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{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY ANALYSIS DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE DG5079 CYBERSECURITY EVENT NOTIFICATIONS (Proposed Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 5.83)
{{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY ANALYSIS
: 1.       Statement of the Problem In 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) promulgated Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 73.77, Cyber security event notifications, and published its associated guidance, Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.83, Cyber Security Event Notifications. The final rule established requirements regarding the types of cyberattacks that require notification to the NRC, different timeframes for making notifications, how licensees make notifications, and how licensees submit written security follow-up reports to the NRC.
 
The current version of RG 5.83 does not reflect the lessons learned from operating experience and interim cybersecurity milestone inspections, or recent insights gained from international and domestic cybersecurity attacks and new technologies. In addition, the NRC recently published Revision 1 of RG 5.71, Cybersecurity Programs for Nuclear Power Reactors, which includes changes to the definitions in the glossary that are also used in RG 5.83. Finally, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has requested endorsement of NEI 15-09, Cybersecurity Event Notifications, Revision 1 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML22298A228) as an acceptable method to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.77.
DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE DG5079 CYBERSECURITY EVENT NOTIFICATIONS (Proposed Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 5.83)
: 2.       Objective This revision of the guide would update RG 5.83 to include lessons learned from operating experience since the original publication of the guide. Specifically, this revision would incorporate editorial changes to align the guide with the current revision of NUREG-1379, Revision 3, NRC Editorial Style Guide; approve NEI 15-09, Revision 1 for use as an acceptable method to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.77; add discussion regarding eight-hour notifications for incidents involving devices residing on the same network as a critical digital asset (CDA) or devices that support CDAs; add examples of malicious activity observed on a boundary device protecting a network containing CDAs; and revise the glossary to align with definitions in RG 5.71, Revision 1.
: 1. Statement of the Problem
: 3.       Alternative Approaches The NRC staff considered the following alternative approaches:
 
In 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) promulgat ed Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 73.77, Cyber security event notifications, and published its associated guidance, Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.83, Cyber Securit y Event Notifications. The final rule established requirements regarding the types of cybe rattacks that require notification to the NRC, different timeframes for making notifi cations, how licensees make notifications, and how licensees submit written security follow -up reports to the NRC.
 
The current version of RG 5.83 does not reflect the lessons lea rned from operating experience and interim cybersecurity milestone inspections, or recent insights gained from international and domestic cybersecurity attacks and new techno logies. In addition, the NRC recently published Revision 1 of RG 5.71, Cybersecurity Progra ms for Nuclear Power Reactors, which includes changes to the definitions in the glo ssary that are also used in RG 5.83. Finally, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has requested endorsement of NEI 15-09, Cybersecurity Event Notifications, Revision 1 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML22298A228) as an a cceptable method to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.77.
: 2. Objective
 
This revision of the guide would update RG 5.83 to include less ons learned from operating experience since the original publication of the guid e. Specifically, this revision would incorporate editorial changes to align the guide with the current revision of NUREG-1379, Revision 3, NRC Editorial Style Guide; approve NEI 15-0 9, Revision 1 for use as an acceptable method to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.77; add discussion regarding eight-hour notifications for incidents involving devices residi ng on the same network as a critical digital asset (CDA) or devices that support CDAs; add examples of malicious activity observed on a boundary device protecting a network containing C DAs; and revise the glossary to align with definitions in RG 5.71, Revision 1.
: 3. Alternative Approaches
 
The NRC staff considered the following alternative approaches:
: 1. Do not revise RG 5.83.
: 1. Do not revise RG 5.83.
: 2. Withdraw RG 5.83 without issuing a revised RG.
: 2. Withdraw RG 5.83 without issuing a revised RG.
: 3. Develop a revised RG 5.83 to address the current methods and procedures.
: 3. Develop a revised RG 5.83 to address the current methods and pr ocedures.
Alternative 1: Do not revise RG 5.83 Under this alternative, the NRC would not revise RG 5.83 or issue additional guidance, and the current guidance would be retained. This alternative is considered the no-Page 1
 
Alternative 1: Do not revise RG 5.83
 
Under this alternative, the NRC would not revise RG 5.83 or iss ue additional guidance, and the current guidance would be retained. This alte rnative is considered the no-
 
Page 1 action alternative and provides a baseline condition from whic h any other alternatives will be assessed. If NRC does not act, there would not be any changes i n costs or benefit to the public or the NRC. However, the no-action alternative would n ot address identified concerns with the current version of the RG.
 
