ML20211P200

Insp Repts 50-454/99-15 & 50-455/99-15 on 990824-26.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Evaluation of Licensee Performance During Exercise of EP

ML20211P200
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	09/08/1999
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20211P189	List: ML20211P184 ML20211P200
References
50-454-99-15, 50-455-99-15, NUDOCS 9909130162
Download: ML20211P200 (12)

See also: IR 05000454/1999015

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U.S' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGIONlli

Docket Nos.

50 4 54; 50-455

License Nos:

NPF-37; NPF-66 -

Report No:

50-454/99015(DRS); 50-456/99015(DRS)

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Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed)

Facility:

' Byron Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Location:

4450 N. German Church Road

Byron,IL 61010

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Dates:

August 24-26,1999

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Inspectors:

J. Foster, Sr Emergency Preparedness Analyst

R. Jickling, Emergency Preparedness Analyst

D. Funk, Emergency Preparedness Analyst

B. Kemker, Resident inspector

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Approved by:

Gary L. Shear, Chief, Plant Support Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

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9909130162 990908

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ADOCK 05000454

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Byron Generating Station Units 1 and 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-454/99015(DRS); 50-455/99015(DRS)

This inspection consisted of evaluating the licensee performance during an exercise of the

Emergency Plan. It was conducted by three regionalinspectors and a Resident inspector. No

violations of NRC requirements were identified.

Plant Sucoort

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Overall licensee performance during the 1999 Emergency Plan exercise was very good

and performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was excellent. (Section P4.1.c).

Performance in the Simulator Control Room was effective. (Section P4.1.c)

The Technical Support Center staff's overall performance was excellent. (Section

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P4.1.c)

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Overall performance of Operational Support Center management and staff was good.

(Section P4.1.c)

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Self-critiques following termination of the exercise were thorough and in close

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agreement with the majority of the inspectors' observations. Licensee critique findings

were consistent with the NRC evaluation team's findings. (Section P4.1.c)

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Report Details

IV. Plant Support

P3

Emergency Preparedness Procedures and Documentation

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P3.1

Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenario (82302)

The inspectors reviewed the1999 exercise's objectives and scenario and determined

that the exercise would acceptably test major elements of the licensee's emergency

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plan. The scenario provided a very challenging framework to cupport demonstration of

the licensee's capabilities to implement its emergency plan. The scenario included a

radiological release and several equipment failures.

P4

Staff Knowledge and Performance in Emergency Preparedness

P4.1

1999 Evaluated Biennial Emeraency Preparedness Exercise

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a.

Insoection Scope (82301)

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Appendix E to 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50 requires that power

reactor licensees conduct biennial exercises that involve participation by offsite

authorities. On August 25,1999, the licensee conducted a biennial exercise involving

partial participation by the State of Illinois, and full participation by Ogle County

responders. This exercise was conducted to test major portions of the licensee's onsite

and offsite emergency response capabilities. Onsite and offsite emergency response

organizations and emergency response facilities were activated.

The inspectors evaluated performance in the following emergency response facilities:

Simulator Control Room (SCR)

Technical Support Center (TSC)

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Operational Support Center (OSC)

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Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)

The inspectors assessed the licensee's recognition of abnormal plant conditions,

classification of emergency conditions, notification of offsite agencies, development of

protective action recommendations, command-and-control, the transfer of emergency

responsibilities between facilities, communications, and the overall implementation of

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the emergency plan. In addition, the inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in

each of the above facilities to evaluate the licensee's initial self-assessment of exercise

performancs.

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b,

Emeraency Response Facility Observations and Findinas

b.1

Control Room Simulator

Exercise performance of shift personnel in the control room simulator was effective.

Operators effectively controlled and stabilized plant parameters, utilizing the appropriate

alarm and emergency response proceoures. The shift manager and Unit 1 Senior

Reactor Operator (SRO) demonstrated strong command and control throughout the

exercise event. The Shift Technical Advisor and Unit 2 SRO were effectively utilized to

assist the Unit 1 SRO.

Communications were generally a strength. Routine briefings provided necessary

information to operations personnel and were appropriate in scope and duration. The

inspectors noted that on at least two occasions, proper use of three-way " repeat back"

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communications prevented operators from potentially acting on incorrect information.

