05000293/FIN-2009007-02: Difference between revisions
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| description = License Condition 3.F for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) states in part that, Entergy shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated December 21, 1978. The SER, states in part, an analysis of safety related shutdown systems will be conducted to demonstrate that fire-related damage in any fire area will not inhibit the capability to safely shutdown. Contrary to this requirement, Entergy calculation PS32, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis Report, incorrectly assumed that the reactor head vent valves (SV220-46 and SV220-47) would not be vulnerable to spurious operation (opening) for a fire in the control room or cable spreading room and would remain closed while the reactor was at power. During review of a recent modification, the licensee determined that the head vent valves could spuriously open due to a control room or cable spreading room fire during a potential control room evacuation scenario. The issue was entered into Entergy's corrective action program (CR 2009-01376) and corrected by implementation of a modification (EC 14506) to the head vent valve circuits. PS32 was subsequently updated to reflect this change. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance(Green) because appropriate plant procedures were in place to operate systems required for post-fire safe shutdown during a control room evacuation scenario and those systems would be have been able to provide adequate makeup to the reactor vessel to compensate for inventory loss through the head vent piping. | | description = License Condition 3.F for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) states in part that, Entergy shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as approved in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated December 21, 1978. The SER, states in part, an analysis of safety related shutdown systems will be conducted to demonstrate that fire-related damage in any fire area will not inhibit the capability to safely shutdown. Contrary to this requirement, Entergy calculation PS32, Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis Report, incorrectly assumed that the reactor head vent valves (SV220-46 and SV220-47) would not be vulnerable to spurious operation (opening) for a fire in the control room or cable spreading room and would remain closed while the reactor was at power. During review of a recent modification, the licensee determined that the head vent valves could spuriously open due to a control room or cable spreading room fire during a potential control room evacuation scenario. The issue was entered into Entergy\'s corrective action program (CR 2009-01376) and corrected by implementation of a modification (EC 14506) to the head vent valve circuits. PS32 was subsequently updated to reflect this change. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance(Green) because appropriate plant procedures were in place to operate systems required for post-fire safe shutdown during a control room evacuation scenario and those systems would be have been able to provide adequate makeup to the reactor vessel to compensate for inventory loss through the head vent piping. | ||
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Latest revision as of 11:39, 30 May 2018
| Site: | Pilgrim |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000293/2009007 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Young R Fuhrmeister J Rogge L Scholl M Patel |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |