ENS 40646: Difference between revisions
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StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
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| event date = 04/05/2004 11:40 EDT | | event date = 04/05/2004 11:40 EDT | ||
| last update date = 05/27/2004 | | last update date = 05/27/2004 | ||
| title = Loss | | title = Loss of Safety Function for Emergency Diesel Generators During Surveillance Testing | ||
| event text = At 1040 hrs during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the 'E' (Substituting for 'A') and 'C' Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 1140 hrs. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 1206 hrs. Unit 1 is in Mode 5 requiring only 2 diesel generators operable, therefore not impacted by the Loss of Power instrumentation inoperability. | | event text = At 1040 hrs during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the 'E' (Substituting for 'A') and 'C' Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 1140 hrs. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 1206 hrs. Unit 1 is in Mode 5 requiring only 2 diesel generators operable, therefore not impacted by the Loss of Power instrumentation inoperability. | ||
Also during the surveillance, two pump start timers failed to meet the required acceptance criteria. The 'A' ESW Pump timer actuated at 47.86 seconds (criteria; 36 sec. to 44 sec) and the 'C' ESW Pump timer actuated at 50.38 seconds (criteria: 39.6 sec. to 48.4 sec). With failure of the timers, proper loading on the Diesel Generators is not assured, and they were declared inoperable until the associated pump control breakers were opened. The 'E' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1448 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'A' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'E' Diesel Generator was returned to operable at 1453 hrs when the DC Knife switches for the 'A' ESW pump were open. The 'C' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1524 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'C' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'C' Diesel Generator was restored to operable at 1706 hrs after supported systems were realigned to prevent further loss of safety function and the DC Knife switches for the 'C' ESW pump were open. | Also during the surveillance, two pump start timers failed to meet the required acceptance criteria. The 'A' ESW Pump timer actuated at 47.86 seconds (criteria; 36 sec. to 44 sec) and the 'C' ESW Pump timer actuated at 50.38 seconds (criteria: 39.6 sec. to 48.4 sec). With failure of the timers, proper loading on the Diesel Generators is not assured, and they were declared inoperable until the associated pump control breakers were opened. The 'E' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1448 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'A' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'E' Diesel Generator was returned to operable at 1453 hrs when the DC Knife switches for the 'A' ESW pump were open. The 'C' Diesel Generator was declared inoperable at 1524 hrs, when the data analysis identified that the 'C' ESW pump timer did not meet acceptance criteria. The 'C' Diesel Generator was restored to operable at 1706 hrs after supported systems were realigned to prevent further loss of safety function and the DC Knife switches for the 'C' ESW pump were open. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:23, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Susquehanna  Pennsylvania (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+2.65 h0.11 days <br />0.0158 weeks <br />0.00363 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Ronald Fry 18:19 Apr 5, 2004 |
| NRC Officer: | Steve Sandin |
| Last Updated: | May 27, 2004 |
| 40646 - NRC Website
| |
Susquehanna with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | |