ML23192A039: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:Approach to Physical Security for Non-Power Reactor Applicants Beth Reed, Security Specialist Advanced Reactor Policy Branch April 13, 2023
{{#Wiki_filter:Approach to Physical Security for Non-Power Reactor Applicants Beth Reed, Security Specialist Advanced Reactor Policy Branch April 13, 2023


Purpose Discuss the NRCs approach to the physical security requirements for non-power production utilization facility (NPUF) applicants planning on possessing, utilizing, or transporting Category ll or III quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). This includes:
Purpose Discuss the NRCs approach to the physical security requirements for non-power production utilization facility (NPUF) applicants planning on possessing, utilizing, or transporting Category ll or III quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). This includes:  
    - Compliance with the current physical security regulations under 10 CFR 73.67
- Compliance with the current physical security regulations under 10 CFR 73.67
    - The potential for issuing supplemental security measures as license conditions
- The potential for issuing supplemental security measures as license conditions  
                                                              *2
*2


SNM Categories
SNM Categories
* The NRCs current approach to the physical protection of SNM is based on the quantity and type of the material (i.e., plutonium, U-233, or enriched U-235).
* The NRCs current approach to the physical protection of SNM is based on the quantity and type of the material (i.e., plutonium, U-233, or enriched U-235).
* There are three categories of SNM that the NRC regulates:
* There are three categories of SNM that the NRC regulates:
  - Category I (formula quantity of strategic SNM),
- Category I (formula quantity of strategic SNM),  
  - Category II (SNM of moderate strategic significance),
- Category II (SNM of moderate strategic significance),
  - Category III (SNM of low strategic significance)
- Category III (SNM of low strategic significance)
                                                          *3
*3


SNM Categories II & III
SNM Categories II & III
                        *4
*4


Current NPUF Approach
Current NPUF Approach
* Regulatory Framework for Security at currently licensed NPUFs:
* Regulatory Framework for Security at currently licensed NPUFs:  
  - Regulations
- Regulations
* 10 CFR 73                             Orders
* 10 CFR 73
  - Supplemental Security Measures
- Supplemental Security Measures
* Physical security                   SSMs
* Physical security
          - Detect & Assess
- Detect & Assess
          - Delay
- Delay
          - Respond
- Respond
  - Orders Regulations
- Orders
* Access Authorization
* Access Authorization Orders SSMs Regulations
                            *RTR Security           *Slide 5of 17
*RTR Security
*Slide 5of 17  


Security Regulations
Security Regulations 10 CFR Part 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials
* 10 CFR Part 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials
- SGI Program: 10 CFR 73.21, 22, and 23; Regulatory Guide 5.79 (ML103270219); Order EA-06-203 (ML062350289)
    - SGI Program: 10 CFR 73.21, 22, and 23; Regulatory Guide 5.79 (ML103270219); Order EA-06-203 (ML062350289)
- Physical security of SNM: 10 CFR 73.60(f), 73.67; Regulatory Guide 5.59
    - Physical security of SNM: 10 CFR 73.60(f), 73.67; Regulatory Guide 5.59
- Access Authorization: 10 CFR 73.57, 73.59, Order EA-07-074 (ML070750190)
    - Access Authorization: 10 CFR 73.57, 73.59, Order EA-07-074 (ML070750190)
- Event Notification: 10 CFR 73.71 and 73 Appendix G
    - Event Notification: 10 CFR 73.71 and 73 Appendix G
* Update to requirements: Effective April 13, 2023 with 300 day implementation period
* Update to requirements: Effective April 13, 2023 with 300 day implementation period
* New 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215
* New 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215
* https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/14/2023-03944/enhanced-weapons-firearms-background-checks-and-security-event-notifications
* https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/03/14/2023-03944/enhanced-weapons-firearms-background-checks-and-security-event-notifications
*6
*6


Security Regulations and Guidance (continued)
Security Regulations and Guidance (continued)
* 10 CFR 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials
* 10 CFR 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials
  - Transportation:
- Transportation:
* Fresh fuel: 10 CFR 73.67
* Fresh fuel: 10 CFR 73.67
* Spent fuel: 10 CFR 73.37 and 38
* Spent fuel: 10 CFR 73.37 and 38
  - Posting: 10 CFR 73.75
- Posting: 10 CFR 73.75
  - Cyber Security: No regulations for NPUFs, for information purposes only refer to Regulatory Guide 5.71 (ML18016A129); Effective Practice for RTRs (ML15253A060)
- Cyber Security: No regulations for NPUFs, for information purposes only refer to Regulatory Guide 5.71 (ML18016A129); Effective Practice for RTRs (ML15253A060)
*7
*7


Line 70: Line 70:
* Post 9/11 additional security measures
* Post 9/11 additional security measures
* 2015 Regulatory Basis for proposed rule
* 2015 Regulatory Basis for proposed rule
    - ML#14321A007
- ML#14321A007
    - Risk informed and graded approach
- Risk informed and graded approach
* Commissioned approve SSMs for NPUFs producing Moly-99
* Commissioned approve SSMs for NPUFs producing Moly-99
    - SECY-18-0063 (ML17333A161)
- SECY-18-0063 (ML17333A161)  
    - Staff developed SSMs based on previous post 9/11 security measures and information from the Regulatory Basis
- Staff developed SSMs based on previous post 9/11 security measures and information from the Regulatory Basis
                          *RTR Security               *Slide 8of 17
*RTR Security
*Slide 8of 17  


Additional Security Measures for NPUFs following the Events of 9/11
Additional Security Measures for NPUFs following the Events of 9/11
Line 81: Line 82:
* The CMIPs were inspected and confirmed through the issuance of confirmatory action letters (CALs).
* The CMIPs were inspected and confirmed through the issuance of confirmatory action letters (CALs).
* In general, the CMIPs included enhancements such as vehicle barriers, personnel background checks, coordination and communication with local law enforcement, vehicle and personnel searches, and visitor escorting.
* In general, the CMIPs included enhancements such as vehicle barriers, personnel background checks, coordination and communication with local law enforcement, vehicle and personnel searches, and visitor escorting.
                                                          *6
*6


Developed to Support Rulemaking
Developed to Support Rulemaking
* Regulatory Basis 2015 for Rulemaking to Enhance Security of SNM
* Regulatory Basis 2015 for Rulemaking to Enhance Security of SNM
    - In ADAMS under ML14321A007
- In ADAMS under ML14321A007
* Rule was discontinued, but approach remains
* Rule was discontinued, but approach remains
    - Graded approach
- Graded approach
    - Risk informed
- Risk informed
    - Based on the attractiveness of the material
- Based on the attractiveness of the material  
    - Driven by the dilution of the material
- Driven by the dilution of the material
* Commission recently directed staff to submit options for enhanced security of SNM, one option is to restart rulemaking to include previously written security measure into the regulations
* Commission recently directed staff to submit options for enhanced security of SNM, one option is to restart rulemaking to include previously written security measure into the regulations
*10
*10
Line 96: Line 97:
Security for NPUFs for Moly-99 Production
Security for NPUFs for Moly-99 Production
* COMSECY-17-0008 (non-public)
* COMSECY-17-0008 (non-public)
    - Staff request applying SSMs to NPUFs intending to produce Molly-99
- Staff request applying SSMs to NPUFs intending to produce Molly-99
* Staff develop[ed SECY-18-0063 in response to SRM-COMSECY-17-0008 (non-public)
* Staff develop[ed SECY-18-0063 in response to SRM-COMSECY-17-0008 (non-public)
    - Staff developed SSMs and committed to using a site-specific graded approach (quantity of SNM and material attractiveness)
- Staff developed SSMs and committed to using a site-specific graded approach (quantity of SNM and material attractiveness)
    - The Commission approved the approach for NPUF applicants intending to produce Moly-99
- The Commission approved the approach for NPUF applicants intending to produce Moly-99
* Staff intends to use the same approach for all NPUF applicants, to include material attractiveness
* Staff intends to use the same approach for all NPUF applicants, to include material attractiveness
                            *RTR Security             *Slide 11of 17
*RTR Security
*Slide 11of 17  


Physical Security for NPUF Applicants
Physical Security for NPUF Applicants
Line 107: Line 109:
* The regulatory framework remains appropriate at NPUFs because of the type of SNM and its location.
* The regulatory framework remains appropriate at NPUFs because of the type of SNM and its location.
* The material attractiveness approach will be used
* The material attractiveness approach will be used
  - Pure, solid ingots
- Pure, solid ingots
  - Fuel elements
- Fuel elements
  - Aqueous fuel
- Aqueous fuel
                                          *13
*13


What Could the SSMs Look Like
What Could the SSMs Look Like
* Similar to what is in place now for licensed NPUFs
* Similar to what is in place now for licensed NPUFs
  - Supplement the regulations
- Supplement the regulations
* Site specific
* Site specific
  - Dependent on design, use, product, etc.
- Dependent on design, use, product, etc.
* Graded approach
* Graded approach
  - Accounts for type and quantity of material used
- Accounts for type and quantity of material used
  - Risk informed, consequence driven.
- Risk informed, consequence driven.
                            *RTR Security *Slide 13of 17
*RTR Security
*Slide 13of 17  


Potential Supplemental Security Measures Cat I           Cat I Mod Dilute       Cat II Mod Dilute     Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II                                        Cat III Protective Strategy Protect against DBT     Immediately detect    Promptly detect        Timely detect of theft and diversion attempts to remove of attempts to remove of attempts to remove of and radiological        SNM and provide       SNM and notify local  SNM and notify LLEA sabotage                sufficient delay       law enforcement        to recovery SNM through the use of     agencies to allow Prevent the removal    barriers and/or armed recovery of SNM.
Potential Supplemental Security Measures Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Protective Strategy Protect against DBT of theft and diversion and radiological sabotage Prevent the removal of SNM and other unauthorized activities involving SNM Diversion Path Analysis Immediately detect attempts to remove of SNM and provide sufficient delay through the use of barriers and/or armed responders to allow LLEA to promptly recover SNM Promptly detect attempts to remove of SNM and notify local law enforcement agencies to allow recovery of SNM.
of SNM and other        responders to allow unauthorized activities LLEA to promptly involving SNM          recover SNM Diversion Path Analysis Security Plan       Physical Security Plan Physical Security Plan Physical Security Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.        Safeguards Cont.
Timely detect attempts to remove of SNM and notify LLEA to recovery SNM Security Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.
Plan                    Plan Training & Qual. Plan   Training & Qual. Plan
Plan Training & Qual. Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.
*14
Plan Training & Qual. Plan Physical Security Plan Physical Security Plan
*14


Cat I         Cat I Mod Dilute   Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II                                Cat III Security         Implement Program    Implement Program  Implement Program  Implement Program Organization Management          Management        Management          Management System              System            System              System Part 26 - except Subpart I & K Part 26, Subpart I -
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Security Organization Implement Program Management System Part 26 - except Subpart I & K Part 26, Subpart I -
Manage Fatigue Physical Barrier OCA Vehicle Barrier      Vehicle Barrier System/blast         System analysis Isolation Zone      Isolation Zone Protected Area      Protected Area Vital Area Material Access     Controlled Access  Controlled Access  Controlled Access Area                 Area              Area                Area Locked Processes    Locked Processes  Locked Processes Vault                Vault-type room   Vault-type room Hardened CAS        Hardened CAS                                                *15
Manage Fatigue Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Physical Barrier OCA Vehicle Barrier System/blast analysis Isolation Zone Protected Area Vital Area Material Access Area Locked Processes Vault Hardened CAS Vehicle Barrier System Isolation Zone Protected Area Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Hardened CAS Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Controlled Access Area
*15


Cat I           Cat I Mod Dilute     Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II                                  Cat III Access Controls Protected & Material Protected Area &     Controlled Access  Controlled Access Access Area Access   Controlled Access   Area Access Portals Area Access Portals Portals              Area Access Portals Limit unescorted     Limit unescorted    Limit unescorted    Limit unescorted access                access               access              access Part 11              73.57               73.57              73.57 Photo Badges          Photo Badges        Photo Badges        Photo Badges Escort Requirements  Escort Requirements  Escort Requirements Escort Requirements Search Programs OCA - vehicles                                                 None Protected Area -      Protected Area -
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Access Controls Protected & Material Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access Part 11 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Protected Area &
entry (contraband) &  entry (contraband) &
Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Search Programs OCA - vehicles Protected Area -
exit (SNM -           exit (SNM &
entry (contraband) &
shielding)            shielding)
exit (SNM -
Material Access      Controlled Access    Controlled Access Area - entry and exit Area - exit (SNM &   Area - entry (SNM - shielding)     shielding)          (contraband) random exit (SNM &
shielding)
Vault (weapons)                            shielding)
Material Access Area - entry and exit (SNM - shielding)
                                                                                                    *16
Vault (weapons)
Protected Area -
entry (contraband) &
exit (SNM &
shielding)
Controlled Access Area - exit (SNM &
shielding)
Controlled Access Area - entry (contraband) random exit (SNM &
shielding)
None
*16


Cat I         Cat I Mod Dilute   Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II                                Cat III Detection and Protected Area &     Protected Area &   Vault type room Assessment    Material Access     Vault type room     Intrusion Detection Area Intrusion      Intrusion Detection System with UPS Detection System    System with UPS with UPS Video Capture Video Capture Central Alarm       Central Alarm Central Alarm        Station            Station Station Secondary Alarm     Secondary Alarm Secondary Alarm      Station (on-site or Station (on-site or Station              off-site)          off-site)
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Detection and Assessment Protected Area &
Surveillance        Surveillance        Surveillance        Surveillance Program -            Program            Program            Program Protected Area &
Material Access Area Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station Surveillance Program -
unoccupied Material Access Area Periodic Patrols of  Periodic Patrols of Periodic Patrols of Periodic Patrols of outside areas       outside areas      outside areas      outside areas Two person rule in MAA Three person rule in Vault Illumination        Illumination                                                *17
Protected Area &
unoccupied Material Access Area Periodic Patrols of outside areas Two person rule in MAA Three person rule in Vault Illumination Protected Area &
Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or off-site)
Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Illumination Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or off-site)
Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas
*17


Cat I         Cat I Mod Dilute   Cat II Mod Dilute   Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II                                  Cat III Communication CAS/SAS two-way     CAS/SAS two-way      CAS/SAS two-way      Two-way redundant redundant            redundant            redundant            communication with communication with  communication with  communication with   LLEA LLEA                LLEA                LLEA Continuous           Continuous          Continuous          Continuous communication        communication       communication        communication between CAS/SAS      between CAS/SAS     between CAS and      among security force and on-site and off- and on-site and off- on-site and off-site site response force  site response force  response force Non-portable         Non-portable        Non-portable        Non-portable equipment on UPS     equipment on UPS    equipment on UPS    equipment on UPS Response      10 Tactical Response Team -
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Communication CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS Two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication among security force Non-portable equipment on UPS
interrupt and neutralize Deadly Force        Deadly Force Armed Security      Armed Security Officers            Officers - interrupt LLEA Liaison        LLEA Liaison        LLEA Liaison        LLEA Liaison Heightened Security  Heightened Security  Heightened Security
                                                                                                  *18


Cat I       Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat II                              Cat III Security Program Annually         Bi-annually        Bi-annually        Bi-annually Review Management      Management        Management        Management Review          Review            Review            Review CAP or event log CAP or event log   CAP or event log   CAP or event log Maintenance &     Required         Required           Required           None Testing Compensatory     In PSP           In PSP             In PSP             In PSP Measures Suspension of     Allowed         Allowed           Allowed           Allowed Security Measures Records           Required         Required           Required           Required Alternative       Allowed         Allowed           Allowed           Allowed Measures
===Response===
                                                                                            *19}}
10 Tactical Response Team -
interrupt and neutralize Deadly Force Armed Security Officers LLEA Liaison Heightened Security Deadly Force Armed Security Officers - interrupt LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison
*18
 
Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III
*19 Security Program Review Annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Maintenance &
Testing Required Required Required None Compensatory Measures In PSP In PSP In PSP In PSP Suspension of Security Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed Records Required Required Required Required Alternative Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed}}

Latest revision as of 02:45, 27 November 2024

Abilene Christian University, NRC Slides from April 13, 2023, Closed Meeting to Discuss Security Topics
ML23192A039
Person / Time
Site: 99902088, Abilene Christian University
Issue date: 04/13/2023
From: Beth Reed
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML23192A037 List:
References
Download: ML23192A039 (1)


Text

Approach to Physical Security for Non-Power Reactor Applicants Beth Reed, Security Specialist Advanced Reactor Policy Branch April 13, 2023

Purpose Discuss the NRCs approach to the physical security requirements for non-power production utilization facility (NPUF) applicants planning on possessing, utilizing, or transporting Category ll or III quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). This includes:

- Compliance with the current physical security regulations under 10 CFR 73.67

- The potential for issuing supplemental security measures as license conditions

  • 2

SNM Categories

  • There are three categories of SNM that the NRC regulates:

- Category I (formula quantity of strategic SNM),

- Category II (SNM of moderate strategic significance),

- Category III (SNM of low strategic significance)

  • 3

SNM Categories II & III

  • 4

Current NPUF Approach

  • Regulatory Framework for Security at currently licensed NPUFs:

- Regulations

- Supplemental Security Measures

  • Physical security

- Detect & Assess

- Delay

- Respond

- Orders

  • Access Authorization Orders SSMs Regulations
  • RTR Security
  • Slide 5of 17

Security Regulations 10 CFR Part 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials

- SGI Program: 10 CFR 73.21, 22, and 23; Regulatory Guide 5.79 (ML103270219); Order EA-06-203 (ML062350289)

- Physical security of SNM: 10 CFR 73.60(f), 73.67; Regulatory Guide 5.59

- Access Authorization: 10 CFR 73.57, 73.59, Order EA-07-074 (ML070750190)

- Event Notification: 10 CFR 73.71 and 73 Appendix G

  • Update to requirements: Effective April 13, 2023 with 300 day implementation period
  • New 73.1200, 73.1205, 73.1210, and 73.1215
  • 6

Security Regulations and Guidance (continued)

  • 10 CFR 73 Physical Security of Plants and Materials

- Transportation:

- Posting: 10 CFR 73.75

- Cyber Security: No regulations for NPUFs, for information purposes only refer to Regulatory Guide 5.71 (ML18016A129); Effective Practice for RTRs (ML15253A060)

  • 7

Developments of Supplemental Security Measures

  • Post 9/11 additional security measures
  • 2015 Regulatory Basis for proposed rule

- ML#14321A007

- Risk informed and graded approach

  • Commissioned approve SSMs for NPUFs producing Moly-99

- SECY-18-0063 (ML17333A161)

- Staff developed SSMs based on previous post 9/11 security measures and information from the Regulatory Basis

  • RTR Security
  • Slide 8of 17

Additional Security Measures for NPUFs following the Events of 9/11

  • From 2002 to 2003 (following the 9/11 attacks), NRC requested most NPUF licensees develop a site-specific compensatory measures implementation plan (CMIP) that addressed additional security measures.
  • The CMIPs were inspected and confirmed through the issuance of confirmatory action letters (CALs).
  • In general, the CMIPs included enhancements such as vehicle barriers, personnel background checks, coordination and communication with local law enforcement, vehicle and personnel searches, and visitor escorting.
  • 6

Developed to Support Rulemaking

  • Regulatory Basis 2015 for Rulemaking to Enhance Security of SNM

- In ADAMS under ML14321A007

  • Rule was discontinued, but approach remains

- Graded approach

- Risk informed

- Based on the attractiveness of the material

- Driven by the dilution of the material

  • Commission recently directed staff to submit options for enhanced security of SNM, one option is to restart rulemaking to include previously written security measure into the regulations
  • 10

Security for NPUFs for Moly-99 Production

- Staff request applying SSMs to NPUFs intending to produce Molly-99

- Staff developed SSMs and committed to using a site-specific graded approach (quantity of SNM and material attractiveness)

- The Commission approved the approach for NPUF applicants intending to produce Moly-99

  • Staff intends to use the same approach for all NPUF applicants, to include material attractiveness
  • RTR Security
  • Slide 11of 17

Physical Security for NPUF Applicants

  • The regulatory framework remains appropriate at NPUFs because of the type of SNM and its location.
  • The material attractiveness approach will be used

- Pure, solid ingots

- Fuel elements

- Aqueous fuel

  • 13

What Could the SSMs Look Like

  • Similar to what is in place now for licensed NPUFs

- Supplement the regulations

  • Site specific

- Dependent on design, use, product, etc.

  • Graded approach

- Accounts for type and quantity of material used

- Risk informed, consequence driven.

  • RTR Security
  • Slide 13of 17

Potential Supplemental Security Measures Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Protective Strategy Protect against DBT of theft and diversion and radiological sabotage Prevent the removal of SNM and other unauthorized activities involving SNM Diversion Path Analysis Immediately detect attempts to remove of SNM and provide sufficient delay through the use of barriers and/or armed responders to allow LLEA to promptly recover SNM Promptly detect attempts to remove of SNM and notify local law enforcement agencies to allow recovery of SNM.

Timely detect attempts to remove of SNM and notify LLEA to recovery SNM Security Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.

Plan Training & Qual. Plan Physical Security Plan Safeguards Cont.

Plan Training & Qual. Plan Physical Security Plan Physical Security Plan

  • 14

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Security Organization Implement Program Management System Part 26 - except Subpart I & K Part 26, Subpart I -

Manage Fatigue Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Implement Program Management System Physical Barrier OCA Vehicle Barrier System/blast analysis Isolation Zone Protected Area Vital Area Material Access Area Locked Processes Vault Hardened CAS Vehicle Barrier System Isolation Zone Protected Area Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Hardened CAS Controlled Access Area Locked Processes Vault-type room Controlled Access Area

  • 15

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Access Controls Protected & Material Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access Part 11 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Protected Area &

Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Controlled Access Area Access Portals Limit unescorted access 73.57 Photo Badges Escort Requirements Search Programs OCA - vehicles Protected Area -

entry (contraband) &

exit (SNM -

shielding)

Material Access Area - entry and exit (SNM - shielding)

Vault (weapons)

Protected Area -

entry (contraband) &

exit (SNM &

shielding)

Controlled Access Area - exit (SNM &

shielding)

Controlled Access Area - entry (contraband) random exit (SNM &

shielding)

None

  • 16

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Detection and Assessment Protected Area &

Material Access Area Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station Surveillance Program -

Protected Area &

unoccupied Material Access Area Periodic Patrols of outside areas Two person rule in MAA Three person rule in Vault Illumination Protected Area &

Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Video Capture Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or off-site)

Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Illumination Vault type room Intrusion Detection System with UPS Central Alarm Station Secondary Alarm Station (on-site or off-site)

Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas Surveillance Program Periodic Patrols of outside areas

  • 17

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III Communication CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS/SAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS CAS/SAS two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication between CAS and on-site and off-site response force Non-portable equipment on UPS Two-way redundant communication with LLEA Continuous communication among security force Non-portable equipment on UPS

Response

10 Tactical Response Team -

interrupt and neutralize Deadly Force Armed Security Officers LLEA Liaison Heightened Security Deadly Force Armed Security Officers - interrupt LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison Heightened Security LLEA Liaison

  • 18

Cat I Cat I Mod Dilute Cat II Cat II Mod Dilute Cat I Highly Dilute Cat III

  • 19 Security Program Review Annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Bi-annually Management Review CAP or event log Maintenance &

Testing Required Required Required None Compensatory Measures In PSP In PSP In PSP In PSP Suspension of Security Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed Records Required Required Required Required Alternative Measures Allowed Allowed Allowed Allowed