ML13018A352

Initial Exam 2012-302 Final SRO Written Exam

ML13018A352
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	01/15/2013
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Duke Energy Carolinas
References
ES-401
Download: ML13018A352 (60)

Text

ES-401 Site-Specific SRO Written Examination Form ES-401-8 Cover Sheet US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Site-Specific SRO Written Examination Applicant Information Name:

Date: 12/13/2012 Facility/Unit: Oconee Region: I E ii iii E IV E Reactor Type: WE CE E BW GEE Start Time: Finish Time:

Instructions Use the answer sheets provided to document your answers. Staple this cover sheet on top of the answer sheets. To pass the examination you must achieve a final grade of at least 80.00 percent overall, with 70.00 percent or better on the SRO-only items if given in conjunction with the RO exam; SRO-only exams given alone require a final grade of 80.00 percent to pass. You have 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to complete the combined examination, and 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> if you are only taking the SRO portion.

Applicant Certification All work done on this examination is my own. I have neither given nor received aid.

Applicants Signature Results RO/SRO-Only/Total Examination Values 75 / 25 / 100 Points Applicants Scores / / Points Applicants Grade / / Percent

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 76 IL T42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Time = 0400

• Reactor power = 100%

• 1 HP-410 closed with breaker tagged open for maintenance Time = 0405

• Transient occurs

• 1 RC-67 opens

• 1 SA-1 8/A-i (Pressurizer Relief Valve Flow) actuated Time = 0425

• SCM=0°F

• 1HP-26 failed closed

• LOSCM tab in progress

• 300 gpm EFDW flow established to each SG

1) As directed by the LOSCM Tab, BOTH SG5 will be (1) .

2) The next action directed by the LOSCM tab will be to (2)

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. fully depressurized

2. increase EFDW flow to maximum allowable rate per Rule 7 (SG Feed Control)

B. 1. fully depressurized

2. throttle EFDW flow to maintain RCS cooldown rates within limits C. 1. depressurized to not less than 250 psig

2. increase EFDW flow to maximum allowable rate per Rule 7 (SG Feed Control)

D. 1. depressurized to not less than 250 psig

2. throttle EFDW flow to maintain RCS cooldown rates within limits Page 76 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 77 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Initial conditions:

• Reactor power = 75%

• AP!20 (Loss of Component Cooling) in progress Current conditions:

• 1A1 RCP Radial Bearing Temperature = 248°F stable In accordance with AP/20:

1) The 1A1 RCP _(1)_ required to be secured.

2) If the RCP is required to be secured the reactor (2) be tripped first.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1.is

2. will B. 1.15

2. will NOT C. 1. is NOT

2. will D. 1. is NOT

2. will NOT Page 77 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question:

• 78 IL T42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 2 conditions:

• Refueling in progress

• FTC level = 22 feet stable

• No water additions are being made to the system

• 2A LPI train is operable and in service Current conditions:

• Refueling SRO desires stopping the 2A LPI Pump to aid in inserting a fuel assembly

• 2A LPI pump has been in continuous operation for the previous 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Which ONE of the following describes whether the 2A LPI pump may be stopped in accordance with OP!2/Al 502/007 (Operations Defueling /Refueling Responsibilities) and the bases for this action?

A. 2A LPI Pump may be stopped FTC provides adequate backup decay heat removal B. 2A LPI Pump may be stopped Spent Fuel Cooling system provides adequate backup decay heat removal C. 2A LPI Pump may NOT be stopped FTC does NOT provide adequate backup decay heat removal.

D. 2A LPI Pump may NOT be stopped Spent Fuel Cooling does NOT provide adequate backup decay heat removal Page 78 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 79 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Time = 0400

• Reactor power = 100%

• 2SA-i 8/A-i 1 (Turbine BSMT Water Emergency High Level) actuates Time = 0402

• BOTH Main FDW Pumps trip Time = 0407

• Both SGs level = 30 inches XSUR stable In accordance with the TBF tab:

1) EFDWflowwill be (1)

2) Subsequently if, ALL EFDW is lost (2) .

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. adjusted to increase BOTH SG5 to 95% O.R.

2. HPI Forced Cooling will be initiated B. 1. adjusted to increase BOTH SG5 to 95% O.R.

2. SSF-ASW flow will be established to BOTH SGs C. 1. controlled in accordance with the guidance in Rule 7 (SG Feed Control),

Table 4 (SG Level Control Points)

2. HPI Forced Cooling will be initiated D. 1. controlled in accordance with the guidance in Rule 7 (SG Feed Control),

Table 4 (SG Level Control Points)

2. SSF-ASW flow will be established to BOTH SGs Page 79 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 80 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Time = 0400

• Reactor power = 100%

• TDEFDW pump OOS Time = 0445

• Station blackout

• Reactor trip

• Control Rod Group 2 Rod 3 position = 90% withdrawn

• AP/25 (SSF EOP) initiated Time = 0550

• 1TC, 1TD, and 1 TE de-energized

• Standby Buses energized from CT-5

• Feed to the SGs is established Time = 0600

• CETCs = 545°F slowly decreasing

1) At 0550, the Blackout tab will direct using (1) to feed the SGs.

2) At 0600, the Blackout tab and its basis (2) allow cooling down to 450°F.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. SSFASW

2. will NOT B. 1. SSFASW

2. will C. 1. StationASW

2. will NOT D. 1. StationASW

2. will Page 80 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 81 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

In accordance with the Site Emergency Plan, which ONE of the following would require notifying the State and Counties of plant status?

A. An RCS leak of4gpm B. SG tube leakage of 19 gpm C. An instrument failure results in ES Channels 1 2 actuation D. A loss of heat transfer requires feeding the SG with the SSF ASW pump Page 81 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 82 IL T42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Initial Conditions:

• Reactor power = 85% slowly increasing

• DeltaTcin HAND Current conditions:

• ICS runback in progress

• Reactor power as indicated below ir POWER RANGE NIS 848 831 756 864 A A A A 460 +60 +60 125 125 125 125 100 +40 100 +40 103 ÷40 100 +40 80 +20 80 +20 80 +20 B) +20 0 60 0 60 0 0 60 40 20 40 20 40 20 40 20 20 40 20 40 20 40 20 40 0 -60 60 0 6) 0 60 V V V V 000 000 000 000

% MB MB 1MB MB Which ONE of the following describes:

1) the reason for the ICS runback?

2) the consequences of operating the unit under the conditions described above?

A. 1. Dropped Control Rod

2. Allowable Thermal Power limits of Tech Spec 3.4.4 (RCS Loops MODES 1 and 2) could be exceeded B. 1. Dropped Control Rod

2. Maximum Linear Heat Rate could be exceeded C. 1. RCP trip

2. Allowable Thermal Power limits of Tech Spec 3.4.4 (RCS Loops MODES 1 and 2) could be exceeded D. 1. RCP trip

2. Minimum DNBR limits could be exceeded Page 82 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 83 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Time = 0400

• Reactor power = 70% decreasing

• Unit shut down in progress due to a 140 gpm RCS leak Time = 0420

• CoreSCM=0°F

• RCS temperature = 550°F decreasing

• Reactor building pressure = 6 psig increasing

• 1RIA-58 = 15R!hr increasing Time = 0445

• Reactor building pressure = 18 psig increasing

• Tremor felt in the control room

• Seismic trigger actuates Time = 0450

• Reactor building pressure = 4 psig decreasing

• 1 RIA-58 = 55RIhr decreasing

• Little River Dam has failed

1) The Emergency Classification at 0420 is (1)

2) The Emergency Classification at 0450 is (2)

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. Alert

2. Site Area Emergency B. 1. Alert

2. General Emergency C. 1. Site Area Emergency

2. Site Area Emergency D. 1. Site Area Emergency

2. General Emergency Page 83 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 84 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Initial conditions:

• Time= 0400

• Reactor power = 100%

• 1BHPIOOS Current conditions:

• Time=0410

• ES Channels 1 8 actuated

• CoreSCM=0°F

• EOP Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) in progress

• Seal Inlet HDR Flow 25 gpm

• HPI Flow Train A flow = 456 gpm

• HPI Flow Train B flow = 482 gpm

1) (1) exceeding the HPI pumps flow limits in accordance with Rule 6 (HPI Pump Throttling Limits).

2) The MINIMUM number of HPI trains required to mitigate this event is (2)

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. BOTH HPI headers are

2. two B. 1. BOTH HPI headers are

2. one C. 1. ONLY the 1 B HPI header is

2. two D. 1. ONLY the 1BHPI headeris

2. one Page 84 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 85 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Time = 0400

• Reactor has been tripped due to SGTR in the 1 A SG Time = 0430

• Feedwater to the 1A SG is isolated

• 1A SG level = 273 inches XSUR increasing Time = 0500

• 1A SG level = 293 inches XSUR increasing Time = 0530

• 1A SG reaches the Water in Steam Line Level In accordance with the SGTR tab:

1) At 0500, EOP Enclosure 5.22 (SG Blowdown) (1)_be used to reduce 1A SG level.

2) At 0530, (2) steaming the 1A SG.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. will NOT

2. continue B. 1. will NOT

2. stop C. twill

2. continue D. 1. will

2. stop Page 85 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 86 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Initial conditions:

• Reactor power = 85%

• Control rod group 7 = 93% withdrawn

• Makeup to LDST in progress Current conditions:

• Reactor power = 85%

• Control rod group 7 = 30% withdrawn

1) In accordance with the bases of TS 3.2.1 (Regulating Rod Position Limits) continued operation in the current plant configuration is NOT allowed because (1)

2) Restoring rods to within the acceptable region by (2) will satisfy the requirements of TS 3.2.1.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. SDM is not adequate and ejected rod worth is too high

2. boration ONLY B. 1. SDM is not adequate and ejected rod worth is too high

2. boration OR reducing reactor power C. 1. this configuration is in violation of the assumptions made in the safety analysis

2. boration ONLY D. 1. this configuration is in violation of the assumptions made in the safety analysis

2. boration OR reducing reactor power Page 86 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 87 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

BWST Level ci) ci)

-J 1200 1300 1400 1500 Time

1) Referring to the chart of control room indicated BWST level above, the latest time that adequate NPSH for the LPI and RBS pumps after suction is swapped to the RBES is ensured is (1)

2) The minimum BWST level in accordance with the basis of TS 35.4 (2) also ensure the solution in the RB Emergency sump following a LOCA is within a specified pH range.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 1300

2. will NOT B. 1. 1300

2. will C. 1. 1400

2. will NOT D. 1. 1400

2. will Page 87 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question:

• 88 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

• Reactor power = 100%

• 1 FDW-368 is discovered closed and will NOT open

1) In accordance with TS 3.7.5 (Emergency Feedwater) basis the (1) is inoperable.

2) If 1 FDW-368 remains inoperable, entering MODE 4 (2) required.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. TDEFDW pump

2. is B. 1. TDEFDW pump

2. is NOT C. 1. associated EFW flow path

2. is D. 1. associated EFW flow path

2. is NOT Page 88 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 89 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Which ONE of the following sets of 125 VDC Vital I&C power pan elboards are required for Unit 2 in accordance with TS 3.8.8 (Distribution Systems Operating) and why?

A. lDIAandlDlB They provide power to SK and SL breakers B. 1DIAand1DIB They provide power to the Switchyard Isolation circuitry C. lDlCandlDID They provide power to SK and SL breakers D. 1DICand1DID They provide power to the Switchyard Isolation circuitry Page 89 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question:

• 90 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 2 conditions:

• Reactor power = 100%

1) The IA pressure setpoint which will cause the Diesel Air Compressors to automatically start is (1) psig.

2) The bases for 2AP/22 (Loss of IA) ensuring that the Diesel Air Compressors are operating if IA header pressure decreases below the setpoint is to (2)

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1.88

2. ensure operability of 2FDW-315/316 during a subsequent blackout B. 1.88

2. prevent exceeding RB design pressure during a subsequent MSLB/LOOP C. 1.90

2. ensure operability of 2FDW-315/316 during a subsequent blackout D. 1.90

2. prevent exceeding RB design pressure during a subsequent MSLB!LOOP Page 90 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 91 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Initial conditions:

• Unit is returning to power after a short maintenance outage

• Reactor power = 2.5% increasing

• 1A LPI Train piping insulation removal for weld inspection in progress Current conditions:

• Power to the 1A LPI Train Flow gage disconnected Which ONE of the following states:

1) the equipment that must be declared inoperable in accordance with the basis of Tech Specs 3.5.3 (LPI) and 3.6.5 (RB Spray and Cooling Systems)?

2) if Unit 1 can continue with the power escalation to 100% in accordance with Tech Specs?

A. 1. 1ALPITrainONLY

2. can continue B. 1. 1ALPITra1nAND1ARBSTrain

2. can continue C. 1. 1ALPITrainONLY

2. can NOTcontinue D. 1. 1ALPITrainAND1ARBSTrain

2. can NOT continue Page 91 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 92 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

• De-fueling in progress

• Withdrawing assembly from core

1) The MINIMUM load cell reading that will result in the overload light illuminating is (1) lbs.

2) In accordance with MP/0/Al 500/029 (Main Fuel Bridge Operation) the first action taken to resolve the overload conditions is to (2) .

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 2000

2. jog the hoist in both directions B. 1. 2000

2. adjust the load cell set point up by 20 pounds C. 1. 2500

2. jog the hoist in both directions D. 1. 2500

2. adjust the load cell set point up by 20 pounds Page 92 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question:

• 93 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Time = 0400

• SFP level = (-) 1.7 feet decreasing

• 1 SA-9/A-5 (Spent Fuel Pool Level High/Low) actuated

• ALL SF Cooling Pumps have tripped OFF

• ALL SF Cooling Pump switches green lights are illuminated Time = 0405

• NEC reports actual SFP level is low

1) At 0400, has the LOW SFP Level interlock functioned as designed?

2) At 0405 and in accordance with AP/35 (Loss of SFP Cooling and/or Level) which ONE of the following enclosures will be performed t?

Which ONE of the following completes the questions above?

A. 1. yes

2. Enclosure 5.5 (SFP Makeup from Ui or U2 BWST)

B. 1. yes

2. Enclosure 5.4 (Unit 1-2 SEP Time to Reach 180°F, 200°F)

C. i.no

2. Enclosure 5.1 (SFP Makeup from 1A B HUT)

D. 1.no

2. Enclosure 5.12 (Jumpering SFP Low Level Interlock)

Page 93 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 94 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Initial conditions:

• Time0400

• LOCA CD tab in progress

• ALL SCM = 5°F stable

• RCS pressure = 870 psig slowly decreasing

• RB pressure peaked at 2.4 psig and is now decreasing

• HPI aligned for piggyback operation

• LPI suction source is the RBES

• 1LP-15 failed CLOSED Current conditions:

• Time= 0405

• RCS pressure = 855 psig stable

• 1SA-07/E-6 (ES LPI BYP PERMIT) actuates

1) At 0405, the LPI ES channels_ (1) allowed to be manually bypassed in accordance with the LOCA CD tab.

2) The MAXI MUM allowed HPI flow is (2) gpm.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. are

2. 750 B. 1. areNOT

2. 750 C. 1. are

2. 500 D. 1. are NOT

2. 500 Page 94 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 95 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

In accordance with NSD 301 (Engineering Change Program):

1) An on-line temporary design change is required to have a plan that specifies removal of the change within (1) _from installation.

2) The Operational Control Group (Operations) (2) responsible for maintaining a log of installed changes.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. thirty days

2. is B. 1. thirty days

2. is NOT C. 1. oneyear

2. is D. 1. oneyear

2. is NOT Page 95 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question:

• 96 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

• Reactor Power = 100%

• 1A MDEFWP was declared inoperable at 13:00 on 05/01

• 1 B MDEFWP was declared inoperable at 14:00 on 05/06

• 1A MDEFWP was returned to service at 01:00 on 05/07 Which ONE of the following describes when the 1 B MDEFWP is required to be returned to service?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 13:00 on 05/08 B. 13:00 on 05/09 C. 13:00 on 05/11 D. 14:00 on 05/13 Page 96 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 97 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following plant conditions:

Time = 0400

• Reactor power = 100%

• 1A GWD tank release in progress at 1/3 Station Limit Time = 0415

• 3B GWD tank release initiated at 1/3 Station Limit Time = 0430

• Loss of power to RM-80 skid of 1 RIA-45 (Norm Vent Gas)

• 1SA8/B-9 RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH in alarm

• 15A8/B-10 RM PROCESS MONITOR FAULT in alarm

1) In accordance with OP/3/Al 104/018 (GWD System) the release at 0415 is required to be approved by the (1)

2) At 0430 and in accordance with the ARGs, an RO will (2) .

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Unit3 CRS

2. manually close GWD-4 B. 1. Unit3CRS

2. verify GWD-4 has automatically closed C. 1. OSM only

2. manually close GWD-4 D. 1. OSMonly

2. verify GWD-4 has automatically closed Page 97 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question:

• 98 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Time = 0410

• Reactor power = 100%

• 1 RIA-59 = 0.1 gpm

• 1RIA-60=35 gpm

• Emergency classification declared Time = 0430

• Reactor power = 38%

• lAMSLBoccurs Time = 0500

• Cooldown is initiated using the 1A SG

1) At 0410, in accordance with the bases of TS 3.4.13, RCS Pressure Boundary LEAKAGE (1) _occurring.

2) At 0500, an Emergency Classification upgrade (2) required (Do NOT use Emergency Coordinators judgment).

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1.is

2. is B. 1.is

2. is NOT C. 1. is NOT

2. is D. 1. is NOT

2. is NOT Page 98 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 99 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Initial conditions:

• All 3 Units reactor power = 100%

• 1 SA-3/B6 (Fl RE ALARM) actuated 3

r d

• NECs dispatched to the Turbine Building Floor (1TA and 1TB area)

Current conditions:

• NEC reports the fire on 1TB with heavy smoke and rolling flames

• Fire Brigade is dispatched

1) In accordance with the Fire Plan a water fog (1) be used on the switchgear to fight the fire.

2) In accordance with SLC 16.13.1 (Minimum Station Staffing Requirements), an SRO (2) required to serve as the fire brigade leader.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1.can

2. is B. 1.can

2. is NOT C. 1. can NOT

2. is D. 1. can NOT

2. is NOT Page 99 of 100

Oconee Nuclear Station Question: 100 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examination (1 point)

Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Initial conditions:

• Reactor power = 68% decreasing

• RCS leak rate = 50 gpm

• AP/2 (Excessive Leakage) in progress Current conditions:

• 1TA and 1TB lockout

• Subsequent Actions tab in progress

• RCSleakrate= 125 gpm

• Station has determined that a natural circulation cooldown is desired

1) The (1) tab will be used to cool down the RCS.

2) In accordance with the above EOP tab, the MAXIMUM allowable cooldown rate is (2) .

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Forced Coo ldown

2. <25°F/

/2hr 1

B. 1. Forced Cooldown

2. <50°F/

/2hr 1

C. 1.LOCACooldown

2. 25°F!

/2hr 1

D. 1. LOCACooldown

2. 50°F/

/2hr 1

Page 100 of 100

FOR REVIEW ONLY DO NOT DISTRIBUTE -

Reference List for: 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examinati Question Reference List Number 16 AP/34EncI..5.1 48 TS 3.8.3 50 AP/1 1 End. 5.1A Page 5 of 5 83 RP/1000/001 EncL 4.1 - 4.9 86 TS3.2.1 Unit 1 COLR 88 TS3.7.5 96 TS 3.7.5 98 RP/1000/O01 Printed 11/29/2012 2:34:15 PM Page 1 of!

Enclosure 5.1 AP/l/A/1 700/03 4 Generator Capability Page 1 of3 Curve 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

100 200

300 400 500 600 700 CURVE AB LIMITED BY FIELD HEATING CURVE BC LIMITED BY ARMATURE HEATING CURVE CD LIMITED BY ARMATURE CORE END HEATING

• 4 3/2

DC Sources Operating 3.8.3 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.3 DC Sources Operating LCO 3.8.3 DC Sources shall be OPERABLE as follows:

a. Three of four 125 VDC Vital l&C power sources for each unit as follows, Unit 1 - 1CA, lOB, 2CA, 2CB Unit 2 - 2CA, 2CB, 3CA, 3CB Unit 3- 3CA, 3CB, 1CA, 1CB; and each aligned to at least one panelboard provided that a power source is not the only source for two or more of the Units panelboards.

b. Two additional 125 VDC Vital l&C power sources when any other Unit is in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4;

c. One additional 125 VDC Vital l&C power source when no other Unit is in MODES 1, 2, 3, or 4;

d. Two 230 kV Switchyard 125 VDC power sources.

NOTES

1. For Units 2 and 3, a 125 VDC Vital l&C power source shall not be the only source for panelboards 1 DIC and 1 DID required by LCO 3.8.8.

2. Each additional 125 VDC Vital l&C source required by LCO 3.8.3 part b or part c shall be connected to at least one pane Iboard associated with the unit where the source is physically located.

3. The additional 125 VDC Vital I&C power source required by LCO 3.8.3 part c shall not be a 125 VDC Vital l&C power source that is available to meet the three of four requirement of LCO 3.8.3 part a.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.8.3-1 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

DC Sources Operating 3.8.3 ACTIONS NOTE The Completion Times for Required Actions A through D are reduced when in Condition L of LCO 3.8.1.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required 125 VDC A.1 NOTE Vital I&C power source Not applicable for up to inoperable. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to perform equalization charge after completion of a performance or service test.

Restore required power 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> source to OPERABLE status.

B. One required 125 VDC B.1 Align sources such that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Vital l&C power source one power source is the only source for two not the only source for or more of the Units two or more of the panelboards. Units panelboards.

C. NOTE C.1 Align sources such that 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Only applicable to Units one power source is 2 and 3. not the only source to 1DIC and 1DID.

One 125 VDC Vital l&C power source the only source for panelboards 1DIC and 1DID.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.8.3-2 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

DC Sources Operating 3.8.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. One 230 kV switchyard D.1 NOTES 125 VDC power source 1. Not applicable for inoperable, up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to perform equalization charge after completion of a performance or service test.

2. Not applicable for upto 10 days to replace entire battery bank and perform required tests to restore operability.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Restore power source to OPERABLE status.

E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 5. 84 hours9.722222e-4 days <br />0.0233 hours <br />1.388889e-4 weeks <br />3.1962e-5 months <br /> 000NEE UNITS 1,2, &3 3.8.3-3 Amendment Nos. 370, 372, & 371

DC Sources Operating 3.8.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.3.1 Verify correct breaker alignments and voltage 7 days availability from required distribution centers to isolating transfer diodes.

SR 3.8.3.2 Verify battery terminal voltage is 1 25V on 7 days float charge.

SR 3.8.3.3 Verify battery cells, cell plates, and racks 12 months show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could degrade battery performance.

SR 3.8.3.4 Verify battery cell to cell and terminal 12 months connections are clean and tight, and are coated with anti-corrosion material.

SR 3.8.3.5 Verify battery capacity is adequate to supply, 12 months and maintain in OPERABLE status, the required emergency loads for the design duty cycle when subjected to a battery service test.

SR 3.8.3.6 Verify battery capacity is in accordance with In accordance with the the Battery Discharge Testing Program. Battery Discharge Testing Program OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.8.3-4 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

Enclosure 5.1A AP/l/A/1700/01 1 CT-4 Overload Limits{O} Page 5 of 5 ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

2. Maintain CT-4 within the limits of Figure 1.

FIGURE 1{20}

CT-4 MEGAWATTS 24 23 :::Ilizz 1 T 1 II 22 100% --+

21

---

+

20 7 Jmit wit ionlyone SK brea <er 19 18 17 16 Acceptable Region 112% --

with cooling available .

15 14 (0

I 13 12 (3 z .

uJ 11 Limit with NO I Forced Cooling 10 -

9 8

7 -

z 6

5 4

1 Accepi ab a F egion witi No Cooling available \ i 3

2 1

0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 2021 22 23 CT-4 Mvar Mwat. Rev. 2 4/12/05 rtr

3. WHEN directed by CR SRO, THEN EXIT this enclosure.

. . . END...

Enclosure 4.1 RP/0/B/ 1000/001 Fission Product Barrier Matrix Page 1 of I DETERMINE THE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION USING THE TABLE BELOW: ADD POINTS TO ClASSIFY. SEE NOTE BELOW RCS BARRIERS (RD 5-7) FUEL CLAD BARRIERS (RI) 8-9) CONTAINMENT BARRIERS (BD 10-13)

Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss (5 Points) Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss (5 Points) Potential Loss (1 Point) Loss (3 Points)

RCS LeakrateE 160 gpm RCS Leak rate thai results in a loss Average of the 5 highest Average of the 5 highest CETC CETC 1200 F 15 minutes Rapid unexplained containment of subcooling. CETC I 200 F OR pressure decrease after increase 700 F (ETC 700 F 15 minutes with a ia/itl RVLS reading 0 containment pressure or sump level not consistent with LOCA SGTR 160 gpm Valid RVLS reading of 0 Coolant activity 300 l.tCi/ml DEl RB pressure 59 psig Failure of secondary side of SG OR results in a direct opening to the RB pressure 10 psig and no environment with SG Tube Leak RBCU or RBS tO gpm in the SG NOTE: RVLS is NOT valid if one or more RCPs are running OR if Entry into the PTS (Pressurized I RIA 57 or 58 reading 1.0 RJhr Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 SG Tube Leak F 10 gpm exists in LPI pump(s) arc Thermal Shock) Operation Since SD RJbr RJhr Since SD R/hr RIhr one SG.

finning AND taking NOTE: PTS is entered under 2 RIA 57 reading F 1.6 R/hr suction from the LPI 0 tt.5 F 1800 F 860 the other SG has secondary side 2 RIA 58 reading F 1.0 R/hr drop line. 0 - <0.5 F 300 F 150 -

either of the following: failure that results in a direct

. A cooldown below 400F opening to the environment AND 0.5 < 2.0 F 80 F 40 0.5 < 2.0 F 400 F 195 3RIA 57 or 58 reading 1.0 Rihr

> l00F/hr. has occurred. is being fed from the affected unit

. HPI has operated in the 2.0- 80 F 32 F 16 2.0- 8.0 F 280 F 130 injection mode while NO RCPs were operating.

HPI Forced Cooling RCS pressure spike F 2750 psig Hydrogen concentration 9% Containment isolation is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment Director judgment Director judgment judgment Director judgment Director judgment UNUSUAL EVENT (1-3 Total Points) ALERT (4-6 Total Points) SITE AREA EMERGENCY (7-10 Total Points) GENERAL EMERGENCY (11-13 Total Points)

OPERATING MODE: 1.2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3.4 OPERATING MODE: 1.2,3.4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2.3,4 4.1 .U. I Any potential loss of Containment 4.1 A. 1 Any potential loss or loss of the RCS 4.1 .G. I Loss of any two barriers and potential loss of 4 I S I Loss of any two barriers the third barrier 4.l.U.2 Any loss of containment 4.I.A.2 Any potential loss or loss of the Fuel 4 I S 2 Loss of one barrier and potential loss of either Clad 4.1 .G.2 Loss of all three harriers RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers 4.1 .S.3 Potential loss of both the RCS and Fuel (tad Barriers NOTE: An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss threshold is IMMINENT (i.e., within -3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds arc exceeded.

7

Enclosure 4.2 RP/0/B/ 1000/001 System Malfunctions Page 1 of2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY I. RCS LEAKAGE (BD 15)

OPERATING MODE: C 2.3,4 A. Unidentified leakage 10 gpm B. Pressure boundary leakage 10 gpm C. Identified leakage 25 gpni

. Includes SG tube leakage UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL

2. UNPLANNED LOSS OF MOST OR ALL SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION! 1. INABILITY TO MONITOR A SAFETY SYSTEM ANNUNCIATION!

INDICATION IN CONTROL ROOM SIGNIFiCANT TRANSIENT IN INDiCATION IN CONTROL ROOM (BD 20) PROGRESS (BD 22)

FOR> 15 MINUTES(BD 16)

OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2,3,4 Unplanned loss of> 50% of the following A. Unplanned loss of> 50% of the following A. Unplanned loss of> 50% of the following A.

annunciators on one unit for> 15 minutes: annunciators on one unit for> 15 minutes:

annunciators on one unit for> 15 minutes:

Units I & 3 Units I & 3 Units I & 3 I SAl, 2.3,4,5,6.7.8.9. 14, 15, 16, & 18 1 SAl, 2,3,4.5.6,7,8.9. 14. 15, 16, & 18 1 SAI,2,3,4,5.6,7,8,9, 14.15, 16.& 18 3 SAl, 2,3,4,5,6.7,8,9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 3 SAl. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 14, 15, 16, & 18 3 SAl, 2, 3, 4. 5. 6, 7. 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, & 18 Unit 2 Unit 2 Unit 2 2 SAl. 2,3.4,5.6.7.8,9. 14, 15, & 16 2 SAl, 2,3,4,5.6,7,8,9, 14, 15, & 16 2 SAl. 2,3,4.5,6,7.8.9, 14, 15, & 16 AND AND AND Loss of annunciators or indicators requires A ,slgni/Icant transient is in progress Loss of annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift additional personnel (beyond normal shift complement) to satbly operate the unit complement) to safely operate the unit AND Loss of the OAC and ALL PAM indications AND (CONTINUED)

SignifIcant p/on! transient in progress AND

!nuhi/iti to direct/i monitor any one of the OR following functions:

Loss of the ( )AC and ALL PAM indications I. Suheriticality (END) 2. Core tooling 3 Heat Sink 4 R(S Integrity

5. Containment Integrii ft. RCS Inventory (END) 8

Enclosure 4.2 RP/O/B/1000/OOl System Malfunctions Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

3. INABILITY TO REACH REQUIRED SHUTDOWN WITHIN LIMITS (BD 17)

OPERATING MODE: 1.2, 3,4 A. Required operating mode not reached within TS LCO action statement time

4. UNPLANNED LOSS OF ALL ON SITE OR OFFSITE COMMUNICATIONS (BD 18)

OPERATING MODE: All A. Loss of all onsite communications capability (Plant phone system, PA system.

