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{{Adams
#REDIRECT [[IR 05000338/1998001]]
| number = ML20216H671
| issue date = 04/03/1998
| title = Insp Repts 50-338/98-01,50-338/98-01 & 72-0016/98-01 on 980125-0307.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Operations,Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support
| author name =
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =
| addressee affiliation =
| docket = 05000338, 05000339, 07200016
| license number =
| contact person =
| document report number = 50-338-98-01, 50-338-98-1, 50-339-98-01, 50-339-98-1, 72-0016-98-01, 72-16-98-1, NUDOCS 9804210211
| package number = ML20216H649
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 25
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000338/1998001]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:.    .
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                          U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                          REGION II
      Docket Nos:    50-338. 50-339. 72-16
      License Nos:    NPF-4. NPF-7
      Report Nos:    50-338/98-01. 50-339/98-01, and 72-16/98-01
      Licensee:      Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
      Facility:      North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2
      Location:      1022 Haley Drive
                      Mineral. Virginia 23117                                    ,
      Dates:          January 25 through March 7. 1998
                                                                                  !
      Inspectors:    M. Morgan. Senior Resident Inspector
                      R. Gibbs. Resident Inspector
                      P. Fillion. Reactor Inspector (Sections E2.1 and E8.1)
                      L. Garner. Senior Project Engineer (Section 08.4)
                      W. Stansberry. Security Specialist (Sections S2.2. S2.9.
                        S3.2. S4.1. S5.2. 56.3 and S7.3)                          J
                                                                                  j
                                                                                    1
      Approved by:    R. Haag. Chief. Reactor Projects Branch 5
                        Division of Reactor Projects
                                                                                    l
                                                                                  ;
                                                                                    l
                                                                                    I
                                                                        ENCLOSURE
    9804210211 980403        E
    PDR  ADOCK 05000338      !
    G              PDR      ;
 
                            - - _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _    . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _
.    -
                                                        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
                          North Anna Power Station. Units 1 & 2
      NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-338/98-01. 50-339/98-01, and 72-16/98-01
  This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations,
  engineering, maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six-week
  period of resident ins)ection. In addition, it includes the results of
  announced inspections ]y regional inspectors.
  Doerations
  *      Receipt. inspection, and storage of new fuel was acceptable. Issues                      l
          regardirig personnel safety practices and procedure usage were noted and
          corrected (Section 01.2).
  *      Response to increased Lake Anna level met Technical Specification
          requirements and operation of the Lake Anna spillway was proper
          (Section 01.3).
  *      The decision to remain at a reduced power level while the B condensate
          pump was repaired was prudent (Section 01.4).
  .
          Six non-emergency NRC notifications were accurate. timely, and proper
          (Section 01.5).
  .    Tag out of the Unit 1 charging pump was adequately performed. A
        disabled annunciator was not added to the disabled annunciator list
          (Section 02.1).
  *      Proper actions were taken to meet Technical Specification requirements
        when a Unit 1 service water pump was removed from service. Operator
        knowledge of the limiting condition for operation and required service
        water system pressures was good (Section 04.1).
  Maintenance
  .
        Communications self-checking practices, and procedure adherence during
        the Unit 1 train 8 solid state protection system test were good (Section
        M1.1).
  .      The operability test for the steam generator power operated relief
        valves was properly performed. Technical Specifications and other
        techriical requirements were satisfied (Section M1.2).
  *      Overall maintenance activities on the Unit 1 charging pump were good.
        Improved work practices associated with charging pump seal repair were
        noted (Section M1.3).
  .    The Maintenance Rule program effectively monitored charging pump
        performance criteria (Section M1.3).
 
  .
      -
                                              2
    Enaineerina
    .    Weather-related problems were not prevalent during this inspection
          period for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
          construction. The observed ISFSI activities were adequately performed
          (Section E1.1).
    .    A review of open engineering work items indicated that the licensee was
          timely in resolving safety significant issues (Section E2.1).
    Plant Sucoort
    .    Survey maps used to inform workers of radiological conditions were
          accurate and were )osted properly. Several other effective practices
          used to inform worcers of radiological conditions were noted (Section
          R1.1).
    .    Posting and control of high radiation areas was appropriate (Section
          R1.1).
    .    The licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment were in
          compliance with the criteria in Chapters 1-6. 8. and 9 of the Physical
          Security Plan and appropriate Security Contingency Plan Implementing
          Procedures and Security Plan Implementing Procedures (Section S2.2).
    .    Chapter 8 of the Physical Security Plan described an adequate security
          protection plan for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
          Construction implementation was appropriate (Section S2.9).
    .    A random sam)le of Security Plan Implementing Procedures and Security  i
          Contingency )lan Implementing Procedures adequately met the Physical    l
          Security Plan commitments and practices (Section S3.2).
                                                                                  1
    .    Security personnel possessed appropriate knowledge to carry out their  l
          assigned duties and responsibilities, including response, use of deadly 4
          force and armed response tactics (Section S4.1).
    .    The security force was being trained in an excellent manner and in
          accordance with the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory
          requirements (Section $5.2).
    .    The total number of trained security officers and armed personnel
          immediately available to fulfill response requirements met Physical
          Security Plan requirements (Section S6.3).
    .    The documented problem analyses for five security-related deviation
          reports were adequate (Section S7.3).
,
 
  .
          .
                                          Reoort Details
l
l      Summary of Plant Status
        Unit 1 began the inspection period at 100-percent reactor power. Power was
        reduced to 88 percent on February 12 when the B high pressure heater drain
        ) ump and the B condensate pump experienced motor bearing failures and had to
        )e secured. 'On February 16, power was increased to 92 percent after the
        B heater drain pump was repaired and placed in service. On February 21. the
        B condensate pump was. repaired, placed in service, and power was increased to
        100 percent. Power remained at or near 100 percent for the remainder of the
        inspection period.
        Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.    Unit
        coastdown for the April 1998 refueling outage began on March 1.
                                            I, Operations
        01    Conduct of Operations
        01.1 Daily Plant Status Reviews (71707. 40500)
              The inspectors conducted frequent control room tours to verify proper
              -staffing, operator attentiveness, and adherence to approved procedures.
              The inspectors attended daily plant status meetings to maintain
              awareness of overall facility operations and reviewed operator logs to
              verify operational safety, and compliance with Technical Specifications
              (TSs). Instrumentation and safety system lineups were periodically
              reviewed from control room indications to assess operability. Frequent
                                                                                        )
                                                                                        '
              )lant tours were. conducted to observe equipment status and housekeeping.
              Jeviation Reports (DRs) were reviewed to assure that potential safety    )
              concerns were properly reported and resolved. The inspectors found that-
              daily operations were conducted in accordance with regulatory
              requirements and plant procedures.
    '
        01~2 Receint. Insoection. and Storace of New Fuel
            .
          a.  Insoection Scone (71707. 60705)
              On February 3 and February 5, the inspectors observed receipt,
              inspection and temporary storage of new fuel designated for the April
              1998 Unit 2 refueling outage.
          b.  Observations and Findinos
              Operations personnel conducted the new fuel receipt activities
              in accordance with 0-0P-4.2, " Receipt and Storage of New Fuel,"
              Revision 12. Fuel received was in good condition and the shipping
              containers did not show indications of damage or improper handling.
              Appropriate rigging and handling of the containers and proper movement
              of the fuel from its horizontal storage position.to a vertical            .
              inspection position was observed. . Appropriate use and control of the    I
              new fuel handling tool and crane / hoist was also observed. The operators  l
      1
                                                                                          i
 
  .
      .
                                              2
          and Health Physics (HP) technicians who inspected the fuel were
          knowledgeable. Communications between the new fuel handling coordinator
          and other members of the fuel handling team were good. Use of
          industrial safety and HP equipment (i.e. use of cotton gloves, safety
          glasses, and hearing protection) was adequate. After inspection of the
          fuel by the coordinator and a corporate refueling engineer, the fuel was
          properly stored in the new fuel storage sites.
          The following deficiencies were observed by the inspectors. immediately
          reported to operations, and promptly addressed by management:
          *      Movement of the refueling crane / bridge required about six feet of
                movement over a stairwell which runs between the fuel container
                  receipt and new fuel storage area. This stairway area was not
                appropriately roped-off or designated as an " Caution Area" during
                bridge movement. Ropes and caution signs were subsequently placed
                  in these areas shortly after the February 5 inspection.
          *      Hard hats were not routinely worn by the bridge crane o)erators
                and the new fuel handling coordinator because the hats lampered
                wearing of communications equipment. Clarification of hard hat
                  use in the new fuel handling areas was addressed by management.
                During a subsequent inspection. the inspectors noted that
                personnel were following the guidance for use of hard hats in the
                area.
          *      A checkoff sheet, which was used as a place-keeping tool by the
                new fuel handling coordinator. was not appropriately used.
                  Procedure steps were initialed, however. several steps were not
                checked-off on the checkoff sheet upon completion. This oversight
                did not negatively affect fuel handling and inspection activities.
                The coordinator immediately corrected the oversight and no further
                problems were noted.
    c.    Conclusions
          Receipt. inspection and storage of new fuel was acceptable. Issues
          regarding personnel safety practices and procedure usage were noted and
          corrected.
    01.3 Doeration of the Lake Anna Soillway (71707)
          On February 5. the inspectors toured the Lake Anna Spillway area. Due
          to heavy rains. lake level increased and exceeded the local area
          resident notification level of 250.9 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL) and TS
          4.7.6.1.B surveillance requirement level of a 251 feet MSL. Entry into
I        TS 4.7.6.1.8 required the licensee to measure lake level every two
          hours. The inspectors verified the TS requirement was met. Because
          call-outs were made to local area residents and local highway department
          officials, both the NRC Operations Center and the resident inspectors
          were notified. During the tour, the inspectors noted that the spillway    l
          dam gates were opened to urgency level control positions of three feet
 
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              .
                  .
      :
                                                          3
l                      on two of the three available spillway dam gates. Hydraulically-powered
!                      generators located at the base of the dam were secured in accordance        -
L                      with spillway operating procedures. While touring the area, the
                        inspectors examined spillway diesel conditions following February 3
                      troubleshooting and repair activities (Reference Section 01.5). The
                        inspectors noted.that the spillway diesel was in good condition. The      -I
                      -inspectors also noted that overall spillway operation was appropriate
,
                      and in accordance with the operating procedure. Response to_ increased
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                      Lake Anna level met TS requirements and operation of the Lake Anna
                      spillway was proper.
L              01'.4 Unit 1 Power Reduction Review
i
l                  a.  InsDeetion scooe (71707)
                      The inspectors reviewed an operational transient caused by lower motor
l                      bearing failures'of a high pressure heater drain pump and a condensate
l-                    pump. The inspectors also discussed with operations management the
!
                      decision to remain at a reduced power level while the condensate pump
;                    'was'out of service for repair,
                                -
f
i                ;b.  Observations and Findinas
L
L                      On February 12 while the plant was operating at 100 percent power.'the
L                      B high pressure heater drain pump lower motor bearing. failed, requiring      l
L                      the pump to be secured. In order to compensate for the decrease in
                      suction pressure to the main feedwater pumps, the B condensate-pump,
'
                      which was in standby, was manually started. Shortly afterwards, its
L                      lower motor bearing also failed resulting in its shutdown by operator's.'
                      Reactor power was quickly reduced to.88 percent in accordance with
                      abnormal procedures. -DRs N-98-370 and N-98-371 were initiated for the
        - '..
L                      bearing failures to determine the causes_'and evaluate appropriate-
l                      corrective actions. The B high pressure heater drain pump was repaired    -I
                      and power-was increased to 92 percent on February 16. On February 21.
l                      repairs were completed for the B. condensate pump and power was returned
L                      to 100 percent. The actions taken by the licensee in response to these
                      equipment failures were appropriate.
r                      The inspectors discussed with the Operations Superintendent why power
%                      was limited to 92 percent during the time period the standby condensate
                      pump was out of service for repair. Power could have been increased to
                      nearly 100 percent once the heater drain pump was returned to service.
  .."
                      The superintendent indicated that the decision to remain at 92 percent
                      -power _was prudent. He stated that the loss of another high or low
  t''                pressure heater drain pump or failure of a high level divert valve could
                      possibly cause a steam generator level transient and challenge plant          1
                      operation. The decision was, in Jart, based on simulator observations
                      and.' reduced output of one of the ligh pressure heater drain pumps that
                      had been observed since the May 1997 refueling outage. The inspectors
                      had noted previously in Inspection Report Nos. 50-338, 339/97011.
                      Section 01.2, that there had been increased attention by operators
                        regarding operation of the secondary plant. Specifically, maintaining
 
