05000440/FIN-2010001-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = A Barker, C Ariano, C Pederson, J Cameron, J Heck, L Linn, P Buckley, P Voss, S Bagley, S Orth, S West, T Tomczakd, | | Inspector = A Barker, C Ariano, C Pederson, J Cameron, J Heck, L Linn, P Buckley, P Voss, S Bagley, S Orth, S West, T Tomczakd, Hoangj Beavers, J Bozga, J Giessner, L Jones, M Bielby, M Marshfield, R Edwards, R Langstaff, T Hartman, V Meghani | ||
| CCA = H.2 | | CCA = H.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.2 | | INPO aspect = LA.2 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the inspectors for failure to provide adequate design control measures for crane support structure elements which included bridge crane rail, bridge crane rail clips, bridge crane rail clip studs, leveling plate and leveling plate anchors. Specifically, for evaluation of these structural elements, the licensee failed to demonstrate Seismic Category I compliance in accordance with their design and licensing basis and failed to evaluate the structural elements for resulting reaction forces from the Fuel Handling Building crane. The licensee documented these issues in CRs 11-88791; 11-90252; 10-86582; and 11-04124. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern if independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) loading was conducted. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a for the Barrier Integrity cornerstone. Based on answering No to all the questions in the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone column of Table 4a, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors identified a Human Performance, Work Practices (H.4.c) cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding, in that the licensee did not ensure effective supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety was supported. Specifically, the licensee failed to have adequate oversight of design calculations and documentation for establishing structural adequacy of the rail, rail clips, rail clip bolts, leveling plate and leveling plate anchors | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the inspectors for failure to provide adequate design control measures for crane support structure elements which included bridge crane rail, bridge crane rail clips, bridge crane rail clip studs, leveling plate and leveling plate anchors. Specifically, for evaluation of these structural elements, the licensee failed to demonstrate Seismic Category I compliance in accordance with their design and licensing basis and failed to evaluate the structural elements for resulting reaction forces from the Fuel Handling Building crane. The licensee documented these issues in CRs 11-88791; 11-90252; 10-86582; and 11-04124. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern if independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) loading was conducted. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a for the Barrier Integrity cornerstone. Based on answering No to all the questions in the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone column of Table 4a, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors identified a Human Performance, Work Practices (H.4.c) cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding, in that the licensee did not ensure effective supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety was supported. Specifically, the licensee failed to have adequate oversight of design calculations and documentation for establishing structural adequacy of the rail, rail clips, rail clip bolts, leveling plate and leveling plate anchors | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:39, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Perry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000440/2010001 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Barker C Ariano C Pederson J Cameron J Heck L Linn P Buckley P Voss S Bagley S Orth S West T Tomczakd Hoangj Beavers J Bozga J Giessner L Jones M Bielby M Marshfield R Edwards R Langstaff T Hartman V Meghani |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
| ' | |