ENS 41742: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 06/02/2005 17:49 CST | | event date = 06/02/2005 17:49 CST | ||
| last update date = 06/02/2005 | | last update date = 06/02/2005 | ||
| title = Appendix R Assessment | | title = Appendix R Assessment on Remote Shutdown Panel | ||
| event text = The licensee provided the following information via facsimile: | | event text = The licensee provided the following information via facsimile: | ||
On 6/2/05, while performing an Appendix 'R' assessment, it was determined that the capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, as required by Appendix 'R', has not been adequately demonstrated. Specifically, a postulated fire requiring the evacuation of the Control Room could also cause a spurious hot short in the protective relaying circuitry for the credited division of essential electrical power and subsequent loss of that division. It was recently determined that the hot short could occur at anytime during the transient, whereas previous evaluations had assumed any such hot short would be associated with the initiating event. Consequently, existing compensatory measures would only be implemented if the adverse consequences were apparent, and therefore might not be implemented within the timeframe required to assure satisfactory results. The result is that Appendix 'R' requirements are not met, and an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety may exist. | On 6/2/05, while performing an Appendix 'R' assessment, it was determined that the capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, as required by Appendix 'R', has not been adequately demonstrated. Specifically, a postulated fire requiring the evacuation of the Control Room could also cause a spurious hot short in the protective relaying circuitry for the credited division of essential electrical power and subsequent loss of that division. It was recently determined that the hot short could occur at anytime during the transient, whereas previous evaluations had assumed any such hot short would be associated with the initiating event. Consequently, existing compensatory measures would only be implemented if the adverse consequences were apparent, and therefore might not be implemented within the timeframe required to assure satisfactory results. The result is that Appendix 'R' requirements are not met, and an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety may exist. |
Latest revision as of 21:20, 1 March 2018
Where | |
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Duane Arnold Iowa (NRC Region 3) | |
Reporting | |
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |
LER: | 05000331/LER-2005-001 |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-1.97 h-0.0821 days <br />-0.0117 weeks <br />-0.0027 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Hans Olson 21:51 Jun 2, 2005 |
NRC Officer: | Mark Abramovitz |
Last Updated: | Jun 2, 2005 |
41742 - NRC Website
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