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        -
    .
                                                4
!            adequate feedwater header pressure had been an operator concern since
            the Moisture Separator Reheaters (MSRs) had been replaced during the May
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            1997 refueling outage.
i
          c. Conclusions
            The decision to remain at a reduced power level while the Unit 1 B
            condensate pump was repaired was prudent. Increased operator attention
            of secondary plant operations continued as a result of the moisture
            separator reheater replacement project completed during the May 1997
            refueling outage.
      01.5 NRC Notifications
          a. Insoection Scooe (71707)
            The inspectors reviewed the following NRC notifications to determine if
            the reports were accurate, timely, and proper for the events.
          b. Observations and Findinas
                                                                                      ]
            On January 28. February 4. and February 17, 4-hour non-emergency
            notifications were made because the licensee contacted local county
            highway departments and local downstream residents concerning rising
            Lake Anna water level. Plant procedures required local notifications
            when lake level reached 250.9 feet MSL. Heavy rains had caused the lake
            level to increase. Because local officials were contacted. 10 CFR
            50.72(b)(2)(vi) required the licensee to notify the NRC. DRs N-98-212.
            N-98-290, and N-98-407 were initiated. Reporting actions were
            appropriate.
            On January 29. a 1-hour non-emergency notification was made to the NRC
            because the Emergency Response Facility Computer System (ERFCS) failed
            and could not be restored within one hour. The system was subsequently
            repaired and returned to service several hours later. 10 CFR
            50.72(b)(1)(v) required the ERFCS failure to be reported within one hour
            to the NRC.    DR N-98-218 was initiated to determine the-cause and
            address appropriate corrective actions. Reporting actions were
            appropriate.
                                                                                      >
            On February 3. the Lake Anna spillway emergency diesel generator failed
  c          to start during its operability test. A fuse holder for a control
            circuit fuse had lost its spring tension causing the fuse to become
  '
            loose.    The fuse holder was repaired and the diesel was returned to
            service later that day.    Plant procedures required notification to the
            Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Because an offsite agency was
            contacted.10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(vi) required a 4-hour non-emergency
(            notification to the NRC. DR N-98-263 was initiated to determine the
'
            cause and address appropriate corrective actions. Reporting actions
l            were appropriate.
                                                          -
 
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    -    *
l                      ,
  $.
                                                  5
                On February 17. a 1-hour non-emergency notification was made because
                both data links to the local emergency off-site facility and the central
                emergency offsite facility were lost and not restored within 1-hour.
                The system was repaired and. returned to service the following day.
                10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(v) required the communication capability loss to.be
                reported within one hour to the NRC. Reporting actions were
g              appropriate
            c  Conclusions
l              Six non-emergency NRC notifications were accurate, timely, and proper.
      '02      Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
!      02.1 Unit 1 Charcina Pumo 1-CH-P-1 A'Taa Out Review
l          a.  Insoection Scooe (71707)
,              The inspectors reviewed tagging activities associated with charging pump
l                1-CH-P-1A. The pump was removed from service for routine preventive
l              maintenance and seal leak repair.
          b.. Observations and Findinas
                On February 23. the inspectors verified that the tag out of 1-CH-P-1A
L              was properly performed:. tagging record 1-98-CH-0007 was referenced. All
                tags were in place and all equipment was in the recuired positions. The
                tagging record had.been properly signed off, inclucing independent
i              verification, and properly authorized by licensed operators. The
                ins)ectors evaluated the tagging record to ensure it was proper for the
                wort and no problems were found.
,              During the review, the inspectors found that one of the tagged items
L              disabled a low lube oil temperature annunciator. The disabled
l              annunciator was not. on the disabled annunciator list. The inspectors
L              discussed this observation with the Operations Superintendent who stated:
                that the individuals involved with the tag nut had attempted to add the.
L              annunciator to the list. The individuals however, had not properly
b              . saved the changes to the computerized list. The licensee initiated DR
                N-98-466 to determine why the annunciator was not properly added to
                list.
        c;      Conclusions
                Tag out of the Unit 1 charging pump'was adequately performed. A
                disabled annunciator was not added to the disabled annunciator list.      !
                                                                                          !
                                                                                          !
 
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                                            6
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  04    Operator Knowledge and Performance
1
  04.1 Service Water (SW) System Throttlina Alianment Review (71707)
.
!
        On January 30. the inspectors performed a review of the SW system
        configuration and the required system pressure to ensure TS and
        procedural requirements were met. Operators were also interviewed to
        determine their awareness of the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
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        and system operating limits. Because a Unit 1 SW pump had been removed
        from service. TS action 3.7.4.2.a was in effect. This action required
        throttling of component cooling water heat exchanger SW flows within 72
        hours after the SW pump became inoperable. The licensee properly
        adhered to this requirement. The operating procedure required the pump
        discharge pressure to be maintained between 54 and 70 psig. The
        inspectors verified SW system pressure was within this pressure range.
        0)erators displayed a good knowledge of the system pressure limits and
        t1e LCO action statement requirements. Proper actions were taken to          i
        meet TS requirements when a Unit 1 service water pump was removed from        '
        service. Operator knowledge of the LCO and required SW system pressures      ,
        was good.                                                                  '
  08    Miscellaneous Operations Issues (92901, 92700, 92903)
  08.1  (Closed) URI 50-338. 339/97002-01: review compliance with TS 6.5.1.6
        requirement for SNSOC review of programs. On March 6. 1997, the
        licensee identified that no process existed to ensure that TS 6.5.1.6.a
        would be satisfied for changes to the Primary Coolant Sources Outside
        Containment program.    Specifically. TS 6.5.1.6.a requires, in part, that
        the Station Nuclear Safety And Operating Committee (SNSOC) shall be
        responsible for review of all programs required by TS 6.8.4 and changes
        thereto. The above program is listed in TS 6.8.4. The licensee had
        initiated DR N-97-577 to determine the root cause and address
        appropriate corrective actions.
        The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for DR N-97-577 and found
        that the program procedure was revised to ensure that subsequent changes
        would require SNSOC approval. Past procedure revisions to the program
        procedure were reviewed by the inspectors and no changes had been made
        without SNSOC approval. Other plant programs listed in TS 6.8.4 were
        also reviewed to determine if a process existed which required SNSOC
        approval before changes were made to the programs. These other programs
        had required SNSOC approval and changes to the programs had received
        SNSOC approval.
l
  08.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Reoort_.(LER) 50-338/97006:    entered TS 3.0.3 due
        to inoperable control rod indicators.    On July 31, 1997, with Unit 1 at
        100 percent power. TS 3.0.3 was entered because two Individual Rod
        Position Indicators (IRPI) in the same group were ino)erable.
        Saecifically, the IRPI for control rod M4 was inoperaale due to testing
        w1en the IRPI for control rod M12 failed. This condition was outside
        the requirements of TS 3.1.3.2.a. The IRPI for control rod M4 was
        immediately returned to operable status and TS 3.0.3 was exited. The
!
 