Alternative 2: Withdraw RG 5.83 without issuing a revised RG
 
Under this alternative, the NRC would withdraw this RG and woul d not issue a revised RG. Withdrawal of the guide would eliminate the important infor mation already provided to commercial nuclear power plant licensees for complying with 10 CFR 73.77. It would also eliminate one of the only readily available descriptions of the methods the NRC staff considers acceptable for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 7 3.77. Licensees may, however, use methods other than those described in this guide t o meet NRC regulations, if appropriately justified. Although this alternative would not in volve significant resources, it would eliminate the publics accessibility to the most current NRC guidance available on cybersecurity event notification requirements.
 
Alternative 3: Develop a revised RG 5.83
 
Under this alternative, the NRC would develop and publish for comment DG-5079, a proposed revision of RG 5.83. This proposed revision would incorporate the latest information available to the NRC in the form of supporting guidance, practi ces, and lessons learned from operating experience developed since 2015. By revising RG 5.83, the NRC would ensure that the guidance related to cybersecurity event notifications is current, remains robust, and accurately reflects the staffs position.
 
The impact to the NRC would be the costs associated with preparing and issuing the revised RG. The impact to the public would be the voluntary cos ts associated with reviewing and providing comments to NRC during the public comment period. NRC staff, licensees, and other stakeholders would benefit from the enhanced clarity and effectiveness of using an updated guidance document as a technical basis for demonstratin g compliance with regulatory requirements for reporting cybersecurity events to t he NRC.
 
Conclusion
 
Based on this regulatory analysis, the NRC staff concludes that issuance of a revision of RG 5.83 is warranted. The staff concludes that the proposed action will enhance a licensees access to and understanding of the most current info rmation available regarding cybersecurity event notifications required by 10 CFR 73.77 sinc e the guides original issuance.


action alternative and provides a baseline condition from which any other alternatives will be assessed. If NRC does not act, there would not be any changes in costs or benefit to the public or the NRC. However, the no-action alternative would not address identified concerns with the current version of the RG.
Alternative 2: Withdraw RG 5.83 without issuing a revised RG Under this alternative, the NRC would withdraw this RG and would not issue a revised RG. Withdrawal of the guide would eliminate the important information already provided to commercial nuclear power plant licensees for complying with 10 CFR 73.77. It would also eliminate one of the only readily available descriptions of the methods the NRC staff considers acceptable for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 73.77. Licensees may, however, use methods other than those described in this guide to meet NRC regulations, if appropriately justified. Although this alternative would not involve significant resources, it would eliminate the publics accessibility to the most current NRC guidance available on cybersecurity event notification requirements.
Alternative 3: Develop a revised RG 5.83 Under this alternative, the NRC would develop and publish for comment DG-5079, a proposed revision of RG 5.83. This proposed revision would incorporate the latest information available to the NRC in the form of supporting guidance, practices, and lessons learned from operating experience developed since 2015. By revising RG 5.83, the NRC would ensure that the guidance related to cybersecurity event notifications is current, remains robust, and accurately reflects the staffs position.
The impact to the NRC would be the costs associated with preparing and issuing the revised RG. The impact to the public would be the voluntary costs associated with reviewing and providing comments to NRC during the public comment period. NRC staff, licensees, and other stakeholders would benefit from the enhanced clarity and effectiveness of using an updated guidance document as a technical basis for demonstrating compliance with regulatory requirements for reporting cybersecurity events to the NRC.
Conclusion Based on this regulatory analysis, the NRC staff concludes that issuance of a revision of RG 5.83 is warranted. The staff concludes that the proposed action will enhance a licensees access to and understanding of the most current information available regarding cybersecurity event notifications required by 10 CFR 73.77 since the guides original issuance.
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Latest revision as of 04:15, 16 November 2024

DG 5079 (RG 5.83 Rev 1) Regulatory Analysis
ML22250A472
Person / Time
Issue date: 04/17/2023
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
Gardocki, S
Shared Package
ML22250A439 List:
References
RG-5.083, Rev 1 DG-5079
Download: ML22250A472 (2)


Text

REGULATORY ANALYSIS

DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE DG5079 CYBERSECURITY EVENT NOTIFICATIONS (Proposed Revision 1 of Regulatory Guide 5.83)

1. Statement of the Problem

In 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) promulgat ed Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 73.77, Cyber security event notifications, and published its associated guidance, Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.83, Cyber Securit y Event Notifications. The final rule established requirements regarding the types of cybe rattacks that require notification to the NRC, different timeframes for making notifi cations, how licensees make notifications, and how licensees submit written security follow -up reports to the NRC.

The current version of RG 5.83 does not reflect the lessons lea rned from operating experience and interim cybersecurity milestone inspections, or recent insights gained from international and domestic cybersecurity attacks and new techno logies. In addition, the NRC recently published Revision 1 of RG 5.71, Cybersecurity Progra ms for Nuclear Power Reactors, which includes changes to the definitions in the glo ssary that are also used in RG 5.83. Finally, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) has requested endorsement of NEI 15-09, Cybersecurity Event Notifications, Revision 1 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Number ML22298A228) as an a cceptable method to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.77.

2. Objective

This revision of the guide would update RG 5.83 to include less ons learned from operating experience since the original publication of the guid e. Specifically, this revision would incorporate editorial changes to align the guide with the current revision of NUREG-1379, Revision 3, NRC Editorial Style Guide; approve NEI 15-0 9, Revision 1 for use as an acceptable method to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.77; add discussion regarding eight-hour notifications for incidents involving devices residi ng on the same network as a critical digital asset (CDA) or devices that support CDAs; add examples of malicious activity observed on a boundary device protecting a network containing C DAs; and revise the glossary to align with definitions in RG 5.71, Revision 1.

3. Alternative Approaches

The NRC staff considered the following alternative approaches:

1. Do not revise RG 5.83.
2. Withdraw RG 5.83 without issuing a revised RG.
3. Develop a revised RG 5.83 to address the current methods and pr ocedures.

Alternative 1: Do not revise RG 5.83

Under this alternative, the NRC would not revise RG 5.83 or iss ue additional guidance, and the current guidance would be retained. This alte rnative is considered the no-

Page 1 action alternative and provides a baseline condition from whic h any other alternatives will be assessed. If NRC does not act, there would not be any changes i n costs or benefit to the public or the NRC. However, the no-action alternative would n ot address identified concerns with the current version of the RG.

Alternative 2: Withdraw RG 5.83 without issuing a revised RG

Under this alternative, the NRC would withdraw this RG and woul d not issue a revised RG. Withdrawal of the guide would eliminate the important infor mation already provided to commercial nuclear power plant licensees for complying with 10 CFR 73.77. It would also eliminate one of the only readily available descriptions of the methods the NRC staff considers acceptable for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 7 3.77. Licensees may, however, use methods other than those described in this guide t o meet NRC regulations, if appropriately justified. Although this alternative would not in volve significant resources, it would eliminate the publics accessibility to the most current NRC guidance available on cybersecurity event notification requirements.

Alternative 3: Develop a revised RG 5.83

Under this alternative, the NRC would develop and publish for comment DG-5079, a proposed revision of RG 5.83. This proposed revision would incorporate the latest information available to the NRC in the form of supporting guidance, practi ces, and lessons learned from operating experience developed since 2015. By revising RG 5.83, the NRC would ensure that the guidance related to cybersecurity event notifications is current, remains robust, and accurately reflects the staffs position.

The impact to the NRC would be the costs associated with preparing and issuing the revised RG. The impact to the public would be the voluntary cos ts associated with reviewing and providing comments to NRC during the public comment period. NRC staff, licensees, and other stakeholders would benefit from the enhanced clarity and effectiveness of using an updated guidance document as a technical basis for demonstratin g compliance with regulatory requirements for reporting cybersecurity events to t he NRC.

Conclusion

Based on this regulatory analysis, the NRC staff concludes that issuance of a revision of RG 5.83 is warranted. The staff concludes that the proposed action will enhance a licensees access to and understanding of the most current info rmation available regarding cybersecurity event notifications required by 10 CFR 73.77 sinc e the guides original issuance.

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