The inspectors also noted, however, that three-way communications were not

consistently utilized during later portions of the exercise. Radio communications were

often difficult to understand because of poor quality transmissions. Cnmmunications

between communicators in the control room simulator and the Technical Support Center

(TSC) were dependable.

The shift manager correctly classified events at the Unusual Event and Alert levels in a

timely manner. Event notification message forms and verbal notifications to the State

and NRC were completed in sufficient detail and well within required time limits.

Transfer of command and control of emergency responsibilities from the control room

simulator to the TSC was completed smoothly.

The Unit 2 SRO made a very early assessment of a containment release based upon a

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slight containment building pressure decrease. When the actual release occurred, the

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control room staff readily identified it.

Operatcrs diligently monitored the control panels following the loss of annunciators. A

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reactor operator promptly identified that the 1 A centufical charging pump tripped by

noting the trip indicating lamp. However, operators could have made better use of the

alarm printout to monitor alarm conditions during the time that the annunciators were out

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of service. Operators were slow to recognize that the 1CC0685 valve failed closed

isolating component cooling water flow to the thermal barrier heat exchangers. The

condition was not recognized until 15 minutes after the valve failed and upon return of

the annunciators to service, which prompted operators to walkdown the control panels to

evaluate alarming annunciators.

b.2

Technical Suocort Center

Overall performance in the TSC was excellent. Personnel were focused on their

emergency response, and teamwork and communications were very good. The TSC

staff promptly staffed and activated in an orderly manner following the Alert declaration.

Transfers of command and control of event response to and from the TSC's Station

Director (SD) were done in a timely and well coordinated manner and effectively utilized

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the turnover briefing form. The SD made good use of TSC staff and ensured the staff

was informed of the current status of communications and forthcoming notifications. An

Assistant SD provided excellent support to the SD.

Briefings of the TSC staff were effectively and efficiently performed by utilizing a

cordless microphone circulated among the directors. Those periodic briefings kept all

TSC personnel wellinformed of changing plant conditions, major decisions and revised -

plant priorities. The initial briefing conducted by the SD was especially effective in

providing the proper focus for the TSC staff and assigning specific responsibilities to key

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individuals.

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Status boards were effectively used to accurately display information on major events,

key decisions, current priorities and the status of in-plant team activities. Status board

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information served as a good backup information source to the verbal briefings.

The Operations and Technical directors were pro-active in tracking plant conditions and

comparing emergency action levels for possible event paths leading to potential

emergency classification upgrades. Tasks and priorities were effectively identified for

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OSC repair teams by the Maintenance, Operations, Technical, and Radiation Protection

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Directors and quickly communicated to the OSC.

Individuals assigned to participate as the " mock NRC" site team could have been better

integrated into TSC activities. These individuals arrived and immediately began to

interact with TSC personnel before being briefed and introduced. After TSC staff

recognized that the mock NRC team was present they were appropriately briefed by the

Assistant SD and introduced during the next facility briefing.

Simulated dose rates in the TSC were monitored. The SD and Radiation Protection

Director kept TSC staff adequately informed of the TSC's simulated radiation levels. A

radiation protection technician was observed conducting habitability monitoring every 30

minutes after elevated radiation levels were identified.

Two offsite radiation survey teams were activated following the Alert declaration. Their

initial deployment strategy was reasonable. The TSC kept command and control of

these teams until an expanded EOF activation was accomplished at the Site Area

Emergency classification. The TSC then appropriately completed transfer of command

and control of these radiation survey teams to the EOF, monitored the communications

between these teams and the EOF and continued to compare survey data in case a

discrepancy in data was observed.

b.3

Operational Support Center and Emeraency Response Teams

The overall performance by OSC personnel was good. Personnel were professional

and focused on their emergency response. The OSC activation was rapid and efficient.

The facility was fully staffed and operational within 30 minutes after the Alert declaration.

The TSC's staff was promptly notified when OSC personnel were ready to accept

assignments. The inspector noted, however, that plant announcements for the

emergency and facility activations were not heard in the OSC.

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The OSC Director provided good command and control of the facility and personnel.

Facility briefings were periodic and concise. However, some personnelin the facility

were not attentive to the briefings as discussions and phone conversations continued as

the OSC Director and OSC Supervisor provided updates to the staff. Also, it was noted

that when the OSC Supervisor and RP Director spoke during some of the initial facility

briefings, some information could not be heard in all locations of the OSC.