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  .
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l                                            7
          IRPI for control rod M12 was repaired shortly afterwards.    Because TS
          3.0.3 was entered. an LEP,was required in accordance with 10 CFR
          50.73(a)(2)(i). The licensee initiated DRs N-97-2210 and N-97-2294 to
          determine the root cause and address appropriate corrective actions.
          The inspectors reviewed operating logs, responses to the DRs. and
          discussed the event with several personnel including a licensing
          engineer. the system engineer, and the Instrument and Control (I&C)
          supervisor. The inspectors determined that the LER accurately reflected
          the event and was timely. The cause and corrective actions were also
          reviewed. Engineering and the maintenance departments concluded that
          the cause of the event was aging of the operational amplifier. Part of
          the corrective actions included immediate replacement of the failed
          ampli fier.
          The inspectors discussed with the system engineer and the I&C supervisor
          if consideration had been given to replacing amplifiers that had reached
          a certain service life. They stated that because the amplifiers had
          been very reliable since their original installation and since the IRPI
          system was being monitored in accordance with the licensee's Maintenance
          Rule program, it was decided to address individual failures as they
          occurred. The engineer and supervisor also stated that if more failures
          occurred in the future causing performance criteria to be exceeded,
          consideration would be given to more aggressively evaluate amplifier
          replacements.
          The licensee properly responded to the event and issued an appropriate
          LER.  The cause of the event was understood and appropriate corrective
          actions were taken.
    08.3 (Closed) VIO 50-338. 339/97002-03: failure to assure that control room
          chart recorders were marked. On March 28, 1997, during a control board
          walkdown, the inspectors identified that operators had not correctly
          verified proper o)eration of the Units 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant Pumps'
          Number 1 Seal Leacoffs and the Unit 2 Nuclear Power Range chart
          recorders. The control room operator turnover checklist and logs and
          operating records procedures required the operators to verify recorder
          operation.                                                              I
          The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to the violation dated
          May 23. 1997. The response addressed the reason for the violation and
          discussed corrective steps that were taken and the results achieved.
l        The root cause of the violation was improper emphasis on verification of
l        proper chart recorder inking. The operators had relied upon redundant
          indications. Corrective actions included:
,
                                                                                  i
'
          .      initiation of a DR                                                I
          e      adjustment of the recorder pens * upscale travel and subsequent  l
                recorder pen re-priming                                          j
          e      implementation of a daily general operating procedure to ensure  i
                control room recorders function properly                          l
                                                                                  !
l                                                                                  )
 
    .  .
                                                  8
,
              .-    operator coaching to emphasize th'e importance of verifying
                    recorder function.
L          - Since the violation occurred, the inspectors have on numerous occasions
i            checked control room recorders for proper operation. The inspectors
;.            have not identified any instance where recorders-had not been inking as
l            required. The inspectors have also noted daily operator log entries
            which documented performance of the recorder operability verification
l            procedure. Proper actions were taken to ensure control room chart
!
            -recorders function as required.
:
L    08.4 (Ocen) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-338. 339/96003-05: review Final Safety
I            Analysis Report discrepancies. The ins)ectors reviewed various
;            documents concerning actions taken by t1e licensee'to address specific
I
              discrepancies comprising this-item. Additional reviews are necessary to
              complete inspection activities associated with the individual parts of
              this URI and determine their significance.
l;I                                      II. Maintenance-
,
      M1-  . Conduct of Maintenance                                                  {
,
      M1.1 Train B Solid State Protection System Test
        a.  Insoection Scooe (61726)
'
              On February 19, the inspectors observed I&C technicians perform portions
              of 1-PT-36.1B, " Train B Reactor Protection and ESF Logic Channel
              Functional Test." Revision 23. The inspection focused on procedure
              adherence.
                                                                                      '
L        b.  Observations and Findinas
I
            The inspectors observed implementation of the test in the control room
              and at the local test panels. In the control room the inspectors found
              that the controlling technician carefully followed the procedure. Steps
            were initialed when completed and effectively communicated to those
              involved with the test.. The technicians at the local test panels also
              carefully'followed their procedure. There were two examples during the
              test when the procedure steps and associated notes were somewhat
              complex. The technicians stopped the procedure, discussed the steps to
              ensure they understood them fully, and then completed the steps without
              problems.
              Communications were good. The inspectors observed one of the
              technicians and the system engineer, who was observing the test to
            ' address potential problems. effectively assist another technician when
              he was out of sequence when repeating back completed steps.    The
              technicians also used good self-checking practices.
              The inspectors verified that the test equipment was in good condition
              and calibrated. Expected test responses for the test circuits were also
i
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                                            9
,
          veri fied. Switches manipulated during the test were verified to be
'
          placed in the correct positions. The switches were also verified to be
          placed in their proper positions when the test was completed.
      c. Conclusions
          Communications, self-checking practices, and procedure adherence during
          the Unit 1 train B solid state protection system test were good.
    M1.2 Unit 2 Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Test
      a. Insoection Scooe (61726)
          The inspectors observed operators perform 2 PT-213.38. '' Valve Inservice
          Testing Steam Generator PORVs (2-MS-PCV-201A. 2-MS-PCV-201B. and 2-MS-
          PCV-201C)," Revision 7. The purpose of the test was to satisfy TS 4.0.5
          and Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Sections 3.1 and 7.5
          requirements,
      b. Observations and Findinas
          On February 24. the inspectors observed performance of 2-PT-213.38 in
          the control room, at the PORVs in the main steam valve house and in the
          cable vault area. The test involved isolation of the PORVs from the
          main steam header and subsequent manual cycling of the PORVs both
          locally and from the control room. Also during the test. Appendix R
          switches were operated to ensure that when the switches were placed in
          the " FIRE EMER CLOSE" position that operation from the control room was
          inhibited.
          The test was properly approved on the Plan of the Day and was evaluated
          for on-line maintenance risk in accordance with the licensee's
          Maintenance Rule program. The test was performed while the Station
          Blackout Diesel and a Unit 1 charging pump were out of service. The
          licensee's evaluation showed that the maintenance configuration resulted
          in a " green" window for up to seven days, which was acceptable.
          The inspectors observed that valve operation was smooth and met open and
          close timing requirements. The valves were examined and their condition
          was good. All components associated with the test. including the PORVs'
          manual isolation and bypass valves, were properly labeled and were
          operated without difficulty.
          The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the test and found
          that procedure execution was good. Operators followed their procedure
          in a step-by-step manner and communicated completion of steps
l        effectively between the three stations. There was also appropriate
          management oversight.
 
