ENS 49292
ENS Event | |
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16:15 Aug 20, 2013 | |
Title | 24 Hour Report Related to Criticality Control Bulletin 91-01 |
Event Description | The Hematite Decommissioning Project (HDP) is excavating burial pits containing enriched uranium. HDP has established criticality safety controls to ensure the safe handling of the buried waste as it is excavated. These controls involve redundant surveys and visual inspections at the time of excavation. These controls failed to identify an item upon excavation that was 400,000 ncpm [net counts per minute] on contact and had dimensions of 6 inches or greater. Instead, the item was identified and placed in criticality safety controls (collared drum) after it had reached the Waste Holding Area.
The item appeared to be a crushed container, estimated at 10 gal. in original size, and had contents primarily consisting of gloves and plastic. After the contents were removed, the empty container was confirmed to have only contamination that was below the threshold of criticality safety controls. The detailed assay of the contents was 22 g of U-235, which does require criticality safety controls. Work in the burial pit areas was stopped pending retraining of those workers on the requirements and criticality safety controls regarding survey and visual inspection during excavation. Excavated burial pit area waste that has not reached the Waste Holding Area will be resurveyed and inspected prior to proceeding to the Waste Holding Area. The licensee notified NRC R3 (Tapp).
[HDP's] controls failed to identify and control an item upon excavation that was 100,000 ncpm on contact had dimension 6 inches or greater. Instead, the item was identified to require and be placed in criticality safety controls (collared drum) after it had been counted at the Material Assay Area. The item appeared to be the mangled remnant of a container. There were no contents, but there was soil-like material adhering to the surfaces. The soil-like material was separated from the remnant for detailed assay. Detailed assay identified the remnant contained 3 g of U-235 and the soil like material contained 21 g of U-235, which requires criticality safety controls. Work in the burial pit areas was stopped pending retraining of those workers on the requirements and criticality safety controls regarding survey and visual inspection during excavation, and pending development of additional engineered measures. In addition, shipment of railcars has been suspended pending additional evaluation. Excavated burial pit area waste that has not reached the Waste Holding Area will be resurveyed and inspected prior to proceeding to the Waste Holding Area. The licensee notified the NRC R3. Notified R3DO (Kozak) and NMSS (Hsia). |
Where | |
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Westinghouse Hematite Hematite, Missouri (NRC Region 3) | |
License number: | SNM-33 |
Reporting | |
Response | |
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.68 h0.07 days <br />0.01 weeks <br />0.0023 months <br />) | |
Opened: | Kevin Davis 17:56 Aug 20, 2013 |
NRC Officer: | Howie Crouch |
Last Updated: | Aug 22, 2013 |
49292 - NRC Website | |
Westinghouse Hematite with Response | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 492922013-08-20T16:15:00020 August 2013 16:15:00
[Table view]Response 24 Hour Report Related to Criticality Control Bulletin 91-01 ENS 480992012-07-12T17:00:00012 July 2012 17:00:00 Response 24 Hour Report Related to Criticality Control Bulletin 91-01 ENS 419232005-01-07T20:00:0007 January 2005 20:00:00 Response Bulletin 91-01 Report on Failure to Follow Criticality Controls 2013-08-20T16:15:00 | |