ML20236V842

Forwards Safety Insp Rept 50-341/87-45 on 871006-1109.No Violations Noted.Record Copy

ML20236V842
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	12/03/1987
From:	Greenman E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	Sylvia B DETROIT EDISON CO.
References
NUDOCS 8712070127
Download: ML20236V842 (2)

See also: IR 05000341/1987045

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DEC 0 31987

Docket No. 50-341

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The Detroit Edison Company

ATTN:

B.' Ralph Sylvia

Group Vice President

Nuclear Operations

6400 North Dixie Highway

Newport, MI 48166

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Gentlemen:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. W. G. Rogers,

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M. E. Parker, and P. R. Pelke of this office on October 6 through November 9,

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'1987, of activities at Fermi 2 authorized by Facility Operating License

No. NPF-43 and to the discussion of our findings with Mr. W. Orser at the

conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas exa.uined during

the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective

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examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and

interviews with personnel.

No violations of NRC requirements were identified during the coarse of this

inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the Coc. mission's regulations, a copy of

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this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC

Public Document' Room.

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

Edward G. Greenman, Deputy Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure:

Inspection Report

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No. 50-341/87045(DRP)

See Attached Distribution

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The. Detroit Edison Company

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DEC 0 31987.

Distribution

cc w/ enclosure:

Lewis P. Bregni, Licensing

P. A Marq% rdt, Corporate

Lege.1 Department

DCD/DCB (RlDS)

Licensing Fee Management Branch

Resident Inspector, RIII

, Ronald Callen, Michigan

Public Service Commission

Harry H. Voight, Esq.

Michigan Department of

Public Health

Monroe County Office of

Civil Preparedness

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

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Report No. 50-341/87045(DRP)

Docket No. 50-341

Operating License No. NPF-43

Licensee:

Detroit' Edison Company

2000 Second Avenue

Detroit, MI 48226

Facility Name:

Fermi 2

Inspection At:

Fermi Site, Newport, Michigan

Inspection Conducted:

October 6 through November 9, 1987

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Inspector:

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E. Parker

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P. R. Pelke

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Approved By:

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Deputy Director

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Inspection Summary

Inspection on October 6 through Nsvember 9, 1987 (Report No. 50-341/87045(DRP))

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of

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previous inspection findings, LERs, events, operations, maintenance,

surveillance, startup tests, and report review.

Results:

No deviations or violations were identified.

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DETAILS

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Persons Contacted

a.

Detroit Edison Company

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F. Abramson, Operations Engineer

• F. Agosti, Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and Services

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• J. Bass, Production Quality Assurance, Senior Engineer

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• L. Bregni, Compliance Engineer

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5. Cashell, Licensing

• T. Dong, Plant Safety

R. Eberhardt, Radiation Protection Engineer

L. Esau, Maintenance Engineer

• L. Fron, Mechanical / Fluid System Nuclear Engineering

• D. Gibson, Plant Manager

J. Green, Systems Engineering

R. Kelm, Director, Nuclear Security

J. Leman, Director, Plant Safety, Nuclear Production

• R. Lenart, General Director, Nuclear Engineering

L. Lessor, Advisor to Plant Manager

R. May, Superintendent, Maintenance and Modification

G. Ohlemacher, Principal Engineer, Licensing

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• W. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations / Plant Manager

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J. Plona, Operations Support Engineer

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E. Preston, Assistant Director, Plant Safety

• T. Randazzo, Director, Regulatory Affairs

B. Sheffel, Nuclear Production, Technical Engineering ISI

• F. Svetkovich, Technical Engineer, Nuclear Production

B. R. Sylvia, Group Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• W. Tucker, Superintendent, Operations

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b.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• M. Parker, Resident Inspector

P. Pelke, Region III

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• W. Rogers, Senior Resident Inspector

• Denotes those attending the exit meeting on November 13, 1987.

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2.

Action On Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

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(Closed) Open Item (341/86003-01(DRP)):

Overpressurization of the

HPCI/RCIC Piping and Condensate Storage Tank Rupture.

This item concerned

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the February 14, 1986, overpressurization of a section of the high pressure

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coolant injection / reactor core isolation cooling (HPCI/RCIC) full flow test

line, and the subsequent event on November 17, 1986, overpressurizing the

same line, resulting in a rupture of the condensate storage tank (CST).

The corrective action to the February 14, 1986, event is documented in

Inspection Report No. 50-341/86034 and is considered adequate.

Concerning the November 17, 1986, overpressuritation, tne licensee took

action to reduce the possibility of additional overpressurization events.

This action included:

Rerouting the control rod drive (CRD) minimum flow line downstream

of the spectacle flange.

Upgrading the 300 pound class piping from E41-F11 to the spectacle

flange with 600 pound class piping and extending the class boundary

to the last isolation valves on the spectacle flange.

Providing overflow capability and detection on the CST and condensate

return tank (CRT).

Installing relief valves for overpressure protection on the

HPCI/RCIC test line.

Installing a vinyl liner on the diked area surrounding the CST /CRT.

The inspector reviewed the following Engineering Design Packages (EDP).

EDP 6731:

Upgrade Selected Piping Segments.

This consisted of

replacement of 300 pound class carbon steel piping components in

the combined HPCI/RCIC test return line to prevent piping

overpressurization.

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EDP 6737:

Reroute the CRD Minimum Flow Line.

This consisted of

relocation of the one-inch CRD minimum flow line connector from

upstream of valves E41F175 and E41F179 to an area downstream of

valves E41F158 and E41F178, to prevent an inadvertent

overpressurization of the piping upstream of E41F158 and E41F178.

EDP 6687:

Install pressure relief protection on the HPCI/RCIC

return line.

This consisted of the installation of three pressure

relief valves in the combined HPCI/RCIC/CRD test return line to the

CST to prevent overpressurization of the 150 pound class portion of

the test return line.

The inspector verified that the EDPs had been implemented by review of

the following PN-21s (work orders):

259499, 668568, 269500, 669302, and

986466.

The inspector also walked down the accessible portions of piping

to verify the above action had been completed and the necessary procedures

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and drawings had been updated to reflect this modification.

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In addition, the inspector verified that the vinyl liner had beon

installed in the diked area and that overflow protection had been

installed on the CST /CRT.

This item is closed.

3.

Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700)

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Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and

review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine

that deportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective

action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had

been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications,

a.

(Closed) LER 85079-01:

Auto-Start of Division II Emergency

Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) and Emergency Equipment Service Water

(EESW) Caused by Improper Adjustment of Valve Controller. This LER

was previously reviewed in Inspection Report No. 50-341/87012 and-

remained open pending implementation of Engineering Design Package

(EDP) 1720.

EDP-1720 has been implemented by field completion of

Work Regeests (PN21) No.

007A0827, No. 018A0826, cnd No. 276738.

Post-maintenance surveillance tests were conducted prior te

declaring EECW Divisions I and II operable.

The inspector verified

that the reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system is

currently operated with the RBCCW Make-Up Tank (P4200A001) in

service and both EECW Make-Up Tanks (P4400A001 and P4400A002)

isolated during normal RBCCW operations.

Procedure POM 23.127,

" Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water / Emergency Equipment Cooling

Water System," has been revised to incorporate the current system

line-up.

During the review of P0M 23.127, Revision 17, the

inspector noted that Valve P42-F113 was' incorrectly listed on

Page 6 as a RBCCW Return Header Vent Valve.

This error was

subsequently corrected in P0M 23.127, Revision 18.

The licensee is currently performing sequence-cf-event testing to

verify proper system operation and actuation.

The inspectors will

continue to observe system operation as a result of other LERs oa

premature system ai'uation.

b.

(Closed) LER 85083-00:

Reactor Protection-5ystem (RPS) Divisional

Power Failure Causing Emergency Safety Feature (ESF) Actuations.

During closecut of LER 85083, RPS Divisional Power Failure Causing

ESF Actuations, the inspector reviewed the licensee's cause of

failure.

The failed component was determined to be a failed circuit

board in the electrical protection assemble (EPA) protection logic

causing the protection logic to actuate resulting in the opening

of the circuit breaker.

The licensee replaced.the failed circuit

board.

Review of previous failures at other plants indicated that

some failures were attributable to the electrolytic capacitors on

the circuit board.

Electrolytic capacitors typically have a specified

deenergized shelf life.

Review of the licensee's shelf life program

determined that the EPA circuit board including the capacitors have

an indefinite shelf life as specified by the manufacturer, General

Electric.

Subsequent discussions with the manufacturer indicated

that General Electric now recommends a seven year deenergized shelf

life.

The licensee has now implemented the manufacturers shelf life

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recommendations into their shelf life prograr, and indicated that the

electrolytic capacitor shelf life would be reviewed further in view

of the circuit board failures identified at other sites.

c.

(Closed) LER 86045-00:

Overpressurization and Rupture of. CST

Piping Caused by Inadequate Overpressure Protection and Operator

Error.

This item concerned the overpressurization of HPCI/RCIC

piping and rupture of the CST piping on November 17, 1987.

This

LER was voluntarily submitted by the licensee to inform the NRC

of the event and to describe corrective action taken to prevent

recurrence.

This event is being tracked independently by the NRC

under Open Item 341/86002-01 and 341/86003-01.

Open Item 341/860^2-01

addresses the health physics and environmental aspects and 341/86003-01

addresses the licensee s corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

This LER is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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4.

Followup of Events (93702)

During the inspection period, the licensee experienced several events,

some of which required prompt notification of the NRC pursuant to

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10 CFR 50.72.

The inspectors pursued the events onsite with licensee

and/or other NRC officials.

In each case,'the inspectors verified that

the notification was correct and timely, if appropriate, that the licensee

was taking prompt and appropriate actions, that activities were conducted

within regulatory requirements and that corrective actions would prevent

future recurrence.

The specific events are as follows:

October 17

Potential loss of primary containment integrity.

October 20

Sodium hydroxide leaked to environment.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

5.

Startup Test Witnessing and Observation (72302)

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The inspector reviewed portions of startup test procedures, reviewed

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procedure results completed to date, toured the areas containing system

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equipment, interviewed personnel, and observed test activities of those

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startup tests identified below.

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During this review, the inspectors noted that the latest revision of

the test procedure was available and in use by crew members, the minimum

crew requirements were met, the test prerequisites were met, appropriate

plant systems were in service, the special test equipment required by the

procedure was calibrated and in service, the test was performed as

required by approved procedures, temporary modifications such as jumpers

were installed and tracked per established administrative controls.

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The inspector observed the performance of the following startup tests:

STUT.03E.015

HPCI System - Hot Vessel Injection.

STUT.03F.015

HPCI System - Cold Vessel Injection.

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STUT.03H.015

HPCI System - Cold Vessel Injection (Second Run).

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STUT.03G.015

HPCI System - 1000 PSIG Cold CST Injection.

Startup Tests STUT.03E.015 HPCI System - Hot Vessel Injection and

STUT.03F.015 HPCI System - Cold Vessel Injection were originally

performed during Test Condition 2.

These tests were reperformed

on October 14 and 18, 1987, respectively, to demonstrate proper

system operation after undergoing repair and modification to correct

previous problems.

These tests were performed successfully with no

major problems identified.

During the performance of STUT.03H.015 HPCI System - Cold Vessel Injection

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(Seccnd Run), the HPCI system tripped on high reactor vessel water levei

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after about 35 seconds of operation at rated flow.

This trip was not a

result of improper operation of the HPCI system.

The HPCI functioned as

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designed and tripped on a Level 8 (high reactor vessel water) to protect

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the HPCI turbine from excessive moisture carryover.

The high level was a

result of trying to control feedwater in manual while performing HPCI

injectiens at low power /feedwater flow rates.

As such, the licensee has

determined that the startup test meets the acceptance standards required

and reperformance of this test is not required.

During the tests, the inspector observed preparations, pre-job briefing,

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testing and restoration of system following startup testing activities.

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Good communication and coordination was noted between the operating shift,

startup personnel, and all support personnel.

The pre-job briefing

included discussions on prerequisites, cautions, abnormal conditions,

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and radiological concerns.

The testing activities were noted to be

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well planned and executed.

Nu violations or deviations were identified in this area.

6.

Operational Safety Verification (71707)

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The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

e.nd conducted discussions with control room operators during the period

from October 6 through November 9, 1987.

The inspectors verified the

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operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and

verified prcper return to service of affected components.

Tours of the

reactor building and turbine building were conducted to observe plant

equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and

excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been

initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.

The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the

physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with the

station security plan.

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The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and

verified implementation of radiation protection controls.

During the

inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the

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Division I and II reactor heat removal (RHR) system including the low

pressure cc,olant injection (LPCI) system to verify operability. by

comparirg the system lineup with plant drawings, as-built configuration

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or present valve lineup lists; observing equipment for conditions that

could degrade performance; and verified that instrumentation was properly

valved, functioning, and calibrated.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility

operations were in conformance with the requirements established under

technical specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

On October 26, 1987, the shift noted an increase in generator gross

megawatts, while the plant was in steady state operation with reactor

power at 40%.

Further investigation discovered that recirculation pump

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"A" had begun a steady increase in speed without any manipulations of

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the controls.

The control room operator placed the manual / automatic (M/A)

station for the "A" pump in manual and attempted to lower recirculation

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pump speed.

When no response was noted, the operator manually loc'ked the

scoop tube in place.

The recirculation pump speed increased from 51% to

61% resulting in a peak increase in reactor power to 52%.

The shift then

took steps to reduce the pump speed aanually at the reactor recirculation

motor generator set te balance out both pumps.

The "A" pump flow controller

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was then left in manual control with the speed at 51% until repairs were

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completed.

A previous event occurred on October 22, 1987, in which the reactor power

increased to a maximum of 51% during the transient.

At that time,

troubleshooting and repairs were taken which were believed to have

corrected the situation.

The licensee has since performed additional

troubleshooting and repairs to correct the recirculation pump runaway

problem.

The inspector was in the control room during the October 26, 1987, event

and observed operator action to control and reduce recirculation pump

speed.

The operating shift demonstrated good control in identifying and

resolving the event.

On November 5, 1987, licensed operators received an unanticipated reactor

recirculation pump runback to 32% power due to reactor feedwater pump

actions.

During the process of recovering from the runback and resetting

the pump controls, one of the recirculation pumps increased to maximum

flow.

The flow increase caused an instantaneous increase of power to 70%

then reduced to 50% and remained constant.

The licensee issued deficiency

event report (CER)87-435 on the event.

The inspectors will review the

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licensee's corrective actions to the DER.

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No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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7.

Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety-related systems and components

listed below were observed to ascertain that they were conducted in

accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and ind,ustry

codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

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The following items were considered during this review:

the limiting

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were

removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were

inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were

performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality

control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by

qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly cert,ified;

radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls

were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine the status of outstanding jobs

and to assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment

maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed:

Annual Preventative Maintenance on Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG)

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No. 13 Switch Gear Room North Ventilation Fan.

Annual Preventative Maintenance on Electric Fire Pump.

Following completion of maintenance on the EDG system, the inspectors

verified that the system had been returned to service properly.

During the Division II core spray outage on October 22, 1987, the

inspector observed the following activities:

Replacement of a leaking valve on E21N006B, located on Rack H21-P019

in accordance with PN-21 008A0409.

Recalibration of minimum flow differential pressure switch E21N006B

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in accordance with P0 24931.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

8.

Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspectors observed surveillance testing required by Technical

Specifications and verified that:

testing was performed in accordance

with adequate procedures, test instrumentation was calibrated, limiting

conditions for operation were met, removal and restoration of the affected

components were accomplished, test results conformed with Technical

Specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel

other than the individual directing the test, and any deficiencies

identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by

appropriate management personnel.

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The inspectors also witnessed portions of the following test activities:

24.110.05

RPS Turbine Control Valve / Turbine Stop Valve Channel

Functional Test.

24.307.15

Emergency Diecel Generator No.12 31-Day Start and Load

Test.

The inspectors performed a record review of completed surveillance tests.

The review was to determine that the test was accomplished within the

required Technical Specification time interval,' procedural steps were

properly initiated, the procedure acceptance criteria were met, independent

verifications were accomplished by people other than those performing the

test, and the tests were signed in and out of the control room surveillance

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log book.

The surveillance tests reviewed were:

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24.425.01

Containment Integrity Verification for Valves Outside

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Containment.

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No problems were identified.

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On October 23, 1987, the inspector observed the performance of POM

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24.307.15, Revision 12, Attachment 1, " Emergency Diesel Generator

No. 12 31-Day Start and Load Test." Attachment 4 to P0M 24.307.15 is

the 30-n.inute operating log.

The inspector noted that t.'.e recorded lube

oil temperatures were approximately 182 F and the recorded jacket cooling

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water temperatures were approximately 158 F.

These values were outside

the normal operating values of 190 F to 205 F, ar.d 165 F to 180 F,

specified in Enclosure C of P0M 23.307, " Emergency Diesel Generator

System." The values its P0M 23.307 were changed after licensee personnel

confirmed that the values were obsolete.

This matter is considered

resolved.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

9.

Report Review (90713)

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During the inspection period, the inspector reviewed the licensee's

Monthly Operating Report for Septeraber 1S87 and the Emergency Diesel

Generator Start Failure Reports dated October 5, 1987, and October 26,

1987.

The inspector confirmed that the information provided in the

Monthly Operating Report met the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.1.6 and Regulatory Guide 1.16 and that the information

provided in the Emergency Diesel Generator Start Failure met the

requirements of Technical Specifications 4.8.1.1.3 and Regulatory

Guide 1.108.

No violations c>r deviations were identified in this area.

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10.

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragt aph 1)

on November 13, 1987, and informally throughout the inspection period

and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activi, ties.

Tne inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the

inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the

inspectors during the inspection.

The licensee did not identify any such

documents / processes as proprietary.

The licensee acknowledged the

findings of the inspection.

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