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                                              10
      c.  Conclusions
            The operability test for the steam generator power operated relief
'
            valves was properly performed. Technical Specifications and other
            technical requirements were satisfied.
      M1.3 Unit 1 Charaina Pumo Maintenance
      a.  Insoection Scooe (62707)
            The inspectors observed various maintenance activities associated with
            Unit 1 charging pump 1-CH-P-1A. The inspectors also reviewed the
            Maintenance Rule program assessment of the pump.
      b.  Observations and Findinas
            On February 23, charging pump 1-CH-P-1A was removed from service to
            repair a small seal leak and to perform various preventive maintenance
            activities. The inspectors observed maintenance activities on numerous
            occasions to evaluate enhanced work practices that had been recently
            implemented.
            Maintenance procedures were carefully followed. A procedure reader was
            dedicated for seal repair maintenance. This individual controlled the
            evolution and ensured that the work was performed in a step-by-step
            manner.    This practice was observed during most aspects of the seal
            repair efforts.
            The inspectors discussed with the workers improvements to work )ractices
            for the charging pumps. One of the most noteworthy practices tlat had
            been incorporated was the location change of the seal repair
            maintenance. Previously. the maintenance was performed in the pump
            cubicle area on the floor. The seal repair activities were moved to the
            decontamination building in a more controlled and comfortable work
            environment. The workers felt that this change was helpful due to the
            delicate nature of seal repairs.
            Foreign' Material Exclusion (FME) practices were observed and were found
          'to be adequate. For the most part. FME control efforts were initially
            performed, however, the inspectors identified two examples of FME
            deficiencies after the work had started. The deficiencies were pointed
            out to the workers who took immediate corrective action. These          !
            deficiencies were also discussed with the job foreman.
                                                                                    1
            The work wasc erformed in a contaminated area, therefore, full anti-
            contamination clothing was required to be worn by the workers. The
            inspectors checked for proper radiological practices on several
            occasions and no problems were found.
l          Aspects of the Maintenance Rule program were evaluated to determine if
!          the program properly tracked pump performance. The Plan of the Day was
!          reviewed during the course of the maintenance. The inspectors found      '
 
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I                                          11
        that the planning department actively considered the risk impacts of
        having the pump out of service with other plant equipment unavailable.
        Further the unavailability performance criteria was monitored. When
        the maintenance began there were 122 hours of unavailability logged
        against the pump. The unavailability performance criteria was 438
        hours. The projected increase in unavailability was about 132
        additional hours which was below the 438 hour limit. The licensee was
        effective in implementing Maintenance Rule program requirements.
        The pump was returned to service on March 1. Initially, the pump seal
        leaked about ten drops per minute and later decreased to less than three
        drops per minute. On March 3. the inspectors observed the pump in
        operation and no leakage was observed. The inspectors discussed with an
        engineering supervisor what was considered acceptable leakage. The
        supervisor stated that due to the design of the seal that zero leakage
        was very difficult to achieve. Component engineering was in the process
        of defining acceptable seal leakage and after discussions with them it
        was determined that some small amount of leakage (i.e. , one to two drops
        per minute) may become acceptable.
    c. Conclusions
        Overall maintenance activities on the Unit 1 charging pump were good.
        Improved work practices associated with charging pump seal repair were
        noted. The Maintenance Rule program effectively monitored charging pump
        performance criteria.
                                                                                  4
                                  III. Enaineerin_g
  El    Conduct of Engineering                                                    l
  El.1  Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storaae Installation (ISFSI) Construction (60853)
        On March 3. the inspectors toured the ISFSI pad area and observed the
        following:
        .      Perimeter fencing was complete along the south, east and west      l
              areas. The north perimeter fence was scheduled for completion in
                                                                                  '
              April 1998.
        .      The inner security fence was complete and security isolation zone
              equipment was being installed.
        *      The new ISFSI roadway paving began on March 2.  Use of the roadway
              was scheduled for the week of March 9, 1998.
        .      Alarm and emergency power panels were installed and were being
              prepared for wiring installation.
,
 
