ENS 50826
ENS Event | |
|---|---|
22:44 Feb 16, 2015 | |
| Title | Control Room Special Vent Boundary Inoperable |
| Event Description | On February 16, 2015, at 1644 [CST], Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant (PINGP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Room Envelope Boundary was declared inoperable when it was discovered that Door 158, Auxiliary Building to 122 Control Room Chiller Room, would not latch. Both trains of Control Room Special Ventilation were declared inoperable and Tech Spec LCO 3.7.10 Condition B was entered. In addition, with the Control Room Envelope Boundary inoperable, Tech Spec 3.7.11 Condition E was required to be entered due to both Control Room Chillers inoperable. The required actions of Tech Spec 3.7.11 Condition E required both Units to enter Tech Spec LCO 3.0.3. As a mitigating action, station personnel were dispatched to secure Door 158. This condition was corrected on February 16, 2015, at 1709 [CST] when the deadbolt was engaged to maintain Door 158 closed. Tech Specs 3.7.10 Condition B, 3.7.11 Condition E, and 3.0.3 were all exited at 1709 [CST] February 16, 2015.
This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function to Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. Based on immediate implementation of mitigating actions and restoration of the Control Room Envelope, the protection of the health and safety of the public was not affected by this issue. This event has been entered into the sites Corrective Action Program. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: After discussions and interviews with personnel involved, it was determined that the Aux Building Operators found Door 158 latched. After passing through the door, the Operators checked to ensure the door was latched and discovered it was sticking and required assistance to latch by agitating the latch operating mechanism. The door was checked additional times and the door would latch with assistance. The Operators ensured the door was latched and notified the Control Room at 1644 [CST]. When the Operators installed the dead bolt and padlock at 1709 [CST], the door was still latched. As the door was never left unlatched and was always able to latch, the door was operable and there was no loss of safety function. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Prairie Island  Minnesota (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.48 h0.0617 days <br />0.00881 weeks <br />0.00203 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Brian Johnson 00:13 Feb 17, 2015 |
| NRC Officer: | John Shoemaker |
| Last Updated: | Feb 24, 2015 |
| 50826 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Unit 2 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |