ENS 42866: Difference between revisions
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| facility = Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant | | facility = Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant | ||
| Organization = | | Organization = | ||
| license number = | | license number = GDP-1 | ||
| region = 2 | | region = 2 | ||
| state = Kentucky | | state = Kentucky | ||
| Line 16: | Line 16: | ||
| event date = 09/28/2006 18:02 CDT | | event date = 09/28/2006 18:02 CDT | ||
| last update date = 09/29/2006 | | last update date = 09/29/2006 | ||
| title = Failure | | title = Failure of Autoclave High Cylinder Pressure System | ||
| event text = At 1802 CDT on 09/28/06, the Plant Shift-Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-333A Autoclave 3 South High Cylinder Pressure System (HCPS). During a normal cylinder heating cycle the operator noted that the cylinder pressure, as read on a local digital pressure indicator and on a digital recorder in the Operations Monitoring Room (OMR), unexpectedly fell from a steady 65 psia to a negative value on both instruments. A 14 ton cylinder containing 0.4019% U235 assay uranium hexafluoride had been heating (TSR Mode 5) for approximately 2.2 hours when the failure occurred. The PSS declared the HCPS inoperable and TSR LCO 2.2.4.14B actions were implemented to place the autoclave in Mode 2, 'Autoclave Open and Out-of-Service'. The HCPS is a TSR system designed to minimize the potential of primary system integrity failure (cylinder rupture) during a pressure increase event by tripping the steam supply to the autoclave prior to reaching the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of the cylinder. | | event text = At 1802 CDT on 09/28/06, the Plant Shift-Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a failure of the C-333A Autoclave 3 South High Cylinder Pressure System (HCPS). During a normal cylinder heating cycle the operator noted that the cylinder pressure, as read on a local digital pressure indicator and on a digital recorder in the Operations Monitoring Room (OMR), unexpectedly fell from a steady 65 psia to a negative value on both instruments. A 14 ton cylinder containing 0.4019% U235 assay uranium hexafluoride had been heating (TSR Mode 5) for approximately 2.2 hours when the failure occurred. The PSS declared the HCPS inoperable and TSR LCO 2.2.4.14B actions were implemented to place the autoclave in Mode 2, 'Autoclave Open and Out-of-Service'. The HCPS is a TSR system designed to minimize the potential of primary system integrity failure (cylinder rupture) during a pressure increase event by tripping the steam supply to the autoclave prior to reaching the Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) of the cylinder. | ||
This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident, b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function. | This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident, b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function. | ||
Latest revision as of 18:34, 24 November 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Paducah, Kentucky (NRC Region 2) | |
| License number: | GDP-1 |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+15.65 h0.652 days <br />0.0932 weeks <br />0.0214 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Billy Wallace 14:41 Sep 29, 2006 |
| NRC Officer: | Mark Abramovitz |
| Last Updated: | Sep 29, 2006 |
| 42866 - NRC Website | |