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1
                                              12
          Weather-related problems were not prevalent during this inspection
          period: the ISFSI construction schedule was four weeks behind the
          original schedule. The ISFSI activities observed by the inspectors were
'
          adequately performed.
    E2    Engineering Support of Facilities and Equipment
    E2.1 Manaaement of Enaineerina Workload
        a. Insoection Scone (37550)
          The inspectors evaluated the quality of engineering involvement in site
          activities through evaluation of the management of the total engineering
          work load. The inspectors evaluated the responsiveness to request for      I
          engineering assistance and timeliness of engineering work on safety
                                                                                      '
          significant issues.
          The following specific inspection activities were conducted:
                                                                                      i
                                                                                      '
          .      Reviewed the summary of 1996 and older active (open) Request for
                  Engineering Assistance (REA)
          *      Reviewed the summary of active REAs having an assigned priority of
                  1 to 100 and 427 to 477 (the lowest 50)
          .      Reviewed the summary of all active REAs assigned to electrical
                  system engineers and electrical design engineers
          *      From the three summaries mentioned above, selected a sample of 27
                  potentially safety significant issues that required engineering
                  involvement, and requested additional information on the sample
                  selected to provide a complete picture of the issues and how they
                  were prioritized.
          .      Reviewed the summary of active (open) Commitment Tracking System
                  (CTS) items that had been extended past the original due date:
                  the CTS was maintained by Nuclear Licensing, and was generally
                  reserved for more significant external or internal commitments.
          .      Reviewed and evaluated the summary of currently late DRs assigned
                  to engineering. The program called for closure of DRs within 30
                  days of initiation.
I
          .      Reviewed and evaluated various statistical and trend data on the
                  number of REAs. CTS items. DRs. drawing update items, vendor
                  manual update items, etc.
          *      Reviewed recently implemented concepts and initiatives designed to
                  improve management of the engineering work load.
l
L
 
                                    _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _        . - _ _ _ .
                                                                                        13
      *      As an example of the licensee's performance in the area of
            special programs the inspectors evaluated the Motor Operated
            Valve (MOV) program from the scheduling and timeliness viewpoints.
            An NRC report covering inspection of the MOV program was reviewed
            to determine the quality of that program.
      The basic requirement applicable to the scope of inspection was
      10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Quality Assurance Criteria: especially Criterion
      XVI. Corrective Action.
  b. Observations and Findings
    Recently implemented concepts and initiatives designed to improve
    management of the engineering workload included the following:
      .    Creation of a consolidated data base for tracking individual work
            items using more sophisticated computer software than previously
            used for the multiple departmental data bases. Previously there
            were 45 separate data bases. The new software had the capability
            to generate reports sorted by many input fields.
    .      Arrangement of all REAs and design changes in order of priority.
            The priorities were established by the four system engineering
            supervisors. A management review team provided oversight of the
            process.  Previously, the REAs and design changes were approved
            (or rejected) by the management review team and assigned one of
            three priority codes.
'
    *      Establishment of goals for the reduction of the engineering work
            backlog.
    The inspectors found that the number of CTS items granted time limit
    extensions by management was small and there was no particular safety
    significance associated with the extensions. All due date extensions
    were approved by management.                            While the CTS data base had been intended
    for more significant items, it also contained minor items due to the
    lack of confidence in the de)artmental data bases as an effective
    tracking tool. To rectify t1is situation. an " internal items" data base
    was created, which was a subpart of the consolidated data base mentioned
    above. It contained about 300 items.
    The inspectors observed that 1593 DRs initiated in 1997 were assigned to
    engineering. This exceeded the number closed by engineering in that
    same time period by 109. The inspectors also observed that the number
    of late DRs was small, and most of these were only a few days late.
    Evaluation of the 27 active REAs selected for further review led to the
    conclusion that engineering was timely with regard to resolving
    regulatory issues. A similar finding was made with regard to the motor
    operated valve program.
                                                                                                                            . _____
 
.  .
                                            14-
          The number of open REAs and Design' Change Packages (DCPs) dated 1996 and
          older is summarized as follows:
                        Year          A
                                    REAS        QCPg
                                                  P
                        1985.          0            1
                        1989            0            1
                        1991            0-          5
                        1992            0            4
                        1993          2-            6
                        1994          18          21
                        1995          32          38
                      .1996        145          49
          The inspectors was not aware of any self-assessments in the same area as
          this inspection, although as stated above. the subject had received
          special management attention.
      c.  Cpnclusions
          A review of open engineering work items indicated that the licensee was
          timely in' resolving safety significant issues.
  E8      Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903, 92700)
  E8.1    (Closed) Insoection Followuo Item (IFI) 50-338. 339/97004-04: review of
          additional- controls on molded-case circuit breaker set points. The
          licensee revised the applicable electrical maintenance 3rocedure to      2
          include instructions on establishing the set ]oint of tie magnetic
          element. The inspectors confirmed that the clange was made by review of
        . procedure 0-EPM-0304-01. " Testing / Replacing 480-Volt Breaker
          Assemblies." Revision 23. Steps 4.7, 6.1.4 and 6.2.4. The inspectors
        . agreed that the procedure would provide an acceptable level of set point
          control.
                                    IV. Plant Support-
  R1      Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls
  R1.1 Radiolooical Survey Maos and Hiah Radiation Area Postinos Walkdown
      a.  Insoection Scooe (71750)
          The inspectors walked down various areas in the Radiation Control Area
          (RCA) with an HP technician to ensure that posted survey maps were
          accurate and that all high radiation areas were properly posted and
          locked if required.
      b.  Observations and Findinos
          On March 4'. the inspectors reviewed survey maps posted outside the main
          entrance to the RCA and found that each general area in the RCA had
 
  .  .                                                                            !
                                            15
          updated maps with recent survey data.    The inspectors selected several
          areas to verify that the maps reflected actual plant conditions and no
          problems were found. While reviewing the survey maps, the inspectors
          noted the posting of additional color coded radiological maps for each
          elevation of the auxiliary building. The combination of the survey maps
          and the color coded maps was an effective means to inform workers of
          radiation dose rates prior to entering the RCA.
          During the walkdown the inspectors ensured that all areas designated as
          high radiation areas were ]roperly posted. In addition, radiation level
          surveys were taken at the )oundary of selected high radiation areas to
          ensure the areas were roped off properly. No problems were found. All
          locked high radiation doors were locked and posted as required. The      i
          ins)ectors also checked for proper control of access keys to the locked
          hig1 radiation areas. The keys were controlled by the HP supervisor.
          An inventory of the keys for the very high radiation areas was performed
          and all keys were in place.
                                                                                  1
          There were several other practices noted during the walkdown which
          informed workers of radiological conditions. The inspectors noted the
          presence of multiple low dose waiting areas. These areas were marked
          with a sign and a flashing green light. Surveys of the areas were taken
          to ensure the radiation levels were low. The readings were less than
          one millirem per hour. Also noted were radiation area " flip" signs.
          The color coded signs were olaced throughout the RCA to inform workers
          of radiation levels. The H) office also had a remote monitoring system
          which monitored multiple area dose rates.throughout the RCA. This
.
'
          system was used. in part, to detect sudden changes in higher risk areas
          such that appropriate actions could be taken.
      c. Conclusions
l        Survey maps used to inform workers of radiological conditions were
l        accurate and were posted properly. Posting and control of high
          radiation areas was appropriate. There were several other effective      l
          practices used to inform workers of radiological condition;              !
                                                                                    \
j  S2    Status of Security Facilities and Equipment
    S2.2 Alarm Stations and Communications
      a. Insoection Scoce (81700)
          The inspectors evaluated the licensee's alarm stations and communication
          equi) ment to ensure that applicable criteria in Chapters 1-6. 8. and 9
          of tle Physical Security P1an (PSP), appropriate Security Contingency    l
          Plan Implementing Procedures (SCPIPs) and Security Plan Implementing      )
          Procedures (SPIPs) were being implemented.                                i
                                                                                    i
 
  .  .
                                              16
      b.  Observations and Findinas
          The inspectors verified that annunciation of protected and vital area
            alarms occurred audibly and visually in tb alarm stations. The
            licensee equipped both stations with communication equipment and limited
          ' Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) assessment capabilities. Alarms were
            tamper-indicating and self-checking, and were provided with an
            uninterruptable power supply. These stations were continually manned by
          capable and knowledgeable security operators. The stations were
            independent yet redundant in o)eration. The interior of the alarm
            station was not visible from tie protected area. No single act could
            remove the capability of calling for assistance or otherwise responding
            to an alarm. Alarm station walls, doors, floors, ceiling and windows
          were bullet-resistant.
          The inspectors evaluated the provision operation, and maintenance of
            internal and external security communication links, and determined that
            they were adequate and appropriate for their intended function. Each
            security force member could communicate with an individual in each of
            the ' continuously manned alarm stations, who could call for assistance
            from other security force personnel and local law enforcement agencies.
            Each alarm station had the capability for continuous two-way voice
            communication with the sheriff's department through radio or separate
            commercial telephone service. The licensee had compensatory measures
            for defective or inoperable communication equipment.
      c.  Conclusions
            The licensee's alarm stations and communication equipment were in        l
            compliance with the criteria in Chapters 1-6. 8. and 9 of the Physical  >
            Security Plan and appropriate Security Contingency Plan Implementing
            Procedures and Security Plan Implementing Procedures.
    S2.9 Indeoendent Soent Fuel Storace Installations                                ,
      a.    Insoection Scooe (81001)
            The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the proposed protection for the
            ISFSI as addressed in Chapter 8 of the PSP.
      b.  Observations and Findinas
            The licensee had ir!dicated in Chapter 8 of the PSP the following        l
            protection functions for the ISFSI: three perimeter barriers intrusion  !
:          detection system of the protected area barrier, assessment capabilities  l
l          of annunciated alarms of the isolation zones'. single vehicle access
!          portal. vehicle barrier system. Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS). and a  !
            testing and maintenance program for the 3rotection equipment. A
            memorandum of understanding concerning t1e response commitments of the  ;
                                                                                      I
 
  .
                                            17
          licensee and the sheriff's department had not been executed at the time
          of this inspection. The inspectors visited the ISFSI construction site
          to evaluate installation progress of the security protection equipment.
          At the time of the visit a perimeter barrier was partially in ) lace,
          the UPS foundation was constructed, and electrical cabling was )eing
          installed around the site.
          Chapter 8 would remain in the PSP while the ISFSI was being constructed.
          Once construction was completed and security systems were tested and
          operational. Chapter 8 would be celeted from the PSP and established as
          a separate ISFSI Security Plan.
      c. Conclusions
          Chapter 8 of the Physical Security Plan described an adequate security
          protection plan for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation.
          Construction implementation was appropriate.
    S3    Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation
    S3.2 Security Procedures
      a. Insoection Scoce (81700)
          The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee's SPIPs and SCPIPs to
          verify that the procedures were consistent with PSP commitments and
          practices.
      b. Observations and Findinas
          The inspectors reviewed five SPIPs and four SCPIPs. Procedures
          implementing plan changes, which the licensee had determined not to
!        decrease the effectiveness of the respective plans, were reviewed and
          discussed with appropriate licensee management to verify the validity of
          the determination. Also, the impact of the imp'.emented changes on the
          respective plans and overall program was evaluated.
l        The Security. Contingency, and Safeguards Training and Qualification
l        plans were revised and reviewed in accordance with approved licensee
l        procedures before changes were implemented.    Changes were incorporated. l
          as appropriate. into the im)lementing procedures. The changes that were
          reviewed did not decrease t7e effectiveness of the respective plans.
      c. Conclusions
          A random sam)le of Security Plan Implementing Procedures and Security
          Contingency )lan Implementing Procedures adequately met the Physical
          Security Plan commitments and practices.
 
    .
                                                                                  1
  .
                                                                                    I
                                                                                  4
                                            18
    S4    Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance                  ,
                                                                                  l
    S4.1 Security Force Reauisite Knowledge
      a. Inspection Scone (81700)
          The inspectors interviewed security personnel to determine if they
          possessed adequate knowledge to carry out their assigned duties and
          responsibilities, including response, use of deadly force, and armed
          response tactics.
      b. Observations and Findinas
          The inspectors interviewed approximately 20 security personnel,
          including supervisors, and witnessed approximately 30 others in the
          3erformance of their duties. Members of the security force were
          (nowledgeable in their duties and responsibilities, response commitments
          and procedures, and armed res)onse tactics. The inspectors found that
          armed response personnel had 3een instructed in the use of deadly force
          as required by 10 CFR Part 73.
      c. Conclusions
          Security personnel possessed appropriate knowledge to carry out their
          assigned duties and responsibilities, including response, use of deadly
          force, and armed response tactics.
    S5    Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification
    SS.2 Trainino Records
      a. Insoection Scone (81700)
          The inspectors interviewed security personnel and reviewed security
          personnel training and qualification records to ensure that the criteria
          in the Training and Qualification Plan were met.
      b. Observations and Findinos
          The inspectors interviewed 12 security non-supervisory personnel and two
          supervisors about the quality and timeliness of training provided.
          Members of the security force were knowledgeable in their
          responsibilities, plan commitments and procedures. Twelve randomly
          selected training records were reviewed by the inspectors concerning
          training. firearms, testing job / task performance and requalification.
          Members of the security organization were requalified at least every 12
l        months in the performance of their assigned tasks. both normal and
:        contingency. This included the conduct of physical exercise
          requirements and the completion of the firearms course. Through the
          records review and interviews with security force personnel, the
I        inspectors found that the requirements of 10 CFR 73. Appendix B.
 
      .  -
                                                  19
                Section 1.F. concerning suitability. physical and mental qualification
                data-. test results and other proficiency requirements were met.
                The interviews and training records reviewed revealed an excellent
                training program due to the thoroughness of the records and dedication
                                        -
                of the training personnel.
          c.  Conclusions
                The security force was being trained in an excellent manner an in
                accordance with the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory
                requirements.
        S6      Security Organization and Administration
        S6.3. Staffino Levels
          a.  Insoection Scooe (81700)
              -The inspectors verified that the total number of trained security
                officers and armed personnel immediately available at the facility to
                fulfill response requirements met the number specified in the PSP. The-
                inspectors also verified that one full-time member of the security
                organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not-
              ' have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities.
l              during an incident.
          b.  Qbservations and Findinos
L              The licensee has an onsite physical protection system and security
l              organization. Their objective was to provide assurance against an
L              unreasonable risk to public health and safety. . The security
!
'
                organization and physical 3rotection system were designed to protect
                against the design basis tareat of radiological sabotage as stated in
                10 CFR 73.1(a). At least one full-time manager of the security
                organization was always onsite and had no duties that conflicted with
                the assignment to direct all activities during an incident. This
                individual had the authority to direct the physical protection
                activities of the organization. The inspectors reviewed four shift
                rosters and interviewed security force personnel on two shifts. This
                verified that the licensee had the number of trained security officers
                and armed personnel immediately available to fulfill response
              . requirements and commitments of the PSP.
f
'
  ,        c.  Conclusions
              . The total number of trained security officers and armed personnel
    -          immediately available to fulfill response requirements met Physical
                Security Plan requirements. One full-time member of the security
                organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not
                have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities
                during an incident.
 
    . .  .
                              (
                                                    20
          S7    ~ Quality Assurance in Security and Safeguards Activities
        - 57.3 Problem Analysis
            a.  Insoection Scoce (81700)
                The inspectors reviewed and evaluated a sample of documented problem
                analyses conducted by the licensee since the last inspection.
            b.  Observations and Findinas
                Five DRs were reviewed to verify that' the problems'were appropriately
                assigned for review, appropriately analyzed. reached logical
                conclusions, and prioritized for corrective action. The five DRs
                reviewed were found to be adequate in the problem analysis process. The
                inspectors discussed with .the licensee enhancements that would improve
                the problem analysis of the DR process.
            c.  Conclusions
                The documented problem. analyses for five security-related deviation
                reports were adequate.
                                                                                          !
                                        V. Manaaement Meetinas
          X1-    Exit Meeting Summary
                The inspectors ) resented the inspection results to members of licensee
                management at t1e conclusion of the inspection on March 12, 1998, The
                licensee acknowledged the findings presented.
                The. inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during
                the inspection should.be considered proprietary. No proprietary
                information was identified.                                              ;
,
                                                                                            .
  4
                                                                                            !
                                                                                            I
-                                                                                          !
      ,
                                                                                            1
                                                                                            I
                                                                                          e
 
.
  .
                                                                                1
                                          21
                          PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
  Licensee
  B. Foster. Superintendent Station Engineering                                  .
  C. Funderburk. Superintendent. Outage Planning
  E. Grecheck. Manager. Station Operations and Maintenance                        j
  J. Hayes. . Director, Nuclear Oversight
  D. Heacock. Manager. Station Safety and Licensing
  M. Kansler Vice President. Nuclear Operations-
  P. Kemp. Supervisor. Licensing
  L. Lane. Superintendent. Operations                                            ;
  T. Maddy. Superintendent. Security
  W. Matthews. Site Vice President
  H. Royal. Superintendent. Nuclear Training
  D. Schappell Superintendent. Site Services                                      !
  R. Shears. Superintendent. Maintenance
  A. Stafford. Superintendent. Radiological Protection
                              INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED                        )
                                                                                '
  IP 37550:    Engineering
  IP 37551:    Onsite Engineering
  IP 40500:    Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying. Resolving, and
              Preventing Problems
  IP 60853:    hsite Fabrication of Components and Construction of an ISFSI
  IP 60705:    F aparation For Refueling
  IP 61726:    Surveillance Observations
  IP 62707:    Maintenance Observations
  IP 71707:    Plant Operations
  IP 71750:    Plant Support Activities
  IP 81001:    Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (s)
  IP 81700:    Physical Security Program for Power Reactors                        i
  IP 92700:    Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power
              Reactor Facilities
  IP 92901:    Followup - Plant Operations
  IP 92903:    Followup - Engineering
                              ITEMS CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
  Closed
  50-338. 339/97002-01      URI  review compliance with TS 6.5.1.6 requirement
                                  for SNSOC review of programs (Section 08.1)      i
  50-338/97006              LER  entered TS 3.0.3 due to inoperable control rod
                                  indicators (Section 08.2)
  50-338. 339/97002-03      VIO  failure to assure that control room chart        i
                                  recorders were marked (Section 08.3)            l
                                                                                  l
                                                                                  l
                                                                                  I
                                                                                J
 
  .  .
                                      22
    50-338, 339/97004-04 1F1 review of additional controls on molded-case
                              circuit breaker set points (Section E8.1)-
    Discussed
    50-338, 339/96003-05 URI review Final Safety Analysis Report
                              discrepancies (Section 08.4)
          /
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