Pager system, Onsite Radio system) affecting ability to perform Routine operations B. Loss of all onsitc communications capability (Selective Signaling, NRC ETS lines, Offsite Radio System, AT&T line) affecting ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

5. FUEL CLAD DEGRADATION (BD 19)

OPERATING MODE: A]l:

A, DEI->5l.tCi/ml (END) 9

Enclosure 4.3 RP/0/B/ 1000/001 Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Page 1 of2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 1 ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF I. ANY UNPLANNED RELEASE OF BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTING FROM I. BOUNDARY DOSE RESULTiNG FROM GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY GASEOUS OR LIQUID RADIOACTIVITY ACTUAL/IMMINENT RELEASE OF ACTUAL! IMMINENT RELEASE OF TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT TO THE ENVIRONMENT THAT GASEOUS ACTIVITY (RD 35) GASEOUS ACTIViTY (BD 39)

EXCEEDS TWO TIMES THE SLC EXCEEDS 200 TIMES RADIOLOGICAL LIMITS FOR 60 MINUTES OR LONGER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR 15 OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All (HD 25) MINUTES OR LONGER (BD 30)

A. Valid reading on RIA 46 of 2.09E+05 cpm A. Valid reading on RIA 46 of? 2.09E+06 cpm OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All for l5 minutes (See Note 3) for >15 minutes (See Note 2)

A. Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 33 A. Valid indication on RL 46 of? 2.09E04 cpm B. Valid reading on R]A 57 or 58 as shown on B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on of 4.06E+06 cpm for> 60 minutes for>l5 minutes (See Note I) Enclosure 4.8 (See Note 2) Enclosure 4.8 (See Note 3)

(See Note I)

B RIA 33 HIGH Alarm C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at

13. Va/k! indication on radiation monitor RIA 45 the site houndart of:

the site boundary of:

of? 9.35E+05 cpm for> 60 minutes AND (See Note I)  ? 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE adult 1000 mRem TEDE Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 thyroid C. Liquid effluent being released exceeds two times the level of SLC 1 6. II .1 for> 1 5 minutes OR timeS SLC 16.11.1 for> 60 minutes as as determined by Chemistry Procedure D. Field survey results indicate cite boundary dose  ? 5000 mRem CDE adult thyroid determined by Chemistry Procedure rates exceeding lOO mRadJhr expected to C. Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 D. Gaseous effluent being released exceeds two continue for more than one hour D. Field survey results indicate sire boundary dose times the level of SLC 16.11.2 for >15 minutes times SLC 16.11.2 for> 60 minutes as at determined by RP Procedure rates exceeding? 1000 mRad/hr expected to OR continue for more than one hour determined by RP Procedure Analyses of field stirs ey samples indicate adult NOTE I: Ifrnonitor reading is sustained OR thyroid dose commitment of ? 500 rnRem for the time period indicated in the EAL (CONTINUED) CDE (3.84 E 7 i/mI) for one hour of the required assessments (procedure Analyses of field survey samples indicate adult inhalation calculations) cannot be completed within thyroid dose commitment of? 5000 mRem this period, declaration mutt be made on the CDE for one hour of inhalation valid Radiation Monitor reading. NOTE 2: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the ca/id radiation monitor reading should be NOTE 3: If actual Dose Assessment cannot used for emergency classification. be completed within 15 minutes. then the va/id radiation monitor reading should be used fir emergency classification.

(CONtiNUED)

((:ONTIN L ED) (END)

I0

Enclosure 4.3 RP/0/B/ 1000/001 Abnormal Rad Leves/Radiological Effluent Page 2 of 2 2

UNUSUAL EVENT UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN PLANT 2.

ALERT RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE

[ 2.

SITE AREA EMERGENCY LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE 1 GENERAL EMERGENCY RADIATION OR AIRBORNE MATERIAL OR IN CREASES IN REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR CONCENTRATION (BD 27) RADIATION LEVELS THAT IMPEDES WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE OPERATION OF SYSTEMS REQUIRED REACTOR VESSEL (BD 38)

OPERATING MODE: All TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATiON OR TO ESTABLISH OR MAINTAIN COLD OPERATING MODE: 5,6 SHUTDOWN (BD 32)

A, Li 5 reading 14 and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage 33fl fuel in the OPERATING MODE: All A. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 core (Cold Shutdown) condition A. Va/id radiation reading l5 mRad/hr in CR. AND B. Valid indication of nnconovlled water decrease CAS, or Radwaste CR in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by waler Unp/anned/unexpected sa/icl area monitor LT 5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS B.

readings exceed limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 makeup AND B. Failure of heat sink causes loss of ModeS

3. MAJOR DAMAGE TO IRRADIATED (Cold Shutdown) condition Unplanned t alid RIA 3. 6 or Portable Area 7

Monitor readings increase. FUEL OR LOSS OF VATER LEVEL THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT IN THE UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL AND C. I RJhr radiation reading at one foot away from OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL a damaged storage cask located at the ISFS1 (BD 33) Either train ultrasonic level indication less than D. Valid area monitor readings exceeds limits o inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS OPERATING MODE: All makeup stated in Enclosure 4.9.

A. ValidRlA3*, 6,41, OR 49* HIGH Alarm NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located located in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown in Enclosure 4.4., (Loss of Shutdown Functions).

• Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only Functions). High radiation levels will also be I-ugh radiation levels will also be seen with this seen with this condition.

condition.

B. HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the main bridge or SFP bridge C Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered (END))

D. Operators detcnninc water level drop in either (END) the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel n ill be uncovered NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.4.. (Loss of Shutdown Functions).

I ligh radiation levels will also he seen with ihts condition.

(I D) 11

Enclosure 4.4 RP/O/B/1000/OO1 Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 1 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR I. FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE OR I. FAILURE OF RPS TO COMPLETE INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 44) INITIATE A Rx SCRAM (BD 50) AUTOMATIC SCRAM AND MANUAL SCRAM NOT SUCCESSFUL WITH OPERATING MODE: 1.2 INDICATION OF CORE DAMAGE OPERATING MODE 1,2,3 (BD 53)

(CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

A. Valid reactor trip signal received or required A. Valid reactor trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram OPERATING MODE: 1,2 WITHOUT automatic scram A. ulid Rx trip signal received or required AND WITHOUT automatic scram DSS has inserted Control Rods DSS has NOT inserted Control Rods R AND Manual trip from the Control Room is successful and reactor power is less AND Manual trip from the Control Room was NOT than 5% and decreasing successful in reducing reactor power 10< 5%

and decreasing Manual tnp from the Control Room was NOT successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing Average of the 5 highest CETCs l 2000 Fan ICCM

2. INABILITY TO MAINTAIN PLANJ IN 2. COMPLETE LOSS OF FUNCTION MODES (COLD SHUTDOWN) (BD 46) NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OR MAINTAIN (END)

MODE 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN) (BD 51)

OPERATING MODE: 5,6 OPERATING MODE: 1,2, 3,4 A. Loss of LPI and/or LPSW A. Average of the 5 highest CETCs t200° F AND shown on ICCM Inability to maintain RCS temperature B. Unable to maintain reactor subcritical below 2000 F as indicated by either of the followmg.

C. FOP directs fueding SG from SSF ASWP or station ASWP R( S temperature at the 1101 Pump Suction (CONTINUED)

Average of the 5 highest CETCs as indicated by ICCM display OR

\ isual observation (CONTINUED) =

12

Enclosure 4.4 RP/O/B/1000/OO1 Loss of Shutdown Functions Page 2 of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN PLANT 3. MAJOR DAMAGE TO IRRADIATED 3. LOSS OF WATER LEVEL IN THE RADIATION OR AiRBORNE FUEL OR LOSS OF WATER LEVEL REACTOR VESSEL THAT HAS OR CONCENTRATION (BD 42) THAT HAS OR WILL RESULT IN THE WILL UNCOVER FUEL IN THE UNCOVERING OF IRRADIATED FUEL REACTOR VESSEL (BD 52)

OPERATING MODE: AU OUTSIDE THE REACTOR VESSEL (BD 48) OPERATING MODE: 5.6 A. LT 5 reading 14 and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the OPERATING MODE: All A. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 core (Cold Shutdown) conditions A. ValidRlA 3*, 6, 41, OR 49* HIGH Alarm B. Valid indication of uncontrolled water decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblics remaining covered by water Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS B. HIGH Alarm for portable area monitors on the Makeup AND main bridge or SFP bridge Unplanned Valid RIA 3. 6 or Portable Area B. Failure of heat sink causes loss of ModeS Monitor readings increase. C Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel (Cold Shutdown) conditions uncovered AND C. I R!hr radiation reading at one foot away from

0. Operators determine water level drop in either Either train ultrasonic level indication less than a damaged storage cask located at the ISFSI the SFP or fuel transfer canal svill exceed 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS Va/id area monitor readings exceeds limits makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel makeup D.

stated in Enclosure 4.9. be uncovered I NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located I I NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located I NOTE: This Initiating Condition is also located in Enclosure 4.3, (Abnormal Rad I in Enclosure 4.3, (Abnormal Rad in Enclosure 4.3., (Abnormal Rad I I Levels/Radiological Effluent). High radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent) High radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent). 1-ugh radiation levels will also be seen with this condition.

I I levels will also be seen with this condition.

levels will also be seen with this condition. I (END)

(END)

(END) 13

Enclosure 4.5 RP/O/B/1000/OO1 Loss of Power Page 1 of 1 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE POWER TO 1. LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND I. LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE AC POWER AND 1. PROLONGED LOSS OF ALL OFFSITE ESSENTIAL BUSSES FOR GREATER LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO LOSS OF ALL ONSITE AC POWER TO POWER AND ON SITE AC POWER THAN 15 MINUTES (BD 55) ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 57) ESSENTIAL BUSSES (BD 59) (RD 62)

OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: 5,6 OPERATING MODE: 1,2. 3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1,2. 3,4 Defueled A. Unit auxiliaries are being supplied from A. MFB I and 2 de-energized A. MFB I and 2 dc-energized Keowee or CT5 A. MFB 1 and 2 dc-energized AND AND NJ A?J Failure to restore power to at least one MFB SSF fails to maintain Mode 3 Failure to restore power to at least one MFB within 15 minutes from the time of loss of (Hot Standby) {]

Inability to energize either MFB from an offsite within 15 rntnutes from the time of loss of both both offsite and onsite AC power source (either switchyard) within 15 minutes. offstte and onsite AC power AND At least one of the following conditions exist:

2. AC POWER CAPABILITY TO 2. LOSS OF ALL VITAL DC POWER (BD 60) Restoration of power to at least one

2. UNPLANNED LOSS OF REQUIRED DC ESSENTIAL BUSSES REDUCED TO A MFB within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOT likely POWER FOR GREATER THAN 15 SINGLE SOURCE FOR GREATER THAN MINUTES (BD56) I5MINUTES (BD58) OPERATINGMODE: 1,2,3.4 Qg OPERATING MODE: 5, 6 OPERAIING MODE: 1.2,3.4 A. Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required Indicatiotis of coHtinuing DC busses as indicated by bus voltage lest than degradation of core cooling based A. Unplanned loss of vital DC power to required A. AC power capability has been degraded to a 1 10 VDC on Fission Product Barrier DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less single power source for> 15 minutes due to the monitoring than 110 VDC loss of all but one of the following:

(END)

Unit Normal Transfomier (baekcharged) Failure to restore prmer to at least one required Unit SL Transfonricr DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss Failure to restore power to at least one required Another Unit SU Transformer (aligned)

DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss CT4 (END)

CT5 (END)

(END)

Loss of Power Emergency Action Levels (EAL5) apply to the ability of electrical energy to perform its intended function, reach its intended equipment. ex. If both MFBs, are energized but all 4160V switchgear is not available, the electrical energy can not reach the motors intended. The result to the plant is the same as if both MFBs were dc-energized.

14

Enclosure 4.6 RP/O/B/1000/OO1 Fire/Explosions and Security Actions {2} {3} Page of 2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY FIRES/EXPLOSIONS WITHIN THE 1. FIRE/EXPLOSION AFFECTING (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE) (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

PLANT (BD 65) OPERABILITY OF PLANT SAFETY SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH/MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATING MODE: All SHUTDOWN (BD 70)

NOTE: Within the plant means:

Turbine Building V V V V NOTE: Only one train of a system needs to Auxiliary Building V V V V V be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this Reactor Building V V condition V Keowee Hydro V V Transformer Yard B3T B4T Service Air Diesel Compressors A Fire/explo.cioii.c Keowee Hydro & associated Transformers AND SSF Affected safciy-rclaicd system parameter indications show degraded perfonstance OR A. Fire within the plant not extinguished within 15 minutes of Control Room notification or Plant personnel report visible damage to verification of a Control Room alann permanent structures or equipment required for sale shutdown B. Unanticipated eVrp/oVsmoim within the plant resulting in visible damage to pennuinent (Continued) structures/equipment includes steam line break and FDW line break (Continued) 15

Enclosure 4.6 RP/0/B/ 1000/001 Fire/Explosions and Security Actions 2} {3) Page 2 of2 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY I GENERAL EMERGENCY

2. CONFIRMED SECURITY CONDITION 2 HOSTILE ACTION WITHIN THE HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED A HOSTILE ACTION RESULTING IN OR THREAT WHICH INDICATES A OWNER CONTROLLED AREA OR AREA (BD 76) LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF POTENTIAL DEGRADATION IN THE AIRBORNE ATTACK THREAT. (BD 72) THE FACILITY (BD 79)

LEVEL OF SAFETY OF THE PLANT (BI) 67)

A. A HOSTILE ACTION is occstrnng or has OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All occurred witltiti the OWNER CONTROLLED OPERATING MODE: All AREA as reported by the Security Shift A. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or baa A. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that Supervisor. occurred within the PORTECTED AREA as plant personnel are unable to operate A. Security condition that does not involve a reported by the Security Shift Supervisor. equipment required to maintain safety HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the B. A validated notification from NRC of an functions Security Shifi Supervisor AIRLINER attack threat within 30 minutes of 2. OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN the site. THE JUDGEMENT OF THE EMERGENCY B. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of B. A credible site-specific security threat DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and notification OF A SITE AREA EMERGENCY. (BD 78) IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a

3. OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH IN freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

C. A validated notification from NRC providing THE JUDGEMENT OF THE information of an aircraft threat EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT DECLARATION OF AN ALERT (BD 75) OPERATING MODE: All 2. OTHER CONDITiONS EXIST WHICH IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE

3. OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE the Emergency Director indicate that events are in DECLARATION OF A GENERAL EMERGENCY DIRECTOR WARRANT progress or have occurred which tnvolve actual or EMERGENCY. (BD 81)

DECLARATION OF A NOUE. (BD 69) OPERATING MODE: All likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment that results in intentional damage or malicious of the Emergency Director indicate that events acts; (I ) toward Site personnel or equipment that are in progress or have occurred whtch involve could lead to the likely failure of or: (2) that OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All an actual or potential substantial degradation of prevent effective access to equipment needed for the level of safety of the plant or a security the protection of the public. Any releases are not A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment A. Other conditions exist which itt the judgment event that involves probable life threatening of the Emergency Director indicate that expected to result in exposure levels which of the Emergency Director indicate that risk to site personnel or damage to site events are in progress or have occurred events are itt progress or have occurred whtch exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline equiptsietlt because of HOSTILE ACTION. exposure levels beyond the stte bottndary.

indicate a potential degradation of the level of which involve actual or I1vIMINENT Any releases are expected to be limited to small substatitial core degradation or inciting with safety of the plant or indicate a security threat fractions of the EPA Protective Action potential for loss of containtrient integrity or to facility protection has been inittated. No Guideline exposure levels. HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual releases of radioactive material requirtng off-site response or monitoring are expected (END) loss of physical control of the facility.

unless further degradation of safety systems (END) Releases can be reasonably expected to occurs. exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the (END) tmmediate Site area.

(Itl\D) 16

Enclosure 4.7 RP/0/B/ 1000/001 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 1 of3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE 1. NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PHENOMENA AFFECTING THE PLANT (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE) (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

PROTECTED AREA (BD 83) VITAL AREA (BD 89)

OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All A. Tremor felt and seismic trigger actuates (O.05g)

A. Tremor felt and valid alarm on the strong motion aceelerograph NOTE: Only one train of a safety-related system needs to be affected or damaged in B Tornado striking within Protected Area Boundary order to satisfy these conditions.

C. Vehicle crash into plant structures/systems B. Tornado, high winds, missiles resulting from within the Pi-otected Area Boundary turbine failure, vehicle crashes, or other catastrophic event.

D. Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals AND Visible damage to permanent stmcwres or equipment required for (CONTINUED) safe shutdown of the unit.

OR Affected safety system parameter indications show degraded performance.

(CONTINUED) 17

Enclosure 4.7 RP/0/B/1 000/001 Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 2 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY I GENERAL EMERGENCY

2. NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE 2. RELEASE OF TOXIC/FLAMMABLE 1. CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION AND PHENOMENA AFFECTING KEOWEE GASES JEOPARDIZING SYSTEMS PLANT CONTROL CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN SAFE ESTABLISHED (BD 96) 1 HYDRO CONDITION B (RD 85) (CONTINUE TO NEXT PAGE)

OPERATION OR ESTABLISH]

OPERATING MODE: All MAINTAIN MODE 5 (COLD SHUTDOWN) (BD 91)

A. Reservoir elevation 805.0 feet with all OPERATiNG MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All spillway gates open and the lake elevation A. Reportldetection of toxic gases in Continues to rise A. Control Room evacuation has been initiated concentrations that will be life-threatening to plant personnel B. Seepage readings increase or decrease greatly AND or seepage water is carrying a significant B. Report/detection of flammable gases in amount of soil particles Control of the plant cannot be established from concentrations that will affect the safe the Aux Shutdown Panel or the SSF within 15 operation of the plant:

C New area of seepage or wetness, with large minutes amounts of seepage water observed on dam,

• Reactor Building dam toe, or the abutments

• Auxiliaiy Building

• Turbine Building 2. KEOWEE HYDRO DAM FAILURE D. Slide or other movement of the darn or

• Control Room (BD 97) abutments which could develop into a failure OPERATING MODE: All E. Developing failure involving the powerhouse or 3. TURBINE BUILDING FLOOD (RD 93) appurtenant structures and the operator believes the safety of the structure is questionable A. Imminent/actual darn failure exists involving any of the following:

OPERATING MODE: All

• Keowee Hydro Darn NATURAL AND DESTRUCTIVE

• Little River Darn

3. A. Turbine Building flood requiring use of PHENOMENA AFFECTING JOCASSEE AP/l 2,3/All 700/I 0, (Turbine Building Flood)

• Dikes A, B. C. or D HYDRO CONDITION B (RD 86)

• Intake Canal Dike

• Jocassee Dam Condition A

4. CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION HAS OPERATING MODE: All BEEN INITIATED (BD 94) (CON TUU ED)

A. Condition B has been declared for the Jocassee OPERATING MODE: All Dam A. Evacuation of Control Room (CONTINUED)

AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

AND Plant control IS established from the Aux shutdown Panel or the SSF OR Plant control IS BEING established from the Aux Shutdown Panel or SSF (CONTINUED) 18

Enclosure 4.7 RP/O/B/1000/OOl Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety Page 3 of 3 UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY 4 RELEASE OF TOXIC OR FLAMMABLE 5. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT 3. OTHER CONDITIONS WRRANT 1. OTHER CONDITIONS WARRANT GASES DEEMED DETRIMENTAL TO SAFE CLASSIFICATION OF AN ALERT DECLARATION OF SITE AREA DECLARATION OF GENERAL OPERATION OF THE PLANT (BD 87) (BD 95) EMERGENCY (RD 98) EMERGENCY (BD 99)

OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: All OPERATING MODE: AU OPERATING MODE: All A. Report/detection of toxic or flammable gases A. Emergency Coordinator judgment indicates A. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director A Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director that could enter within the site area boundary in that: judgment indicates:

judgment amounts that can affect nonnal operation of the plant Plant safety may be degraded Actual/imminent subsiantial core (END) degradation with potential for loss of B. Report by local, county, State officials for containment potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event Increased monitoring of plant functions OR is warranted Potential for uncontrolled (END) radionuclide releases that would

5. OTHER CONDITIONS EXIST WHICH result in a dose projection at the WARRANT DECLARATION OF AN site boundary greater than 1000 mRem UNUSUAL EVENT (BD 88) TEDE or 5000 inRem CDE Adult Thyroid OPERATING MODE: All (END)

A. Emergency Coordinator determines potential degradation of level of safety has occurred (END) 19

Enclosure 4.8 Rp/0/B/1000/001 Radiation Monitor Readings for Emergency Classification Page 1 of 1 All RIA values are considered GREATER THAN or EQUAL TO HOURS SINCE A 57 RIhr I RIA 58 RIhr*

REACTOR TRIPPED 0.0 < 0.5 Site Area Emergency 5.9E+003 General Emergency 5.9E+004 Site Area Emergency 26E+003

] General Emergency 2.6E+004 0.5 < 1.0

- 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 1.IE+003 1.1E+004 1.0 < 1.5

- 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.6E+002 8.6E+/-003 1.5 -<2.0 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.5E+002 8.5E+003 2.0 < 2.5

- 1.4E--0O3 1.4E+004 6.3E+002 6.3E+003 2.5 < 3.0

- 1.2E+003 1.2E+004 5.7E+002 5.7E+003 3.0- < 3.5 1.1E+003 1.IE+004 5.2E+002 5.2E+003 3.5- < 4.0 1.OE+/-003 1.OE+004 4.8E+002 4.8E+003 4.0- < 8.0 1.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.4E+002 4.4E+003 RIA 58 is partially shielded 20

Enclosure 4.9 RP/O/B/1000/001 Unexpected/Unplanned Increase In Area Monitor Readings Page 1 of I NOTE: This Initiating Condition is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g.; incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.).

UNITS 1, 2, 3 MONITOR NUMBER UNUSUAL EVENT l000x ALERT NORMAL LEVELS mRAD/HR mRAD/HR RIA 7, Hot Machine Shop Elevation 796 150 5000 RIA 8, Hot Chemistry Lab Elevation 796 4200 5000 RIA 10, Primary Sample Hood Elevation 796 830 5000 RIA 11, Change Room Elevation 796 210 5000 RIA 12, Chem Mix Tank Elevation 783 800 5000 RIA 13, Waste Disposal Sink Elevation 771 650 5000 RIA 15, HPI Room Elevation 758 NOTE* 5000 NOTE: RIA 1 5 normal readings are approximately 9 mRad/hr on a daily basis. Applying I 000x normal readings would put this monitor greater than 5000 mRad/hr just for an Unusual Event. For this reason, an Unusual Event will NOT be declared for a reading less than 5000 rnRad/br.

21

Regulating Rod Position Limits 3.2.1 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3.2.1 Regulating Rod Position Limits LCO 3.2.1 Regulating rod groups shall be within the physical position, sequence, and overlap limits specified in the COLR.

NOTE Not required for any regulating rod positioned to perform SR 3.1 .4.2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Regulating rod groups A.1 Restore regulating rod 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> sequence or overlap groups to within limits.

requirements not met.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.2.1-1 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

Regulating Rod Position Limits 3.2.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Regulating rod groups B.1 NOTE positioned in restricted Not applicable to or unacceptable region. regulating rod groups positioned in the restricted region.

Initiate boration to 15 minutes restore SDM to within the limits specified in the COLR.

AND B.2.1 Restore regulating 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rod groups to within acceptable region.

OR B.2.2 Reduce THERMAL 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> POWER to less than or equal to THERMAL POWER allowed by regulating rod group position limits.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met.

OCONEE UNITS 1,2, & 3 3.2.1-2 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

Regulating Rod Position Limits 3.2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.2.1 .1 Verify regulating rod groups are within the 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> sequence and overlap limits as specified in the COLR.

SR 3.2.1.2 Verify regulating rod groups meet the position 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> limits as specified in the COLR.

SR 3.2.1.3 Verify SDM to be within the limit as specified Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to in the COLR. achieving criticality 000NEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.2.1-3 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

105 J Oconee *I Cycle 27 ONEJ-040C *ev 32 Page 25 of 33 105 100 Control Rod Position Setpotnts 100 95 Nn mo rnbIe nods 4 um F 95 90 90 85 85 80 80 75 75 70 Unacceptable Operation 70 65 0 65 60 60 55 C 55 C- 5Q 0 Acceptable 50 Operation 45 40 40 35 35 30 30 25 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5

5 5 1 25 75 85 0 II iliti II II j I

1 ljltlt 0

10 10 2030 40 50 60 70 80 90 iop_J [5 10 1 GroupJ 20 30 4050607080 90 100 J Group7J Control Rod Posfilon, % WD

Oconee I Cycle 27 ONEI-04( ev 32 105 Page 26 of 33 105 100 100 95 95 90 90 85 85 80 80 75 75 70 70 65 65 0

60 60 55 55 0

50 50 0

C) 45 cc 40 40 35 35 30 30 25 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 3040 50 60 70 80 90 100 I GroupJ LGrOUP7J Control Rod Position, % WD

J Oconee I Cycle 27 ONEI-041 ev 32 105 Page 27 of 33 105 100 Control Rod Position Setpoint fno erable Rod, 4 Ptim ioo 95 95 90 90 85 85 80 80 75 .

75 70 70 65 Unacceptable 65 Li so Operation 60

- 55 55 0

0 5Q 50 Acceptable 45 Operation ci) 45 40 40 35 35 30 30 25 25 20 20 15 15 10

. 10 5 . .

GroupS 5 5 15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 95 0

c c c

• I I I l * * *  ! *

• c c

• j 1 c* iii I I1 fI II I 0

I0 10 20 304050 6070 80 90 100 J j b 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 ioOl L!:pup 5 f [oup 7 I Control Rod Position, % WD

105 L Oconee I Cycle 27 ONEI-0 t-ev 32 Page 28 of 33 105 100 100 95 95 90 90 85 85 80 80 75 75 70 70 65 65 a

60 60 55 55 0

50 50 0

()

(0 45 40 40 35 35 30 30 25 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 0 10 20 30 4050 60 70 80 90 100 Group 5 Group 7 Control Rod Position, % WD

EFW System 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System LCO 3.7.5 The EFW System shall be OPERABLE as follows:

a. Three EFW pumps shall be OPERABLE, and

b. Two EFW flow paths shall be OPERABLE.

NOTE Only one motor driven emergency feedwater (MDEFW) pump and one EFW flow path are required to be OPERABLE in MODE 4.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3, MODE 4 when steam generator is relied upon for heat removal.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MDEFW pump A.1 Restore MDEFW pump 7 days inoperable in MODE 1, to OPERABLE status.

2,or3. AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO B. Turbine driven EFW B.1 Restore turbine driven 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> pump inoperable in EFW pump and EFW MODE 1,2,or3. flowpathto AND OPERABLE status.

OR 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the One EFW flow path LCO inoperable in MODE 1, 2, or 3.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.7.5-1 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

EFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Two MDEFW pumps C.1 Restore one MDEFW 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> inoperable in MODE 1 pump to OPERABLE 2, or 3. status.

D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, AND or C not met.

D.2 Be in MODE 4. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> OR Turbine driven EFW pump and one EFW flow path inoperable in MODE 1,2, or3.

(continued)

OCONEE UNITS 1,2, &3 3.7.5-2 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

EFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Three EFW pumps El NOTE inoperable in MODE 1, LCO 3.0.3 and all other 2, or 3. LCO Required Actions requiring MODE Qfl changes are suspended until one Two EFW flow path EFW pump and one inoperable in MODE 1, EFW flow path are 2, or 3. restored to OPERABLE status.

Initiate action to restore Immediately one EFW pump and one EFW flow path to OPERABLE status.

F. Required MDEFW F.l Initiate action to restore Immediately pump inoperable in required MDEFW MODE 4. pump and required EFW flow path to OR OPERABLE status.

Required EFW flow path inoperable in MODE 4.

000NEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.7.5-3 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

EFW System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 Verify each EFW manual, and non-automatic 31 days power operated valve in each water flow path and in the steam supply flow path to the turbine driven pump, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.5.2 Verify the developed head of each EFW pump In accordance with the at the flow test point is greater than or equal Inservice Testing to the required developed head. Program SR 3.7.5.3 NOTE Not required to be met in MODES 3 and 4.

Verify each EFW automatic valve that is not 18 months locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.4 NOTE Not required to be met in MODES 3 and 4.

Verify each EFW pump starts automatically 18 months on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.5 Verify proper alignment of the required EFW Prior to entering MODE 2 flow paths by verifying valve alignment from whenever unit has been the upper surge tank to each steam in MODE 5 or 6 for> 30 generator. days 000NEE UNITS 1, 2, & 3 3.7.5-4 Amendment Nos. 300, 300, & 300

Examination KEYfor: 1LT42 ONS SRO NRC Examin Question Answer Number 76 A 77 A 78 A 79 B 80 A 81 D 82 B 83 B 84 A 85 D 86 D 87 A 88 A 89 C 90 D 91 D 92 C 93 C 94 A 95 C 96 B 97 C 98 D 99 B 100 A Printed 11/29/2012 3:21:17PM Page 4 of4