Status boards were continuously maintained and included indication of the TSC's priority

assigned to the plant response teams. Team personnel's information was effectively _

transferred from the OSC Staffing board to the Team Tracking Status Board which

provided a good means of tracking personnel availability. The teams' deployment times

and results were promptly communicated to TSC staff. One ad hoc flip chart was used

to track emergency events. The Station Priority Log was available and used in the

OSC. The Station Priority Log's wall projected information was not focused tightly and

. was difficult to read from certain locations in the facility; the screen saver activated

periodically, resulting in a black screen.

Personnel selected for response teams were adequately briefed prior to dispatch.

During the emergency hatch repair team briefing, team members were checked to verify

whether they were qualified to use respirators. The Security Guard appropriately

identified that he was not qualified to wear a respirator. Respiratory protection

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equipment requirements were later removed for the emergency hatch leak repair team

when dose estimates were performed. The requirement for full protective clothing was

retained.

OSC habitability monitoring, which included dose rates, contamination, and airborne

surveys, was periodically performed. A step off pad was conservatively set up at the

OSC entrance in the event of an unmonitored radiological release. Later in the

- exercise, participants appropriately determined whether issuance of potassium lodide to

environmental teams and an OSC response team was warranted.

- The inspector accompanied two OSC response teams. A plant survey team was

requested to survey the Turbine Building after the General Emergency was declared.

The radiation protection technician (RPT) accompanying the team was professional,

demonstrated effective radiation practices, and demonstrated appropriate exercise

drilismanship.

The unit one emergency hatch inspection / repair teams requested dispatch from the

OSC was delayed more than one hour and 27 minutes while the licensee evaluated the

emergency conditions and the team prepared to respond. A radiological release to the

environment was thought to be from a leaking emergency hatch on unit one

containment. An " urgent" priority team was requested at approximately 11:37 a.m. to

inspect and later, at 12:30 p.m., to repair the suspected leaking emergency hatch. At

1:04 p.m., the exercise objectives had been met, the exercise was terminated, and the

emergency hatch repair team was not yet fully prepared for dispatch. The licensee's

evaluation of the process to request, prepare, brief, and dispatch " urgent" OSC

response teams will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (IFl 50-454/99015-01;

455/99015-01).

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~ b.4 E Emeroency Ooerations Facility

Overall performance of the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff was excellent.-

The facility was efficiently activated and assigned personnel performed their duties

. effectively throughout the exercise?

Procedures and associated checklists were observed to be extensively used.- Status

~ boards were generally well maintained, with few exceptions. Periodic and as-needed

- briefings kept the EOF staff aware of current status and concems. Tumover of

command and control from the TSC was smoothly accomplished.' Availability of a -

- former Byron SRO appeared to significantly enhance familiarity with sation equipment.

Event classifications were accurate and timely. A list of events or parameter changes

. which would lead to a higher level classification were posted on a status board.

Parameters which would lead to classification changes were trended. Notification forms

were quickly generated when classifications changed, and communicated to offsite

authorities within required timeframes.

Protective action recommendations were developed per the applicable procedure and

promptly communicated to state of Illinois authorities. Periodic communication between

the Manager of Emergency Operations and Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

officials effectively kept offsite authorities aware of plant status and event mitigation

activities. The EOF staff was aware of protective actions implemented by the State of

lilinois. Minor errors made in several Illinois Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS)

forms were quickly detected and corrected by verbal communication or re-issuance of

the NARS form.

The Protective Measures staff performed well, utilizing available information to make

decisions on dose extensions and issuance of potassium iodide. Communication

problems with one environs team developed immediately after the decision to issue

potassium iodide. Environs team communicators coped well with this problem,

requesting the other environs team to communicate with the team which was out of

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communication, or search for and directly communicate with the other team.

Priorities for response activities were well tracked by the " Station Priorities Log", and

events were tracked by the "Significant Events" electronic system.

b.5

Scenario and Exercise Control

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The exercise scenario was very challenging and exercised the majority of the licensee's

emergency response capabilities.

The inspectors identified no significant controller performance concems related to the

plant response teams that were evaluated. Controllers ensured that team members

asked appropriate questions before providing them with information sought, such as

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current radiological conditions. Simulation for obtaining parts from stores was noted by

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the inspectors.

