ENS 45726: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 02/25/2010 14:18 EST | | event date = 02/25/2010 14:18 EST | ||
| last update date = 02/25/2010 | | last update date = 02/25/2010 | ||
| title = Invalid Actuation | | title = Invalid Actuation of Containment Isolation Valves | ||
| event text = This 60-day notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states that in case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), other than the actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. Because plant conditions necessary to prompt a containment isolation were not present, this event constitutes an invalid system actuation under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The condition meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) because the loss of the Unit 1 'B' RPS bus affected containment isolation valves in more than one system. | | event text = This 60-day notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states that in case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), other than the actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. Because plant conditions necessary to prompt a containment isolation were not present, this event constitutes an invalid system actuation under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The condition meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) because the loss of the Unit 1 'B' RPS bus affected containment isolation valves in more than one system. | ||
On 1/4/2010 at 1418 hours, the Unit 1 'B' RPS bus was lost. This event resulted in a half scram and primary containment isolations. By design, when the RPS MG set output breaker trips, all EPA breakers downstream of the MG set also trip resulting in a half scram and primary containment isolation signals. | On 1/4/2010 at 1418 hours, the Unit 1 'B' RPS bus was lost. This event resulted in a half scram and primary containment isolations. By design, when the RPS MG set output breaker trips, all EPA breakers downstream of the MG set also trip resulting in a half scram and primary containment isolation signals. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:10, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Susquehanna  Pennsylvania (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER, Invalid Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-2.97 h-0.124 days <br />-0.0177 weeks <br />-0.00407 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | David Borger 16:20 Feb 25, 2010 |
| NRC Officer: | John Knoke |
| Last Updated: | Feb 25, 2010 |
| 45726 - NRC Website
| |