIRONMENTALLYFOCUSED)

OPERATE AND MAINTAINA SYSTEM FOR PREVENTION OF SALT WATER INTRUSION MANPOWER/CAPITALCOMMITMENTS ANNUALOPERATING BUDGET 4 2.2 MILUON ANNUALCAPITAL BUDGET 4300,000 FPL PERSONNEL ON SIQE: 2 CONTRACT PERSONNEL ON SITE: 29 SPECIAL CHARARCTERISTICS SITE CONTAINS SEVERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES SITE HAS BOTH FOSSIL AND NUCLEAR REQUIREMENTS CANALSYSTEM IS UNIQUE IN THE WORLD XERISCAPED ENTRANCE TO PLANT

BISCAYHC BAY

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8 QiRg ScouT cAMP 80VRONV C. REO BAtK NEA g ~(ORO;OQCk TOWER LOCATK)HS.

A. l0 METER TOWER.

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2.B South Dade Neteorol ical Tower NE 80<OAR~

FIGURE 5.$ -1 SlTE NDI, MAP lVRKEY POINT UNITS ) 4 4

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1-10

t C MEN 6 TURKEY POINT NUCLEAR PLANT SITE AUDIT DESCRIPTION OF CIVIL/STRUCTURAL OBSERVATIONS Outside Containment Water accumulation in the Unit 3 containment vertical tendons has been observed during tendon surveillance.

However, no water accumulation has been observed in Unit 4 containment vertical tendons. Expanded vertical tendon surveillance for the presence of water for Unit 3 would provide additional data to determine the extent of water accumulation.

2 ~ In the Unit 3 tendon 'gallery, some of the bearing plates show signs of corrosion; there are cracks and voids in the concrete adjacent to the bearing plates; and there is a gap between the tendon gallery wall and the ceiling which allows water infiltration.

3 ~ Near the junction of the Unit 3 containment dome and the ring girder there is a discoloration which appears to be due to poor water drainage.

4 Two spare penetrations in the Unit 3 containment wall at approximately elevation 30 ft. azimuth 226 degrees are not

~

capped at the outside surface of the concrete containment.

They go completely through the concrete wall (approximately 4 ft.) and are capped at the liner plate.

Inside Containment (Based on ILRT report for Unit 4)

In some areas of the containment liner, the top.coat peeled, delaminated, and disbonded.

2 ~ Surface corrosion of penetrationwan'isters some of .th'ii ilier seam welds and a few was- observed.

a-3 ~ Joint Tiller'aterial between the>-liner and adjacent concrete;.structures was leaching:in some areas.

4 ~ RadieFtly"inward bulging of the liner was observed at the operating deck level and above the polar crane girder level.

The bulging is random but widespread around the perimeter of the co~inment. The bulges run the entire height of the 10 ft. liner panel, are about 15 inches wide (liner stiffener spacing), and are deflected about 1/2 inch radially inward at the middle of the panel.

5. Two 1/16 inch cracks originating at the lower corners of a duct penetration through the 4B steam generator cubicle wall were found.

4' ttac e 6 C t'e ta e ct e recognize that FPL is aware of the deteriorating condition of We the intake structure and of the corrective actions for some of these areas. The audit team reviewed a it has taken report on the intake structure prepared by a consultant to FPL. The report indicates that the bay walls are also degrading and experiencing active corrosion of the reinforcing bars. Therefore, the audit team recommended that the licensee also give close attention to other parts of the structure such as the intermediate and exterior walls.

S ent ue Bui di The ceiling of the Unit 3 spent fuel building has a discoloration over an area of. about 3 by 6 feet.

Tanks

1. Unit 3 condensate storage tank:

There are bent plates on the anchor bolt chairs.

There is deterioration of the water seal at "the base of the tank'nd corrosion of the tank bottom plate is visible.

In a few places there are signs of corrosion and.scratches and gouges on the tank wall.

2. The diesel oil tank does not have washers-.=:between the. nuts and the anchorage plates.

i) ~

• For unreinforced.masonry walls. the seismic qualification* relies on the assumptiod,'that there=.;are no cracks in the wall. However, there appears to",be no fora+..monitoring program to confirm that no cracks develop'.

In the air handling room in the control building at elevation 30 ft., the angle support at the ceiling is not masonry wall.

flush with the Cathod c Protect S stem A cathodic protection system was installed during original construction to protect the containment-liner plate, reinforcing steel, and tendon assemblies. The system is presentlyis exhibiting presently low to very low readings in some of the anodes. FPL evaluating this condition.

e ttac e t 6 - Co t'nued o es 'n Co crete Structures In some concrete walls, abandoned anchor holes, drilled holes, or holes from original construction have not been grouted. One example is the 9 inch deep holes on the exterior concrete wall of the Unit 3 containment.

Se smic Inst ume tat o The following item is not related to aging degradation effects but was brought to the attention of FPL for their benefit.

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 states that if the vibratory ground motion from an earthquake exceeds the plants operating basis earthquake, the plant will be required to shutdown. The NRC staff has developed guidelines recommendations.

it will use to make plant shutdown The consequences of the guidelines is based on the ability of the plant to provide prompt information about the earthquake.

Turkey Point has only one three-component accelograph that records photographically. It requires three hours to develop the film after the instrument trigger is detected. Prompt analysis of the photographic record could only provide peak ground accelerati'on. To obtain response spectra, the records would have to be digitized and used to generate response spectra. This could take a considerable time.

EPRI has developed an OBE exceedance criterion based on a damage threshold estimate. To use the EPRI criterion, digital recording and the generation of response spectra and cumulative absolute velocity are required. The ability-to do this can provide the information to avoid unnecessarily shutting the plant down in the event of a nondamaging earthquake which has short duration high frequency exceedance of the OBE.

ATTACHMENT 7 Representative Photographs of Key Observations

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Un 3 e do Ga le (continued)

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U t 3 Co ta e t Spare Penetrations (2) Uncapped on Outside Surface at Azimuth 226', Elevation 30'

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ke Point Site Seismo ra Mounted on Unit 3 Containment Basemat at Azimuth 226'

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View of Site Cooling Water Discharge and Canal System, Looking SW from atop Unit 3 Containment

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'5 peeling of Dome coating Material (White ~eas) i Possible Cause of Water Drain Blockage

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Unit 3 S ent Fue B di Approx. 3' 6'rea of Discoloration on Ceiling;

'I Possible Water Leak from Roof Air Handlin Room in Control uildin Gap Between Masonry Wall and Angle Support Installed at Ceiling as Part of Bulletin 80-11 Program (View Looking Up)

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Deterioration of the Water Seal at Base of Tank/

Corrosion of Tank. Bottom Plate

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4v i~Mt TYpical Condition of Anchor Bolt Chairs U it 3 Co de ate Stora e an

Circulating Water pumps Mounted On top of Intake Structure; Supporting Concrete Beams Have Deteriorated and Currently Being Strengthened 4 ~

L View of Cooling Water Inlet, from North Side, Looking SW Intake St ucture