ML17262A413

Proposed Tech Spec Removing Table 3.6-1 Re Containment Isolation Valves from Tech Specs

ML17262A413
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	03/08/1991
From:	ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
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ML17262A411	List: ML17262A410 ML17262A412 ML17262A413 ML17262A414
References
NUDOCS 9103140015
Download: ML17262A413 (16)

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ATTACHMENT ARevisetheTechnical Specification pagesasfollows:Remove3.6-23.6-33.6-43.6-53.6-63.6-73.6-7A3.6-83.6-93.6-103.6-114~444.4-74.4-84.4-11Insert3.6-23.6-34~444.4-74.4-84.4-11gOP0244'DP QQOGK@DE 3.6.33.6.3.1Containment Isolation ValvesWithoneormorecontainment isolation valvesinoperable, maintainatleastoneisolation boundaryOPERABLEineachaffectedpenetration thatisopenandeither:a.Restoretheinoperable valve(s)tooperablestatuswithin4hours,orb.Isolateeachaffectedpenetration within4hoursbyuseofatleastonedeactivated automatic valvesecuredintheisolation

position, or3.6.43.6.4.13.6.4.2c.Isolateeachaffectedpenetration within4hoursbyuseofat,leastoneclosedmanualvalveorblindflange,ord.Beinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext6hoursandincoldshutdownwithinthefollowing 30hours.Containment isolation valvesareinoperable fromaleakagestandpoint whenthedemonstrated leakageofasinglecontainment isolation valveorcumulative totalleakageofallcontainment isolation valvesisgreaterthanthatallowedby10CPR50AppendixJ.Combustible GasControlWhenthereactoriscritical, atleasttwoindependent containment hydrogenmonitorsshallbeoperable.

OneofthemonitorsmaybethePostAccidentSamplingSystem.Withonlyonehydrogenmonitoroperable, restoreasecondmonitortooperablestatuswithin30daysorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext.6hours.3.6.4.3Withnohydrogenmonitorsoperable, restoreatleastonemonitortooperablestatuswithin72hoursorbeinatleasthotshutdownwithinthenext,6hours.3.6.5Containment Mini-PureWheneverthecontainment integrity isrequired, emphasiswillbeplacedonlimitingallpurgingandventingtimestoaslowasachievable.

Themini-purge isolation valveswillremainclosedtothemaximumextentpracticable butmaybeopenforpressurecontrol,forALARA,forrespirable airqualityconsiderations forpersonnel entry,forsurveillance teststhatmayrequirethevalvetobeopenorothersafetyrelatedreasons.Amendment No.X83.6-2Proposed Basis:Thereactorcoolantsystemconditions ofcoldshutdownassurethatnosteamwillbeformedandhencetherewouldbenopressurebuildupinthecontainment ifthereactorcoolantsystemruptures.

Theshutdownmarginsareselectedbasedonthetypeofactivities thatarebeingcarriedout.The(2000ppm)boronconcentration providesshutdownmarginwhichprecludes criticality underanycircumstances.

Whenthereactorheadisnottoberemoved,acoldshutdownmarginof14k/kprecludes criticality inanyoccurrence.

Regarding internalpressurelimitations, thecontainment, designpressureof60psigwouldnotbeexceedediftheinternalpressurebeforeamajorsteambreakaccidentwereasmuchas1psig.'"Thecontainment isdesignedtowithstand aninternalvacuumof2.5psig.<'>The2.0psigvacuumisspecified asanoperating limittoavoidanydifficulties.

withmotorcooling.Containment isolation valvesandboundaries arelistedinUFSARTable6.2-13.Isolation boundaries canincludeisolation valves,closedsystems,andflangesasshownonUFSARTable6.2-13.

References:

(1)Westinghouse

Analysis, "ReportfortheBASTConcentration Reduction",.

August1985(2)UFSAR-Section3.8.1.2.2 (3)UFSARTable6.2-133.6-3Proposed AccetanceCriteriaa~b.TheleakagerateLtmshallbe<0.75LtatPt.Ptisdefinedasthecontainment vesselreducedtestpressurewhichisgreaterthanorequalto35psig.Ltmisdefinedasthetotalmeasuredcontainment leakagerateatpressurePt.Ltisdefinedasthemaximumallowable leakagerateatpressurePt.Lt'shallbedetermined asLe=La-whichequalsSC~/2Za1528percentweightperdayat35psig.Paisdefinedasthecalculated peakcontainment internalpressurerelatedtodesignbasisaccidents whichisgreaterthanorequalto60psig.Laisdefinedasthemaximumallowable leakagerateatPawhichequals.2percentweightperday.C~TheleakagerateatPa(Lam)shallbe<0.75La.Lamisdefinedasthetotalmeasuredcontainment leakagerateatpressurePa.TestFreuenca~Asetofthreeintegrated leakratetestsshallbeperformed atapproximately equalintervals duringeach10-yearserviceperiod.Thethirdtestofeachsetshallbeconducted inthefinalyearofthe10-yearserviceperiodoroneyearbeforeorafterthefinalyearofthe10-yearserviceperiodprovided:

theintervalbetweenanytwoTypeAtestsdoesnotexceedfouryears.i'.3.3.~following eachin-service inspection, thecontainment

airlocks, thesteamgenerator inspection/maintenance penetration, andtheequipment hatchareleaktestedpriortoreturning theplanttooperation, andanyrepair,replacement, ormodification ofacontainment barrierresulting fromtheinservice inspections shallbefollowedbytheappropriate leakagetest.4.4-4Proposed 0

c~shutdownanddepressurized untilrepairsareeffectedandthelocalleakagemeetstheacceptance criterion.

Ifitisdetermined thattheleakagethroughamini-purgesupplyandexhaustlineisgreaterthan0.05Laanengineering evaluation shallbeperformed andplansforcorrective actiondeveloped.

4.4.2.4TestFreuenca~Exceptasspecified inb.andc.below,individual penetrations andcontainment isolation valvesshallbetestedduringeachreactorshutdownforrefueling, orotherconvenient intervals, butinnocaseatintervals greaterthantwoyears.b.Thecontainment equipment hatch,fueltransfertube,steamgenerator inspection/maintenance penetration, andshutdownpurgesystemflangesshallbetestedateachrefueling shutdownoraftereachuse,ifthatbesooner.Amendment No.Z84.4-7Proposed c~Thecontainment airlocksshallbetestedatintervals ofnomorethansixmonthsbypressurizing thespacebetweentheairlockdoors.Inaddition, following openingoftheairlockdoor-during theinterval, atestshallbeperformed bypressurizing betweenthedualsealsofeachdooropened,within48hoursoftheopening,unlessthereactorwasinthecoldshutdowncondition atthetimeoftheopeningorhasbeensubsequently broughttothecoldshutdowncondition.

Atestshallalsobeperformed bypressurizing betweenthedualsealsofeachdoorwithin48hoursofleavingthecoldshutdowncondition, unlessthedoorshavenotbeenopensincethelasttestperformed eitherbypressurizing thespacebetweentheairlockdoorsorbypressurizing betweenthedualdoorseals.Amendment No.i84.4-8Proposed

thetendoncontaining 6brokenwires)shallbeinspected.

Theacceptedcriterion thenshallbenomorethan4brokenwiresinanyoftheadditional 4tendons.Ifthiscriterion isnotsatisfied, allofthetendonsshallbeinspected andifmorethan5%ofthetotalwiresarebroken,thereactorshallbeshut,downanddepressurized.

4.4.4.2Pre-Stress Confirmation Test'a~Lift-offtestsshallbeperformed onthe14tendonsidentified in4.4.4.1aabove,attheintervals specified in4.4.4.1b.

Iftheaveragestressinthe14tendonscheckedislessthan144,000psi(60%ofultimatestress),alltendonsshallbecheckedforstressandretensioned, ifnecessary, toastressof144,000psi.b.Beforereseating atendon,additional stress(6%)shallbeimposedtoverifytheabilityofthetendontosustaintheaddedstressappliedduringaccidentconditions.

4.4.54.4.5.1Containment Isolation ValvesEachcontainment isolation valveshallbedemonstrated tobeOPERABLEinaccordance withtheGinnaStationPumpandValveTestprogramsubmitted inaccordance with10CFR50.55a.4.4.64.4.6.1Containment Isolation ResonseEachcontainment isolation instrumentation channelshallbedemonstrated OPERABLEbytheperformance oftheCHANNELCHECK,CHANNELCALIBRATION, andCHANNELFUNCTIONAL TESToperations fortheMODESandatthefrequencies showninTable4.1-1.4.4.6.2Theresponsetimeofeachcontainment isolation valveshallbedemonstrated tobewithinitslimitat,leastonceper18months.Theresponsetimeincludesonlythevalvetraveltimeforthosevalveswhichthesafetyanalysisassumptions takecreditforachangeinvalvepositioninresponsetoacontainment isolation signal.Amendment No.Zf4.4-11Proposed

ATTACHMENT BThepurposeofthisamendment istoremoveTable3.6-1,"Containment Isolation Valves",fromtheR.E.GinnaTechnical Specifications.

Thereference toTable3.6-1inTechnical Specification sections3.6.3.1,4.4.5.1,and4.4.6.2willbedeleted.Areference toUFSARTable6.2-13willbeprovidedintheBasisforTechnical Specification 3.6.Inaddition, theinoperability definition andactionrequiredstatement forTechnical Specification 3.6.3.1willbeclarified.

Technical Specifications 4.4.1.5,sectiona(ii)and4.4.2.4,sectionb,willberevisedtoincludethemodifiedsteamgenerator inspection/maintenance penetration.

Technical Specification 4.4.1.5,sectiona(ii)willalsobeclarified.

Thetemporary notesassociated withthepurgesystemandmini-purge valves(Technical Specifications 3.6.5,4.4.2.4sectiona,and4.4.2.4sectiond)willberemovedsincethevalveshavebeeninstalled.

Also,theacceptance criteriaforcontainment leakagecriteriainTechnical Specification 4.4.1.4willbeclarified.

The1988Inservice Test(IST)ProgramprovidedacompletereviewoftheGinnaContainment, Isolation Valvesandtheirtestingrequirements.

Theinformation obtainedduringthisreviewwassubmitted totheNRCtodefinetheISTrequirements forthethirdten-yearintervalatGinna.Thissubmittal wassubsequently approvedbytheNRC.Asaresultofthissubmittal andapproval, numerousclarifications wererequiredofTechnical Specification Table3.6-1andUFSARTable6.2-13.However,thisamendment willremoveTechnical Specification Table3.6-1.Thenecessary changestoUFSARTable6.2-13havebeencompleted.

Attachment Ccontainsthesafetyevaluation relatedtothesechangesforyourinformation.

TheremovalofTable3.6-1fromtheTechnical Specifications andtheincorporation oftherequiredinformation intoGinnaUFSARTable6.2-13willkeepthelistingoftheContainment Isolation Valveswithinalicenseecontrolled document.

Changestothisdocumentcanonlybeperformed underthecriteriaof10CFR50.59 toensurethatnounreviewed safetyquestions arerelatedtothechange.Anyadditional changestoUFSARTable6.2-13willbesubmitted aspartoftheannualUFSARupdate.Inaddition, areportsummaryofthechangestotheGinnaUFSARarefurnished totheNRConanannualbasis.Areference toGinnaUFSARTable6.2-13isnowprovidedintheBasisforTechnical Specification 3.6consistent withStandardTechnical Specifications.

Theadditionofthesteamgenerator inspection/maintenance penetration toboththeUFSARTableandthenecessary Technical Specification surveillance requirements istheresultofamodification toenhancecontainment closureduringmid-loopoperation (GenericLetter88-17).Nonewcontainment isolation valveswereaddedasaresultofthismodification.

Theadditionofthispenetration totheUFSARTableandTechnical Specifications 4.4.1.5,sectiona(ii)and4.4.2.4,sectionb,causesthenewpenetration tobetreatedconsistent withrespecttothePersonnel andEquipment Hatches,andthefueltransfertube(seeletterfromR.C.Mecredy,RGGE,toA.R.Johnson,NRC,datedMarch13,1990).

ThefirstlineofTechnical Specification 4.4.1.5,sectiona(ii)willalsobemodifiedtostate"following eachin-service inspection..."

Thehyphenation of"in-service" istocorrectatypographical erroronly.Thereplacement of"one"with"each"providesgreaterunderstanding ofthetestfrequency requirements.

Thesechangesareaminorclarification onlyanddonotinvolveatechnical change.Thechangesrelatedtotheinoperability definition forcontainment isolation valvesinTechnical Specification 3.6.3.1donotinvolveanytechnical changes.Instead,theseclarifications willprovideconsistency with10CFR50AppendixJrequirements.

ChangeswithrespecttotherequiredactionsofTechnical Specification 3.6.3.1allowconsistency withStandardTechnical Specifications.

However,"isolation boundary" wasusedinplaceof"isolation valve"sincenotallpenetrations havetwocontainment isolation valvesinplace.Forexample,penetrations underthespecifications forGeneralDesignCriteria57onlyrequireasingleisolation valve;thepipingprovidesanadditional boundary.

Theuseof"isolation boundary" isaalsoconsistent withthecolumnheadingsofthecurrentContainment.

Isolation ValveTable3.6-1.Information onwhat,qualifies asan"isolation boundary" isprovidedintheBasisforTechnical Specification 3.6.Thesecriteriaareconsistent withthenecessary GeneralDesignCriteriaorexemption asappropriate.

Thechangeswithrespecttocontainment leakagecriteriainTechnical Specification 4.4.1.4areclarifications only.Alltermscontained inthedefinition forLtwillbespecified intheTechnical Specifications consistent.

with10CFR50AppendixJ.Thetemporary notesassociated withthepurgeandmini-purge valvesinTechnical Specifications 3.6.5,4.4.2.4sectiona,and4.4.2.4sectiondwillberemovedsincethesevalveshavebeeninstalled.

Thisisnotatechnical changesincethenoteswereonlyintendedtobeapplicable untilthecompletion ofthenecessary modifications.

Inaccordance with10CFR50.91, thesechangestotheTechnical Specifications havebeenevaluated todetermine iftheoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment would:involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; or2.createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident, previously evaluated; or3.involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Theseproposedchangesdonotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously evaluated accidentorcreateanewordifferent typeofaccident.

Furthermore, thereisnoreduction inthemarginofsafetyforanyparticular Technical Specification.

Thedetailedchangesaredescribed inTable1.

Therefore, Rochester GasandElectricsubmitsthattheissuesassociated withthisAmendment requestareoutsidethecriteriaoflOCFR50.91; andanosignificant hazardsfindingiswarranted.

Attachment C(UFSARChangesSafetyEvaluation)