Regulatory Guide 5.31

Specially Designed Vehicle with Armed Guards for Road Shipment of Special Nuclear Material

ML003740081
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/30/1975
From:	Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
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RG-5.31 Rev 1
Download: ML003740081 (4)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

REGULATORY

GUIDE OFFICE OF STANDARDS

DEVELOPMENT

REGULATORY

GUIDE 5.31 SPECIALLY

DESIGNED VEHICLE WITH ARMED GUARDS FOR ROAD SHIPMENT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

A. INTRODUCTION

Paragraph

73.31(c) of 10 CFR Part 73, "Physical Protection of Plants and Materials," requires that road movements of special nuclear material (SNM) in quanti ties identified in paragraph

73.1(bX2)

be protected by one of the following methods: (1) shipment with at least two armed guards accompanying the shipment in a sepa rate escort vehicle or (2) shipment in a specially designed truck or trailer which reduces the vulnerability to di version by design features that permit immobilization of the van and provide barriers or deterrents to physical penetration of the cargo compartment.

If armed guards are used with the specially designed vehicle, immobiliza tion is not required.

Paragraph

73.30(d) requires that the qualification, of individuals to act as guards used pur suant to paragraph

73.31(c) be documented.

This guide describes features acceptable to the NRC staff for a vehi cle operated by armed guards to ship special nuclear material by road and for the qualification of the armed guards.

B. DISCUSSION

There are two approaches that can be taken to satis fy paragraph

73.31(cX2), i.e., specially designed truck or trailer. One method would be the use of a specially de signed secure cargo vehicle that is constructed so as to resist entry for a substantial period of time by unauthor ized personnel using a wide variety of tools and weap ons. The penetration time would be commensurate with the time needed for law enforcement agencies to re spond to the scene of an emergency.

The vehicle would be designed to be immobilized upon command in case of a diversion attempt.

The other method would be through the use of ar mored car service. In this case, resistance to unauthorized entry is provided, in part, by the armed personnel within the vehicle who are in turn protected by the inherent design of the armored vehicle.

Acceptable characteristics of vehicles and personnel used in armored car service are provided in this guide. This revision reflects comments received from the public and other factors.

1. Armor Armored vehicles are supplied to the industry by a very small number of manufacturers.

The specific design of the armor supplied by each company is considered proprietary information.

The armor can generally be de scribed with respect to its resistance to projectile pene tration. All manufacturers provide armor that will re sist initial penetration by bullets from readily available small arms. The armor is usually affixed to the vehicle in such a way as to provide protection to the occupants against attack from any external direction.

2. Cab-Cargo Interface The cab-cargo interface can be provided with several options. In most cases, the separating wall between cab and cargo compartment is armored to provide protection in case either compartment is compromised.

A window of bullet resistant material that allows the crew in one compartment to have a clear view of the access doos of the other compartment is also provided.

Some models have a door that. allows passage from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle. Other models are equipped with gunports that permit firing from cab to cargo compartment.

3. Guards and Drivers Normally an armored vehicle crew consists of tWo or three individuals divided between the cab and cargo compartments.

For long-distance trips the crew.is often USNRC REGULATORY

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Washington.

D.C. N00. Attention:

Docketing

• nd methods ccpble to the NC staff of implementing specific prtsService Section.

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ating specific problems or postulated accidents, or to provide guidance to appli. cants. Regulatory Guides are not substitutes for regulations, end complilance

1. Power Reactors & Products with them is not required.

Methods and solutions different from those set out in 2. Research aedrTetReactors

7.

the guides will be acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings requisite to 3. Fuels and Materiale Facilitle

8. Ocsupat"oe "eo the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.

4. Environmental and Siting 9. Antitrust Review Comments and suggestions for improvements in these guides are encouraged

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10. General at all times, and guides will be revised, as appropriate.

to accommnodate com ments and to reflect new information or experience.

This guide was revised as a Copies of published guides may be obtained by written request Indicaling the result of substantive comments received from the public and additional staff divisions desired to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comeloeion.

WasnIngton.

D.C. review. 2f6. Attention:

Director.

Office of Sandaerds Developement.

Revision 1 April 1975 increased to allow rest periods for drivers and guards. SNM shipments are expected to involve frequent long distance trips of two or more days. In order to maintain the full-protective capacity of the armored service during these trips, it is important that adequate crews for continuous manning of both compartments during normal operation be supplied.

Considerable flexibility in achieving this end would be provided if both guards and drivers were qualified and permitted to perform either function (guard or driver).

4. Door Locks All armored vehicles are supplied with compartment locks for both the cab and cargo doors. In many cases, access to the cargo compartment requires positive action by personnel in both compartments when the cargo compartment is occupied by a guard. 5. Alarm System Many of the armored cars presently in service are equipped with audible alarms or flashing lights similar to those used by police and emergency vehicles.

The aware ness of attack that such alarms elicit in the general pub lic can facilitate response to attack or recovery of di verted material.

6. Securing the Cargo Armored cars have no standard provision for tying down cargo. This is understandable in view of the types of cargo normally handled by these carriers.

For SNM cartage, where larger and heavier cargos can be expected, some provision for adequate tie-down restraint will be required to provide for cargo integrity and personnel safety. It is expected that only minor effort and expense would be required to equip existing vehicles with tie down fittings.

"17. Gas Protection Many of the newer armored vehicles use a flow through (front-to-back)

air system for heating and cool ing the vehicle interior.

Typically, these systems draw outside air from the front (cab area) of the vehicle and expel exhaust air through vents in the upper areas of the vehicle. A slight positive internal pressure provided by the air system offers some resistance to the introduction of gaseous substances.

The air intake is under occupant control and can be closed. S6me vehicles are normally equipped with gas masks. The use of gas masks, filters, and internal air supplies for carriers of SNM would en hance the ability of vehicle crew members to resist gas attacks.

8. Antenna Protection Almost all armored vehicles are equipped with communication systems of some kind. Each vehicle is equipped by the purchaser of the vehicle although the manufacturer may provide mounting structures or access areas for the communication system components.

In some instances, the purchaser may provide the corn*Lines indicate substantive changes from previous issue.munication equipment to the manufacturer who will in stall the equipment at the time the vehicle is con structed.

Both radio and radiotelephone systems are in use. Each system is dependent on the use of radio signals received and transmitted from a vehicle-mounted antenna that could logically become the first target of an attack. Loss of an antenna during attack would pre clude the vehicle occupants from either notifying ex ternal agents of the attack or from seeking aid or as sistance.

To provide for sufficient delay during an attack for a vehicle crew to transmit emergency messages, antenna protection is desirable.

Such protection could be provided in the form of concealment, multiplicity, or hardening.

The actual antenna could be concealed or designed to appear as some other object while con ventionally appearing dummy antennas would be conspicuously located on the vehicle. Multiple antennas using internal switching could offer a delay sufficient to enable emergency messages to be transmitted.

Hardened, attack-resistant antennas could be designed and used to provide a delay time. Combinations of these or other similar methods could enhance the viability of trans mission.

C. REGULATORY

POSITION The characterisitcs listed below are acceptable to the NRC staff for a road vehicle operated by armed guards in order to comply with NRC regulations pertain ing to SNM shipments.

Additional Federal, State, and local requirements pertaining to safe interstate and local transport of cargo may also pertain to such shipments and compliance with these requirements is expected.

1. Armor The vehicle should provide protection for the driver(s)

and guard(s) against projectile impact. The ex ternal surface of the vehicle (side panels, floor, top, fire wall area, and viewing areas) should be constructed of materials that are resistant to at least the muzzle im pact energy of a .357 magnum bullet. Fuel tanks should be provided with similar protection against projectile im pact. Fuel tanks also should be equipped with a lock type cap and a screen in the tank nozzle to prevent the insertion of an explosive device into the tank. 2. Cab-Cargo Interface The wall separating the cab and cargo compartments should be armored. Additional features to be considered in the detailed construction of the cab-cargo interface depend on the method selected for the protection of the shipment.

At least one of the methods listed below should be used. These methods are similar in that each provides the capability for the crew to use firearms to prevent entry into the cargo compartment without leav ing the vehicle.

a. An armed guard should be permanently stationed in the cargo compartment.

In this case, a continuous wall of armor with a bullet-resistant window would be considered adequate as a cab-cargo interface.

5.31-2 b. Access to the cargo compartment from the cab should be available so that a guard can go directly from the cab to the cargo compartment without leaving the vehicle.

c. Gunports should be available which will permit firing from the cab into the cargo compartment..

Addi tionally, the gunports should permit firing of the weap on at wide angles so that overt entry from all sides of the cargo compartment can be prevefited.

3. Guards and Drivers All personnel of an armored vehicle should be quali fied to perform all normal operational tasks involved with a shipment.

Both guards and drivers should be qualified to perform either function, and interchange of function should be allowed if required for the safety and security of the cargo and crew. Compliance with DOT regulation

49 CFR 173.393(jX4), which deals with radiation levels in occu pied vehicles, should be maintained in addition to other applicable State and local requirements.

All guards and drivers should be qualified in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 5.20, "Training, Equipping, and Quali fying of Guards and Watchmen," or an equivalent pro gram. 4. Door Locks The cargo compartment doors should normally be in a locked mode and should be secured by a locking mechanism requiring positive action by personnel in both the cargo and cab compartments for operation if the cargo compartment is occupied.

If the cargo com partment is not occupied, the cargo compartment door lock should latch closed when shut, and should also be further secured by a padlock. Opening of the cargo com partment door lock should require positive action by personnel at the cargo compartment door and in the cab compartment.

The cab compartment doors should normally be locked and should require key insertion for operation from the outside.

S. Alarm System The vehicle should be equipped with an audible and/or visual alarm which is activated from within the vehicle and which has the same range of detection as that normally required by emergency vehicles.

De activation of the alarm system circuitry should require access to the armored compartments of the vehicle.6. Securing the Cargo The vehicle should be supplied with fittings in the cargo compartment to provide an adequate attachment for such securing devices as are required to provide re straint against substantial movement of or damage to the cargo in normal operation and during emergency stops. The cargo must be secured as required by 49 CFR Part 177. 7. Gas Protection The vehicle compartments should be equipped with gas masks, filters, or an internal air supply to permit the crew to resist an attack by incapacitating gas for a suf ficient time to allow transmittal of a distress message and, if possible, the arrival of aid. 8. Antenna Protection Either a concealed or a hardened antenna should be provided in order to afford sufficient time for the com munication system to transmit an emergency message.

9. Immobilization Although there is no requirement for immobili zation of vehicles that use armed guards, this is a desira ble feature. The vehicle could have a provision for im mobilization upon an authorized command originating from within the vehicle. Once commanded, the im mobilization system should resist unauthorized de activation for -as long as feasible.

Caution should be taken to ensure that activation devices that cause im mobilization are adequately shielded to prevent them from being energized from spurious electromagnetic signals.

D. IMPLEMENTATION

The purpose of this section is to provide informa tion to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for utilizing this regulatory guide. This guide reflects current regulatory practice.

Therefore, except in those cases in which the applicant or licensee proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Com mission's regulations, this guide will be used by the staff in evaluating the materials and plant protection portion of license applications, licensee security plans, or other documents pertaining to materials and plant protection submitted to the NRC on or after the issuance date of this guide.5.31-3 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

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