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Draft Review of Vogtle Units 1 & 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability Analysis, Technical Evaluation Rept
	ML20101R104
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	10/31/1984
From:	Fresco A, Papazoglou I, Youngblood R; BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY
To:	; NRC
Shared Package
ML20101R102	List: ML20101R104;
References
	CON-FIN-A-3702 NUDOCS 8501180533
	Download: ML20101R104 (95)
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NUREG/CR-BNL-NUREG- l l DRAFT COPY REVIEW 0F THE V0GTLE UNITS 1 AND 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM RELIABILITY AN4i.YSIS A. Fresco, R. Youngblood and I. A. Papazoglou ' Department of Nuclear Energy Brookhaven National Laboratory Upton, NY 11973 October 1984 Prepared for U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Contract No.0E-AC-02-76CH00016 FIN A-3702 0501180533 000110 PDR ADOCK 05000424

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o . . 7 ABSTPACT I' h[1{b Wit t.- %w$ This report presents the results of the review of the Auxiliary Feedwater System reliability analysis for the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 1 and 2. The objective of this report is to estimate the probability that the Auxiliary Feedwater System will fail to perform its mission for each of three different initiators; (1) loss of main feedwater with offsite power available, (2) loss of offsite power, (3) loss of all AC power except vital instr.: mentation and control 125V DC / 120V AC power. The scope, methodology, and failure data are prescribed by NIREG-0611, Appendix III. The results are compared with those obtained in NUREG-0611 for other Westinghouse plants. 5 I i i l aur= se--- . . - - - . . b . ..... , 2 . . . , , , , , ,, , , , , , , _ , , , ,, , , , , , , l i

         .o                    e i

h TABLE OF CONTENTS s 2h ] P_ge 4

A BS T RACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

l LIST OF FIGURES .................................................. . ! LIST OF TABLES ................................................... f EXECUTIVE SUPMARY ................................................ i j-

1.0 INTRODUCTION

................................................                                                                                                                      I 2.0 SCOPE OF BNL REVIEW .........................................                                                                                                                      I 3.0 MISSION SUCCESS CRITERIA ....................................
;                                                        4.0 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ..........................................

4 5.0 EMERGENCY OPERATION .........................................

5.1 Los s of 1Mai n Feedwater (LMFW) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.2 Los s of 'Of f si te Powe r ( LOOP ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Loss of All AC (LOAC) ..................................

j. 6.0 TESTING ..................................................... ,

i 1 7.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS ................................... , j 8.0 OUTAGE LIMITATIONS AND MAI NTENANCE .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Outa9e Limitations ..................................... 8.2 Maintenance ............................................ 9.0 RELIABILITY ANALYSIS ........................................ 9.1 Qualitative Aspects ....................................

,                                                                          9.1.1 Mode of System Initiation .......................

i 9.1.2 System Control Following Initiation . ............ i 9.1.3 Effects of Test and Maintenance Activities ...... l 9.1.4 Availability of Alternate Water Supplies ........

9.1.5 Adequacy and Separation of Power Sources ........

i 9.1.6 Commo n Mode Fa il ures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]' 9.1.7 Single Point Failures ........................... , 9.1.8 Adequacy of Eme rgency Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Quantitative Aspects ................................... ] j 9.2.1 Applicant's Use of letC-Suggested Methodology i i and Data ....................................... 9.2.1.1 Fault Tree Construction and Evlauation.. i 9.2.1.2 Failure Data ........................... l 9.2.2 Appl ic ant 's Result s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , i 9.2.2.1 Systess Unavailabilities ............... 9.2.2.2 Dominent Failure Modes and Conclusions.. 1 9.2.3 BML Assessment .................................. I i 9.2.3.1 Fau l t Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !

;                                                                                                9.2.3.2 Failure Data ...........................

9.2.3.3 System Unavail abil i ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9.2.3.4 Dominant Failure Modes ................. 9.2.3.5 General Comparison to Other Plants ..... , 9.2.3.6 General Comments ....................... R EF E R E NC E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 1 h i

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oeo-=m sene me sesew e e. p**m -

e-t-...... , . _ ~ . . _ . _ . . _ . . . . . , . _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ , _ . -._ , , . _ . , . . . _ . _ _ . . - _ . _ _ _ , _ . , _ _ _ _ _ . ._..._-__.-_....-,..m.-

LIST OF FIGURES 1 Figure Title Page. l 1 AFWS (Simpl i fi ed Fl ow Di a gram) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater/ Steam Generators Intake ...

3 AFWS Simplified Piping Layout ........................ 4 AFWS Reliability Evaluation Methodology Flow Chart ... 5 Unit 1 AFWS Block Diagram ............................ 6 AFWS Expanded Block Diagram .......................... 7 Uni t 1 AFWS Fault Tree Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 VEGP AFWS Unavailability Assessment Dominant Fail ure Modes - Case No. 1 - LMFW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 VEGP AFWS Unavailability Assessment Dominant Failure Modes - Case No. 2 - LOOP ................... 10 VEGP AFWS Unavailability Assessment Dominant Fail ure Mode s - Case No. 3 - LOAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ _ _ . . _ . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . . ?..____......._...-_.-_.._...

                                                                                                                     ~ _ _

r s ~ LIST OF TABLES Table Title PaSe 1 VEGP AFWS Conditional Availability Comparison to Other ; Plants Using the Westinghouse NSSS ................... ! 2 Unavailabilities of the VEGP AFWS, Comparison of l Applicant's Results to BNL Assessment . ............... l 3 BNL Assumptions of VEGP NSSS Steam Generator Makeup Requirements Based Upon FSAR Infomation ............. 4 FSAR Table 10A-4, AFWS Component Failure Data .......... 5 NRC-Supplied Data Used for Purposes of Conducting a Comparative Assessment of Existing AFWS Designs and Their Potential Reliabilities ........................ 6 Nomenclature Scheme for Fault Identifiers Added by

    ,                         BNL to the Appl icant 's Fault Tree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 7 Compa ri son of Data As sumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i 8 VEGP AFWS Unavailability Sensitivity Comparison ........ i 2 l l l <

                     ...... N. - .. - :. . - .                 _
                                                                      ................e..--....-.

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                                                                                           .i. G a l EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

After the accident at Three Mile Island, a study was perfomed of the re-liability of the auxiliary feedwater system (AFWS) of each then-operating l plant with NSSS designed by Westinghouse. The results of that study were ! presented in NUREG-0611.(1) At the request of the NRC,(2) Georgia Power Corporation, an operating license applicant, has provided the NRC with a study of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Units 1 and 2 AFWS,(3) perfomed using NREG-0611 as a guideline. BNL has reviewed this study. The BNL conclusions are as follows ("High", " Medium", and " Low" refer to the NUREG-0611 reliability scale).

1. For an accident i

resulting in a loss of main feedwater (LMFW with of-fsite power availab'le the reliability of the AFWS is in the H M range (un-availability = 2.2E-5/ demand).

2. For a loss of offsite power (LOOP) resulting in a concurrent loss of main feedwater (LMFW): The reliability of the AFWS is on the borderline of the M range (unavailability = 1.0E-4/ demand).

3. For a loss of all AC power (LOAC), except for the 125V DC /120V AC vital instrumentation and control power systems, resulting in a concurrent loss of main feedwater (LMFW): The reliability of the AFWS is in the Medium range (unavailability =3.2E-2/ demand).

A comparson of the VEGP AFWS reliability to other AFWS designs in plants . using the Westinghouse NSSS is shown in Table 1. The specific quantitative comparison between the applicant's and BNL's results is shown in Table 2. The i BNL results are based on the unavailabilites shown in Table 8 of this report, for Case C with " Multiple Errors Assumed." This evaluation incorporates certain fairly conservative assumptions which were made for lack of infomation. These are discussed in Section 9.2.3. It is likely that additional information would reduce the up-availability estimates quoted above.

                      ......'...~._,-.._.-.._-..                       - . _ - - . . - - .     , . . . - - . .

VEGP AFWS Conditional Availability Camparison(a) Table 1 To Other Plants Using the Westinohouse MSSS t t i TaasssatmT EwEmTS Laarse EnsfunitOop LasimitOAc" , eLA=rs 50= asE O noe v,',

                                                      ,    ",!         PLA=TS             tO=             n.E c        n.ca               eLA=Ts         Lo=       we       waca         ;

mEsimucacmass I wEsisescnouse outsTweewousE ) nAODA wen G --- =ca 4 a - EcK o SAas OsuOf #E e EAas OssOf af a saas casof M q%-<> PeasantuSLAsuc <> PRAIAeE 4EL AaeO e PRAlast esLAsop t> g S SALEne <>-4 5ALEns 1>-p SALEGA 4i i

                                                                                    -._-                             ---                                                                 I rao=                        .                                   i.c.                               .                              zio=             o                                 I vaansLEE secust                 e                              V AssaE E Rome                          D                          VAss#EE 20 sue                      4>

T " maa e T#0JAss e f TROJase 4> macease POWsi 4 t useOsaan Poessi e sesOeAss Possef 4> a g maans g a gEmaaeEE D aEftAaeEE 4> es 3. ma=== 4p u s . """ e MS. 8000sesEOes <> ! eEAvEa w ALLEv e oE ave n vALLEv e' eravEnvutav o OA . .8 . O.ses. ,, Pou.TetAc= e POe=TeEAcw e POmeTeEAcw (, COOst e COOK e

COOK 4> s TuesLET Pessai e TumaEV POopei e TuesLEY foefeT 4i SAALEY e FAALEY e FARLEY ti WT e SustatY e SuitAY f i

enORTM AmenA e esOATH ABIS$4 e secayg gggggg g { WOGTLE <> woGTLE D WOCTLE t, 8 _ t A. ; OGOER OP anAGamsinmE ens umeAwastAesLITV MPetESEesTED. 33967 3 ; 8EuCSEAEEEE Awang assa gTy, j i e Teet SCALE fodt Twe5 EwEht es asOT TME SamsE AS THAT FO4 THE Ln0FLW AseO Laef st> LOOP. e Applicant's results l o !>

                                                                                                                       ~$ BNL assessment                                                t I

Table 2 Unavailabilities of the VEGP AFWS, Comparison of Applicant's Results to BNL Assessment Transient Applicant's Results BNL Assessment

1. LMFW 6.3E-6 2.2E-5

2. LOOP 2.6E-5 1.02-4

3. LOAC 1.0E-2 3.2E-2' t

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                                                                                                                             . l S     O

a

1. INTRODUCTION This report is a review by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) of the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

Appendix 10A, entitled "VEGP Auxiliary Feedwater Systen Availability An-alysis," prepared by Bechtel Corporation for Georgia Power Corporation.(3) After the accident at Three Mile Island, a study was performed of the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems (AFWS) of all the then-operating plants. The re-sults obtained for operating Westinghouse-designed plants were presented in NUREG-0611.(I) At that time, the objective was to compare AFWS designs; ac-cordingly, generic failure probabilitf 2s were used in the analysis, rather than plant-specific d9ta. Some of these generic data were presented in NUREG-0611. The probability that the AFWS would fail to perform its mission on denand was estimated for three initiating events: 1 (a) loss of main feedwater (LMrW) without loss of offsite power; (b) loss of main feedwater associated with loss of offsite power (LOOP); ! (c) loss of main feedwater associated with loss of offsite and onsite AC (LOAC). Since then, each applicant for an operating license has been required (2) to submit a reliability analysis of the plant's AFWS, carried out in a manner similar to that anployed in the NUREG-0611 s*udy. A quantitative criterion for AFWS reliability has been defined by the NRC in the current Standard Re-view Plan (SRP) for Auxiliary Feedwater Systens:(4)

                      "...An accepgable AFWS should have an unreliability in the range of 10- to 10-5 per demand based on an analysis using methods and data presented in NUREG-0611 and NUREG-0635. Compensating factors such as other methods of accomplishing the safety functions of the AFWS or other 1

reliable methods for cooling the reactor core during abnormal conditions may be considered to justify a larger unavailability of the AFWS." l l l I l

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2. SCOPE OF BNL REVIEW The BNL review hus been conducted in accordance with the methodology, '

data,andscopeofNUREG-0611,AppendixIII.(1) .It has two major ob-jectives: (a) to evaluate the applicant's reliability analysis of the AFWS. (b) to provide an independent assessment, to the extent practical, of the AFWS unavailability. Unavailability as used in this report has been defined as the " probability that the AFWS will not perform its mission on demand." The term un-availability is used interchanget.bly with unreliability. Specific goals of this review are then! (a) to conpare the applicant's AFWS to the operating plants studied in NUREG-0611 by following the methodology of the latter as closely as a possible. (b) to evaluate the applicant's AFWS with respect to the reliability goal set forth in SRP 10.4.9, i.e., that the AFWS has unreliability in the range of 10-4 to 10-5 per demand, using the above methodology. The NUREC-0611 methodology and the BNL review specifically exclude ex-ternally caused common mode failures such as earthquakes, tornados, floods, etc., and internal failures caused by pipe ruptures.

   .. .. . . . .. -. . .-...              ...n-.--....-..........,-....-.     . . - . . . .            .

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3. MISSION SUCCESS CRITERIA

According to Ref. 3, the AFWS is composed of three mechanical trains which serve the four steam generators at a given unit. The steam generators have been analyzed to require 510 gal / min of flow under the most severe acci- . dent conditions. Each motor-driven pump of trains A and B has a capacity of I ! 630 gal / min and provides more than 100 percent of the required auxiliary ' feedwater flow. Train A provides feedwater to steam generators 1 and 4, and l

train 8 provides feedwater to steam generators 2 and 3. The (steam) turbine-driven pump of train C has a capacity of 1300 gal / min and provides more than 1 200 percent of the required auxiliary feedwater flow. The turbine-driven pump j j provides feedwater to all four steam generators. The success criterion for the AFWS is flow to any two stean generators. Furthermore, as outlined by the IECevaluationof'genericAFWSs(NUREG-0611),theAFWSmustactuatewithinthe l
time it takes for the steam generators to boil dry when no flow is provided to the steam generators. At VEGP, the boiloff time (and therefore the limit on the AFWS actuation time) is approximately 30 min, as stated in Reference 3.

l ! In addition, FSAR Subsection 10.4.9.2.1 states that normal flow is from the CST to the auxiliary feedwater pumps. The design of the CST provides for i l { cold shutdown capability for a period of 9 hours: 4 hours at hot standby, fol- { lowed by a 5 hour cooldown period. Taole 3 of this report provides the nucle-l ar steam supply systen (NSSS) required makeup rates to the steam generators { i for the specific transients within the scope of this review. Initially, sens- l ! ible heat is removed from the RCS to reduce the taperature from a full-power ! operation average temperature of 588'F to a nominal hot standby temperature of

500'F. Subsequently, to bring the reactor down to 350*F at 50*F/h, an initial i i makeup rate of 500 gal / min is required.

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4. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION k,.,. 6 a l#}.

The BNL review of the AFWS reliability is based on the system as described in the VEGP FSAR Sections 10.4.9 and 10A currently on file in BNL's Nuclear Safety Library. The simplified AFWS flow diagrams, f ault trees, and other drawings from Section 10A have been included in this report for convenience (see BNL Figures 1 to 7). All figures and tables will be referred to by the present numbering scheme, e.g., Table 1 'of this report, which is FSAR Table 10A-5, will be called simply Table 1. I e e 0

 . . . .      . . . _ . . .....:..l.......L._-.________.-_........_...

1 1 l Table 5 : NRC-SUPPLIED DATA USED FOR PURPOSES OF CONOUCTING A WPfrAMAilVE As5L55MtMI 0F EA15TINFs i AFWS DE51GN5 AND INEla Posi.MisAL RELIAdiLITIES ' Point Yalke Estimate of Probability of* Failure on Demand I. Canoonent (Har-fware) Failure Data

a. Valves:

Manual Valves (Plugged) ~1 x 10-4 Check Valves ~1 x 10-4 Motor-Operated Valves

                                        -        Mechanical Components                                                       ~1 x 10-3
                                        -        Plugging Contribution                                                       ~1 x 10-4 Control Circuit (l.ccal to Valve) w/ Quar *.arly Tests                                                   ~6 x 10-3 w/ Monthly Tests                                                       *2 x 10-3

b. Ptnes: (1 Ptanp)

Mechanical Components , ~1 x 10-3 Centrol Circuit

                                       -        w/ Quarterly Tests                                                            7 x 10-3
                                       -        w/ Monthly Tests                                                              4 x 10-3

c. Actuation Locic 7 x 10-3

grror ractors of 3-10 (up and dawn) about such values are not unexpected for basic data uncartainties. , 4 1 l l e g y g. -. .,.,,e,- ..,o -.ee**e===***.e -e***e*.******"**-- M*****'+**'"***'"********* * * * " " " ' '

                                           -- , __r           ---

Taule 5 (Cont.) II. test and Maintenance Outage Contributions:

a. Calculational Approach

1. Test Outage Q7g g7 : ( hrs / test) ( tests / year) nrstyear

2. Maintenance Outage -- -

0M AINT. :- (0.22)( hrs140 /maint. act)

b. Data Tables for Test and Maint. Outages

i

SUMMARY

OF TEST ACT DURATION Calculated Range on Test Mean Test Act , Ccmoonent Act Duration Time, hr Duration Time, to, hr Pumps 0.25 - 4 1.4 Yalves 0.25 - 2 0.86 0.25 - 4

Diesels 1.4 Instrumentation 0.25 - 4 1.4 LOG-NORMAL MCOELE3 MAINTENANC2 ACT DURATION Calculated Range on Maintenance Mean Maintenance Act Component Act Duration Time, hr Duration Time, to, hr Pumps 1/2 - 24 7 1/2 - 72 19 Valves 1/2 - 24 7 - Diesels 2 - 72 21 Instrumenta-fon 1/4 - 24 6 I 1 Nota: inese cata tables wert taken frem the Reactor Safety Study ' (WASH-14CO) for purposes of this AFW system assessment. , Where the plant technical rpecifications placed limits on ) the outs duration (s) allowed for MW systan trains, this tech see: limit was used to estimata the mean duration times for maintenance. In gener31, it was found that the outages allowed for saintenanca dominated those contributions to AFW system unavailantlity from outages due to tasting. l I

      .   .   .__1.........._.2_.__....____._                                        . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

L Table 5 (Cont.)

III. tounen Acts & Errors - Failure Data: . Estimated Human Error / Failure Probabilities Modifying Factors & Situatians' With Valve Position With Local Walk-Around & W/0 Eitner f* Indication in Control Room Double Check Procedures

!                                                                                                 Point Value Est      Est. on  Point Yalt.e      Est On
**                                                             Point Valw* Est      Est. on                                                       Error Error       l Error    Estimate Factor                     Factor Factor I           a. Acts & Errors of A Pre-Accident Isature

1. Walves Mispositioned During Test /Maint i (a) Specific Single valve Wrongly Selected out of A Population '

of valves During Conduct of a 10-2 g1

 !                                                                           -2                         1 x 10  -I g1 Test or Maintenance Act (X No.              I g 10 x11          20          2             I       10              I          lo ef Valves in Population at Choice)       75 l

(b) Inadvertently Leaves Correst 3 2 10

!                          Valve in Wrog Position                      5 x 10 4

20 5 x 10 10 10

~3

{ 1 x 10'3 10 3 x 10 10 i 2. leere than one valve is affected 1 x 10'8 20 (coupled errors) l t j 3. Miscalibration of Sensors / Electrical

llelays

                                                                                                                 ~3                       -2             10
                                                                    -                      -             5 x 10              10        10 (a) One Sensor /Ilelay 8.ffected
'                     (b) More than one Sensor / Relay                                                           ~3                           ~3
                                                                     -                     -             1 x 10              10        3 x 10            10 f                          Affected 1

T

8

e q i J 9 4 Table 5 (Cont.)

 '                                              flee Actuation leeeded   Estloated Failure Estimated Failure      Overall            Estimated Prob. for Primary   Prott. of other      Estimate Operator to         (Backup) Control                        Error Factor j                                                                        Actuate AFWS        lie. Operator to     of Failure         on Overall           -

Probability Probability I Actuate AFWS'

b. ,

Acts'& Errors of a Post-Accident Iseture i i 1. Manual Actuation of AFW system free Control I b i' i (a) Considering " Dedicated" Operater 5 min. i to Actuate AFW system and Possible Backg Actuetten of AFW5 15 min. 2x10ll 0.5 (mod. dep.) 2x10j 10 30 min. 1 xx 10 5 10 4 10

                                                                                              .25 (Iow dep.)      5x1f 10 4

10 (a) Considering ' leon-Dedicated" j Operator to Actuate AFW system 5 min,. 5x10lf - and Possible Backw 15 min. I xx 10 0.5 ( W . M .) 5x10ll 10 i Acutation of AFW system 30 min. 5 10 3 .25 (Iow dep.) 5 m 10 3 10 10 10 . I - 1 1 I i l 1 e -i l e

Table 6 Nomenclature Scheme for Fault Identifiers Added by BNL to the Applicant's Fault Tree Basic Events RA = Random Acts (includes pre-accident operator error for manual valves) MA = Maintenance Acts TA = Test Acts OE = Operator Error (includes both pre- and post- accident operator error for motor-operated valves) CL = Closed 1 OP = Open FTO = Fails to Open 4 ACTRNAF = Random failure of Train A. AC power, i.e., Diesel Generator A. ACTRNBF = Same for Train B. Components BYV = Butterfly Valve MDP = Motor-Driven Pump CHV = Check Valve TDP = Turbine-Driven Pump SCV = Stop Check Valve DG = Diesel Generator MGV = Manual Gate Valve MOV = Motor-Operated Valve l 1 l s

 .   .      .. .-. - ...- . _ =                                     . - - - - - - - , - - - - . - - - - . - -

J Table 7 Comparison of Data Assumptions Unavailability / Demand Description Applicant BNL A. Maintenance

1. Pumps 5.81x10-3 5.8x10-3

2. Valves

a. Motor-operataf gate and butterfly valves 2.17x10-6 2.1x10-3

b. Manual butterfly valves on CST discharge lines 4.0x10-7 0

c. Manual butterfly valves on pump suction lines 7.0x10-8 o ,

d. Speed governor and trip and throttle valves 2.17x10-6 2.1x10-3 ,

e. Manual stop check valves at steam generator intakes 0* O

f. Manual stop check valves on pump discharge lines 2.17x10-6 o

g. Manual gate valves on turbine steam intake 0* O

h. Manual gate valves on pump discharge lines 7.0x10-8 o

1. Check valves at steam generator i ntakes 0* 0

j. Check valves on pump discharge lines 2.17xic.-6 o

3. Diesel Generators (On Site AC Power) 0 6.4x10-3 2.4x10-6

4. 125V DC Power o B. Testing

1. Pumps 0 6.4x10-4

2. Valves Op Op

3. Diesel Generators 0 0

              *It is assumed that no maintenance can be performed on these components due to their proximity to the steam generators.
            - / Valve testing does not cause unavailability.
                   .- . - . , :-.- . -. :-.      .~.      - - -     - - - - - - . .   - ~ . -    - - . -
                                             .       .~

s

I

                                                               - .                                                        l Table 7     (Co nt.)

Unavailability / Demand Description Applicant BNL C. Human Errors

1. Pre-accident nature

a. Motor-operated valves with Control Room position indication 5x10-4 5x10-4

b. Manual valves with no Control Room position indication

1) Post-accident operator recovery not possible within 30 minutes 0 5x10-3

11) Posta. accident operator recovery possible within 30 minutes 0 1x10-3

2. Post-accident nature '

a. Operator fails to open motor-operated valves (includes transfer to alternate Condensate Storage Tank) 5x10-3 1x10-3

b. Operator fails to start pumps 5x10-3 1x10-3 D. Mechanical and Electrical Faults

1. Plugging of all valves 1x10-4 1x10-4

2. Failure of mechanical compon2nts including pumps and motor-operated valves 1x10-3 1x10-3

3. Diesel generator fails to start 3x10-2 3x10-2

4. 125V DC power failure 0 0

5. Failure of actuation logic for pumps and motor-operated valves (per train) 7x10-3 7x10-3

6. Control circuit failure

a. Pumps (monthly tests) 4x10-3 4x10 b. Valves (monthly tests) 2x10-3 2x10-3 9

_ m. . . _ . , ..-.....1.. .. - - - . - - . - - - - _ . - . . - - - - - -

Table 7 (Cont.) Unavailability / Demand Description Applicant 'BNL E. Sumation of Random Failures ' (Human Errors and Mechanical and Electrical Faults)

1. Pumps, both motor- and turbine-driven 5x10-3 5x10-3 l 2. Valves

! a. Motor-operated, position change required (plugging plus control 4i ' circuit f ailure) 3.1x10-3 3.1x10-3

b. Manual valves (locked open)

1. No post accident operator 1 recovery possible within

30 minutes (Valve position not verifiable by pump testing) 1x10-4 5.1x10-3

11. Post accident operator recovery possible within 30 minutes (Valve position verifiable by pump testing) 1x10-4 1.1x1

c. Check valves 1x10-4 1x10-{3

3. Diesel Generators 3x10-2 3x10-2 1

i b I i m em-. m o e.~s.~, , e<--.e-<- - e.e~., .e s e - e e s e-e v. e . * *-

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t Table 8 VEGP AFWS Unavailability Sensitivity Comparison l A. All Manual Valves B. All Manual Valves C. All Manual Valves Applicant's Results

     *.                             5.1E-3 Random Error    1.1E-3 Randam Error     1.1E-3 Random Error Except SG Intake            -

Valves at 5.1E-3 Case Random Error i, 1. LMFW a) Independent Fail-ures Only 4.1E-5 1.4 E-5 8.8E-6 b) Multiple 6.3E-6 i: Errors Assumed 5.4 E-5 2.7E-3 2.2E-5 1

    .!      2. LOOP J          a) Independent Fail-i             ures Only            2.0E-4                 1.1E-4                     8.7E-5 b) Multiple                                                                                     2.6E-5
      ,             Errors Assumed       2.1E-4                  1.2E-4                    1.0E-4 I     3. LOAC l         a) Independent Fail-
      ~

ures Only 3.6E-2 3.2E-2 3.2E-2 I b) Multiple 1.0E-2 { Errors Assumed 3.6E-2 3.2E-2 3.2E-2

   .i
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5. EMERGENCY OPERATION b /

L.gg u 3 j For the discussions below, refer to Figures 1 and 2. 5.1 Loss of Main Feedwater (LMFW) Offsite power is available and the two motor-driven pumps (MDPs) start automatically upon trip of both Main Feedwater (MFW) pumps or low-low level in any one steam generator. Automatic actuation also occurs upon a Safety Injec-tion signal. The turbine-driven pump starts automatically upon low-low level in any two steam generators by the opening of the DC Train C motor-operated steam admission valve 5106. Unless the normally aligned Condensate Storage Tank 001 contains an inadequate supply of water and pump suction has not , already been aligned to the standby CST 002, there are no other closed valves i which must be opened either manually or automatically to initiate auxiliary feedwater flow. Transfer to the alternate CST 002 must be done manually, either from the Control Room or locally, by opening the motor-operated valves ' 5113, 5118 and 5119. The operator can remotely manipulate the position of the AFW flow control valves (5120, 5122, 5125, 5127, 5132, 5134, 5137, and 5139) to control steam generator leve?. This can also be done locally at the valves. Upon reaching 100 GPM or greater pump flow rate, the motor-operated isolation valves in the recirculation mini-flow lines of each MDP are auto-matically isolated so that there is no recirculation flow during most of AFWS operation, except for the continuous recirculation flow of the TDP. If the motor-operated valves in the miniflow lines of trains A and B f ail to close, there is still sufficient flow to the steam generators because of the presence of a flow-limiting orifice to the miniflow lines. 5.2 Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) In this case, with no offsite power available, the MDPs can only be started after receiv'ing an automatic signal from the diesel generators

sequeneffig logic. The TDP is automatically started upon LOOP. The Reactor Coolant Pumps are not powered so that cooldown of the reactor core is by natural circulation. BNL has assumed that the required flow rate is 510 GPM, the same as the LifW case because of- the lack of information concerning 7 7 ,..,., . ,_... .. 2. .... ._ . . . - . . _ - . . . _ _ , . . . . . . . . _ . . . _ . _ _ _ . .. .

l l this in the applicant's FSAR and reliability analysis. This still results in only one MDP being required. All valve orientations and manipulations are the same as for the LHFW case, except that the steam admission valve, 5106, is automatically opened to start the TDP directly upon a LOOP signal. Steam generator level control is again either remote from the Control Room or local nanual.

5.3 Loss of All AC Power (LOAC)

Since both offsite and onsite power are unavailable, only the steam turbine-driven pump is available to supply AFW flow. All valves in the TDP train, including the flow control valves, are supplied with DC power so that the operator has complete control capability of the single TDP train from the Control Room without requiring local manual actions unless there are component failures. All of the motor-operated valves in the TDP train are powered from a separate DC train designated Train C which derives power from AC Train A ' with backup power provided by batteries. Therefore, Train C DC power can be I assumed to be independent of Train A DC power because it is backed by

dedicated batteries which would becane the sole power source for the LOAC condition.

4 Since the LOAC condition includes a blackout sequence signal, the TDP is automatically actuated upon LOOP by opening steam supply valve 5106. For the same reasons explained previously, BNL has assumed that the required flow rate is 510 GPM. Again, the Reactor Coolant Pumps are not powered so that cooldown of the reactor core is by natural circulation. Steam generator level control is performed manually either from the Control Room or locally at thel valves. I m l 1 l

  , , . . . . ..         _ . . _    .:. ._._~._ _..._ _ . _ . _ _...        _ _ . _       . _ . _ _ . _

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6. TESTING b ki. E The applicant has based his analysis with regard to testing on the fol-lowing information which has been taken from FSAR Appendix 10A. As of the date of the applicant's evaluation, the Technical Specifications, operating procedures, maintenance procedures, and testing procedures applicable to the VEGP AFWS were not written. Thus, in order to model and analyze the contribution of human error, testing and maintenance to the unreliability of the VEGP AFWS, relevant generic documents were used.

The Technical Specifications used were extracted from the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications.(5) The most notable factors of these preliminary Technical Specifications are (with respect to testing): i

a. The testing frequency for AfWS punips is once every 31 days.

b. The testing frequency of pumps and valves with automatic actuation is perfonned once every 18 months.

c. The testing frequency of each DC train is once every 7 days.

k , BNL interprets item 4 to mean that the automatic actuation signal of pumps and valves is tested every 18 months, not that the pumps and valves themselves are tested every 18 months. BNL also assumes that testing of the automatic j actuation signals and the DC trains does not cause those components to be un-avaliableduringthetest. In addition, according to Ref.3, the generic plant testing and maintenance

procedures used in the AFWS reliability evaluation were a synthesis of generic I

procedures. These generic procedures are based on current industry practice, l 1essons learned f rom previous human reliability analysis, and the VEGP AFWS l design capabilities. Those procedures relevant to testing are: . a. The motor-operated valves in the discharge lines (5120, 5122, 5125, j 5127, 5132, 5134, and 5137) are used to manually throttle.AFWS flow and pressure during testing to keep AFWS flow from entering a steam generator.

b. The motor-operated valves in the discharge lines receive an automatic actuation signal to go to their full-open position even if they are

. being used for testing.

u. . . . . . . . ..Z. . _ , . . . . . . . . . _ . _ _ . _ _ . . ~ . , . . - _ . _ . ..

I

c. The only valves requiring manual realignment for testing or flushing are the recirculation bypass valves (81, 82, 83, and 84).

d. If a single recirculation bypass valve has not been closed, there is

, still sufficient flow to the steam generators due to the presence of a - flow-limiting orifice in the recirculation line.

e. The motor-operated valves from CST 002 (5113, 5118, and 5119) are man-ually controlled with no automatic signals to close (if CST 002 is i being used for testing or flushing of an AFWS train).

f. Valve position after a test is checked by a single operation.

The pump testing procedure requires further discussion. According to Ref.3, the design'. capabilities oi' the AFWS allow flushing or testing while the

plant is operating without.affecting main feedwater flow. The alignment of l any train of the AFWS for testing or flushing is such that suction is taken ,

from a CST and the flow passes through the pump and discharge lines where the motor-operated valves in the discharge lines are used to throttle the flow and pressure. The flow is then diverted away from the steam generators prior to the stop check valves by the manual opening of the bypass (recirculation) valves and discharged to the condensate system. Each recirculation line is

fitted with an orifice that limits the amount of flow diverted away from the

! steam generators. This allows sufficient flow to the steam generators should

the AFWS be required during flushing or testing. When not in use, the re-i circulation valves (81, 82, 83, and 84) remain closed. Also, upon receipt of any of the AFWS automatic actuation signals, the discharge (control) valves go to the full-open position if not already open. Although the applicant states that failure to close the recirculation valves after a test, or during a test i

in which the AFWS is required, does not result in excessive flow diversion, it is not clear that this is true when only one MDP is available. In particular, if either MDP has a capacity of 630 GPM at steam generator pressure with the ( mini-flow recirculation lines closed, a diversion of more than 120 GPM through ! the test recirculation line would result in a flow rate below the required 510 l 7 , ,, , .. . - ... Z. . . . _.' _,.A . - ,__...._.._ _.-. ,. . . ..

o .

.g.

the GPM LMFW (see Table 3). To see the effect of this, BNL has modeled failure to close the recirculation line valves as independent human errors coupled with testing of a single pump which can cause insufficient flow to the respective steam generator. The net impact on the final results is, however, . quite small. e

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                                                                                               -y          . mr       T g  +     -iy.-.,.   - ,y,   ,          -                -.                           .- -

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7. SURVEILLANCE RE(1]IREMENTS j^

0 8

                                                                                                                                                                            . is As explained in the previous section, the Technical Specifications were                                                                                                           l extracted from the preliminary Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications.                                                                                                           l The most notable of them with respect to surveillance are:                                                                                                                          -

l l

a. The verification frequency of the CSTs water volume is once every 12 1 hours. !

b. The verification frequency of valves in the flowpath is once every 31 days.

The applicant's failure data is presented in Table 10A-4 of Ref.3 included , in this report as Table 4. The above information is used in conjunction with the f ailure data for; human acts and errors given in Table III-2 of NUREG-0611, which is provided as Table 5 of this report. From Table 4, it appears that the applicant has assumed operator errors for motor-operated valves only. 1 Pre-accident closure was given a 5x10-4 unavailability / demand which cor-responds to the NUREG-0611 value for valves having control room position indication, which is the case for motor-operated valves. However, no pre-accident error was assumed for manual valves, which typically do not have such' indication. BNL has assumed a value of 1x10-3/ demand for valves whose posi-tion can be verified by the pump testing act and a value of 5x10-3/ demand , for valves whose position can not be verified. 1 Post-accident closure of motor-operated valves is assumed at 5x10-3f demand, which is the NUREG-0611 value for a 30 minute allowable actuation time for a "Non-Dedicated" primary operator to actuate the AFWS. This does . , not consider the probability of the backup control room operator taking the proper action. In this case, the NUREG-0611 value for the overall estimated f ailure probability is 1x10-3, i.e., a 0.2 recovery factor, which is what has been assumed in the BNL analysis. No unavailability due to post-accident closure of manual valves is assumed. 4

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8. OUTAGE LIMITATIONS AND MAINTENANCE L-8.1 Outage Limitations

. From the preliminary Westinghouse Technical Specifications, the limiting conditions of operation are:

a. With one AFWS pump inoperable, the limiting condition of operation ac-tion time to hot standby is 78 hours, b With two AFWS pumps inoperable, the limiting condition of operation ac-tion time to hot standby is 6 hours.

c. With one or more steam generators inoperable, the limiting condition of operation action time is I hour.

d. With less' than 330,000 gal in the CSTs, the limiting condition for operation action time to hot shutdown is 16 hours.

e. With one 125-V de train inoperable, the limiting condition for oper-ation action time to hot standby is 2 hours.

The above requirement essentially define a maintenance policy which does i not allow more than one pump train or steam generator to be unavailable due to maintenance. Any secondary unavailability of a pump train or steam generator is assumed to be due to a failure discovered during testing of the remaining two pump trains. It should be noted that testing by itself does not cause. pump unavailability, only the failure to reclose the recirculation bypass valve or reopen the throttled control valve to a steam generator. However, it is assumed that testing of only one pump train at a time is allowed. , 8.2 Maintenance The generic plant procedures contain the following items which pertain to maintenance:

a. The performance of maintenance on a component requires that the com-pnent be manually isolated on both the upstream and downstream sides,

b. The motor-operated valves in the miniflow lines of trains A and B (5154 and 5155) are subject to maintenance for calibration of the flow element actuation dev' ice in these valves.

7.g. . . _ . l...~.._._..._._..____ ... . . -- - - - ... .- .. .. .

The applicant has stated the required actions to perform component mainte-nance, i.e., the need for both upstream and downstream isolation. Maintenance has been assumed by the applicant for all pumps and valves, including check valves and manually operated check, gate and butterfly valves. However, the applicant did not assume maintenance for the diesel generators. Although the applicant references both NUREG-0611 and WASH-1400(6) as sources for maintenance unavailabilities, the data values for valves appear to be substantially lower than those given in the referenced sources. In particular, the applicant's data compared to the sources is as follows: Component in Maintenance Applicant's Data NUREG-0611/ WASH-1400 Check, stop check motor-operated valves, trip and throttle valve, speed governing valve 2.17x10-6 2.1x10-3 Manual gate valves and manual

butterfly valves on pump suc-tion lines 7x10-8 2.1x10-3 Butterfly valves on CST discharge lines 4x10-7 2.1x10-3 Motor and turbine-driven pumps 5.8x10-3 5.8x10-3 Diesel generators 0 6.4 x10-3 125V DC electric power 2.4 x10-6 *
out of NUREG-0611 scope In the BNL analysis, the NUREG-0611/ WASH-1400 data were used. However, maintenance was assumed only for motor-operated valves. All other valve l maintenance was assumed to be zero.

The modeling of the fault trees and a complete comparison of the data as-sumptions are discussed in detail in Section 9.2 of this repo,rt. i i l l 1 g ,, . -, 2. ....~.~...1t....,.... . - _ - . . _ _ _ _,.__.m......__.. ..

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                                                                                                                                                               !. w i .e . M  S

9. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS LjghyM 9.1 Qualitative Aspects l 1

9.1.1 Mode of System Initiation

1. LMFW - As stated previously in Section 5, both MDPs start
automatically upon loss of both MFW pumps or upon low-low level in any one steam generator. Should the MDPs fail to start, the TDP will start l automatically upon low-low level in ary two stem generators.. All three plups l can be manually started by the operator both fra the Control Room and

, locally. Therefore, the applicant complies with Recommendation GL-1 of NUREG-0611 that AFWS flow be automatically initiated using safety grade l equipment and that manual start serve as a backup to automatic AFWS l i nitiation. ) 2. LOOP - Both MDPs are automatically initiated by the diesel-generator , j sequencing logic once power is received fra the diesel generators. The TDP is also automatically initiated by opening DC-operated valve 5106 by means of ! 125V DC Train C power provided either by the 120V AC power of the Train A diesel-generator through the inverters or by the dedicated battery backup power. All three pumps can again be manually started by the operator either from the Control Room or locally. Therefore, the applicant still complies F l with recommendation GL-1 mentioned above. { 3. LOAC - In this case, only the TDP is available. Since this case { implies LOOP, the TDP is again automatically initiated by opening valve 5106. l The pump is normally aligned to CST 001. If the standby CST 002 must be , utilized as the suction source, valve 5113 is powered by DC Train C and can be I opened manually either from the Control Room or locally, although normally j such aligruent would have been performed prior to the transient. The TDP can also be manually initiated either from the Control Roan or locally in this case. Therefore, the applicant conplies with Recommendation GL-3 of i NUREG-0611 which states that at least one AFW pump and its associated flow

path and essential instrumentation should automatically initiate AFW system i flow and be capable' of being operated independently of any AC power source for l at least two hours.

I l

                                                    . .. _.:                 .._.s...._.._                       . _ .                         . . . - . . _ . _              __   ..

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                                   ,        ___x         - _ , , . - - _ .             .- .,-_ _,      - ,-            . . - - , - , . - = . , . - _ - - . . > _ , - - -                           --

4 L i 9.1.2 System Control Following Initiation According to Ref.3, the AFWS is aligned to be placed in service auto-l matically in the event of a demand. Following the receipt of a safety injec-tion signal, a two-out-of-four low-low steam generator water level signal from

any one steam generator, a trip signal from both main feedwater pumps, or a loss of offsite power signal, the auxiliary feedwater discharge valves go to the full-open position if not already open and the two motor-driven auxiliary I feedwater pumps are actuated and begin to deliver flow from the online CST to

the steam generators. Once flow has been established, the motor-operated valves in the miniflow lines close automatically. The turbine-driven pump is actuated automatically on two-out-of-four low-low water level in any two steam generators or on a loss of offsite power signal. To actuate the turbine-driven pump, the normally closed de motor-operated valve (5106) in the steam supply line to the turbine is opened automatically. The speed governing valve ,

i and the trip / throttle valve, which are in the same line as the steam inlet valve, are automatically controlled by the speed governor on the turbine-l driven pump. Following a transient or accident, the minimum flow is delivered { to at least two effective steam generators within 1 min of an automatic { auxiliary feedwater actuation signal. Once the system has been actuated, the operator can remotely manipulate the auxiliary feedwater control valves in order to control steam generator water level. l For nomal operation, the AFWS is used to fill and/or maintain the water level in the steam generators during startup, shutdown, and hot standby con-l ditions. The AFWS may be actuated and controlled manually during nomal oper- , l ation or abnormal conditions. The motor-operated valves in the miniflow lines i of mechanical trains A and B (5155 and 5154) can only be actuated automatical- l l ly. Although not shown on Figure 1, safety-grade flow meters with both Con-trol Room and remote shutdown panel indication and instrument channels powered from emergency busses have been provided to indicate flow to each steam j generator. This appears to satisfy the requirements of Additional Short Tenn 1 Recommendation 5.3.3 of NUREG-0611. For the specific cases covered by this review, system control is as fol-lows:

1. LMFW - Steam generator level control is maintained by the operator manually modulating the motor-operated flow control valves in the pump i

  ,,......~..,--~-.-N.-                     J- --                      --+   - - - - - - - - - - ~ ~ - - ~ - ~ -

(-.-- .-- - _ . --. - _ - - _ _ _ - - . _ _- ---- .-

discharge lines to each of the four steam generators (MOVs 5120, 5122, 5125, 5127, 5132, 5134, 5137, and 5139). In the event that suction must be transferred fran the primary condensate storage tank CST 001 to the standby tank CST 002, the nonnally closed MOVs 5113, 5118 and 5119 can be manually , opened either fram the Control Room or locally. There is no automatic pump trip on low suction pressure. The mini-flow lines around the MPs are automatically isolated when ptsnp flow is above 100 GPM while the mini-flow line around the TDP continuously operates. There are two nonnally closed manual gate valves, 055 and 056, on a header which joins the two motor-driven pumps A and B together. Normally MDPA only supplies Steam Generators 1 and 4 while MDPB only supplies Steam Generators 2 and 3. By opening both of these valves, either motor-driven pump alone can supply all four steam generators.

2. LOOP - System control is basically the same as for LMFW. The only significant difference is that AC power is supplied by the diesel generators.

Level control can still be accomplished by modulating the flow control valves in the dischanje lines to the steam generators. Transfer to the standby condensate storage tank and use of one motor-driven pump to feed all four steam generators are also perfonned in the same way as for LMFW.

3. LOAC - In this case, only the turbine-driven pump and its flow paths j are available. Since all motor-operated valves in its flow paths are DC-operated, the operator can still control steam generator level by modulating the flow control valves either fram the Control Roam or locally.

In effect, the operator can perfonn all of the same functions as before with the TDP for LMFW and LOOP because the Train C DC power is backed up by its own dedicated batteries which are utilized when Train A 120V AC power'is unavailable. 9.1.3 Effects of Test and Maintensnce Activities The effect of testing on this systen has been previously discussed in Section 6. As noted in Section 8, the applicant has correctly stated that to perfonn maintenance on any camponent, the camponent must be manually isolated both upstream and downstream. This can quite easily incapacitate an entire pump train. For example (see Figure 1), if maintenance must be perfonned on _.... _.. __ . ~ . . ~ _ . . . . _ . . - .. ..._ _._ _ . - ._.. -_ .

i one of the manual gate valves on any one of the discharge lines to the four steam generators from the TDP, valves 016, 019, 022, or 025, all four valves must be closed, therby incapacitating the TDP. 9.1.4 Availability of Alternate Water Supplies ! There are two redundant condensate storage tanks which are each maintained above a minime level of 330,000 gallons. The minimum water level of each CST is designed to maintain the reactor in a hot standby condition for 4 hours ! followed by a 5 hour cooldown period, at sich time the residual heat removal systen can be used to further cool the reactor coolant systen. The cambined minimun operating capacity of the CSTs (660,000 gal) is designed to allow a hot standby condition for 31 hours followed by a 5 hour cooldown period until operation of the residual heat rmovel system is initiated. 4 Each tank is a Seismic Category 1 structure and has a capacity of 480,000 gal . The minimm safety capacity is ensured by all nozzles of nonsafety sys-tems being located on the storage tanks above the corresponding elevation. l The condensate level in each tank is automatically maintained by a level con-trol valve in the line (to the tank) from the domineralized water system, which actuates when the volume in the tank drops to 472,250 gal. ' As the water in the online CST is depleted, the operator may manually 4 realign the system so that the standby CST serves all three peps. A separate line connects each punp to each CST. Therefore, the applicant has taken substantial measures to ensure an . adequate supply of alternate water sources. However, it should be noted that the check valves on the pumps' suction side, valves 013. 033, 051, 058, and 061 have had their flappers removed (see Figure 1). The reason for this is not explained. Such being the case, if and when the operator must transfer to the standby CST 002, it seems that the level in CST 001 will precipitously rise while the level in CST 002 will precipitously fall to equalize the static head. This is because there are effectively no check valves on the pap suc-tion side, so that flow fran CST 002 does not isolate CST 001. This afght cause some momentary confusion on the operator's part and possible mis-j interpretation of instrument readings. i I i I

                                                                ~           ~

l -. . . . . . . , _ , . _ _ . . . . -

1 The specific energency procedures for transferring to the standby CST have not been provided in Ref. 3. The procedures should include criteria to infonn the operator when the transfer to the standby CST should take place, and should meet all other requirements described in Reconmendation GS-4 of NUREG-0611. Ref. 3 does indicate that there are level indicators and alanns both in the Control Room and locally for the CST water level to allow the operator to anticipate the need to makeup water or transfer to the alternate

CST to prevent a low pump suction pressure from occurring. It does not indi-cate whether the indicators and alanns are redundant and whether the low-low .

level of such alanns allows at least 20 minutes for operator action, as de-scribed in Additional Short-Tenn Recommendation 5.3.1 of NUREG-0611. 9.1.5 Adequacy and Seperation of Power Sources 4 { According to Ref. 3, physical separation between the trains of the AFWS is maintained with regard to the prevention of common cause failures created by fire, flooding, and missiles. The simplified piping layout schenatic of the

AFWS is provided as Figure 3 of this report. Excluding the containment i

building, there are only two locations where a portion of all three trains lie

in a common area. The first is in the building that houses the CSTs and the

! second is in a pipe chase in the auxiliary feedwater pimphouse. Both of these j locations:

a. are protected from external missiles and have no internal source for missiles, b.

l have no components sibject to disabling damage due to flooding, and 1 l I

c. have minimal sources of fire. :

l !- Physical separation between electrical components of the AFWS is provided in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75 and Institute of Electrical and Elec-tronics Engineers (IEEE). Standard 384. ~ 9.1.6 Common Mode Failures In BNL's judgement, there.are two obvious aspects of the Vogtle AFWS design which yield potentially significant common mode failure contributions to the system unavailability. See Figures 1 and 2. The first aspect involves , the manual 11y operated stop check valves at the steam generator inlet lines, i

                                ..,.~..a '._,......L._.......---.---------.......-----

i.__.__..-_____- - _ _ _ _ .. . . . _ . . _ _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . . _ _-

(113,114,115 and 116). If the operator inadvertently closes, ary three of the four valves, the mission success criteria is violated. Closure of one of these valves prevents the flow from both of the ptsnps which nonnally supply a steam generator. Even if the normally closed inter-connection between the two motor-driven ptsnps, valves 055 and 056, is open, flow can still not enter the steam generator from the alternate rcotor-driven pump. The other aspect is the testing of the turbine-driven ptsnp coupled with common mode failure to close at least two of the recirculation line valves, (81,82,83,84) causing 2xcessive flow diversion fonn the steam generators. Both of these cases are quantitatively assessed in Section 9.2.3.2. The applicant's own conmon cause analysis, according to Ref. 3 was performed deterministically and in two parts. The first part was perfonned explicitly for commun cause hardware failure by location, and is discussed in the

preceding Section 9.1.5 on physical separation. The second part of the common cause analysis was perfonned implicitly throughout the evaluation. According to the applicant, the results of the entire common cause analysis revelaed no significant conmon cause potential within the VEGP AFWS.

9.1.7 Single Point Failures There were no single point failures discovered during the course of this review. 9.1.8 Adequacy of Emergency Procedures The applicant has not provided emergency procedures at this time. Such - procedures should be provided in the future. 9.2 Quantitative Aspects 9.2.1 . Applicant's Use of NRC-Suggested Methodology and Data 9.2.1.1 Fault Tree Construction and Evaluation In Ref. 3, the applicant states tha'. the initial fault tree was developed to the component failure mode level and then expanded to the component failure cause level. The component failure causes considered were: y ge .. e . ,e e *eomwe*e+ - _ - womeo e sse - n _ go - _

                                                                               -ow oupeee.-wo -oe 7. .- + + - +

i . I f

c. Random failure on demand.

b. Unavailability due to testing.

c. Unavailability due to maintenance.

 ;                                                      d. Independent human error during testing or maintenance.

e. Common cause human error during testing or maintnenance.

l The f* ult tree developed for the analysis is shown in FSAR Figure 10A-7, 4 , Sheets 1 to 30, included in this report with BNL modifications as Figure 7, Sheets 1 to 33. l ~ l l Although the applicant states that unavailability due to testing and j ctamon cause human error during testing or maintenance were considered in the l fault tree, BNL was not able to locate any such aspects in our review of both i the fault tree and the applicant's asseptions in Table 3. Neither the fault , tree nor the data table contain specific fault identifiers so that the i applicant's results can not be unequivocally duplicated. Nevertheless, the i j fault tree is very comprehensive and great care was evidently taken to ] correctly model maintenance acts on all pumps and valves. However, the l important contribution of diesel-generator maintenance was omitted. i In addition, the fault tree does not model maintenance acts excluded by I technical specification requirments in any useful way, particularly l considering that the applicant utilized in WAM-CUT (7) computer code. ! Specifically,'in Figure 10A-7, Sheets 2 through 9 (BNL Figure 7, Sheets 3 through 10), show that the inputs to the AND gates :"N0!F TO SG__ FROM TRAIN , f DUE TO MAINTEPENCE" and a NOT gate described as "DOES NOT VIOLATE TECHNICAL , ! SPECIFICATIONS". l Obviously the latter gate cannot be utilized as described in any capucer ; code because it does not identify exactly which coincident maintenance events l are to be excluded. It is therefore not clear just exactly how the applicant arrived at his numerical results. Ihen utilizing the WAMCUT code, there are basically two approaches to elimination of disallowed coincident test and/or maintenance acts. The first is to make extensive use of NOT gates, while the

!                                           second is so to define the top event that disallowed maintenance and test acts are inherently excluded.

_ m. .,. -_ . . . ~ . - . ~--- - --. - ee-* -m.~*~*-oe- * ~ * ~ *

                      , , . _ _ - . - - - . . - , , . , -                       .--a_r-,.,-             , - . , , - _ _ _ . _ , . ,.                                                                    .

   .L _

i' i l BNL utilized the SETS code (8) to quantify the results. SETS allows both i of the methods mentioned above; additionally, it allows a third method. In the third method, the top event is defined so as to allow unlimited coincident ' test and maintenance acts; the cutsets are then processed by SETS to eliminate those which are to be disallowed by the Technical Specifications. This is discussed further in Section 9.2.3, BNL Assessment. 9.2.1.2 Failure Data The applicant's failure data are shown in Table 10A-4, which is included in this report. The date is in substantial agreement with the data prescribed in Table III-2 " NUREG-0611 (see Appendix A), with the very notable exception i of valve and diesel generator maintenance unavailabilities. The applicant's

data values for valve mt!ntenance are extremely low, ranging from 7x10-8 to !

j 2.17x10-6, as compared to the NUREG-0611 value of 2.1x10-3, while diesel l generator maintenance was neglected. The references cited are NUREG-0611 and l WASH-1400, but BNL cannot ascertain how the applicant derived his values from l those sources. Reference 3 states: "All data were used to quantify point estimates of unavailability on demand, and uncertainty is not accounted for in the analysis. It should be noted that the data utilized in the reliability analysis is generic, and as such the results are an evaluation of the AFWS design. The implication of the data is that they do not account for the actual characteristics of how the plant is to be operated and maintained", 1 (emphasis by BNL).

I l' The situation of pre-accident operator error with respect to closing manually-operated valves appears to have been omitted from Table 10A-4. This subject is further discussed in Section 9.2.3, BNL Assessment, since it has a significant impact on the quantitative results.

i A minor comment: the applicant's data include a maintenance I unavailability of 2.4x10-6 for 125-V DC electric power, while random failure l was neglected. It does not appear that maintenance unavailability was included in the fault tree, while randan failure was included. l 2 h - .

9.2.2 Applicant's Results 9.2.2.1 S.ystem Unavailabilities According to Ref. 3, the quantitative results of the conditional unavailabilities for the three cases designated by the NRC for the AFWS are: A. Case 1 - LMFW - For the case where there is an assmed loss of main feedwater with a reactor trip occurring and offsite AC power available, the conditional unavailability of the AFWS was calculated to be 6.3x10-6, B. Case 2 - LMFW/ LOOP - For the case where there is an assumed loss of main feedwater with a reactor trip occurring and offsite AC power not available, the conditional unavailability of the AFWS ms calculated to be 2.6x10-5, C. Case 3 - LMFW/LOAC - For the case diere there is an assumed loss of main feedwater with a reactor trip occurring and no AC power available, the conditional unavailability of the AFWS was calculated to be 1.0x10-2 9.2.2.2 Dominant Failure Modes and Conclusions It is stated in Ref. 3 that the quantitative measure of importance was used as an indication of the dominant contributors to the AFWS conditional unavailability. The value of importance was then taken as the sum of all cut set probabilities containing a category of failure divided by the top event probability. The failure catetories analyzed for each case are: random failure of valves on demand; unavailability of valves due to maintenance; , operator error; and pmp unavailabilities (random or maintenance). The applicant's dominant failure modes and conclusions for each case are as follows: A. Case 1 - LMFW - The most significant contributor to systen failure was pump unavailabilities. The importance value to pump unavailabilities was calculated to 86 percent. An examination of the category of pap i unavailabilities revealed that pap failures were occurring in combination with electric power systen failure. Furthennore, it was detennined that the l unavailability of the turbine driven pump was not the most significant single component of the AhS, but this punp did not dominate systen unavailability. N? l l

y. . _ . . . _ ._..____.....a-__.... _ ._ . . . - ._. . . . - . . _ . . . _ _ . . _ .

1 B. Case 2 - LMFW/ LOOP - The findings for Case 2 revealed pump unavail-abilities contribute 80 percent to system unavailability. An examination of this category revealed, as did Case 1. no single component of the AFWS can be thought of as dominating (orcontrolling)systemunavailability. The reduc-tion of the system conditional availability for this case was found to be directly attributable to the assumed loss of redundancy in ac power sources. C. Case 3 - LMFW/LOAC - The findings for Case 3 revealed (under assumed conditions) that the AFWS is reduced to only the turbine-driven pump. Thus, any single failure along this pump train would be sufficient to fail the AFWS. , ) The dominant contributors to system unavailability were as follows: ,

1. The turbine-driven pump package (pump, trip throttle valve, and speed governing valve).

2. The steam inlet valve (motor-operated valve 5106).

9.2.3 BNL Assessment 9.2.3.1 Fault Trees j Since the applicant's fault trees, provided in Ref.3, seem to be substantially correct and complete, particularly with respect to the modeling . of maintenance acts at the component level, these same fault trees with minor revisions were utilized in the BNL analysis, provided in this report as Figure 7, Sheets 1 to 33. The major revisions which were necessary were the addition of fault identifiers and a finer separation of certain maintenance acts so the top event could be properly identified and the non-functional event "Does Not l Violate Technical Specifications" eliminated. The fault identification } nomenclature scheme is shown in Table 6. The applicant did not separate the 5

                                 ~ steam generator intake sections in the expanded block diagram. Figure 6, into random and maintenance contributors because no maintenance can be performed on either of the two check valves or the stop check valve in a typical intake section, e.g., check valves 121 and 125 and stop check valve 113 on Steam

Generator 1 Intake. However, BNL did so in order to model both maintenance on: g. O the stop check valves on the pump discharge lines to a given steam generator j and also a possible unavailability due to testing if the operator fails to l reclose the recirculation valve in the condensate system return line. See Figure 7 Sheets 12 and 13. , i; Another significant revision was the inclusion of diesel generator 4 maintenance unavailability on Sheets 14 and 15. There were other minor revisions which are identified on the fault trees. It should also be noted

] that the top event on Sheet I was modified to show the actual gate names and j the Boolean expression which was used to replicate the 3 out of 4 combination gate used by the applicant in the WAM-CUT code. The SETS code used by BNL does not utilize combination gates. i The fault trees as shown allow unrestricted coincident test and maintenance act s. Those acts which are not allowed by the Technical Specifications were then deleted from the cutsets by use of the DELETE TERM option of the SETS . code. Specifically, the equation establishing the terms to be deleted is based on the ExpandedJteliability Block Diagram in Figure 6, and is given below: ! DELETE = A*B + B*C + A*C l

!                                 A = PMPAMAINT + A1MAINT + A4MAINT + TAMDPA003 i'

B = PMPBMAINT + B2MAINT + B3MAINT + TAMDPB002 C = PMPCMAINT + C1MAINT + C2MAINT + C3MAINT + C4MAINT + TATDPC001 l Af ter cutsets are obtained, they are processed to eliminate f ailure combina-tions which imply event " DELETE." i j This essentially disallows simultaneous maintenance on or testing of two or three pumps, or one pump and one of the discharge flow paths of another pump, . or two or more discharge flow paths when each flow path is supplied by a ! different pump. 9.2.3.2 Failure Data i A general comparison between the applicant's data assumptions and those ! . utilized by BNL is provided in Table 7. ) I l

                                                                                                                                         -)
+

l

9 i a The most important aspects of the applicant's data in tenns of sensitivity l in the quantitative results are the maintenance unavailabilities assumed for

all valves and the pre-accident human error assumed for the operator inad- !

vertently closing a manual valve. The applicant's assumptions for valve maintenance are extremely low compared to the NLREG-0611 data, ranging from 7E-8 to 2.17E-6, while the BNL assumption was 2.1E-3, based on NUREG-0611

data, for all motor-operated valves and 0 for all manually-operated valves and check valves.
Similarly, the applicant appears to have assumed 0 for the pre-accident

] operator error of inadvertent closure of a manually-operated valve. The BNL ! assumptions for this case were SE-3 for locked-open manual valves whose posi-tion cannot be verified as a result of the testing of its associated pump and i 1E-3 if testing does allow position verification. This has very important ! implications for the manually-operated stop check valves 113, 114, 115, and } 116 at the AFW intake to each steam generator. Since each valve lies in a l common discharge path for the two AFW pumps which supply any given steam , l 9enerator, its inadvertent closure blocks all AFW flow to thFt steam j generator. I 4 It does not appear that pump testing per se can verify the position of

those valves because, during the pump test, the discharge pressure is throt-

! tied by the motor-operated valves (5120, 5122, 5125, 5127, 5132, 5134, 5137, l and 5139) so that flow does not enter the steam generators but is diverted to the Condensate System through the recirculation bypass valves. Thus, no flow l passes through the locked-open stop check valves in question. In the IGtC f Standard Technical Specifications (4), periodic surveillance is generally not required if a valve is locked into its amergency position. Thus, the only way j for the position of these valves to be verified appears to be by a voluntary visual inspection during a pump test. However, for independent frilures, i utilizing the post-accident recovery factor of 0.25 is specified in Table 5 i for30minutesallowabletime, yields (5E-3)*(0.25)A 1E-3. The common mode failures described in Section 9.1.6 have been quantified and added to the sys- !

tem unavailabilities for independent failures only, (as shown in Table 8) as
follows

I 4 - . . . . - . . . . _ _ . . . . _ . _ . _ _ . ._

 - . - - ,   n,-.-            ,s--,y,,m      .        . _ . -, ,      ._m..---.---    , _., , , , . , ,- , - .._ _ _ . . , , , . - ,                             ,           - , . , , - . - , , . ~       ..,y-.-.        ,- , , , , . .-,, -

 , e NOFLOSGS1234 = CRVLO*0EFTCCRVS+CM0ESCVS*0EFTOSCVS                                              (1)

CRVLO = CMOECRVS + TATDPC001 (2) where NOFLOSGS1234 = Multiple error contribution to the probability of no flow to steam generators 1, 2, 3, and 4. CRVLD = probability of the condensate return valves (081, 082, 083, 084) being in the open position. OEFTCCRYS = probability of the operator failing to close the condensate return valves after automatic AFWS initiation, SE-3. CM0ESCVS = Common mode probability of pre-accident operator - error in leaving the manually-operated stop check valves (113,114,115,116) in the closed position, IE-3. OEFTOSCVS = probability of the operator failing to open the stop check valves after automatic AFWS initiation, SE-3. CM0ECRVS = Common mode probability of pre-accident operator error in leaving the condensate return valves in the open position, IE-3. TATDPC001 = probability of the turbine-driven pump undergoing test, which requires that the conder. sate return , valves be open, 6.4E-4. Substitucing (2) into (1) NOFLOSGS1234 = (CM0ECRVS+TATDPC001*.(0EFTCCRVS)

                                          +(CM0ESCVS)*(OEFTOSCVS)
                                          = ( I E-3+6.4 E-4 ) *( S E-3)+( 1E-3 )* ( 5E-3)
                                          = 8.2E-6+5E-6-1.3E-5 Therefore,1.3E-5 is the multiple error contribution to the top event from either misalignment of multiple stop check valves or misalignment of multiple condensate return valves.

, . . . . . . . . . . .'. . - . L =- _ _ - - - - - - - - - , . ~ . - - - - - - . . . .

   ,         e r

For each of the initiators, and for different error probabiities as-sociated with other valves, Table 8 provides results calculated with and without this contribution. The purpose of this is to display the effect of the assumptions which have been made, which, in the present case, must be re-

                  .garded as ingredients of a parametric sensitivity study. It is unclear whether opening all of the condensate return valves really fails the systeci.

If not, then the corresponding contribution if 5.E-6 (see above) should be subtracted from the system unavailability quoted in all " Case b" entries in Table 8, and from the results given in the Executive Summary. 9.2.3.3 System Unavailabilities A sensitivity comparison between the applicibutors because no maintenance can be perfonned on either of the two check valves or the stop check valve in a typical intake se LOAC in which the following assumptions have been made:

1) Case A - All manual valves are assigned a pre-accident operator error rate of SE-3/ demand plus a 1E-4/ demand for plugging.

i

2) Case B - All manual valves are assigned a pre-accident opentor error l rate of IE-3/ demand plus a IE-4/ demand for plugging except l the manually-operated stop check valves at the steam l generator intake lines (113,114,115,116) which have a

' pre-accident operator error rate of SE-3/ demand. .

3) Case C - All manual valves are assigned a pre-accident operator error rate of IE-3/ demand plus a IE 4/ demand for plugging. The

! manually-operated stop check valves 113, 114, 115 and 116 are i evaluated with a recovery factor of 0.25, which also equates to a 1E-3/ demand failure rate. i i I The purpose of presenting results in this way is to display more cleerly the effects of certain assumptions. In many similar analyses of Westinghouse systems, credit has been taken both implicitly and explicitly for operator l action to recover certain errors. Here, choosing lower. error probabilities

corresponds, in effect, to taking more credit for recovery.

     , . , ,  -. ... .. ..-. .. ~. - . d - . -           '
                                                                                 .-- ..~.    . ----~~~ -    - -

                                     . - . . _                   .      .               -                               - .                         . - -  . _ ._.      ~ _-
 -,                  e 27-For the purpose of selecting the proper assessment for compliance with the NUREG-0611 guidelines,_ and correspondence with the applicant's actual design,                                                                      .

BNL has chosen Case C with common made failures included for the final evaluation provided in Tables 1 and 2 in the Executive Summary. 9.2.3.4 Dominant Failure Modes The results of the BNL analysis are' provided in Figures 8, 9 and 10 for Case B of Table 8, assuming independent failures only.

1. Case 1 - LMFW i

The dominant failure modes are shown in Figure 8. The leading group is j random failure of one pump combined with maintenance outage of a second pump and random failure of one of the manual stop check valves on the steam , generator inlet lines supplied by the third pump. The next significant set is . random failures of three out of four of the manual stop check valves on the steam generator inlet lines, followed by random failure of two pumps and one of the manual stop check valves supplied by the third pump.

2. Case 2 - LOOP The dominant failure modes for this case are shown in Figure 9. The leading group is random failure of both diesel generators (ACTRNAF and ACTRNBF) combined with random or maintenance acts on the turbine-driven pump i train. The next major group is maintenance acts on one of the pumps combined j with random failure of one of the diesel generators and random failure of either one of the manual stop check valves on the steam generator inlet lines supplied by the third pump or random failure of the third pump itself.

3. Case 3 - LOAC

                                                 . The dominant failure modes are shown in Figure 10 for this case. As expected, single random failures or maintenance acts on the turbine-driven
                                       . pump itself or one of the several valves on the turbine inlet supply line comprise the predominant group of failure modes. At much lower failure probability rates, the next group consists of double failures pertaining to 4

5 y g,. . . .~, , ,...-...---e._ w-+e-- 4.--%. - ' -m*--e..~<-... * * *-=--a __ _ . . _ . . _ , _ . - - _ _ . . - _ , , . . _ _ _ , , , , .m,. ._ __ .._..,_,.m , - - , - - - . - - - -

1

                                                                  .             random failures of the locked-open manually-operated butterfly valves on the condensate storage' tank supply lines to the turbine-driven pump suction com-bined with random failure of or operator failure to open the normally-4 closed motor-operated valves isolating the turbine-driven pump suction from the standby condensate storage tank.

9.2.3.5 General Comparison to Other Plants The Vogtle AFWS design is similag to many other plants in that it consists of two motor-driven pumps and a third pump which is steam turbine-driven. It does have several notable features such as two redundant, safety-class, con-densate storage tanks each of dich has sufficier.t capacity for an extended cooldown and satisfaction of the design basi.s requirements. Transfer to the

standby tank must be cene manually. Another feature is the provision of a

i- third, independent tra'in of DC power for the TDP and its associated motor-

! operated valves, designated as 125 V DC Train C power. In this manner, failure of either DC Train A or Train B fails only one of the MDPs, not an MDP J and the TDP simultaneously. Also, since the motor-operated throttle valves on the TDP discharge lines to the SGs are DC-powered by Trcin C, SG level control can be maintained by the operator from the control room even during a LOAC transient. The location of the test recirculation lines very close to the SG intakes allows the position of all valves on th? pumps' discharge lines with the exception of the manually-operated stop chr.dk valves on the inlet lines to eachSG(113,114,115,116) to be verified by the pump testing. The MDP headers are joined together by two nomally-closed manual valves 055 and 056. By opening both of these valves, either MDP can be utilized to j feed all four steam generators. This fenturs is also provided in several other AFWS designs. p _ _. _ . . _ - . . . _ . _ _ _ ,

s Finally, the provision of the stop check valves 113,114,115, and 116 in the SG intake lines is rather unique. Although, as mentioned previously, the potential for human error blocking all AFW flow to an entire steam generator increases, the valves may provide additional safety margin in preventing the back-leakage of steam into the AFW lines. 9.2.3.6 - General Coments The Vogtle AFWS is a generally very well-designed systen. The provisions for pump testing allow for nearly complete verification of the valve positions on the pump's discharge, the exception being the steam generator intake lines

         -themselves. The inadvertent closure of the manually-operated stop check valves on the intake lines does, however, have a significant effect on the unavailability analysis. This effect is substantially reduced if the valves have control room position indication or if the operator can credibly recognize the problem and take appropriate actions outside the Control Room within the 30 minutes allowable action time.

The actual procedure for and the sequencing of pump testing was not adequately explained in the applicant's analysis. It is not clear how many of the recirculation bypass line valves to the Condensate System are simultan-eously opened during the testing of any one pump. Presumably, the recircu-lation line valves for the two steam generators supplied by each MDP and the four valves for the four steam generators supplied by the TDP are simultan-eously opened. e i ep- . -...n........ ----..----1--.,.--. . . . - . . - - - - - . - - , - - . - - + - - - - -

                                     -_=   -                   _ , _ _ _                       _           _         . _ _

REFERENCES

1. U.S. NRC, " Generic Evaluation of Feedwater Transients and Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Accidents in Westinghouse-Designed Operating Plants,"

NUREG-0611, January 1980.

2. Letter from D. F. Ross, Jr., U.S. NRC, to "All Periding Operating License Applicants of Nuclear Steam Supply Systems Designed by Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering," dated March 10 1980.

3. Georgia Power Corporation, "VEGP Auxiliary Feedwater System Reliability Analysis," VEGP FSAR Appendix 10A, current edition.

4. U.S. NRC, " Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants - LWR Edition - Section 10.4.9, ' Auxiliary Feedwater System'," NUREG-0800, Revision 2, July 1981.

5. U.S. NRC, " Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactors," NUREG-0452, Revision 4, Fall 1981.

, 6. U.S. NRC, " Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants - Appendices 3 and 4: Failure Data," WASH-1400 (NUREG75/014), October 1975.

7. Erdmann, R. C. , Leverenz, F. L., and Kirch, H., "WAM-CUT: A Computer Code for Fault Tree Evaluation," EPRI-NP-803, Science Applications, Inc., June 1978.

8. Worrell, R. B., Stack, D. W., "A SETS Users Manual for the Fault Tree An-alyst," NUREG/CR-0465, Sandia National Laboratory, November 1978.

4 m , , & = _ _ an> assww es-m ++-h** **w _ , , _.- . _ m ,,

Table 3 2NL Assumptions of VEGP NSSS Steam Generator MaNup Requirements Based Upon FSAR Information Flow Requirements (GPM) . Power Levels Loss of Main Loss of offsite Loss of All (MWt) Feedwater (LMFW) Power (LOOP) AC Power (LOAC) 3425 510 510 510 AFW Flow Information . Pump Discharge F1ow . Pump Recirculation (gal / min) Flow (gal / min) Turbi ne- Moto r- Motor- Turbi ne- Moto r- Motor-Driven . Driven Driven Driven Driven Driven Pump Pump A -Pump B Pump Pump A Pump B - 852 552 552 144 0(a) 0(a) at 1235 psia 120*F (a) The motor-operated valves in the motor-driven pump recirculation lines are intended to close when the pump flow reaches the miniflow,100 gal / min, within a minute. Thus, the motor-driven pump recirculation flow was not considered. i m = S ee = - ee come dem -,enermamma e - ee sp 48me eg=M *eu=**Suu>*hw**d -6'*8*"**M*h4***"**M*O**" *"'* *

                                                           -             -t     -                = ' - - -      "e"**                            "+      'H      " " " " ' " ' * ' ^ "

P P & 'O A O O l .

Table 4 TABLE 10A-4 (SHEET 1 OF 3) AFWS COMPONENT FAILURE DATA Unavailability Failure on Repair Time .Due to fault Event / Tree Description - Component Demand Rg h ence lhl Maintenance flefereneg . Check valve (at steam gen- 121, 122, 1 x 10~" 1 NA NA NA

,  erator intake) falls to             123,  124, open on demand                      125,  126, 127,  128                                                                                                 ;

Stop check valve (at steam 113, 114, 1 x 10** 1 NA . NA NA i* generator intake) ra!ls to 115, 116 open on demand Stop check valve (on AFWS 017, 020, 1 x 10"* I 7 2.17 x 10~' 1, 3

  - discharge) fails to open          023, 026,     ~                                                                                      4 on demand                          037, 080,4                                                                                           p3 0's3, Ot:6                                                                                           o m
                                                                                                   ~8 Motor-operated valve ton           5120, 5122,       1 x 10~'        1        7       2.17 x 10                               1, 3       8 discharge line) transre,rs closed
                                      $125, 5127, 5132, 51386 p

5137, 5839 y a - Cate valve (on discharge 015, 016, 1 x 10 '

1 7 7 x 10-e j, 3 g O line) transfers 019, 022, closed 025, 035, # , 036, 039, 1 042, 045, 060 Check valve (on discharge 001, 002, 1 x 10~' 1 7 2.17 x 10-8 1, 3 line) fails to open on 014 ' demand . 003, 002 ~3 ~3 Motor-driven pump 5 x 10 1 19 5.81 x 10 1 fails (includes controls) .

                                                               -3                                  -8 Turbine-driven pump                001               5 x 10          1       19       5.81 x 10                               1 fails (includes controls)                                                                                                                                     r

i

1 P P o o a o a .

     ;                             Table 4 (Cont.)        TABLE 10A-4 (SHEET 2 OF 3)
     'e Unavailability raifure on                    Repair 1ime        Due to roult Event / Tree Description e                                        Component       __ __ Dema nd   Referenge _         th) _ Haintenanco       Re fo rgneg_

t Motor-operated va lve 5106 3.1 x 10-3 1 7 2.17 x to-' 1 (on turbine intake) j fails on demand

    !*    Check valves (on                    006, 008        1 x 10-*              1            7
                                                                                                    *~

2.17 x 10-6 1, 3 8 turbine steam 4 j intake) ra i l to open . 4 on demand i Motor-operated valves 3009, 3019 1 x 10-* I 7 2.17 x 10-6 i, 3 (on turbine steam intake) transfer closed on demand i Cate valve (on turbine 005, 007 1 x 10-* I NA NA NA h l steam intake) transfers a closed on demand m I Butterfly valve (on 093, 09ts, 1 x 10-* 1 7 7.0 x 10-e 3, 3 m suction line) transrers 095 M closed y Motor-operated valve (pump suction line) 5113, 5118, 5119 3.1 x 10-3 1 7 2.17 x 10-8 1, 3 h o rails on demand > Butterfly valve (on 090, 091 1 x 10-* 1 a0 a as x 10-7 2, 3 CST discharge 092, 097, line) transfers 098, 099 6 closed I { CST raiis . 001, 002 1 x 10-e 3 NA NA NA f, railure of actuation Tra in A, 7 x 10-3 1 NA NA NA signal train 8,

   ;                                        -speed gove rno r
   ;     Loss or orrsiti power               Case 1          0.2                                NA 3                       NA                  NA tailure or 125-V dc
        .selectric power Tra in A, train B, MA                   NA            2         2.4 x 10-8          3 train C 9
                                                                                                                                                ..,,.*a

i P P O A A A O

                  .i 1

Table 4 (Cont.) TABLE 10A-4 (SHEET 3 OF 3) l I Unavailability 3 Failure on Repair Time Due to l Fault Event / Tree Description Componenj A and !!efegenje th) Maintenance Reference j Failure or ac Train A, 3 x 10-2 3 NA NA NA 4 electric power (onsite - t ra in B case 1 and 2) Motor-operated valve closed by error 3009, 3019, 5 x 10" 1 NA NA NA 5120, 5122 - 5125, 5127, 5132, 5134, 5137, 5139 Mo manual open signal to 3009, 3019, 5 x 10-3 1 NA NA NA motor-ope ra ted va lve 5106, 5113, 5118, 5119,

                                         .                     5120,    5122,                                                                            <

5125, 5132, 5134, 5137, [ y 5139 i M No manual start signal to 001, 002, 5 x 10-3 1 NA NA NA (n pump 003, speed > gove rno r y Trip and throttle valve or speed governing valve rails Trip and th rott le 1.1 x 10-3 1 7 2.17 x 10-6 3 $p to open on demand valve, speed governing valve 2

                                .er., enc.s j        ..

1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, " Generic Evaluation of Feedwater Transients and Small-Break i Loss-or-coolant Accidents in Westinghouse-Designed Operating Pla.its," ffURIC-U611, Bulletins

                }                   and Orders Task Force, Orrice of Nuclear Reactor Regul3 tion, January 1980.                                               ,
                  ,             2. Engineering Judgment.

l 3. Rasmussen, N. C., 31_R.L., " Reactor Safety Study - An Assessment or Accident Risks in

,                                   U.S. Commerica l Nuclea r Power Plants," U.S. Nuclea r Regulatory Commission, } LASH-1400 l                       .          (NUREC-75/014), October 1975.

b. Maintenance is defined to be maintenance whereby tire component is unable to perform its function.

Also, unavailability due to maintenance is calculated as the frequency of railure times the repair time. - 1

{ , 3 : ta 9 a=

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   !                                                                                                                             BNL Figure 1

1 voGTLE Apwg ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT Georgia Pbwer unir i A=o unir 2 FSAR FIGURE 10A-1.

        .33-9

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2

 . . , _       . - . . .                         L.......----...----------~~~_----;---                                                  - - -

i 9 i i Motor- Motor - Tunnel Driven Driven I Pump Pump T68 2 l Train A Train D g

         !.                                               Ma.in Steam i

f- V8 rna m . i Room TRAnd c Common i , Pipe Tnam A Chase TnAI., C TuMne-CONTAINMENT Driwn CST 1 Bull. DING Pump ,

                                                                                                                                                                     ~.
         .                                                                                                                                Room                         ,

f, Train C AFWS Pumphouse TW Main T6A Steam Vdn 1 Room i BNL Figure a A Ninic camenarma rtant AFWS SIMPLIFIED PIPING LAYOUT Georg. ia Ibwer s1 u 11,,,o u 12 FSAR FIGURE 10A-3 433-9 d 1

e s SYSTEM SYSTEM DESCRtMIONS DRAVWINGS I I SYSTEM BOUNOS RELIAtiLITY BLOCKOIAGRAM DEVELOPMENT 1 FAULTTREE DEVELOPMENT TO COMPONENT NUREG1811 . FAILURE CAUSE TECHNICAL = SPECIFICATIONS MINIMAL e CUT SET ANALYSIS i OPE R ATING PROCEDURES REVISED F AULT TREE

         .                                                                                                                         DETERMINISTIC COMMON CAutt                                ,

ANALYSIS STATISTICALLY INOEPENDENT FAILURE CAUSE OUANTIFICATION RESULTS ANO CONCLU$lONS

                                                                                                                    .                      19947 3 i

BNL Fiqure 4

     )             GeorgiaPower v0cTLE E LECTRIC OENE RATING PLANT UNifiANOUNiT:

AFWS RELIABILITY EVALUATION METHODOLOGY FLOW CHART FSAR FIGURE 10A-4 433 9

                                                                                                                                 -       e .-%.      , -.
                            -,-.--ge.        - ,., , - - - - - , - -               - , --             , - - , -        .---_m-.-       -     .,,,. -        -e -----+, - ,-~-+     wo-w -

4 b 4 m TRAIN A '

DISCHARGE TO STE AM 1 GENERATOR 1 g 4All SECT 80N I"N TRAIN A OtSCHARGE i TO STE AM

     ;t                                        GENEARA., TOR 4

{ TR AIN C STE AM t

DISCHARGE g GENE RATOR 1

!    {                                            TO ST E AM             j      INTAKE SECTION                  i t                                         GENERATOR 1 t   .                                                (Ctl                            ISGI) 4
)       *                                                                                                       .-

TRAIN C I

1. STEAM OtSCHARGE GENE RATOR 4 l TO STE AM 1 l GENERATOR 4 miAKE SECTeON -

g 4C4) (SG4) 3' PUMP C SECT 104 2/4

    *                     (PMPC)                   TRAM C DISCHARGE                            STEAM
    }                                                                            GENER ATOR 2    8 -

4 TO STE AM INTAKE SECTION GEWERATOR 2 4 i (SG2) 1' TRAeN C STEAM l DtSCHARGE g GENERATOR 3 TO STE AM y GENERATOR 3 INTAKE SECTION 3

IC30 ISG3) s t g TRAW S

    ,                                           DeSCHARGE TO STE AM

' GE80ERATOR 2 g (S2)

    .                   SECTION
   .;                    fPMPSI          '

TRAM S 4 DISCHAftGE

          ~
                              ~                   TO STE AM GENERATOR 3 ta3                            BNL Figure 5 L

j CTRC GEpeERATMANT UNIT 1 APWS BLOCK DIAGRAM cemg. a nwer A [T. Ap E T. FSAR FIGURE 10A-5 1 3 ? 433-9 1 1

r s

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                                                .IN I

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     !                                                                        NOlFTSG2                                                         NOlFTSG3                                                   NOlFTSG4 a

NOlFTSGlh l I I I I I I I esost10333 m3 gestME asoof TOSG2 SG3 sesTME asoof 70SG3 304 sesTME escot TO SG4 i 983 sestasta SECTS e Ast SE T Ast SE T e 1 r, A r7 A r, I r7

i IFTSGilNTM , IFTSG2tNTK g IFTSG41NTK T Q IFTSG31NTK T T ST NI T ST EN2 STMGEN3 I I STMGEN4 I I I I I I FE td E Taasse C s'N Taases S h

fnases C E TesAsse A tsh TelAsse C 4 Tesasse A Tesalue C Tesases e T3ft suostT3fC escop13FS T suosti A es0ofTefC r i asestTsf A seest -seeSA essestfetsesft Plaer **** W IFTSGSl234 : STMGENS 123 + STMGENS 124 + STMGENS 134 + STMGENS 234 STMGENS 123 = MOlFTSGI- NOlFTSG2-NOlFTSG3 STMGENS 134 =NOlFTSGl NOlFTSG3 NOlFTSG4 i : STMGENS 124 : NOlFTSGI-NOlFTSG2 NOlFTSG4 STMGENS 234 =NOlFTSG2 NOlFTSG3 NOlFTSG4 14811 Fim me 7 ( % ett 1 nf 33) 3 l VOGTLE UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL k ELECTRSCGEfeERATimeGPLApeT FSAR

                                                                               % . l3I h tT h i                                                                                                                                                                             '
          .                                                                                                                   usesT t Ansa ur' T 2                 ,

FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 1 OF 30)) 433-9

_ _ . _ __ - ._ - -. . . - . - . --- ._-~. _ - _ . - . . . _ _ . - . _ . ... - . ... . - ... - - .-. .. - - i e 2 . 1 .

I ' I SGI INTAKE SG 2 INTAME SECTION FAILS \ SECTION FAILS i STMGENI STMGEN2

i O O: T T; , I I i .- i 1 I SGI IN TAME SGI INTAKE SG2 INTAKE SG2 INTAKE SECTION FAILS SECTION IN SECTION FAILS SECTION IN ls RANDOMLY MAINTENANCE l RANDOWLY MAIN TEN ANCE i OR TEST OR TEST i

t l I SGilNTKRAND SG21NTKRAND SG2tNTKMAINT I' SGilNTKMAINT i

 ;         I                                                                                                                                                                                                           ,

l t SG3 INTAKE SG 4 INTAKE f

SECTION FAILS \ SECTION FAILS STMGEN3 STMGEN4 ( ]' l [ f

           !                                                                                                                                           T l# % :

l i i l l l l SSS INTAKE SG3 INTAME SG4 INTAKE SG4 INTAKE j . SECTION FAILS SECTION IN SECTION FAILS SECTION IN RANDOMLY MAINTENANCE RANDOMLY MAINTENANCE , e OR TEST OR TEST j

           !                                       SG3fNTKRAND                                                            SG41NTKRAND t                                                                   SG31NTKMAINT                      ,

SG41NTKMAINT s . BNI. Pteure 7 (Sheet 2 of 33) a UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL :

                                                               % EDWETh            k la Sctneccemenateessrtaarl.

unser i asso vent 2 - BNL ADDITION FSAR FIG. IOA-7 _ SHEET IA OF 3'O. _ m. l

k NOtF YO SG1 FROM TRAIN A

-                                          9eO4FTIF A 4          BNL REVISION i                                                                 T I                                    t \ \                                                            l DeOIF 70 501
,                                                 1 FROM TRAIN A OUE TO RANDOM
'                                                                                                  FAILuftE I                                    3 AIRPM PAR
                          \                                                               l                        I T                             TRAaN A flour                TRAtti A DIS-             ygagggapuny
.                 Y  AT                              TO SGI UNAVAIL-           CHARGE SECTIO 90             SECTIO 90 FAILS ASLE DUE TO                TO SGI F#1LS                MADIDOesLY M tr  i                               RAAI9ff ENA80CE               RA8eDOMLY AIMPMPAM A1 RAND                 Per AA A81D I                           I
!                                        TRA100A N                  TRA800 A Puher t                                       coeAmGE vALv5                SECT Oss a RSAINTENAfeCE O.
                                   , AIMAINT-MOV5139 o

P'8PAasA NT im 4 BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 3 Of 33) VOGTLE UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL ELCCTRIC GENERATIfeG PLANT

FSAR CreOlgiaIDMY. useiT i ANO um:sv 2 ,

FIGURE 10A-7 (SHE'ET 2 OF 30)I e 3 3-9

s il

,    I NO4F 70 SG1 FRome TRA4N C 8001FT1FC l
     '                                                                                                l j                        BNL REVISION                                                      T
     -                                                          t  \ \                                                          .          I FT                                                                   NOIF 70 SG1 FRome TRAIN C
     ,                                                                                                                         DUETORANOOtt t                                                     188                                                                     F AlLUME -

j i' ' CIRPMPCR A i - m i \ t - i ; I I TRAlti C FLOW TRAsN C DIS- TRAISI C PURIP I j T \ TO SG1 UNAVAIL-ASLE DUE TO RAAINTEMAtfCE CHARGE SECTION TO SG1 FAILS RANDORALY SECTIO 98 FAILS RAfsDOteLY

    !                                                                 CIM PMPCM C1 RAND                   PtdPCRAfC l  !                                                                                        .

I I TRAttiC N TRAISI C PUREP

CHARGE VALVE SECTIOed ens g

1 y htA8NTENANCE

 . j i

i O CIMAINT-MOV5122 o PREPChtAnff 1

74 i.

BNI. Fiqure 7 (Sheet 4 Of 33) UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL

                                                                                  -"y,EIC           GEffERATM N                                   FSAR Georg,ia fbwer              unit i ,NO unit                 ,

FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 3 OF 30)'. 1 433 9 i

I

 $                                                                                                                      o 6

4 i NOf F TO SG2 FROM T RAIN 8 NORFT2FB l I BNL REVISION I n ) 1 i T SG NOlF TO SG 2 R TR IN . FROM TRAIN 3 T DUE TO r1ANDOM IN EN FAILURE ! B2 RPM PBR .

                         \                                                        I                        I TRAlal3 flout             TRAIN 3 DIS-             TRAIN B PUMP TO SG2 UNAVAIL-         CHARGE SECTION              SECTION FAILS
  ~

ASLE DUE TO TO SG2 FAILS RMY MAINTENANCE RANDOMLY i B2MPMPBM m2RANO PMPsRANO I I TRAW5DE TRABN 3 PUMP CHARGE VALVE SECTION W

     .                                 dyL,                   MAINTE*$ANCE O

B2MAINT-MOV5132 o PMPsMAINT somo BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 5 of 33) VOGTLE

                             ,                    ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
                                                                                    -     UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL IO b YCI            UNIT 1 ANO UNIT 2        ,

FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 4 OF 30) i 4319

1 6 i l l t NOtFTOSG2 t froes TRAIN C

    '                                                  NOtFT2FC j                   BNL REVISION                                            T
                                                   \ \                                                                                   l 8008F TO SG2 F       \                                                                        F MOM TRAIN C l                                                                                                                         DuE TO RAfeDOM FAILURE
   }                                             T j    i,                                                                                                    C2RPMPCR
    .                                                                                                                                 n
    )                        .

I i TRAlps C flour TRA8N C E TRA8N C TURIP

     -                                                          TO SG2 uMAVAIL-               CHARGE SECTIOff                                 SECT 80N FA8LS E                                  ASLE DuE TO                           TO SG2 F AtLS                          gmy                                     -

l IFpT RAAeNTENA80CE RA8eDOteLY

                                  \                  C2MPMPCM C.RA O                              FM.CRA O
    ,                                                                      y j                                                        1                          1 j

TRA888 C Puner VE SECTIOfe Ise i

51256 sh AGAINTENA80CE RAA881TE98A8eCE 1 l ;

t O C2MAINT-MOV5125 o resFCesA NT

eura

BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 6 of 33)

VOGTLE UNIT 1 AFWS TAULT TREE MODEL ELECTRIC GENERATING PLA81T FSAR MID MWI unit 1 ANO uNav z FIGURE 10A-7 (SHE2T 5 OF 30) 433-9

l . i i NOtF TO SG3 FROM TRAINS

   .                                                   seOsFTars O

1 l BNL REVISION T

l\ \ I -

l T 5 04F TO SG 3 TR m FROne TRAIN 5

   ,                                     D4E Y                                                           DUE TO RANDOM m N          E                                                        FAILURE

(

     .*                                \         3
     .                                                                                         B3RPMPBR
                                        }                                                                       -%

l i \\ \/ TRAles a FLOW TRAIN 3 Dis-TRA400 3 PUMP e T TOSG3 UNAVAIL- CHARGE SECTION SECTION FAlt3 T ASLE DUE TO TO SG3 FAILS gmy l T MAINTENA8eCE RANDOMLY B3MPMPBM

   ;                                                                 y                           .3RA O                   .MP.RA
   .                                                       I                             e t

TRANs a Ds TRAsesePuesP . CHARGE VALVE SECTIOss m

        .                                                                       MAINTENAfeCE O

B3MAINT-MOV5134 fs PREPSMAWT 3 N7-3 BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 7 of 33) v0GTLE , ggIT 1 Apyg. FAULT ThEE MODEL EL ECTRIC GENERATING PLANT

                                          .la M YtY                unit ANO use:T 2                  .

FSAR.

]                                                                                              '
                                                                                     ,                         FIGURE lbA-7 (SHEET 6 OF 30).
 !        .u.

            . __ _ _ _ _ _ . _ ~ _ .    . - .              .-_.          -               -.         -.        .      . _        - -         _ -             -.      .

i

i 8s08F TO SG3 froes

    .                                                                                         TRAIN C
                                                    -                 seceFT3*C i

j BNL REVISION . 7 1 \ \ \ - . i 1 1

seOIF TO SG3 i FRO 44 TRAIN C DUE TO RANDOte j FAILURE l.

                               '                                                                                 C3RPMPCR

.f f

                                              \                                                                                                                                                        ,
    .                                          \                                                                         I                            l j                                                                            TRAses C FLOW                  TRAlff C D85                    TRA380CPtar                                          .

t 70 SG3 UssAVAst. CHANGE SECT 9000 SECTIO 98 FAtts

   ;                   l ASLE DUE TO                   TO SG3 FAILS                     RANDOnety                                             1 g                                                                            BAA880TENA8eCE                  RAmponety

! f m b CAO O C.A O

   !                                                                       I                            1 M@g                         TRases C PURAP MCTICIE 808                                                                                           l 5127 88f                  RAA888TE98A80CE.

t e mggegggg ;

    .                                                          ~

O C3MAINT-MOV5127 a PGAPCREA4NT I"#'3 i . BNL Fioure 7 (Sheet 8 of 33)

                                                         .                      NCTRiC GENE RArmG etANTUNIT 1 AFN                                    FAULT TREE MO' DEL
                                                 %GMRT                          unit i ANO UNIT 2           .

FSA FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 7 OF 30), m.

                           - +       --          -T                                                                                                                     - - - __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

I s l 9006F TO SG4 FROM

,                                                          TR AIN A
!                                   BeOIFT4FA I

i 5 l BNL REVISION l \ \

                                            )                                            DIOlF TO SG4 T                                                        FROM TRAIN A DUE TO RANDOed FAILURE l

e l A4RPMPAR

                                                                                              -s
                          \    rr i

r

                      \                          TRAIN A FLOW I

TRA888 ADe$. l TRA40s h PUnsp TO SG4 U8sAVAll- CHARGE SECTIOf8 SECTIOpf FAILS 1 ASLE DUE TO TOSG4 Fast $ RA88DOteLY MA80sTE86A80CE Amy A4MPMPAM l A8AA880 ParARAss g I i b VE TRAlps.A

                                                                 =C10 =PURAP
                                      .ma                      *AANTEB8A88CE
                                                               =

gB4488 Tete 480CE a i O A4MAINT-MOV5137 PasPaanAmT 88

4 I BNt. Figure 7 (Sheet 9 of 33)

UNIT 1 AFWS. FAULT TREE MODEL CsCOrgiaPtMver h

                                         $        e   mir     i  AasO     ,

U m , TNCTRiC FSARcEseERATiesc etAs.T FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 8 OF 30) 4339

I - 9 seoeF ro sc4 TR C 9eOIFT4FC

!,                                                               O T

BNL REVISION g g g l FENAEC ouE To RAmoose

 =                               TE                                                           FAILURE C4RPMPCR
                                    .-                                                         - s.

b\\E TO it-B000 h goog og

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                  ~

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i i

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. e                                                              GAAladTEssA8dCE I

O C4MAINT-MOV5120 fs

                                                                    '"PC'**'"T                                  "

i BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 10 of 33) WoGTLE UNIT 1 AFWS *' FAULT TREE MODEL E LECTRtC CEp8ERAYlseG PLANT p

                              .IO      E              Usesi1 ANO UestY 2       .

FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 9 OF 30) ,' 1 4339

a . BNL REVISION TYPICAL SGilNTKRAND h mm,hltm

                                         ._. 1         .                I
                     //h y
                        .                       -:$t*~                        er                ~:ky                f/)c V O O

RACHV121 O RACHV125 O MASCVil3 .

                                                                          ** , l' "

SG2lNTKRAND *****' n i n O n [

                        =a a
                              ,e/

es w

                                                -::,w ctoseo

w stono

                                                                                                -. =a -
                                                                                                  'j{ght           (p/'A[a           Mepf I'3                                       O                    O S                     RACQH                122  RACHV126             RASCVil4                     M              0 SG3tNTKRAND h          mina,a ltm II /                       I                                               I                     I Il LVI
                    /          e
                        .v a te af 134.a 48 ctono
                                                                                  . L5 ctono CNSC tjegge w
                                                                                                                                       ,e, MS        06 O

RACHV124 O RACHVl28 O RASCVil5 5 O SG4INTkRANO h "Y l'* t/ I I I / fl

                                                                                                   .      $8        [                             i V 7               RAC         12 3           RAC       127       RAS          11 6 BNL Figure 7 Uheet 11 of J3)

A stecemc oswenAf ewo rtant UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL GeorgiaIbwer ma u ,i u ,, raAa FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 10 0F 30) ene y ,< . . .... .,. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . . .

e SGI INTAKE ;

SECTION IN

              ,                                                                                                                                                             l MAINTENANCE                                                                                                          I SGilNTKMAINT           OR TEST I                     I                                             l                                                       l STOP CHECK                       TRAIN A PUMP SECTION IN                           TRAIN C PUMP SECTION IN STOP CHECK                                                                                              TEST & OPEPATOR FAILS TEST & OPERATOR FAILS VALVE 020 IN         VALVE 046 IN MAINTE NANCE         MAINT ENANCE                     yggyg gg                                          yggyg                 g o

3 O MASCV020 O MASCV046 5 IPMPATEST SGIPMPCTEST I I TRAIN A PUMP OPERATOR FAILS TRAIN C PUMP OPERATOR FAILS SECTION IN TO RECLOSE SECTION IN TO RECLOSE TEST VALVE OSI TEST VALVE OSI O TAMDPA003 O OEMGV0810P TATDPC001 O OEMGV0810P O SG 2 INTAKE SECTION IN . MAINTENANCE SG2iNTKMAINT OR TEST n m I I I I STOP CHECK TRAIN B PUMP SECTION IN TRAIN C PUMP SECTf 0N,lN STOP CHECM TEST & OPERATOR FAILS TEST & OPERATOR FAILS VALVE 023 (N VALVE 037 lN ' MAINTENANCE MAINTENAflCE VALVE 082 VALVE 082 . O O o " MASCV023 MASCV037 SG2PMP8 TEST _ _ SG2PMPCTEST _ _ l i TRAIN O PUMP OPERATOR FAeLS TRAIN C PuesP OPERATOR PAILS SECTION IN TO RECLOSE SECTION IN TO RECLOSE TEST VALVE OSI TEST VALVE OSI ! ! O TAMDP8002

                                                                                    . O OEGV0020P TATDPC001 O                    OEMGV0020P O
                       .                          ,,,,                                             BML Figure 7 (sheet Iz 07 33)

A E Lact mic at NanAt:No rt Amr 11 NIT 1 AFWS PAULT TREE MODEL Georgiali>wei ma u.., i Ano u. , , sNL AcolTION FSAR, FIG.10A 7, SHEET 10A ' 0F 30 i

o s SG3 INTAKE ! SECTION IN

                                                                           \                              MAINTENANCE

SG3lNTKMAINT OR TEST ;

                                                                                                                   &                                                                                                                                         l
                                  -                                                                                                                                                                                                       I 1                                              I                                                                     I STOP CHECK                                   STOP CHECK                                            TRAIN 8 PUMP SECTION IN                                                         TRAIN C PUMP SECTION IN TEST S OPERATOR FARS                                                            TEST S OPERATM FARS VALVE OES IN                               VALVE 040 IN MAINTENANCE                                 M AINT E NANCE VALVE OSS                                                                       VALVE 083 i

o o MASCVO26 0 MASCVO40 0 ' SG3PMP8 TEST SG3PMPCTEST i I I

                                                                                   '                          TRAIN 8 PUMP                           OPERATOR FAILS                                  TRAIN C PUMP             OPERATOR FAILS 1                                                                                                               SECTION IN                                TO RECLOSE                                     SECTION IN                TO RECLOSE TEST                                       VALVE 083                                      TEST                  VALVE 083 i

O TAMDPBOO2 OEMGV0830P O O TAMOPCOOI OEMGVO830P O .

l 4 ' SG4 INTAME I SECTION IN ! \ MAINTENANCE

SG41NTKMAINT OR TEST

} I I I I STOP CHECM STOP CHECM TRAIN A PUMP SECTION IN TRAIN C PUMP SECTION ,1N VALVE 043 IN TEST S OPERATOR FALS TEST & OPERATOR FAILS VALVE Of f IN TO RECWSE CMMNSATE TO RECLOSE CMOENSATE MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE i VALVE 084 - VALVE 084 i MASCV017 O MASCV043 O o SG4PMPCTEST SG4PMPATEST_ _ _ _ l I TRAIN A PUMP OPERATOR FAILS T24481C PUMP OPERATOR FAILS ! SECTION IN TO RECLOSE SECTION les 70 REGLOSE ! TEST VALVE 084 TEST VALVE 084 i O TAMDPA003 O OEMGV0040P TAMDPC001 OEMGV0840P O O i , BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 13 of 33) l A SCinec eswanatimo rt Aw, UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL ! Georgialbwer ma u , i A= u=lt i BNL ADDITION ! FSAR FIG.10A 7."iHEET '0 8 B' 0F 30 , 433 9 l

i g 3. . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _ . . - - . . .-... . . ... ... . ..... ..,. -

   .                                                                                                           T RAIN A PUteP                                                            *
  .                                                                                                           SECTION F AILS g                                                                                                         IN MAINTENA,NCE                                                                                  l PheFAMAINT g

j i BNL ADDITION

   .                     J Os

, , , , i ,

i seEset eEnEaATom GATE VALVE PUMP #3 NOlF TO GATE VALVE CHECK VALVE GATE VALVE Teals A in es2 IN IN PUMP A DUE TO $35IN W1 IN 845IN as AsIIT EMAIGC E MAINTE NANCE MAINTE N ANCE MAINTENANCE MAIN T E NANCE MAINT E N ANCE MAINTE 4ANCE l l ; l l* O MADGA 0 MAMGVO42 0 MAMDPAOO3 O MAMGVO45 O MACHVOOI O MAMGVO45 . 7 ' '

   !.                                                                       I              IFTMDPAMAINT                                  I j

NOlF THROUGH NOSF THROUGH a SUTTERFLY VALVE MOV 5119 l 6 095 00E TO DUE TO l MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE .

l . l BYVO95MAINT MOV5119MAINT , l

I I I I i BUTTERFLY SUTTERFLY BUTTERFLY MOV 5119 , VALV,E OSI VALVE #95 BN IN asAmTENWE M MTEN W E Al[N i SAAastTENANCE MAINTENANCE I O MABYVO91 O MABYVO95 O MAMOV5119 O MABYVO97

i 1 SUTTERFLY SUTTERFLY SUTTERFLY SUTTERFLY l
VALVE 990 VALVE 992 IN VALVE $99 IN VALVE 995 MAIDsT NAseCE MAINTENANCE O

MABYVO90 O MABYVO92 O MABY VO99 O MABYVO98

, i                                                     suoisr sso oR iNsurFiciENT rta                                                               BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 14 of 33)

VOGTLE l UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL

                                                                     @IQbWN M k            ELECTRIC CENERATiNG PLANT UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 FSAR f

FIGURE lbA-7 (SHEET 11 OF 30)l 433-9

I (-

                                                                                                                                                                                                                            .. 1 f

5 Y R AIts 3 PUMP SECT 80N F AILS MAlfeTENAseCE i BNL ADDITION I T. I I I I I I

                                      \ GAT.E                                                                                                                   ALVE CHECK,V,N i           (seesE.L  A.       ..eEs.t.aAver
                                                 -- VALVE MAsasTEasAseCE PUeA.P N

MAlf(TLNANCE 882 U feO.lF OUETO to MAfNTENANCE GAT.E V.ALVE MAINT ENANCE MAINTENANCE GAT.E.N VALVE MAINT ENAleCE j NAseTEmAncE t O O a O MADGB O MAMGVO36 O MAMDPBOO2 O MAMGVO60 MACHVOO2 MAMGVO39 i T -

I IFTMDPBMAINT I

                                       .                               feOIF THROUGH                                       NOtF THROUGH                                                                            i-SUTTERFLY VALVE                                         MOV58IS

! see DUE TO DUE TO I 884810TENANCE MAINTENANCE f BYVO94MAINT MOV5fl8MAINT i c I I I I ; SUTTERFLY SUTTERFLY RAOV 5118 BUTTERFLY

,                            VALVEgag                                                 VALVESeeIts                                              198                    VALVEGOS see nsasesTEssAssCE                                          esAINTENAfeCE                                       MAINTENAfeCE            IN MAlesTEfeAf0CE
     !                    MA8QY          90 O

MABYVO94 O MAMOV5tl8 O MABYVO99 SUTTERFLY BUTTERFLY SUTTERFLY SUTTERFLY 4 { VALVE 800 DN VALVE 097

!        .                                 VALVESW108                       W1310

! I esAlleTEgeAasCE geassffE90A00CE MA4NTENANCE 100 MAINTENA80CE i O MABYVO92 O MA8YVO91 O MABYVO98 O MABYVO97* , , , l

   .y seoer-No on iessuFFsCitasT Foom                                                 BNI. Figure 7 (Sheet 15 of 33)

VOGTLE GeorgiaPowerd*'"%Til*NOZT7""'lf * " UNIT 1 FSA AFWS[ FAULT TREE MODEL FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 12 OF 30):' m.

I 1 i _A__, _=_. =_ , , 1, l' l i i i i i i i f~ i

                                                 .=,=a
                                                   =::.-                        -w:                                                                       ~:,= -                                                   ~2=~              -a: -
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                                                                                                                                                                                           = , , =z,a~
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             .~.2.=. _. ,          . .. _ ,                                                                                                                                        .

O O n O O TDeCMAinTn L O MAMGVO22 O MAMGVO25 MAMGVOl6 MAMGVOl9 'T' MACHVOl4 MAMGVOIS T' '

     ,i are,f,=.       ,, IFTTDPCMAINT                                                                                      =-                                    ==                      .==.                 r_.

j _= _=_ _==. O O uOv5ii3MAinTQ O O noisMainTO MAMOV5106 l BYv093MAiurQ MATDPCOOI MASGV MATTV i i

                              .           N.OE.                                 _m,Tuanc.                                                                                                                                   ;

l' , O O MABYVO93 MAMOV5tl3 V, = =:

                                   ._._.,                       =. = _ . ,               . = . . = . . _~w:                                                .             ,           ~,= _ ' ' ,         ~w:-                 ~
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                ,.=
            . =.__ =_ .                                                         ,                                                                        _ _ , . _                       .               . . . . _ .                                   I l

I

   !        'T                        O                                    O                          O                                                       O                       O                      O MACHVOO6 MAMOV3OO9 _,,

O l

   ',                                  MABYVO90          MABYVO97                                         MABYVO98 MACHVOO8 MAMOV3Ol9
        .       +                                                                ,,,,,,,
                                                                               .==.

l l .==. l MABYvmi o O MABYVO99

   ;,                 MABYVO92 i                                                                                                                                                                                  BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 16 of 33)

I M TLE UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL , Georg. a Powerh k ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT unir u.uo u=ir : FSAR . FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 13 OF 30): 4139

l 1 4 I 5 e t t l M O SG1 M o SG2 SE Y O SG3 M OSO4 CtmAseO masspOerLY C2nasso AA88DCt8LY C3nasso RafsDOesLY - CenAsso AAAIDOABLY I I I I I I l l Fays

F S N As 3 ts N[a$I ts CLOSED NtCLOSE D ts N[a$I[

CLOSED CLOMO CLOMO CLOSED CLOSE D CLOSE D l

   )                O RASCVO2O O

RAMGVOt9 RASCVO23 O O RAMGVO22 O RASCVO26 O RAMGVO25 O RASCVOl7 RAMGVOl6 O 7 AOLS CLOSEO F AOLS CLOSEO FAILS CLOSEO FAILS CLOMO OCOasvlift DCDesWlt. DCDesvt127 OCceevelse

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        .l s

i I 4 . l 1

19967 3 BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 17 of 33)

TLE

ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL*:

Georgia Pbwer mk unit i Ano unit FSAR FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 14 OF 30)f , 433-9

l lr\' f

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7 L 0 E 3 t 0 69 E 3 V S 4 NS tLD 4 01 D

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     .                                                                                             I V.

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                 .OS                                              r       SILY                                                                   (

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                                                                              \N                                                                                             _

A [\/ RA A 4 E 2 b / 3s R E 9 VS 4 VS 3 ,! LLD LLD O O AIE V T I AI E VAS E2L T4C FO OG V M I VAS eel TsC Ae FO 0GM N A L P - AS A G A G G R R NI

                                                                                                                               \                            T A

RTi E NN Eu GD CN E I A L R iT T GEi CT OLN VEu E 7 E 6 V S VS 3 LLD 4 LLD O 0 AIE PAIAE AS

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r e w E4 A H H$ C R C R P o

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                        \N A
                                                                               \3mR R                                                           2                                                     6
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   .                                       I        VAS E6L T4C FO     OG      M I            VAS EsL TsC Ae FO      OV     M A

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                                                                                                                                              '                                                                                          R             .It) oR     trE N                 o aRI CL     o                                                                3                                            L E i                     O irFMDPAOO RAMGVO35                                                                                  RACHVOOI O                                                                                       E.-

ACTRNAF iSTMoeaOO2 RAMOPAOO3 ', i i i i I I mov'E'oE' vin Wa*R,'s %R* sea"'s"S'at "M,e ,o o na'U" rume n , y,=goa,3

  !,                                                                                re                                                                                                                                                       vo rnai = =

b uo*a2' IFTMDPAOO3 ISTTRNAF OEMDPAOO3 : j i I

                    .u,,%'v"L.                                                                                                                                                                                          %'v',;;'

IFFBYVO95 IFFMOV5119

                          .... .                                                        ,.....<.                               ,,,,,,,,                                                                                  ,..... .                                                             .                    i
 !                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          9:,w

~ctosto var ~.'ar cLoseo

                                                                                                                                                              ,o                                                        ~ctosto var 1

g j o RABYVO95 o RABYVO92 gMOv5n9Ct RABYVO99 o RACSTOO2 o I I I cst N1 et nNAL au o,E. ,"g$',; ov. agg; ,37o.,o'a.,oEg o l O RACSTOOl O OEMOV5119FTO ACTRNAF O O RAMOV5119 soon-3

                        "***""*"'"*""*"""'*"                                                                                                                                                                                                    BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 19 of 33)

VOGTLE UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL! ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT FSAR Georg.iaPower unit i Ano unit 2 FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 16 OF 30)I l 433 9

o l t M.R $$75 M ,. ~5.RA.3[" i i b i i ,

    ;                                  i t      O.                 W STARf                        MOTORDnewtN GA,(VALVt.8.                              N06,fROM                                   CHf CK WALW1
                                     '" I                                           V                                           '                                                                          R                s0       on VEN                        STAnt C    ID                                                                                    t IR AIN O                  M8M8 007                          DE M ann Q

l l Q RAMGVO60 IFFMDPB002 Q RACHVOO2 ACTRNBF' STMDPB002Q RAMOPBOO2 i i i i l' O EE'" mo,'ER ol?viu I!ARYE5'.i't Sh""h,h,,' ' ms,a u-=> 'o vaA'= on,vi. - . O IFTMDPB002 O OEMDPBOO2 O Moreen ISTTRNBF i I , 3 F BUT ER LVE Ng'y IFFBYVO94 IFFMOV5118 l m m. .

                                  , , n=.          ,

[. ,. nv!=,

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                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             ?'

O O RABYO94 [ y ovS'8c' O RABYVO98 RACSTOO2 O - l

 .                                RABYVO91 TY                                  Elf       CAL                                                   FA         m C8',$'
                        'A     '                                            . s.t.ov .,,.                              g",R,,;                                                         o .T. A o j

O O O

 !.                      O RACSTOOI                       OEMOV5118FTO                                                    ACTRNBF                                                        RAMOV5118                                                                               noest.:            f l                                   " ' ' * " " * " * " " " ' "                                                                                                                                                       BNL Fiaure 7 (Sheet 20 of 33)

WCTLE UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODELi ia Power k ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - FSAR Georg. m unit uuo unit 2 , FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 17 OF 30)\ 433-9

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                                                                                                                                      '2     T         T A                 O      02 T         E V                  V 2

E l K C E H OH C t e e L U A l i S ( C A h S F GLS R ( S R 7-I NB G DIAD E NFE F V S 7 WA A REOS I E PE SV VL OA LC AG S F S I e r u FS AF 10 GV 4 O 5 g 1 N E O i E MR V3 F R _ OMOT R LE A O T U AA V OGM I F E l V L I G STR N E N I t O NESE T B U N G A A F _

                                    -                         S                            G                                     R P                EL DLID D              NT    A T              ATF SE         V T

S I I POEO IRVL RHLC T TA AF T T T N A O V s D L P , N O i 0S E e G E 0 s ON s 0O N T1 v 3L Ae v I S8 VC I l IR O OS T OU N T u S e L pI A Mi s A2 RT Ei F NN E o Eo AR FE T A P O O T N I I O0 T1 S 5 Iv OO NM 8 p sRu t T T Co CN I G CTEi EO VTN O D E oLN RIEOO O 9S 1 s i vEu DILEN 0O Aev P 3L E ATA i N tP F AM eMPED R E OC D T l VC OS eL pI M i s RUO A A UP T R N F E r 5P 2 0O F s G e A 1 0 i 5O VT 1 V S T w OS M S b MIL I P A O 7 F MR E N E V O .a i OMO L D A O g r R T V I F E STR AA l V E OGM s a o e I T OSE A N E N O A G A E T s G R r w E e n e E 8 s u e V O p LA D O R V o I K C E OVH C A O N H s C R i O N 9-3 3 4 e l i e* ' i: l !l ! :!ll ; I ll

lIl! . l Il l

0 3

                                                                              )             F 3             O 3

f 0 o 2 3 T 2 E t E e H M ' ll 1i h S ( e ( S R 7-7 A A 3-7 e S 0 6 r F M 1 N 9 0 u ED 6 1 g E 6PN 0 i F R U 8OA 1 N f U I 5OM V L N G VTE O B I

                 .         OSD          M                                                    F MINL         A R

AO O F LL6 T AA9 M F T 6 UN1 5 6 N A NIG V , O0 0 1 L 1 5 I ASO 5 V P G W V MNM E O N O PO I O M T E N M NOT E O A Rr E T Ei 6P O6 S Nn Eu 0O 1 NT9 E 1 l co 5O _ P L5 cn _ OA l ia n VT _ O NV ti OSL GO cr Ei MI NIS M Nun A C F I L TAC F ANN C F MGI OI A N

$nr

[\6 9 1 V 1 TSR UNT AEO OT R T Sl e w

             /                                               P T M                                           OO                         b L                             N                          P N         F                                             a COC          C                                           i g

N r I RN I R o TEA T e WR C G OEOT D L(P E 9-3 3 4 lll l

e 8 TRIP AND THROTTLE VALVE FAILS TTVF O _ I I LOSS OF DC SIGNAL TO ELECTRICAL TRIP AND TH O E POWER ON THROTTLE VALVE FAILS TRAIN C VALVE FAILS TO OPEN ON DEMAND

             ,                                                                           ISTTTV DCTRNCF                                                   "^77V'T T

I i 1 OPERATOR FAILS GOVE R FAILS GOVERNOR l O RASPDGOV O OESPDGOV SPEED GOVERNING VALVE FAILS SGVF I T' 1 l LOSS OF DC SIGNAL TO SPEED

ELECTRICAL SPEED GOVERNING POWER ON GOVERNING VALVE FAIM TR AIN C VALVE FAILS O E ND O

DCTRNCF F3 ISTSGV k (%/) RASGvrTO i T I I SPEED OPERATOR FAILS [ GOVERNOR TO OVERRIDE FAILS SPEED GOVERNOR > , O RASPDGOV O OESPDGOV 3 o.3 BNL Figure 7 (5heet ze OT JJJ a crRIC GENERATING PLANT UNIT 1 Aphis FAULT TREE MODEL 6,tlCTj.ia PDWCT unit ANo uNir a FSAR 433 9 FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 21 OF 30)

                    .. . - . - - . - - . . . - ._               T- --- - .         - - --              - . . - . - - - -      -   - -

s. ..

 ~.                                                                                                                                                            .

f 6 i 1 l MOV 3019 MOV 3009 FAILS FAILS

   '                                           CLOSED                                                                 CLOSED f                 SIMVG19                                                                           SIMVG99 l                                              O                                                                      O l                                                                                                                                   I

I I I MOv 30i9 M V #9 MOv 3009 MOv3019 FAILS CLOSED FAILS CLOSED NOT OPEN NOT OPEN ON DEMAND ON DEMAND i

O n O i RA MOV3Ol9CL -- MOV3Ol9CL

RAMOV3OO9CL - MOV3OO9CL i

  ;                                  I                                                                        I
  !                   MOV 3019                           MOV 3019                                       MOV 3009                MOV 3000 J                    CLOSED                             FAILS                                          CLOSED                   FAILS i                  BY ERROR                            TO OPEN                                       BY ERROR                  TO OPEN                           :
  ?                                                                     .

I l Q O MOV3Ol9FTO Q O MOV3OO9FTO j OEMOV3Ol9CL -% OEMOV3OO9CL -% 1 I I I I j LOSS OF DC NO MANUAL MOV 3019 FAILS NO MANUAL MOV 3009 FAILS ELE E^ TO OPEN ON ELE T IC L OPEN SIGNAL TO OPEN ON OPEN SIGNAL POWER ON ON TO MV E9 DEMNO TO MOV 3009 DEMAND TAINA TRAIN 8 1 1 O DCTRNAF O OEMOV3Ol9FTO O RAMOV3Ol9FTO O DCTRNBF O OEMOV3OO9FTO O RAMOV3OO9FTO 10947 3 BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 25 Of 33) L CTRCGENERATING PLANT - FSAR Georg.iaPower unit i A NO unit , j FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 22 OF 30)l 433-9

e J' j l ( MOV 5132 FAILS -

                                                                                              \          CLOSED ACDMV5132 I

r I MOV 5132 FAILS MOV 5132 CLOSED NOT 3, ON DEMAND OPEN O O RAMOV5182CL MOV5132CL l l l l l l MOV 5132 MOV 5132 i CLOSED BY FAILS ! ERROR TO OPEN l O OEMOV5132CL A MOV5132FTO I 1 LOSS OF ELECTRICAL NO OPEN MOV 5132 FAILS POWER ON SIGNAL TO TO OPEN MOV 5132 ON DEMAND TRAIN B ISTMOV5132 ACTRN8F RAMOV5132FTO

                           .                                                                                                     I I         _

l NO AUTOMATIC NO MANUAL OPEN SIGNAL OPEN SIGNAL TO TRAIN B YO MOV 5132

O ISTTRNBF OEMOV5132FTO O 10967 3 BNL Figure 7 (Sheet Zb of 34) UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL GeorgiaPowerkh scTRic cENERATINC PLANT uniTi ano unit FSAR FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 23 'OF 30) 433 9

y ,. . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - . . . . . . . _ . . . . _ . . _ _ . - . . . . . . _ . .

e. >

                                                                                       /r MOV 5134
       ,'                                                                                                                        FAILS
                                                                                                                    \          CLOSED ACDMV5134 p

I I MOV 5134 MOV 5134 FAILS CLOSED NOT ON DEMAND OPEN l O 0 MOV5134CL RAMOV5134CL - I MOV 5134 MOV 5134 CLOSED BY FAILS ERROR TO OPEN O OEMOV5134CL m MOV5134FTO I I LOSS OF ELECTRICAL NO OPEN MOV 5134 FAILS POWER ON SIGNAL TO .TO OPEN TRAIN B MOV 5134 ON DEMAND O F3 ISTMOV5134 ACTRNBF RAMOV5134 FTO 1 I I NO AUTOMATIC NO MANUAL OPEN SIGNAL OPEN SIGNAL TO TRAIN B TO MOV 5134 O ISTTRNBF O OEMOV5134FTO sour-a

                                                                                                                                                                       'BNL Fiaure 7 (Sheet 27 of 33)

Sctnic'CENER AflNG PLANT UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL Georgialbwer uNir i A=o uNir e FSAR FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 24 OF 30) 433-9

 ,      . 6 MOV 5137 g                      FAILS CLOSED ACDMV5137                                                                                                                                                      .
                                             ....,                                            j   __.e.

MOV 5137 MOV 5137 FAILS CLOSED NOT ON DEMAND OPEN n O RAMOV5137CL MOV5137CL . l l . MOV 5137 MOV 5137 CLOSED BY FAILS ERROR TO OPEN l l l V MOV5137FTO OEMOV5137CL m I I ELE R CAL NO OPEN MOV 5137 FAILS l POWER ON SIGNAL TO TO OPEN l TRAIN A MOV 5137 ON DEMAND , o r3 ISTMOV5137 ACTRNAF RAMOV5137FTO I I I NO AUTOMATIC NO MANUAL OPEN SIGNAL OPEN SfGNAL TO TRAIN A TO MOV 5137 O ISTTRNAF O OEMOV5137FTO 1"*78 DML tigure / (Oneet 40 OT JJ) , ,, inicormsnar mo rtant UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL GeorgiaPower unir . unit FSAR FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 25 6F 3M 433 9 y go . 4. ,. . me.. ees= * -9 e sov - . e*.someow . * ""** N "N *

6 *

                                                                                                                           ****"***7

_, ;s (

      .                                         MOV 5139 FAILS
                                 \                 CLOSED ACOMV5139 g   .. . . . .

T . . j MOV 5139 MOV 5139 FAILS CLOSED NOT ON DEMAND OPEN O' RAMOV5139CL O MOV5139CL l l 1 - MOV 5139 MOV 5139 CLOSED BY FAILS TO ERROR OPEN O_ OEMOV5139CL m MOV5139FTO l I j LOSS OF ELECTRICAL NO OPEN MOV 5139 FAILS POWER ON SIGNAL TO TO OPEN TRAIN A MOV 5139 ON DEMAND ISTMOV5139 ACTRNAF RAMOV5139FTO I 1

NO AUTOMATIC NO MANUAL OPEN SIGNAL OPEN SfGNAL TO TRAIN A TO MOV 5139 I

O ISTTRNAF O OEMOV5139FTO tem a

                                                     "--       ~

m yt BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 29 of 33) Georg. ia Nwer A u EL acra,iccamenarimort.UNIT Ant1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL ir . unir a rsAR 433 9 FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 26 OF 30)

  -       .-.     ~. -           -

, 3 MOV 5120 FAILS CLOSED DCDMv5120 T I I MOV 5129 MOV 5129 FAILS CLOSED NOT ON DEMAND OPEN O O, MOV5120CL RA,MOV5120CL I MOV 5128 MOV 5129 CLOSED BY FAILS TO ERROR OPEN O OEMOV5120CL m MOV5120FTO I I ELECTR CAL NO OPEN MOV 5129 FAILS SIGNAL TO TO OPEN R N MOV 5129 ON DEMAND gN C O DCTRNCF (3 ISTMOV5120 RAMOV5120FTO I I NO AUTOMATIC NO MANUAL OPEN StGNAL OPEN SIGNAL

          ,                                                                 TO TRAIN C                                  TO MOV 5129 O

ISTTRNCF O OEMOV5120FTO , BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 30 of 33). ._ Ncinic oswanavinc ri. ANT UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL GeOrgiaPower u ir . u,,,, , rSAR FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 27 ' OF 30')~

                          <as o                                                                                                          .

 .-        3

MOV 5122

                                                                    . FAILS
                                      \                              CLOSED DCMV5122 T
                                         -l                                                 1 MOV 5122                                         MOV 5122
         -                        F AILS CLOSED                                          NOT ON DEMAND                                            OPEN O

O, MOV5122CL RAMOV5122CL I MOV 5122 MOV 5122 CLOSED BY F AILS TO ERROR OPEN MOV5122FTO CEMOV5122CL m I I NO OPEN MOV 5122 FAILS ELE TR CAL SIGNAL TO TO OPEN ER ON MOV 5122 ON DEMAND (3 O DCTRNCF ISTMOV5122 RAMOV5122FTO i I I i NO AUTOMATIC NO MANUAL OPEN SIGNAL OPEN SIGNAL TO TRAIN C TO MOV 5122 O ISTTRNCF

                                                                                                      . O OEMOV5122FTO V0cTLE                                         BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 31 of 33)   .

stscTnsc ossenAvene rLauf UNIT 1.AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL GeOrgialbwer u.Ti. u T: FSAR FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 28 OF 30) 433 9 y-,- . . . . ....-

e 3 l MOV 5125 FAILS

       '                                      -- h                                                                                                       CLOSED DCMV5125 T

I 1 MOV 5125 MOV 5125 FAILS CLOSED NOT ON DEMAND OPEN , O RAMOV5185CL O MOV5125CL I MOV 5125 MOV ti125 CLOSED BY FAILS ERROR TO OPEN l l MOV5125FTO OEMOV5125CL m I I LOSS OF DC ELECTRICAL NO OPEN MOV 5125 FAILS POWER ON SIGNAL TO TO OPEN TRAIN C _ MOV 5125 ON DEMAND O DCTRNCF F3 ISTMOV5125 RAMOV5125FTO

                                                                                                                                                                  'I                                1 NO AljTOMATIC                                                            NO MANUAL OPElJ SIGNAL                                                   OPEN SIGNAL TO TRAIN C                                             TO MOV 5125 ISTTRNCF O                                 O OEMOV5125FTO n.
                                                                                                                       ,,g,                                                                   BNt. Figure 7 (Sheet 32 of 33)                .

sLecinic osseenArissa PLAser UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL GeorgiaPower u m r i Asso usar FSAR FIGURE 10A-7 (SHEET 29 OF 30)~

m. .

n . . . ,.,-.-.-n--.._.. __ . _ _ . , _ _ _ . _ _ , , _ , , , , , _ _ _

                          ,=        >

MOV 5127 g FAILS CLOSED DCDMVS127 I ] MOV 5127 MOV 5127

                                  -                                     FAILS CLOSED                                                                 NOT ON DEMAND                                                           OPEN O                                                                                                                                    l RAMOV5125CL O.                                                     MOV5125CL                                                                                                             l I

MOV 5127 MOV 5127 CLOSED BY FAILS ERROR TO OPEN MOV5125FTO OEMOV5125CL l l l LOSS OF DC " ELECTRICAL NO OPEN MOV 5127 FAILS POWER ON SIGNAL TO TO OPEN TRAIN C MOV 5127 ON DEMAND ISTMOV5125

                               -                                                                                 RNCF RAMOV5125FTO
                              -                                                                                                                          1 I                                                        l NO AUTOMATIC                                       NO MANUAL OPEN SIGNAL                                      OPEN SIGNAL TO TRAIN C                                     TO MOV 5127 O

ISTTRNCF o OEMOV5125FTO 10M73 voortE BNL Figure 7 (Sheet 33 of 33) . . _ , ELECTRIC GENERATI.G PLANT GeorgiaIbwer u.ir i Al G u.Br , UNIT 1 AFWS FAULT TREE MODEL FSAa e u., FIGURE 10A-7 (SUEET 30 OF 30) y_.. . _. . . _ . . . . . . _ _ . , __ 2__ . _ . . . , _ . . . . , _ . , _ _ _, _ ,, _ , _ ,,,_ ,,

TEFP PRO 8. ' NUMEEE CF TERM IFTSGS1234-TKCL4 = l 1 1 479 0E-07 RASCV115

RAMOFA003
MATOFC001 +
2 1 479 0E- 07 RASCV114
EAM0FA003
MATOPC001 +

i 3 1. 4 79 0E- 07 RASCVii6

EAMCP8002
MATOPC001 + l 4 1. 479 0E- 07 RASCV113
FAMCF6002
MATOPC001 + l RASCV115
EATEFC001
PANOFA003 + l 5 1.4790E-07 l t 1.479CE-07 RASCV114
FATOPC001
MAPDFA003 +

7 1.4793E-G7 RASCV116

FATDFCOG1
MAh0FB002 +

8 1. 479 0E- 07 RASCV113

FATOFC001
MAPCPB002 + l 9 1. 4 50 0E- 07 RANCPA0 03
RANDP2002
MATCPC001 + l .

10 1.4500E-07 R AMCF A0 03

RATOPC0Ji
MANCPE002 + l 11 1.45 0 0E- 07 RANCFB002
RATCPC001
HANCPA003 +

12 1. 326 5E- 07 RASCV113

RASCViik
R ASCV115 + l 1-3 1.32e5E-07 R ASCViit-*-RASCV114 -*-R ASCV 1-il :

14 1. 3 26 5 E-07 RASCV114 *-EASC WiiS *-R ASCV116M 15 1.-3 26 5 E- 07 R AS CV11-3 *-+ A S C V115 *-R ASCV 116 : l it 1.-175 0 E- 07 R ASCVii-5 8-F AMDPA00 3 5-EATDPC001 : l 17 16 275 OE-07----R ASCV114W ANDP A00 3-*-f ATDPC00-14 , le 1.-275 0E-07 RASCV11t W AMCP9002 *-FATOFC001 0 i 10 1. 275 0E-07 RASCV113 *-RAMDP9002 *-RATEPC001 : I 20 1.0540E-07 RAMOPA003 8--RAMOP9002 *-ftATOPC461 : , BNL Figure 8 VEGP AFWS Univailability Assessment-Dominant Failure Modes Case No.1-LMFW (Sheet 1 of 2) e+- - um.-@-.- , me h e & e

   -     s TERP                P F.0 8.                                                                                           !

NUMEER CF-T ER M 21 0.1698E-08 P.ASCV11-5 *-F ASGVFTO *-P AMGP A0 03 ^ l

22 0 .-169 f E- 0 6 RASCV114- *-EASGVFTO *-HAMCP A 003 ^ l 2 3--9 169 EE-06 RASCV114 3-FASGVFTO 3-N AMOFE002-+ i 24 9. ies tE- 08 R ASCV113 *-RASGVFTO 2-N AMGPB0 02-4 , 2 5---9 16 9 8E- 0 8 RASCV115 *-FATTVFTO *-MANCP A003 * , { 20 9.169 tE- 06 RASCV114 8--FATTVFTO *-H AMGP A0 03 ^ - l l 27 0 169EE-06 R ASCViiE *-EATT WFTO *-N AMCF80 02-+

28 .16hGE-08 RASCV113 *-F ATTVFTO *-M AMCF B0 02 -+ 29 - 4 1698E-08 -RASCV115 *-FAMOV5106 *-NAPOPA003-+ 30 h169 EE- 08 RASCV114 8-FAMOV5106 3-NAHOPA003-+ 31 0.1698E-08 RASCV116 *--F AMOV5106 *-MAPDFB002- + 22 0 1698E-06--RASCV113 8 FAMOV5106 *-NAFDF8002 t 33-8 990 0E-06 R AMCF A0 03 *-RASGVFTO *--MAM0F800 2 + 3^ S,993 0 E- 06 R AMGF E0 02- *-R ASGVFTG- *-NAMOFA00 3-+ 35 - 8.9930E-08 R AMOF A0 03

RATTWFTO *-NAHOF600 2-+ .

3 6---4 . 9 9 0 G E- 0 8 RAM CF20 02- *-RATT VFTO *-NAPCPA00 3-+

     ,                        37      S.993OE-08         RAMCF A0 03                          *-R AMov5106 *-H AMCPB0 0 2-+

35 .9900E-06 RANCF40 02 * -F AMOV5106 2-M ANCP A002 ^ 39 ?-. 9 05 0E- 08 " AS CV115 *-E AMOP A00 3- *--E ASGVFTC

BNL Figure 8 (Sheet 2 of 2)

O w .= . ---.....,%. . - - 2 .. .-..#...+. . . .

                                                                                                                                 ..p...._..

                                       .      a TERM                             Fo C t.
                                                           -- Mut1BER                                  O F-Tio ri i

IFTSGS1-234-TKDL4 - a 3rt2tti-0~ ACT RN A F-*-AC T RN BF-*-M AT DP D0 01--+ l 2 4.5000E-f6 AC T Rt4 A F-+-A CT RN DM AT Do C 0 0. 1 j i 3 2TF900E-SE A CT RN A F-*-AC T RN t!F--* -R A S GV F T O-+ 2.-7900E- t6 ACTRtl A F-*- AC T RN EF--*-R AT TVF T O-+ . I

                                                                                             ?       247970E-06                    ACT RtJ A F-* -ACT Rt4e F-*- R AN OV 510 6 - +

6 148900E-06 ACT RN A F- * --ACT RN E F-+ -M AN OV 3 0 0 9 - + 7----1. 8 9,0 E- J 0 6- AC T RN A F -*-AC T RN 8 F -*

H At*CV 3C 19 - +

8 -1 2 9 0 0E- 06"-- - AC T Rt4 A F-

ACTRN 6F
M AttDV S10 6 +

9 av 890 0E= 0 6 -- ACT Rtl A F -* --AC T RN 6F-* -M AT TV- + , l 10 1.890tE*06 ACT frN A F

ACT RN eF -* M ASGV +-

l 11 - 9.9 0 0 0E-C?--- ACTRN A F * - AC TRf4 EF

R ANGV315 -+

129. 6 G CCE- 0 7 ACT PN3F-* -R A T DP C001-* -M AD GA + i-3 'ii6-0 0tE-Ti ACT RNA F"-R ATDP C001--* M ADGS- + iL 6. 8 740 E-T7 R A SC V1T6-*--A CT-R h3F-*-M A-TDP C 0 01-+ l 15 8.8? ace-C7 R A S C V113 -* -A C T R t40 F -* -M A TD P C 0 41-+ l 46 6.67hCEw07 RASCV1T5-*-ACTRt4AF-*-MATD*C001

17 or87wCE -07 R A S CVit4-*--A CT R N A F-+-M A T DP C 0 C1M i

18 3<7504E-07 ACT Frtl6 F-*-R A MDP A 0 011-*-N AT DPC0 01-- + . I 19-- trr?t90E-07 AC T RNS F-*--R A TD

C001-*
M AM DP A 0 0 3 -+ .

BHL Figure 9 VEGP AFWS Unavailability Assessment-Dominant Failure Modes Case No.2-LOOP (Sheet I of 2)

                                         ..y,   . _ . . . . . , ~ . . ~ . . .                              . . -.... .. . _ .                                                                  ,. - ... - . ...   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

F I . TERM P P. CS .

                                      - NUMBEx                       ur-T E%

l' 20 8770005-07 ACT Rr4 A F-* -R AMDP B0 0 2--* -H ATDPC0 01-+ 21 6. 7 000 E- 07 A C T RN A F -*-ft AT O F C 091-*-M AM D F B 0 0 2-+ i 72 7. 65 0 0E-0 7 RASCV116 *- ACTRH6F-*--RATDPC0017 23 776500E-07 RASCV113 -* ACT RhBF-*-R ATDP C 001-+

28. 7.6500E-07 R A S CV 115-*-A CT R >v AF-*-R A TD P C 001 ;

                                              -25                 7.t500E-07                      R ASCV118e

ACT P,n AF-*-R ATDP C 001-+

26---7.-5 0 0f E- 0 7 AC T RHS F-+-RA ND P A 0 0 3 -*-R AT 3 P C0 01-+ 27 7T5 00M-uT ACTRNAF-*-RANDPb002-*-RATOPC001-+ 28 20E-C T AC'T RN EF-*-R A SGV FTO-*-M A DG A -+ , 29 579520E-07 AC T RN9 F-+-RA TT V FTQ-*-t* A DG A-+ . 30 Srs 99 20 E AC T RN 5 F-*--R A NO V 510 6-*-ft A DG A-+ - 31 5.1 205-07 A CT RN A F-* R A SG V FT O-*-N A CGS-+ . 32 -5. 9520E-07 ACT RN A F- *- RA TT V FTO--*-M A DG B -+ 33 5.95206-07 A CT R t. A F--*-R A MOV 510 6-+-M ADG 6-+ 3 er--5 r39 40E- 0 7- ACT RHb F

RA SGV FTC
M ANDP A00 3 -+ )

I 35 5. 39 =0E-0 7--- ACT EtibF-* RA TT V FTO

M AHOP A0 0 3 - +- ;

36 5.39*0E-07 ACTRNEF *-RA MOV5106 -* -N AMDP A0 0 3 + 37 5.398 0E-07 ACT RN A F *-RA SGV FTO-*-M ANDPbO D 2 -+ 3 8 --5. 39 *sE- 0 7---- ACT RN A F * -RA TT V FT O

M A NOP 9 0 0 2 + -

BNL Figure 9 (Sheet 2 of 2)

IERN FR06 NUMBER OF TERM ,

                                                                                            !FT5G51234-TKDL4 s 1    5 8000E-01          MATDPC001 i 2    5.0000E 01          RATDPC001 +                                       l 3    3 1000E-03          RA50VFT0 +                                        l 4    3.5000E 03          RATTVFTO i 5    3 1000E 03          RAMOV5106 +

6 2 1000E 03 MAMOV3009 + l 7 2 1000E-03 MAM0V5106 + l

                                                            .      8    2 1000E-03          MATTV +                                          l
                                                        .          9    2 1000E-03          MASGV -                                             '

10 2 1000E-01 MAMOV3019

l 11 L.1000E.01 RAMGV015 +

i 12 2.2000E-04 LCTRNCF + l 53 1.0000E 04 RACHVC14 + 14 7 0000E-06 ISTTFNCF

OEMOV5106Fto i 15 3.4100E-06 RA6YV090
HAMOV5113Ft0 I ;

16 3 4100E-06' PAsyV093 e RAMOV5113FTO i

17 1 2100E 06 RA5yV090
RABYV097 +

18 1 2100E-06 RAMOV005

RAMGV067 +

19 1.2100E-04 RA8yV093

RABYV097 4 h 20 1.1000E-04 RAB'fV093
OEMOV5113FT0 1 21 1.1000E-0A RAByV090
OEMOV5113FT0 1 Rasp 000V e OESPD00V + '

22 5 0000E 07 BNL Figure 10 VEGD AFWS Unavailability Assessment Dom'nant Failure l Modes Case No.3.LOAC __ ,}}

ML20101R104: Difference between revisions

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ML20101R104: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 01:09, 12 May 2020

Text

1.0 INTRODUCTION

SUMMARY

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