ENS 53853: Difference between revisions
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| emergency class = Non Emergency | | emergency class = Non Emergency | ||
| notification date = 01/31/2019 10:48 | | notification date = 01/31/2019 10:48 | ||
| retracted = Yes | |||
| notification by = Doug Larson | | notification by = Doug Larson | ||
| NRC officer = Mark Abramovitz | | NRC officer = Mark Abramovitz | ||
| event date = 01/31/2019 07:43 CST | | event date = 01/31/2019 07:43 CST | ||
| last update date = | | last update date = 03/22/2019 | ||
| title = | | title = En Revision Imported Date 3/25/2019 | ||
| event text = At 0743 [CST] on 1/31/2019, both trains of Unit 2 Diesel Generators were declared INOPERABLE due to outside air temperature exceeding the low temperature design limit for the diesel engines; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The Unit 2 Diesel Generators are still able to start if necessary to provide power. Additionally, multiple layers of defense in depth measures are in place to ensure safety. Prairie Island has five sources of offsite power; all of which are currently available. The Unit 1 Diesel Generators are OPERABLE and capable of being cross-connected to Unit 2. Additional equipment capable of responding to beyond design basis events is available on site providing another layer of defense in depth. | | event text = EN Revision Text: BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE DUE TO LOW AIR TEMPERATURE | ||
At 0743 [CST] on 1/31/2019, both trains of Unit 2 Diesel Generators were declared INOPERABLE due to outside air temperature exceeding the low temperature design limit for the diesel engines; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The Unit 2 Diesel Generators are still able to start if necessary to provide power. Additionally, multiple layers of defense in depth measures are in place to ensure safety. Prairie Island has five sources of offsite power; all of which are currently available. The Unit 1 Diesel Generators are OPERABLE and capable of being cross-connected to Unit 2. Additional equipment capable of responding to beyond design basis events is available on site providing another layer of defense in depth. | |||
Both Unit 2 Diesel Generators were returned to an OPERABLE status at 0810 on 1/31/2019 based on outside air temperature rising above the low temperature design limit with forecasted temperatures to remain above the low temperature design limit. | Both Unit 2 Diesel Generators were returned to an OPERABLE status at 0810 on 1/31/2019 based on outside air temperature rising above the low temperature design limit with forecasted temperatures to remain above the low temperature design limit. | ||
There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
The air temperature limit was -30 degrees Fahrenheit. | The air temperature limit was -30 degrees Fahrenheit. | ||
Unit 1 was not affected. The EDGs were supplied by a different manufacturer with different air temperature limits. | Unit 1 was not affected. The EDGs were supplied by a different manufacturer with different air temperature limits. | ||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2019/ | * * * RETRACTION AT 1340 EDT ON 03/22/2019 FROM BRIAN JOHNSON TO JEFFREY WHITED * * * | ||
Engineering analysis performed subsequent to the event notification has determined that both Unit 2 Diesel Generators would have been able to fulfill their safety function during the period of time when the outside air temperature had exceeded the low temperature design limit. Therefore, EN# 53853 is being retracted. | |||
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event notification retraction. | |||
Notified R3DO (McCraw). | |||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2019/20190325en.html#en53853 | |||
}}{{unit info | }}{{unit info | ||
| Unit = 2 | | Unit = 2 | ||
Latest revision as of 06:30, 25 March 2019
| Where | |
|---|---|
Prairie Island  Minnesota (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-2.92 h-0.122 days <br />-0.0174 weeks <br />-0.004 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Doug Larson 10:48 Jan 31, 2019 |
| NRC Officer: | Mark Abramovitz |
| Last Updated: | Mar 22, 2019 |
| 53853 - NRC Website
| |
Prairie Island with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |