05000259/FIN-2013002-03: Difference between revisions

Finding

Title

Licensee-Identified Violation

Description

Technical Specifications 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), required that PCIVs be operable while Unit 1 was in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The Technical Specification (TS) action statement C.1 required that the affected flow path be isolated by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for excess flow check valves (EFCVs). Contrary to the above, between May 21, 2007, and November 27, 2012, excess flow check valve 1-ECKV-068- 0065B was installed in a reverse orientation, preventing the valve from performing its function to reduce flow downstream in the event of a line rupture outside of primary containment, and the affected flow path had not been isolated. The finding was screened in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix H, Containment Integrity SDP and was characterized to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the valve was a one-inch valve and would not generally contribute to Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) as discussed in IMC 0609, Appendix H.

03
Site:	Browns Ferry
Report	IR 05000259/2013002 Section 4OA7
Date counted	Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	Licensee-identified
Inspection Procedure:
Inspectors (proximate)	C Fletcher C Kontz C Stancil D Dumbacher L Pressley P Niebaum T Stephen
Violation of:	Technical Specification
INPO aspect
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v • d • e

Finding - Browns Ferry - IR 05000259/2013002

2(4)3(4)4(4)5(7)7(5)8(0)9(0)10(3)11(16)12(0)13(0)14(0)15(0)201(0)301(0)302(0)403(1)405(1)503(0)8(0)12(0)13(0)15(0)201(0)

IR 05000259/2013002: 1 3 4 2

Finding List (Browns Ferry) @ 2013Q1

CCA Matrix: 2013Q1

	Q	CCA	Title
05000259/FIN-2012004-01	2012Q3	H.7	Loss of Seismic Monitoring Capability
05000259/FIN-2012004-02	2012Q3	H.7	Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Inadequate Design Review of Relay Setting
05000259/FIN-2012004-03	2012Q3	H.2	Automatic Reactor Scram Due to Inadequate Testing of Current Transformer
05000259/FIN-2012004-06	2012Q3		Unanalyzed Conditions Discovered During NFPA 805 Transition Review
05000260/FIN-2013002-02	2013Q1	H.12	Failure to Follow Operating Procedure Guidance Resulted in Unit 2 Reactor Scram
05000259/FIN-2013002-01	2013Q1	H.5	Failure to Implement Preventive Maintenance Program

Self-Identified List (Browns Ferry)

	Q	Title
05000259/FIN-2012004-04	2012Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2012004-05	2012Q3	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2012005-01	2012Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2012005-02	2012Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2013002-03	2013Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2013002-04	2013Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation
05000259/FIN-2013403-01	2013Q1	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Browns Ferry Findings full list]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{finding
-| title = LICENSEE-IDENTIFIED Violation
+| title = Licensee-Identified Violation
 | docket = 05000259, 05000260, 05000296
 | inspection report = IR 05000259/2013002

05000259/FIN-2013002-03: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 10:47, 30 May 2018

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05000259/FIN-2013002-03: Difference between revisions

Latest revision as of 10:47, 30 May 2018

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