ML20195A174
| ML20195A174 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/17/2020 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research |
| To: | |
| M. Bayssie; G. Purdy | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20195A173 | List: |
| References | |
| RG-5.046, Rev. 1 DG-5041 | |
| Download: ML20195A174 (3) | |
Text
Page 1 REGULATORY ANALYSIS DRAFT REGULATORY GUIDE (DG)-5041, PHYSICAL PROTECTION PROGRAMS AT NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS (SGI)
(Proposed Revision of Regulatory Guide 5.76, dated July 2009)
- 1.
Statement of the Problem The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is considering revising Regulatory Guide 5.76, Physical Protection Programs at Nuclear Power Reactors (SGI), to provide licensees guidance on the implementation of a Reasonable Assurance of Protection Time (RAPT), as proposed in SECY-20-0070, Technical Evaluation Of The Security Bounding Time Concept For Operating Nuclear Power Plants. The RAPT concept recognizes the existing layers of protection available to sites along with how the safety and security of the site would evolve over time following initiation of an attack. This guide contains information specific for both operating power reactors and new reactors licensed under 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52.
The NRC initially published Regulatory Guide 5.76 in July 2009 to provide licensees and applicants with agency-approved guidance for complying with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials (10 CFR 73.55)).
The RAPT reflects the staffs determination that a licensees current physical protection program meets the general performance objective of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(1) to provide reasonable assurance that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety when that program is capable of independently defending against the design basis threat (DBT) for a timeframe of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. After the RAPT, there is a reduced risk profile and licensees can reasonably expect to have additional resources available, such as law enforcement and/or recalled off-duty personnel, to provide support for the licensee to continue to defend against the DBT. Although a licensee remains bound by regulation to continue to protect its site following the RAPT, the staff recognizes that its response to an attack will likely be augmented with these additional resources. The RAPT will enable licensees to refine their protective strategies in a risk-informed manner.
- 2.
Objective The objective of this regulatory action is to update NRC guidance and provide applicants with a method to demonstrate compliance with 10 CFR 73.55, Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage.
The NRC is conducting a limited revision of RG 5.76 to assist licensees that volunteer to implement the RAPT. The RAPT allows licensees to refine protective strategies to focus on the most risk-significant target sets (i.e., those target always sets with a time to core damage (TTCD) of eight hours or less) while continuing to maintain physical protection of the site. The RAPT is a holistic framework where the many existing layers of defense work together to manage risk and provide reasonable assurance that the licensee can always maintain physical protection of the site to prevent radiological sabotage (e.g., significant core damage or spent fuel sabotage).
Page 2 After the Commission provides staff with a decision on the revised RG 5.69, Guidance for the Application of Radiological Sabotage Design-Basis Threat in the Design, Development and Implementation of a Physical Security Program that Meets 10 CFR 73.55 Requirements, and site-specific security bounding time (SECY-20-0070), staff will conduct a comprehensive revision of RG 5.76 to update the guidance with revised policy decisions, and incorporate resolutions from the Security Frequently Asked Questions process. Additionally, with Commission approval, staff will include guidance on the site-specific security bounding time, which will provide guidance to licensees that wish to further refine their protective strategies by increasing law enforcement coordination, enhancing use of FLEX equipment, or by implementing robust recall programs for licensee personnel.
- 3.
Alternative Approaches The NRC staff considered the following alternative approaches:
- 1. Do not revise Regulatory Guide 5.76
- 2. Withdraw Regulatory Guide 5.76
- 3. Revise Regulatory Guide 5.76 to address the current methods and procedures.
Alternative 1: Do Not Revise Regulatory Guide 5.76 Under this alternative, the NRC would not revise guidance and the current guidance would be retained. If NRC does not take action, there would not be any changes in costs or benefit to the public, licensees or NRC. This alternative is considered the no-action alternative and provides a baseline condition from which any other alternatives will be assessed. However, the no-action alternative would not address identified concerns with the current version of the regulatory guide. Without the revised guidance, there would be inconsistent implementation of the RAPT concept by licensees or licensees may decide not to implement the RAPT due to the lack of NRC guidance.
Alternative 2: Withdraw Regulatory Guide 5.76 Under this alternative the NRC would withdraw this regulatory guide. This would eliminate the only readily available description of the methods the NRC staff considers acceptable for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 73. Although this alternative would be less costly than the proposed alternative, it would impede a licensees ability to develop a physical protection program a nuclear power plants that meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55.
Alternative 3: Revise Regulatory Guide 5.76 Under this alternative, the NRC would revise Regulatory Guide 5.76. This revision would incorporate the latest information to allow licensees to implement the RAPT. The RAPT allows licensees to refine protective strategies to focus on the most risk-significant target sets (i.e.,
those target sets with a TTCD of eight hours or less) while continuing to maintain physical protection of the site by supporting guidance, and review practices. By doing so, the NRC would
Page 3 ensure that the RG guidance available in this area is current, and accurately reflects the staffs position.
The impact to the NRC would be the costs associated with preparing and issuing the regulatory guide revision. The impact to stakeholders would be the voluntary costs associated with reviewing and providing comments to NRC during the public comment period. The value to NRC staff and its applicants would be the benefits associated with enhanced efficiency and effectiveness in using a common guidance document as the technical basis for license applications and other interactions between the NRC and its regulated entities.
Conclusion Based on this regulatory analysis, the NRC staff concludes that revision of Regulatory Guide 5.76 is warranted. The action will provide guidance to enable licensees to refine their protective strategies in a risk-informed manner. Industry stakeholders have expressed that the RAPT concept adds a greater level of regulatory clarity because it provides a consistent framework for target set development. While implementation of the RAPT might require some revisions to site documentation, it does not require any additional commitments beyond the current regulatory framework. The RAPT allows licensees focus on protecting the more risk-significant equipment, while maintaining a physical protection program meets the general performance objective of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(1) to provide high assurance0F1 that activities involving special nuclear material are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
1 In SRM-SECY-16-0073, the Commission stated that the concept of high assurance of adequate protection found in our security regulations is equivalent to reasonable assurance when it comes to determining what level of regulation is appropriate (ADAMS Accession No. ML16279A345).