ENS 47369: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 10/24/2011 16:11 EDT | | event date = 10/24/2011 16:11 EDT | ||
| last update date = 10/24/2011 | | last update date = 10/24/2011 | ||
| title = Manual Reactor Scram Due | | title = Manual Reactor Scram Due to Erratic Irm Indications During Startup | ||
| event text = While performing a startup of HNP-2, after reaching criticality, the crew observed erratic indications on two Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs), 2C51K601A and 2C51K601C. IRM 2C51K601A had been spiking and was subsequently bypassed. The 2C51K601C was spiking downscale and could not be bypassed due to the 2C51K601A being bypassed already. Both IRMs are in the 'A' RPS trip system. At the time when the second IRM was acting erratic, the crew identified the condition as both IRMs in the same quadrant and did not continue withdrawal of control rods. As a result of not withdrawing control rods, reactor power began to decrease and the crew conservatively inserted a manual reactor scram to shutdown the reactor. All rods did fully insert into the core. No PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation System] actuations occurred and none were expected to occur based on plant conditions following the scram. | | event text = While performing a startup of HNP-2, after reaching criticality, the crew observed erratic indications on two Intermediate Range Monitors (IRMs), 2C51K601A and 2C51K601C. IRM 2C51K601A had been spiking and was subsequently bypassed. The 2C51K601C was spiking downscale and could not be bypassed due to the 2C51K601A being bypassed already. Both IRMs are in the 'A' RPS trip system. At the time when the second IRM was acting erratic, the crew identified the condition as both IRMs in the same quadrant and did not continue withdrawal of control rods. As a result of not withdrawing control rods, reactor power began to decrease and the crew conservatively inserted a manual reactor scram to shutdown the reactor. All rods did fully insert into the core. No PCIS [Primary Containment Isolation System] actuations occurred and none were expected to occur based on plant conditions following the scram. | ||
At this time, investigation is in progress, but the investigation and corrective actions have not yet been completed. | At this time, investigation is in progress, but the investigation and corrective actions have not yet been completed. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:05, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Hatch  Georgia (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-3.17 h-0.132 days <br />-0.0189 weeks <br />-0.00434 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Daniel A. Komm 17:01 Oct 24, 2011 |
| NRC Officer: | Steve Sandin |
| Last Updated: | Oct 24, 2011 |
| 47369 - NRC Website
| |
Hatch with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |