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UNITED STATES i
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMEN 0 MENT NO. 22 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-38 LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY l
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 DOCKET N0. 50-382
 
==1.0 INTRODUCTION==
By application dated March 26, 1987, as supplemented by {{letter dated|date=May 8, 1987|text=letter dated May 8, 1987}}, Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License No. NPF-38) for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.
The proposed changes would add operability and surveillance requirements for the existing Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray system.
: 2. 0 DISCUSSION
{
l The Waterford 3 reactor coolant system (RCS) is designed without power operated relief valves (PORVs) on the pressurizer.
The auxiliary pressurizer spray system (APSS) has been credited as the safety-related I
means of RCS depressurization during mitigation of a postulated steam generator tube rupture accident and during depressurization to cold shutdown in compliance with the Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.
The acceptability of this system design has been documented in the Waterford 3 FSAR and NUREG-1044, " Evaluation of the Need for a Rapid Depressurization capability for Combustion Engineering Plant."
In a {{letter dated|date=June 29, 1983|text=letter dated June 29, 1983}}, the licensee identified a potential single failure vulnerability associated with the charging loop isolation
)
valves, which, when closed, divert charging flow to the APSS. Of concern was the potential for one of the isolation valves to fail to close on demand, thus reducing the amount of charging flow to the APS and a subsequent reduction in RCS depressurization rate. As a result, the Waterford 3 operating license was conditioned to require performance of a test to demonstrate adequate APS depressurization capability with an open charging loop isolation valve.
870824010e 870812 PDR ADOCK 05000382 P
PDR i
 
' Since the APSS in the Waterford 3 serves the above-stated safety-related
)
functions, the stHf requested, during its review of the plant technical
{
specifications CS) prior 6 issuance of an operating license, that the Waterford TS should include appropriate LCOs and the surveillance requirements on the AP3S in response to the staff % request, the licensee connitted, in in: {{letter dated|date=May 29, 1984|text=letter dated May 29, 1984}}, to develop a TS on the Ar.is, should the Ac3S be proven necessary to satisfy the steam generator tube rupture criteria.
3.0 EJALUATION By a {{letter dated|date=June 13, 1985|text=letter dated June 13, 1985}}, the licensee provided the results of the required test which demonstrated that the APSS provided an adequate depressurization rate assuming a single failure of the charging loop isolation valve.
In a NRC {{letter dated|date=April 22, 1986|text=letter dated April 22, 1986}}, the staff concluded that license condition 2.C.12 has been satisfied i
and that the APSS could satisfy its design safety function.
However, in letters dated June 20, 1986 and March 20, 1987, the licensee indicated that LP&L did not intend to develop a TS for the APSS.
The staff found this to be unacceptable because it failed to fulfill the licensee's commitment.
Following discussions with the staff, LP&L in its {{letter dated|date=March 26, 1987|text=letter dated March 26, 1987}} proposed changes of technical specifications to include LC0 and surveillance requirements for the APSS.
In response to staff comments on the proposed TS regarding the time period which allows one train of APSS out of service, the licensee, in a {{letter dated|date=May 8, 1987|text=letter dated May 8,1987}} submitted its finalized TS on APSS.
The proposed changes to Section 3/4.4.3 require both auxiliary spray valves operable during Modes 1, 2, and 3.
The action statements are:
: 1) with only one of the above required auxiliary spray valves operable, restore both valves to operable status within 30 days or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours and.in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours; and 2) with none of the above required auxiliary spray valves operable, restore at least one valve to operable status within the next 6 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours.
The proposed TS also requires the verification of the power available to each APS valve every 24 hours and that the APS valves are cycled at least once per 18 months.
The APSS in Waterford Unit 3 is designed to perform the safety-related function of RCS depressurization during a postulated steam generater tube rupture accident and during plant cool shutdown per the Branch j
Technical Position RSB 5-1.
The licensee's proposed changes to j
Section 3/4.4.3 provide reasonable assurance that the APSS would be available to serve its design function when called upon. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to Section 3/4.4.3 as j
documented in LP&L letters dated March 26 and May 8,1987 are acceptable.
j i
I
 
4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL The NRC staff has advised the Administrator, Nuclear Energy Division, Office of Environmental Affairs, State of Louisiana of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration.
No comments were received.
 
==5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION==
The amendment relates to changes in installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
 
==6.0 CONCLUSION==
based upon its evaluation of the proposed changes to the Waterford 3 Technical Specifications, the staff has concluded that:
there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
The staff, therefore, concludes that the proposed changes are acceptable, and are hereby incorporated into the Waterford 3 Technical Specifications.
Dated: August 12, 1987.
Principal Contributor:
C. Liang
____}}

Latest revision as of 19:50, 22 May 2025

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 22 to License NPF-38
ML20237G504
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/1987
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20237G501 List:
References
NUDOCS 8708240108
Download: ML20237G504 (3)


Text

.

?

e nsu o

UNITED STATES i

g I

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o

E WASHING TON, D. C. 20655

%.....)

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMEN 0 MENT NO. 22 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-38 LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY l

WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 DOCKET N0. 50-382

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated March 26, 1987, as supplemented by letter dated May 8, 1987, Louisiana Power and Light Company (LP&L or the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Facility Operating License No. NPF-38) for Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3.

The proposed changes would add operability and surveillance requirements for the existing Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray system.

2. 0 DISCUSSION

{

l The Waterford 3 reactor coolant system (RCS) is designed without power operated relief valves (PORVs) on the pressurizer.

The auxiliary pressurizer spray system (APSS) has been credited as the safety-related I

means of RCS depressurization during mitigation of a postulated steam generator tube rupture accident and during depressurization to cold shutdown in compliance with the Branch Technical Position RSB 5-1.

The acceptability of this system design has been documented in the Waterford 3 FSAR and NUREG-1044, " Evaluation of the Need for a Rapid Depressurization capability for Combustion Engineering Plant."

In a letter dated June 29, 1983, the licensee identified a potential single failure vulnerability associated with the charging loop isolation

)

valves, which, when closed, divert charging flow to the APSS. Of concern was the potential for one of the isolation valves to fail to close on demand, thus reducing the amount of charging flow to the APS and a subsequent reduction in RCS depressurization rate. As a result, the Waterford 3 operating license was conditioned to require performance of a test to demonstrate adequate APS depressurization capability with an open charging loop isolation valve.

870824010e 870812 PDR ADOCK 05000382 P

PDR i

' Since the APSS in the Waterford 3 serves the above-stated safety-related

)

functions, the stHf requested, during its review of the plant technical

{

specifications CS) prior 6 issuance of an operating license, that the Waterford TS should include appropriate LCOs and the surveillance requirements on the AP3S in response to the staff % request, the licensee connitted, in in: letter dated May 29, 1984, to develop a TS on the Ar.is, should the Ac3S be proven necessary to satisfy the steam generator tube rupture criteria.

3.0 EJALUATION By a letter dated June 13, 1985, the licensee provided the results of the required test which demonstrated that the APSS provided an adequate depressurization rate assuming a single failure of the charging loop isolation valve.

In a NRC letter dated April 22, 1986, the staff concluded that license condition 2.C.12 has been satisfied i

and that the APSS could satisfy its design safety function.

However, in letters dated June 20, 1986 and March 20, 1987, the licensee indicated that LP&L did not intend to develop a TS for the APSS.

The staff found this to be unacceptable because it failed to fulfill the licensee's commitment.

Following discussions with the staff, LP&L in its letter dated March 26, 1987 proposed changes of technical specifications to include LC0 and surveillance requirements for the APSS.

In response to staff comments on the proposed TS regarding the time period which allows one train of APSS out of service, the licensee, in a letter dated May 8,1987 submitted its finalized TS on APSS.

The proposed changes to Section 3/4.4.3 require both auxiliary spray valves operable during Modes 1, 2, and 3.

The action statements are:

1) with only one of the above required auxiliary spray valves operable, restore both valves to operable status within 30 days or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and.in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; and 2) with none of the above required auxiliary spray valves operable, restore at least one valve to operable status within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

The proposed TS also requires the verification of the power available to each APS valve every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and that the APS valves are cycled at least once per 18 months.

The APSS in Waterford Unit 3 is designed to perform the safety-related function of RCS depressurization during a postulated steam generater tube rupture accident and during plant cool shutdown per the Branch j

Technical Position RSB 5-1.

The licensee's proposed changes to j

Section 3/4.4.3 provide reasonable assurance that the APSS would be available to serve its design function when called upon. Therefore, the staff concludes that the proposed changes to Section 3/4.4.3 as j

documented in LP&L letters dated March 26 and May 8,1987 are acceptable.

j i

I

4.0 CONTACT WITH STATE OFFICIAL The NRC staff has advised the Administrator, Nuclear Energy Division, Office of Environmental Affairs, State of Louisiana of the proposed determination of no significant hazards consideration.

No comments were received.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment relates to changes in installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area.

The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

based upon its evaluation of the proposed changes to the Waterford 3 Technical Specifications, the staff has concluded that:

there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

The staff, therefore, concludes that the proposed changes are acceptable, and are hereby incorporated into the Waterford 3 Technical Specifications.

Dated: August 12, 1987.

Principal Contributor:

C. Liang

____