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The control room ventilation system was not initially aligned for operation in the make-up

mode (which would have been normal with the diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump in

operation) by the drill controllers prior to starting the exercise. Operators promptly

recognized this in the simulator, and properly aligned the control room ventilation

system.

b.6

Licensee Critiaues

The inspectors attended the licensee's self-critiques in the SCR, TSC, OSC, and EOF

which occurred immediately after the exercise. Exercise controllers solicited verbal and

written inputs from the participants in addition to providing the participants with the

controllers' initial assessments of personnel performance. The inspectors concluded

that these initial self-critiques were thorough and in close agreement with the majority of

the inspectors' observations.

c.

Summary of Conclusions

Evaluation of the license's exercise performance was as follows:

Overall licensee performance during the 1999 exercise was very good.

Performance of shift personnel in the Simulator Control Room was effective.

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The Technical Support Center staff's performance was excellent.

Overall performance of OSC management and staff was good.

Performance in the Emergency Operations Facility was excellent.

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The participants and controllers initial critique following termination of the

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exercise was self critical and detailed. The critiques included inputs from

controllers and exercise participants. Licensee critique findings were consistent

with the NRC evaluation team's findings.

P8

Miscellaneous EP lasues

P8.1

(Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-263/97016-01: Exercise Weakness: During

the 1997 exercise, personnel in the simulator control room did not classify the initial

events properly (an Alert was classified as an Unusual Event). During the current

exercise, the shift manager correctly classified events at the Unusual Event and Alert

levels in a timely manner. Event notification message forms and verbal notifications to

the State and the NRC were completed properly. This itern is closed.

P8.2 (Closed) Insoection Followuo item No. 50-263/97016-02: Exercise Weakness: During

the 1997 exercise, the Acting Station Director failed to utilize the Acting Station Director

procedure and checklist. During the current exercise, the procedure and checklist were

appropriately utilized. This item is closed.

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V. Manaaement Meetinas

X.1

Exit Meetina Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the

conclusion of the inspection on August 26,1999. The inspection team leader stated that overall

exercise performance was very good, a single Inspection Followup Item had been identified,

and the licensee critiques were effective. The licensee acknowledged the preliminary findings

presented. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the

inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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Licensee

- B. Adams, Regulatory Assurance Manager

T. Burns, Emergency Planner ,

R. Colglazier, NRC Coordinator

D, Drawbaugh, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

M. Jurmain, Maintenance Manager

B. Kouba, Engineering Manager -

'J. Kramer, Work Control Manager

R. Karthelser, Communicatoins

S. Kuczynski, Nuclear Oversight Manager -

W. Levis, Site Vice President

R. Lopriore, Station Manager

W. McNeill, Radiation Protection Manager

S. Merrell, Assistant Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

M. Snow, Operations Manager

D. Stobaugh, Coordinator

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P. Sunderland, Lead Scenario Developer

M. Vonk, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager

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E. Cobey, Senior Resident inspector

B. Kemker, Resident inspector

Illinois Deos,b.e ,t of Nuclear Safety

C. Thompson, Resident Engineer

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 82301

Evaluation of Exercises for Power Reactors

IP 82302

Review of Exercise Objectives and Scenarios for Power Reactors

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

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Opened

50-454/455/99015-01

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Difficulty in dispatching " urgent" inplant team.

ClQfed

.50-454/455/97016-02

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Exercise Weakness: Failure to classify properly during the

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1997 evaluated exercise.

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' 50-454/455/97016-01

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Exercise Weakness: Failure to utilize the Acting Station

Director procedure and checklist.

Discussed

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None.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

DRP

Division of Reactor Projects

- DRS

Division of Reactor Safety

EAL.

Emergency Action Level

ED

Emergency Director.

EM

Emergency Manager

EOF

Emergency Operations Facility

EOP

Emergency Operating Procedure -

EP

Emergency Preparedness

FEMA

Federal Emergency Management Agency

IFl

inspection Follow up Item

Kl

Potassium lodide

NARS

lilinois Nuclear Accident Reporting System

NPF

' Nuclear Power Facility

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NRR

Office of Nuclear Reactor. Regulation

NUE.

Notification of Unusual Event

OSC-

Operational Support Center -

PA

Public Address

- PAR

Protective Action Recommendation

PDR

NRC Public Document Room

PRR

Public Reading Room

RPT

Radiation Protection Technician

SCR

Simulator Control Room

SD

Station Director

SRI '

Senior Resident inspector

TSC

. Technical Support Center

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