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| issue date = 08/10/1984 | | issue date = 08/10/1984 | ||
| title = Minutes of August 10, 1984 Meeting to Discuss to Snupps Safety Shutdown Analysis | | title = Minutes of August 10, 1984 Meeting to Discuss to Snupps Safety Shutdown Analysis | ||
| author name = Holonich | | author name = Holonich J, O'Connor P | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DE | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DE | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
Line 17: | Line 17: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:b U-1t.w- -j I Docket Nos., | {{#Wiki_filter:b UNITED 11TATES !, I, . | ||
Statinn | U NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGToE, 0.c.205 It ,,:I:!, | ||
Union Electric CompanY. | 1-11AI51 I -I Eav) I I | ||
-1t.w- - j I AUG Docket Nos., STN 5048 and STH 50-483 FACILITY: Wolf Cre eok G~norhtfna~Statinn Callaway Plant, Unit 1I APPLICANTi Kansas Gas and Electric Company , I | |||
, i jt. | |||
) iX ; , | |||
LICENSEE: Union Electric CompanY. | |||
==SUBJECT:== | ==SUBJECT:== | ||
MINUTES OF AUGUST 10, 1984 MEETING | MINUTES OF AUGUST 10, 1984 MEETING .1 i i: | ||
Enclosure I | SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYtIS TO01DSCUSS T11E SHUPPS On August 10, 1984 members of the staffimet Electric Company, Kansas Gas and Electric with representatives from Union discuss the utilities' safe shutdown analysis. Company, SNUPPS, and Bechtel to attendees. Enclosure I Isa list of I | ||
The meeting opened with a review of the 1984 meeting. During an NRC inspection of events which lead to the August 10, Creek Station, the staff identified alconcern fire protoction at the Wolf operators to obtain safe shutdownvfrom'outs1de about the ability of the particular, Isolation from the controltroxn the controllroom. In response to this concern, the'utilities did not appearladequate. In of' the SHUPPS design were reviewed and approved noted tthat tho isolation cagabilities was documented InSupplement No. 3 to both by'tho NRC'staff. | |||
Evaluation Reports. As a result ofthf:ol'nspectlon", lthe Wolf Croek and Callawayihis approval Safety the supplements were Inerror'and that the thestaff'determined that corrective actions, Bepause of this, the utilities wouldineed to take utilities requested a meeting. | |||
In response to this concern, the'utilities | lext, the utilities discussedltheir safe there were certain actions which needed shutdown anilysis'and the fact that shutdcwn panel could be isolated fromi,thoto be taken beforo tho auxiliary to tho staff was the problem of not being control room. Of particular concern control room If a tire had caused ,ahot able to achieve isolation from the The NRC position Is that transfer switches short Intho safe shutdown circuitry. | ||
shutdown equipment regardless of the should Isolate the needed situation In the control room. safe FA09g&?R1g40I | |||
The NRC position Is that transfer switches | ,: 2 | ||
,: 2/5 | /5 | ||
' | |||
These requirements are detailed In Enclosure | 'kol ' . | ||
.i ;:, ; | |||
Therefore, a formal request for on appeal would bo forwarded. | 1, IWG 10 184 The utilities rebutted that this was a different set of criteria against which the safe shutdown analysis was reviewed and a different scenario from that which had been previously approved by the staff. | ||
Joseph I. l ionich, Project Manager Licensing Brhnch No. I Division of Licensing | As a result of the above discussion It was apparent that there had been a miscomiunication between the staff nnd the utilities; however, this did not prtclude the need to meet the applicable isolation requirements. These requirements are detailed In Enclosure 2. Because SNUPPS did not meet these criteria, the staff concluded that the supplements would need to be revised. | ||
The meeting ended with the utilities noting that this would Impact the Callaway full power ascension schedule and the Wolf Creek fuel load schedule. Therefore, a formal request for on appeal would bo forwarded. | |||
Joseph I. l ionich, Project Manager Pau W. O'Connor, Project Manager Licensing Brhnch No. I Licensing Branch No. I Division of Licensing Division of Licensing | |||
==Enclosures:== | ==Enclosures:== | ||
As stated | As stated cc: See next page CONI RENCrs: | ||
cc: See next page CONI RENCrs: J h | J T h hh:os PO Connor rr B hto 8(P/84 84'/84 ,j (84 8/p)/84ho~ | ||
.10 1O9B4 2 The utilities rebutted that this was a different set of criteria the safe shutdown analysis was reviewed and a different scenario which had been previously approved by the staff. | |||
These requirements are detailed in Enclosure | .10 1O9B4 2 The utilities rebutted that this was a different set of criteria against which the safe shutdown analysis was reviewed and a different scenario from that which had been previously approved by the staff. | ||
As a result of the above discussion Itwas apparent that there had been a miscommunication between the staff and the utilities; however, this did not preclude the need to meet the appl1cable isolation requirements. These requirements are detailed in Enclosure 2. Because SNUPPS did not meet these criteria, the staff concluded that the supplements would need to be revised. | |||
Therefore, a formal request for an appeal would be forwarded. | The meeting ended with the utilities noting that this would impact the Callaway full power ascension schedule and the Wolf Croek fuel load schedule. Therefore, a formal request for an appeal would be forwarded. | ||
c4w ='1Oc5V Joseph 3. Holonich, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. I Division of Licensing | c4w | ||
='1Oc5V Joseph 3. Holonich, Project Manager 4 °/ A/ | |||
Paul W. O'Connor, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. I Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Division of Licensing | |||
==Enclosures:== | ==Enclosures:== | ||
As stated | As stated cc: See next page | ||
*iI | |||
-Nuclear Union Electric Company P. 0. dox 149 St. Louis, Missouri 63166 | I | ||
*iI I , I . | |||
-Production 1330 Baltimore Avenue Kansas City, Missouri 64141 | SNUPPS Mr. D. F. Schnell Mr. Glen L. Koester Vice President - Nuclear Vice President - Nuclear Union Electric Company Kansas Gas and Electric Company P. 0. dox 149 201 North Market Street St. Louis, Missouri 63166 P. O. Box 208 I Wichita, Kansas 67201 cc: Gerald Charnoff, Esq. Mayor Howard Steffen Thomas A. Baxter, Esq. Chamois, Missouri 65024 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W. Jay Silberg, Esquire Washington, D. C. 20036 Shaw, Pittman, Potts &Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W. | ||
:L : 0 t | Kansas City Power & Light Company Washington, D. C. 20036 AT7H: Mr. D. T. McPhee Vice President - Production Mr. Donald W, Capone 1330 Baltimore Avenue Manager - Nuclear Engineering Kansas City, Missouri 64141 Union Electric Company P. 0. Box 149 Mr. Nicholas A. Petrick St. Louis, Missouri 63166 Executive Director, SNUPPS 5 Choke Cherry Road Ms. Mary Ellen Salava Rockville, Maryland 20850 Route 1, Box 56 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Mr. J, E. Birk Assistant to the General Counsel Eric A. Fisen, Esq. | ||
Union Electric Company Birch, Horton, Bittner & Moore St. Louis, Missouri 63166 1140 Connecticut Avenue, N. w. | |||
--___ | Washington, D. C. 20036 Mr. Howard Bundy Resident Inspector/Wolf Creek NPS Ms. Wanda Christy c/o U. S. NRC 515 N. 1st Street P. 0. Box 311 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Ms. Majorle Reilly Mr. Michael C. Keener Energy Chairman of the League of State Corporation Commission Womn Voters of University City, MO State of Kansas 7065 Pershing Avenue Fourth Floor, State Office Buliding University City, Missouri 63130 Topeka, Kansas 6612 Mr. Fred Lukay Mr. John toiisler Presiding Judge, Montgomery County U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commitsion Rural Route Resident Inspectors Office Rhinoland, Missouri 65069 RR *1 Steadman, Missouri 65077 Professor William H. Miller Missouri Kansas Section, American Terri Sculley, Director Nuclear Society Special Projects Division Department of Nuclear En9ineering Kansas Corporation Commission 1026 Enginoerlng Building State Office Building, 4th Floir University of Mlssouri Topeka, Kansas 66612 Columbia, Missou-l 662l1 | ||
All manual operations mutt be achieveable prior to the fire or fire suppressant Induced maloperations reaching an Unrecoverable plant condition. | -"Qwunm | ||
:L : 0 t : I; ' ' ~ ' | |||
SNUPPSS cc: Robert G. Wright Mr. Donald Bollinger, Member Associate Judge, Eastern Missoruians for Safe Energy District County Court 6267 Delmar Boulevard Callaway County, Missouri University City, Missouri 63130 Route I1 Fulton, Missouri John H. Simpson, Esq. | |||
Attorney for Intervenors Lewis C. Green, Esq. 4350 Johnson Drive, Suite 120 Green, Hennings & Henry Shawnee Mission, Kansas 66205 Attorney for Joint Intervenors 314 H. Broadway, Suite 1830 St. Louis, Missouri 63102 Mr. James G. Keppler U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Earl Brown Region III School District Superintendent 799 Roosevelt Road P. 0. Box 9 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Kingdom City, Missouri 65262 Mr. John T. Collins Mr. Samuel J. Birk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. R. #1,Box 243 Reglon IV Morrlion, Missouri 65061 611 Ryan Plaza, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 Mr. Harold Lottman Presiding Judge, Dasconade Countly Mr. Joe Mulholland Route I Manager of Power Supply & Engineering Owensville, Missouri 65066 Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. | |||
P. 0. Box 4877 A. Scott Cauger, Esq. Gage Center Station Assistant General Counsel for tho Topeka, Kansas 66604 Missouri Public Service Conn. | |||
P. 0. Box 360 C. Edward Peterson, Esq. | |||
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101 Legal Division Kansas Corporation Comnission Mr. John G. Reed Fourth Floor Route I1 State Office Buildin; Kingdom City, Missouri 65262 Topeka, Kansas 66612 Mr. Dan t. Bolef, President Brian P. Cassidy, Regional Counsel Kay Droy, Representative Fccral Emergency Management Agency Board of Directors Coalition Region I for the Environment J, W. McCormack POCH St. Louis Region Boston, Massachusetts 02109 6267 DOlmar Boulevard University City, Missouri 63130 | |||
2 ,., l S I ,I I s *I | |||
' ' ; i!. ! , .; "" , ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES NRC Joe Holonfch R. Ebfrly R. Ferguson M. Murphy Jerry Wilson B. J. Youngblood Rich Stark William T. LeFave Marty Virgillo Charlp Ramsey Gordon Edison rom Wambach Nick Fioravante SHUPPS M. H. Fletcher KGAE | |||
: 0. L. Maynard G. P. Rathbun Hels Hoadley UE Al Passwater Bechtel Patrick Ward Mohsen Tantawf John S. Prebula Asif Hasson Bruce Kenner H. 1. Thomas Anthony Coppola | |||
- -___ __Mv ENCLOSURE 2 Operability of the hot shutdown systems including the ability to overcome a fire or fire suppressant induced maloperation of hot shutdown equipment and the plant's power distribution system, must exist without repairs. Manual operation of valves, switches and circuit breakers is allowed to operate equipment and isolate systems and is not considered repairs. The removal of fuses for isolation is not permitted. All manual operations mutt be achieveable prior to the fire or fire suppressant Induced maloperations reaching an Unrecoverable plant condition. | |||
Modifications, e.g., wiring changes, are allowed to systems and/or components not used for hot shutdown, but whose fire or fire suppressant induced maloperation may indirectly affect hot shutdown, i.e., pulling fuses to close PORV that spuriously opened or to prevent spurious opening. These repairs must be achieveable prior to the maloperations causing an unrecoverable plant condition. | Modifications, e.g., wiring changes, are allowed to systems and/or components not used for hot shutdown, but whose fire or fire suppressant induced maloperation may indirectly affect hot shutdown, i.e., pulling fuses to close PORV that spuriously opened or to prevent spurious opening. These repairs must be achieveable prior to the maloperations causing an unrecoverable plant condition. | ||
At the time the fire starts In the control room the capabilit must exist for hot shutdown outside the control room that is independent of control room circuits. | At the time the fire starts In the control room the capabilit must exist for hot shutdown outside the control room that is independent of control room circuits. If it can be shown that each piece of equipment necessary for hot shutdown can be isolated from the control room without repairs regardless of control room damage, then'this is acceptable. Procedures must exist to perform the isolation. During the time it takes to perform such isolation an un-recoverable plant condition must not be reached, e.g., the plant must be capable of reaching stable hot shutdown condition prior to core damage. | ||
If it can be shown that each piece of equipment necessary for hot shutdown can be isolated from the control room without repairs regardless of control room damage, then'this is acceptable. | With regards to control room evacuation, the only operation that is allowed prior to leaving the control room is a reactor scram. All other actions required for hot shutdown must be accomplished from outside the control room. | ||
Procedures must exist to perform the isolation. | Procedures may call for other operations within the control room but also point out the alternative procedure from outside the control room. | ||
During the time it takes to perform such isolation an un-recoverable plant condition must not be reached, e.g., the plant must be capable of reaching stable hot shutdown condition prior to core damage.With regards to control room evacuation, the only operation that is allowed prior to leaving the control room is a reactor scram. All other actions required for hot shutdown must be accomplished from outside the control room.Procedures may call for other operations within the control room but also point out the alternative procedure from outside the control room.Credit Is given for coordinated cIrucit protection features (breaker coordination/ | Credit Is given for coordinated cIrucit protection features (breaker coordination/ | ||
fuse coordination) with regards to associated circuits of concern. Associated circuits of concern are defined as those cables (safety related, non-safety related, Class IE and non-Class I{) that: 1. Have a physical separation less than that required by Section 111.G.2 of Appendix RI and;2. Have one of the following: | fuse coordination) with regards to associated circuits of concern. Associated circuits of concern are defined as those cables (safety related, non-safety related, Class IE and non-Class I{)that: | ||
: a. a common power source with the shutdown equipment (redundant or alternative) and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuitiof concern by coordinated hreakers, fuses, or similar devices or b. a connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves, ADS valves, PORVi, steam generator atmospheric dump valves, instrumentation, steam bypass, etc.) or c. a common enclosure (e.g.,, raceway panel, junction) with the shutdown cables (redundant and al:ornativyle | : 1. Have a physical separation less than that required by Section 111.G.2 of Appendix RI and; | ||
: 2. Have one of the following: | |||
.2.:(1) are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or (2) will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.}} | : a. a common power source with the shutdown equipment (redundant or alternative) and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuitiof concern by coordinated hreakers, fuses, or similar devices or | ||
: b. a connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves, ADS valves, PORVi, steam generator atmospheric dump valves, instrumentation, steam bypass, etc.) or | |||
: c. a common enclosure (e.g.,, raceway panel, junction) with the shutdown cables (redundant and al:ornativyle and, | |||
.2. | |||
:(1) are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or (2) will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.}} |
Latest revision as of 07:16, 23 March 2020
ML060690160 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Wolf Creek, Callaway |
Issue date: | 08/10/1984 |
From: | Joseph Holonich, O'Connor P Division of Engineering |
To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
FOIA/PA-2006-0095 NUDOCS 8408210034 | |
Download: ML060690160 (8) | |
Text
b UNITED 11TATES !, I, .
U NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGToE, 0.c.205 It ,,:I:!,
1-11AI51 I -I Eav) I I
-1t.w- - j I AUG Docket Nos., STN 5048 and STH 50-483 FACILITY: Wolf Cre eok G~norhtfna~Statinn Callaway Plant, Unit 1I APPLICANTi Kansas Gas and Electric Company , I
, i jt.
) iX ; ,
LICENSEE: Union Electric CompanY.
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF AUGUST 10, 1984 MEETING .1 i i:
SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYtIS TO01DSCUSS T11E SHUPPS On August 10, 1984 members of the staffimet Electric Company, Kansas Gas and Electric with representatives from Union discuss the utilities' safe shutdown analysis. Company, SNUPPS, and Bechtel to attendees. Enclosure I Isa list of I
The meeting opened with a review of the 1984 meeting. During an NRC inspection of events which lead to the August 10, Creek Station, the staff identified alconcern fire protoction at the Wolf operators to obtain safe shutdownvfrom'outs1de about the ability of the particular, Isolation from the controltroxn the controllroom. In response to this concern, the'utilities did not appearladequate. In of' the SHUPPS design were reviewed and approved noted tthat tho isolation cagabilities was documented InSupplement No. 3 to both by'tho NRC'staff.
Evaluation Reports. As a result ofthf:ol'nspectlon", lthe Wolf Croek and Callawayihis approval Safety the supplements were Inerror'and that the thestaff'determined that corrective actions, Bepause of this, the utilities wouldineed to take utilities requested a meeting.
lext, the utilities discussedltheir safe there were certain actions which needed shutdown anilysis'and the fact that shutdcwn panel could be isolated fromi,thoto be taken beforo tho auxiliary to tho staff was the problem of not being control room. Of particular concern control room If a tire had caused ,ahot able to achieve isolation from the The NRC position Is that transfer switches short Intho safe shutdown circuitry.
shutdown equipment regardless of the should Isolate the needed situation In the control room. safe FA09g&?R1g40I
,: 2
/5
'kol ' .
.i ;:, ;
1, IWG 10 184 The utilities rebutted that this was a different set of criteria against which the safe shutdown analysis was reviewed and a different scenario from that which had been previously approved by the staff.
As a result of the above discussion It was apparent that there had been a miscomiunication between the staff nnd the utilities; however, this did not prtclude the need to meet the applicable isolation requirements. These requirements are detailed In Enclosure 2. Because SNUPPS did not meet these criteria, the staff concluded that the supplements would need to be revised.
The meeting ended with the utilities noting that this would Impact the Callaway full power ascension schedule and the Wolf Creek fuel load schedule. Therefore, a formal request for on appeal would bo forwarded.
Joseph I. l ionich, Project Manager Pau W. O'Connor, Project Manager Licensing Brhnch No. I Licensing Branch No. I Division of Licensing Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc: See next page CONI RENCrs:
J T h hh:os PO Connor rr B hto 8(P/84 84'/84 ,j (84 8/p)/84ho~
.10 1O9B4 2 The utilities rebutted that this was a different set of criteria against which the safe shutdown analysis was reviewed and a different scenario from that which had been previously approved by the staff.
As a result of the above discussion Itwas apparent that there had been a miscommunication between the staff and the utilities; however, this did not preclude the need to meet the appl1cable isolation requirements. These requirements are detailed in Enclosure 2. Because SNUPPS did not meet these criteria, the staff concluded that the supplements would need to be revised.
The meeting ended with the utilities noting that this would impact the Callaway full power ascension schedule and the Wolf Croek fuel load schedule. Therefore, a formal request for an appeal would be forwarded.
c4w
='1Oc5V Joseph 3. Holonich, Project Manager 4 °/ A/
Paul W. O'Connor, Project Manager Licensing Branch No. I Licensing Branch No. 1 Division of Licensing Division of Licensing
Enclosures:
As stated cc: See next page
I
- iI I , I .
SNUPPS Mr. D. F. Schnell Mr. Glen L. Koester Vice President - Nuclear Vice President - Nuclear Union Electric Company Kansas Gas and Electric Company P. 0. dox 149 201 North Market Street St. Louis, Missouri 63166 P. O. Box 208 I Wichita, Kansas 67201 cc: Gerald Charnoff, Esq. Mayor Howard Steffen Thomas A. Baxter, Esq. Chamois, Missouri 65024 Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W. Jay Silberg, Esquire Washington, D. C. 20036 Shaw, Pittman, Potts &Trowbridge 1800 M Street, N. W.
Kansas City Power & Light Company Washington, D. C. 20036 AT7H: Mr. D. T. McPhee Vice President - Production Mr. Donald W, Capone 1330 Baltimore Avenue Manager - Nuclear Engineering Kansas City, Missouri 64141 Union Electric Company P. 0. Box 149 Mr. Nicholas A. Petrick St. Louis, Missouri 63166 Executive Director, SNUPPS 5 Choke Cherry Road Ms. Mary Ellen Salava Rockville, Maryland 20850 Route 1, Box 56 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Mr. J, E. Birk Assistant to the General Counsel Eric A. Fisen, Esq.
Union Electric Company Birch, Horton, Bittner & Moore St. Louis, Missouri 63166 1140 Connecticut Avenue, N. w.
Washington, D. C. 20036 Mr. Howard Bundy Resident Inspector/Wolf Creek NPS Ms. Wanda Christy c/o U. S. NRC 515 N. 1st Street P. 0. Box 311 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Burlington, Kansas 66839 Ms. Majorle Reilly Mr. Michael C. Keener Energy Chairman of the League of State Corporation Commission Womn Voters of University City, MO State of Kansas 7065 Pershing Avenue Fourth Floor, State Office Buliding University City, Missouri 63130 Topeka, Kansas 6612 Mr. Fred Lukay Mr. John toiisler Presiding Judge, Montgomery County U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commitsion Rural Route Resident Inspectors Office Rhinoland, Missouri 65069 RR *1 Steadman, Missouri 65077 Professor William H. Miller Missouri Kansas Section, American Terri Sculley, Director Nuclear Society Special Projects Division Department of Nuclear En9ineering Kansas Corporation Commission 1026 Enginoerlng Building State Office Building, 4th Floir University of Mlssouri Topeka, Kansas 66612 Columbia, Missou-l 662l1
-"Qwunm
- L : 0 t : I; ' ' ~ '
SNUPPSS cc: Robert G. Wright Mr. Donald Bollinger, Member Associate Judge, Eastern Missoruians for Safe Energy District County Court 6267 Delmar Boulevard Callaway County, Missouri University City, Missouri 63130 Route I1 Fulton, Missouri John H. Simpson, Esq.
Attorney for Intervenors Lewis C. Green, Esq. 4350 Johnson Drive, Suite 120 Green, Hennings & Henry Shawnee Mission, Kansas 66205 Attorney for Joint Intervenors 314 H. Broadway, Suite 1830 St. Louis, Missouri 63102 Mr. James G. Keppler U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Earl Brown Region III School District Superintendent 799 Roosevelt Road P. 0. Box 9 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Kingdom City, Missouri 65262 Mr. John T. Collins Mr. Samuel J. Birk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. R. #1,Box 243 Reglon IV Morrlion, Missouri 65061 611 Ryan Plaza, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 Mr. Harold Lottman Presiding Judge, Dasconade Countly Mr. Joe Mulholland Route I Manager of Power Supply & Engineering Owensville, Missouri 65066 Kansas Electric Power Cooperative, Inc.
P. 0. Box 4877 A. Scott Cauger, Esq. Gage Center Station Assistant General Counsel for tho Topeka, Kansas 66604 Missouri Public Service Conn.
P. 0. Box 360 C. Edward Peterson, Esq.
Jefferson City, Missouri 65101 Legal Division Kansas Corporation Comnission Mr. John G. Reed Fourth Floor Route I1 State Office Buildin; Kingdom City, Missouri 65262 Topeka, Kansas 66612 Mr. Dan t. Bolef, President Brian P. Cassidy, Regional Counsel Kay Droy, Representative Fccral Emergency Management Agency Board of Directors Coalition Region I for the Environment J, W. McCormack POCH St. Louis Region Boston, Massachusetts 02109 6267 DOlmar Boulevard University City, Missouri 63130
2 ,., l S I ,I I s *I
' ' ; i!. ! , .; "" , ENCLOSURE 1 LIST OF ATTENDEES NRC Joe Holonfch R. Ebfrly R. Ferguson M. Murphy Jerry Wilson B. J. Youngblood Rich Stark William T. LeFave Marty Virgillo Charlp Ramsey Gordon Edison rom Wambach Nick Fioravante SHUPPS M. H. Fletcher KGAE
- 0. L. Maynard G. P. Rathbun Hels Hoadley UE Al Passwater Bechtel Patrick Ward Mohsen Tantawf John S. Prebula Asif Hasson Bruce Kenner H. 1. Thomas Anthony Coppola
- -___ __Mv ENCLOSURE 2 Operability of the hot shutdown systems including the ability to overcome a fire or fire suppressant induced maloperation of hot shutdown equipment and the plant's power distribution system, must exist without repairs. Manual operation of valves, switches and circuit breakers is allowed to operate equipment and isolate systems and is not considered repairs. The removal of fuses for isolation is not permitted. All manual operations mutt be achieveable prior to the fire or fire suppressant Induced maloperations reaching an Unrecoverable plant condition.
Modifications, e.g., wiring changes, are allowed to systems and/or components not used for hot shutdown, but whose fire or fire suppressant induced maloperation may indirectly affect hot shutdown, i.e., pulling fuses to close PORV that spuriously opened or to prevent spurious opening. These repairs must be achieveable prior to the maloperations causing an unrecoverable plant condition.
At the time the fire starts In the control room the capabilit must exist for hot shutdown outside the control room that is independent of control room circuits. If it can be shown that each piece of equipment necessary for hot shutdown can be isolated from the control room without repairs regardless of control room damage, then'this is acceptable. Procedures must exist to perform the isolation. During the time it takes to perform such isolation an un-recoverable plant condition must not be reached, e.g., the plant must be capable of reaching stable hot shutdown condition prior to core damage.
With regards to control room evacuation, the only operation that is allowed prior to leaving the control room is a reactor scram. All other actions required for hot shutdown must be accomplished from outside the control room.
Procedures may call for other operations within the control room but also point out the alternative procedure from outside the control room.
Credit Is given for coordinated cIrucit protection features (breaker coordination/
fuse coordination) with regards to associated circuits of concern. Associated circuits of concern are defined as those cables (safety related, non-safety related, Class IE and non-Class I{)that:
- 1. Have a physical separation less than that required by Section 111.G.2 of Appendix RI and;
- 2. Have one of the following:
- a. a common power source with the shutdown equipment (redundant or alternative) and the power source is not electrically protected from the circuitiof concern by coordinated hreakers, fuses, or similar devices or
- b. a connection to circuits of equipment whose spurious operation would adversely affect the shutdown capability (e.g., RHR/RCS isolation valves, ADS valves, PORVi, steam generator atmospheric dump valves, instrumentation, steam bypass, etc.) or
- c. a common enclosure (e.g.,, raceway panel, junction) with the shutdown cables (redundant and al:ornativyle and,
.2.
- (1) are not electrically protected by circuit breakers, fuses or similar devices, or (2) will allow propagation of the fire into the common enclosure.