ENS 49292: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 08/20/2013 11:15 CDT | | event date = 08/20/2013 11:15 CDT | ||
| last update date = 08/22/2013 | | last update date = 08/22/2013 | ||
| title = 24 Hour Report Related | | title = 24 Hour Report Related to Criticality Control Bulletin 91-01 | ||
| event text = The Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP) is excavating burial pits containing enriched uranium. HDP has established criticality safety controls to ensure the safe handling of the buried waste as it is excavated. These controls involve redundant surveys and visual inspections at the time of excavation. These controls failed to identify an item upon excavation that was 400,000 ncpm [net counts per minute] on contact and had dimensions of 6 inches or greater. Instead, the item was identified and placed in criticality safety controls (collared drum) after it had reached the Waste Holding Area. | | event text = The Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP) is excavating burial pits containing enriched uranium. HDP has established criticality safety controls to ensure the safe handling of the buried waste as it is excavated. These controls involve redundant surveys and visual inspections at the time of excavation. These controls failed to identify an item upon excavation that was 400,000 ncpm [net counts per minute] on contact and had dimensions of 6 inches or greater. Instead, the item was identified and placed in criticality safety controls (collared drum) after it had reached the Waste Holding Area. | ||
The item appeared to be a crushed container, estimated at 10 gal. in original size, and had contents primarily consisting of gloves and plastic. After the contents were removed, the empty container was confirmed to have only contamination that was below the threshold of criticality safety controls. The detailed assay of the contents was 22 g of U-235, which does require criticality safety controls. | The item appeared to be a crushed container, estimated at 10 gal. in original size, and had contents primarily consisting of gloves and plastic. After the contents were removed, the empty container was confirmed to have only contamination that was below the threshold of criticality safety controls. The detailed assay of the contents was 22 g of U-235, which does require criticality safety controls. | ||
Revision as of 22:00, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
| Westinghouse Hematite Hematite, Missouri (NRC Region 3) | |
| License number: | Snm-33 |
| Reporting | |
| Response | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.68 h0.07 days <br />0.01 weeks <br />0.0023 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Kevin Davis 17:56 Aug 20, 2013 |
| NRC Officer: | Howie Crouch |
| Last Updated: | Aug 22, 2013 |
| 49292 - NRC Website | |