ENS 48725: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 07/28/2009 EST | | event date = 07/28/2009 EST | ||
| last update date = 02/06/2013 | | last update date = 02/06/2013 | ||
| title = Unanalyzed Condition That Could Have Resulted | | title = Unanalyzed Condition That Could Have Resulted in an Increased Maximum Flood Level | ||
| event text = On July 28, 2009, TVA identified, in the Corrective Action Program, the potential to overtop and fail earthen embankments at Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar Dams. This condition could have resulted in an increase in the probable maximum flood (PMF) level at Sequoyah Nuclear (SQN) Units 1 & 2. TVA initiated immediate actions to address the condition by conducting additional analyses and developing contingent actions. Additional actions were developed including the installation of modular flood barriers [which were] completed in December 2009. The barriers increase the effective height of the affected embankments preventing their overtopping and failure. The increase in PMF could have affected plant equipment including the emergency diesel generator system and the essential raw cooling water system. | | event text = On July 28, 2009, TVA identified, in the Corrective Action Program, the potential to overtop and fail earthen embankments at Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar Dams. This condition could have resulted in an increase in the probable maximum flood (PMF) level at Sequoyah Nuclear (SQN) Units 1 & 2. TVA initiated immediate actions to address the condition by conducting additional analyses and developing contingent actions. Additional actions were developed including the installation of modular flood barriers [which were] completed in December 2009. The barriers increase the effective height of the affected embankments preventing their overtopping and failure. The increase in PMF could have affected plant equipment including the emergency diesel generator system and the essential raw cooling water system. | ||
Additional details regarding the modular flood barriers and the results of TVA's subsequent hydrologic analyses for SQN were discussed in public meetings between TVA and the NRC staff on July 7, 2010 and May 31, 2012, and provided in TVA letters to the NRC dated August 10, 2012, October 30, 2012, and January 18, 2013. | Additional details regarding the modular flood barriers and the results of TVA's subsequent hydrologic analyses for SQN were discussed in public meetings between TVA and the NRC staff on July 7, 2010 and May 31, 2012, and provided in TVA letters to the NRC dated August 10, 2012, October 30, 2012, and January 18, 2013. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:01, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Sequoyah  Tennessee (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+30947.17 h1,289.465 days <br />184.209 weeks <br />42.391 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Harold Howle 17:10 Feb 6, 2013 |
| NRC Officer: | Bill Huffman |
| Last Updated: | Feb 6, 2013 |
| 48725 - NRC Website
| |